THE AMERICAN POLITICAL SCIENCE





Culc- 402788-55-0293425

The "Intensity" Problem and Democratic Theory Willmoore Kendall and George W. Carey	. 5
A Theory of the Calculus of Voting William H. Riker and Peter C. Ordeshook	25
On the Fluidity of Judicial Choice J. Woodford Howard, Jr.	43
A Functional Analysis of Defense Department Decision- Making in the McNamara Administration Paul Y. Hammond	57
The Structure of Political Conflict in the New States of Tropical Africa	
Aristide R. Zolberg Majority vs. Opposition in the French National Assem-	70
bly, 1956-1965: A Guttman Scale Analysis David M. Wood	88
Communism and Economic Development Roger W. Benjamin and John H. Kautsky	110
Policy Maps of City Councils and Policy Outcomes: A Developmental Analysis	40.
Heinz Eulau and Robert Eyestone The Institutionalization of the U.S. House of Repre-	124
sentatives . Nelson W. Polsby The Transmission of Political Values from Parent to	144
Child M. Kent Jennings and Richard G. Niemi	169
Bibliographical Essay	
Comparing Communist Nations: Prospects for an Empirical Approach	
Paul Shoup Research Notes	185
A Theorem about Voting	
Thomas W. Cassterens A Measure of the Population Quality of Legislative Ap-	205
portionment Henry F. Kaiser	208
Image of a President: Some Insights into the Political Views of School Children	2.00
Roberta S. Sigel Communications to the Editor	216 227
	LLI
Book Reviews and Notes James W. Prothro (ed.)	233
Announcements	316

VOL. LXII MARCH, 1968 NO. 1

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391

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VOL. 62 NOS. 1-6.

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THE AMERICAN POLITICAL SCIENCE REVIEW, published quarterly during the months of March, June September, and December, is supplied to all APSA members. Individual and institutional memberships are \$15.00 a year (\$6.00 for graduate and undergraduate students). Foreign currency at the official exchange rate will be accepted for foreign subscriptions and foreign membership fees. The equivalent of \$1 for additional postage should be added for foreign subscriptions.

Current issues are priced at \$3.75 per copy; for back issues address Johnson Reprint Corp., 111 5th Ave., New York, N.Y. 10003.

Applications for membership, orders for the Review, and remittances should be addressed to the Executive Director, The American Political Science Association, 1527 New Hampshire Ave., N.W., Washington, D.C. 20036. Notices of change of address should be received in the Washington office by the 25th day of the month before publication.

Address correspondence about contributions to the Review to Austin Ranney, North Hall, University of Wisconsin, Madison, Wis. 53706. All manuscripts should be submitted IN DUPLICATE. They should be double-spaced and may be in typed, mimeographed, hectographed, or other legible form. Footnotes should appear at the end of the manuscript, not at the bottom of the page.

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Articles and notes appearing in the Review before the June, 1953 issue were indexed in *The Reader's Guide to Periodical Literature*. The International Political Science Abstracts and the International Index to Periodicals index current issues. Microfilm of the Review, beginning with Volume 46, may be obtained from University Microfilms. 313 North First Street, Ann Arbor, Michigan. A Cumulative Index of the Review, Volumes 1-57: 1906-1963, may be obtained from Northwestern University Press, 1735 Benson, Evanston, Illinois.

Office of publication: Curtis Reed Plaza, Menasha, Wisconsin.

Foreign Agent: P. S. King and Staples, Ltd., Great Smith Street, Westminster, London.

Second class postage paid at Menasha, Wisconsin. Acceptance for mailing at special rate of postage provided for in Section 1103, Act of October 3, 1917, authorized May 12, 1926.

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The American Political Science Review

VOL. LXII

MARCH, 1968

NO. 1

THE "INTENSITY" PROBLEM AND DEMOCRATIC THEORY*

WILLMOORE KENDALL
University of Dallas

GEORGE W. CAREY Georgetown University

Dinner is over. Mr. and Mrs. Jones and Mr. and Mrs. Smith are having coffee. The question arises: What shall we do this evening? Play bridge? Go to the movies? Listen to some chamber music from the local FM station? Sit and chat? Each, in due course, expresses a "preference" among these four alternatives but with this difference: Mr. and Mrs. Jones and Mrs. Smith, though each has a preference, "don't much care." Their preferences are "mild" or "marginal." Not so Mr. Smith. His preference is "strong." He is tired, couldn't possibly get his mind on bridge, or muster the energies for going out to a movie. He has listened to chamber music all afternoon while working on an architectural problem, and couldn't bear any more. If the group does anything other than sit and chat, he at least will do it grudgingly. He "cares enormously" which alternative is chosen.

Now: which is the "correct" choice among the four alternatives? Which, "distributive justice" to one side, is the choice most likely to preserve good relations among the members of the group? Some theorists, it would seem, find these two questions easy to answer. Mr. Smith ought to have his way, and good relations are likely to be endangered if he does not; and these answers are equally valid whether the other three all prefer the same thing or prefer

* Editor's note: After this article had been accepted for publication, Willmoore Kendall died in June, 1967. I am grateful to his co-author, Professor Carey, for having assumed the entire burden of preparing this final draft. As Professor Kendall's friend and sometime collaborator, I am proud that his last published scholarly article should appear in this Review.

different things. Since, for the latter, the choice is a matter of indifference, it is both "more fair" and "more expedient" (less likely to lead to a quarrel) for the group to do what Mr. Smith prefers to do.

To another but highly related point. At the Philadelphia Convention, some of the delegates drew a distinction between "temporary" or "snap" or "frivolous" majorities on the one hand, and what we may call "serious" or "deliberate" majorities on the other. The Convention in consequence, wrote into the new Constitution severe limitations upon temporary majorities, and left the path to the statutebook open only to serious, deliberate majorities -that is, majorities able to keep themselves in being long enough to gain control of both houses of Congress, of the Presidency, and of the Supreme Court. Why penalize the frivolous majorities? One possible answer seems to be this: Frivolous majorities will, in due course, prove to have been more or less indifferent on the policy-issue being decided because they will not remain in being long enough to gain mastery of the constitutional machinery. In other words, they will show, by their subsequent behavior, that they "didn't much care," in contrast to serious majorities which will, because their preferences are "strong," "stick to their guns."

The two situations sketched above, the one posing a problem in "moral" theory the other a problem in "political" theory, have not always been regarded as in pari materia. There is no evidence that the 55 at Philadelphia, though they certainly distinguished between frivolous and deliberate majorities, rested the distinction on the supposed relative strength of the preferences, or the opinions, of the individuals

involved. They did not, on the record at least, go behind the distinction to ask, why does the frivolous majority turn out to be frivolous, while the serious or determined majority does not? But "we," in mid-Twentieth Century America, see at once the comparability, nay the identity, between the two situations. Because our "democratic theory" is more sophisticated than theirs, we readily bring the two situations together as illustrations of the "problem of intensity": Mr. Smith's "preference," being more "intense" than that of the others, should "weigh" more than theirs. Frivolous majorities, because they reflect "preferences" that are not "intense," must bide their time in favor of majorities that reflect "preferences" that are "intense."

What we fashionably call the "problem of intensity" is a problem for democratic theory. We today are indeed more sophisticated about it, as a matter of explicit theory, than the Framers seem to have been. But that does not necessarily mean we have a more sophisticated solution of the problem than theirs. It may be we have greater sophistication. The Framers, however, may have had the better answers. One purpose of this article is to investigate that possibility.

It would be difficult to say when the phrase "the problem of intensity" first began to be heard in the land. But we can say when, and in what book, it appears first to have been hauled out into the open and made the topic of a selfconscious venture in theoretization.2 And we may safely add that it is a problem that had to arise, in due course, once people had begun to speak pejoratively of "apathetic" majorities, and to question the validity, or legitimacy, of the latter's claim to act for the entire electorate. For from the concept of the "apathetic" majority it is a brief step to the concept of the "non-apathetic," that is, "intense" majority, and the idea that "intensity" is the dimension in which to measure the difference between the apathetic majority and the majority that is not apathetic. Concretely, the "intensity" problem, as we know it, arises out of analysis of a "special case" under the theory of majority-rule, or "populistic" democracy. This theory assumes, as Professor Dahl put it, that decisions should be made according to "The Rule," or, as one of the present writers put it many years ago, the "majority principle," the principle that the majority should "have its way."

Now: the Rule does not, in its pure form. make qualitative distinctions among members of the group. For purposes of constituting the majority that is to have its way, all are equal to every other one. Each in voting gives his consent to the proposed decision, which only he can give or withhold and which, for that reason and because consent is the only possible basis for right, for legitimacy, must be counted equally with everybody else's consent. Translated into the more sophisticated language of the recent literature, the Rule becomes: The decision-making group adopts the decision that is "preferred by most members," each member deciding for himself what he prefers. and each expression of preference being counted as of equal "weight" with every other. What is being weighed are preferences, and votetaking is the scale on which they are weighed. So matters stood in majority-rule theory for a long while—until, we repeat, doubts began to arise in some minds about decisions backed up not by a majority tout court but by an "apathetic" majority. Again translating into the more sophisticated language of the recent literature, an apathetic majority is a majority made up to a greater or lesser extent of persons who indeed "prefer" the proposed decision, but do not prefer it "strongly." And the question arises: If what we are weighing is preferences, does it make sense to let a "weak" preference count equally with a strong one. Perhaps the Rule should speak not of the decision "preferred by most members," but of the decision "most preferred by members," which, clearly, is not necessarily the same thing. And, once that possibility is conceded, a number of further questions unavoidably arise: Is there a way of "telling," at the moment the vote is taken, which members have "strong" or "intense" preferences, and which "weak" or "apathetic" preferences? If there is, can we go further and somehow distinguish between "stronger" preferences and "less strong" preferences? Can we, that is to say, "weigh" preferences at all? And if the answer to both questions is "Yes," does it become incumbent upon us to devise the electoral machinery of the future populistic democracy, assuming we can do so, in such fashion as to make sure that the policy alternative shall prevail which is "most preferred?" What then happens to the "political equality" that is the point of departure of the theory of populistic democracy? Are citizens to be made "less than equal" just because the issue being voted on is one on which they do not happen to feel strongly? More, though here we venture perhaps into less familiar territory: If political equality is to be compromised to take into account differences in intensity, are theremight there be-other differences of which the electoral machinery should take account? Should differences in knowledge (a strong preference, after all, might be based on ignorance, while an equally strong preference may be based on sound knowledge) also be considered? What about differences in probity? An individual's strong preference for a given measure might-just might-be born of deeply-rooted anti-social tendencies on his part. Should it nevertheless be counted equally with the equally strong preference of the man motivated by thoughts of the general welfare? Is it true that a system that does not take intensity into account is probably headed for trouble? And, per contra, would a system that does take intensity into account generate problems peculiar to itself? All of these, clearly, are questions that are inescapable, and they are, demonstrably, questions that lead us to the very heart of political theory as it is generally understood in our democratic age. More: they point, in our opinion, to new and potentially fruitful areas of inquiry, the exploitation of which would broaden and deepen our understanding of democratic institutions and precedures.

In the hope, first of all, of clarifying the problem on which these questions touch, we shall: (1) try to show that the "intensity" problem is all too easily and frequently confused with certain other problems to which it bears a superficial cousinly resemblance, but which are, in fact, unrelated to it and, simultaneously, endeavor to show what the problem, once correctly formulated, does and does not involve; (2) put forward and defend the thesis that differences in "intensity" do indeed pose certain problems, problems as to the relation between majority and minority in the self-governing political community, of which the political theory of such a community must take account and in so doing, attempt to evaluate the effort. on the part of previous theorists, to deal with those problems; (3) raise and attempt to answer, again with an eye to the democratic theory of the past, the question: Can we conceive of a political system that, while remaining faithful to the axioms of populistic democracy, would "measure" and take into account differences of intensity? Or to put it otherwise: What minimum requirements would such a system have to meet; and (4) with the foregoing in mind, venture to suggest certain standards or criteria, by which we can assess the "performance" of this or that political system over against the problem of intensity.

I. THE NATURE OF THE "INTENSITY" PROBLEM

The problem of intensity as we know it has. as noted above, arisen as a special problem in the theory of populistic democracy. It is not, however, peculiar to that theory. Any theoretical answer to the question "How is the selfgoverning community to govern itself?" must, soon or late, make a decision as to the extent to which policies are to reflect the individual preferences of members of the community, and as to whether, in order to be reflected accurately, those preferences are (as we have now learned to state it) to be merely counted, or both counted and weighed. Moreover, any answer to the question, "How is a non-democratic political system to be viable?" can ignore differences in the intensity of individual preferences at its peril. (A Stalin, and even more certainly a de Gaulle, well knows that the stability of his regime requires him, first, to see that not too many individuals out among the governed become too disaffected, and, second, to see that enough individuals out among the governed view his policies with a degree of approval well above the "average.") The intensity problem, then, emerges as a universal problem of politics. To put the same point a little differently: Although we are accustomed to hear of the intensity problem from writers who speak out of a concern for "individual rights," "the rights of the minority," the "prerequisites" of democracy, etc., we must not conclude that the problem arises exclusively out of those concerns, or that it is exhausted once those concerns are taken care of. Put otherwise again: The question "Should there be limitations on the powers of the minority in a democratic political system?" is by no means congruent with the question, "Should a democratic political system take into account differences in the intensity of individual preferences?" The

⁵ For the most part we will discuss the problem in the context of the populistic model of democracy. However, most of what we have to say is also applicable to other "models" of democracy.

first of these questions does, to be sure, readily translate itself into the second in certain circumstances. For example, where existing limitations on the power of the majority themselves become, at a given moment, an "inportant" political issue; or where, again for example, the legitimacy or meaning of this or that claim to "individual rights" or "minority rights" is in dispute, and the attachment or non-attachment of individuals out in the community to those rights is put to the test. Clearly, however, there is a wide range of political issues, about which the self-governing community must make decisions, that have nothing to do either with rights or with limitations on the power of the majority and that, nevertheless, pose the dilemma: "Are we merely to count preferences, or weigh them?"

Another point is this: it must be clearly understood that the intensity problem is not and cannot be exhausted by focusing attention. as theorists have shown a marked tendency to do, on the "extreme case," namely, the "apathetic majority" versus the "intense minority" and then proceeding to show that in such a case the minority must, whether for "ethica." or prudential reasons, be given its way. Far from exhausting the real problem, the "extreme case" merely exposes the Achilles heel of the theorists who have yielded to its fascination, which we may put as follows: Up to a certain point in the argument, everything is simple: One man, one equal vote; in the absence of unanimity, the majority decision is accepted as the decision of the community. Suddenly, hovever, the "extreme case" presents itself, at least as a theoretical possibility that the theorist must not ignore, and he finds himself unwilling to administer to the patient the medicine his prescription calls for. Suddenly, that is to say, merely counting preferences is not good enough, and they must be weighed as well as counted, and weighed in such a manner that the heavier ones tip the scale more than the lighter ones. "The Rule" then gives way to another rule—which, we are told, is called for by considerations alike of fairness and of ϵx pediency. Now: no theorist of the extreme case—such at least is our thesis—has ever faced up to the difficulties that, so to speak, cry up at one out of this sudden transition: How is it to be justified? If it can be justified in the extreme

⁶ See Henry Mayo, Introduction to Democratic Theory (New York: Oxford University Press, 1960). Mayo writes: "It is often objected . . . that to count each person . . . equally is absurd: some people feel more strongly about certain issues than others. Would it not fly in the face of

case, why not in the case somewhat short of the extreme, and if in the latter why not in the case that is not extreme at all—that is, in all cases? The extreme case, to the extent that it is taken into account at all, can only drive home the following theoretical unavoidable truth: The choice between merely counting on the one hand, and weighing on the other hand, is an exhaustive choice, about which you simply can not have it both ways. Having once made his choice between "preferred by most" and "most preferred," the theorist is, so to speak, stuck with it, and must apply his rule to all cases that present themselves. Nor is it any answer here to say. "Ah! we shall devise a system that both counts and weighs preferences" and not merely, or primarily, because no theorist of populistic democracy has yet brought forward any suggestion as to how this might be done (though that is a not uninteresting fact), but rather because the two rules are mutually incompatible. so that to move from the first to second is to repudiate, not merely compromise, the first. In other words, if it were possible to devise a procedure that would simultaneously count preferences and weigh them, that procedure would be outlawed by each of the two rulesor, if you like, by each of the two principles that, respectively, underlie the two rules.

Nor is that all: The argument for the sudden switch from counting to weighing, or from counting to some combination of counting and weighing, owes much of its plausibility, we believe, to a tacit assumption on the part of some that intensity is a "discrete" not a "continuous" variable; that is, more precisely, an intensity curve may be neatly chopped up into sections, which may be labelled "low,"

common sense and elemental fair play to argue that 50% plus one of the lukewarm should overrule 50 percent minus one consisting of passionate dissenters? In such artificial terms the answer is yes" (p. 178). Mayo offers no justification for this stance except that such a condition would not arise save possibly in the case of "alienated or permanent" minorities.

Dahl writes: "Even an individual who finds the Rule reasonable in cases where he believes the intensity of desire is about the same among the individuals in the minority and majority might find it intolerable in the type of cases cited above, where x is only slightly preferred by a bare majority and y is very strongly preferred by a bare minority. Indeed, probably no one would advocate the Rule for every situation": op. cit., p. 49. Dahl offers no justification for the switch on ethical grounds but does introduce the value of stability. See our comments below.

"medium," or "high." Perhaps this explains the emphasis in our literature on minorities whose preferences are of "high" intensity, together with the implication that you move from the first rule to the second at the point on the curve that divides "medium" intensity from "high" intensity.7 But this assumption is clearly unwarranted, since there is no such point; for intensity, in the very nature of the case, is a continuous variable which affords no point in particular at which "things become different" in the manner assumed. The moment at which the political system is to shift gears from the first to the second rule cannot, if we start with the assumption that intensity is a continuous variable, be formulated in operationally significant language. (See text below.) Nor can this difficulty be circumvented by shifting attention from the absolute level of intensity of minority or majority preferences over to the ratio or proportion between the intensity of the one and the intensity of the other. In our view, that would make it more difficult to define, in operational terms at least, the point at which to make the transition, since the ratio in question is again a continuous variable, and, on the face of it, more complex in character than the curve that measures absolute intensity.

In speaking of the incompatibility of the two rules, and of the principles underlying them, we have of course been emphasizing the so-called "ethical" aspect of the problem. The conclusion we have reached is that any arguments used to justify weighing instead of counting in the "extreme case" would be equally applicable to any case short of the extreme. But we reach the same result if we forget about "fairness" and attempt to state the case for weighing, or counting and weighing, instead of merely counting, in terms of the "stability" of the political system, and content ourselves with the plea: Let us, in the extreme case, weigh instead of count, because otherwise the system will, like London Bridge, come tumbling down. Here we encounter, to begin with, two baffling "technical" difficulties: First, the "stability" that now becomes the "goal" of the political

⁷ Such a conception of intensity has been fostered by polls which measure direction of opinion (agree-disagree) and also attempt to measure depth by asking the respondent "how much" (i.e., to what extent) he agrees or disagrees—e.g., strongly, mildly, etc. For reasons we will note below it is highly doubtful that such polls measure intensity in terms that are meaningful for a political system designed to handle the intensity problem.

system must, if it is to do useful service as a goal, be given an operationally precise definition, which (a) probably cannot be done, and (b) would, if it were done, merely give rise to further problems. Is "stability" to be equated with the perpetuation of existing formal institutions, structures, and processes, governmental and social? Is it, rather, to be equated with compliance on the part of the governed with the laws and regulations the system produces—that is, with the absence of violent resistance on the part of individuals to policies to which they are opposed? If the former, are we to understand that the political system we seek is, a priori, to exclude "change" except by unanimous agreement? If not that, then we must ask "How much change can the system accommodate and yet be called 'stable'?" If the latter-if, that is, we equate "stability" with the absence of violent resistance—we run hard up against the difficulty that no system can reduce violent resistance to the zero point. So we must again, soon or late, define in operationally significant terms the point on the continuum at which the amount of anticipable violent resistance warrants the shift from counting to weighing. E And, since different persons in any community are certain to place different valuations upon "stability" (as opposed to change) no matter how defined, as also upon the elimination of violent resistance (as opposed to bringing to bear the coercive force necessary to prevent it) no matter how defined; since, moreover, the differing valuations will be projected on differing levels of intensity; we find once again that the answer we have before us raises more problems than, even ideally, it can be said to solve. To all of which we must add this: The "case" for weighing preferences in order to assure "stability," whatever its merits or demerits, is clearly incompatible with the case for weighing preferences in the name of "fairness," save as we are prepared to assume that fairness and stability always come down, in politics, to one and the same thing.

There are, let us notice, several readily discernible difficulties involved in any proposal, brought forward in the name of "stability," for identifying a point on the curve at which a populistic democracy must cease to merely count votes and begin to weigh them because they are intense:

8 This job remains for our present day "behaviorists." Though apparently determined to remain ethically neutral, they are still forced back upon stability or "system persistence" for justification of their enterprises.

a) Suppose, arguendo, that we have identified the "strategic" point on the curve, and have been able to formulate the necessary rule in operationally meaningful terms, so that we can now recognize, with confidence, the set of conditions in which the system must shift gears. Suppose, again arguendo, a series of decisions in which this set of conditions is approached but not quite reached. There would then seem to be no need for the system to shift from counting to weighing. But we are compelled to ask: Would such a system really work? Would stability, no matter how defined, be insured? We can easily imagine the following state of affairs: Individuals with intense preferences just slightly below the point or level at which we are supposed to make the transition from counting to weighing being frequently thwarted or denied by the system. This could well create a very special type of intensity, not related to any specific policy issue before the population, but rather with respect to the very system itself. At this point, of course, the intensity might be of such a degree as to warrant a shifting of gears. But we can also readily imagine at this stage of the process a second group consisting of the highly intense "victors" in the series of decisions that has produced this state of affairs, exhibiting a degree of intensity for the system that would also warrant a shift from counting to weighing. What now? It seems clear to us that by recognizing intensity as a factor to be taken into account, the system, through the cumulative effects of its own operation, might very well paint itself into such a corner. In the last analysis, it has no means to solve this kind of problem.

b) Because, first, the system as envisaged here is an open invitation to minorities to "fake" the symptoms that identify it as a threat to stability; because, second, a significant number of individuals caught up in the system may, in any case, get to feeling intensely on any side of any question; because, third, the system can, since it is by definition indifferent to all ethical considerations except the maintenance of stability, exclude no decision desired by a minority that meets the conditions for shifting gears; and because, fourth, we cannot imagine a population whose rank and file members are themselves so emancipated from ethical considerations as to be willing to elevate stability to the position of a summum bonum (which is what the system calls on them to do)—for all these reasons, we submit, the shift-gears-for-the-sake-of-stability system has a built-in potential for generating an instability all its own. It will, predictably, produce legislation that a (to be sure) greater

or lesser number of voters will deem ethically outrageous, thus intolerable, and thus reason enough for upsetting the applecart. The stability-at-any-price system, on the face of it, emerges as an ingenious machine for the manufacture of the kind of intensity that produces instability. That perhaps helps explain the fact that no democratic theorist has ever actually assigned to stability as such the high "rank," amongst democracy's goods, here in question. (And, we may note in passing, the point we have just made would be equally applicable if the system's founders built in its arrangements for weighing votes not in the name of stability but in the name of fairness. It would still leave intense minorities free to force on it legislation that would produce a countervailing intense minority and, at the margin, a countervailing intense majority.)

Let us now confront the central difficulty in all this: Populistic democracy (or, if you like, the theorists of populistic democracy) cannot take intensity into account. Populistic democracy's bets, unlike those of the traditional political philosophy against which it is in open revolt, are on the notion that a political system can be adjudged good or bad according as authoritative decisions within it emanate from a certain "source" (to use Bertrand de Jouvenel's terminology)—from, concretely, the majority of a voting population made up of political equals, and not some minority. Its bets are on the notion, that is to say, that the majority must get its way. Its (and its theorists') only possible answer to the question, Suppose the majority doesn't much care, while the minority cares "intensely"? is: "So much the worse for the minority. If it feels so strongly about the matter, let it get out and win a majority over to its side." For a theorist of populistic democracy even to flirt with the idea of giving the minority its way is to appeal to "values" (e.g., justice or stability), and this he cannot do because the theory has cut itself off, once and forever, ab initio, from such considerations. The theorist can appeal to these or similar values only at the cost of admitting to himself that he has been wrong all along. In sum: If it is justice we are interested in, or stability, or justice and stability, and not merely equality, then we had best, as constructive founders of a democracy, build from the first moment with those goods in mind. The "intensity" problem, we repeat, merely exposes the Achilles-heel of the whole populistic democracy approach to the problem of how a people is to govern itself, that Achilles-heel being an exclusive concentration, for purposes of evaluating political systems, upon the "source" of decisions rather

than the quality of their "content." It cannot, for the reasons we have been expounding in this section, meet the problem by switching to a new "source" (even if that new source could be justified on its principles, which the intense minority cannot be). It must go back to the beginning, and make a fresh start.

This is not to say that the "intensity problem" is not a real problem for democratic theory, or that any democracy could be viable that failed, in some manner, to take it into account. It is a real problem, but one that populistic democracy cannot solve. Put otherwise: it remains true, as a matter of history, that the intensity problem has arisen as a special problem in the theory of populistic democracy; but it has not, on our showing here, arisen there properly, because populistic democracy has no hooks for grappling with it.

II. THEORETICAL CONSEQUENCES OF DIFFERENCES IN "INTENSITY"

We are not, let us reiterate, denying that there is an "intensity problem" in politics, of which democratic theory, the theory of the self-governing society, certainly must take account. All we are saying, up to this point, is a) that the theory of populistic democracy cannot, on its own basic premise, properly recognize it as a problem; and b) that, even if it could, it cannot, on its own basic premise, conceivably "do" anything about it (i.e., the only "principled" answer it can give to an outvoted "intense" minority in political society is, as indicated above, "So much the worse for you"). To those two points we may now add this one: contemporary democratic theory, because of the parochialism that lies at its very heart, has uncritically committed itself to the assumption that democratic theory and the theory of populistic democracy are one and the same thing—that, if you like, any theory that refuses to accept the populistic-democracy model, at least as a paradigm that all selfgoverning societies must seek to approximate at the earliest possible moment, is ipso facto anti-democratic, or if not that, non-democratic.9 One purpose of the present article, let

⁹ We need hardly document the fact that one of the major preoccupations of many political scientists, since at least the turn of the century, has been advocacy of reforms calculated to bring our institutional fabric more in line with the seeming requirements of populistic principles. Proposals for the reform of Congress, of the party system, and of the electoral college, as also the current reapportionment movement, reflect this.

us confess, is to combat that manifestation of parochialism.

With that in mind, let us approach our topic from another angle: The majority of the enfranchised in the self-governing society, we are told in a now vast corpus of political literature, might use its power to determine the result of an election as a means for writing rules into the statute-book (or even into the Constitution, if there be one), or for implementing policies, which violate the "rights" of "minorities" or of individuals; it might violate this or that allegedly indisputable principle of morality (or, what is equally reprehensible, perpetuate injustices); it might act foolishly, or out of ignorance, or out of momentary passion; and it might, all that entirely apart, ignore potential minority resistance to its legislation or policies and so produce defiance of the law, resistance to governmental action, and, at the margin, civil war. So the question gets itself asked: Is it possible, through the electoral process, to have it both ways, that is, somehow restrain the majority when, for any of the foregoing reasons, it "ought" to be restrained, and yet not challenge its "right" to "control" the government and, through the government, both legislation and policy-making? Much of the theory of the self-governing society handed down to us from the past (i.e., from the days before the advent of the theory of populistic democracy) insists, as is well known, that the correct answer to that question is "Yes, you can have it both ways." Calhoun's "concurrent majority" system, for example, says in effect, "Yes-by giving the minority the power to veto acts of the majority; that is, by letting the minority, any minority it would seem, decide when the majority 'ought' to be restrained."10 Similarly, John Adams' theory of the balanced constitution says in effect: "Yes, by giving the 'natural aristocracy' the power to veto acts of the majority and thus to decide when the majority 'ought' to be restrained."11 Clearly, however, neither succeeds in having it both ways, since neither is in the slightest concerned with the majority's "right" to control the government (though it is always amusing to remember that Calhoun appears to have had no quarrel with that right on the level of state government). Equally clearly, neither seems about to lose any sleep over the distinction between "intense" minorities and minori-

10 A Disquisition on Government. R. K. Cralle (ed.), The Works of John C. Calhoun, Volume 1.

¹¹ Defence of the Constitutions of Government of the United States. Charles Francis Adams (ed.), The Works of John Adams, Volume IV.

ties that are something less than intense, or that between majorities that are "apathetic" and minorities that are something less than apathetic. Alike, Calhoun's veto and Adams' veto could be wielded by a minority only marginally concerned with the issue at stake. J. S. Mill, though he perhaps moves a trifle closer to the theory of populistic democracy, seeks a solution to the problem in an "artificial balance" between "classes." maintained through a system of "plural voting" which, again, reflects an indifference to the "right" of the merely numerical majority to control legislation and policy, and demands of the plural voters only that amount of "intensity" that will call them away from their normal pursuits, whether of foxes or of learning, long enough to cast their "extra" votes.12 Aristotle's polity, looking as it does to a "natural" rather than "artificial" balance, that is, to a situation in which the middle-class is as large as, or larger than, the poor class and the rich class. does depend upon the majority, that is, the middle class, conceived as possessing qualities that will dispose it to restrain itself, and therefore "saves" majority control of the government—though at the expense of any minority veto, and without regard (save as the majority itself may take it into account) to the "intensity" of the minority. (In the absence of such a natural balance, Aristotle is fully prepared to subordinate majority-rule to "justice' and "stability." Here, also, "intensity" figures in his formulations at most by implication, and of course even then only as bearing upor "stability," not "justice".)13

Now: Let us hold all that aside, and do a little thinking of our own. If the majority is to be restrained when it ought to be restrained the power to restrain it must vest either (a) in the majority itself; (b) in some minority; or if that means anything (as we believe it does). (c) in the people as a whole, thought of as acting through what some of us like to call "consensus." Any proposal for lodging the power to restrain in some minority, on the face of it, ends you up with minority dictation. Instead of solving the problem of the self-governing society, it merely sweeps it aside. To paraphrase The Federalist, the self-governing society cannot vest the "last say" in a minority and must never forget that the basic principle of the self-governing society is some form of

the majority-principle—which, as Publius well knew and as our contemporary parochials forget, can take many forms. It cannot vest the "last say" in any minority, moreover, as the adverse critics of Calhoun and Adams are quick to point out, because no minority can be counted on not to abuse its veto power, and use it to its own advantage at the expense of the common good. It cannot, again, vest the power to restrain the majority in the majority itself, because there is no more reason to expect the numerical majority to restrain itself when and only when it ought to be restrained, than to expect this or that minority to restrain it when and only when it ought to be restrained. What, then, about the third possibility we mention—that of the majority being restrained by the whole people? Is it nonsensical on the face of it, since it calls upon the whole people to perform an action that the majority of the whole people is opposed to? We shall return to this below. For the moment. we can only say that if the idea is nonsensical. then so is the whole idea of restraining the majority when it ought to be restrained without ending yourself up with minority dictation. The restrained majority becomes a willo'-the-wisp.

Let us now hold all that also aside, and do a little further thinking of our own. Let us imagine a society, determined to be a selfgoverning society, with a total population of only two individuals, X and Y, with differing notions about legislation and public policy, and let us fix our attention for the moment on X. To the extent that X is to have his way (we are about to see why he will not have his way completely), he will get it only if, and to the extent that, he enlists Y's cooperation, alike in the short and long term. Now: Is it not clear, Y having by definition ideas (or "preferences") of his own, that one of the "prices" X is going to have to "pay" for Y's cooperation is that of not proposing, and certainly that of not doing, things that he knows Y will find absolutely unacceptable? And if that is clear, is it not also clear that Y's potential sense of outrage is merely the "extreme case," at one end of a continuum, the other end of which is X's proposing and doing things to which Y will respond with enthusiastic approval? Which is to say: another method by which X can enlist Y's cooperation is to propose and do things that will please Y. And in between the two extreme cases lie an infinite number of courses X can adopt, that will, in descending order, please Y less and less and, beyond a certain point, an infinite number of courses that, in ascending order, will displease Y more and

¹² Considerations on Representative Governmen: (London, 1861), passim.

¹³ The Politics of Aristotle, Ernest Baker (trans.) (New York: Oxford University Press 1962).

more. Y the more pleased is the more likely to cooperate; Y the more displeased the less likely to

Now, if these propositions be correct, the following corollaries and inferences seem to us to follow:

- a) If X needs Y's cooperation in order to effectuate purposes of his upon which he places value, yet ends up so displeasing Y, or failing to please him, as not to get him to cooperate, X must recognize, retrospectively, that he has acted irrationally. The more irrationally, we hasten to add, to the extent that he had means of knowing, beforehand, that his behavior would lose him Y's cooperation. Similarly X will have acted rationally if, needing Y's cooperation, he behaves in such manner as to please Y, or not to displease him, to the extent needed in order to carry Y with him. It is by no means a matter of the stability of the system and, at the margin, of X avoiding a set-to with Y; it is a matter of X being able to use the system, through time, for the realization of the purposes he cherishes. And, of course, all that we have said of X with respect to Y goes for Y with respect to X. Each, to the extent that he has purposes he expects to realize through the political system, and recognizes a need for the other's cooperation, must give thought to pleasing and/or not displeasing the other enough to keep him from withholding his cooperation.
- b) Both X and Y will, clearly, always be deciding for themselves whether to give or withhold their cooperation—and whether, insofar as that is the determining factor (it is not, of course, the only one; see below), and to what extent each is pleased or displeased by the other's legislative-and-policy-proposals. Each, moreover, knows this about the other. Either, therefore, might-just might-attempt to deceive the other, or even himself, as to the "price" the other must pay for his cooperation; that is, either might—just might—try to get out of the other a little more of what pleases him, or to shoo the other off a little further from that which will displease him, by exaggerating the likelihood of his withholding his cooperation unless his wishes are met, his "preferences" recognized and ministered to. One major component of the art of politics in the self-governing society is skill in raising and answering the question: "This démarche I am about to propose—whom it is going to please, whom displease, and how much?" And that question, clearly, leads to the further question: "How can I tell?"
- c) The "intensity problem" in democratic theory is, then, by no means merely a matter of

a people feeling strongly against legislation or policy; it includes, as an equally important dimension, people feeling strongly for legislation or policy. (This fact is implicitly, but only implicitly, recognized in those formulations of the problem that set the "apathetic" majority against the "intense" minority, which is always thought of as being against what the majority is about to do. We do not hear explicitly—such at least is our impression of intensely pleased minorities, or of intensely displeased majorities.) And, what is more important, the "intensity problem" is by no means peculiarly a problem of majorities over against minorities. One is tempted to sav. indeed, that the normal situation in democratic policies is the "apathetic" majority, the majority not sufficiently concerned with or informed about the issues at stake, over against two "intense" minorities. Put otherwise: the X and Y of our two-man selfgoverning society have as their normal counterpart, not a majority and a minority, but two minorities, neither of which can hope to effectuate its purposes without eliciting some degree of cooperation from the other, with the majority playing pretty much a spectator's role until the intense minorities (in the U.S. Senate, for example, the ADA'ers and the major Southern senators plus a Hruska or two) work out a frontier treaty. One is tempted to say, in other words, that the "apathetic" majority is the normal majority, not only out among the enfranchised but even in the legislative assembly of the self-governing society; but that it stands over against not an "intense" minority, but two or more intense minorities.14

d) One interesting and unavoidable complication that suggests itself, in the light of the foregoing, is that an "intense" X may transform an "apathetic" Y into an intense Y by seeking to exact too high a "price" for his cooperation—i.e., by overestimating Y's need for him. Another component of the art of politics, therefore, is skill in not making that kind of mistake. Both X and Y must continually put

¹⁴ Virtually all of the survey studies to date testify to the fact that the American people are "apathetic," at least in the sense that they do not know or care about the major issues of public policy. Our conception of the political process runs along these lines: The proponents of change and the resistors of change have to plead their cases before what may aptly be termed a "jury" of persons non-involved in or non-affected by the "issue" at stake.

to themselves, and try to answer correctly, such questions as: "How badly does he, the other, need my cooperation? Am I demanding more, in the way of being pleased or not being displeased, than I can get?" Each X and Ydropping now our supposition that there are only two individuals involved in the systemhas his own hierarchy of purposes, and, we repeat, must arrive at his own judgment as to the price he is prepared to pay, perhaps in the form of giving up on some of his purposes, for the cooperation of other X's and Y's. Thus a "passionate minority" of X's might, for example, by seeking to exact too high a price for its cooperation, or failing to offer a sufficiently high price for the acquiescence of an "apathetic majority" of Y's, transform the latter into a "passionate majority" (a fact that certain leaders of the contemporary Civil Rights movement may now be pondering). In short, any group, minority or majority, in the self-governing society, must, to the extent that it is rational in the pursuit of its objectives, constantly ask itself: "Are we going too farare we, so to speak, over-bidding our hand?" And since groups are made up of individuals, the same thing is true of each individual member of any group. To spell the point out completely in terms of our original model, with the addition of Z: X knows that there are issues about which he feels more (or less) strongly than Y and Z appear to feel about them, and knows that his own decision as to whether to give to or withhold from Y and Z or Y or Z the cooperation they wish from him, must be made in terms of a calculation that he must make for himself—erroneously, perhaps—with an eye to the intensity of his own feelings; and he will probably assume that Y and Z, who appear to belong to the same species of animal as himself and are, presumably, much like him, are making similar calculations. The problem, we may fairly say, is common to all political systems, whether the theorists of the system are aware of it or not. Nor is it by any means confined to the "politically active" (e.g., in a democracy, the "electorate"). The "nonvoter," or even the slave, can, if only by resisting, rock the boat, and this brings him also within the confines of the "intensity problem." Only to the extent that the system "handles" the problem well is the cooperation it requires likely to be forthcoming.

e) Returning now to the "special case" of "the majority" over against "the minority" or "minorities," there emerge, in the context of the foregoing, a number of apparent paradoxes that are highly relevant to that general prob-

lem in any self-governing political society, and suggest certain minimum conditions that the latter must meet if it is to avoid tripping itself up over the "intensity problem" (a matter to which we shall return in Section III). Specifically, these apparent paradoxes are significant because they help us to understand not only why majority-rule systems (we do not, we repeat, equate "majority-rule system" and "populistic democracy") have not only shown a capacity to survive, but also to survive in a general atmosphere of willing cooperation and "good feeling."

First: the majority-principle and the unanimity-principle are not, though they appear to be and are generally thought to be, ipso facto, mutually exclusive. On the contrary. What makes a democracy workable, and hence viable, is precisely the apparently impossible combination of these two principles in a "system" whose characteristic feature is this: it gets its decisions made by the majority, but in such fashion that those decisions elicit what amounts to unanimous, or virtually unanimous, support or acquiescence. Just as the individuals X and Y, though disagreeing about this or that policy issue, may both, the one who does not get his way equally with the one who does, string along with the decision arrived at by the "system," so the minority may string along with the majority's decision-whether because of devotion to the majority-principle as such, or because it finds itself, overall, not too discontented with the results the system produces.

Second, "restraints" on the power of the majority need not be thought of exclusively (as some, at least, are in the habit of thinking of them) as either (1) of necessity imposed from some "outside" quarter (e.g., a Constitution, or a Supreme Court), or (2) as self-imposed out of devotion to the idea of "minority rights," or (3) as necessarily "anti-majoritarian," "anti-majority rule," in their bearing. The majority may very well impose such restraints upon itself, and subsequent majorities may respect and perpetuate them, because, quite simply, they deem them necessary for reasons falling within the "intensity problem" as we have defined it. It may, that is to say, restrain itself without in the slightest writing a questionmark beside the majority-principle, or in any sense abandoning its claim to a capacity to make whatever decisions it sees fit to make, but rather out of a determination to keep the majority-rule "show" on the road. In doing so, what it may be doing is to re-assert, rather than abandon, its claim to be the ultimate

caller of the shots.15 We too often forget that in all political systems—monarchies, aristocracies, democracies, dictatorships even-the power to govern is frequently exercised (if only for convenience's sake)-through the elaboration of "procedures," established ways of doing things or handling problems, that have, operationally, the effect of limiting necessarily only for the short term. Concretely, the decision-making authority (the king, the nobles, the majority in a democracy) may deem it prudent, may even find itself obliged, in order to achieve the maximum possible in the light of its "goals," to yield on this or that policy issue to one or more groupings out in society with a view to obtaining its, or their, willing cooperation in other areas of policy that is, to "restrain" itself. And if its calculations in this regard are correct, which is to say based on a realistic appraisal of what it is up against, it does not, in restraining itself, undermine the "system" or compromise the principle upon which the system is based. On the contrary, what it does is to enhance the efficacy of the "system" and, at the same time, the chances of its perpetuating itself as that kind of "system."

Third, the decision-making authority, including again the majority in a majority-rule "system," may restrain itself (not always "prefer" its own "preferences") out of regard to a constitutional morality, or a morality tout court, or even a tradition or custom that it "values." This point will, to be sure, be lost on

15 The point we are making both here and above is, we believe, similar to that made by Almond and Verba in accounting for the success of "civic culture." "In general," they write, "[the] management of cleavage is accomplished by subordinating conflicts on the political level to some higher, overarching attitudes of solidarity, whether these attitudes to be the norms associated with the 'rules of the democratic game' or the belief that there exists within the society a supraparty solidarity based on non-partisan criteria."

"This balance, furthermore, must be maintained on the elite as well as the citizen level. Though our data are not relevant here, it is quite likely that similar mechanisms operate on the elite level as well. The elaborate formal and informal rules of etiquette in the legislatures of Britain and the United States, for example, foster and indeed require friendly relations. . . And this tempers the intensity of partisanship": Gabriel Almond and Sidney Verba, The Civic Culture (Boston: Little, Brown and Company, 1965), pp. 359-360.

those who insist on reducing everything to preferences; especially those who are unable to distinguish between what "I" would give my right arm to feel free to do and that which I know, or believe, I ought to do. 16 But it is, we contend, a valid point, and an indispensable one for understanding the actual functioning of viable majority-rule systems. More: the decision-making authority, monarchy, aristocracy, or popular majority, may seek to bind its successors, may seek to stack the cards in such fashion as to limit their freedom of choice, without prejudice to the principle it appeals to in exercising its authority.

Fourth, philosopher kings are indeed (as we have lately been reminded by Professor Dahl) "hard to come by." But to concede that that is true is by no means to concede that every minority empowered to restrain "the majority," or every parlement empowered to restrain a king or an aristocracy, will as a matter of course end up acting in its own "selfish interest," or abusing its power, or "upsetting the apple-cart," or undermining the decision-making authority it restrains. The king, the aristocracy, the majority may, for reasons of prudence or morality, among others, itself establish arrangements calculated to cut itself off from the possibility of hasty or ill-considered decisions, and these may involve putting some minority in position to exert pressure upon it, and to keep it reminded of its obligations and responsibilities-so long, of course, as it retains the power to abolish the restraint when. in its considered judgment, it no longer serves the purpose for which it was intended. Just as it can, by creating machinery that will subject it to pressures on behalf of a constitutional morality, a morality tout court, a tradition or custom, or the need, arising out of the "problem of intensity," to carry others along with it, so also it can place a restraining minority in

16 See F. H. Bradley, "My Station and its Duties," in Ethical Studies (Oxford: At the Clarendon Press, 1937). A, a paycheck in hand at the end of the month, may wish above everything to chuck it all, disappear, and start all over again, yet still go home to his tawdry and sullen wife and the five sons and daughters who drive him to despair—out of a sense of duty. Those whose idiom excludes such a distinction, and will have it that in going home to the wife and kids he "prefers" to do so, have, in our view, become so "scientific" as to cut themselves off from all possible communication with persons who "prefer" to preserve the traditional relationship between language and common sense.

such a position that it too will be subject to such pressures and can be counted on to respond to them. Philosopher kings, we repeat, are indeed hard to come by; but we are by no means ignorant as to the steps we can take, in establishing a "restraining" minority, in order to force out of it "behavior" sufficiently like that of philosopher kings to be worth our while.

With all this in mind, we can lay down certain conditions that, in particular, a majority-rule "system" must fulfill if it is to handle the "problem of intensity." We turn now to this matter.

III. MEANS FOR TAKING ACCOUNT OF DIFFERENCES IN INTENSITY

At least the following conditions, it seems to us, leap to the eye, on the above showing, as among those that a political system must meet if it is to handle the "intensity problem."

- 1) The system must have built-in facilities for correct reciprocal anticipations, on the part of groups and, ultimately, of individuals, of the intensity of each other's reactions, favorable or unfavorable, to the alternative courses of political behavior open to each. In our view, to the extent that the system fails to facilitate correct reciprocal anticipations, it is likely to encourage courses of action, on the part of groups and individuals, that will prove to be self-defeating, and that may easily lead to the breakdown of the system itself. And this applies equally to the "governors" and the "governed."
- 2) The condition just laid down does not mean, of course, that the system must never permit groups or individuals to take action that, because of the intensity of the reaction to it in this or that quarter or quarters, will deny them cooperation, or that it must never permit groups or individuals from attempting to exact, for their cooperation or compliance, a higher price than they can get. The important point is that groups and individuals shall not base their choice among various courses of action on false anticipations as to how others will respond; that, if you like, insofar as that is possible, they should not act in ignorance of foreseeable unfavorable reactions. The "governors" may well decide that they are not prepared to pay the price that this or that group will end up demanding for its cooperation or compliance. The "governed," on the other hand, may well decide to take, over against this or that legislative or policy démarche, retaliatory action that will bring down upon their heads disagreeable consequences. Our condition merely stipulates that such decisions must be taken, if the system is to work

"rationally" from the standpoint of the participants, with the maximum possible knowledge of the consequences they will entail.¹⁷

- 3) The condition does not require that a democratic system weigh "preferences" instead of counting them. As far as elections are concerned it can, in the end, do nothing but count, though democratic systems of course differ enormously as to who is counted, and how, and with respect to what. What it requires is merely that the "counted" shall. as they cast their votes in elections, be so situated as to be able to reckon, beforehand. with the intensity of the reaction in various quarters to the use they make of their votes. In other words, a democratic system does not fail to meet our major "condition" merely by not itself weighing preferences, but does fail to meet it when it affords groups and individuals insufficient opportunities, before their votes are cast, to do their own "weighing," Above all, our condition does not require that people be given their way on this or that issue because they happen to feel intensely about it. The decision as to when, and about what, to give them their way, is one that the "governors" must make according to their lights; it does require that those lights, when issues are "up" about which some of the governed happen to feel strongly, be dimmed as little as possible by the system's machinery.
- 4) Correct reciprocal anticipation requires, clearly, a high degree of mutual knowledge and

¹⁷ While many have contended that the Civil War was the great failure of the American political system, there is, within the framework we suggest here, reason to dispute this. Calhoun's last speech to the Senate in 1850 certainly reflected an awareness of things to come.

"I have . . . believed from the first that the agitation of the subject of slavery would, if not prevented by some timely and effective measure, end in disunion. Entertaining this opinion, I have, on all proper occasions, endeavored to call the attention of both the two great parties which divide the country, to adopt some measure to prevent so great a disaster, but without success. The agitation has been permitted to proceed. with almost no attempt to resist it, until it has reached a period when it can no longer be disguised or denied that the Union is in danger. You have thus forced upon you the greatest and the gravest question that ever can come under your consideration: How can the Union be preserved?" We repeat: All that a well constructed political system can possibly do is to provide the means for correct reciprocal anticipations, and with respect to the Civil War the American system probably rates an A + on this score.

understanding among the participants. The science and technology of politics, despite its great leaps forward in recent decades, has yet to invent a thermometer-like device that can be inserted in people's heads, much less into their hearts, to "measure" the intensity of their preferences. The only preferences we actually "experience," and can calibrate with great accuracy, are our own; and there is indeed "no conceivable way" to "directly observe and compare the sensate intensities of preference of different individuals [or groups]." or even to correlate them with observable "changes in facial expression, words, posture, or even the chemistry of the body."18 Yet people do, and on our showing must if their political activity is to be other than counterproductive, attempt to make such correlations. The correlations they arrive at are often "proved out" by subsequent events, as, also, they are sometimes belied by them. All we are saving, for the moment, is that the critical variable here, the variable that results now in correct anticipations and now in incorrect ones. must be the knowledge-understanding the "anticipator" possesses as to what makes the other "tick." (The supreme example of the process at work, and the one most of us are likeliest to have experienced, or at least observed at first hand, is the smoothly-running family, in which each participant, husband or wife, brother or sister, parent or child, precisely because of the intimacy of their life together, can predict with a high degree of accuracy how the "others" will react to various alternative courses of action on his or her part). The successful politician, one might say, is, other things being equal, successful just to the extent that his anticipations in this regard approach the degree of accuracy achieved, day in day out, by the members of a smoothlyrunning family. And, from the standpoint of our overriding condition, a political system is to be judged "good" or "bad" according as it facilitates, or renders difficult, accurate anticipations of this kind.

5) A further corollary of the foregoing line of argument would be the following: The more "diverse" or "heterogeneous" the political society, the greater its need for elaborate and complex "machinery" to facilitate mutual knowledge and understanding of the kind here in question. Put otherwise: to the extent that a society is relatively homogeneous, so that people can safely assume that the "others" are pretty much like themselves, any given individual may fairly be expected to come up with fairly accurate forecasts as to the reac-

tions of those others to any given political gambit he is contemplating. This for at least three basic reasons: First, the chances are greater, just to the extent that the society is homogeneous, that the legislative act or line of policy in question will affect the "others" pretty much as it will affect oneself—that, if you like, the individual will possess first-hand personal knowledge as to the extent to which the contemplated step will or will not elicit cooperation. Second, and allowing now for the fact that a society can be highly homogeneous (non-diverse, in the sense of Federalist 10) and still have in its bosom groupings that will be differently affected by a given policy decision, it remains true that the participants in a society have, to the extent that the latter is homogeneous, the greater opportunities to comprehend the composition and structure of the society, the "lay" of the potentially conflicting interests, goods, and "values." Third, just to the extent that the homogeneity of the homogeneous society is a matter of shared interests, goals, and values, we may fairly expect from the participants a higher degree of sympathetic "identification" with each other. thus a greater desire or willingness to understand beforehand the probable effects of the action contemplated, and thus, finally, a greater effort to feel the others out and seek some kind of accommodation with those who, predictably, will, if not accommodated, "cause trouble." The "extreme" case here, of course, is the "tightly-knit," "primitive" society which seeks, and obtains at whatever cost, unanimity, that is, does not submit issues to majority determination.19

19 See on this point Bertrand de Jouvenel, Sovereignty (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1957), Ch. 8. He makes a similar point when he writes: "The wider and more developed a society is, the less can the climate of trustfulness (such as should always prevail among its members if they are to confer on each other all the benefits possible) be the fruit of a spirit of community: the widening of the circle and the growing diversity of personalities tend to destroy that spirit. For that reason the climate of trustfulness comes more and more to rest on the guarantees provided by Law. I know nothing of Primus and am emotionally neutral in regard to him. No element of personal sympathy, no feeling of our belonging to each other will induce in him a certain course of conduct as regards me-only the abstract feeling of obligation as such" (p. 132).

That Madison was fully aware of this principle is beyond dispute. "Those who contend for a simple Democracy, or a pure republic, actuated by the sense of the majority, and operating within

¹⁸ Dahl, op. cit., pp. 99-100.

6) Having mentioned Federalist 10, with its emphasis on "diversity" as one of the two preconditions for a democratic republic that will not lead to tyranny, we must (a) say a word about the second of Publius' two pre-conditions. and (b) face the question whether, and to what extent, our own emphasis on mutual selfknowledge places us (as at first blush it seems to) in opposition to Publius. As for (a), all that we have said about heterogeneity as an obstacle to successful handling of the "intensity problem" evidently applies, mutatis mutandis. to "extensiveness." An individual or group in say, Florida, has scant opportunity, other things being equal, to make an accurate forecast concerning the reactions of an individual or group in, say, Washington (as we have largely been reminded by Watts, which seems to have surprised its neighbors in "extensive" Los Angeles hardly less rudely than it did its constructive neighbors in Portland, Maine) Distance, like diversity, is then a genuine obstacle to the kind of mutual knowledge and understanding that emerges as desirable in the light of our analysis of the "intensity problem." And this analysis certainly appears to point to the thesis—a truism in much of what we call "traditional" political theory—that self-government can thrive only in the "small" state. Such, certainly, was the teaching of Aristotle, who, as every careful reader knows, is echoed on this point by Rousseau, with his insistence that in a true democracy each of the citizens must be so situated that he can come to know and understand the "others" whom he wil encounter in the assembly. (Rousseau, we feel sure, would have construed "know" and "understand" to be a matter not merely of the "head, '

narrow limits, assume or suppose a case which s altogether fictitious. They found their reasoning on the idea, that they have all precisely the same interests and the same feelings in every respect. Were this in reality the case, their reasoning would be conclusive. The interest of the majority would be that of that of the minority also; the decision could only turn on mere opinion comcerning the good of the whole, of which the major voice would be the safest criterion; and within a small sphere, this voice could be most easily collected, and the public affairs most ascurately managed. We know however, that Lo society ever did or can consist of so homogeneous a mass of Citizens. In the savage state indeed, an approach is made toward it; but in that state little or no Government is necessary": Madison's letter to Jefferson, Gaillard Hunt, The Writings of James Madison, Volume IV, pp. 222-224.

but also of the "heart.") We do not suggest, of course, that the traditional argument for the non-extensive republic necessarily rested, even in part, on considerations akin to our overriding condition. Far from it; we suggest merely that the traditional argument would have been strengthened had it explicitly taken "intensity" into account, and that contemporary democratic theory would find itself less helpless. in the presence of the "intensity problem." had it given more weight to the considerations on which the traditional theorists did rest their argument. One might add (anticipating a little what we shall say in Section IV) that democratic societies have, in practice, departed notably less from the traditional teaching in this area than has democratic theory. As for (b), whether, on our showing here, we must end up taking issue with Publius in regard to his most celebrated doctrine, the answer is "No, indeed!" For our money, the case Publius makes out in Federalist 51 is, quite simply, unanswerable, and the conclusion at which he arrives beyond challenge:

In [an]... extended republic, and among the great variety of interests, parties, and sects which it embraces, a coalition of the majority of the whole society could seldom take place on any other principles than those of justice and the general good.²⁰

At worst, our analysis merely exposes a weakness of the Federalist 10 model, which Publius and his adepts must do something about lest their system come a cropper over the "intensity problem." (Again to anticipate a little: Publius, regardless of whether he had anything like the "intensity problem" in mind, did do something about it). In brief: just to the extent that a system does not meet Publius' two conditions, it will require special machinery to meet our condition, since mutual knowledge

20 The Federalist, Jacob E. Cooke (ed.) (Cleveland: World Publishing Company, 1961), Federalist 51, pp. 352-353. Incidentally, this view is not so much at odds with Rousseau's as one might imagine. Rousseau does indeed teach that there should be no subsidiary groups in the true democracy. But he hastens to add that where that condition does not obtain, i.e., everywhere, "they should be made numerous and prevented from being unequal in size. . . . [Only in this way can you make sure! that the general will shall always be enlightened and the people never misinformed": Jean-Jaques Rousseau, The Social Contract, translated with an introduction by Willmoore Kendall (Chicago: The Henry Regnery Company, 1954), p. 29.

and understanding on the part of the participants, comprehension of the general workings of the system, sympathetic reciprocal identification, etc., will to that extent be, as a matter of course, the more difficult to achieve. For Publius' system, as Professor Burns has brilliantly demonstrated in a recent book, does tend to generate intense competition among the "diverse" groups that it deploys over the "extensive" territory, thus increasing the danger that a group or combination of groups will, in the "heat of the battle" and with the righteous zeal that intense competition is likely to engender, try to ride rough-shod over intense preferences on the part of other groups.21

7) It is impossible to mention the participants' attempts to calibrate the intensity of the preferences of the "others" by observing their behavior (the expression on their faces, the noises they make, etc.) without running hard up against this difficulty: The participants have nothing except observable behavior to go on in arriving at their anticipations. Yet the observable behavior may tell us more about the histrionic talents of the agonizer than about the intensity of his feelings on the issue that is up. (One thinks, as a matter of course, of Senator Dirksen, whose tear-glands would seem to be equipped with spigots.) The "others," in a word, may be bluffing about their intention to rock the boat if they can't get their way; may, for example, be using an issue about which they do not in fact feel strongly in order to gain this or that strategic advantage. And such bluffing is the more likely to be successful just to the extent that the participants have had insufficient opportunity to come to know and understand each other well. In order to meet our overriding condition, therefore, the system will require rules and procedures, analogous to those of a poker game, that impose potentially heavy penalties on the player who would like to win the pot with the weaker hand. To the extent that the system permits the bluffer to win the pot, it is unnecessarily exposed to varying degrees of instability; partly because it will run the danger of overlooking tomorrow's real boat-rockers, and let itself in for trouble it might have avoided, and partly because it will run the danger of not mobilizing, behind the goals of the decision-makers, the maximum possible cooperation available to it given the "lay" of the "intensity problem" it faces. For the majority that can be bluffed will never

²¹ The Deadlock of Democracy (Englewood Cliffs, N. J.: Prentice-Hall, 1963).

be in position to make accurate forecasts as to the future reactions of the "others."

Can we conceive of rules and procedures that will minimize successful bluffing? Not easily, of course; but (a) the structure of the system can take into account the fact that X is likely to get by with his bluff just to the extent that Y and Z do not know and understand what kind of poker he plays, and (b) it can, through rules formal or informal, exact sacrifices from those who, in the course of playing out a political hand, demand that the intensity of their preferences be made a ratio decidendi—can, that is to say, put the costs of injecting such a demand so high that no one who does not have a genuinely intense preference will be willing to pay it. One possibility: give each member of the assembly n number of votes at the beginning of the session, and let him "spend" them as he sees fit—all of them if he likes, on a single issue, with the understanding that once they are gone he can cast no further votes. Another: encourage the "horse-trading" and "log-rolling" for which the Congress of the United States is so frequently denounced, thus maximizing the opportunity on the part of the participants to "trade" their votes on issues about which they do not feel intensely for votes of the others on issues about which they do. Viewed from the standpoint of our overriding condition, "logrolling" may well play a beneficent role in the political system by helping to handle the "intensity problem."

We turn, in Section IV, to the implications of our analysis for scholarly inquiry, whether "normative" or "empirical," into the institutions and procedures of those contemporary democratic systems that appear to have demonstrated their viability.

IV. CRITERIA FOR EVALUATING POLITICAL SYSTEMS

The questions that want asking in the light of the foregoing would appear to be these: First, to what extent do the "going" democratic systems meet the overriding condition we have laid down in Section III? And second, insofar as these systems fail to reflect accurately the "models" elaborated in democratic theory (i.e., insofar as they represent departures from those models), to what extent can we say that the models themselves meet that overriding condition? We can, we trust, pose those questions without seeming to suggest that democratic models and systems should be viewed, and judged, exclusively on the basis of their handling of the intensity problem. Our point, from first to last, has been merely that a democratic system which fails to provide facilities for accurate reciprocal anticipation among the participants does so at its peril.²²

Let us take up these questions in reverse order, speaking first of the models, and, following Professor Dahl, assuming that after you clear away the smoke, there remain only two: "populistic democracy" and "Madisonian democracy," the first of which underlines the bulk of contemporary empirical research by American political scientists, and may fairly be called the current orthodoxy, while the second is that embodied in *The Federalist.* 24

First, then, the model of "populistic democracy." Its essential characteristics are: (a) it treats elections (in which all the citizens cast equal votes) as the be-all of democracy; (b) it conceives of elections as a means through which the voters express their "preferences" on matters of policy; and therefore (c) it understands elections as having no other function, properly speaking, than to eventuate in policy "mandates" that are, sensu stricto, governing, and, governing precisely because they express the will of a majority of the voters.

Now: reminding the reader that we are not concerned here with the model's "merits," either from the standpoint of ethics or from that of "workability," we ask only: What about it from the standpoint of the intensity problem? And our answer must be: The populistic model, just to the extent that it is workable and therefore capable of achieving its primary objective (a one-one correspondence between governmental action and the "prefer-

²² By doing so, it both renders itself inherently unstable (an "empirical" judgment) and lays itself open to the charge (a "normative" or "ethical" judgment) that, by failing to elicit the maximum of cooperation available to it for the achievement of its objectives (which, arguendo, we assume to be "good"), it is self-defeating and therefore "bad." We hope to have dissociated ourselves sufficiently from the view that intense preferences should get the green light just because they are intense.

²² Subject to correction by Professor Dahl, "polyarchy," on our reading of the *Preface*, is a variant of the model of "populistic democracy."

²⁴ Whose author was not, of course, Madison, but a creature with three heads who answered to the name "Publius."

²⁵ Professor Dahl is well aware of the difficulties involved in midwifing a "mandate" out of the electorate, as he indicates in the last chapter of his *Preface*.

ences" of the majority), is, on the face of it, incapable of handling the intensity problem, and for the following crystal-clear reasons: (a) the constitutional morality implicit in the model encourages voters-nay, imposes upon them the obligation—to consult their own preferences about policy as they cast their votes, so that, just to the extent that they live up to that morality, they precisely do not take into account the preferences of the "others." Why should they, since the avowed purpose of the model is to translate, into legislation and policy, the preferences of the victorious majority? The role of the minority in the model—again on the face of it—is to say to itself, after the election, "so much the worse for us," and then obey the "mandate." (b) If we abstract from (a), and do impute to the majority a disposition (with a view to gaining its objectives) to take into account the preferences of the minority, and "weigh" them with an eye to their "intensity," the eristical clash between two idealogico-programmatic "alternatives" at election time, which the model's admirers deem necessary for a clear "mandate" that must at all costs be executed, is-still again on the face of it—the worst possible arena for working out the kind of accommodation needed for handling the intensity problem.26

²⁶ In this connection a comparison of the writings of Clinton Rossiter and James Burnham is instructive, as concretely illustrating how the differences in the two models manifest themselves with respect to American institutions.

Rossiter writes of the Presidency in the followterms: "...he is ... the Voice of the People, the leading formulator and expounder of public opinion in the United States. While he acts as political leader of some, he serves as moral spokesman for all." Or: "Throughout our history there have been moments of triumph or dedication or frustration or even shame when the will of the people—the General Will, I suppose we could call it-demanded to be heard clearly and unmistakably. . . . No effective President has doubted his prerogative to speak the people's mind on the great issues of his time, to act, again in Wilson's words, as the spokesman for the sentiment and purpose of the century": The American Presidency, rev. ed. (New York: Harcourt, Brace & World, Inc., 1960), pp. 32-33.

Contrast this with Burnham's description of Congressional operations. "Many who complain about congressional slowness and inefficiency have not stopped to reflect that many of the ways in which Congressmen 'waste their time' are apt methods for accomplishing the tasks of a representative legislature in a democratic repub-


What such a clash is likely to produce is more or less angry determination on both sides to have one's way and, at the margin, a fanaticism that is only too willing for the chips to fall where they may. Nor is it possible to answer either that the "leaders" will make the needed accommodations in the act of drawing up the alternative programs (their job, as the model's explicators understand it, is to elaborate a program that will win a majority by appealing to the preferences of the larger number), or that the needed accommodations will be made. after the elections, in the assembly or by the executive (exactly the point about the model is that the real decisions about law and policy get themselves made at the polls, so that decision-making "history" is, so to speak, over when the polls close). (c) The "preferences" of the majority are, of course, in the last analysis the preferences of the individuals of which it is composed, which the model treats, if we may put it so, as "givens." But to say that is to expose the great weakness of the model from the standpoint of the intensity problem, the handling of which calls for, on the one hand, the wish for statesmanlike accommodations insofar as they are needed in order to prevent rocking of the boat, and the kind of knowledge and understanding, partly "intellectual," partly having to do with the (notvery-intellectual) capacity for empathy, needed for working out such accommodations. Now: the wish, or if you like the disposition to entertain such a wish regarding this intellectual know-how and empathy do require qualities with respect to which we should expect a lognormal distribution out among the population. Which is to say: the larger the number of people a party attracts into its projected majority, the further it must dip into strata of the population where these qualities are

lic: by the chats and correspondence with constituents, the encounters with the press, the lunches with experts from the bureaucracy and even the cocktails with the lobbyists, the informal hours with each other and the staff professionals, the lecture trips to cities and universities, the travel junkets at home and abroad, the members are not merely helping to get themselves reelected . . . but getting to know-or, better, to feel-the myriad problems and interests, the competing needs and desires, complaints and demands, that the legislature, if it performs its function, must try to weave into some sort of working resolution": Congress and the American Tradition (Chicago: Henry Regnery Company, 1959), pp. 264-65.

present in more and more modest quantities. To state this another way: the very fact that the majority is by definition made up of lots and lots of people, incapacitates it for "feeling out" the intensity of the minority's preferences.27 (d) Decision-making history, we repeat, is over when the model's polls close, and this has the following further consequence: "Interelection" policy decisions on issues included in the mandate (i.e., on the very issues that are most likely to produce unanticipated intense reactions that want placating) are out of the question. Concretely, the model hauls out into the open and emphasizes the kind of situation that cannot be handled consistently with its own basic principles of majority-rule: a majority preferring X, whether apathetically or intensely, standing over against a minority that intensely prefers Y, each committed, by the election, to a course of action irreconcilable with that preferred by the other; and in a context where nothing can be done about it short of the next election—a situation that is, of course, the more threatening the longer the interval between elections. The model first divides the voters into warring camps, then prevents their ranks from closing.

Does the Federalist model come off any better, from the standpoint of the intensity problem? Its characteristics, as we understand them, are: (a) It treats deliberation, that is, dialogue back and forth among members of the assembly and among the "branches" of the government, as the be-all-end-all of the democratic process, and claims for it that it will produce the "sense" (not the will) of the people as a whole. (b) It regards elections as means through which the voters express not their "preferences" on issues of policy or their "will" as to what the government is to do tomorrow, but their considered judgment, amongst the candidates who present themselves, as to which is the "best" man they can send forward to participate in the deliberative process contemplated in characteristic (a). (c) It postpones actual decisions concerning policy issues until a relatively tardy moment in the process of deliberations. (d) It places no premium upon an all-inclusive electorate, or upon an equal impact upon policy for each

²⁷ Our voting and public opinion studies have shown, over and over again, that the rank-and-file voters are incapable of expressing, through an election, even their own "real" preferences. To impose upon them the further obligation to anticipate the impact of their mandates upon the cooperativeness of persons with different preferences is, clearly, to overburden them.



member of that electorate; it contemplates, rather, a citizenry divided into the two catagories "voters" (i.e., persons able to meet whatever "qualifications" subordinate legislatures may have set for admission to the electorate) and "non-voters," and is not *ip30 facto* unfriendly to "qualifications" that tend to make entry into the first of these categories more or less difficult. And (e) while it does not prohibit capture of its governmental machinery by a bare majority of the electorate, or legislative and policy decisions imposed by a bare majority of its bicameral assembly, it discourages both and, by clear implication, seeks decisions by "consensus."

Now: to return to our question. Just as the model of populistic democracy looks as if it had been devised to prevent handling of our intensity problem, because it renders gross v improbable correct reciprocal anticipations as to how the "others" will react to decisions by the "governors," so the Federalist model affords maximum facilities for such anticipations. And this for the following reasons: (a) Its implicit constitutional morality, which cannot be stated in the language of "preferences" or "will," is so to speak a summons to "statesmanship" understood as the eliciting of maximum cooperation—that is, as a matter of not ignoring the feelings of the losers in elections. (b) Since it does not encourage voters in elections to suppose, in casting their votes. that they are making actual policy decisions (i.e., since it tells them, in effect, that it is theirs only to choose the men who are to make those decisions at a later date), it is far less likely than the populistic model to divide the voters or, for that matter, their representatives, into warring camps committed, as we put it above, to irreconcilable positions. (c) By spreading actual policy-decisions out over a period of many months or even years (for 30 the inventors of the model conceived of it), it affords the participants in the decisionmaking process maximum opportunities to know and understand one another, to "feel each other out," and thus to arrive at correct reciprocal anticipations about future reactions to current policy alternatives. (d) Because it clearly takes a dim view of decisions by a bare majority, it puts the participants (whom it expects to arrive at a "consensus") under severe pressure to come to know and understand one another, to "feel each other out." (e) Decisionmaking history, far from being over in the Federalist model once the polls are closed (the word "mandate" does not appear in the model's dictionary), happens precisely in the intervals between elections, so that the model is at all

times highly flexible as regards accommodations with potential boat-rockers. (f) To the extent that the qualifications for admission to the electorate make any sense whatever (=to the extent that the distinction between voters and non-voters is made meaningful, which, to be sure, cannot be guaranteed beforehand), the model may indulge the hope, impossible under the populistic model, of "creaming off" from the people, to become politically active, those whose scores would put them in the upper reaches of our log-normal curves (see above)—in the hope, in short, of not making demands on the participants that they are incapable of meeting.

But, the reader may object, have you not, insofar as you have proved anything, proved too much? Is there not every reason to believe that the British system of government (and its imitators in Australia and Canada) handles the intensity problem about as well as the American system? And is not the British system the very embodiment of the populistic model, as the American system is, traditionally at least, the embodiment of the Federalist model? Have you not, somewhere along the line, misled us, and proved to be impossible in theory that which every reader of the New York Times sees, under his very nose, in daily dispatches from London and Ottawa?

These are, evidently, questions that demand treatment on a scale far exceeding the limitations of a single article. But we can at least indicate the shape of the answers called for as follows: Let us concede, arguendo but reluctantly, that the British system handles the intensity problem about as well as the American system—that the former, like the latter, does bump along from decade to decade without creating pockets of irridentism that produce crises. But that is by no means to acquiesce in the main thrust of the objection, for two reasons: First, the governments in question do not, in our opinion, "embody" the model of "populistic democracy" to anything like the extent that some writers like to suppose. The British parties, at least as we see them in the dispatches from London, neither offer the voters at election-time the clear choice between alternative policies that the model calls for, nor make the unabashed appeal to "preferences," i.e., self-interest (as opposed to supposedly irrelevant considerations such as the "wisdom" and "virtue" of the competing candidates), which some textbook descriptions of the system would lead one to expect. The party that wins the election does, to be sure, win it on a "program," and does come to power with a "mandate" of sorts to carry out the program. The majority principle does, no doubt, command in Britain a kind of allegiance it has never enjoyed in America. Votes in Parliament do, when they are finally taken, no doubt reflect a very high degree of party "regularity." But the two major parties, each of which notoriously has its "left" and "right" wings, are by no means the national monoliths of the populistic model, which is to say: Electoral contests remain to a very considerable extent "local," with great differences of emphasis between candidates of one and the same party from constituency to constituency, and, in any case, are (from, e.g., the point of view of an American Conservative) more similar "ideologically" than dissimilar. Parliament. moreover, has by no means yet been reduced to the "rubber-stamp" role that the model would attribute to it. It remains essentially a deliberative body in the strict Federalist sense of the term, and its deliberations certainly turn, in very large part, on the majority's recognition that concessions must be made to the views of the minority. It gives M.P.'s on the two sides of the House all manner of opportunities to get to know and understand one another. The M.P.'s, if only because their constituencies are closer to hand, do, if anything, more constituency "nursing," more "feeling out" of the drift of voter opinion between elections than their American counterparts, and one who follows the dispatches gets the impression that the M.P. at home for the week-end by no means confines his attention to members of his own party, and is by no means without sources of information as to what measures will result in irridentism; and not a few writers on the British system have suggested that the "weekend" house-parties bring the leaders of the parties together in a kind of intimacy that, say some, has no equivalent in the American system. In sum, the British system involves a great deal of machinery that brings it, in point of fact, closer to the Federalist model than to that of populistic democracy. Viewed in the light of our analysis of the problem of intensity, this clearly facilitates accurate anticipations, back and forth among the M.P.'s, of one another's future reactions. Secondly, Britain remains, by contrast with America, a relatively homogeneous (i.e., non-"diverse") society that lives and has its being on a relatively tiny (i.e., non-"extensive") piece of real estate and therefore has, on our own showing, less need than the American system for ad hoc procedures to take care of the intensity problem. The fact it nevertheless takes the trouble to provide procedures that come off very well when referred to our overriding condition, rather fortifies than weakens the main argument of the present article.

One might argue, similarly, that if the American system is beginning, of late, to show signs of tripping up over the intensity problem, these are to be explained, in large part, in terms of a certain "slippage" in the direction of the populistic model. While we cannot fully explore this matter here, this much seems worth saying: Small wonder that—let's call it the Law of the Pinching Shoe—in any democratic system those institutions that enable it to handle the intensity problem are the ones most likely to become the target of "reform" proposals whose adherents press them with impassioned zeal, and the more certainly when those institutions are part of the very fabric of government and thus highly visible to participants in the political process (as they are in America, and are not in Britain). We have already expressed skepticism as to whether anybody ever gets to believing in the majority-principle in the sense of being ready, as a matter of course, to accept any and every majority determination, no matter how outrageous or disagreeable it may seem.28 It nevertheless remains true that the idea "unanimity being impossible, the majority must decide" is likely, in an age when egalitarian notions pervade the intellectual climate, to commend itself to many people as axiomatic, self-evident, etc., and as, therefore, ultimately the essence of the democratic process; and from there, there is indeed nowhere to go, logically, except to automatic condemnation of institutions that "frustrate" the "will" of the majority as, ipso facto, "undemocratic." In other words, solutions calculated to prevent intense minorities from kicking up a future fuss are likely to displease the large number of persons who, because of them, end up politically with something less than the jackpot; and it is only natural that they should direct their fire not merely at the substance of the decisions in question, but also at the rules and procedures that produced them, and that they should make noises about "minority dictation." And, in absence of a certain understanding of, and commitment to, Federalist political philosophy,29 efforts will be made to bring the

²⁸ An exception would perhaps have to be made here for situations, such as that in the bosom of the Supreme Court, where the participants really regard each other as pretty much equals. But we have yet to see a national democratic system in which that condition is fulfilled.

²⁹ Again, not necessarily in the heads of the participants. Such understanding and commitment can, in Lincoln Steffen's phrase, lodge itself

system in line with the populistic model. We hope to have shown, however, that proper evaluation of such reform proposals is an extremely difficult and delicate undertaking, and that it must, at some point, face up to the question: What, if you clear a wide-open path for the majority, will happen to the cooperation the majority needs from the minority or minorities that will take exception to its policies? And let that man think twice who is tempted to say either that cooperation is not needed, or that it will be forthcoming as a matter of course. Those answers tempt him precisely because he has not done his homework. And the literature of political reform in America seems to us to rest, to a frightening degree, upon some such tacit premises.

in the "hips"—and not merely the hips of isolated individuals, but those of the generality of men in a democratic society. The American people, who up to now have turned a cold shoulder to most reform proposals of the kind here in question, despite the pleadings of the most knowledgeable writers on such topics, certainly do not do so out of an intellectual understanding of Publius; but they do so, all the same.

In our view, at least the following questions are highly relevant when dealing with the problem of reform. To what extent do existing deviations from the populistic model facilitate correct reciprocal anticipations? Given the social, economic, cultural, and political structure of the society, what means are available for the majority to impose its will after gaining full knowledge as to the possible reactions to its decisions? Is there reason to believe that certain identifiable minority groups are permanently advantaged or disadvantaged by the existing rules for making decisions, and in a way that does not facilitate handling of the intensity problem?

Finally, we submit: (a) The foregoing analysis of the intensity problem lays bare a whole series of heretofore neglected questions with respect to populistic democracy. (b) Contemporary studies of existing political systems, whether "empirical" or "normative," all too frequently overlook the complexities introduced by the intensity problem. And (c) we can nope to understand existing democracies only to the degree that we are prepared to take into account the dimensions of the intensity problem and the complexities it introduces.

A THEORY OF THE CALCULUS OF VOTING*

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Much recent theorizing about the utility of voting concludes that voting is an irrational act in that it usually costs more to vote than one can expect to get in return.1 This conclusion is doubtless disconcerting ideologically to democrats; but ideological embarrassment is not our interest here. Rather we are concerned with an apparent paradox in the theory. The writers who constructed these analyses were engaged in an endeavor to explain political behavior with a calculus of rational choice; yet they were led by their argument to the conclusion that voting, the fundamental political act, is typically irrational. We find this conflict between purpose and conclusion bizarre but not nearly so bizarre as a non-explanatory theory: The function of theory is to explain behavior and it is certainly no explanation to assign a sizeable part of politics to the mysterious and inexplicable world of the irrational.2 This essay is, therefore, an effort to reinterpret the voting calculus so that it can fit comfortably into a rationalistic theory of political behavior. We describe a calculus of voting from which one infers that it is reasonable for those who vote to do so and also that it is equally reasonable for those who do not vote not to do so. Furthermore we present empirical evidence that citizens actually behave as if they employed this calculus.3

- * We wish to thank a number of colleagues who have helpfully contributed improvements to our argument, especially Professors Richard Rosett, Richard Niemi, and Steven Brams. William Riker wishes to thank the National Science Foundation for a grant under which this essay was written.
- ¹ The two most interesting presentations of this analysis are Anthony Downs, An Economic Theory of Democracy (New York: Harper, 1957), pp. 36-50, 260-276 and Gordon Tullock, Toward a Mathematics of Politics (University of Michigan Press, 1968), Chapter 7.
- ² In Downs' theory, which he characterizes as "positive, but not descriptive," there is no reason to expect descriptive accuracy, although in science one would expect to discard positive theories that are inadequate as descriptions. Tullock's theory is, however, intended to be descriptive.
- ³ There is continuing interest in political science in the question of whether or not the

I. THE BASIC VOCABULARY

We start with the variables customarily used in the analysis of the calculus of voting:

- N: set of eligible voters for a particular election
- n: number of members of N
- V: set of actual voters in a particular election
- v: number of members of V
- R: the reward, in utiles, that an individual voter receives from his act of voting
- B: the differential benefit, in utiles, that an individual voter receives from the success of his more preferred candidate over his less preferred one
- P: the probability that the citizen will, by voting, bring about the benefit, B; of course, 0 < P < 1
- C: the cost to the individual of the act of voting.

The expected utility hypothesis expresses the calculus of voting thus:

$$(1) R = (BP) + C$$

so that, if R > 0, it is reasonable to vote; while, if $R \le 0$, it is not reasonable. Since in any election where n and v are as large as they typically are in national elections in the United States P is a very small number (e.g. 10^{-8}) and since it is usually thought that C > 0, it follows that B

substantive decisions in voting are rational: e.g., B. R. Berelson, P.F. Lazarsfeld, and W. N. McPhee, Voting (Chicago, 1954); and V. O. Key, The Responsible Electorate (Cambridge, Mass., 1966), the former of which takes the position that substantive decisions are irrational while the latter argues that they are rational. See also W. H. Riker, Democracy in the United States (2nd ed., New York, 1965), pp. 47-49. This essay may be taken as supporting the position of Riker and Key on the procedural level, i.e., that voters are rational in deciding whether or not to cast a substantive ballot.

4 When we say "customarily," we are referring not only to the work of Downs and Tullock, but also to the numerous unpublished analyses we have read or heard from political scientists and economists over the past twenty years. must be a very large number (as compared to C) when R is positive. The size of B when R is positive does indeed stagger the imagination. Hence it is concluded that R is typically negative, even when the citizen votes, which is cf course irrational.

Accepting (1) as a reasonable initial expression of the calculus, the problem for those (like ourselves) who wish to render the inferences from it also reasonable in the explanation of behavior is to examine each element of (1) in order to determine an appropriate method for estimating its parameters. So we shall examine R, C, P, and B successively in order to understand and interpret (1).

Since, in (1), R is a consequence of three other variables, it cannot be examined directly. But it can be examined in relation to the real world, for the actions of real people in the real world set constraints on R, if we wish R to be descriptive. The problem for the theory is to explain the fact that in the real world some people vote and others, who are eligible, do not. Hence if R is to be descriptive, it must be the case that, for an individual voter, i,

(2) if
$$i \in N$$
 and $i \in V$, then $R_i > 0$ and if $i \in N$ and $i \notin V$, then $R_i \le 0$.

We know from empirical investigation that there are classes of eligible voters who vote in very high proportions (e.g. about 92 percent of the white prosperous males aged 46–64 in the midwest voted in 1964) and there are other classes of eligible voters who vote in very low proportions (e.g. about 20 percent of the Negro, poor, females aged 21–24 in the South voted in 1964). Surely any theory of the utility of voting must reflect and explain this difference. And this is what statement (2) demands by insisting that, for each individual, R be calculated in such a way that it is positive for voters and zero or negative for non-voters.

Empirical investigation has revealed numerous other facts about R. Not all of these appear to be relevant here; but at least one certainly is, so we point it out as an additional constraint on R. In a descriptive theory, R must be consonant with facts we already know. Hence this prior knowledge is a kind of constraint on the way R is calculated.

The constraint arises from the following fact: In election districts in which one party is completely dominant (e.g., the solid South as it existed from ca. 1880 to 1952), it is typically

⁵ U. S. Bureau of the Census, Current Population Reports Series P-20 #143, "Voter Participation in the National Election: November 1964," (Washington, 1965).

the case that many more people vote in the primary of the dominant party then in the general election. Signifying the primary with the subscript "1" and the general election with the subscript "2", this fact can be expressed

(3)
$$v_1 > v_2$$
.

For at least those voters included in V_1 but not in V_2 , it must be the case that

(4)
$$R_1 > R_2$$
.

It is probably true that (4) holds for those who vote in both elections as well; but we have no way of knowing for sure. And of course about those who do not vote in either election we know only that $R_1 \leq 0$ and $R_2 \leq 0$. But we can be sure that (4) holds for some voters.

The constraints on R, (2) and (4), are obvious; but they are not trivial for they permit some methods of calculating R and prohibit others.

II. A REINTERPRETATION OF B AND C

It has usually been assumed that B, representing the gain from the success of one's favored candidate, is always positive and C, representing the cost of voting, is always a subtraction in equation (1). These assumptions, B>0 and (-C)<0, seem needlessly restrictive and perhaps unrealistic and so we reopen the discussion of them.

In Downs' analysis B is calculated for an individual, i, thus:

(5)
$$B_i = E(U_{t+1})_i - E(U_{t+1})_i$$
 where

 U^x is the utility for the individual of the election of candidate x,

$$x = 1, 2$$


 $(U^1)_i > (U^2)_i$

t is a time period E(U) is expected value of U

so that B is simply the difference in expected utility, for the individual of the election of his favored candidate over the election of his disfavored one. As such, of course, it is always positive or zero. Similarly C is the collection of time spent on the voting decision, the act of voting itself, etc. Since time itself is always costly, C is always to be subtracted in equation (1). Unfortunately, this incomplete analysis of the act of voting has been followed by most other analysts.

- ⁶ Downs refines (5) considerably and we refer the reader to his work cited, pp. 38-47, for the full presentation.
- ⁷ Downs, of course, recognizes that his is an incomplete analysis of the act of voting. Because

TABLE 1. CATEGORIZATION OF EFFECTS ON THE EXPECTED UTILITY OF VOTING



If, however, we consider voting as a selfcontained act with a set of associated effects on expected utility, some of which are positive and some negative, then we can approach the matter more realistically, for we have put the act of voting in a fuller context. In (1), we apparently distinguish between those parameters of the utility function for which the magnitude is dependent on the individual's contribution to the occurrence of a favorable outcome and those parameters of the utility function for which the magnitude is independent of his contribution. That is, B is multiplied by P, while C is not. This suggests a categorization of the effects on expected utility into those which are dependent on the outcome and those which are not. And each of these categories can be further subdivided into positive and negative effects. Hence we get Table 1.

of the particular theory of rationality he adopted. however, he was unable to include other considerations. Rationality may be interpreted broadly as the ability to order preferences and to choose the more preferred action over the less preferred. In this sense, almost all behavior is rational and the assumption of rationality is close to tautological. Because he thinks the tautology is sterile, Downs rejects this definition of rationality, which is the one customarily used by economists, for a narrower interpretation in which rational behavior is only that behavior directed toward the goals that the theorist postulates as appropriate for a particular realm of action. As a result Downs cannot include "non-political" benefits (i.e. those calculated in (7) but not in (1)) in his analysis, although many of the benefits he cannot include are clearly political. It seems to us that he is unduly bothered by the tautology, which after all does affirm something, namely that people calculate about their actions and that Since category (6 (b)) is what has hitherto been called "B" and category (6(c)) what has hitherto been called "C", we need not concern ourselves further with them and can concentrate on interpreting (6(a)) and (6(d)). Let (6(a)) = A and (6(d)) = D.

Both A and C are kinds of costs, which have not previously been distinguished, probably because only the costs in C are universal. Nevertheless costs in A can exist. Consider an election without a secret ballot (as still occurs in one state) in which a Negro farm laborer votes for a candidate opposed by his white employer. The amount of reprisal the laborer can expect is presumably related to the amount of rancor the employer feels. And this will doubtless be greatest if the employer's favored candidate loses by a narrow margin. Hence it will probably not much hurt the laborer to vote for a candidate who loses or who wins by a wide margin; but it may hurt him considerably to vote for a candidate who just barely wins. Such circumstances of course exist even under the secret ballot if the employee reveals his preference to his employer or the part of the laborer is played by one spouse and of the employer by the other.

The variable A appears to be a rather com-

their calculations can be understood by others. It seems to us also that in a descriptive theory it is unwise for the theorist to impose his own interpretation of goals on the observed behavior. By so doing, he falls into the trap (that all the natural law theorists fall into) of saying that one goal is rational and another is not. Because it is not possible to judge the "rationality" of goals—unless one adopts some sort of natural law theory—we will adopt here the broader interpretation of rationality, recognizing its tautological character, in order to develop a theory that may more adequately describe behavior.

plex function of the election returns and P. Since the magnitude of A is, in the foregoing example and probably generally, dependent on the margin of victory of the employer's less preferred candidate, the expected utility loss to the employee can be written as Pf(M), A = f(M) and M = margin of victory. Because A is probably both non-universal and complexly related to R, we think it likely that formal incorporation of A in the analysis will yield little payoff. We therefore neglect it from this point on.

Although the costs in A are probably rare in the real world, the benefits in D are substantial and their omission from (1) seriously impairs its adequacy. Among these elements in D are the following positive satisfactions:

- 1. the satisfaction from compliance with the ethic of voting, which if the citizen is at all socialized into the democratic tradition is positive when he votes and negative (from guilt) when he does not.
- 2. the satisfaction from affirming allegiance to the political system: For many people, this is probably the main rationale for voting. It is also a highly political motive and to leave it out of the calculus would be absurd.
- 3. the satisfaction from affirming a partisan preference: Voting gives the citizen the chance to stand up and be counted for the candidate he supports. For many voters this must be the most important and politically significant feature of voting. Why else vote so determinedly for a candidate whom the voter knows is almost certainly going to lose or, for that matter, going to win? In the United States, millions of Stevenson supporters did that in 1956 and millions of others in 1964 for Goldwater, two sets for which there was probably very little overlap. Some of these millions must surely have been clear-headed enough to see how poor were their hero's chances. And for this clearheaded group at least, the major satisfaction in voting must certainly have been this one. Of course, it is relevant for those who support a winning candidate also.
- 4. the satisfaction of deciding, going to the polls, etc.: These items are usually regarded as costs, but for those who enjoy the act of informing themselves for the decision, who get social satisfactions out of going to the polling booth, etc., these supposed costs are actually benefits.
- 5. the satisfaction of affirming one's efficacy in the political system: The theory of democracy asserts that individuals and voting are meaningful and for most people

the only chance to fulfill this role is in the voting booth.

Doubtless there are other satisfactions that do not occur to us at the moment; but this list is sufficient to indicate the nature of D. It should be noted that most of the items, and the most significant items, are political satisfactions or benefits and therefore must be included in any consideration of the political rewards of voting.

Equation (1) can now be rewritten:

$$(7) R = PB - C + D$$

III. CONSTRAINTS ON P

For many voters, the weightiest parameters of R are C and D. It may be tempting, therefore, to disregard P and B. But this is unreasonable, as the following illustration suggests: Consider a primary election in which the only candidates are those for a non-partisan judicial office. (Some states actually conduct such trivial elections.) Naturally the participation is very low, but still as much as ten percent of those registered vote. The usual incentives summarized by D are far less influential, so that for most citizens $C > D \ge 0$. For those who do not vote, it must be that C > (D+PB). For those who do vote, however, it is probably also true that D is very small or zero, since voters are subject to the same influences rendering D small as are non-voters. So, for at least some voters it must be the case that C > D. Yet they can become voters, given the constraint of (2) only if PB > (C-D). We can be sure in such an election that P is vastly larger than usual in elections in the same jurisdiction. Hence, even if B is smaller than usual, PB may be relatively large. It is not unreasonable to suppose, therefore, that what impels the (admittedly small number of) voters in such elections to be voters is the size of PB. And if we can see the force of PB in elections like this one, it can be supposed to operate for some voters in other elections.

Even if we can have some confidence that voters exist for whom the size of (PB) is an incentive to vote, we are still faced with a difficult problem of calculating P and (PB). Although Downs' number, E(U), in (5), may result from the method of calculating P that we shall subsequently propose, he does not discuss the operator E and we cannot be sure just what he intended. Tullock uses P, but does not explain his calculation so that we can only infer his method of calculation from his examples. Most of the unpublished analyses we have seen or heard, however, assume either:

$$(8) P = v^{-1}$$

which is attractive because it is the Shapley value when voters are weighted equally, or

$$(9) P = \left(\frac{v+1}{2}\right)^{-1}$$

Statement (8) is the chance that a voter casts the last necessary vote for the winning candidate. Statement (9) is the chance that a voter on the winning side casts the deciding vote. Tullock apparently uses (9). Both (8) and (9) are unreasonable, however, as the following argument shows: Given, for a one-party state, a primary, 1, and a general election, 2, in which the same man wins both. We assume $v_1 > v_2$, for reasons indicated in our argument leading to (4). Since the same candidate is involved in both elections, for those who favor that candidate, either $B_1 = B_2$ or (since B is a differential benefit and thus likely to be larger in the general election) $B_1 < B_2$. (While it might be argued that in special cases $B_1 > B_2$, as when, for a conservative voter, a conservative defeats a liberal in a primary and faces another conservative in the general election, we can nevertheless assume that in most one-party states $B_1 < B_2$ if only because the party attachment is itself so strong—as in the solid South in the 1920's and 1930's.) We can easily assume that $C_1 = C_2$. And similarly we can also assume D constant so that $D_1 = D_2$. We then have the pair of equations

(10)
$$R_1 = P_1 B_1 - C + D$$
$$R_2 = P_2 B_2 - C + D$$

in which the C and D terms can be combined as a constant, k. Substituting (8) into (10) we get

(11)
$$R_1 = v_1^{-1}B_1 + k$$

$$R_2 = v_2^{-1}B_2 + k$$

Since $v_1 > v_2$, it follows that $v_1^{-1} < v_2^{-1}$. We have two cases:

1. $B_1 = B_2$. In this case, $R_i = v_i^{-1}B_i + k$, so that $R_2 > R_1$.

⁸ L. S. Shapley, "A Value for n-Person Games," Annals of Mathematics Study #28 (Princeton, 1953), pp. 307-317. See also L. S. Shapley and M. Shubik, "A Method for Evaluating the Distribution of Power in a Committee System," this Review, 48 (1954), 787-792.

⁹ It might be argued that $C_1 > C_2$ owing to the fact that in an area of strong partisanship, the party label reduces the cost of decision in the general election to zero. If this is true then the argument in the text is even more persuasive because B_1 must then be even greater than B_2 for v_1 to be greater than v_2 .

2. $B_1 < B_2$. In this case, $R_i = v_i^{-1}B_i + k$. Because R_2 is the product of the larger number of the pair (v_1^{-1}, v_2^{-1}) and the larger number from the pair (B_1, B_2) , again $R_2 > R_1$. But to say $R_2 > R_1$ is a direct violation of condition (4), which is $R_1 > R_2$. Indeed any form of P in which the major component is 1/v, as in (8) or (9), necessarily violates (4). Hence we may reject such methods of calculation of P as (8) and (9) as unrealistic.

Approaching the task of calculating P in a way that seems to us to accord with the thought processes of a citizen who is trying to decide whether or not to vote, we ignore D initially because it in part involves considerations arising outside of the context of the election at hand. The citizen has two alternatives. to vote and not to vote; and the state of the world can be that his preferred candidate either wins or loses. If a citizen votes and his candidate wins, he receives the utility to him of the victory of his candidate, U141, to use Downs' terminology, less, of course, the cost of voting, C. So we can write, for a particular voter, U^{1}_{t+1} -C, which is the reward to that voter when he votes and his preferred candidate wins. When his preferred candidate loses, the voter's reward is U^2_{t+1} -C. But, of course, his candidate has only the subjectively estimated chance, q say, of winning, where $0 \le q \le 1$. Therefore the expected utility of voting is:

$$q(U_{i+1}-C)+(1-q)(U_{i+1}-C)$$

As for the citizen who does not vote, he receives (U^1_{t+1}) with the probability q' and (U^2_{t+1}) with the probability (1-q'); of course, he has no cost of voting. This information is summarized in Table 2, where the entries in the cells are the utility outcomes for the citizen times their probability of occurring, given his choice of alternatives and the state of the world.

TABLE 2. EXPECTED UTILITY FOR VOTING AND NON-VOTING

	Possible Results of Election		
	1 wins	2 wins	
Citizen votes	$\overline{q(U^1_{t+1}-C)}$	$(1-q) (U^2_{\iota+1}-C)$	
Citizen does not vote	$q'(U^1_{t+1})$	$(1-q') \ (U^2_{t+1})$	

The marginal reward the citizen, *i*, gets from voting is then the sum of the outcomes in row 1 less the sum of the outcomes in row 2.

(12)
$$R_{i} = \left[q(U^{1}_{t+1} - C) + (1 - q)(U^{2}_{t+1} - C) \right] \\ - \left[q'(U^{1}_{t+1}) + (1 - q')(U^{2}_{t+1}) \right] \\ = qU^{1}_{t+1} - qC + U^{2}_{t+1} - C - qU^{2}_{t+1} \\ + qC - q'U^{1}_{t+1} - U^{2}_{t+1} + q'U^{2}_{t+1}$$

(13)
$$R_i = (q - q')(U_{t+1} - U_{t+1}) - C$$

Setting P = (q-q') and $B = (U^1_{++1}-U^2_{++1})$, equation (13) is another form of equation (1). With the addition of D to the right side, it becomes (7).

Despite the similarity of (13) to (1) and (7), however, we have learned something new from the analysis, specifically,

$$(14) P = q - q'$$

and from (14) we have some notion of how P might be calculated.

But in order to calculate it exactly we need to know more about q and q' which are probability numbers, specifically probabilities that 1 will win when i does (or does not) vote. In order to define q and q' precisely, we offer the following definitions:

(15) "pr [1; x]" means "the probability that candidate 1 will receive exactly x votes;" (while pr [1; x] is a subjective probability, we assume that it behaves like an objective probability so that

$$\sum_{i=1}^{n} pr[1;x] = 1);^{10}$$

where there are v voters, $0 < v \le n$, the decision rule for winning is that the winner must receive at least m votes where, if v is even, m = (v/2) + 1, and, if t is odd, m = (v+1)/2;

We now define q and q', when there are v voters in addition to voter i: if v is odd

(16)
$$q = \operatorname{pr}\left[1; \frac{v+1}{2} + 1\right] + \operatorname{pr}\left[1; \frac{v+1}{2} + 2\right] + \cdots + \operatorname{pr}\left[1; v+1\right];$$
$$q' = \operatorname{pr}\left[1; \frac{v+1}{2}\right] + \operatorname{pr}\left[1; \frac{v+1}{2} + 1\right] + \cdots + \operatorname{pr}\left[1; v\right];$$

and if v is even

(17)
$$q = \operatorname{pr}\left[1; \frac{v}{2} + 1\right] + \operatorname{pr}\left[1; \frac{v}{2} + 2\right] + \cdots + \operatorname{pr}[1; v + 1];$$
$$q' = \operatorname{pr}\left[1; \frac{v}{2} + 1\right] + \operatorname{pr}\left[1; \frac{v}{2} + 2\right] + \cdots + \operatorname{pr}[1; v];$$

¹⁰ In the general case, since we are dealing with subjective probabilities, we may write $\sum_{x=1}^{v} px$ [1; x] = A, where A is any positive number.

or more concisely

(16a)
$$q = \sum_{x=(v+1)/2+1}^{v+1} \operatorname{pr}[1; x];$$
 (odd)
$$q' = \sum_{x=(v+1)/2}^{v} \operatorname{pr}[1; x];$$
 (17a)
$$q = \sum_{x=v/2+1}^{v+1} \operatorname{pr}[1; x];$$
 (even)
$$q' = \sum_{x=v/2+1}^{v} \operatorname{pr}[1; x].$$

Note that, if v is odd, then q and q' both contain (v+1)/2 terms, while, if v is even, q' contains v/2 terms and q contains (v/2)+1 terms. This curious fact can be readily explained: When v is odd, the addition of the citizen who decides to vote increases both the number of voters and the number required to win by one, so that q and q' contain the same number of terms. But when v is even, the addition of the citizen who decides to vote increases the number of voters by one but does not change the number required to win, so that q has one more term than q'.

We now need to prove a modest lemma about the terms in the definition of q and q' and for this purpose we need the additional notation that "pr_v [1; x]" means "the probability, when there are v votes cast, that 1 receives x votes" and an axiom:

(18) The preference for a member of V between candidates 1 and 2 remains unchanged when the set of voters is expanded by voter i to $(V \cup [i])$.

This axiom is probably realistic when there are hundreds or millions of voters but it may not be totally realistic when, e.g., v=5, since it is possible that a voter, j, change sides from 2 to 1 or 1 to 2 just and only because a voter, i, who prefers 1 is added to the system. Such bandwagon and repulsion effects are probably limited to small committees, however; and so we assume (18).

We now prove:

(19) If voter i intends to vote for candidate 1, and $p_1 = \operatorname{pr}_v[1; x]$, and $p_2 = \operatorname{pr}_{v+1}[1; x+1]$, then $p_1 = p_2$

Assume citizen i believes p_1 exists when he does not vote and then adds his own vote to the system to produce p_2 . He knows, of course, that his vote will be cast for 1 for certain, while by (18) the probability distribution remains unchanged for other voters. Hence the probability, p_2 , that 1 receives x+1 votes in the expanded system is at least as great as the probability, p_1 , that 1 receive x votes in the smaller




Fig. 1(a): v odd

system. That is, (18) forbids $p_1 > p_2$; hence at most, $p_1 = p_2$.

Assume $p_1 < p_2$; Then it follows that

(20)
$$\sum_{x=0}^{v} \operatorname{pr}_{v}[1;x] < \sum_{x=0}^{v} \operatorname{pr}_{v+1}[1;x+1] \cdot$$

But this is impossible because by the definition of probability numbers (15) both sides of (20) must equal one. The assumption, $p_1 < p_2$, thus leads to a contradiction. So it must be that $p_1 = p_2$ as stated in (19).

It is now possible to prove an identity about P:

(21)
$$P = q - q' = \frac{1}{2} \operatorname{pr}_{v} \left[1; \frac{v}{2} \right]$$

There are two cases:

1. v is odd. In this case, q - q' = 0. Consider a typical term in q', e.g. $a' = \operatorname{pr}_v [1; k]$, where $(v+1)/2 \le k \le v$. By reason of (19) there must be in q a term, $a = \operatorname{pr}_{v+1} [1; k+1]$, such that a = a'. Since by (16) q and q' have the same number of terms, the expression, q - q', must consist of a series of subtractions, a - a' = 0, so that q - q' = 0.

2. v is even. In this case, $q - q' = \operatorname{pr}_v[1; v/2]$. For all terms a' in q', there is, by (19), a matching term a in q such that a - a' = 0. But q contains one more term than q'. This additional term must be $b = \operatorname{pr}_{v+1}[1; v/2+1]$ because the term matched with it by (19) is $b' = \operatorname{pr}_v[1; v/2]$, which is not in q'. Hence it must be that $q - q' = b = b' = \operatorname{pr}_v[1; v/2]$.

Since case 1 may be expected to occur with a probability of $\frac{1}{2}$, we get, when we sum the outcomes in the two cases,

$$P = \frac{1}{2}[q - q' = 0] + \frac{1}{2}[q - q' = \text{pr}_v[1; v/2]]$$

= \frac{1}{2} \text{pr}_v[1; v/2]. Q.E.D.

Statement (21) lends itself readily to a verbal interpretation: the probability that i will by voting influence the outcome is exactly one-half his subjective estimate of the chance that, if i does not vote, a tie will occur. His influence is thus a function of his chance to break a tie. This result can perhaps be conveyed more effectively from a geometric interpretation. In Figure 1(a), we have depicted the case where v is odd. On the horizontal axis is recorded the number of votes 1 can receive, x, where (0 or $1 \le x \le (v \text{ or } v+1)$. On the vertical axis is recorded the probability that 1 receive x votes. As is apparent from (21) and Figure 1(a), a'=a and hence

$$\sum_{x=(v+1)/2}^{v} (a')_x = \sum_{x=(v+1)/2+1}^{v+1} (a)_x$$

and hence q - q' = 0.

Figure 1(b) depicts the case where v is even. In Figure 1(b), $a_1' = \operatorname{pr}_v[1; v/2+1] = a_1 = \operatorname{pr}_{v+1}[1; v/2+2]$ and so on to $a_n' = \operatorname{pr}_v[1; v] = a_v = \operatorname{pr}_{v+1}[1; v+1]$, just as in Figure 1(a). But in Figure (1b) there is an unmatched probability in q, namely $b = \operatorname{pr}_{v+1}[1; v/2+1] = b' = \operatorname{pr}_v[1; v/2]$. Clearly b' is not in q', while b is in q. Hence in the case where v is even, the addition of i makes a difference.

Statement (21) that $P = \frac{1}{2} \operatorname{pr}_{v}[1; v/2]$ permits us to make an additional statement about an important property of P. Let x_0 be the value of x for which $\operatorname{pr}_{v}[1; x]$ is at its maximum. Then, assuming the variance is constant, as x_0 approaches v/2, P increases. That is, the higher the probability of a tie without the voter and as subjectively estimated by the voter, the higher is P. In more conventional terms, the closer




Fig. 1(b): v even

the anticipated outcome the higher is P. P is thus a function of the estimated closeness of the vote. This fact can be visualized as in Figure 2. There are two distributions in this figure, j and j', with approximately equivalent variances and with two maximum pr, [1; x] at x_0 and x'_0 . Clearly P is greater in j than in j' because r > r', where r and r' are the points of intersection between j and j' and a perpendicular line at point v/2. Note that this property of P, where P=qq', avoids the contradiction with (4) that occurred when P was calculated as in (8) and (9). In those equations, P was a function of the number of voters, regardless of the location of x_0 , and this is what led to the contradiction. In (21), however, P is a function of the location of x_0 and the number of voters, thereby avoiding the contradiction. For those voters who vote in the primary but not the general election, it may be the case that P_1 (in the primary) is substantially larger than P_2 (in the general election).

In the foregoing argument, we have assumed that the variance is constant. This need not be so. Indeed the probability density function for a particular voter is a function of certainty. Thus a voter who honestly says he doesn't know how the election will turn out has a density function as depicted in Figure 3(a), while a voter who says he is quite sure might have a density function like Figure 3(b). Therefore, for a voter, i, who believes the outcome less certain than does a voter j, i's P may be greater than j's, even though x_0^i may be closer




Fig. 2





Fig. 3


to v/2 than x_0^i . This situation is depicted in Figure 4. Clearly P is a very complicated number since it is a function of both x_0 and the subjective variance around x_0 .¹¹

In the proof of statement (21) we supposed the probabilities were discrete, while in the argument of the foregoing paragraph we have implied they are continuous, a confusion we must now clear up. In small electorates, a discrete probability density function is prob-

11 The variance is a function of certainty and certainty is in turn a highly complicated function of information such that increases in information may either increase or decrease certainty. For example, information about opinion surveys taken closer and closer to the election and showing a large and sustained majority for one candidate might increase certainty while information about opinion surveys showing an increase in undecided voters as the election approached might decrease certainty.

ably descriptively accurate, whereas in large societies like ours it may not be, for it is hard to imagine a voter estimating, e.g., pr [1; 37,492, 203]. (We are supposedly describing a rational voter and the reasonableness of such a calculation escapes us.) But if the voter assumes a continuous density function, then pr [1; x] = 0, even when x=v/2, because in general for continuous densities Pr[x] = f(x) = 0. Hence statement (21) is rendered trivial in that P=0. (Doubtless it was this fact about large electorates that led to the use of $P = v^{-1}$, as in statements (8) and (9).) There is, however, a way out of this contretemps. In probability theory it is assumed that, although Pr[x] = f(x)= 0, still $0 \le f_{\delta}f(x) \le 1$. That is, for some interval. δ , in the domain of f(x), there will be a Pr[x] > 0. Hence, for the continuous density shown in Figure 5, P would be calculated as approximately r rather than zero. This method of calculation is not behaviorally unrealistic. It _assumes, however, that the citizen knows what





the turnout will be, which of course he does not. Behaviorally, it is probably more accurate to assume that his perceptions of electoral outcomes are not-based on absolute vote totals but on percentages. Hence he probably evaluates P by estimating pr [1; $v_1/v = .5$], where v_1 is the number of votes received by candidate 1. And when the horizontal axis is in terms of percentages rather than absolute numbers, it is reasonable to suppose that the points are thought of as discrete. Like Schelling's "tacit coordination points," certain points (e.g. .50, .505, .51, .55, .60, etc.) stand out as foci for citizens' perceptions. Hence we can return once more to our analysis which employed discrete density functions without loss of generality so that equation (21) becomes

(21')
$$P = \frac{1}{2} \operatorname{pr}_{r}[1; v/2] \cong \frac{1}{2} \operatorname{pr}[1; (v_{1}/v) = .5].$$

IV. A TEST OF THE THEORY—INTRODUCTORY COMMENTS


We now have a theory about the individual calculus of voting which is at least consistent with some known facts about the decision to vote and mildly compelling because it has been constructed out of a careful analysis of the voting calculus under the assumption of incividual rationality. But it is still not intuitive y convincing, for our only major difference in (7), i.e., R = PB - C + D, from (1), i.e., R=PB-C, is the addition of D in the former equation. Thus we have provided an excuse 50 render R positive for all voters. But we have said nothing to alter the intuitively persuasive supposition that PB-C<0. And if this intitive supposition is correct, then we have simply made voting rational by saying that the decision to vote by those who have been socialized to vote is a rational decision. So it appears that the rational calculation is based on habit and not on judgments about the candidates and the electoral situation.

By reason of our detailed analysis of P and B, however, we are in a stronger position than is suggested in the previous paragraph. Our theory makes it possible to infer statements about how voters behave in particular situations and these inferences can, of course, be subjected to an empirical test. In particular, our theory allows us to say something about the way voters calculate P and B so that we can discover whether or not P and B are ever large enough to determine a positive R. Our previous analysis shows that voters might reasonably: (1) Assume the probability density function is continuous and that P=0, in which case the only components of the voting decision would be the magnitudes of D and C. (2) Assume that the function is continuous and evaluate P with a δ approximation or assume that it is discrete, defined over a domain of percentages, and evaluate $P = \sim \frac{1}{2} \Pr [1; (v_1/v) = .5]$. Whether or not voters follow the second procedure is a testable proposition, where the hypothesis tested is: In the United States in some recent elections some voters employ a calculation of P and B to decide whether or not to vote. In the remaining sections, therefore, we set forth the result of a test of this hypothesis, which indicates that P and B are significant components of the calculus of voting. To the degree that this evidence is persuasive, the whole equation is a useful description of behavior, while eliminating the implication of irrationality mentioned at the end of Section I.

The data we use in our test are questions asked by the Survey Research Center of the University of Michigan in surveys conducted in connection with the 1952, 1956, and 1960 Presidential elections.¹² We infer from our theory the kind of responses that should be expected to some of these questions. If the responses are in fact substantially those dictated by the inferences, as they indeed are, then we can regard the theory as verified. Incidentally we note that, historically, the development of the theory preceded by several months the test we are about to report. The relation of theory to experiment is, therefore, exactly that demanded in the notion of a deductive explanation of behavior.

Consider an individual citizen for whom we can assume D and C constant over several elections. Assuming P and B to vary, we then have three cases

¹² The data utilized in this study were made available by the Inter-University Consortium for Political Research and were originally collected by the Survey Research Center of the University of Michigan.



- (a) D > C. Since $PB \ge 0$, R is positive and the individual always votes.
- (b) $D \le C$. For those elections in which PB > C D, R is positive and the individual votes.
- (c) $D \le C$. For those elections in which $PB \le C D$, then $R \le 0$ and the individual does not vote.

Unfortunately it is probably impossible to obtain empirical evidence about the calculus of voting for one individual, if only because D and C probably do not remain constant over time. So we attempt instead to make analogous predictions about groups of individuals. Consider a set of citizens who can be assigned to subsets such that, for those in each subset, D stands at about the same height on their preference scales. Suppose we have also some way of estimating the variables P and B for those in each subset. Then, we predict that, for those in a particular subset, those with a high (PB) would be more likely to vote than those with a low (PB). This prediction can be stated systematically thus: Let "pr [ai]" signify "the probability that a citizen in cell a_i votes" so that from Figure 6 we obtain the following predictions as indicated by the arrows which can be read as signs of the inequality "greater than": $pr[a_1] > pr[a_2]$; $pr[a_1] > pr[a_3]$; $pr[a_1]$ >pr $[a_4]$; pr $[a_2]>$ pr $[a_4]$; pr $[a_3]>$ pr $[a_4]$.

In every cell we would expect the occurrence of some individuals covered by case (c), i.e. D < C, so that we would expect typically that pr $[a_i] < 1$. And we would expect some individuals covered by case (a) to appear in all cells so that typically $\Pr[a_i] > 0$. But we would expect a greater probability of finding a case (b) individual in cell a_1 than in cells a_2 , a_3 , and a_4 and a lesser probability of finding a case (b) individual in cell a_4 than in cells a_2 and a_3 . Note that we make no prediction about the relation of $\Pr[a_2]$ to $\Pr[a_3]$. Given equation (7) we should be able to make such a prediction; but our method of testing is far too gross to verify any prediction about this relation, so we

attempt none here. Nevertheless, if our predictions are verified with respect to the relations stated in Figure 6, we believe that we have shown that for persons in categories (b) and (c) the calculus in equation (7) is actually carried out.

V. THE OPERATIONAL ESTIMATORS OF P, B, C, D, and pr $[a_i]$

For the operationalization of P, we have the pre-election interview responses to a question asked in each quadrennial survey from 1952 to 1960 about how close the respondent believed the outcome of the Presidential election would be. Since, as we have already shown, when $P = q - q' = \text{pr}_v$ [1; v/2]/2 and the variance remains constant, P increases as x_0 approaches v/2, it follows that the closer the respondent believes the outcome will be the higher his subjective estimate of P. We assume that the variance is constant.13 Since the SRC offered the respondents several degrees of closeness, we simplified the data by dichotomizing: All those who were in the two lowest categories of closeness, we said had a low P, while those in the other categories we said had a high P.¹⁴

For the operationalization of B, we have the pre-election interview responses to a question asked in the same surveys as to how much the respondent "cares" about the outcome of the

¹³ An operationally equivalent assumption is that the variance of the probability density function is randomly distributed, independently of x_0 . Hence those citizens with a subjective x_0 "close" to v/2 are expected to have a higher P than those whose x_0 is "far" from v/2.

¹⁴ It is conceivable that some people who have a high P by this operationalization actually view the probability density as continuous so that for them P=0 rather than $P=\frac{1}{2}$ pr [1; v/2]. If some "low" P persons are by this error of operationalization included in the "high" P category, our predictions are of course rendered more difficult to verify.

Presidential election. Since we have already assumed $B = U^1_{i+1} - U^2_{i+1}$, the greater the differential benefit from the election of his favored candidate, the more the voter can be expected to "care" about the outcome. The answers of this question are, therefore, estimates of B. Again, since the SRC offered the respondents several degrees of "caring", we simplified the data by dichotomizing: All those in the two highest categories of caring had, we said, a high B, while those in the remaining categories had a low B.

For the operationalization of pr $[a_i]$ we have the post-election interview responses to the question of whether or not the respondent recalled having voted. To estimate pr $[a_i]$ we can construct a ratio, v/n, where v is the number in cell a_i who said they recalled having voted and n is the number of persons in cell a_i as determined by their estimates of P and B. This ratio, v/n, is the percentage of voters in the cell and we can, grossly, interpret it as the probability that any individual in the cell is in fact a voter. So for purposes of estimating, we say pr $[a_i] = v/n$.

There is some ambiguity in the operationalization of P, B, and pr $[a_i]$; but we think it does not materially disturb the outcome. When respondents are asked whether or not they care about the outcome and whether or not they think it will be close, the question speciacally refers to the Presidential election only. When citizens vote, however, they actual y vote in several elections simultaneously. Each voter can be expected to have a vector \vec{P} of \vec{P} 's and a vector \overrightarrow{B} of B's, where each pair of elements in \overrightarrow{P} and \overrightarrow{B} relate to one office, e.g. President, governor, register of deeds, etc. In the voter's calculation of R, therefore, all the PB terms are summed. Since $P \ge 0$ and $B \ge 0$, the new marginal utility of voting, E', say, is greater than R. But $R' \ge R$ for voters n all cells, a:. Hence, if we hold D constant as we intend to do, the inflation of R' should not materially affect the outcome of the test.

In the operationalization of P, B, and $\neg r$ $[a_i]$, we have had a gross but intuitively unobjectionable procedure. Turning to the operationalization of D and C, however, we have a more difficult task with a more dubious result. For the operational estimate of D we have a so-called sense of citizen duty scale which the SRC constructed out of responses to four questions about the duty to vote asked in the pre-election interviews. According $\overleftarrow{}$ to

¹⁸ Unfortunately the SRC did not ask the appropriate questions in 1964 so that we cannot use

Campbell, Gurin, and Miller, the scale of the sense of citizen duty has a high degree of internal consistency (i.e., an index of reproducibility of .96). Given this consistency, to the degree that the sense of citizen duty scale captures the essence of the notion of D, we can regard this scale as an operationalization of D.

The index of citizen duty yields five scale scores. The bulk of the respondents scored I or II, while the lower three scores each occur with considerably less frequency. In order to avoid practically empty cells, therefore, we collapsed the last three categories into one so that we had:

- I. high sense of citizen duty (score I on the scale)—high D
- II. medium sense of citizen duty (score II on the scale)—medium D
- III. low sense of citizen duty (scores III-V on the scale)—low D

We regarded the persons in each category of D as having approximately the same level of D on their scales of preference. This interpretation may seem to involve some interpersonal comparison of utility, which, of course, we wish to avoid. We think it does not, however, because we have simply categorized respondents into those for whom D is high, medium, or low on their own individual scales and thus we believe we avoid interpersonal comparison. In any event, we propose by this means to hold D constant in one of three categories. ¹⁶

other data from that year in our analysis. The sense of citizen duty scale is fully described in A. Campbell, G. Gurin and W. E. Miller, *The Voter Decides* (Evanston, 1954), pp. 194-199.

¹⁶ The constancy of D is open to some technical question. The SRC ceased in 1964 to collect the necessary information, first, because the scale of citizen duty turned out to be very similar to the scale of the sense of political efficacy, which was more useful for SRC purposes, and, second, because it seemed possible that the four questions on the sense of citizen duty scale might be contaminated by a positive response set. Their first reason for the rejection of the scale is not immediately relevant to our concerns. Their second reason, if true, does, however, bias the data in favor of our predictions. Suppose some persons with an actually low D are included (by reason of response set) in our categories I and II of high and medium D. They will then lower the percentage of voters in these categories. And if low D is associated with not caring about the outcome of the election so that these low D's add disproportionately to the non-carers, their presence among the non-carers in category I or II will

The operationalization of C is somewhat arbitrary. We assume that C and D are not positively correlated and that C is constant in each category of D. In fact, it seems likely that C and D are negatively correlated. That is, if the halo effects of voting (D) are high, then the costs of voting (C) are low simply because the citizen who believes it is terribly important to vote is likely to minimize costs of voting while the citizen who thinks voting is unimportant is likely to maximize costs of voting.

VI. A TEST OF THE THEORY

Concerning the answers to questions in the three surveys, we offer the following predictions:

1. For each election in the set K, $k_1 = 1952$, $k_2 = 1956$, $k_3 = 1960$, and for each category of D, i.e., (I, II, III), it is the case that

$$pr[a_{i,I}]_{k_j} > pr[a_{i,II}]_{k_j} > pr[a_{i,III}]_{k_j}$$

 $j = 1, 2, 3$

This prediction is essentially a test of our operationalization of D. If it were the case that the predicted relation did not hold, we would not be able to affirm that D had been held constant.

2. For each category of D, $d_1=I$, $d_2=III$, $d_3=III$ and for each election, k_j , j=1,2,3, it is the case that

$$\begin{array}{l} \text{pr } [a_1]_{d_ik_j} > \text{pr } [a_2]_{d_ik_j} \\ \text{pr } [a_1]_{d_ik_j} > \text{pr } [a_3]_{d_ik_j} \\ \text{pr } [a_1]_{d_ik_j} > \text{pr } [a_4]_{d_ik_j} \\ \text{pr } [a_2]_{d_ik_j} > \text{pr } [a_4]_{d_ik_j} \\ \text{pr } [a_2]_{d_ik_j} > \text{pr } [a_4]_{d_ik_j} \end{array}$$

The data for testing these predictions is set forth in Table 3 where each cell contains $v/n = \text{pr } [a_i]$.

As is indicated in Table 4, prediction 1 is true (T) in 23 out of 24 cases.¹⁷ The one case in which it is false (F) involves a cell in which n=4, by far the smallest n in any cell. We

make it easier to verify our hypothesis that those who care about the outcome are more likely to vote than those who do not care. If, however, this bias, for our purposes, was significant it would tend to wipe out differences among like a_i 's between categories. Since, as will be shown later, this does not occur, we may suppose that the response-set contamination of the scale of citizen duty is minimal.

¹⁷ This is the necessary confirmation of assumption, mentioned earlier, that the effect of response set is minimal. (See footnote 16.)

believe this one falsehood is well within the chance of sampling error and so we regard prediction 1 as well verified and we regard the operationalization of D as adequate. The test of prediction 2 is set forth in Table 5. As indicated in this table, the predicted differences occur in 42 out of 45 cases.

This high score for accuracy is, however, somewhat spurious, for the predictions are not independent. If pr $[a_1] > \text{pr } [a_2]$ and if pr $[a_2] > \text{pr } [a_4]$, then certainly pr $[a_1] > \text{pr } [a_4]$. Similarly, if pr $[a_1] > \text{pr } [a_3]$ and if pr $[a_3] > \text{pr } [a_4]$, then certainly pr $[a_1] > \text{pr } [a_4]$. So the prediction that pr $[a_1] > \text{pr } [a_4]$ is not independent of the other predictions. We can allow for this fact by eliminating it, although this is probably unduly harsh. The situation is: Let α_1 stand for the pair of predictions pr $[a_1] > \text{pr } [a_2]$ and pr $[a_2] > \text{pr } [a_4]$. Let α_2 stand for the pair of predictions pr $[a_1] > \text{pr } [a_3] > \text{pr } [a_4]$. Let α_3 stand for the prediction pr $[a_1] > \text{pr } [a_4]$. Then

if α_1	and α_2 ,	then α_3
${f T}$	${f T}$	${f T}$
${f T}$	${f F}$	${f T}$
\mathbf{F}	${f T}$	${f T}$
\mathbf{F}	${f F}$	T or F

so that in 3 cases (i.e. if either α_1 or α_2 are true) the truth value of α_3 is determined. But when α_1 and α_2 are both false, the truth value of α_3 is not determined. Therefore, the total elimination of α_3 sets an unreasonably high standard for our prediction to meet. Nevertheless, if we do eliminate it, we still have 33 accurate predictions out of 36.

It is possible to calculate a statistical significance level for the results set forth in Table 5. Since our 45 predictions involve some interdependence, we will interpret each row of Table 5 as an observation. Then we can calculate the significance of obtaining seven out of nine observations which support the hypothesis. It is possible for an observation to have one of 18 forms. (For example, rows 1952-I, 1952-III, and 1956-II represent three of these forms.) If both P and B had no effect on a voter's calculus, we would expect on each observation any one of the 18 forms to occur with equal likelihood. Hence, for our null hypothesis, each form would occur with a probability of 1/18. Only one form (i.e., that of row 1952-I, for example) agrees with our theory, however, so the chance of a validating observation would be 1/18 and the chance of an invalidating observation 17/18. Assuming equiprobability of the occurrence of forms, the significance level of only 2 invalidating observations is the sum of the probabilities of obtaining exactly

		PREDICTI	

		,	I		 , II		III		
•		_	$\operatorname{High} D$		 $\mathbf{Medium}\ D$			Low D	
			1	3	В			B	
1952			\mathbf{High}	Low	High	Low		High	Low
	P	High	$\frac{323}{362}$ = .89	$\frac{104}{124}$ = .84	$\frac{259}{310}$ = .84	$\frac{95}{141} = .67$		$\frac{86}{150}$ = .57	$\frac{73}{159}$ = .46
•	Ī.	Low	$\frac{85}{99} = .86$	$\frac{21}{27}$ = .78	$\frac{58}{75} = .77$	$\frac{17}{26} = .65$		$\frac{33}{54}$ = .61	$\frac{16}{32}$ = .50
1956						-	-		, ,
	··P	High	$\frac{376}{421}$ = .89	$\frac{160}{198}$ = .81.	$\frac{220}{274}$ = .80	$\frac{89}{137} = .65$		$\frac{56}{98} = .57$	$\frac{64}{156}$ = .40
•	Ρ	Low	$\frac{104}{129}$ = .81	$\frac{49}{63}$ = .77	$\frac{-64}{87} = .74$	$\frac{22}{30}$ = .73		$\frac{24}{46}$ = .52	$\frac{10}{38}$ = .26
1960		•							
	P.	High	$\frac{315}{335} = .94$	$\frac{128}{154} = .83$	$\frac{178}{198} = .90$	$\frac{79}{96}$ = .82		$\frac{52}{70}$ = .74	$\frac{42}{92} = .46$
	Γ	Low	$\frac{37}{41} = .90$	$\frac{8}{12} = .67$	$\frac{26}{33}$ = .79	$\frac{3}{4} = .75$		$\frac{8}{11} = .73$	$\frac{5}{12} = .42$

2, 1, and 0 invalidating observations. These probabilities and the significance level may be calculated using binomial probability thus:

significance level =
$$\sum_{x=0}^{2} {9 \choose x} \left(\frac{1}{18}\right)^{9-x} \left(\frac{17}{18}\right)^{x}$$

Using this method, the level of significance of our result is approximately .00000005, so that there is about one chance in twenty million that we have falsely asserted our hypothesis to be true. Hence we regard prediction 2, our main theory, as validated.¹⁸

VII. CONCLUSION

We started out with an intuitively persuasive theory, equation (1), which many people

18 If we drop from our calculations in Table 3 all those persons whom the SRC coded "not appropriate," "don't know," or "no answer" to the question about the closeness of the outcome (whom we have actually included in Table 3 in the "high" P category), then the results are somewhat improved. Two of the three bad predictions in Table 5 are eliminated and the level of significance increases.

believe to be false because it leads to counterintuitive conclusions. We refined this theory, equations (7) and (21), so that we could draw from it a non-obvious inference, i.e., that Pincreases as x_0 approaches v/2. We then presented evidence that, given the non-obvious inference, people actually behaved as the theory predicts; so we conclude that the theory is nevertheless true. We have therefore described the rational calculus that does in fact occur in the act of deciding whether or not to vote. And we are able to affirm that the behavior of most people can be described by a theory of rational decision-making. This is what we set out to do.

Nevertheless, those who find the conclusions from the theory counter-intuitive are bound to be dissatisfied, for they will wonder how their intuition went wrong. For their sake we offer the following observations:

1. It is likely that, for many people, the subjective estimate of P is higher than is reasonable, given the objective circumstances. Subjected as we are to constant reminders that a few hundred carefully selected votes by nonvoters could reverse the results of very close

TABLE 4. TEST OF PREDICTION 1

	$pr [a_1]_1 > pr [a_1]_{11} > pr [a_1]_{111}$	$pt [a_2]_1 > pr [a_2]_{11} > pr [a_2]_{111}$	•
1952	T	TT	
1956	${f T}$	$^{\cdot}$ T T	
1960	${f T}$ ${f T}$	T T	
	$pr [a_3]_1 > pr [a_3]_{11} > pr [a_5]_{111}$	$pr [a_4]_1 > pr [a_4]_{11} > pr [a_4]_{111}$	* ; *
1952	\mathbf{T}	\mathbf{T}	;
1956	. ${f T}$ ${f T}$	f T	
1960	${f T}$ ${f T}$	${f F}$ ${f T}$	

elections, such as the Presidential election of 1960, the subjectively estimated chance of a tie (i.e., P) may be as high as the propaganda urges it to be, even though in objective calculations the chance of a tie may be low.

2. It is likely that B is much higher for many people than anyone has heretofore supposed:

3. We have not, of course, completely eliminated instances of possible irrationality from the system. One wonders, for example, why, out of the 4294 respondents, the 104 who cared deeply, believed the outcome close, had a high sense of citizen duty, nevertheless did not vote (i.e., the non-voters of a_1 , Category I, assuming—what may be false—that they were eligible to vote); and why the 31 who cared little, believed the outcome not close, had a low sense of citizen duty, nevertheless did note (i.e., the voters of a_4 , Category III).

By the foregoing comments we believe we have explained most of the difficulties that led previous thinkers to decide that the intuitively satisfying equation (1) led to counter-intuitive results. Therefore, we reaffirm the validity of the intuitively satisfying equation (7).

The development of any science is characterized, in the beginning, by some conceptualization and a great deal of operationalization of notions relevant to the subject matter. This is followed by the formulation, inductively, of empirical generalizations and these become the hypotheses tested in elementary scientific research. We might call this stage 1 in the development. In further stages, the verified hypotheses from stage 1 are used to generate additional empirical generalizations but more importantly to generate a systematic theoryoften stated in axiomatic form—which theory, when used to derive inferences that are subsequently verified, is then the corpus of the science itself. This we might call stage 2.

Political science is, in our opinion, now well into stage 1, proliferating hypotheses and beginning to learn how to test them. The leaders in this enterprise have mostly been those who are classified as "behavioralists," for example, the students of American voting

TABLE 5 TEST OF PREDICTION 2

	$\operatorname{pr}\left[a_{1}\right]> \operatorname{pr}\left[a_{2}\right]$	$ \begin{array}{c} \operatorname{pr}\left[a_{1}\right] > \\ \operatorname{pr}\left[a_{3}\right] \end{array} $	$\operatorname{pr}\left[a_{1}\right]> \operatorname{pr}\left[a_{4}\right]$	$ \begin{array}{c c} \operatorname{pr}\left[a_{2}\right] > \\ \operatorname{pr}\left[a_{4}\right] \end{array} $	$\operatorname{pr}\left[a_{3}\right]> \\ \operatorname{pr}\left[a_{4}\right]$	Form of Observation
1952						
I	${f T}$	${f T}$	${f T}$	${f T}$	${f T}$	$R_{ m i}$
II	${f T}$	${f T}$	${f T}$	${f T}$	${f T}$	R_1
III	${f T}$	${f F}$	${f T}$	\mathbf{F}	${f T}$	R_2
1956	•					,
I	${f T}$	${f T}$	${f T}$	${f T}$	${f T}$	R_1
II	${f T}$	${f T}$	${f T}$	\mathbf{F}	${f T}$	$egin{array}{c} R_1 \ R_3 \end{array}$
. III	' T	${f T}$	T	_ T	${f T}$	R_1
1960						
I	${f T}$	${f T}$	${f T}$	${f T}$	${f T}$	R_1
II	\mathbf{T}	${f T}$	${f T}$	${f T}$	${f T}$	R_1
III	\mathbf{T}	${f T}$. T	${f T}$	${f T}$	R_1

behavior. What we have attempted in this essay, however, is to go somewhat beyond stage 1 and into stage 2 for one tiny aspect of politics. We have taken a few notions about voting, incorporated them into the larger theoretical system of rational decision-making, derived testable inferences from the theory, and tested them with the result that we now have confidence in the accuracy both of the inferences and of the theory.

APPENDIX

Many readers of an earlier version of this paper have suggested that an implicit assumption of our analysis misrepresents the voter's calculus. This criticism arises from the introspective belief that many voters vote either for causes which they know are lost or for candidates who are certain to win. In such a case, the utility of a vote is reflected not only by D but also by the effect on the outcome (defined not only by who wins but also by how much). Many citizens voted in the 1964 Presidential election, for example, knowing with almost certainty the inevitable outcome, since they desired Johnson to win by a landslide or they wanted the conservative voice of America to be counted.

We emphasize again that these benefits are not necessarily to be accounted for by D but are reflected in our PB term. The question then becomes: how do these additional considerations affect our analysis? Some additional notation must be introduced to answer this question.

Assume: (1) There is a utility function, u(x), defined over the range of all possible electoral outcomes. (2) There are v voters in the system. (3) The equation, u(v)=1, is the citizen's utility if his most preferred candidate receives all the votes. (4) The equation, $\dot{u}(0)=0$, is his utility if his most preferred candidate receives none of the votes. (5) There is a probability density function, $g(x-x_0)$, defined over the range of all possible electoral outcomes, where x_0 is the citizen's subjectivity estimated most probable outcome when he does not vote.

In terms of our previous analysis it was assumed:

$$u(x) = B x \ge m$$

$$u(x) = 0 x < m$$

$$m = v/2, v \text{ even}$$

$$m = \frac{v+1}{2} + 1, v \text{ odd.}^{19}$$


¹⁹ If the vote for the citizen's preferred party is v/2, v even, before he votes, then this outcome is

In other words, u(x) was assumed to be a step function. For purposes of the present analysis we can normalize u(x), but we would like to analyze PB when u(x) is continuous throughout its range.

Given these definitions the expected value of the election, before the citizen votes, can be represented as.

(1A)
$$EV = \int_0^v u(x)g(x-x_0)dx$$

Since we are applying the continuous calculus to variables that might best be described as discrete, the limitations of the assumption of continuity must be kept in mind. It is possible to represent u(x) and $g(x-x_0)$ graphically as follows.



Hence equation (1A) is simply a means of representing the product of the value of an event and its subjectively estimated probability of occurrence, summed over all possible events. Furthermore, if we assume that $g(x-x_0)$ goes to zero sufficiently rapidly, we can write the change in EV with respect to an increase in x_0 (which would represent the citizen's decision to vote),²⁰

worth B utiles since his vote gives his party v/2+1 votes, or enough to win. If, however, v is odd, then, assuming the voter does not value a tie, only until an outcome of (v+1)/2+1 votes is assured can the voter realize the desired outcome of his preferred candidate winning when he votes.

 20 It is assumed that $g(x-x_0)$ goes to zero sufficiently rapidly so that small changes in x_0 do not violate

$$\int_0^v g(x-x_0)=1.$$

Also it is assumed that u(x) does not change when one more voter is added to the electorate.

(2A)
$$\frac{\partial EV}{\partial x_0} = -\int_0^v u(x)g'(x-x_0)dx,$$

where $g'(x-x_0) = \partial g(x-x_0)/\partial x$.

A special class of utility functions is that for which utility is a simple linear function of the number of votes the citizen's preferred candidate receives. In this case u(x) = x/v and (2A) becomes,

(3A)
$$\frac{\partial EV}{\partial x_0} = -\frac{1}{v} \int_0^v x g'(x-x_0) dx.$$

Integrating by parts (3A) becomes,21

(4A)
$$\frac{\partial EV}{\partial x_0} = -\frac{1}{v} \left[vg(v - x_0) - 1 \right].$$

But by our earlier assumption—that $g(x-x_0)$ goes to zero sufficiently rapidly— $g(v-x_0)=0$. Hence:

(5A)
$$\frac{\partial EV}{\partial x_0} = \frac{1}{v}$$

This is the Shapley value which we rejected earlier as a means for calculating P. We may conclude, therefore, that voters probably do not, in general, have linear monotonic utility functions for electoral outcomes.

Our original analysis, although recognizing the importance of taking into account the size of the electorate, indicates the importance of two additional factors of the voter's calculus, namely, x_0 and the variance of $g(x-x_0)$. Clearly, $\partial EV/\partial x_0 = 1/v$ is independent of these two factors. For nonlinear u(x), however, it can be shown that $\partial EV/\partial x_0$ depends on these two factors. To prove this, take (2A) and integrate by parts.

(6A)
$$\frac{\partial EV}{\partial x_0} = \int_0^{\infty} u'(x)g(x - x_0)dx$$

where u'(x) = du(x)/dx. Now assume that u(x) can be described or approximated by a polynomial.²² For polynomials of order n, the derivative of the polynomial will be of order n-1. For the simple linear case the derivative will contain no factors in x and (6A) will reduce to (5A). For higher order polynomials, however, the first, second, etc. moments of

21 Integration by parts is defined as follows:

$$\int udv = uv - \int vdu$$

In this particular case we let x=u and $g'(x-x_0)dx=dv$.

²² An *n*-order polynomial is any function of the following form:

$$f(x) = a_0 + a_1x + a_2x^2 + a_3x^3 + \cdots + a_nx^n$$

 $g(x-x_0)$ will determine $\partial EV/\partial x_0$. The first moment is simply x_0 . The second moment, with some simple manipulation, is the variance of $g(x-x_0)$. Hence, only for the special case of linear utility functions is $\partial EV/\partial x_0$ independent of how close the citizen feels the election will be or how certain he is of his prediction (the variance of $g(x-x_0)$ will not be a factor for quadratic utility functions, however).

A closer scrutiny of (6A) yields another important observation. The number $\partial EV/\partial x_0$ will be maximized if u'(x) is greatest when $x=x_0$. The maximum amount u(x) can change is 1 when it is a step function. Hence the maximum of $\partial EV/\partial x_0$ is $g(0) = \operatorname{pr}_v[1; x_0]^{.23}$. Hence the following constraints on P exist;

$$(7A) 0 \le P < pr_v [1; x_0]^{24}$$

which is identical to the constraints on P in our original analysis.

This leads to the following important observations: Although x_0 and $g(x-x_0)$ may be subjectively estimated by the citizen so that $\operatorname{pr}_v[1;v/2]=0$, it is not necessarily the case that $\partial EV/\partial v_0=0$. This accounts for the vote for lost causes and inevitable winners. Both $\partial EV/\partial x_0$ and $\operatorname{pr}_v[1;v/2]$ are, however, bounded by the same limits. Hence, we cannot escape the conclusion that a voter's subjective P can appear and probably usually does appear greatly to exceed our objective calculation of it.

A utility function which decreases after some point (reflecting a desire on the part of the voter not to give a particular candidate a mandate), of course, complicates this analysis. For such utility functions and a given x_0 it may be the case that $\partial EV/\partial x_0 \leq 0$. In such circumstances the citizen obviously shouldn't vote. It might, moreover, be in his interest to dissuade others from voting. A more complete analysis of utility functions which have a

This result differs by a factor of $\frac{1}{2}$ from our original formulation in equation (21) because we have implicitly assumed v even. Our original analysis showed however that when v is odd the voter cannot affect the outcome so as to bring about the victory of his preferred candidate. The gain associated with increasing his favored candidate's chance of winning is offset by increasing the chance of a tie (from 0 to pr_v [1; v+1/2]). Given an equal likelihood for even and odd v we would once again let $P = \frac{1}{2}pr_v$ [1; v/2]. If we assumed the voter equally valued creating a tie to having his preferred candidate win then we would drop the $\frac{1}{2}$ once again.

²⁴ Or if one wishes $\frac{1}{2}$ pr_v [1; v/2].

negative slope in some range is not intended here. All we wish to suggest is that an analysis of them can be incorporated into the present framework.

Finally, if we assume that S-shaped utility functions are the most general case we can make an important observation concerning the relationship of $\partial EV/\partial x_0$ and x_0 . We can show

graphically that the closer x_0 is to v/2 (assuming the inflection point of the utility function occurs at v/2) the greater is $\partial EV/\partial x_0$ (the step function is a special limiting case of the S-shaped function). Hence, our conclusion—the closer the citizen believes the election will be the larger will be P—receives additional justification.

ON THE FLUIDITY OF JUDICIAL CHOICE*

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Within the past decade, a significant change has occurred in political science literature about the judiciary. The central questions have shifted from public law concerns—what is the law and its value?—to a primary focus on decision-making and process-how and why courts decide what they do, and with what political effects? The Supreme Court still dominates professional attention, but a host of new research techniques (jurimetrics and socialization studies, content and capability analysis, small group theory, etc.) vie for the allegiance of researchers.1 The variety of methods in vogue is formidable, and a testament to the borrowing power of the profession. So has been the sound and fury accompanying the change.2 The new approaches are perhaps too young to attempt a synthesis with traditional methods of analysis or even among themselves.

1.37

* The author wishes to thank the Duke University Council on Research and the Ford Grant for Research in Public Affairs for research support and Allan Kornberg and Martha B. Fletcher for helpful comments.

¹ For bibliography see Glendon Schubert, "Behavioral Research in Public Law" this REVIEW, 57 (June, 1963), 433-445. Some outstanding later examples are Walter F. Murphy, Elements of Judicial Strategy (Chicago, 1964); Martin Shapiro, Law and Politics in the Supreme Court (New York, 1964); Schubert, Judicial Behavior; A Reader in Theory and Research (Chicago, 1964); Schubert, The Judicial Mind (Evanston, 1965); and S. Sidney Ulmer, "Toward a Theory of Sub-Group Formation in the United States Supreme Court," Journal of Politics, 27 (February, 1965), 133-152. Also, see symposia, "Jurimetrics," Law and Contemporary Problems, 28 (Winter, 1963), 1-270; and "Social Science Approaches to the Judicial Process" Harvard Law Review, 79 (June, 1966), 1551-1628.

² See, e.g., Walter Berns, "Law and Behavioral Science," Law and Contemporary Problems, 28 (Winter, 1963), 185-212; Wallace Mendelson, "The Neo-Behavioral Approach to the Judicial Process: A Critique," this Review, 57 (September, 1963), 593-603, and communications, 948-953; Theodore L. Becker, Political Behavioralism and Modern Jurisprudence (Chicago, 1964); and Lon L. Fuller, "An Afterword: Science and the Judicial Process," Harvard Law Review, 79 (June, 1966), 1604-1628.

Yet it is never too early to locate unities of inquiry, including common problems. The object of this essay is to air one difficulty facing virtually every student of the judicial process—the fluidity of judicial choice—and to examine some of its implications for research in and normative evaluation of judicial behavior.

The general argument should be stated at the outset. My purpose is to present empirical findings as a basis to critique some current research techniques in hopes of contributing to the analytical synthesis which must come if the discipline is to make a concerted advance in understanding judicial behavior. From a research standpoint, an unfortunate by-product of the debate between the "quantifiers" and the "qualifiers," as Joseph Tanenhaus has distinguished them, is that extremes of advocacy have obscured the much more important things that students of the judiciary share in common than the methodological differences which agitate them.3 In the first place, most analysts assume that judging is a value-laden rather than a value-free art. Moreover, researchers who attempt to answer how or why questions are all engaged in the very humbling enterprise of making inferences from manifest behavior about the unknown, the judicial mind. If that enterprise were not enough to mellow the most messianic methodologue, it is also the case that some behavioral approaches have more in common with traditional approaches than with each other. Admittedly, one treads on dynamite in suggesting such kinship, but those who infer attitudes and motivation from opinions and those who infer attitudes and ideology from aggregate votes are basically in the same camp. That is, both infer individual attitude from a form of group behavior, and with insufficient attention to the group interaction which intervenes between attitude and action and qualifies both.4

Under both quantitative and qualitative

³ Joseph Tanenhaus, "Supreme Court Attitudes Toward Federal Administrative Agencies," Vanderbilt Law Review, 14 (March, 1961), 481.

⁴ Cf. Glendon Schubert, "Ideologies and Attitudes, Academic and Judicial," Journal of Politics, 29 (February, 1967), 3-40; "Academic Ideology and the Study of Adjudication," this Review, 61 (March, 1967), 106-129.

research procedures, inferences about individual belief systems are derived from the "hard" data of group outcome. Once attitudes and ideologies have been inferred, they are then offered as explanations of outcome. Both procedures inspire reservations for the precise reason that intervening variables operating in a collegial court mediate significantly between individual attitude and behavior. The evidence for this mediation is a phenomenon I have chosen to call the fluidity of judicial choice. My contention is that fluidity of choice is so extensive in empirical reality as to pose very serious problems of classification and inference. whether one's categories and inferences are behavioral or jurisprudential in character. To put the matter simply, if a vote or an opinion has changed in response to a multiplicity of intra-court influences before its public exposure, how reliable is that vote or opinion as an indicator of attitude, ideology, or, if one pleases, predilection? If a vote, opinion, or speech has been ghosted by someone else, how reliable is that datum in establishing the modal categories which everyone from Shepard's 53 Schubert perforce must use in making classifcations?

In the official theory of judging as a process of discovery, to be sure, this problem is inrelevant: a judge may freely change his mind up to the point of revealing his discovery without straining the analytical system. Once the analyst seeks to pierce the mystery, however, the issue of flux is inescapable. Quantifiers, though dependent upon the same objective data of votes and opinions, cannot duck the problem, for they purport to measure the most subjective of quantities, psychological attitudes, including latent ones. Qualitative methods of doctrinal analysis and biographical study, though they may raise illuminating examples of changing options, seldom do se systematically or with contemporary data.³ Obvious difficulties of observation under conditions of secrecy prevailing in American cours explain the scant attention to the issue. Difficulty of analysis cannot explain away the problem of reliability, however, nor its implications for development of theory about judicial behavior.

⁶ See Schubert, The Judicial Mind, pp. 76-77, 185-186; and "Jackson's Judicial Philosophy: An Exploration in Value Analysis," this Review, 59 (December, 1965), 944-945. Alpheus T. Mason, Harlan Fiske Stone: Pillar of the Law (New York, 1956), p. 641; and Alexander Bickel, The Unpublished Opinions of Mr. Justice Brandeis (Cambridge, 1957).

I. THE EVIDENCE OF FLUIDITY

It has long been known, of course, that judges change their votes and permit their opinions to be conduits for the ideas of others. Causes célèbres such as the Legal Tender and Flag Salute Cases, or the Carolene footnote, come quickly to mind. So does Chief Justice Hughes' pungent expression of willingness to alter language in the interest of harmony: "Justice Holmes used to say, when we asked him to excise portions of his opinions which he thought pretty good, that he was willing to be 'reasonably raped.' I feel the same way."

Walter F. Murphy's excellent Elements of Judicial Strategy is replete with examples of how Justices work such changes via internal bargaining.7 Yet it may come as some surprise to political scientists how commonplace, rather than aberrational, judicial flux actually is. The recently opened papers of Justice Murphy, which contain fairly extensive conference notes for the years 1940-49, as well as docket books for the 1947 term, give a much more plastic impression of judicial choice in the making than the rigidly stratified bloc warfare by which most of us have characterized the Roosevelt and Vinson Courts.8 Indeed, when meshed with the Stone and Burton papers, which overlap the same period, the Murphy papers tempt one to say that hardly any major decision in this decade was free from significant alteration of vote and language before announcement to the public. Neither was the phenomenon confined to Justices whose overt allegiances were to professional ideologies of law as reason or to philosophies of self-restraint. One of the most striking aspects of the decade is that the most important instances of judicial flux, from the doctrinal standpoint, occurred precisely among those Justices most suspected

- ⁶ Knox v. Lee, 12 Wall. 457 (1870); Juilliard v. Greenman, 110 U.S. 421 (1884); Minersyille School District v. Gobitis, 310 U.S. 586 (1940); West Virginia State Board of Education v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624 (1943); United States v. Carolene Products Co., 304 U.S. 144, 152 (1938). Charles E. Hughes to Felix Frankfurter, November 1, 1939: Box 18, Frankfurter Correspondence, Manuscript Division, Library of Congress. ⁷ Op. cit., note 1 supra.
- ⁸ The Murphy papers are located at the Michigan Historical Collections of the University of Michigan, Ann Arbor. Unless otherwise cited, manuscript material comes from this source. Additional details about cases discussed in the text may be found in the author's Mr. Justice Murphy: A Political Biography (forthcoming, Princeton University Press).

of ideological automation and in cases that stand as highpoints of their libertarian commitment. From the very human tendency to change one's mind under pressure, no one, and certainly no "libertarian activist," was immune.

Examples of fluctuating options are legion; but for convenience of illustration, certain types of flux may be distinguished from among well-known civil liberties decisions of the day. Without pretending to offer the following categories as a unified theoretical construct, we may classify fluid choices according to certain intervening variables which appear to have been at work. First is the "freshman effect"i.e., unstable attitudes that seem to have resulted from the process of assimilation to the Court. It is not uncommon for a new Justice to undergo a period of adjustment, often about three years in duration, before his voting behavior stabilizes into observable, not to mention predictable, patterns. Biographical materials suggest the generality of this experience, irrespective of prior background and ranging from Justices as dissimilar as Cardozo and Murphy. Justice Cardozo, according to one clerk's recollection of the docket books, registered surprisingly unstable options as a newcomer. Frequently voting alone in conference before ultimately submerging himself in a group opinion, Cardozo himself confessed discomfort in adjusting from the common law world of the New York Court of Appeals to the public law orientation of the federal Supreme Court.9 Elsewhere I have documented a similar instability on the part of Justice Murphy. During his freshman years on the high bench, Murphy swung from the wing of Justice Frankfurter, whom he had assumed would be his intellectual mainstay and ally, to substantial agreement with Justice Black, whose views regarding the First Amendment and state criminal procedure, it should be remembered, were also shifting ground at the time. In the process of adjustment, however, Murphy had problems of craftsmanship in the picketing cases and, along with other members of the Court, groped for a coherent position regarding free speech. He drowned a dissent in Gobitis: he cast a decisive turnabout vote at the last minute in Bridges v. California; and he also switched sides in Hines v. Davidowitz.

⁹ Paul A. Freund, "The Supreme Court: A Tale of Two Terms," Ohio State Law Journal, 26 (Spring, 1965), 227; Robert H. Jackson, "Full Faith and Credit—The Lawyer's Clause of the Constitution," Columbia Law Review, 45 (January, 1945), 1-2.

However contrary to preconceptions, it was the libertarian Justice Murphy who had to be talked out of publishing a concurrence in Cantwell v. Connecticut (in return for different language) which criticized Justice Roberts' Court opinion for inadequately protecting state power to preserve the peace from clashing religious sects.¹⁰

Eloise Synder's pioneering study of the Court as a small group supports the hypothesis that the "freshman effect" has been a continuing phenomenon.11 Parallels in other decision-making groups, e.g., the socialization of freshman Senators, also indicate that the Court is not alone in creating assimilation problems for new members. What occurs is a sort of hiatus between the norms of the individual's belief system and new institutional norms which must be internalized as role expectations unfold. Still, the aggregate effects of such freshman transitions are probably more difficult to trace in the judiciary. Using the concept of cliques, Synder hypothesized that the high court assimilates its new members through a "pivotal clique" in the ideological center, with the implication that uncommitted newcomers on stratified courts are likely to maximize influence at the outset of their judicial careers, before attitudes and bloc alignments jell. The experience of Justices Cardozo and Murphy suggests the need of refining this concept, however, especially the suggestion that fledging judges with unstable or inchoate attitudes are more influential than senior, committed members. While a pivotal Justice may have a controlling vote in a given five-four situation, the very reasons for the "freshman effect"-inexperience, feelings of inadequacy, hesitation about premature bloc identification, low seniority in assignments, strategies of playing safe, etc.—all point to the opposite direction of freshmen Justices follow-

10 J. Woodford Howard, Jr., "Justice Murphy: The Freshman Years," Vanderbilt Law Review, 18 (March, 1965), 473-505. Thornhill v. Alabama, 310 U.S. 88 (1940); N.L.R.B. v. Virginia Electric and Power Co., 314 U.S. 469 (1941); Bridges v. California, 314 U.S. 252 (1941); Hines v. Davidowitz, 312 U.S. 52 (1941); and Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 U.S. 296 (1940). In Cantwell, Justice Stone also withheld a concurrence after Justice Roberts deleted a passage which had questioned state regulation of solicitation as a prior restraint. Copy, Harlan F. Stone to Owen J. Roberts, May 2, 1940: No. 632, Box 129.

¹¹ Eloise Synder, "The Supreme Court as a Small Group," Social Forces, 36 (March, 1958), 236-238.

ing rather than leading.¹² Further, to the extent that "freshmanness" does cause newcomers to restrain personal preferences and gravitate toward the center, it may retard the absorption of current ideas into the Court's output, which Robert A. Dahl once argued is a prime effect of the appointive system and a means of harmonizing the institution with the outlook of dominant lawmaking majorities.¹³ The problem, in brief, is whether the newcomer's influence should be measured in terms of votes or in terms of formulating doctrine and persuading peers. Only a mechanistic view of the judicial process, in my view, would measure influence exclusively in terms of either.

A second cluster of fluctuating choices may be grouped around the familiar strategic variables of massing the Court and of institutional loyalties. Justices frequently compromise personal opinion in order to maximize their collective force and to safeguard the power and legitimacy of the Court among its reference groups. That personal ideology may be qualified or even defined by organizational perspectives is by no means unique to the judiciary. Neither must a judge genuflect at the mere mention of the tribunal, as a friendly wag once said of the agnostic Justice Frankfurter. to be affected by such considerations in the system of expectations within which modern judges operate. The evidence of the 1940's suggests that all of the Justices, at one time or another, were constrained by group and institutional interests. Not only was it common for them to offer helpful suggestions and advice to adversaries, according to the official theory of collective responsibility, but they also sacrificed deeply felt views. For example, Justice Murphy stifled a powerful lone dissent in the first Japanese Relocation Case under the badgering and patriotic appeals of Justice Frankfurter: and Justice Douglas did the same in the second.14 After finding himself alone, and probably under advice from Justice

¹² For an incisive critique of clique and powergame concepts as applied to the Supreme Court, see Ulmer, op. cit., note 1 supra.

¹³ Robert A. Dahl, "Decision-Making in a Democracy: The Supreme Court as a National Policy-Maker," Journal of Public Law, 6 (Fall, 1957), 284-286.

14 Hirabayashi v. United States, 320 U.S. 81 (1943). See Sidney Fine, "Mr. Justice Murphy and the Hirabayashi Case," Pacific Historical Review, 33 (May, 1964), 195-209. Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S. 214 (1944). Douglas, J., draft dissent, circulated December 1, 1944: No. 20, Box 133.

Rutledge, Murphy also withheld an elaborate dissent in the case of runaway spy Gerhard Eisler, with the result that he left stillborn the first known assault by a Justice upon the House Un-American Activities Committee for violating the First Amendment.15 Similarly. Justice Rutledge swallowed personal opinion in order to avoid stalemate in Screws v. United States, an important civil rights decision which held off an attack on expansive concepts of state action at the price of enfeebling federal statutory power to punish police bruality in the states.16 And in familiar marshalling tactics. Murphy and Rutledge stifled their prepared dissents in the Resweber double execution case by joining forces with Douglas (who had switched votes) in Justice Burton's libertarian protest.17 Massing support behind an unexpected ally is not an unfamiliar judicial stratagem, and it may well explain Justice Murphy's assignments in both United States v. White, which denied Fifth Amendment privileges to trade union officers in their official capacity, and Hickman v. Taylor, a pathfinding decision regarding pre-trial discovery.18

More difficult to analyze is a third class of fluctuating options, those which appear to have resulted from the changing factual perceptions of a particular judge. In some cases, the reasons for such a shift may be indistinguishable from pressures to coalesce. Thus, Justice Douglas' acquiescence in Korematsu v. United States probably was made easier by Chief Justice Stone's continuing reminders that opportunity

15 Eisler v. United States, 338 U.S. 189 (1949). Murphy, J., draft opinion, circulated June 3, 1949: No. 255, Box 139. This attack, incidentally, anticipated by almost twenty years Judge Howard F. Corcoran's celebrated injunction against H.U.A.C. in 1966, which was based upon a theory of community rights and the chilling effect on free speech developed by way of Murphy's opinion in Thornhill v. Alabama as revived by the Warren Court in Dombrowski v. Pfister, 380 U.S. 479, 486 (1965). Since Murphy was ill during much of the preparation of his Eisler opinion, however, the draft dissent must be viewed as a clerk's trial balloon which the Justice agreed to sponsor in hopes of restraining committee abuse. See New York Times, August 17, 1966, p. 24:5-8.

¹⁶ 325 U.S. 91 (1945). Rutledge, J., Memorandum to Conference, February 24, 1945: No. 42, Box 133.

¹⁷ Louisiana ex rel. Francis v. Resweber, 329 U.S. 459 (1947). Cf. draft dissents of Murphy and Rutledge, JJ: No. 142, Box 137.

18 322 U.S. 694 (1944); 329 U.S. 495 (1947).

to challenge relocation orders still remained open to petitioners so long as orders to report to control centers and actual detention were separable. Lack of opportunity for individuals to prove their loyalty was what had troubled Douglas all along.19 In other cases, shifting perspectives appear to have been a function of additional thought and homework, by a clerk or a Justice, into issues that were only partially perceived at first because of inadequate argument, briefs, or time. The Supreme Court does not follow the practice in some state supreme courts of assigning cases by lot and of infrequent dissent.20 But it is not uncommon for a Justice assigned to express one consensus to reverse field after further analysis, and then persuade his colleagues to follow suit. Justice Murphy did so with unanimous approval in the complex Chickasaw-Choctaw land claim controversy.21 An even neater example occurred in Lawson v. Suwannee Fruit & Steamship Co., in 1949. There, after independent research by a clerk in a poor record showed that a workmen's compensation award for the particular petitioner might jeopardize statutory rights of longshoremen as a class, Murphy turned tail, reworked the opinion without asking the Court's leave, and won quick, eight-to-one approval at conference. Justice Frankfurter, at that point, could not resist the "dig":

It seemed to me a compelled conclusion if due respect is to be given to legislation—if, that is, we let Congress make laws and not re-make them.

This opinion (and change of Conference vote) ought to be a lesson that merely because a particular case is to be decided for a particular employee the result on a fair and long view may be a great disservice to labor and to Law. I could 'document' this truth.²²

¹⁹ 323 U.S. 214 (1944). Stone, C.J., undated Memorandum to Conference; Black, J., Memorandum to Conference, December 8, 1944: No. 20, Box 133.

²⁰ Robert J. Sickels, "The Illusion of Judicial Consensus: Zoning Decisions in the Maryland Court of Appeals," this Review, 59 (March, 1965), 100-104. On the effects of limited time, see Robert H. Jackson, The Supreme Court in the American System of Government (Cambridge, 1955), pp. 15-16.

²¹ Choctaw Nation v. United States and Chickasaw Nation, 318 U.S. 423 (1943). Cf. draft opinions of February 5, 1943, and March 1, 1943: No. 80, Box 131.

²² 336 U.S. 198 (1949). Clerk to Murphy, J., February 1, 1949; Frankfurter, J., comment on slip opinion, February 8, 1949: No. 56, Box 139.

The difficulty is that the reasons for changing perceptions are not usually so obvious. One may argue that flux of this sort is inevitable in the cross-pressures of a collegial court of last resort whose main business lies at the frontier of legal development. One may speculate further about the competing values, the strategies of avoidance, the problems of obtaining linguistic consensus, the rush of business, and the just plain difficulties of substance which induce perceptual change. Occasionally, one may even suspect Justices of doing the unexpected just to confound bloc identification. Justice Murphy had one clerk who suggested that ploy in close cases after the Black-Douglas-Murphy trio began to form. S. Sidney Ulmer, after publishing an attitudinal study of the Michigan Supreme Court, was later challenged by one of the judges to explain an aberrant vote!23

But no outsider really knows why judges change their minds. Seldom do they admit, as Jackson hinted in Everson v. Board of Education, to having switched their votes.24 Even when overruling themselves later, seldom do they write with the candor of the Canadian jurist who blandly confessed: "the matter does not appear to me now as it appears to have appeared to me then."25 Nor, it must be stressed, should judges be faulted either for changing their minds or for lack of complete candor. A major objective of the adversary system, after all, is prevention of premature classification and judgment.26 That judges may shift position between conference and final voting is not only well understood among themselves, but a testament to the limitations of conference and the effectiveness of the argumentation system. And it is hardly "robism" to suggest that a cloak of secrecy

The conference vote was 5-4 in favor of reversal, with Vinson, Black, Douglas, Rutledge, and Murphy in the majority, but the last three Justices apparently had misgivings because the clerk noted question marks by their votes. The final outcome was an affirmance, Douglas, J., dissenting without opinion.

 ²³ Clerk to Murphy, J., January 31, 1942.
 Box 101. Ulmer to author, December 16, 1966.
 ²⁴ 330 U.S. 1, 18 (1949).

²⁵ Bramwell, J., in Andrew v. Styrap, 26 Law Times Reports (N.S.) 704, 706 (1872), referring to his judgment in Ellis v. Kelly, 3 Law Times Reports (N.S.) 331 (1860).

²⁶ See Lon L. Fuller, "The Adversary System," in Harold J. Berman (ed.), Talks on American Law (New York, 1961), pp. 39-41.

may be just as necessary for judges as for diplomats in making such accommodations possible.

Whatever their causes, however, shifting individual perceptions can significantly affect public policy and the ideological complexion of courts. Consider, for example, the changing positions of Justices Black and Douglas in three of the most ideology-charged decisions of the decade: Martin v. Struthers, Colegrove v. Green, and Terminiello v. Chicago.²⁷

In Struthers, the Court faced the question whether an anti-doorbell ringing ordinance designed to protect sleeping night-shift workers in an industrial town violated the First Amendment rights of proselyting Jehovah's Witnesses. Although he too expressed sympathy in conference for the Sunday sleepers of Struthers, Chief Justice Stone at first was unable to attract a majority in support of "preferred freedoms." Justice Black, who saw the scales tipping toward privacy of the home and local control, expressed prophetic fears in conference that the next case might be Jehovah's Witnesses invading Roman Catholic services if no restraints were approved. That view was accepted by a five-four vote; and, after assigning himself the majority opinion, Black circulated a hard-hitting memorandum to the effect that such a community reasonably could forbid doorbell ringing altogether in order to protect privacy. Then, after answering objections in a second circulation, Justice Black suddenly reversed himself. The ordinance was overturned by a five-four vote, and the Chief Justice graciously permitted Black to write a new majority opinion which in effect invited the town to try again with a more carefully drafted ordinance that accommodated privacy and free speech. After all, as Stone argued behind the scenes, some room for accommodation remained before community action, at least until homeowners had an opportunity to listen or object.28

Justice Black's about-face in Struthers goes far toward explaining some of the puzzles in the opinions. For one thing, it accounted for Justice Murphy's emotional concurrence which replowed the same terrain but had originated as a Murphy-Douglas-Rutledge dissent against their colleague's failure to balance interests. It also made more sense of the Frankfurter-

Jackson complaints that the Court was "wanting in explicitness" and attempting to resolve tough practical issues by a "vague but fervent transcendentalism."29 What the Court had decided was a narrow question of judgment—whether it was possible for a community to accommodate colliding interests by more carefully framed time, place, and manner regulations. What the public read, on the other hand, were heavily rhetorical outpourings from both sides which obscured the precise rights involved and exaggerated the doctrinal split over "preferred freedoms." No one could have guessed until twenty-five years later that privacy of the home and local control loomed so high in Justice Black's scale of values. No one could have guessed that the attitudes he expressed in the sit-in and racial picketing cases of the 1960's represented, not a switch attributable to advancing age, but constancy to prime values which, for two decades, the course of litigation had left unexposed.30

Likewise, from reading the opinions in Colegrove v. Green, no one could have fathomed that Justice Black, author of the three-man opinion which viewed congressional reapportionment as a justiciable issue, had initially expressed contrary conclusions in conference, along with every other Justice but one. Who could have guessed that Justice Black had not only echoed the general fears about entering the apportionment thicket, but himself had attempted to express those sentiments for the Court before he once again changed his mind and wrote the powerful minority opinion which structured a fateful enlargement of judicial power as a supervisor of the electoral

^{** 319} U.S. 141 (1942); 328 U.S. 549 (1946); 337 U.S. 1 (1949).

²⁸ Conference notes, No. 238, Box 132; No. 966, Box 131. Cf. draft opinions circulated by Black, J.: No. 238, Box 132.

²⁹ 319 U.S. 141, 153; 319 U.S. 157, 179.

<sup>See Bell v. Maryland, 378 U.S. 226, 344 (1964); Cox v. Louisiana, 379 U.S. 536, 580 (1965); Brown v. Louisiana, 383, U.S. 131, 151 (1966); Adderley v. Florida, 385 U.S. 39 (1966).
Cf. Schubert, Judicial Policy-Making (Chicago, 1965), p. 127; Wall Street Journal, November 2, 1965, p. 18; and New York Times, February 27, 1966, IV, p. 7.</sup>

or first impression, only Justice Douglas voted to intervene. Justice Murphy passed, and Justice Rutledge echoed general doubts about the political implications of the case. Rutledge later changed his mind on the justiciability issue, but cast the decisive vote against intervention because of difficulties perceived in equitable remedies. Conference notes, No. 804, Box 136. 328 U.S. 549, 564 (1946).

process?³² The answer, of course, is that no one could have inferred such flux from votes or opinions. Having resolved his own misgivings, Justice Black simply advanced his conclusions unencumbered by his previous doubts.

The majority opinion in Terminiello v. Chicago also provided no clue that its author, Justice Douglas, had followed a parallel course. Nevertheless, both the Murphy and Burton papers indicate that Justice Douglas had initially perceived Terminiello's speech at a volatile political rally of Gerald L. K. Smith forces in Chicago as throwing a lighted match into an explosive situation and had cast his vote accordingly. Then, after reversing position and thus the result, Justice Douglas was assigned the majority opinion and defended the choice by arguments that many contemporaries regarded as the apogee of libertarian dogma. Here we will be a supposed to the choice by arguments that many contemporaries regarded as the apogee of libertarian dogma.

These examples may be extreme because the opinions acknowledged none of the doubts which had been resolved. Yet they serve to make the point. Votes can be a crude measure of attitude. So can opinions, and even the lack of them.35 The ideological commitments seemingly manifest in both may be lower and the basis of choice far more pragmatic than either imply on their face. Certainly that was true of the 1940's. The disparity between the rigid ideological appearances of opinions and the fluid choices behind them was sufficiently widespread as to pose genuine problems for anyone making ideological inferences, whether by analyzing opinions or by aggregating votes. After all, if it is true that even the most libertarian of Justices sweated so hard over their options, what are we to make of interpretations, advanced by both quantitative

³² Ibid. Docket Book, 1945 Term, Box 92. Harold H. Burton Papers, Manuscript Division, Library of Congress.

³³ 337 U.S. 1 (1949).

³⁴ Conference notes, No. 272, Box 140, Murphy Papers. Docket Book, 1948 Term, Box 182; and conference notes, Box 184, Burton Papers. Cf. Washington Post, July 20, 1949, p. 12:3.

³⁵ For instance, Justice Frankfurter's dissent in *United States* v. *Kahriger*, 345 U.S. 22, 38 (1953), was predicated in part upon an assumption that Justice Brandeis, by joining the majority in the Child Labor Tax Case, 259 U.S. 20 (1922), considered the tax unconstitutional. Bickel, *op. cit.*, pp. 16–19, indicates that Frankfurter's inference was erroneous inasmuch as Brandeis had acquiesced in the Child Labor Tax Case for largely tactical reasons.

analysts and their critics, which explain libertarian judicial behavior as simply attitudinal automatism? Plainly, the data point to a deflation of the ideological component in the decision-making of this period.³⁶

II. THE GAP BETWEEN IDEOLOGY AND CHOICE

To deflate ideology is not to explain the disparity between choice and opinion on a Court otherwise known for its ideological cleavages. The tough nut is still knowing when individual attitude and action have been proximate. In grouping the evidence of flux around intervening variables of socialization, strategy, and personal perception, the implication is that group variables moderate personal ideologies. Yet the mediation works both ways. Ideology may be inflated as well as deflated. To generalize whether moderation or exaggeration will result from group interaction, it is plain, would tax the middle range theory the discipline so desperately lacks. My hunch is that systematic application of role theory to the appellate process offers the richest potential aid to the problem. Pending that development, however, a number of discrete variables can be identified from the 1940's which may help to account for disparities of both types.

Besides bargaining and the intervening variables already mentioned, moderation may have resulted from: equivocation, in which personal ideologies were victim of novel situations and newness on the bench (Flag Salute Cases); pragmatism, in which ideological values were tempered by strategic judgments about what professional and lay traffics would bear (Murphy, J., in Hirabayashi); crosspressure, in which conflicting values neutralized individual response (Rutledge, J., in Colegrove). Limitations of law cannot be dismissed from that equation. As Justice Rutledge once put the problem to his confrere Murphy in a tax case: "I am constrained to concur, though I wish, as I know you do, that there was some tenable way to reach the opposite result."37 Ideological inflation, in turn, appears to have resulted from several factors: conversion, in which judges who changed tack after further

³⁵ In this connection, see Walter F. Murphy, "Deeds Under A Doctrine: Civil Liberties in the 1963 Term," this REVIEW, 59 (March, 1965), 64-79.

³⁷ Wiley Rutledge to Frank Murphy, December 1, 1943: No. 53, Box 132. Commissioner of Internal Revenue v. Gooch Milling & Elevator Co., 320 U.S. 418 (1943).

analysis wrote with a conviction that acknowledged none of the misgivings they had resolved (Black, J., in Colegrove); workload, in which busy decision-makers reached into pigeon holes and lawyers' briefs for standing arguments to support conclusions more discriminatingly reached (Murphy, J., in Prince v. Massachusetts); 38 evangelism, in which

38 321 U.S. 158, 171 (1944), which sustained application of a child labor law against religious solicitation at night by a Jehovah's Witnesses child accompanied by her guardian. Cf. the absolutist quality of Murphy's lone dissent and this preliminary observation to his clerk, who had done much to agitate the Court into review: "After carefully examining the records and briefs and with no little reflection and the benefit of the Rutledge draft, it is not difficult to come out on the same side of the question that he does although all my instincts are against it and I want very much to be on the other side in dissent if I can stand on firm ground. . . . Rutledge has made something of an impressive case. I want you to see his side of it and clearly what we have to meet. He stands on the grounds of enlightened conception of control and responsibility for child welfare. As he sees it it is modern social legislation under the police power to which religious as well as secular organizations ought to be required to conform, -and to which the 'rights' of the parent or custodian must be subordinated for reasons outlined by Rutledge. But I do not want to conform-I want to save all that can be saved for the individual in freedom of conscience and I want to save all that can be saved for the parent as against the state in the right to teach the religion to the child. This might sound a little Catholic but I assure you I have nothing in mind but liberty of religion in a country that was conceived as a sanctuary for oppressed people. . . . What motives are behind the prosecutions in this case? What is there in the record to support my suspicions? Very little. But I am confident I am right about it. We are up against a tough problem I know when we attempt to say that the public streets are a no-man's-land where social legislation cannot operate and parents or religious bodies are free to do as they like....But...I don't see a genuine or substantial evil in what the child did in this case. She was evangelizing her religion as she understands it (as well as her guardian). Their literature on religion must be offered to the public. . . . Is the matter in issue the rights of the custodian, not the child? It is to be observed that the custodian herself thought the child should be left home, and took her along only because she cried. But out on the street she desires to persuade lay publics reinforced tendencies to black-and-white argument (id.); c milieu of advocacy, in which the demands of persuading colleagues and countrymen in trailblazing cases coalesced with professional habits and personal antagonisms to transform opinion-writing into argumentation and overstatement (S.E.C. v. Chenery Corp.).39

Admittedly, these variables resist quantification and are seldom constant; but it is not unlikely that we have underestimated their effect upon judicial choice, styles of argument, and hence ideological appearances. Especially is this so of institutionalized advocacy. Among the myriad influences at work on the Roosevelt and Vinson Courts, surely advocacy by judges flowered with unaccustomed brilliance. And what advocate would willingly concede an advantage to his adversary by parading his doubts in public? Judges, all of them lawyers and many ex-politicians, commonly refer to opinion writing in terms of advocacy; "you have stated your side of the case as well as it can be put," is a routine compliment to an opponent. Neither are they impervious to Huey Long's reported tactical suggestion on the margin of a Senate speech: "Weak Point, Holler Louder!" Vigorous language, as Judge Walter V. Schaefer of Illinois once remarked, may even be psychologically necessary to cover interior doubt. Aggravating the effects of advocacy, moreover, are heavy workload and scarce time. The Justices, whatever their inclinations, simply lack the time to indulge in all the subtle philosophic calculations attributed to them by commentators. As active problem-solvers, they are sometimes, in Murphy's words, "rushed beyond belief."40 Pressures are especially intense at the end of term. Under the circumstances, it is understandable why busy judges may throw the book at their tasks of persuasion. And the tendency to overstate is

went to the defense of the child's legal right." Memorandum to clerk, January 22, 1944: No. 93, Box 133.

³⁹ Justices Jackson and Murphy, who had collided within the Justice Department before joining the Court, seldom joined each other's dissenting opinions and, when spokesmen for opposing positions, often wrote in pejorative style. See, e.g., Jewell Ridge Coal Corp. v. Local No. 6167, 325 U.S. 161 (1945); Western Union Co. v. Lenroot, 323 U.S. 490 (1945); S.E.C. v. Chenery Corp., 332 U.S. 194 (1947).

⁴⁰ Auerbach et al, The Legal Process (San Francisco, 1961), pp. 358-359. Frank Murphy to G. A. Richards, December 16, 1940. Box 93.

reinforced by the prevalent professional norm that it is nobody's business how the Court's decisions are reached, that official explanations are all that count.

Whatever the reasons for the disparity between plastic deeds and hard argument in the 1940's, however, one untoward effect was exaggeration of doctrinal conflict to the point, it is tempting to say, that outside ideologues preferred. For ideology is also in the mind of the beholder, and scholarship did not escape entrapment in its own polar opposites. However useful pedagogically it may have been to depict judicial struggles of the decade as an epic clash between dichotomous ideologies, the fact is that few major issues took so simple a form. Rather, the fluidity of choice on the Roosevelt and Vinson Courts serves as a reminder that judging, like most American decision-making, is situational and that causation is apt to be more complex than the simple mirroring of precedent or principle or personal belief systems.

This observation has particular bearing on the controversy between "quantifiers" and "qualifiers" regarding the accuracy of attitude measurement. All doubtless would agree that attitudes affect action. All probably would agree with Justice Frankfurter's aphorism that general propositions do decide concrete cases if a judge's convictions are strong enough.41 The main issue is how to determine attitudes and to chart their effects, and that touches again upon the question whether influence should be measured by doctrines or by votes. This question, of course, has close parallels to an older conflict between aggregationists and survey researchers in the study of voting behavior. An inherent problem of voting analysis generally is that votes, of themselves, do not distinguish underlying variations of intensity, issue perception, and certainty of response among voters. Opinion sampling and scaling techniques were designed to unravel these variables in mass electoral behavior. and today few scholars would seriously dispute their efficacy or rich potential.42 Guttman scaling, content analysis, and other quanti-

41 Frankfurter, J., Memorandum to Conference, April 25, 1947: No. 84, Box 136. *Harris* v. *United States*, 331 U.S. 145 (1947).

⁴² See Walter Dean Burnham, "The Changing Shape of the American Political Universe," this Review, 59 (March, 1965), 7–28; Warren E. Miller, "Party Identification and Partisan Attitudes," in Raymond E. Wolfinger (ed.), Readings in American Political Behavior (Englewood Cliffs, 1966), pp. 252–253.

tative techniques were adapted to judicial behavior as surrogates for opinion sampling. But while sampling poses problems enough in mass populations, there is little doubt that the surrogate methods of attitude analysis face rougher sledding in the Supreme Court. The principal reason is that the universe is a collegial elite whose members not only make decisions in a highly structured and secret process but also must offer persuasive collective reasons to the public. While scaling of judicial votes in split decisions has the virtue of stressing relationships among the decision-makers. the method excludes unanimous decisions and the power considerations which help produce them. Further, the unit of analysis itself is under collegial influences. The very reliance on votes to infer attitudes points to the essential problem of identifying the intervening variables which affect those votes.

These difficulties are reflected especially in the conflict over measurement of attitude intensities. Qualifiers such as Martin Shapiro resist suggestions in jurimetrics literature that Supreme Court decisions can be explained or predicted in terms of the attitudes of median men on cumulative scales of split decisions: and many scholars balk at some of the headier conclusions reached in the salad days of quantification, e.g., the Schubert-Spaeth assertions that Justice Clark was the most influential Justice in determining the Court's position in the late 1950's. Quantifiers, in turn, object to rebuttals that median men are, by definition, least affected by the values at play; and Schubert has gone so far as to suggest that they may be involved the most.43 The truth seems to be that neither side is wholly right or wrong. For one thing, no general proposition yet framed squares with all that we can reconstruct from the real world of the past. For another, quantifiers do not always agree whether median Justices on attitude scales are most or least structured in attitude or are most or least influential.44 Ambiguity also lurks

43 Cf. Shapiro, op. cit., 37-38, and Glendon Schubert's reply in "Ideologies and Attitudes, Academic and Judicial," op. cit., 30-38, note 4

"Cf. Schubert in *ibid.*, with his earlier work in "The Study of Judicial Decision-Making As An Aspect of Political Behavior," this Review, 52 (December, 1958), 1010-1011, and with Harold J. Spaeth, "Warren Court Attitudes Toward Business: The 'B' Scale," in Schubert (ed.), *Judicial Decision-Making* (New York, 1963), pp. 89-90; and with S. Sidney Ulmer, "Supreme Court Behavior and Civil Rights," Western

in the debate because of a tendency to imply that median Justices on scalograms are the swing-men of particular cases. Clearly, there is no necessary connection, just as there is no reason to assume a priori that the most intense Justice is the most influential or that either Justice is the swing-man, the tailman, the group spokesman, or anyone else. Relative attitude intensities and influence are separate questions.

The variations, in reality, may be broad. It is quite conceivable that the most intense or most influential Justice may go unexposed. For example, the driving force in the Gobitis case may not have been the Court spokesman, Justice Frankfurter, any more than Chief Justice Hughes, whose forceful analysis of the issue in conference was followed exactly, and with little apparent debate, in the final opinion of the Court.45 While the similarity of Hughes' conference presentation and Frankfurter's opinion may have been coincidental, given the speedy conference deliberations in those days, the similarity is enough to make us pause before assuming that Justice Frankfurter, before the Barnette reversal, was most influential or intense. Justice Black's swings in Struthers and Colegrove, to take another illustration, indicate that he felt quite intensely and had critical influence. But in neither case was he the classically disengaged or moderate swing-man, who is sometimes postulated as the most likely recipient of assignments in close cases. By the same token, it is hard to believe that he felt less intensely or had less influence than swing-man Murphy in Bridges v. California or swing-man Reed in the Jewell Ridge portal pay case, which touched off the so-called Black-Jackson feud. 46 Despite the differences in all these cases, Justice Black nonetheless would be ranked as an anchor man for reasons that opinions do not disclose. Variances between single cases and cumulative scales, it is true, are not conclusive. As a result of his positions in the Doorbell Ringing, Search and Seizure, and Birth Control Cases, Justice Black probably would occupy a median position on a right-to-privacy

scale. But that may suggest no more than that the "chameleon" concept of privacy itself is too inclusive and should be broken down into separable problems—search and seizure, marital privacy, privacy vs. picketing, privacy vs. commercial publication, etc.—about which he appears to entertain strong and separate views. Some commentators have suggested such differentiation as a more fruitful approach to the policy problems of privacy. It would be interesting to scale judicial attitudes accordingly.⁴⁷

Schubert, as I understand his recent writing, would not necessarily disagree. Coming from a different route, he also insists that intensities are relative and depend on the situation.48 We part company mainly on definition of the situation. Here one must readily concede that simplification of empirical reality is an essential step in scientific advance. But the intervening variables of strategy and style, in my judgment, are so critical in judicial decision-making that they cannot be excluded from any stimulus-response model without distorting results and reducing the reliability of the most carefully constructed attitudinal inferences. Consider, for example, Justice Frankfurter's posture toward federal searches and seizures. Either scaling techniques or doctrinal analysis, I daresay, would result in a relatively high rank order for Frankfurter in libertarian responses against searches and seizures by federal police. To assert that he felt more intensely about the matter than even Murphy or Rutledge, on the other hand, would invite dispute. Yet Frankfurter appears to have done just that in the Harris and Trupiano cases, a fact which was obscured because he chose to work through Justice Murphy in order to maximize his protest. 49 Confessing himself to be "nuts about" the Harris problem, and even apologizing to his colleagues for excess heat in conference, Justice Frankfurter himself wrote a brilliant dissent challenging the Court's conclusion that discovery of contraband during lawful arrest legalized unauthorized searches and seizures in the premises. But Frankfurter had difficulty rousing his fellow dissenters to

Political Quarterly, 13 (June, 1960), 296. For a critique of scaling techniques, see Joseph Tanenhaus, "The Cumulative Scaling of Judicial Decisions," Harvard Law Review, 79 (June, 1966), 1590-1594.

⁴⁵ "Observations of Chief Justice Hughes," April 25, 1940: No. 690, Box 129. 310 U.S. 586 (1940).

⁴⁶ For citations, see notes 27, 10, and 39 supra.

⁴⁷ See Time, Inc. v. Hill, 385 U.S. 374 (1967); Berger v. New York, 18 L. ed. 2d 1040, 1059 (1967); and William L. Prosser, "Privacy," California Law Review, 48 (1960), 383. Cf. Schubert, The Judicial Mind, pp. 171-174.

⁴⁸ See op. cit., note 43 supra; The Judicial Mind, pp. 286-287; and Judicial Policy-Making, p. 113.

⁴⁹ Harris v. United States, 331 U.S. 145 (1947); Trupiano v. United States, 334 U.S. 699 (1948).

the same level of intensity. Justice Jackson, who had expressed doubts in conference, declined to enter a joint statement. Justice Rutledge, who differentiated searches of automobiles and homes as well as seizures of open and hidden contraband, refused to join Frankfurter's attempt to undermine the close Zap and Davis decisions of the year before. Justice Murphy's draft dissent was routinely restrained.⁵⁰ Once before in the Detectaphone Case, Justice Frankfurter had encouraged Murphy to add "a little pastry," as Murphy described his rhetoric, to strengthen his dissent.51 Because he regarded it as "terribly important" that their Harris protest reach the police and lower courts as well as their brethren, Frankfurter again prodded Murphy to stoke his fires, which was done in an opinion that Frankfurter regarded as "none too strong." By way of reward, Frankfurter then assigned Murphy the majority opinion in Trupiano the following year, when Justice Douglas' swing gave them a temporary fivefour majority.52

Stylistic variations may color the problem of intensity no less than the tactical. Felix Frankfurter, both as teacher and judge, was a scrappy and excitable intellectual with intense convictions. But Frankfurter also valued "Doric austerity" in opinions, a trait he lionized in Brandeis and juxtaposed to "the Blue Danube side of me."53 Frankfurter's notions of style and strategy coalesced in racial discrimination cases. The former NAACP counsel consistently cautioned his colleagues to play down anti-racist rhetoric on the ground that "this Court should avoid exacerbating the very feelings which we seek to allay." "And if I myself at times betray this wisdom," he added, "so much the worse for me." Frank

⁵⁰ Conference notes; Frankfurter, J., Memorandum to Conference, April 25, 1947; note, Wiley Rutledge to Frank Murphy, April 12, 1947, and comment on slip opinion, April 7, 1947: No. 34, Box 136. Zap v. United States, 328 U.S. 624, 630 (1946); Davis v. United States, 328 U.S. 582, 594 (1946).

⁶¹ Goldman v. United States, 316 U.S. 129, 136 (1942); Felix Frankfurter to Frank Murphy, April 3, 1942; Murphy, J., to clerk, undated: No. 962, Box 130.

⁵² Felix Frankfurter to Frank Murphy, February 15, 1947; comment on slip opinion, April 3, 1947: No. 34, Box 136. Murphy to Frankfurter, April 10, 1948: No. 427, Box 139.

53 Comment on slip opinion, American Power & Light Co. v. S.E.C., 329 U.S. 90 (1946): Nos. 4-5, Box 136.

Murphy also was a passionate character and a pushover for appeals to evangelical preachment, his most congenial style. But perceiving different responses to judicial crusading, former NAACP board-member Murphy insisted that the Court should invoke "constitutional condemnation" at every opportunity as a symbolic stroke against racism. 54 These variations, of course, were situational as well as personal. Yet that is the point; in assessing attitudinal intensities, can we safely subsume such strategic and stylistic variables, hot or cool?

Similar reservations hold for variations of issue perception and certitude among Justices. If anything, these aspects of choice are even harder to infer than intensity. The problem for traditional analysis is that opinions seldom reveal the issue perceptions of all the Justices, and those perceptions which are revealed may reflect collegial influences more than individual cognition. In any event, we are dependent upon what the judges say their perceptions are. The problem for behavioral analysis is that quantification can reach a point of diminishing returns when multiple variables are involved. There are forces at work in the appellate process, to be sure, which are designed to narrow the issues; we also may expect that increasing sophistication in regression techniques may make the multiplicity problem more manageable. Still, the collisions of value which fracture customary blocs—Screws and the privacy cases, for example—also tax ideological analysis. When cases turn on clashes among multiple libertarian values, problems of classification and quantification increase. Furthermore, when past opinions have greater predictive force than current bloc configurations, as was true of Justice Black's Adamson opinion for his position in Griswold v. Connecticut, the lesson may be that, at this point, no one method of prediction is intrinsically superior.55

There are occasions of flux in narrowly pivided courts, finally, which bloc and swingman notions fail to fit because of pervasive uncertainty. A case may be considered so close that one conference vote cannot be considered more stable than another. The Justices, to put the matter differently, may be proceeding on probabilities of 51–49 percent. That situation

⁵⁴ Felix Frankfurter to Wiley Rutledge, January 2, 1948: Box 34, Frankfurter Correspondence, *loc. cit.* Cf. Murphy, J., in *Steele* v. L.&.N.R. Co., 323 U.S. 192, 208 (1944).

⁵⁵ Adamson v. California, 332 U.S. 46, 68 (1947). Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965).

probably obtained for several Justices in the tough treaty abrogation case, Clark v. Allen, in which Justice Rutledge's description of his mental state—"in fog" aptly caught a wider mood.56 Uncertainty also characterized a substantial segment of the Court in the early establishment clause case, Everson v. Board of Education. 57 Although all the Justices readily accepted the principle of a high wall of separation between church and state, application of that principle to a parochial school bus rebate set off prolonged soul-searching and flux. Only two Justices, Frankfurter and Rutledge, would have nullified the subsidy in preliminary voting, and Frankfurter expressed his conclusion "with difficulty." Justice Jackson criticized the child benefit theory so vigorously that his vote for affirmance was doubtful. Justice Murphy, devout Catholic and "ardent Jeffer-" passed. After Justices Jackson and sonian.' Burton switched votes, Murphy's signature gave Justice Black's opinion the decisive fifth vote. Murphy thereby came closest to a classic, cross-pressured swing-man; but it stretches reality to suggest that he, more than Jackson, Burton, or any other doubtful voter, "controlled" the decision. Attitude analysis becomes hazy in Everson because the judges were still in process of determining them. Principle did not decide the concrete case.

In conference, only Justice Rutledge appears to have articulated absolutist arguments: even those reflected a pragmatic judgment that there was no other way to draw a comprehensible and consistent line. "First it has been books, now buses, next churches and teachers," Murphy recorded him as saying bluntly and presciently in conference. "Every religious institution in [the] country will be reaching into [the] hopper for help if you sustain this. We ought to stop this thing at [the] threshold of [the] public school." Rutledge's medicineon the face, invalidation of aid to any private school—was too strong for the others. But as they tried to sharpen alternatives by projecting the principle into implications ahead. Chief Justice Vinson seems to have expressed a common discomfort—and lack of ideological compulsion—when he declared: "I try to think of [the] case before me." Everson, in short, may have been one of Justice Brandeis' "goaheads" when the certainties are no more than 51 percent. 58 Ideological hardening came later.

The Court's evolution in the religion field suggests that different methods of analysis may be better suited to different subjects as well as to different questions. Quantitative methods. in my opinion, have proven utility as negative tests of affirmative hypotheses; it is illuminating, for example, that the legal categories of stare decisis and self-restraint are difficult to scale. It also should be remembered that quantitative techniques were designed primarily for research situations in which votes and opinions are the only data available. Yet even then quantitative methods may be safer after judicial attitudes have time to set than when belief systems and doctrinal categories are still emergent. Early quantitative researchers indeed made a "lucky hit," for instance, by choosing right-to-counsel cases for scalogram analysis.59 The doctrinal watershed in that field and in state criminal procedure generally was reached relatively early in Betts v. Brady.60 Successive decisions after Betts seem to have been a matter of pumping factual situations into standing doctrinal categories rather than attempts at differentiation. Nothing really new was added after 1942 except Justice Black's historicism in Adamson, and even the language used in the great Black-Frankfurter debate over due process in that case was a projection of the internal dialogue in Betts. 61 Religion cases, by contrast, would have been far more difficult to quantify dynamically, because ir both freedom to worship and establishment cases, doctrinal motifs themselves were emergent and the threshold conclusions of judges were erratic. One has only to contemplate scaling of the Flag Salute Cases or Everson, McCollum, and Zorach to grasp the point. 62 Time and litigation may be necessary for implications to be perceived and attitudes to harden in a caselaw system. Methods that make no explicit provision for such change are essentially static. The subject of religion, in this sense, probably could be studied more fruitfully as a form of "incrementalism," however difficult that concept may be to operationalize.63 For the attitudinal referents themselves evolved as the

⁵⁶ Conference note, No. 626, Box 138. 331 U.S. 503 (1947).

^{57 330} U.S. 1 (1947).

⁵⁸ Docket notes and conference notes, No. 52, Box 138.

⁵⁹ Schubert, The Judicia Mind, p. 99.

^{60 316} U.S. 455 (1942).

⁶¹ Conference notes, No. 837, Box 132.

⁶² McCollum v. Board of Education, 333 U.S. 203 (1948); Zorach v. Clauson, 343 U.S. 306 (1952).

⁶³ Martin Shapiro, "Stability and Change in Judicial Decision-Making Incrementalism or Stare Decisis?", Law in Transition Quarterly, 2 (Summer, 1965), 134–157.

Court was forced to shift emphasis from free exercise to establishment and as successive cases exposed tension between the two which at first was only dimly perceived. 4 Consequently, for all the rhetoric released as litigation progressed, the judgments of erstwhile libertarian absolutists remained interest-balancing and close to the vest. Whatever the merits of decisions in either field, it is no accident that the Court ventured into new pastures in state criminal procedure while in religion it still is fashioning attitudes in the old. 55

III. CONCLUSION

If the foregoing argument is persuasive that greater fluidity of choice prevailed in the Supreme Court of the 1940's than is commonly assumed, the evidence presented has several implications for the empirical and normative concerns of the discipline. First, assuming that the experience of this decade can be projected, the data point to a potential disparity between a highly complex and fluid "input" stage and a relatively simplistic official "output" in the judicial process. This disparity between choice and explanation aggravates a general analytical problem of reliably classifying hard data, votes and opinions, whether classification proceeds by a single observer or risks are cut by panel techniques. The disparity also points to the complexity of conversion processes, since presumably they too are affected by group interaction.66 The disparity likewise suggests the need of refining popular concepts about blocs, cliques, and attitudinal automatism which sometimes pass for causal explanations in both quantitative analyses and normative critiques of Supreme Court behavior. By no means do I conclude that the above examples of fluctuating options refute the findings of socio-psychological measurement, particularly the more sophisticated and careful versions as exemplified by Schubert's The

⁶⁴ Philip B. Kurland, Religion and the Law (Chicago, 1962).

ss Cf. Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966), with Zorach v. Clauson, 343 U.S. 306 (1952); Two Guys v. McGinley, 366 U.S. 582 (1961); Gallagher v. Crown Kosher Market, 366 U.S. 617 (1961); and denial of certiorari in church tax exemption cases, Cree v. Goldstein and Murray v. Goldstein, 385 U.S. 816 (1966), and in Horace Mann League v. Maryland Board of Public Works, 385 U.S. 97 (1966).

⁶⁶ See Joel B. Grossman, "Social Backgrounds and Judicial Decisions: Notes for a Theory," *Journal of Politics*, 29 (May, 1967), 334-351.

Judicial Mind, or by Ulmer's suggestive work on the theory of sub-groups. Indeed, a surfacing latent attitude may be the very reason for the flux described; and aggregate analysis may be the most effective safeguard against the hazards of classification, particularly in the nonreplicable and highly impressionistic form in which findings such as mine are usually presented. The point is, however, not necessarily. Quantifiers must classify no less than qualifiers, and both should face squarely the probability and effect of fluid choices on their modal categories and attitudinal inferences. Because group theory focuses upon such variables while drawing from both behavioral and traditional resources, that approach offers a rich potential source of synthesis for analysis of judicial behavior.67

Second, the evidence of the 1940's lends greater support to the lawver's ideal of the judicial process as a system of reasoning than many legal realists would accept. Clearly, judges of all ideological persuasions pondered, bargained, and argued in the course of reaching their decisions, and they compromised their ideologies, too. No one can plow through the papers of a Stone or a Murphy without coming out with renewed respect for the give-andtake or without appreciation for the multiplicity of variables and constraints, including that old whipping-post, Law, that went into the decision-making of the era. On the other hand, several major decisions were neither so collective nor so ideologically opinionated as the Hart-Arnold debate of a few years back would have it.68 At present levels of knowledge the central issue of that debate, what constitutes the judicial process, defies inclusive description and, because it fails to differentiate institutional layers and responsibilities, perhaps asks a meaningless question.

Third, and for the same reasons, the evidence suggests the need of caution before generalizing about the so-called "role" of ideology on the high court. Especially is this so of the everpopular dichotomy between "libertarian activism" and "judicial self-restraint." The fact that the Justices commonly identified as

⁶⁷ Op. cit., note 1 supra. Also, see Joel B. Grossman, "Role-Playing and the Analysis of Judicial Behavior: The Case of Mr. Justice Frankfurter," Journal of Public Law," 11 (1962), 285-309.

⁶⁸ Cf. Henry M. Hart, Jr., "Foreward: The Time Chart of the Justices, The Supreme Court, 1958 Term," *Harvard Law Review*, 73 (November, 1959), 84-125; and Thurman Arnold, "Professor Hart's Theology," *ibid*. (May, 1960), 1298-1317.

libertarian activists actually changed their minds so readily in the 1940's, the fact that Justices Black, Douglas, Murphy, and Rutledge arrived at libertarian conclusions only after tortuous processes of reflection and interchange in some of the most ideologicallyloaded decisions of the day, should cool the attraction of these worn antinomies as meaningful labels (though I doubt that any evidence will). On the other hand, the fact that the opinions lend themselves so easily to simplistic ideological explanation adds substance to continuing professional criticism of the Court for indulging in overstatement.69 The issue here is more than one of taste. Apart from styles of advocacy of interest mainly to lawyers, overstatement touches upon problems of credibility, of clarity of choice and inflation of doctrine, and thus of effective judicial leadership in an intricate legal system in which the Court's ultimate power is persuasion. Libertarian Justices, whatever their reasons for

⁶⁹ Cf. Harlan, J., in *Miranda* v. *Arizona*, 384 U.S. 436, 509-510 (1966).

ideological modes of address, can be faulted for presenting their conclusions as if they never had any doubts. Oversimplification from the Court, after all, feeds its often-decried public counterpart.

Finally, the evidence presented here points to the essential unity of research techniques. in particular as traditional methods of biographical exploration may contribute fresh data and suggest conceptual refinements for newer methods that were designed for more usual research situations in which votes and opinions are the only hard data available. This point is worth stressing because at the present stage of inquiry the critical need is for attempts to combine the findings of aggregate analysis and microanalysis in a theoretical synthesis. Thus, if the above conclusions appear unduly negative or destructive of what passes for conventional wisdom in substantial parts of the discipline, my defense is that they are offered for the peacemaking rather than the warlike purpose of helping to sharpen the theoretical tools that will enable us collectively to cut through the judicial process' fierce complexity.

A FUNCTIONAL ANALYSIS OF DEFENSE DEPARTMENT DECISION-MAKING IN THE McNAMARA ADMINISTRATION

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In 1961 the Defense Department, under a new Secretary of Defense, Robert McNamara, began a major management revolution, based on a set of methods and techniques which came to be called a programming, planning, and budgeting system (PPBS). Few, if any, of the techniques were new. Their revolutionary impact depended upon (1) the high degree of development or sophistication to which some of them (e.g., cost and program analysis) had been driven, and (2) the relatively high degree of integration achieved in the new "system," so that, for example, decisions about current operations can be taken in the light of their effect on programs four or five years in the future, and decisions about future goals can be taken with their implications for present operations specified.

In August, 1965, President Johnson announced his plans to develop comparable management systems in other executive departments. The progress of this effort has been uneven. But it is clear that PPBS is going to be with us for a while. This article is an attempt to assess its effect on the bureaucratic politics of the Defense Department.

The principal method used is functional analysis.² A more common method in the

* Any views expressed in this paper are those of the author. They should not be interpreted as reflecting the views of The RAND Corporation or the official opinion or policy of any of its governmental or private research sponsors.

This paper was prepared for delivery on the American Government panel at the annual meeting of the American Political Science Association, September 9, 1966. It was revised and updated before the announcement of Robert McNamara's resignation as Secretary of Defense had been announced. Only minor editorial changes have been made since then. The author thinks the definite ending of McNamara's career in the Pentagon does not affect substantially what he had to say here.

- ¹ The President's press release and related documents are now compiled in Senate Government Operations Committee, *Planning-Programming-Budgeting: Official Documents*, Committee Print, 90th Cong., 1st Sess. (1967).
- ² For an evaluation of structural-functional analysis as a method in social anthropology see John Beattie, Other Cultures: Aims, Methods and

literature of public administration is a less theoretical and more detailed analysis of political relationships. Such attention to political detail is warranted by the importance of the subject. But the case studies that result often concentrate on the shape and flow of political transactions without dealing explicitly and systematically with the raison d'être of the agency under consideration. Even the more formally structured studies of administrative organizations that use the methods of social psychology commonly do not examine the agency's overall purposes.

The literature on administration has long grappled with the problem of giving appropriate weight to the formal structure and purpose of the organization. Obviously, to take either formal structure or purpose on its face is to be insufficiently empirical. To ignore them, on the other hand, is also to neglect relevant data, particularly since bureaucrats use formal structure and purpose frequently as tools. A distinguishing feature of bureaucratic politics, that is to say, is the prominent role which structural arrangements and authoritative goal prescriptions play in the process. Functional analysis has been used here in an attempt to strike a balance between process descriptions and means-ends analyses.

Briefly, my thesis is that the traditional military requirements process has fulfilled certain political or institutional needs, that these needs still exist, explaining its survival in certain areas, particularly in NATO, but that the new policymaking processes have been able to perform these functions remarkably well. In effect, the political functions which the administrative process must perform for military policymaking explain in part both the survival of old and the success of new processes.

I. THE FUNCTIONS OF TRADITIONAL REQUIRE-MENTS GENERATION PROCESSES

The political functions that the administrative process must perform for military policy-

Achievements in Social Anthropology (London: Cohen & West, 1964), ch. 4. A thoughtful but rambling evaluation somewhat closer to home is Theodore L. Becker, "Judicial Structure and Its Political Functioning in Society: New Approaches to Teaching and Research in Public Law," Journal of Politics, 29 (May, 1967), 302-333.

making can be divided, somewhat arbitrarily, into three main ones: (1) bureaucratic rationalization in the military establishment, (2) risk and role distribution in the making and implementing of military policy, and (3) self-legitimization within the military establishment and in relationship to other elements of the government and the political system. Suppose we look first at the way the traditional requirements process has performed these functions.

1. The Rationalizing Function. To be rational, one must overcome two obstacles. One's propositions must be logically consistent with each other and each must correspond with the real world. For bureaucracies, three standards of rationality cope with these obstacles in different ways. They are radical rationality, procedural rationality, and liberal or transactional rationality.

Radical rationality attacks the cognitive obstacles directly, postulating criteria and applying them to the substance of policies. It persuades and legitimizes on the basis of shared values. In any given context, however, the radically rational position begs the questions about how to establish criteria scientifically. Radical empiricism is a variant of radical rationality. It postulates the validity of empirical (not necessarily organizational) methods by which to acquire and analyze data. One might refer to it as scientific due process.

Procedural rationality appeals to some selfevident or widely accepted standards of organizational or administrative due process, such as deliberation and clearance, information gathering and processing, authority, subordination, and responsibility. Administrative due process can rely upon agreement about more tangible things having to do with how things ought to be done.

The third form, liberal or transactional rationality, is a special case of the second: due process for extreme skeptics in a pluralistic and liberal culture. Skeptical of prevailing standards of administrative due process, it falls back upon the generic political processes of the classical liberal market place. It is more individualistic than administrative due process. Of the three forms of rationality, it may beg the fewest questions, although it assumes rationality in individual behavior.³

³ Aaron B. Wildavsky deals with a comparable distinction in his "Political Implications of Budgetary Reform," Public Administration Review, 21 (Autumn, 1961), 183-190. Wildavsky's The Politics of the Budgetary Process (Boston: Little, Brown, 1964), is a clearly delineated example of a process description.

The rationalizing function is a reciprocal process with several phases. In one it articulates and clarifies objectives and methods (in the course, presumably, of generating the rationale which will explain and win support for them). In another phase it tests the validity of articulated ends and modifies them accordingly. In still another, it adapts, in turn, methods and means to ends or objectives. Rationalizing is concerned with the propriety and probity of ends and the appropriateness of means. A bureaucracy performs the rationalizing function in several ways. It seeks consistency by requiring agreement among various offices on the nature of problems and how to deal with them: the internal clearance process. It may, in addition, expose policies to less structured examination. It seeks factual accuracy, or correspondence, through similar procedures. Viewed in this light, a rationale is an attempt to explain ends and means with reference to each other. The rationalizing function can be described in terms of the policymakers who perform it, the procedures they follow, the content, scope, political weight, factual accuracy and logical rigor of the rationale they produce, and the changes they make in adapting practice to rationale.

Since World War II the traditional military requirements determination process4 has helped bolster central authority in all the services and the Defense Department and prevent Congress from taking significant initiatives. It may seem sensible to assign the central office responsible for military operations the authority to determine the kinds of military forces that it needs. In the United States, however, this arrangement has not existed until recently. Before World War II the supporting bureaus in both the Army and Navy had been inclined to take it upon themselves to decide what kinds of weapons and forces to make available for operations, quite apart from what the operations wanted. One therefore cannot consider the authoritative, centralized determination of requirements a "traditional" process. The propensity to concentrate efforts on meansoriented objectives is doubtless found in other complex organizations, but it is probably peculiarly acute in military ones which spend most of their time preparing for but not performing their pay-off function.

In this pluralistic setting, what I have called

⁴ For an excellent normative statement about the traditional military requirements determination process see House Armed Services Committee, *Hearings on Military Posture*, 88th Cong., 1st Sess. (1963), 361.

the traditional requirements generation process had a rationalizing effect in two respects. First, it gave a prominent voice in specifying what the overall capabilities of the whole military establishment should be to those military officers most directly concerned with the pay-off function. By doing so, it raised the chances that the definition and choice of military tasks or objectives would be valid.

Second, since the wartime role of the military chiefs dictated that at all times they be at or near the center of the military organization, giving them the main voice in determining military requirements had the effect of centralizing authority in the military service departments and throwing more weight onto ends-oriented interests over means-oriented interests.

It should be noted that the criterion of rationality here amounts to what we might call administrative due process: the distribution of authority so as to give sufficient weight to the views of the people who are most closely identified with the pay-off function. One does not attempt to test the wisdom or validity of their collective findings by scrutinizing the deductive and inductive methods by which they have arrived at their conclusions. Avoiding that task may be only for economic reasons. It can also be in order to accommodate an essentially romantic view about judgment that intuition can come closer to the truth than can formal—and hence explicit, articulate, and communicable analytical procedures.

The traditional military requirements notion may be regarded as the supporting doctrine for an authoritative due process arrangement. It replaces, for example, the idea that shipbuilders know best what kinds of ships to build for the fleet, or supply corpsmen what kind of war materiel to provide the combat forces. It does not, however, concern itself with the criteria for deciding what kinds of ships to build or material to procure. It is concerned with procedures, roles, and authority, with who should

⁵ The balance all too often went too far in that other direction in wartime, when administrative doctrine dictated giving the military commander anything he asked for without challenge. Since it was, of course, impossible to do that, the field commander could be his own enemy. Pershing, for example, though anxious to get American aircraft onto the Western Front in World War I, was, by his frequent changes in major specifications, a principal cause of delays in getting production under way: see I. B. Holley, Jr., Ideas and Weapons (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1953). pp. 67–79.

decide, not with substance. Issues of substance were raised only within this procedural framework.

Before unification, each service chief was the principal determiner for his service of short-term force posture requirements. The Joint Chiefs of Staff accommodated military interests with each other. In the fifties, with the establishment of unified commands, and the conferring of command responsibility on the JCS, a second channel for generating military requirements came into effect. Both originate among the operating forces. But one goes up the chain of command, reaching the Joint Chiefs of Staff through the headquarters of a unified command. The other shifts to the supporting service, reaching the JCS through the service chief.

Specifications for weapons capabilities to guide research and development do not always reach the joint arena. Unless they involve weapons for joint use, requirements are usually stipulated by the service chief. The decision to take a developed weapon into production, which could be regarded as a "qualitative" requirement decision, is in fact handled as a quantitative requirement, since it must be linked to particular force postures. In this form it concerns the JCS.

The rationalizing function includes both the generation of ideas and their explicationenough to link perceptions of objectives and purposes to force capabilities and postures. Explication and elaboration may also expose these ideas and linkages to critical examination.6 The military requirements generation processes have not been very successful in performing this function. Even the special deference accorded the JCS has not made it conspicuously successful in performing the function by developing and adapting strategic objectives, strategic concepts, and force postures to each other. The Secretary of Defense stepped into a vacuum of unexplicated strategic concepts and obsolete strategic doctrine when he assumed an important formal role in performing the rationalizing function.

Concepts which could define policy issues and derive alternative resource needs and programs have not been the conspicuous output of the JCS. Rather than encouraging the JCS to

⁶ One would expect that the more the rationalizing process is unified, the more it normally will produce mutually consistent explanations based on agreed suppositions about the real situation, while the more pluralistic the process the more it would reflect disagreement about which data depict the real world.

rationalize in this manner, the traditional generation process may suppress the explanation of concepts and their systematic use by confirming the military as an authority whose decisions, though unexplained, should be deferred to. Deference to military requirements decisions has served at least to protect the military establishment from external probings about the reasonableness of military programs, but without assuring effective internal handling of problems.

2. The Distribution of Risks and Roles. The processes used to determine military requirements distribute political risks and establish administrative and political roles. The ranking military authorities cannot guarantee national security against external threats. The effort to get them to do so helps distribute political responsibility for national security. If at any time since World War II the Joint Chiefs of Staff had been willing to specify without qualification a politically acceptable level of military effort as sufficient to insure the national security, the administration would have shared to the maximum the internal political burdens of the national security effort. In fact, however, never have the Chiefs gone that far. Usually, they have shifted the burden back or avoided it by setting military requirements above politically acceptable levels, by failing to agree upon a common military posture, or upon the nature and extent of the threat, and by qualifying their guarantees. Despite the protective capabilities thus manifest, or perhaps because of them, until the 1960s the JCS have usually been under continuous heavy pressure to bear the political burdens of military force requirements.

Roles are at stake here as well as risks. The incentive to unload responsibility onto the military, which any incumbent administration experiences, depends upon their prestige, nonpartisan status, professionalism, and limited identity with the incubent administrationfactors which make the military capable of bearing them. The political commitments involved in the military program—the demands it makes on resources and manpower, the overseas entanglements that are a part of it, and the involvement of national prestige-all may be considered political burdens in the form of costs and risks. Risks, of course, involve opportunities. The military may run political risks (or assume other political burdens) in order to acquire wanted resources.

Yet, it may be prudent to limit political risks. Not all wanted resources will be granted anyway, and, if necessary, risks can always be assumed later, when the gains as well as the risks are more certain. Whether or not they

have carried the political burden in peacetime, the military can be expected to reap the benefits of political risk-bearing in times of high national security threat anyway. To the extent that they understand this, military authorities are discouraged by their understanding from assuming political burdens in peacetime. In a similar way the prospect of later payoffs to the military at their expense may discourage political authorities from reducing their political burdens by loading them onto military authorities.

The government must decide upon a military program and win support for it. The more that elective officials can make the military do these things, the less burdensome the program is to them. Yet, the military can carry the political burden only to the extent that they do not appear to be either aggressive interest claimants or captives of political authority. They are not captives in the degree that they can limit their commitments and state their differences with civil authorities.

The traditional procedures both pinpoint and obscure responsibility. When an administration tries to push more political burdens onto the military, and they actively resist, much confusion can result. When, as is more often the case, both military and civil authority groups are divided into factions with alliances that include each other, the distribution of risks is a chaotic process, to say the least. The jostling that has occurred in using the traditional requirements generation process since World War II indicates that it has performed this function very imperfectly.

3. Legitimization. When military requirements are generated according to the traditional rules, or appear to be, they carry a presumption of legitimacy with them, winning deference for the incumbent administration's military policies and programs from Congress and from other outside groups. Probably the requirements process has performed the legitimizing function the most satisfactorily, although there have been difficulties with it, also. They seem to fall into three areas. The first involves budget-program-planning discrepancies within the military establishment.

Before McNamara, strategic military planning, military programming, and the annual

⁷ Glenn Snyder has described with illuminating detail how misleading the claims of unanimous JCS endorsement were for the "New Look" elements of the fiscal 1955 budget: see W. R. Schilling, P. Y. Hammond, and G. H. Snyder, Strategy Politics and Defense Budgets (New York: Columbia University Press, 1962) esp. pp. 418–440, 486–491.

military budget-making all took place quite independently of each other. The problems of this disjunction among the core policymaking activities of the military establishment could have been isolated and clarified if each process occurred without reference to the other, or had each consistently taken the others into account. But neither has been the case. Each was performed with an eye on the other, but an eye which produced unexplained and varying accommodations.

This was the consequence for quantitative requirements. For qualitative requirements, the ramifications went much further. Knowing that many feasible and valuable weapons projects would have to be dropped eventually, the Defense Department during the fifties adopted cumbersome procedures to see that the dropping occurred as early as possible. This was done both to save resources and to assure that a new weapons system was eliminated before it had acquired a political base for itself.*

The second area of difficulty concerns authority and consent problems within the Defense Department. Legitimization is valuable to an organization because it reduces the cost of compliance. In the Defense Department consent and support depend heavily upon the political feasibility of alternatives. Whenever it has been easy to persuade powerful Congressmen to support one's minority position in the Defense Department, it has been relatively easy to obstruct central Defense Department authority. Legitimized policies bolster central authority by increasing the cost of risks of advocating alternatives.

The third area of difficulty is the greater prestige and perceived value which military activities and needs have enjoyed over non-military ones in foreign relations. Military legitimization has often provided an umbrella for many nonmilitary parts of foreign policy. The result may be that military instruments in foreign policy get too much attention in comparison with nonmilitary instruments. Certainly during the time when the military umbrella worked the most effectively, in the early 1950s, much criticism was leveled at the administration in these terms.

II. THE MCNAMARA ADMINISTRATION: FROM AUTHORITATIVE ROLE-PLAYING TO PROGRAM ANALYSIS

The McNamara administration both replaced and modified the traditional ways of military

⁸ House Appropriations Committee, Supplemental Appropriation Bill, 1957, H.R. Report No. 2638, 8th Cong., 2nd Sess. (July 7, 1956), 11-12.

decision-making. Without describing changes in detail, it should be helpful now to compare the way the program-generation process Mc-Namara installed performs the three functions which the military requirements setting processes used to perform.

1. The rationalizing function. One of the most impressive achievements of the McNamara reforms is the tight linkage which has been achieved between the five year program and the current annual budget.

The five year program introduced the use of systems analysis, upon which, in turn, cost-effectiveness analysis and program budgeting have heavily depended. They are the backbone of an impressive system for relating means and ends.

The management techniques of the McNamara administration work best when they can address problems some distance in the future. Systems analysis, in the experience of some hardware engineers, works much better in designing new systems than in adapting old ones. Perhaps management problems are comparable. To be effective in the general designing of alternatives, the analytical methods which have been built into the budgetary system need to be able to address problems up to five years or more in advance.⁹

Similarly, systems analysis, used as a management technique, works best when it can design resources and postures for "set-piece" operations. As one might expect, then, the emphasis in military management has come to be on these techniques to the neglect of improvisation, institutional learning and marginal or incremental adaptation.

Systems analysis has held the initiative in defense management for six years. In the research and development sector, the Directorate of Defense Research and Engineering had become a powerful agency by 1961. Since then it has lost its predominance to the Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Systems Analysis, the primary agent in OSD for exploiting these techniques. The "opportunity approach" to research and development used normally in DDR&E may be more flexible, but it is less thorough in the exploration of tradeoffs in a technological environment of rapidly increasing possibilities than are the decision analysis techniques which are exploited by OSD(SA). It is a fair estimate that the latter persuades the Secretary of Defense more often

⁹ Of course, the major reason why one pushes the program budget out five years into the future is not to accommodate the convenience of systems analysis but to achieve the economies of long range programming.

than does DDR&E on major research and development questions.

For a brief period after the Comptroller's office was split into two parts it looked as though OSD(SA) would be faced with a new competitor. When Robert N. Anthony, a former Harvard Business School Professor, took charge of the older elements of the Comptroller's office, as Defense Comptroller, there was some hope that the fiscal management function could draw from (and to some extent pioneer) modern business comptrolling practices to produce adaptive capabilities within the Office of the Secretary of Defense which could exploit the flexibilities of incremental decisionmaking. The promise of such a development is that it would be a supplement to existing programming methods, an alternative to the analytical constructs of systems analysis.13 In fact, however, Anthony's office has become almost wholly absorbed with a formidable and necessary task with less profound implications. It amounts to turning the cost estimates which have served as the basis for the programming. planning and budgeting system into cost accounts—developing, that is to say, a budget and an accounting system for operations which corresponds to the programming and planning categories now used.

From the beginning of Anthony's effort, the difference in perspective between his office and OASD(SA) has been apparent. There may yet be some rivalry shead for the two offices in OSD. If that rivalry, or something else, can raise the capacity of the Defense Department to improvise and learn in the process of operating, it will have expanded the rationalizing

10 Robert N. Anthony has stated the case for what he calls management control, which he distinguishes from operational control, in his Planning and Control Systems: A Framework for Analysis (Boston: Harvard Business School, 1965), esp. ch. 3. The book cannot be taken as analogous to C. J. Hitch and R. N. McKean, The Economics of Defense in the Nuclear Age (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1960), in relationship to Charles J. Hitch's appointment as Defense Comptroller in 1961, although the comparison with Anthony's appointment may be revealing. The Hitch-McKean volume is a set of essays representing an already existing capability. Anthony's book is an effort to formulate and clarify the tasks for developing a capability. Hitch's task was to apply a set of analytical capabilities which had already reached impressive proportions; Anthony's task, if the analogy holds, is to develop the general capabilities as well as apply them.

capabilities of contemporary management methods.11

Explication can expose ends and means to critical scrutiny and clarify their relationship to each other. The heavy emphasis on the explication of major program decisions provides a body of data and doctrines by which to orient, and indoctrinate audiences within the Defense Department to the military program, to explain and defend it before external audiences, like the Congress, and hence to evaluate it. The heavy emphasis of the McNamara reforms on the articulation of reasons and criteria is more than an effective defense mechanism. It is also a procedural inducement to be rational in the same way that written judicial opinions, because they are carefully prepared statements of the reasons why, encourage judges to deliberate carefully. Theoretically, the defense program budget, linked to systems analysis methcds for the exposition of major defense policy issues, establishes common frames of reference for discussion throughout the military establishment and establishes what kinds of data to extract and collect. This is in effect a "scientific" commitment to a rational organization discourse.

According to the market place or transactional approach, critical discussion must be entirely open. There must be no appeal to authority.

Of course, other procedural standards have been applied to defense policy-making. The main alternative is a closed authoritative system. It is similar to the traditional process. It asserts that military judgment is esoteric and

11 Congress must approve changes in the budget and accounting system. For OSD's efforts to win this approval, see House Appropriations Committee, H.R. Report No. 349, Defense Appropriations for Fiscal 1968, 90th Cong., 1st Sess. (1967), 6-7; Senate Appropriations Committee, S. Report No. 494, Appropriations for Fiscal 1968, 90th Cong., 1st Sess. (1967), p. 22; the Secretary of Defense's letter to Rep. George H. Mahon, Chairman, House Committee on Appropriations, August 7, 1967; the Secretary of Defense's Memorandum to Secretaries of the Military Departments, Subject: "Tests of Budgeting and Accounting Systems," August 9, 1967; Department of Defense Position on Amendment Adding Sec. 641 to H.R. 10738, Approval of Accounting and Budgeting Systems, August 19, 1967; Congressional Record, 113 (August 18, 1967), S. 11842-4, and (August 21, 1967), S. 11923-5; and House Appropriations Committee, H.R. Report No. 595, Conference Report on H.R. 10738, 90th Cong., 1st Sess. (August 23, 1967).

deserves a privileged position in the market place of ideas as well as in the policy clearance process for specified authorities who possess it. In some degree every professional group claims that its professional talents involve esoteric knowledge. It cannot claim special status without doing so. The scientific norm of open inquiry without appeal to authority is in fact applicable only within privileged groups. Pursued to its ultimate conclusion it argues for a wholly unstructured arena.

The Defense Department under Secretary McNamara hardly went that far. While the changes he instigated have widened the participation of department officials in the development of military policies by denying to certain professional military groups the privilege of deciding without explaining, the decisionmaking process remains highly structured. The Secretary of Defense not only decides major policy issues, but decides as well which issues. in what form, will be addressed. He holds the initiative in the establishment of the frames of reference for data selection and analysis, chooses many of the issues at controversy, and specifies the criteria by which they will be decided. More people may participate in Defense Department policymaking than before. Yet the modifications of the McNamara administration brought the major decisions into fewer hands.

Fewer participants, or centralization, does not necessarily mean greater procedural rationality, even in a military establishment where assumptions about rationality tend to favor authoritarian models. These changes have also been costly to Congressional participation in defense policymaking, a change which may be, but is also not necessarily, more rational. I have suggested elsewhere that Congressional politics tends to give advantage to correspondence rationality, defined as accurate perceptions of the real world, while the more unitary an administrative structure is, the more administrative politics depends upon consistency as its standard of rationality.¹²

It follows that the more pluralistic adminisstrative politics are, the more resources they will devote to achieving accurate perceptions of the real world, even at the expense of internal consistency. OSD is heavily committed to standards of internal consistency, insofar as they can be given practical meaning. That, in any case, is the premise on which military requirements generation procedures mainly rest. The management reforms of the incumbent

¹² "Foreign Policy Making and Administrative Politics," World Politics, 17 (July, 1965), 660.

administration, then, have established strong controls over the internal policy dialogue. According to this line of reasoning, the Defense Department is strong on internal consistency, but quite possibly at the expense of that untrammeled dialogue and debate which tend to promote accurate depictions of and adaptations to external conditions.

2. The Distribution of Risks and Roles. Across the range of major policy issue areas, the secretary of Defense assumed a larger role and commensurately greater political burdens. If something goes wrong with the F-111, if the Russians deploy an effective anti-ballistic missile defense before the United States does, if there are materiel shortages in Vietnam, if we lose our strategic superiority, McNamara (and his successors) could be blamed.¹³

Undeniably, the distribution of roles and powers, of risks and political burdens, is clearer now than it has ever been in the past. The Joint Chiefs of Staff are no longer the major determiners of defense programs. It is now the Secretary of Defense who takes responsibility, as he should, for a program which must necessarily be a balancing of risks and costs. He can shift responsibility on the margins. But the main political risks, and the main political defenses within the Defense Department, remain his. Role and risk distribution have been clarified by concentration.¹⁴

The value of this clarification is demonstrated by the relationship of the Secretary of defense to the Joint Chiefs of Staff in the present administration. The Secretary of Defense has taken over some important functions from the Joint Chiefs with surprisingly little opposition. First reactions were somewhat militant, but the militancy of the JCS has much subsided. One could conclude that the Chiefs have lost gracefully, but considering the persistence and skill with which they had previously protected their prerogatives, a further explanation may be needed. Probably more

¹⁸ I do not mean either that blaming them would take care of the matter or that no one else would be blamed. Here I am only concerned with their assumption of political responsibilities and risks.

¹⁴ It is not entirely obvious, however, how much the clarification of role and risk distributions represents an asset. If the Secretary of Defense can be held responsible for everything, that may be clear, but it is not very practical. For discussion of this problem in broad democratic representational context, see Robert A. Dahl, A Preface to Democratic Theory (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1956), ch. 2.

than one might have expected, they are content in their reduced role because it involves commensurately reduced responsibilities. There is, at any rate, a certain unprecedented equitableness in the changed status of the JCS which they may recognize.

The assumption by the Secretary of Defense of political risks and responsibilities is not the only factor which produced JCS assent to reduced political status. Another major factor has been what Warner R. Schilling has termed the "shower of dollars"—the increase in Defense Department expenditures under McNamara, as indicated by Table 1.

TABLE 1. TOTAL DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE EXPENDITURES 1959-1967^a

1959	41,223
1960	41,215
1961	43,227
1962	46,815
1963	48,252
1964	49,760
1965	46,173
1966	54,409
1967	66,950b
1968	72,300b
	•

^a Excluding military assistance, nuclear weapons and materials, and defense support expenditures. Figures, in millions of dollars, taken from Budget of the United States Government for Fiscal Year Ending June 30, 1968 (G.P.O., 1967), p. 456.

As these figures indicate, during the period when most of the McNamara revolution was being carried out—in the first two years, say, of the Kennedy Administration—the services had increasing resources to distribute. The management techniques—including the economizing ones, were instigated in an expansive environment. Where the management policies of McNamara really pinched, as with the forced marriage of several aircraft system requirements into the TFX, or with the negative responses to the advanced manned bomber, or the delayed procurement of anti-ballistic missiles, the contentment of the services with the prominence of OSD has been less impressive.

These money matters explain a great deal. But we should not lose sight of the fact that the McNamara administration did change things in the Defense Department to an unprecedented degree. No one previously has come close to changing major functions and processes

so much. There have been "showers of dollars" before, in 1950-51, and, of course, in the early 1940s, to take the major instances. But either of these showers was used to consolidate civilian power in the military establishment. Unquestionably it was easier, politically, to win control in a period of expansion. The opposition had less to rally around. But technically it was much harder. McNamara's consolidation of power was an impressive managerial achievement in taking advantage of political opportunities.

At least four improvements seem to be related to the clarification of roles and risks that was a part of the McNamara reforms. (1) The Defense Department has become more responsive-compared with the State Department, strikingly more responsive—to needs perceived in the White House.15 (2) The new delineation of authority and responsibility is more protective of the military professionals. (3) OSD has held the initiative more in dealing with changes in the military policy environment than it did previously. (4) The new distribution of risks and roles, implemented in part by the integrated planning, programming, and budgeting procedures, has focused defense policies more on issues and less on roles and personalities than it used to.

3. The Legitimizing Function. The defense policy and management innovations of 1961-1967 performed remarkably well the legitimizing functions for policy, perhaps because of the particular combination of authoratativeness and open rationality which seem to have been associated with them. Within the Defense Department, as outside it, the McNamara administration won early respect for its competence. As one might expect of an administration which modifies the status and rewards of powerful interests, the McNamara administration was not spared criticism, or avoided deserving it; but rarely did it come close to being discredited on any particular issue.16 Moreover, holding control of the services to the extent that it did while carrying out major modifications of their forces and methods demonstrates that it could cope with external as well as internal pressures.

The McNamara administration did not en-

¹⁶ The case against the State Department has been givenwide publicity by Arthur M. Schlesinger, Jr., A Thousand Days (Boston, Houghton Mifflin, 1965), pp. 406, 410-413, 446-447, 513, 681, 1016.

¹⁶ Still the closest, probably, is its source selection for the development and manufacturing of the F-111.

^b Estimated.

courage its external critics to think that they could ally with dissatisfied segments of the Defense Department in order to criticize its central authority. At the same time, the vigor with which it defended itself in Congress enhanced its authority within the Defense Department by giving confidence to subordinates that they would be supported if they were loyal, and by indicating that the challenges from outside could only have a limited effect. Effective legitimizing inside and outside the military establishment thus reinforced each other.

The last seven years have seen less appeal than before to military authority to legitimize established policies both inside and outside of the Defense Department. Internally, the change of tone reflects the greater capacity of OSD to compel compliance with general policies through the integrated program-planning-budgeting procedures.

III. THE MCNAMARA ADMINISTRATION: PAST AND PROSPECTIVE TRENDS

So far I have looked at the changes wrought by the McNamara management revolution for their effect on the political functions performed by military policymaking procedures. My purpose has been to establish a basis for evaluating the claims about rationality in behalf of the major changes in relationship to their political environment and functions. In an effort to carry the analysis of political factors further in that direction I will look at two hypothetical developments and then take a final look at the rationality problem.

1. Limited Military Engagement with Increasing Political Burdens. Let us suppose that over the next five to ten years the United States will continue to make increasing commitments of military power and political prestige in Southeast Asia. Maybe the war in Vietnam will be settled in our favor: Then suppose other military challenges arise in the area.

The mounting military effort would impose mounting political burdens on the U.S. Government to go along with mounting expenditures. More and more questions would be raised both inside and outside the government about means and ends. Official Defense Department presentations would carry less weight in legitimizing military policies.

What effect would such a prolonged but limited military effort have on the policy and management reforms achieved in the past few years? On the one hand, one might expect it to weaken the newer analytical methods and strengthen the role of traditional military judgment in defense policymaking. The growing

military effort would enhance the prestige of traditional military command channels and the role of traditional requirements generation. One should expect greater reliance on professional military judgments about how to fight the war and less reliance on analytical methods under the direction of civil authorities. In part the shift could be the result of greater pressures from Congress and the public which would force the shift in roles and political risk distribution, and modify the way the administration would seek legitimization. Congressional probes of military establishment activities in wartime rarely concern themselves with the discrediting of military operational command authority. More often they look for failures in support efforts. During the Korean War, and recently with respect to Vietnam, Congress showed much interest in the possibility of an ammunition shortage.17 The internal environment, showing the effects of the conflict, would enhance the role of the military authorities (the Joint Chiefs of Staff and the major operating commands in the field) at the expense of the civilians in OSD who have gained so much prominence in recent years.

In part, this shift would reflect changes in the tasks performed in the military establishment. Growing military commitments would increase the importance of managerial and operational adaptiveness at the expense of middle range planning. Five-year programs would be less important than how given capabilities would be adapted to cope with immediate and continuing problems. Rationality in the military establishment would come to be defined less in terms of internal consistency and more in terms of the accurate depiction of and accommodation to the real world of the combat situation.

In this environment, not only might more systems analysis be employed under military command channel sponsorship, but analytical and mangerial capabilities under the control of OSD might be enhanced, particularly if these capabilities could compete successfully with the military in making operations and programs more adaptable. If OSD could respond by developing in the Comptroller's office the management control techniques which would

¹⁷ E.g., Senate Armed Services Committee, Ammunition Shortages in the Armed Services, Hearings; Invéstigation of Ammunition Shortages in the Armed Services, Interim Report; and Investigation of Ammunition Shortages in the Armed Services, 2nd Report, all in 83rd Cong., 1st Sess. (1953); and Status of Ammunition and Air Munitions, Hearings, 89th Cong., 2nd Sess., 1966.

do that, OSD might continue to hold the intia-

In effect, the growing burdens of war could become an opportunity for further modifications in Defense Department management controls, providing policy implementation techniques which could be made equal to the burdens that would have to be imposed on them. They would, it seems fair to say, have to undergo considerable development to do that. But if they did so successfully, the pay-off could be high: enhanced Defense Department capabilities to learn and adapt military efforts in the course of implementing policies generated through the new analytical techniques now used.

The argument in favor of continued civilian initiative in reshaping the Defense Department turns in part on propositions suggested by the experience in Vietnam that internal war imposes heavy demands for innovation on miltary capabilities, that the efforts to meet these demands requires reinforcement or support from outside the operational command channels, and-what may be the most important proposition—that the largest apparent need for innovations involves military and civil capabilities for dealing with an environment described better by the behavioral sciences than the physical or biological sciences. If this is the case, then civilian-generated innovations would be in much demand in the hypothetical case under consideration, whether they came from outside or within the military establishment. If OSD should respond to the opportunity, its role would grow in developing more adaptive military capabilities and generating parallel nonmilitary capabilities for use where the military ones are not applicable, or to compete with military capabilities where their predominance is in question.

It may be too much to expect problems of this nature as they appear in Vietnam to be solved by improved management analysis and implementation techniques. Probably no amount of further sophistication in systems analysis or "management control" techniques can overcome the effects of the White House's granting priority to military instruments there. On the other hand, Vietnam may now be demonstrating the profound need for a learning and "steering" capability which PPBS in the Defense Department has not provided.

2. The Cold War Extended. The second hypothetical case is a continued period lasting one or more decades in which the United States would experience no direct military engagements, yet would continue to perceive sufficient military threats to require the maintenance of a

substantial military capability. 18 As a result, on the general strategic level present military policies would be maintained, their success measured in deterrent value, not in the achievement of disarmament.

One of the effects claimed for the cold war has been that it enhances the dominance of the Presidency over the Congress in making and implementing military policy. This hypothetical extension of the cold war might not further Presidential dominance because it might offer the White House, through OSD, few new opportunities to maintain the initiative. The major gains in economizing may now be behind us and further gains are too hypothetical to be taken seriously. If the Secretary of Defense should be willing to assume political burdens as much as he could, he might be able to maintain a working relationship with Congress in which his political risk assumption and role-playing were the basis for continued Congressional support. Yet if his opportunities for taking initiatives proved to be low, it may well be that he could not continue effectively to assume risks and win legitimization for his initiatives.

In the hypothetical case of a continuing cold war, one should anticipate continued centralization, with an emphasis on internal consistency at the expense of three things: efforts to reexamine the relevant premises about the real world, the development of more adaptive capabilities in the implementation of policy, and the propensity of the organization to explore and generate new options. In all three ways, options would be lost or buried in the administrative processes of the Defense Department.

3. Actual and Potential Trends. These sharp contrasts in the hypothetical future draw attention to at least three important indicators of trends in the new defense management arrangements. The first and most important is the policy-making and management initiative of OSD.

If, as I have suggested, the character of the management revolution in the Defense Department has depended upon OSD's taking and maintaining the initiative in the definition of policy issues, the distribution of risks, the legitimization of policy, and in the further rationalization of structures and processes, then it follows that the loss of initiative could

¹⁸ I am not concerned with the likelihood of these two conditions existing together—the continued perception of major, low probability threats and the continued lack of much military engagement.

mean changes in all of these phenomena. The character of existing structures and processes, the sources of political leadership for military affiairs, the basis for public support of defense policy, and the direction of management efforts in the Defense Department could all change if executive initiative is lost. That is why OSD initiative is such an important indicator.

The initiative which would have to be sustained seems to be composed of the high risk-assumption propensities of OSD, combined with very considerable adaptive and innovative capabilities. Two possible component indicators of the latter have been a demonstrated capacity to extract new kinds of information from sectors of the defense establishment, and evidence of innovative momentum, such as new attacks on cost/effective or strategic program analysis problems.

In general, the maintenance of initiative after seven years is impressive. OSD continues to assume risks and to generate new questions and analytical answers. Innovation has been institutionalized in internal OSD capabilities and through a variety of contractual relations with private industry. Large cost analysis tasks remain unfinished which hold much promise. Still, it would not be hard to imagine a lagging of OSD initiative great enough to have a significant effect on the functioning of the Defense Department. In the end, the maintenance of initiatives may depend, as it has so much in the past, on OSD's setting and pursuing major, concrete objectives.

The most promising next set of objectives might be to reach out beyond the new policy-making arrangements and develop new policy implementation techniques. Systems analysis has not provided the way to adapt military capabilities while they operate in close relationship to an uncertain but rich environment.¹⁹ These new techniques should try to do so.

A second indicator—or rather, set of indicators—would be the components of a political support-winning strategy for any Secretary of Defense, for they would indicate the extent that he has adopted or found his way to one. Secretary McNamara played a role of unprecedented prominence in national policy debates for someone in his position. His administration was a striking combination of executive initia-

19 Systems analysis can design flexibility beforehand for a hypothetical future, given sufficient lead time. For a price, it can build in different capacities beforehand. But it cannot tell someone how to evaluate unfolding events in order to establish new criteria by which to use the capacities it designs.

tive-taking, energetic defensiveness in Congressional relations, and political dependence upon the White house. His administration required the defense establishment to assume large political risks and a comparatively prominent political role. The performance may have been impressively successful; but in relationship to the political burdens assumed, the political support was not abundant. Much depended upon its finite limits.

The war in Vietnam shows all the signs of becoming an increasingly prominent national political issue. If it is comparable to the fall of China as a foreign policy issue, with the incumbent administration held responsible and the Congressional parties taking care to disassociate themselves from the administration, this relationship between McNamara's assumption of political risks and the limited political consent and support upon which he depended may come to have an increasingly important bearing on the development of military programs. From the viewpoint of the incumbent administration, it might then appear that changes had been pushed too fast or too far, and that more external support should be generated and existing support demonstrated. In that event, some retrenchment in the recent management revolution would be likely. These may be extreme and unlikely outcomes, yet something less would be a trend worth noticing. Any change in the efforts of OSD to win approval for the administration's military policies would be an important indicator of that trend.

The third indicator to watch is centralization. It is also an important trend in its own right. We can infer from the foregoing depiction of political functions that the side effects from centralizing decision-making in the Office of the Secretary of Defense will vary, depending upon the way political risks are handled and how much executive initiative is maintained. In particular, the more one exploits a given political base, the more he increases the potential costs of centralization in two ways, by pushing the organization into defending the status quo and by encouraging it to suppress options, hedges, and innovations.

These observations can be explained with reference to transactional rationality by looking at the incentives of OSD to conform with prevailing standards of procedural and radical rationality—standards which include the exploration and explanation of unexamined premises, the openness of communications, the opportunity for competitive analysis, the clear distribution of risks and responsibility. Three statements summarize the arrangement of relevant incentives:

- 1. Where the payoffs for OSD-instigated program changes based on cost/effectiveness and systems analysis are high, the quality of the analysis will be high and the propensity of OSD to assume risks and accept responsibility will also be high.
- 2. Where the payoffs are high, but the political risks associated with them increase, OSD will be encouraged to obscure responsibility and degrade the integrity of the analysis.
- 3. Where payoffs are low, and political costs high, but decisions must be made, analysis will lose its integrity and become a tool of management interests.

The point of this survey is that the first situation may have existed and continue to exist in the Defense Department, but the trend has been toward the second and third combinations—the increase in political risks and the reduction of payoffs achievable by the techniques of rational analysis. I have suggested that the first statement will remain applicable, to the extent that OSD maintains the initiative. so that payoffs in programs will stay high and the political costs of risk and responsibility bearing will be held down. I have also indicated that rising costs could handicap the maintenance of initiative and increase the political costs and risks to OSD-a phenomenon which already can be observed to some degree.

What might happen if the U.S. military program were to be reduced—in conformity with disarmament arrangements or in unilateral response to changed perceptions of threat, for example-might be equally discouraging. The services would become more restive, their political supporters more critical of particular OSD economy measures, though still committed to reductions in general. OSD could not score well with a general economy program and would cause outright hostility in many particular cases. These are circumstances in which the pressures and temptations to degrade the policy debate would be brought to bear from all sides. The level of debate might not sink as low as it did in 1949 or 1954-55, but any degradation would have serious consequences. The utility of present management methods is particularly sensitive to quality.

IV. CONCLUSION

In 1960 I wrote:

In all the major fields of defense organization it is evident that the shortcomings of the business approach have been perceived. In some, it has led to a search for program—for some way to formulate general policies—which will provide more adequate guidance to management efforts. When-

ever a solution has been considered, however, it has been rejected because it challenged the prerogatives of the Joint Chiefs of Staff as the determiners of the military ends for which the military establishment exists.²⁰

Sooner than I thought possible the Defense Department had a "program." What made the difference was a new administration which assumed the task of generating programs and objectives by imposing radically rationalistic programming, allocation, and operational techniques.

I have laid stress on the prospects that the initiative which OSD held under McNamara will be sustained. Holding the initiative depends upon both internal and external conditions. I have taken an optimistic view of the internal ones here, referring to some prospects for further innovation. But we ought to consider some less attractive eventualities. If initiative is sustained, we can expect some additional achievements in defense management. and policymaking. We can also expect that the rate of innovation will be sustained, in turn sustaining the capacity to adapt to a changing political and technological environment. But against these prospects, we must measure the very considerable propensities of any large and highly centralized organization to kill its own capacity to innovate or change. By now, the issue may well be whether the Defense Department can survive its own success.

The relations of the Defense Department with external conditions I approached through two alternative views of the future, the cold war continuing peacefully, and the expansion of limited war somewhere, such as Southeast Asia. The first threatened to produce executive stagnation, which could be particularly harmful to the validity of military programs. The second could make Defense Department programs increasingly vulnerable to political attack, and that could produce stagnation and its consequences, too. That may be an important danger posed by the domestic political effects of the war in Vietnam; they would not, so far as I can tell, be the effects anticipated in Hanoi.

We have come to depend heavily for the quality of the defense program upon the quality of executive leadership and management in OSD. In order to get the quality of programs that we want, there may be no other choice. The McNamara reforms were carried out and worked effectively because OSD was able to

²⁰ Organizing for Defense (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1961), p. 315.

take and keep the initiative and thus expand its dominating position in military policy-making outside of the Defense Department as well as inside it. Reduced OSD dominance over external policy-making competitors would mean, conversely, reducing effectiveness within the military establishment, including reduced ability to generate options and innovations. In fact, the first quality OSD would lose by retrenching on the exercise of its authority would probably be its adaptability.

Put in these terms, it should be evident that we are back where we started, with a military program generation process which must defend its actions not "on the merits" but over issues of institutional integrity. That is why, in the end, the case for the new policies and methods of defense policy-making cannot be made on the grounds that they rest on more satisfactory concepts of rational decision-making. Rather, a more inclusive standard must be applied. I have specified three political functions which a military program decision process must perform, and argued that it performs them at least as well as it predecessor did. Functional analysis can be altogether too general and too detached to be much use in evaluating organization behavior and output. But it can bridge the gap between transaction-oriented political analysis and end-means oriented systems analysis, as this study is intended to show.

THE STRUCTURE OF POLITICAL CONFLICT IN THE NEW STATES OF TROPICAL AFRICA

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I. INTRODUCTION1

Having assumed the burden of understanding political life in two-and-a-half dozen unruly countries, political scientists who study the new states of tropical Africa must leap with assurance where angels fear to tread. We have borrowed, adapted, or invented an array of frameworks designed to guide perceptions of disparate events, and Africa is now uniformly viewed through the best lenses of contemporary comparative politics with a focus on political modernization, development and integration. Unfortunately, it appears that when we rely exclusively on these tools in order to accomplish our task, the aspects of political life which we, as well as non-specialists, see most clearly with the naked eye of informed common sense, remain beyond the range of our scientific vision. In our pursuit of scientific progress, we have learned to discern such forms as regular patterns of behavior which constitute structures and institutions; but the most salient characteristic of political life in Africa is that it constitutes an almost institutionless arena with conflict and disorder as its most prominent features.

In recent years, almost every new African state has experienced more or less successful military or civilian coups, insurrections, mutinies, severe riots, and significant political assassinations. Some of them appear to be permanently on the brink of disintegration into several new political units. With little regard for the comfort of social scientists, the incidence of conflict and disorder appears unrelated to such variables as type of colonial experience, size, number of parties, absolute level or rate of economic and social development, as well as to the overall characteristics of regimes. The downfall of what was widely regarded as the continent's most promising democracy in January, 1966, was followed in February by the demise of what many thought to be the continent's harshest authoritarian regime.

¹ Earlier versions of this paper were presented at the September 1966, meeting of the American Political Science Association (New York City) and at the Seventh World Congress of the International Political Science Association (Brussels, September, 1967). The category "new states of Tropical Africa" excludes Liberia and Ethiopia.

Furthermore, recent events in Nigeria, Ghana, and elsewhere indicate that military regimes are as fragile as their civilian predecessors. Given the presence of almost every "gap" ever imagined by scholars concerned with development and modernization, and in the absence of the requisites most commonly posited for the maintenance of a political system, there is little place for countries such as these in the conceptual universe of political science. Yet, more often than not, these countries do persist. Hence, we have little choice but either to play an academic ostrich game or come to grips with their reality.

In order to deal in an orderly manner with such disorderly countries, we must alter our vision. Our normal focus on institutions and their concomitant processes resembles the focus of the untrained eve on the enclosed surface, or figure, of an image. The naive observer sees interstices as "shapeless parts of the underlying ground. He pays no attention to them, and finds it difficult and unnatural to do so." Like trained painters, however, we must force ourselves to reverse the spontaneous figure-ground effect in order to perceive "interstices," shapes which initially do not appear worthy of our attention, but are in fact fundamental to our perception of the surface under observation. To understand political life in Africa, instead of viewing political disturbances as the shapeless ground surrounding institutions and processes which define the regimes of the new states. we must try to view them as characteristic processes which themselves constitute an important aspect of the regime in certain types of political systems.3

II. AFRICAN POLITICAL SYSTEMS AND THEIR ENVIRONMENT

On the whole, African countries are distinguished from other Third World clusters

- ² Rudolf Arnheim, Art and Visual Perception: A Psychology of the Creative Eye (Berkeley and Los Angeles: University of California Press, 1965), p. 230.
- ³ Notions concerning the political system apparent in this paper are inspired by the works of David Easton, but clearly lack the intellectual rigor of A Systems Analysis of Political Life (New York: John Wiley and Sons, 1965).

by extremely weak national centers, a periphery which consists of societies until recently selfcontained, and levels of economic and social development approaching the lowest limits of international statistical distributions.4 They continue to reflect the fact that their origins stem from a recent European scramble for portions of an international system or subsystem constituted by interacting tribal societies. Although the French, British, Belgian, Portuguese or German nets were sometimes cast over an area dominated by a single society or by a group of societies with similar characteristics, this was usually not the case at all. Within the administrative nets which later became states there were only a few decades ago a varying number of more or less disparate societies, each with a distinct political system. and with widely different intersocietal relationships.

Although the new political units provided a territorial mold within which social, economic, political, and cultural changes that accompanied colonization occurred, we are becoming increasingly aware that these processes, although related, did not necessarily vary "rhythmically," i.e., at the same rate;5 and that the rates of change varied not only between countries but also between regions of the same country. If we conceive the original African societies as sets of values, norms, and structures, it is evident that they survived to a significant extent everywhere, even where their existence was not legally recognized as in the most extreme cases of direct rule. Furthermore, the new set of values, norms, and structure, which constituted an incipient national center did not necessarily grow at the expense of the older ones, as if it were a constant-sum game in which the more a country becomes "modern" the less it remains "traditional." Although many individuals left the country for the new towns, they did not necessarily leave one society to enter a new one; instead, the behavior of a given individual tended to be governed by norms from both sets which defined his multiple roles and even mixed to define a particular role. Because the new center had nowhere expanded sufficiently at the time of independence, we cannot characterize what

⁴ For the concepts used see Edward Shils, "Centre and Periphery," in *The Logic of Personal Knowledge—Essays in Honor of Michael Polanyi* (London: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1961), pp. 117–130. See also note 42, below.

⁵ See the discussion in C. S. Whitaker, Jr., "A Dysrhythmic Process of Political Change," World Politics, 19 (January, 1967), 190-217.

is contained within these countries today as a single society in the normally accepted sociological sense of the word, with its connotation of a relatively integrated system of values, norms, and structures. But since the new African states in reality do provide territorial containers for two sets of values, norms, and structures, the "new" and the "residual," with the latter itself usually subdivided into distinct sub-sets, it is useful to think of these sets as forming a particular type of unintegrated society which can be called "syncretic." 6

The syncretic character of contemporary African societies tends to be reflected in every sphere of social activity, including the political. If we seek to identify their political systems by asking how values are authoritatively allocated within these societies, it is evident that in every case the most visible structures and institutions with which political scientists normally deal, such as executive and legislative bodies, political parties and groups, the apparatus of territorial administration, the judiciary, and even the institutions of local government provided by law, deal with only a portion of the total allocative activity, and that the remainder must therefore be allocated by other means, by other structures. This is fairly obvious where some functional division of labor between "modern" and "traditional" institutions was provided for initially as part of the constitutional settlement at the time of independence, but it is equally the case where traditional political structures have no recognized legal or political standing, or even where they have been formally abolished, as in Guinea or Mali.7

Without denying important variations in the

⁶ The problem with which I am dealing here is akin to that of the "plural society" conceptualized by M. G. Smith in *The Pleural Society in the British West Indies* (Berkeley and Los Angeles: University of California Press, 1965). The word "syncretic" distinguishes the present societies from the "plural," which is a particular type involving super-ordination between components. I prefer it to the more passive "heterogeneous," because "syncretic" connotes that a process of amalgamation and integration is being attempted.

⁷ For a further development of this point, see my book Creating Political Order: The Party-States of West Africa (Chicago: Rand McNally, 1966), Chapter V. My reasoning here is deductive; but empirical evidence from micro-political studies of Ghana by David Brokensha and Ernst Benjamin, of Mali by Nicholas Hopkins and of Tanzania by Henry Bienen, confirm the validity of the assumption.

degree of institutionalization of national centers in different countries, it is suggested that from the present vantage point, even the most prominent variations in political arrangements at the time of independence must be viewed as superficial features of the political system since they were never firmly institutionalized. An examination of political parties, the best studied feature of the African scene, reveals such a wide gap between the organizational model from which the leaders derived their inspiration and their capacity to implement such schemes, that the very use by observers of the word "party" to characterize such structures involves a dangerous reification.

These comments may be extended to include constitutional arrangements, which in the absence of anchorage in supporting norms and institutions had little reality beyond their physical existence as a set of written symbols deposited in a government archive; about the civil service, in which the usual bureaucratic norms are so rare that it is perhaps better to speak of "government employees" as a categoric group; of "trade unions," which are more by way of congeries of urban employed anc unemployed intermittently mobilized for a temporary purpose, such as a street demonstration; and even of "the Army," which far from being a model of hierarchical organization tends to be an assemblage of armed men who may or may not obey their officers. It is generally evident that the operations of ever the most "modern" institutions in Africa are governed by values and norms that stem from both the "new" and the "residual" sets.

The societal environment shared by all the new African states thus imposes severe limits upon the range within which significant variations of regimes can take place. Whether we define political integration in terms of the existence of a political formula which bridges the gap between the elite and the masses, or in terms of linkages between the values, norms. and structures that constitute the political system, it is clear that the level of political integration was, at the time of the founding. very low throughout Africa. Hence, although we can refer to the existence of "states" and "regimes" in Africa, we must be careful not to infer from these labels that their governments necessarily have authority over the entire country, any more than we can safely infer from the persistence of these countries as sovereign entities proof of the operations of endogenous factors such as a sense of community and the ability of authorities to enforce cohesion against people's will. Persistence may only reflect the initial inertia which keeps instruments of government inherited from the colonial period going, as well as the inertia of claimants which assures in most cases that all the problems will not reach the center simultaneously; it may reflect also the absence of effective external challenges and even to a certain extent the protection provided by the contemporary international system which more often than not guarantees the existence of even the weakest of sovereign states born out of the decolonization of tropical Africa.

Under these generally shared circumstances. it is not surprising that the founding fathers of most African states behaved very much in the same way in order to achieve the dual goal of modernizing as rapidly as possible while maintaining themselves in office. Like any other government, they had to cope with the problem of managing the flow of demands while at the same time eliciting sufficient support. They could obtain support in exchange for the satisfaction of demands (distribution); they could enhance support on the basis of the internalization by a sufficiently large proportion of the population of a belief in their right to rule (socialization, legitimacy); they could suppress demands by negative reinforcement, while at the same time punishing non-support (coercion and force). In the face of overwhelming problems stemming from the syncretic character of the society they relied increasingly on the latter techniques, thus contributing substantially to the escalation of political conflict.

Initially, the founding fathers of African states benefited from the sudden creation of a multitude of new political offices, from the departure of a number of colonial officials, from the expansion of administrative and statedirected economic activity which had begun during the latter years of welfare-state colonialism, as well as from a prevalent sense that they had earned the right to rule through their leadership of protest movements and that they were the legitimate successors of colonial officials. On these foundations, many were able to construct adequate political machines based primarily on the distribution of benefits to individual and group claimants, in the form of shifting coalitions appearing either as a "multiparty system," or more commonly, as a "unified" party. In the light of the politicians' inability to maintain themselves in office for very long (except in a very few cases) and of the lurid revelations of their corruption and ineptitude which made headlines after their downfall, it is easy to forget that many of them were initially quite successful in developing

symbols and organizations which could be used to channel support and to establish the legitimacy of their claim to rule in the eyes of their countrymen. Beyond this, they also benefited from the sort of inertia already referred to, whereby those individuals who were aware of the existence of country-wide political institutions simply accepted them as a continuation of what they were already used to, the colonial order, but with a welcome populist flavor. The inheritance of instruments of force (police, gendarmerie, small armies), usually among the more professionalized bodies and often under the continued supervision of European officers, provided a certain backing in case the political process failed.

III. THE SHIFT FROM POWER TO FORCE

The shift to a new phase of political activity is related to two sets of mutually reinforcing factors, stemming from the interaction of the rulers with the syncretic society in which they operated. First, there was a growing gap between the leaders' ideological aspirations and their capacity to implement the policies these aspirations entailed. Whether or not it is appropriate to speak of a "revolution of rising expectations" throughout the continent, there is little doubt that such a revolution has occurred among those responsible for government, in the form of a commitment to rapid modernization. The most obvious examples here are the "mobilizing" states, such as Ghana (until 1966), Mali, or Guinea, in which this commitment was defined in a very specific manner to include the transformation of the syncretic society into a homogeneous society by eliminating the "residual" set of values, norms, and structures and institutionalizing the new set according to ideological directives; the creation of an all-pervasive state apparatus, including both an all-encompassing mass party. which could function as a controlling organization in the Leninist sense and as an aggregative organization, and an effective Africanized bureaucracy; and a planned economy geared to the achievement of very high increase in the rate of total output, as well as economic selfsufficiency in which the State plays the dominant role. Whether or not they espoused "socialism" in this form, most other African leaders shared these aspirations, albeit in some modified form. Since African countries are farther behind with respect to most of these goals than any other set of countries in the world, however, the result is that governments with the lowest load capability have assumed the heaviest burdens. But in the process of trying to raise the capability of their governments to achieve these goals, African rulers frittered away their small initial political capital of legitimacy, distributive capacity, inertia and coercion by investing it in non-essential undertakings, much as many of them did in the economic sector. A major source of the vulnerability of African regimes thus stems from adherence to self-imposed ideological directives.

Secondly, even if properly allocated this capital was seldom adequate to deal with political difficulties stemming from the very character of the syncretic society, the circumstances of decolonization, and the characteristics of the new institutions themselves. This was most obvious in the case of the Congo. where challenges stemming from every direction occurred simultaneously and most dramatically within a few weeks after independence. Although elsewhere the challenges have been less extreme and have usually been spaced over a few years, while the countervailing power and force at the disposal of the government was somewhat greater, their cumulative impact has not necessarily been much less severe. Everywhere, African governments have been faced with some or all of the consequences of the politicization of residual cleavages which occurred in the course of the rapid extension of political participation prior to independence; and of an inflationary spiral of demands stemming from the very groups whose support is most crucial for the operations of government. Since these processes are often discussed in the literature, only their major features will be noted here.

1. The Politicization of Primordial Ties:⁸ Pre-existing distinctions between groups in Africa were usually supplemented by others stemming from the uneven impact of European-generated change. Often, by the time of independence, one tribe or group of tribes had become more urban, more educated, more Christian and richer than others in the country. Hence, at the mass level, old and new cleavages tend to be consistent rather than cross-cutting; camps are clear-cut and individuals can engage wholeheartedly in the disputes that occur;

⁸ For a general treatment of this topic, see Clifford Geertz, "The Integrative Revolution," in Clifford Geertz (ed.), Old Societies and New States (New York: The Free Press of Glencoe, 1963) pp. 105-157. Although every serious monograph on African politics has also dealt with the subject, it is unfortunate that no effort has been made to refine for Africa the comparative analysis of the phenomenon along the lines suggested by Geertz.

almost any issue can precipitate a severe conflict; the history of conflict itself tends to make the next occurrence more severe; with few intervening layers of community organization, even localized conflicts rapidly reach the center. They tend to be particularly severe where there is an asymmetry between the old and the new stratification system within a single society or between complementary societies, as when for some reason serfs become more educated than their masters or when their greater number becomes a source of political power at the time universal suffrage is introduced.

At the level of the modernizing leadership, recruitment is usually uneven, but nevertheless open to a certain extent to the various groups in the country; common life-experiences insure a certain degree of solidarity which provides offsetting cross-cutting affiliations; and ethnic ties make an important contribution to national integration by preventing the formation of the sharp elite-mass gap that is common in peasant societies. But there is always a very great strain on the solidarity of the modernizing leadership because, regardless of their ideological orientation, political entrepreneurs who seek to establish or maintain a following must necessarily rely on primordial ties to distinguish between "us" and "them." When it appeared that the shape of the polity was being settled rapidly, perhaps once and for all, a multitude of groups began to press their legitimate claims for the protection of their way of life, for a redefinition of the relationship between their own peripheral society and the center, and for a more satisfactory distribution of benefits. \ Many latent disputes were revived and flowed into the new arena provided by central institutions. Hence it is not surprising that even in countries where one party seemed to be solidly established the leadership felt that their country was less integrated than ever before. Where several ethnic-regional movements vied for power, and especially where participation was extended very suddenly, the consequences of these cleavages and ensuing conflicts upon the center were even more disturbing.9

In general, almost any difference between two groups can become politically significant, even if from the point of view of the ethnographer the two groups belong to the same cultural classification. Although each of the oppositions tends to involve but a small pro-

⁹ I have attempted to deal with this question in *One-Party Government in the Ivory Coast* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1964), pp. 47, 77, 128-134.

portion of the total population, because of the very nature of the groups involved, many permutations are possible and contagion can set in.) Suitable institutional arrangements, such as various forms of territorial federalism, proportional or communal representation, and institutional quotas, are not easily designed in situations where primordial identities are as numerous and fluid as they are in most of the countries under consideration.

(2. The Inflation of Demands: The second major source of challenge involves three crucial categories of individuals: civilian employees of government, men in uniform, and youths. Government employees, who include not only professional civil servants but also a large number of low-level, unskilled clerical personnel and manual workers employed in the operation of the governmental infrastructure (railways, harbors, road maintenance, and public works generally) usually constitute a very large proportion of those gainfully employed outside of agriculture. Promotions were initially rapid because of Africanization and the vast expansion of government agencies; many programs of economic development have had as their major consequence a reallocation of national revenue to the benefit of the managers, including both government employees and politicians; (and government employees often constitute in terms of income and prestige the most privileged group in the society, after the politicians themselves. Yet, these same factors have contributed to a process of acute relative deprivation! Because of their very occupation and training, government employees have internalized to a greater extent than most others the style of life of their European predecessors; they feel that on the grounds of native ability and training they are qualified to rule rather than merely to execute policies;) rapid promotions only lead to higher aspirations among those who have already been promoted and among those left behind, while the rate of governmental expansion tapers off soon after independence. During the colonial period, government employees who vented their grievances against their employer were "good nationalists"; as they continue to do so after independence, they are a "selfish privileged class.'\The deterioration in the relationship between government employees and the politicians is relatively independent of the ideological orientation of the regime itself: in most of French-speaking Africa, government employees are "leftists" in relation to whatever the government's orientation happens to be at a given time; but in Ghana, under Nkrumah, civil servants constituted a sort of "rightist" opposition to the regime. Since personnel expenditures constitute as much as two-thirds or more of the government's annual expenditures, any demands that require translation into resource allocation tend to create a major financial crisis.

The grievance orientation toward government extends also to those employed in the private sector, since even in countries that are not nominally "socialist," \étatisme prevails; the private industrial or commercial sector is closely regulated since major firms usually operate on the basis of government guarantees concerning manpower costs. So much of the workers' real income takes the form of benefits rather than money wages (family allocations, housing, etc.) that any sort of collective bargaining usually involves a modification of rules governing labor and leads to a showdown between the government and the unions. Finally, a similar process prevails among cash-crop farmers, for example, since marketing operations are managed or at least closely regulated by government. Demands in this sector are therefore necessarily and automatically "political," and governments are even viewed as responsible for controlling the fluctuations of world markets for tropical commodities, over which most of them have but a very limited leverage.

Men in uniform tend to act very much like other government employees. In the absence of institutionalized values and norms which transform men in uniform into a military establishment and a police force, officers and men are ruled by the norms that prevail among other groups; hence what has been said above applies to them as well. Furthermore, they rapidly find out that by virtue of their organizational characteristics and their control of certain instruments of force, they are indeed the best organized trade union in the country. 'As I shall point out below, this is not the only factor which has led the military to intervene in African politics; but it has helped set the mood for certain types of interventions and for the general relationship between the military and civilian politicians.10

10 The most useful recent surveys of African military establishments are presented in the publications of the Institute of Strategic Studies, London. See in particular, M. J. V. Bell, "Army and Nation in Sub-Saharan Africa," Adelphi Papers, No. 21 (August, 1965); and David Wood, "The Armed Forces of African States," Adelphi Papers, No. 27 (April, 1966). For an earlier essay, see James S. Coleman and Belmont Bryce, Jr., "The Role of the Military in Sub-

'As Lucian Pye has noted, "The non-Western political process is characterized by sharp differences in the political orientation of the generations," primarily because of a "lack of continuity in the circumstances under which people are recruited to politics."11 In most African countries, it was easy for a particular age-cohort to move from relatively modest positions in the occupational structure to the highest positions in both the polity and the economy. Within a single decade, clerks and elementary school teachers became Presidents, cabinet ministers, members of party executives, directors of large trading establishments, etc. But for the next generations, whose expectations are based on the experience of their predecessors, conditions have fundamentally changed. First of all, the uppermost positions have already been filled by relatively young men who see no precise time limit to their tenure. Secondly, men with some education and occupational qualifications have rapidly became much less scarce because of the huge growth of secondary and higher education during the post-World War II decade. Thus, there has been a manifold increase in supply while the demand has abruptly decreased. The result is that newer generations face an insurmountable glut which frustrates their aspirations, with very few opportunities for movement into alternative spheres of activity.12 Hence, the intergenerational gap within the political sphere can be noticed in almost every other institutional sphere, including especially the civil service and the military. It is exacerbated by the fact that the newer generations are usually in fact better trained and more highly qualified than their predecessors and hence have a very legitimate claim to take their place. To these discrepancies in recruitment must be added gaps in political socialization. In syncretic societies, the regime has very little control over the major mechanisms of socialization, the family and the primary group, and only partially over the educational structure. There is little likelihood that new generations

Saharan Africa," in John J. Johnson (ed.), The Role of the Military in Underdeveloped Countries (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1962), pp. 359-405.

¹¹ Lucian Pye, "The Non-Western Political Process," in H. Eckstein and D. Apter (eds.), Comparative Politics (New York: The Free Press of Glencoe, 1963), p. 660.

¹² On patterns of recruitment of new elites and their consequences see Rémi Clignet and Philip Foster, *The Fortunate Few* (Evanston: Northwestern University Press, 1966).

will have a set of attitudes compatible with the requirements of the new order. This is particularly important given two factors: The rapid growth of a large body of slightly educated, unemployed young urbanites; and the general shape of the demographic pyramid in which adolescents and young adults constitute a very large proportion of the total population. Intergenerational conflict is exacerbated by the fact that youthful discontent tends to be manifested not only by individual deviance from established norms, but also in the appearance of age-homogeneous movements and organizations, functional equivalents of the familiayouth gangs of industrialized societies, which tend to maintain a distinctive sub-culture anc to act autonomously in the political sphere." "Youth" is thus transformed from a mere categoric group into a movement.

In concluding this brief review of the consequences of the politicization of residual cleavages and of the inflationary spiral of demands voiced by crucial groups in the society it is important to note that the two processes are seldom insulated from each other. Government employees, soldiers, or young men in the towns are also members of ethnic groups; yetthese several affiliations do not constitute the sort of web of group affiliation characteristic of "pluralist" societies Hence, the two processes reinforce each other to produce recurrent. serious, and complex conflicts, which easily penetrate into the political arena because of the weakness of aggregative structures. But even if they do not immediately result in an increase in demands or in a withdrawal of support, they constitute serious disturbances from the poinof view of governments engaged in building & nation since by their very existence they provide evidence that this goal has not been achieved.

The added weight contributed by these processes to the burdens of government is relatively independent of the wisdom or devotion of particular political leaders, factors which wilnot be considered here. The difficulties of government in syncretic societies are so great however, that the marginal consequences of human error, of weakness, and of sheer roguery—whose incidence among African politicians may be assumed to be about the same as among equivalent men elsewhere—are vastly magnified. For example, corruption among government officials, which probably did not

¹³ Conditions under which the phenomenon occurs are specified by S. N. Eisenstadt, *Fron. Generation to Generation* (Glencoe: The Free Press, 1956).

interfere with the industrial take-off of European countries or the United States (and perhaps even facilitated it), can have very damaging consequences where it diverts a large proportion of very scarce, non-expanding resources, away from the public domain into the pockets of a non-productive bureaucratic bourgeoisie. Impatience and arbitrary actions, which elsewhere may only lead to the discrediting of a public figure and to personal tragedy, can become sparks which ignite a major conflict.

Within a few years the two types of challenges discussed above strained the restricted distributive potential of the new governments and rapidly undermined the limited legitimacy cf the founders. The center's weakness, hitherto kidden from sight, was unmercifully exposed, as when the value of the currency issued by a national banking system is drastically reduced when the credit pyramid, itself based on the productivity of the economy, collapses.14 In the new situation, demands are expressed more vociferously; depositors knock down the gatekeepers and seek to invade the vault. Parsons has suggested that the system's response can be twofold: "First, an increasingly stringent scale cf priorities of what can and cannot be done will be set up; second, increasingly severe negative sanctions for non-compliance with collective decisions will be imposed."15 Political power, normally based on the overall social structure, gives way to force.

'Although no African rulers ever abandoned completely their reliance on the techniques of machine politics to maintain themselves in office, illustrations of a trend toward the use of force abound and constitute by now a monotonous recitation of unpleasant but familiar facts of African political life: intimidation, exile, detention, or assassination of political opponents; modification of the electoral system to make competition either impossible or at least very costly to those who attempt to engage in it; reduction of the independence of

14 The analogy is drawn from Talcott Parsons, "Some Reflections on the Place of Force in Social Process," in Harry Eckstein (ed.), Internal War (New York: The Free Press of Glencoe," 1964), p. 59-64. A similar analysis is provided by Martin Kilson in Political Change in a West African State: A Study of the Modernization Process in Sierra Leone (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1966), with emphasis on the initial growth of "reciprocity" and the eventual inadequacy of this political technique.

16 Parsons. op. cit., p. 64.

the judiciary or creation side-by-side with it of dependable political courts; redefinition of loyalty into unquestioning obedience and sycophancy; use of the military, of the police, and of political thugs to bulldoze dissidents into passivity, and passives into demonstrative supporters; creation of additional quasi-military or quasi-police bodies to offset the questionable loyalty of the existing ones. (Although coups which result in changes of government have attracted the most attention, the most frequent coups in Africa have probably been those initiated by an incumbent government against threatening individuals or groups (real or alleged), and those launched by rulers or dominant factions against their associates.

Legond its immediate unfortunate consequences for the individuals affected, the shift from power to force as a technique of government has serious long-term consequences for political life more generally in that it serves as the prelude to anti-government coups and revolutions, in the following manner:

(a. In the process of shifting from power to force, governments tend to become over-confident in their ability to reduce the disturbing flow of demands by dealing harshly with their source. They become afraid that any concession might be interpreted as weakness and open up a Pandora's box of claims. Hence, less change occurs altogether. Governments become less adept at discriminating among danger signals and tend to deal with even the smallest disturbances by expending a great deal of force. But since the capital of force is small it becomes rapidly used up in relatively unnecessary undertakings, thus increasing the government's vulnerability to more serious threats.

I b. When a shift from power to force occurs, it is accompanied by a change in the relative market value of existing structures. In the case of the new African states, the relative value of political parties and of civilian administrative agencies has undergone a sort of deflation, while the value of the police, of the military, and of any organization capable of exercising force, even by the sheer manipulation of large numbers of people in demonstrations and civil disobedience actions, has been vastly increased.

• c. Although the shift to force represents an attempt to overcome deteriorating legitimacy and inadequate power, paradoxically it en-

¹⁶ This proposition is related to Apter's suggestion that there is "an inverse relationship between information and coercion in a system." (David E. Apter, *The Politics of Modernization* [Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1965], p. 40.)

hances the problem of the legitimacy of the rulers in the eyes of those to whom the implementation of force must necessarily be entrusted. As Parsons has indicated: "Most important, whatever the physical technology involved, a critical factor in socially effective force is always the social organization through which it is implemented. There is always some degree of dependance on the lovalties of the relevant personnel to the elements of the social structure ostensibly controlling them."17 Attempts to balance one instrument of force which is thought to be unreliable by creating another merely modifies the problem of control of force by political means, but does not eliminate it. In fact, resort to this technique may exacerbate the very problem it seeks to overcome by antagonizing individuals identified with the relevant institution.

v d. When individuals and groups are deprived of the right and opportunity of exercising power to express their demands, they have no choice but to submit to force or use it themselves to express their demands. But when the government's capital of force is discovered to be limited, the latter alternative tends to be frequently chosen. Furthermore, since authority is personalized and the government is committed to a rigid course, specific demands tend to be translated into demands for a general change of rulers.

It is within the context of this inter-relationship between governments who rely on force and the remainder of the society that the growing frequency of military and civilian coups, successful or unsuccessful; of mutinies, large-scale and prolonged urban strikes or rural disturbances; of near-civil wars, insurrections, and revolutionary-minded movements, must be understood.

IV. THE COUP AS A POLITICAL INSTITUTION18

'The coup can be viewed as an institutionalized pattern of African politics on statistical grounds since in recent years it has become the modal form of governmental and regime

17 Parsons, op. cit., p. 66.

18 It is difficult to analyze the patterns of coups because it is impossible to identify the components of the universe with which one must deal. If incumbent rulers are to be believed, attempted coups against the government are extremely frequent in almost every African country; but what appear to be anti-government plots may in fact be only government-initiated purges. The present analysis is based exclusively on secondary sources. Unless otherwise specified, data are drawn from reports in West Africa

change. More significantly, however, the coup is a normal consequence of the showdown between a government and its opponents who use force against each other in a situation where the force at the disposal of the government is very limited. This condition, which is met in most African countries, is most important because it distinguishes the conflict situation that tends to lead to a coup from others which tend to develop into some form of internal war as the result of extensive mobilization of support by both sides. In Africa, the government usually falls too soon for this to occur; there is some evidence that governments even prefer dissolving themselves to fighting. Coups determine who will rule, at least temporarily, but do not in themselves affect the fundamental character of the society or of its political system. The scope of the conflict is limited in relation to the society as a whole. Coups may be accompanied by some brutality but seldom entail more strategic forms of violence.

As of mid-1967, the set of new states of tropical Africa could be divided into two subsets of almost equal numbers: those which had experienced at least one change of central government personnel as the result of a coup, and those which had not. But almost all the units in the second sub-set had experienced some serious challenge; some had withstood it only through external intervention on behalf of the incumbents; and it appeared probable that the next coup, or the one after that, would be successful. As I suggested in the introduction, the incidence of coups appears to be independent of the quantitative or qualitative variables normally used to differentiate among African states. Attempted or successful coups are always justified by the initiators, and often explained by observers, with reference to the corruption, ineffectiveness, and arbitrariness of the incumbents; but it is impossible to distinguish any significant threshold beyond which these faults and weaknesses become intolerable and it would probably be impossible to demonstrate that the regimes of countries in which successful coups have occurred were, as a group, more vulnerable to these criticisms than others. Whether or not a coup occurs in a given African country at a particular time is related

(London), Afrique Nouvelle (Dakar), Le Monde, Sélection Hebdomadaire (Paris), The Times (London), The New York Times, Jeune Afrique (Tunis), Africa Report (Washington), and Africa Digest (London). A more detailed analysis of military interventions will appear in my contribution to Henry Bienen (ed.), The Military Intervenes (New York: Russell Sage, 1968).

to specific and circumstantial features of that country's current political and economic situation, rather than to any fundamental and lasting characteristics which differentiate that country from others on the continent? The most significant variable may well be the passing of time, a factor often neglected in studies of regime stability in the developing countries. Except in the most extreme situations, coups are more likely to occur after a few years of independence than initially because it takes some time for a government to use up its initial political capital and for opponents to test the government's strength.

If the incidence of coups appears random, this is not true of the manner in which they develop. The atmosphere within which a coup is likely to occur can be created by almost any type of conflict situation, originating almost anywhere in the social structure, within the ruling elite or outside of it. But not every kind of showdown between the government and its opponents is equally likely to lead to the government's downfall. The government has to be physically threatened, which means that the initiators of the coup must be able to deploy force in the capital. Hence, (successful coups usually involve two bodies of manpower: trade unions and the formal bearers of force, the Army and the police (including of course such bodies as the gendarmerie, where one exists). But these two bodies are related in an asymmetrical fashion: the unions cannot bring about the downfall of the government without the support of the Army (active or passive), while the Army can carry out a successful coup without securing any alliances. In the final analysis, then, the role of the Army is determinative. As one African journalist has put it, "the Army has established itself as a no man's land between the elite and the masses."201

Miven the small size and organizational weakness of the military establishments inherited by most countries from the colonial era, few students of African politics devoted much attention to its potential political role until it became manifest. Yet, James Coleman and Belmont Bryce, Jr. indicated in one of the first essays on the subject that the Congo crisis

¹⁹ As for example in the hypothesis discussed by Samuel P. Huntington, "Political Development and Political Decay," World Politics, 17 (April, 1965), p. 427. His data are based on Fred R. von der Mehden, Politics of the Developing Nations (Englewood Cliffs, N. J.; Prentice-Hall, Inc., 1964), p. 65.

²⁰ Justin Vieyra in *Jeune Afrique*, December 12, 1965.

of 1960, in which an Army which had recently shown every sign of disaggregation was able to act as the arbiter between the President and the Prime Minister, demonstrated "the determinative influence which a small military force could exercise in a situation in which countervailing institutions of power groups are absent."21 How small "small" can be is now clear in the light of the successful interventions by the Togolese Army of 250 men in 1963 and by the Central African Republic's Army of 600 men in 1966, each of which was the smallest military establishment on the continent at the time of its coup. Perhaps the only reason for the slight delay in the army's prominence was the fact that in some countries the uppermost levels of the army were not Africanized until several years after independence, while in others the presence of European garrisons or bilateral defense agreements provided some protection against the African government's own military.22 Even under these conditions, however, the determinative role of the military in political conflict should have been apparent to us much earlier: for example, the breakup of the Federation of Mali in 1960 involved initially a dispute between Senegal and Soudan over the appointment of the chief of the general staff, while the eventual showdown involved a clash between the pro-Senegalese gendarmerie (with the help of French Community officers) and troops under the command of the Soudanese Chief of Staff; the gendarmerie's action turned the tide in favor of Senegal.23 In Senegal two and a half years later, President Senghor's control over a single batallion of airborne troops insured his victory over Prime Minister Mamadou Dia, who had initially deployed the gendarmerie (with some Army support) against the President's partisans.24

Relationships between civilian governments and the military have steadily deteriorated; in keeping with the processes discussed in the preceding section. In addition, the government's very reliance on the military as an instrument of force brought about a transformation of the military outlook as officers be-

²¹ Coleman and Bryce, op. cit., p. 399.

came intimately acquainted with the seamy side of political life and were able to form an accurate estimate of the government's authority. Initially, the military tended to intervene against obviously weak governments such as the Congo-Kinshasa, Togo, the Congo-Brazzaville, or Dahomey; but later, even the strongest governments appeared to be much less formidable. Hence, there has been a steady escalation of the character of military interventions. Initially they took the form of strikemutinies (to secure better pay, the removal of unpopular officers, better pensions for veterans, or an expansion of the army) and referee actions (in the face of prolonged stalemate between contending politicians, or urban disorder resulting from strikes and demonstration). These early interventions usually led to the establishment of a compromise civilian government satisfactory to the military and to a return of the military to its barracks.25 More recently, however, the military has tended to engage in comprehensive takeovers! Several of these have occurred after earlier referee actions failed to bring about the desired changes; in others, a coup which appeared to be initially intended as a referee action was gradually transformed into a full-scale takeover when attempts to bring about a reconciliation among civilian politicians failed; in the light of these experiences, military leaders have become even less hesitant to establish military rule from the very beginning.

\ The institutionalization of the coup as an important means of government change in Africa stems not only from the internal characteristics of each country but also from the phenomenon of contagion. When African states first became independent, they were still isolated from one another, except when they formed colonial groupings, such as British East or French West Africa: international physical. social, and political communications were almost non-existent. Hence, during an initial period, disturbances in one country (Sudan, 1958; Congo-Kinshasa, 1960; Ethiopia, 1960) do not seem to have had any significant consequences for others, except when they occurred within one of the colonial groups (as in former French-speaking Africa from mid-1962

²⁵ See, for example, the analysis of Dahomey and the Congo-Brazzaville in Emmanuel Terray, "Les révolutions congolaise et dahoméene de 1963: essai d'interpretation," Revue Française de Science Politique, 14 (October, 1964), 917–942. A more detailed account of the process of escalation is presented in my paper cited in note

²² The Congo crisis of 1960 reminds us, however, that African troops can launch mutinies against their European officers.

²³ William J. Foltz, From French West Africa to the Mali Federation (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1965), pp. 176-183.

²⁴ Victor Du Bois, "The Trial of Mamadou Dia," American Universities Field Staff Report Service, West Africa Series, VI, No. 6 (June, 1963), pp. 4-8.

to early 1964, and in former British East Africa in January, 1964). (More recently, however, the countries of the continent have become much more of an interacting international sub-system as denoted not only by the formation of the Organization of African Unity and other formal groupings that cut across former colonial boundaries, but also by the growth of informal political ties among leaders and of intervention by one country in another country's politics. Within this new context, waves of coups are more likely to occur.' Although it is very difficult to show direct connections between events in Algeria (June, 1965), the Congo-Kinshasa (October), and the other countries in which military interventions occurred during the four months that followed, the first two did set the precedent for an escalation from referee actions to takeovers. For West Africa as a region, the links are much more specific. The military leaders of the Central African Republic, of Upper Volta, and of Dahomey have known one another since they served their apprenticeship together in Indochina; and although there is no evidence of concerted action, it is likely that for each of them the promotion of the group as a whole created new political aspirations. Beyond this, General Soglo has explained that his takeover in Dahomey was prompted by the fear that the elections scheduled for early 1966 might crystallize the North-South cleavage and result in disorder similar to that which prevailed among the Yoruba of neighboring Western Nigeria during recent elections, and about which Dahomeyans, many of whom are also Yoruba, were well informed.26 Conversely, Soglo's success probably affirmed the resolution of Nigerian officers next door; their success in turn may have inspired their Ghanaian counterparts, with whom they share not only British professional traditions but also exposure to the disastrous consequences of political disorder gained while serving in the Congo with ONUC.

Within one country also coups engender other coups. The success of one set of claimants encourages others to try. Even the establishment of military regimes does not lessen the probability of future civilian or military coups, since the very characteristics of African armies insure that the solidarity of their leadership, the control they have over their own organization, and their authority over the society at large, are not likely to be much greater than

what they were in the government they replaced.277

V. FORCE AS AN INSTRUMENT OF MAJOR POLITICAL CHANGE

Both the ins and the outs in Africa have also attempted to use force in order to achieve more fundamental changes including the modification of political communities, the alteration of important aspects of the stratification system. and the transformation of regimes (in Easton's sense of "regularized method for ordering political relationships"). These attempts may be initiated by the original founders, by new governments resulting from successful coups, or by alternative elites who seek to construct a competing spstem of authority while the government they oppose is still in place. Since these attempts usually involve the mobilization of extensive support, they tend to lead to an enlargement of the scope of conflict and may entail more strategic forms of violence. Except in a few specific situations discussed below. however, force fails to bring about major political change in Africa. In particular, political revolutions are unlikely to succeed because they entail prerequisites which are absent from the syncretic societies of contemporary Africa. 1. The Modification of Political Communities: Force is often invoked in Africa to bring about a redefinition of the territorial extent of the political community or of the internal relationship between some of its major components. Many countries contain regions that wish to secede, either to constitute an autonomous state or to join a neighbor.\ Such situations usually arise when one or more of the following features are precent: an ethnic group which straddles two countries, one segment of which comes to believe that it is in the wrong country: territorially contiguous societies with asymmetrical status cultures, particularly in countries which straddle the borderline between Arabized Muslim and "Black" Africa; rich areas (with income based on mineral deposits or on an important export crop) which resent having their revenue reallocated on a national basis and are geographically in an eccentric position from the point of view of the larger unit.

(The most prominent case is of course that of Katanga, where secession did occur and was

²⁷ For a further discussion, see my paper, "Military Rule and Political Development in Tropical Africa," presented at the Conference on Armed Forces and Society sponsored by the World Association of Sociologists (London, September, 1967).

²⁶ Reported by Philippe Decraene in Le Monde, Sélection Hebdomadaire, June 30-July 6, 1966.

accompanied by a clash of organized military bodies in the form of a small-scale war, because of the availability of non-Congolese instruments of force on both sides. By contrast, the breakup of the Federation of Mali did not involve strategic violence, but only a show of limited force by the two sides. Many other countries have experienced small-scale versions of this phenomenon: border tensions, involving armed incursions or attempted subversion, are common. Because of the nature of African armies and of the terrain (especially the absence of land communications suitable to military movement between countries with different colonial experiences), however, it is unlikely that these conflicts will lead to international wars; attempts to alter the territorial definition of political communities will either succeed without much violence, or will result in recurrent but minor irritations.28

Conflict over the relationship of one or more relatively integrated and distinct parts of the political community to the remainder stems most commonly from the sequels of indirect rule, as in Nigeria and in Uganda. [The constitutional settlement achieved under British leadership and supervision as a condition of the grant of independence, which provided for a loose form of federation approaching confederacy for all Nigerian regions, and between Buganda and the rest of Uganda, represented merely a truce in a protracted conflict because it could not be anchored in congruent political norms and structures. Although there are many other unsettled issues in both countries, conflict over the role of the North in Nigeria and of Buganda in Uganda have dominated political life since independence, with power rapidly giving way to force as a means of settlement. In Nigeria, the North attempted to preserve its identity by controlling policy-making at the federal level as the indispensable major partner in successive coalitions. Force came to be used by all sides to insure favorable results in critical elections. The new situation led to a first military coup in January, 1966. When the new military government announced its intention of transforming the country into a unitary statea decision which was interpreted in the Nigerian context as a fundamental change in the character of the political community-the North resorted to force (attacks upon southern

²⁸ Intra-national and international conflicts involving Ethiopia and the Sudan are major exceptions; they are not considered here because these two countries are peripheral to the universe of post-colonial tropical Africa with which I am particularly concerned.

residents of northern towns) to obtain concessions. In August, 1966, a new military coup put an end to unitary government before it had even begun to function. The sequels have involved an extension of inter-regional conflict, including the breakup of the Army into regional factions, and the secession of the Eastern region in May, 1967, and subsequently a protracted civil war.

In Uganda, Buganda long resisted all attempts by the national government to obtain control of the police on Buganda territory, organized a para-military body of veterans to occupy contested territory (in the "Lost Counties" dispute), and used force to intimidate Baganda whose political loyalty was not assured. Whatever the reasons which led to the strange government-initiated coup of February, 1966, in the course of which Prime Minister Obote assumed full exceutive powers, his decision to eliminate the offices of President and Vice-President (held by the traditional rulers of Buganda and Busoga respectively), the purge of pro-Baganda elements from the national army, and the eventual proclamation of an entirely new constitution without consulting the federal units, clearly constituted the prelude to an attempt to alter the most important features of the political community by force. Force gave way to the strategic use of violence in the next phase of conflict; and although the Obote government successfully repressed the Buganda uprising of May 1966, it is unlikely that this constitutes the end of the affair.29

Although such clear-cut cases are relatively rare, there are numerous instances which involve similar sequels of quasi-indirect rule, as with the Mossi of Upper Volta or the Agni of the Ivory Coast. Related situations occur in countries that contain pastoral and/or nomadic societies which the colonial powers had been satisfied to contain rather than to rule, and for which the end of European presence represents an opportunity to return to a traditional way of life that includes internal feuding and raiding upon neighbors. These patterns of behavior not only involve violence in and of themselves, but often lead to violent clashes with the military and the police.30 The conflict may be exacerbated by specific factors, as in Mali where the nomads are "white" while the new African

²⁹ This account is based on the excellent analysis by M. Crawford Young, "The Obote Revolution," Africa Report, June 1966, 8-14.

³⁰ Manifestations of this process in Uganda are discussed by Colin Leys, "Violence in Africa," *Transition*, 5 (Fourth Quarter, 1965), 17-20.

government is "black," or by the nationalisticeology of the rulers of new states from whose vantage point successful containment alone is not a satisfactory solution.

12. Stratification Change: A few African countries deviate from the general pattern discussed in section (1) in that the territorial boundaries established by European colonizers coincided with the domain of a single uniz whose stratification system included a clear-cuhierarchical organization of ethnic strata defined in relation to each other with a socially. economically, and politically dominant minority and a subordinate majority approaching the "plural society" discussed by M. G. Smith.3-The introduction of the principle of legitimacy based on popular sovereignty and of opportunities to implement this principle by means of elections based on universal suffrage in such societies can have genuinely revolutionary consequences, as was the case in Rwanda and in Zanzibar.

In Rwanda, the pastoral Tutsi, who constituted approximately 15 percent of the population, ruled for four centuries over the agricultural Hutu linked to them by an inheritable client-patron "contract" through a highly centralized administration headed by their Mwami, backed by their specialized warrior caste, and based on a monopoly of all cattle and land.32 Although both the Germans and the Belgians ruled indirectly, reserving educational opportunities and administrative posts almost exclusively for the Tutsi elite. changes began to occur after World War II when the Hutu engaged in the cultivation of a new major cash crop (Arabica coffee) and were encouraged to attend Catholic mission schools. Although political participation was slowly extended by means of indirect elections in 1953 and 1956, its effects were initially mediated by fears of Tutsi retaliation; nevertheless, Hutuled political organizations began to emerge by the end of the period. In 1959, following the death of the ruling Mwami, Hutu leaders or-

31 See Note 6, above.

³² For background on Rwanda, see in particular Jacques Maquet and Marcel d'Hertefelt, "Elections en Société Feodale," Académie royale des Sciences coloniales, Classe des Sciences Morales et Politiques, XXI, Fasc. 2 (1959); and Jacques Maquet, The Premise of Inequality in Ruanda (London: Oxford University Press, 1961). For more recent events, I have relied on Aaron Segal, "Rwanda: The Underlying Causes," Africa Report, 9 (April, 1964), 3–8; and on an unpublished paper by Donald Attwood, graduate student in anthropology at the University of Chicago.

ganized a popular uprising against the coming to power of an extremist Tutsi faction which advocated immediate independence in order to forestall further political and social reforms. Many Tutsi fled the country at this time, and again in the midst of the serious violence that accompanied the 1960 and 1961 elections in which the Hutu party won a decisive victory. The new government went beyond earlier reforms and destroyed the basis of the stratification system by abolishing the old contract relationship and redistributing cattle. A large number of Tutsi still in the country were slain when Tutsi exiles forcibly attempted to reenter Rwanda in 1963; there have been repeated cycles of violence since then.

As a political unit, Zanzibar is composed of the island of that name and of Pemba. On the island of Zanzibar, the stratification system involved consistent cleavages between an Arab minority, who owned most of the land and the revenue-bearing trees on it, and the Shirazi majority, island Africans who lived on the land on a squatter basis: there were also some mainland Africans with ties to Kenya and Tanganyika. Cleavages were less consistent on Pemba, where the Shirazi were economically less differentiated from the Arabs. The British governed the island indirectly through the traditional Arab rulers but extended participation in the usual manner toward the end of the colonial period. The growth of political organizations entailed a mobilization of the various communities accompanied by the expected exacerbation of cleavages and ensuing disturbances. In the elections preparatory to independence of June, 1963, the Afro-Shirazi party (with support among Zanzibar Shirazi and mainland Africans on both islands) won 63 percent of the votes on Zanzibar alone, and a 54 percent majority on both islands together; because of the system of single-member constituencies, however, it failed to obtain a majority of seats, and the government was organized by the ZNP (with support among the Pemba Shirazi and Arabs on both islands), together with the smaller ZPP. One month after independence, on January 21, 1964, insurgents broke into the police arsenal and armed themselves; the police offered minimal resistance, and the insurgents rapidly gained control of the island of Zanzibar. In the course of this coup and after a new Shirazi-dominant government was installed, large numbers of Arabs were slain, fled, or left under duress. Permanent change in the stratification system was thus brought about.33

³³ This account is based on Keith Kyle, "Coup in Zanzibar," Africa Report, 9 (February 1964), 18-20. See also Michael F. Lofchie, Zanzibar:

In Zanzibar and in Rwanda, genuine revolutions were possible, with or without a coup, because the stratification system was defined by some central features which could be modified by force. But this is a rare situation in the new African states, found at the national level only in Burundi and sometimes in a particular ethnic group within a country (as in Nigeria and others that contain Fulani societies with serf-like clients or captives). The potential for drastic modifications of the stratification systems involving violence is thus present, but is unlikely to have the spectacular effects it had in Zanzibar or in Rwanda.³⁴

v 3. The Second Revolution: Aside from the cases just discussed, there have been few attempts in tropical Africa to bring about rapid and profound changes in established political arrangements and in the underlying social structure by drastic means. The few radicalminded regimes established at independence have tended to choose survival over revolutionary purity and have bowed to necessity by curtailing their goals. Most coups have resulted in military rule, and the main concerns of general-presidents are rule of law, honesty, efficiency, and financial responsibility. Their institutional models resemble those of dedicated European officials during the last phase of colonialism. Yet, many members of newer political generations and older radicals who were by-passed by machine politicians during the first go-around have begun to view the original founding and more recent changes as abortive beginnings. Like the thinkers who launched a wave of political messianism in mid-nineteenth century Europe, they believe that the true revolution is yet to come. The shape it might take has been analyzed by Frantz Fanon. who believed that it would be based upon the total mobilization of the youthful sub-proletariat of the growing cities and of the neglected rural masses.35 Two situations so far seem to approximate what African revolutions might entail, the aftermath of the Congo-Brazzaville coup of 1963 and the Congo-Kinshasa (ex-Leopoldville) rebellions that began in 1964.

With 65 percent of the school-age population

Background to Revolution (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1966).

in schools at the time of independence and with one-fifth of its population in three cities, but without much economic development, the Congo-Brazzaville experienced very early and in an unusually acute form the consequences of growing cities peopled by semi-permanently unemployed youths. Opportunities for employment probably even declined absolutely when Brazzaville ceased to be the administrative capital of French Equatorial Africa. Political life had long reflected a sharp antagonism between the Mbochi of the North and several related Bakongo groups, including the Lari (Balali), who had been a focal point for the activities of numerous religio-political protest movements such as Matswanism during the colonial era and provided basic support for the rise to power of a Catholic priest, Fulbert Youlou.36 Having emerged as a strong man around 1960 after a period of coalition government. Youlou stepped up the construction of a one-party state in mid-1963 in the face of growing unrest stemming from unemployment. open corruption, ruthless elimination of opposition leaders, and his unabashed espousal of causes usually defined as "neo-colonialist". In the course of a confrontation between the government and trade unions in August, the Army, which only a few months earlier had been involved in a near-mutiny put down by the gendarmerie with the aid of French troops, shifted from support of the government to neutrality and eventually demanded Youlou's resignation. This time, French troops did not intervene and the government fell. A moderate provisional government, without direct Army or trade union participation, was immediately installed.

Except for the provision of a dual executive (President and Prime Minister), the other steps in constitutional reform and policy reorientation in the economic and international fields since 1963 have merely brought the country in line with African "radicals" such as Guinea or Mali; on the ethnic side, the Balali (Lari) have been replaced as the leading political group by other Bakongo tribes. The more significant feature of political change is the apparent accountability of the new authorities to the "street," represented by the Jeunesse. The lowering of the voting age from 21 to 18 immediately after the coup sug-

³⁵ For background on Brazzaville, see the several works of Georges Balandier and also Jean-Michel Wagret, *Histoire et Sociologie Politiques de la République du Congo (Brazzaville)* (Paris: Librairie Générale de Droit et de Jurisprudence, 1963). For an analysis of the 1963 coup, see Terray (note 25 above).

³⁴ The political emancipation of Fulani "captives" probably contributed to the rise of the nationalist movements of Mali and Guinea in 1956–58.

²⁵ See The Wretched of the Earth (New York: Grove Press, 1965). For a more general discussion of Fanon's thought in the context of his life, see my article "Frantz Fanon: A Gospel for the Damned," Encounter, November, 1966.

gests that it was among young adults, who probably constitute the bulk of the urban population, that the new leaders hoped to find much of their support or, alternatively, that they were already dependent upon them. Although the youth was formed into an ancillary wing of the Mouvement National pour la Révolution, it appears that it is the youth branch which is the most powerful part of the organization. The major manifestation of its political role are the activities of the "revolutionary militia" whose major weapon seems to be terror, including a political protection racket backed by the threat of violence and occasional assassinations. The Jeunesse as a whole was characterized in 1965 as a "curious mixture of revolutionary idealism and juvenile delinquency," which the government could barely control.37 Although in the absence of additional information it is impossible to analyze the sociology of this movement, it seems that much of the ire of the Jeunesse and of the new regime more generally has been directed at Catholic trade union leaders (including those who had participated in the initial coup), youth leaders, schools, and at the Church more generally. This would suggest that a rejection mood, akin to that which activated earlier messianic movements, underlies contemporary political life. The regime's future remains uncertain. Discontent among the Balali followers of Youlou. the inability of the regime to solve fundamental problems of development and unemployment, factionalism among trade union leaders, have been reflected in sporadic antigovernment riots, plots, and changes of leadership at the top. In June, 1966, the Army reacted to the growing importance of quasi-military political organizations by staging a coup; although this one failed, the next one might well succeed.

The loosely connected movements usually referred to as the Congolese rebellion which originated in Kwilu (near Leopoldville) and in Maniema (Eastern Congo) in 1964 can all be attributed to general factors which are not unique to the Congo, but are exacerbated by the special Congolese situation. They must be distinguished from dissidence elsewhere in Africa, however, not only by their scope and the massive violence engendered, or by their international implications and long-term conse-

quences for the areas involved, but also by their clearly rural rather than urban character. The case of Kwilu is particularly interesting in the present context because of the special ideological meaning it was given by its leaders and the basis on which it was organized. As one study puts it, the Kwilu rebellion emerges as "a revolutionary attempt to correct some of the abuses and injustices by which large segments of the population of the region felt oppressed four years after official Independence and an effort to try once again to express and to concretely realize the goals and dreams promised by the 'First Independence of 1960'." ²³

Kwilu, a densely populated area inhabited by several different ethnic groups whose traditional political organization does not extend much beyond the village level, and whose adult males work mostly as palm cutters on European-owned plantations, had a history of rebellion against the Force Publique (1931) and of religio-political protest movements throughout the colonial period. When political participation was extended in 1959, A. Gizenga. P. Mulele, and C. Kamitatu, representing different tribes, organized the Parti Socialiste Africain (PSA) whose socialism took the form of a "village paradise-on-earth." It was allied at the national level with the Lumumba coalition. After the Congo crisis of 1960, the PSA itself splintered; Gizenga, connected with the Stanleyville government of 1960-61, became the "imprisoned martyr"; Mulele left the country and spent some time in Communist China; while the more "moderate" Kamitatu faction obtained control of the regional government when Kwilu became a province in 1962.

The growing discontent throughout the region in 1962-63, manifested by palm-cutter strikes and a resurgence of messianic cults,

³⁷ Jeune Afrique, August 8, 1965. There is some evidence that similar youth groups helped bring Youlou to prominence in 1956 (Wagret, op. cit., p. 65).

³⁸ Succinct and well-balanced analyses of the Congolese Rebellion can be found in Marvin D. Markowitz and Herbert F. Weiss, "Rebellion

in the Congo," Current History, April 1965, 213-218; and M. Crawford Young, "The Congo Rebellion," Africa Report, 9 (April 1965), 6-11. The present discussion of the Kwilu case is based on Renée C. Fox, Will de Craemer, and Jean-Marie Ribeaucourt, "The Second Independence': a Case Study of the Kwilu Rebellion in the Congo," Comparative Studies in Society and History, 8 (October 1965), 78-105. The most comprehensive source of information on these rebellions is Benoit Verhaegen, Rébellions au Congo, Vol. I ("Les Etudes du C.R.I.S.P." Leopoldville and Brussels, 1966). This work, as well as Herbert Weiss, Political Protest in the Congo (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1967), became available too late to be fully consulted.

³⁹ Fox et al, p. 78.

was channeled into an organized movement by Mulele upon his return in mid-1963. He established forest camps in which équipes, led by a President and a Commissaire Politique, and accompanied by a soigneur (healer-usually a practitioner of traditional magic and medicine). were trained in guerilla warfare. The équipes formed the maguis: above them were the directions ultimately responsible to the centrale. Mulele also provided the movement with a rudimentary ideology which defined what was wrong, diagnosed causes, and indicated remedies. Within this framework, the culprits are the "Congolese colonialists" or retardataires who presently man government at all levels. The remainder of the society is divided into avancés (Mulele partisans) and réactionnaires (moderates, fence-sitters). The goal is to achieve a new society "conceived as a gigantic village made up of thousands of small villages in which the people find their own authenticity; all that they need materially; justice, creativity, and happiness in working the soil together."40 In order to achieve it, the avancés must destroy the retardataires and persuade the réactionnaires. They are bound to triumph if they obey their leaders and adhere to prescribed norms, including certain taboos, such as the prohibition against speaking French. which guarantee their invulnerability.

Support for the movement was generally drawn from Mulele's and Gizenga's own ethnic groups, the BaMbunda and the BaPende: it attracted much of the jeunesse, especially teachers and clerks who hoped to be rapidly promoted in the bureaucracy of the new state; ex-policemen dismissed because of a pay mutiny; and a variety of chiefs and lineage and age segments involved in local conflicts. The initial attacks of January, 1964, were planned, systematic, and well-controlled; they were aimed at religious, industrial, governmental, and educational establishments, but spared those considered friendly to the rebels (such as the mission schools which the leaders had attended). In the absence of outside communications. Mulele was able to persuade much of the local population that the revolution had already been victorious elsewhere; hence, in much of the area, after the initial uprising life tended to go back to normal within the framework of the "new society." Only later, after Europeans had been evacuated and the undisciplined Congolese Army advanced into the region did full-scale, indiscriminate terre brûlée violence occur. Although the Congolese Army was able to contain the

Kwilu area as early as April, 1964, they still clashed with rebels at the beginning of 1966, and their present control over the area remains tenuous.

It is likely that growing tensions and the availability of dissident leaders will contribute to the emergence of similar movements elsewhere, that the activities of these movements will generate large-scale violence, and that participation in them will genuinely lift the spirits of those involved. But even if we combine Brazzaville and Kwilu, it is unlikely that movements such as these will be able to translate their revolutionary aspirations into the institutionalization of a new regime and of new social structures. African society does not have a center; its syncretic character insures that it cannot be turned upside down, or that if an attempt is made to do so, some groups will shift their relative positions but the society as a whole will remain very much as it was before. If the revolutionaries succeed in obtaining control of the government, they will resemble at best the radical-minded regimes created in the course of the "first revolution." If they do not succeed, however, they might give rise to a "vendetta morality" or become full-scale withdrawal movements which consume themselves in senseless violence.41 In the final analysis, it is unlikely that even the most glorious dedication to force can broaden the limits of the range of variation imposed on political arrangements by contemporary African society.

VI. CONCLUSIONS

Seeking to overcome the parochialism of area studies and the intellectual irrelevance of raw empiricism, many scholars dealing with the politics of new states have hit upon the device of bringing the foreground of the contemporary scene into sharp focus, extracting it from context, and blowing up the recorded image for leisurely contemplation. The background tends to be reduced to an indistinct blur called "tradition," which is discarded because it yields little interesting information, But vastly blown-up stills of political development, modernization, or integration obtained in this manner tend to make these processes appear similar regardless of what is being developed, modernized, or integrated. One wonders, however, whether the similarities genuinely stem from the phenomena observed or whether they are artifacts arising from the

⁴¹ For similar outcomes elsewhere see, for example, E. J. Hobsbawn, *Primitive Rebels* (New York: W. W. Norton & Co., Inc., 1965).

manipulation of the recorded images; whether the information on which many current generalizations are based pertains to the reality the image sought to capture, or whether it pertains mainly to the characteristics of the lens and of the film used to record it.

Surely, as we begin to explore an unknown world, we must master the techniques of cinéma-vérité, using hand-held cameras that are a more direct extension of the observer's eye, suitable for obtaining intimate moving pictures of the varying patterns subsumed under the terms political development, modernization or integration. Understanding of these processes will be achieved, not by reducing them prematurely to a common denominator, but by seeking to preserve their singularity and then comparing their manifestations in different settings. The characteristics of political life in all the new states can easily be subsumed under relatively few general headings. However useful such efforts may be in clearing the ground, however, we must remember that the same headings will refer to very different things where, for example, national communities are being carved out of a more universal one and the stratification system is defined by an opposition between urban elites that control land and peasant masses, as against situations where many small societies devoid of this sharp differentiation are being amalgamated into arbitrarily defined larger wholes under the aegis of an open stratum of recently educated men drawn more or less evenly from the component societies that constitute the country.

The situation in most of tropical Africa is so extreme that studies focused primarily on incipient central institutions almost necessarily exaggerate their importance in relation to the society as a whole. Hence, I have tried in this essay to provide some balance by considering politics in the more general con-

⁴² For example, the most recently compiled Selected Economic Data for the Less Developed Countries, published by the Agency for International Development in June, 1967 (data for 1965 and 1966), shows that Africa (not including the United Arab Republic and the Union of South Africa) is the lowest ranking of four areas (Africa, East Asia, Latin America, Near East/South Asia) on total GNP, Annual Growth of GNP, electric power per capita, life expectancy, people per physician, literacy, pupils as percent of population. It was tied with one other area for bottom place on several other indicators, and ranked relatively high only on acres of agricultural land available per capita.

text of African societies and by focusing on conflict as a major element of political life. This is not to say that no institutionalization is taking place, but rather that until such processes reach a certain level-as yet unspecified-force and violence are likely to remain salient features of political action.43 Since various factors insure the persistence of most of the new territorial units even if political institutionalization does not occur at a very high rate, we must make a place for conflict in our conceptual apparatus. Although the incidence of certain manifestations of conflict may be relatively random, political conflict is not a random process but derives a discernible structure from the characteristics of the society itself, as do other patterns of political life. Much more precision can be achieved than in this essay by operationalizing independent and dependent variables in a manner to obtain elements from which a comparative typology can be constructed.

From this point of view, it is clear that a small number of countries, e.g., the Ivory Coast and Ghana, stand out from the rest of the pack and are on the verge of reaching a threshold of societal development which may be labeled "incipient modernity." These are exceptional in the contemporary African scene, and are likely to become even more exceptional in the predictable future as the spillover effects of incipient modernization become infused into every sphere of social life, including the political. At the other extreme, there is a fairly large group of countries, such as the Central African Republic or Upper Volta. which are among the least developed countries in the entire world. Unfortunately, they are likely to remain at the bottom for a long time. since it has become increasingly evident that the die was cast several decades ago in the sense that wherever there was some potential for relatively rapid modernization, it was brought out during the colonial period. In between are countries with some potential but with a complex of problems which has so far prevented it from emerging. Some of these will join the first group, while the others will. unfortunately, join the second. It is not necessary to view politics as merely epiphenomenal to suggest that the general characteristics of the social structure, and especially the nature of primordial solidarities combined with gross

⁴³ An approach to the study of institutionalization and integration is suggested in my paper, "Patterns of Integration," in *The Journal of Modern African Studies* (forthcoming, 1968).

differences in degree of modernization, impose limits within which variations of regime can occur.

Although the relationship between political conflict and political development has not been explicitly examined in this essay, this does not imply that I view the functions of conflict in a society as wholly negative. Integration into a free society does not entail the total elimination of conflict from political life, but rather its containment within acceptable limits as indicated by a shift from force to power and authority. How that is achieved remains a

44 This view is inspired by Ralf Dahrendorf, Class and Class Conflict in Industrial Society central problem of the social sciences which far transcends the parochial concerns of particular disciplines or of sub-fields within each. One thing is clear, however: Progress in this direction requires an acceptance of the premise itself—the institutionalization at the cultural level of a belief that conflict is a potentially manageable aspect of society, rather than the persistence of wishful thinking about its permanent disappearance expressed in the form of ideologies or scientific theories.

(Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1959), especially p. 318. See also my general argument in Creating Political Order: The Party-States of West Africa (Chicago: Rand McNally, 1966).

MAJORITY VS. OPPOSITION IN THE FRENCH NATIONAL ASSEMBLY, 1956–1965: A GUTTMAN SCALE ANALYSIS*

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I. INTRODUCTION

A series of significant developments in French politics has recently touched off speculation about the possibility that a major transformation of the structure and behavioral patterns of the system of political parties is taking place.1 The most salient developments from 1958 until 1967 can be briefly listed: (1) the unprecedented longevity of governmental coalitions throughout the entire span of life of the Fifth Republic (only one Government overthrown in eight years); (2) the near singleparty majority attained by the Gaullist UNR in the November, 1962 elections; (3) the ability of five major non-Gaullist parties to coalesce their forces behind only two candidates opposing General de Gaulle in the December, 1965 presidential election, with the resulting necessity for a second ballot; (4) the subsequent merging of forces on the moderate left and the moderate right into combinations² bent upon

* The research which this paper reports has been made possible by financial assistance granted by the University Research Council and the School of Business and Public Administration Research Center at the University of Missouri. The author wishes to acknowledge the assistance provided by five graduate students in Political Science: Mr. Ahmed H. El-Afandi, Mr. Sami G. Hajjar, Mr. Paul H. Lettmann, Mr. Joel S. Rose, and Miss Sally Angela Shelton. A special debt is owed to Professor Duncan MacRae, Jr. for advice and assistance extended to the author.

¹ The debate among French observers has centered around the possibility of a two-party system emerging. See Le bipartisme est-il possible en France? (Paris: Association Française de Science Politique, 1965). Opinion in this colloquium was weighted toward caution. However, momentarily in the wake of the March. 1967 legislative elections, writers foreseeing a two-party system were having their inning: Alfred Fabre-Luce, "Giscard ou Mendès," Le Monde (March 17, 1967), p. 7; Maurice Duverger, "Vers le Dualisme," Le Monde (March 19-20, 1967), p. 9. It is an assumption of the present article that considerable simplification of the party system can take place without a two-party system necessarily resulting.

² The Fédération des Gauches Démocrates et Socialistes (left-center) and the Centre Démocrate (right-center).

coordinated efforts in the March, 1967 legislative elections; (5) the successful construction of a Gaullist electoral alliance limiting the number of official Gaullist first-ballot candidates in each constituency to one; (6) the electoral agreements between the Communists and the moderate left Fédération permitting only one candidate of the left to remain in the race in any constituency on the second ballot; and (7) the tendency of voters to reward the united fronts of the outgoing Gaullist majority and the consistent leftist opposition and to penalize the relatively small and ambiguous center force, the Centre Démocrate.³

These developments seem to add up to two fundamental changes in the nature of the French party system between 1958 and 1967: (1) The number of effective major parties has been reduced from at least six to no more than five. (2) All but one of the major parties can now be identified as a loyal majority partner or a consistent opponent, whereas

³ For an incisive account of the 1967 legislative elections see François Goguel, "Les élections législatives de mars 1967, "Revue française de Science politique, 17 (June, 1967), 429-467.

4 The figure "six" for the number of effective major parties in 1958 is rather arbitrary. The following are considered to rate that characterization: the Communists, the Socialists, the Radicals, the MRP, the Gaullist UNR, and the Independents. What is striking, however, is that there has been a clear reduction in the number of splinter parties that have to be taken into account. In 1958 there were an additional four or five parties that had to be reckoned with. locally at least. By 1967 only two could by any stretch of the imagination be considered significant: the Parti Socialist Unifié on the left and the Alliance Républicaine on the right. For 1958 see Philip M. Williams and Martin Harrison, "La Campagne pour la referendum et les élections legislatives," in Association Française de Science Politique, L' Etablissement de la Cinquième République: Le Referendum de septembre et les élections de novembre 1958 (Paris: Armand Colin, 1960), pp. 21-59.

⁵ In the election campaign the five major parties were grouped as follows: majority—UNR and Républicains Indépendants; opposition—Communists and Fédération des Gauches; ambiguous—Centre Démocrate.

only two, the Gaullist UNR and the Communists, could be so identified with confidence in the wake of the November, 1958 legislative elections. It has really been only since the 1965 Presidential election that these developments have taken place at a level visible to all but the closest students of the French political scene. Yet before then there already existed one salient fact which distinguished political party behavior under the Fifth Republic from that under the Fourth: government stability. Even during the First Legislature⁷ of the Fifth Republic (1958-1962), when no single party was close to having a majority of the seats in the National Assembly, no Government was toppled by the Assembly until nearly four years had elapsed, a record for longevity until then unsurpassed in the history of republican France. Majority cohesiveness was already apparently a reality more than five years before a coherent majority coalition faced the electorate in 1967. Could it be said that a fairly simple majority-opposition division already existed in the Assembly early in the Fifth Republic? Were the voting patterns at that stage appreciably less complex and more predictable than those of the Fourth Republic? Did the legislative election of 1962 effect an abrupt change in the alignment of parties in the Assembly by giving one party a near majority, or did that election merely accentuate trends already in existence? It is the purpose of this article to shed light on these matters by analyzing voting patterns and trends in the French National Assembly during the period 1956 to 1965, a period which spans the last years of the Fourth Republic and most of the Fifth Republic years up to the present writing. Guttman scale analysis8 is used as a

⁶ Although most of the seven parties identified as "major" for 1958 voiced their support for the policies of General de Gaulle, there was no identifiable majority coalition as there was in 1967.

⁷ The term "Legislature" refers to the span of service of a given set of National Assembly deputies from one election to the next, as the term "Congress" refers to a given two-year term of office of members of the U.S. House of Representatives.

⁸ In addition to the standard fountainhead essay, Louis Guttman, "The Basis for Scalogram Analysis," in Samuel A. Stouffer et al., Measurement and Prediction, Vol. IV of Studies in Social Psychology in World War II (New York: John Wiley & Sons, Inc., 1966), pp. 60-90, see Durcan MacRae, Jr., Dimensions of Congressional Voting (Berkeley and Los Angeles: University of Cali-

means of establishing the essential voting patterns that existed during these years and of enabling comparison between the three legislatures elected during that time span, those of 1956, 1958 and 1962.

The use of Guttman scaling in this article may be differentiated from its uses by other students of legislative roll calls whose studies have come to the author's attention. According to the authors of a handbook for legislative roll call analysis, Guttman scaling has been utilized for three purposes: "the characterization of roll calls; the characterization of the voting behavior of individual legislators; and the characterization of the voting behavior of groups of legislators." All three are subsidiary purposes of the present study; but a more fundamental purpose is to characterize three whole legislative bodies and compare them with one another. In order to do this

fornia Press, 1958); and H. Douglas Price, "Are Southern Democrats Different? An Application of Scale Analysis to Senate Voting Patterns," in Nelson W. Polsby, Robert A. Dentler and Paul A. Smith (eds.), *Politics and Social Life* (Boston: Houghton Mifflin Co., 1963), pp. 740-756.

⁹ A useful listing of such studies may be found in Lee F. Anderson, Meredith W. Watts, Jr., and Allen R. Wilcox, *Legislative Roll Call Analysis* (Evanston, Ill.: Northwestern University Press, 1966), pp. 120-121, footnote 14.

10 Ibid., p. 90.

11 At this level of generality we move away from the initial objectives for which Guttman scaling was devised and first applied to legislative bodies: attitude measurement. The scale has been viewed in earlier studies as a kind of yardstick measuring various degrees to which roll calls express certain underlying attitudes: e.g., George M. Belknap, "A Method for Analyzing Legislative Behavior," Midwest Journal of Political Science, 2 (November, 1958), 377-402; and David M. Wood, "Issue Dimensions in a Multi-Party System: The French National Assembly and European Unification," Midwest Journal of Political Science, 8 (August, 1964), 255-276. Most students have recognized that the legislative vote is likely to involve a more complex choice situation than the response to a survey question (e.g., Lee F. Anderson, "Variability in the Unidimensionality of Legislative Voting," Journal of Politics, 26 (August, 1964), 568-585), and they have therefore paid considerable attention to the relationships that can be found between the positions of legislators on the scales and (1) the various groups, organized and categorical, to which legislators belong or (2)

the samples of roll call votes taken for each Legislature have been subjected to the empirical method of scale-searching outlined recently by Duncan MacRae, Jr. 12 In this method no a priori classification of items (roll calls) is made aside from that applied originally in the selection of the sample. The items in the sample are compared with one another in pairwise fashion to ascertain whether or not thez satisfy some measurement criterion of pairwise fit. The matrix of pairwise coefficients is examined to determine what is the largest possible sub-set of items that can be found wherein each pair of items satisfies the fit criterion employed. This sub-set is then extracted from the sample and the remaining items (if any) are subjected to the identical procedure to determine what is the second largest sub-set; and the procedure is repeated as many times as are necessary to characterize every one of the items in the sample as belonging to some sub-set of one item or more.

Studies which have employed this procedure for roll call analysis have frequently found that the largest scale to emerge is heterogeneous in terms of the substance of the issues before the legislators and is considerably larger than the next largest to emerge. Often the smaller scales are more homogeneous in content.¹³ This sug-

certain properties of the constituencies they represent: e.g., Duncan MacRae, Jr., "Roll Call Votes and Leadership," Public Opinion Quarterly, 20 (Fall, 1956), 543-558; Leroy N. Rieselbach, "The Demography of the Congressional Vote on Foreign Aid, 1938-1958," this REVIEW, 58 (September, 1964), 577-588; Samuel C. Patterson. "Dimensions of Voting Behavior in a One-Party Legislature," Public Opinion Quarterly, 26 (Summer, 1962), 185-200; Lee F. Anderson, "Individuality in Voting in Congress: A Research Note," Midwest Journal of Political Science, & (November, 1964), 425-429. In attempting to characterize an entire legislative body in Guttman scaling terms, I hope, among other things, to make evident the possible applications of the tool in comparative study, whether cross-national or cross-state.

¹² Duncan MacRae, Jr. "A Method for Identifying Issues and Factions from Legislative Votes," this Review, 59 (1965), 909-926.

¹³ MacRae's findings fit this pattern for the Democrats in the House of Representatives, but the results for the Republicans are mixed: *ibid.*, 922–923. See also William O. Aydelotte, "Voting Patterns in the British House of Commons in the 1840's," Comparative Studies in Society and History, 5 (January, 1963), 134–163; Duncan MacRae, Jr., "Intraparty Divisions and Cabinet

gests the existence of a dominant alignment of legislators ranging from strong supporters to strong opponents of the existing Government. Only under the stimulus of issues about which the executive leadership is indifferent or which evoke strong lovalties of (for example) a sectional or religious nature that transcend positions vis-à-vis the Government, is there likely to be a different alignment emerging. one that will be characteristic only of certain types of issues and not of others. This is particularly likely to be the pattern in a parliamentary system, since many of the votes on substantive issues are treated by the Government as matters of confidence and legislators must take into account the consequence of their votes for the life or death of the Government. It can be argued, therefore, that during the life of a single coalition in a multiparty parliamentary system we should expect to find a single dominant heterogeneous scale encompassing the bulk of at least the moreimportant votes taken, especially those regarded as votes of confidence.

An exception to the above would be a case in which a Government, in order to persist, must hover between two alternative majorities. consisting of a common element of reliable supporters and two mutually exclusive supplementary elements. In such a case one would find two major scales emerging, neither one of them dominant, less heterogeneous than in the normal case but more so than is usually true of the smaller exceptional scales. Whatever the number of dominant scales, however, the legislative body could be divided into three types of legislators according to their positions on the dominant scale or scales: a sub-set of consistent supporters, a sub-set of consistent opponents, and a sub-set of intermediate legislators, now supporting the Government, now opposing it. For any given scale it would be possible to establish lines of demarcation between the types at the points along the scale cut by the confidence vote most positive for the Government and the confidence vote giving it the least support. If more than one scale emerges with confidence votes the ranks of the consistent supporters and opponents are likely to shrink to the advantage of the intermediate type, since the consistent deputies

Coalitions in the Fourth French Republic," Comparative Studies in Society and History, 5 (January, 1963), 164-211; and Loren K. Waldman, "Liberalism of Congressmen and the Presidential Vote in Their Districts," Midwest Journal of Political Science, 11 (February, 1967), 73-85.

will have to be consistent on all scales or else be counted among the intermediates. As a final ground rule, should a single scale be found encompassing more than one Government, as might happen in a legislature such as the National Assembly of the Fourth Republic which was unable to sustain any single Government during the entire period between elections, it is regarded as the alignment pattern of a single coalition which, though stable in structure itself, could not sustain a stable Government. This might happen if a group of intermediaries held the balance of power between a frozen group of consistent supporters and a frozen opposition, maintaining its support for a given Government only up to a point, but then withdrawing it, only to serve once again as the key "swing" group for the succeeding Government.

Employing the above assumptions and technique, study has been undertaken of the three legislatures between 1956 and 1965 in order to answer two questions: (1) Has there been a trend during this time toward a less complex, more unidimensional voting structure in the Assembly?¹⁴ (2) Have the consistent

¹⁴ Two votes can be considered to share the property of unimensionality if they divide up the legislative body into only three of the four possible sub-sets shown in the following four-fold table:

$$\begin{array}{c|cccc} & & \text{Vote 2} \\ & + & - \\ & + & a & b \\ \hline \text{Vote 1} & & & \\ & - & c & d \\ \hline \end{array}$$

So long as one of the four cells is unoccupied, unidimensionality prevails, although, if the unoccupied cell is either a or d, it will be necessary to reverse the signs of one of the items to make the items fit the conventional scale model: Anderson, Watts and Wilcox, op. cit., p. 92:

$$+\frac{a}{1}$$
 $\begin{vmatrix} c & d \\ 1 & 2 \end{vmatrix}$ $-$

Here cell b is unoccupied and the deputies are divided by votes 1 and 2 into three sub-sets, with those in the center (c) having voted negatively on vote 1 and positively on vote 2. By extension, more than two votes would be perfectly scalable if each of the possible pairs among them exhibited pairwise perfection.

Clearly such perfection in human behavior is unattainable. Some measure of scalability must be used allowing a certain minimum of non-scalar supporters and opponents increased as a proportion of the Assembly at the expense of the intermediate element? If there was indeed a trend toward a simplified majority-vs.-opposition voting structure in the Assembly before 1965, the answers to both questions should be positive. In the Scandinavian multi-party parliamentary systems majority and opposition coalitions are fixed at the outset of the Legislature and generally remain in force throughout its life. If All members of the legislative

behavior (i.e., a few deputies in the c cell in the above example). Before the pairwise method of scale-finding was introduced an overall measure of scalability, called the coefficient of reproducibility (cr), was used, permitting a certain % of "errors of reproducibility" (non-scale votes) scattered throughout the scale: see Guttman, op. cit., p. 77. With the pairwise method MacRae recommends the use of Yule's Q, a correlation coefficient designed for four-fold tables: "A Method for Identifying Issues and Factions from Legislative Votes," op. cit. I am impressed by the necessity to measure correlation as well as reproducibility, but prefer a measure which combines the two standards, as ϕ/ϕ max rather neatly does. See Edward E. Cureton, "Note on ϕ/ϕ max," Psychometrika, 24 (March, 1959), 89-91. This measure provides for a comparison between cells b and c, which Q does not. The author is indebted to Mr. Joel S. Rose for demonstrating to him the applicability of the ϕ/ϕ max coefficient. By pegging ϕ/ϕ max at the .7 level it was found that no pair of items was admitted to a scale at less than the .94 level of cr for any of the scales of the three legislatures studied. The overall cr's for the five scales analyzed are presented in footnote 36, infra.

15 See Stein Rokkan, "Norway: Numerical Democracy and Corporate Pluralism," and Nils Stjernquist, "Sweden: Stability or Deadlock," in Robert A. Dahl (ed.), Political Oppositions in Western Democracies (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1966), pp. 70-146. When compared to the British two-party model, the Scandinavian multi-party systems fall short of a thoroughgoing majority-opposition confrontation. Stjernquist characterizes the Swedish opposition parties' tactics thus: "in election campaigns, the English approach; in parliament and elsewhere, collaboration with the government in order to influence the political decision-making as much as possible": ibid., p. 137. But the dualism is still present, at least in elections, whereas, until 1967, it was non-existent in France. Maurice Duverger has recently stated the thesis that present-day "centrism" in France (i.e., the joining of the centers against the extremes) is nearly unique to

body may be counted either as consistent supporters or consistent opponents. Since groups of legislators seldom exchange roles with one another during the Legislature, unidimensionality (albeit a rather uninteresting variety) prevails. While France has not yet reached this limit, the question at hand is whether or not, prior to the Presidential election of 1965 which constrained the parties to assume more overt positions as majority or opposition elements, the trends were in existence which moved the National Assembly closer to a pure majority-opposition confrontation than had been the case during the waning years of the Fourth Republic.

II. THE 1956-1958 LEGISLATURE

The data utilized in this article are most of the roll calls (*scrutins*) mentioned in *L'Année* politique, the French political yearbook, for the years 1956 to 1965, inclusive. These total

France among present-day European countries: La Démocratie sans le Peuple (Paris: Editions du Seuil, 1967), pp. 129-132.

¹⁶ Unlike a legislative election, a presidential election forces the parties to choose between a small finite number of individual candidates rather than an indefinite number of potential coalitions. With de Gaulle as one of the candidates, parties in the center of the spectrum either had to fall in behind him or support an active, critical opponent. For accounts of the pre-election soul-searching experienced by the parties see William G. Andrews and Stanley Hoffmann, "France: the Search for Presidentialism," in William G. Andrews (ed.), European Politics I: The Restless Search (Princeton, N. J.: D. Van Nostrand Company, Inc., 1966), pp. 104-138; and Georges Suffert, De Defferre à Mitterrand: La Campagne présidentielle (Paris: Editions du Seuil, 1966).

¹⁷ L'Année politique, économique, sociale et diplomatique en France, 1956-1965 (Paris: Presses Universitaires de France, 1957-1966). MacRae used roughly the same criterion for identifying important votes in his study of the National Assembly in the Fourth Republic. For his persuasive justification, see Parliament, Parties and Society in France (New York: St. Martin's Press, Inc., 1967), pp. 339-341. Only the votes for which pour and contre totals were given in the "Politique intérieur" section of the yearbook were used in the present study. Several votes with excessive numbers of absences and abstentions were omitted, as were all votes in which more than 90 percent of the deputies voting positively or negatively voted the same way. Deputies' votes were tabulated from Journal officiel de la

83 for 1956-58, 65 for 1959-62, and 47 for 1962-65. The three legislatures will be analyzed in chronological order, with general comparisons between the three appearing in the concluding section.

The 83 votes for the Third (1956) Legislature of the Fourth Republic are taken from a total universe of 972 taken up to and including the investiture of Pierre Pflimlin as Premier on May 13, 1958. The votes have been classified in terms of the substance of issues involved. These are rather rough categories whose purpose is primarily to make it more evident at a glance whether the various scales obtained are relatively homogeneous or heterogeneous in content:

Category	Symbol	Number of Votes
North Africa	N	20
Budget	В	11
Government (general)	\mathbf{G}	9
Social welfare	s	8
Europe ·	$\mathbf{E}\mathbf{u}$	6
Church-state	$\mathbf{C}\mathbf{h}$	4.
Economic policy	Ec	4
Political	Po	4
Constitutional revision	Co	3
Military	\mathbf{M}	3
Education	\mathbf{Ed}	2
Veterans	\mathbf{v}	2
Agriculture	Ag	1
Energy	En	1
Foreign policy	\mathbf{F}	1
Housing	H	1
Labor	L.	1
Overseas possessions	0	1
Procedural questions	\mathbf{Pr}	1 .

North African votes for the most part concerned the Algerian War, a dominant issue in the Legislature. One vote concerning the Suez crisis of 1956 and two relating primarily to Franco-Tunisian relations in 1958 are also included in the category. Government questions involve debates on general policy surrounding motions of confidence or interpellations. However, confidence motions and

République française, Débats parlementaires, Assemblée Nationale, 1956-1965.

18 Seven votes were mentioned in L'Année politique for the weeks immediately following the Pflimlin investiture (#974, #977, #986, #989, #990, #993, and #1000). These votes were omitted from the study by my oversight. They include the investiture of General de Gaulle and the granting to him of "pleins pouvoirs."

interpellation resolutions that are specific to a particular issue are included in the appropriate substantive category. Political votes concern electoral system reform and questions of the eligibility of newly elected deputies after the January, 1956 legislative elections.

Party identification of the 615 individuals who were members of the National Assembly for all or part of the 1956 Legislature is best accomplished by adhering to the groupes parlementaires formed within the Assembly for purposes of internal organization. Fragmentary groups not appreciably different from others belonging essentially to the same political "family" are combined with the latter in the following analysis for purposes of simplification. Eleven such groups are identified below roughly as they sat from left to right in the Assembly chamber:

Official Designation	Name Employed in This Study
Groupe communiste	Communists
Groupe socialiste	Socialists
Union démocratique et social-	
iste de la Résistance	UDSR
Républicains radicals et radi-	
cals socialistes	Valois Radicals
Groupe radical-socialiste	Morice Radicals
Rassemblement des Gauches	
républicaines	Faure Radicals
Républicains Sociaux	Gaullists
Mouvement républicain popu-	
laire	MRP
Indépendants et Paysans	
d'Action sociale	Independents
Groupe paysan	Peasants
Union et Fraternité française	Poujadists

The Morice Radicals are included only in the analysis of the latter part of the Legislature. Their defection from the main body of Radicals (the Valois Radicals) occurred in October, 1956.

Essentially two dimensions emerge from scale analysis of the 1956 Legislature. Use of the scale-finding procedure outlined above produced five separate sub-sets of the 83 items, grouping 51, 28, two, one, and one items respectively. 19 The two largest sub-sets

¹⁹ A special computer program was written in Fortran by Mr. Joel S. Rose to find scalable subsets in the prescribed fashion. This overcame the almost insurmountable complexities involved in trying to find the largest scalable sub-set from an 83×82/2 matrix.

were then subjected to scale analysis.²⁰ The items in the 51-item scale (Scale A) are analyzed on page 94 in terms of the categories of votes represented. The votes are listed in the order in which they appear on the scale, beginning with the smallest percentage voting for the position supported by the Government.²¹

The second-largest scale (Scale B) contained (see page 94) 28 items:

The most striking feature of these scales is the clear-cut difference between them in the times when the votes were taken. Whereas the median votes for Scale B (#104 and #105) were taken on May 2, 1956, that for Scale A (#691) was taken on September 25, 1957. Aside from two rather untypical Scale B votes taken in September and October, 1957 (#682 and #692),22 the overlap between the two scales encompasses only twelve votes, taken between July 11 (#210) and November 19 (#303), 1956. With the exception of this interim period, therefore, it can be said that there were two time-spans during the 1956 Legislature, one from January to June, 1956, and the other from November, 1956 to April, 1958, in each of which there was a single dominant dimension

²⁰ The four non-scalar votes for the Legislature (with substantive categories in parentheses) were #211 (Eu), #840 (Po), #841 (Po), and #972 (G). Only #972 was, a confidence vote; it was the investiture vote for the Pflimlin Government. The brace of "Political" votes comes the closest to a small homogeneous scale of any of the subsets. Both votes relate to electoral reform.

21 Roll calls were originally coded according to the criterion that the side on which members of the Government voted should be considered "positive" and the other side "negative." For the two Fifth Republic legislatures, with members of the Government no longer doubling as deputies, the side of the motion supported by the majority of the Gaullist UNR was taken as the positive side. The computer program included a feature whereby pairs of items were flagged if they would scale with the reversal of signs of one of them, thus making it possible to catch items for which the sign criterion was inappropriate. One item (#692) was actually added to Scale B (1956) in this fashion. All of the various types of absences and abstentions by which the Journal Officiel classified deputies were combined into a single residual code category.

²² Both were motions which tended to rally the left and center of the Assembly against the right, an untypical occurrence after late 1956, since the left was usually divided in the period covered by Scale A.

SCALE A (1956)

Scrutin	Type	Date	Scrutin	Type	Date
880	Со	Mar. 12, 1958	387	F	Dec. 20, 1956
693*	G	Oct. 28, 1957	420	$\mathbf{E}\mathbf{u}$	Jan. 22, 1957
971	N	Apr. 15, 1958	212	Eu	July 11, 1956
571*	, G	May 21, 1957	823	N	Feb. 11, 1958
690*	N	Sept. 26, 1957	655*	N	July 19, 1957
772*	V	Jan. 16, 1958	701	N	Nov. 12, 1957
365*	v	Dec. 10, 1956	846*	M	Mar. 7, 1958
366*	В	Dec. 10, 1956	522	Ag	Mar. 6, 1957
714*	Ec .	Dec. 5, 1957	. 687	N	Sept. 26, 195
807	N	Jan. 31, 1958	227*	\mathbf{M}	July 28, 1956
777*	N	Jan. 22, 1958	873	Ec	Mar. 10, 1957
813	M	Feb. 4, 1958	401	В	Dec. 27, 1956
582*	\mathbf{Ec}	June 24, 1957	694*	G	Nov. 5, 1957
942	Co	Mar. 21, 1958	265	N	Oct. 31, 1956
3 96	В .	Dec. 26, 1956	745	В	Dec. 16, 1957
704*	. Ec	Nov. 19, 1957	304	В	Nov. 20, 1956
963	N	Mar. 27, 1958	307	В	Nov. 21, 1956
710*	N	Nov. 29, 1957	210	$\mathbf{E}\mathbf{u}$	July 11, 1956
709*	· N	Nov. 29, 1957	254*	G	Oct. 25, 1956
367*	В	Dec. 10, 1956	·609	$\mathbf{E}\mathbf{u}$	July 4, 1957
364*	В	Dec. 10, 1956	850	\mathbf{Ed}	Mar. 8, 1958
884*	\mathbf{Co}	Mar. 18, 1958	317	$\mathbf{E}\mathbf{d}$	Nov. 27, 1956
778	N	Jan. 22, 1958	681	N	Sept. 25, 1957
623	$\mathbf{E}\mathbf{u}$	July 9, 1957 '	608	En	July 2, 1957
748*	B	Dec. 19, 1957	242	G [,]	Oct. 5, 1956
574*	G ·	June 12, 1957			

Asterisks denote motions of confidence or investiture votes. *

characterizing all or most of the votes taken during the period. In the first of these timespans all 21 votes taken were found to fit on the same scale (Scale B). In the second period, 45 of the 50 votes included in the study for the period were encompassed by the dominant scale (Scale A). For approximately 23 of the 28 months covered in the study virtual unidimensionality prevailed.

Two additional differences between the

SCALE B (1956)

Scrutin	Type	Date	Scrutin	Type	Date
105	, S	May 2, 1956	11	N	Feb. 7, 1956
692*	\mathbf{G}	Oct. 18, 1957	119*	S -	May 5, 1956
34	Ch	Feb. 24, 1956	239	${f B}$	Aug. 2, 1956
19	Ch	Feb. 17, 1956	37*	\mathbf{L} .	Feb. 28, 1956
272	$\mathbf{C}\mathbf{h}$	Nov. 8, 1956	103*	${f s}$,	May 2, 1956
255	\mathbf{Ch}	Oct. 26, 1956	120*	S	May 5, 1956
52	\mathbf{N} .	Mar. 9, 1956	152*	S	June 8, 1956
10	Po	Feb. 7, 1956	6*	\mathbf{G}	Jan. 31, 1956
9	Po	Feb. 7, 1956	157	O	June 19, 1956
104*	· S	May 2, 1956	682	N	Sept. 25, 1957
151*	S	June 8, 1956	54*	· N	Mar. 12, 1956
220*	В	July 25, 1956	56*	\mathbf{N}	Mar. 12, 1956
2	\mathbf{Pr}	Jan. 25, 1956	53*	Ň	Mar. 12, 1956
163*	S	June 21, 1956	303	$\dot{\mathbf{H}}$.	Nov. 19, 1956

scales should be noted: (1) The heavier concentration of confidence votes toward the negative end of Scale A than is the case for Scale B indicates that governments found their majorities more precarious during the time period covered by the former. In the median confidence vote²³ in Scale A (#709) 200 deputies voted against the Gaillard Government; only 108 deputies voted against the Mollet Government in the median confidence vote of Scale B (#103). (2) The two scales differ somewhat also with respect to the nature of the issues involved in the confidence votes. Onehalf of the Scale B confidence votes involved the Mollet Government's Old Age Fund proposal. This issue, in fact, provided that Government with most of its more difficult confidence motion situations in the early months of its existence. North African confidence votes are prominent in both scales, but it is noteworthy that they were among the least critical of those in Scale B and provided some of the most troublesome, and even disastrous, situations among those in Scale A. Veterans' votes are found only in Scale A, and they were clearly among the most dangerous for governments to face.

The explanation for the scalar pattern outlined above becomes quite evident when the alignment of parliamentary groups on the two scales is examined. Of the 52 possible classes (0 through 51) which individuals could occupy in a 51-item scale, députies were found in 29 in Scale A. Since many of these classes were occupied by one or a very few members, neighboring classes were combined in such a way that no remaining class, original or combined, would contain less than two percent of the 615 deputies. As a result of the com-

²³ This refers to the median confidence vote in the order in which confidence votes are arrayed in the above table listing Scale A votes.

²⁴ The procedure for collapsing scale categories departs from that suggested by MacRae in "A Method for Identifying Issues and Factions from Legislative Votes," op. cit. The method used here proceeds from the assumption that, in a parliamentary legislative body, the vote on a given scale which most clearly characterizes a sub-set of legislators is the one at which it first votes against the position advanced by the Government. Thus, as we move from the positive to the negative side of a deputy's voting pattern on the scale, he will be scored according to the point at which the first negative vote that can be deemed scalar appears. This follows the conventional pattern if there are no errors or abstentions on the margin. Thus:

bining 11 classes remain for Scale A. The group distribution among the classes is listed in Table 1.

Scale A reveals a solid combination of Socialist and MRP deputies supporting the three governments whose lives spanned the period covered by the votes in the scale. UDSR support was near-perfect, and the governments could count upon over 60 percent of the Valois Radicals. Opposition, on the other hand, came from the Communists, the Poujadists, most of the Peasants, and some of the Independents, Gaullists and Valois Radi-

is scored as 5, as is

Errors on the margin pose problems for any scoring convention. The way to mentally "sweep an error under the rug" is to pretend that the vote is what it should have been to conform to the pattern. But what of the following kind of pattern?

Here the problem is whether to treat the marginal + as a - or the marginal - as a +. Under the assumption prevailing in this study we attach greater significance to the negative vote. Thus the + is converted to a - and the deputy scores 4. (Incidentally, deputies are given no score if they have more than 10 percent errors or more than 40 percent absences and abstentions.) Absences and abstentions on the margin are treated as if they were positive votes, since the vote against the Government is deemed the "harder" alternative. Thus,

$$(4)$$
 ----0++++

is scored as 5.

Given the importance attached to the first negative vote, we can identify each class on the scale by the vote which separates it from the next most positive class. If a class contains less than two percent of the deputies we must choose whether to combine it with the class to its positive side or with that to its negative side. To resolve this problem the "identifying vote" for the small class is compared with each of its neighbors to see which pair yields the higher ϕ/ϕ max coefficient. Pairs of items with the higher coefficients are combined as are the classes of deputies identified with them. I do not recommend the use of these conventions for other kinds of studies. The particular purpose of the present studymeasurement of majority and opposition votingseemed to warrant it.

Ìass	Group Composition	Cutting Point	Class	Group Composition	Cutting Point
10	96 Socialists	1	9	148 Communists	
	21 Valois Radicals			92 Socialists	
	8 UDSR	•		1 UDSR	-
	1 Morice Radical	•		8 Valois Radicals	
	3 Faure Radicals	· ·		1 Other	
	1 Gaullist	•			•
	72 MRP			250 Total	***** O
	2 Others			• • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • •	-#105 (May 2, 1956), Boisdé
	204 Total		8	1 Communist '	amendment to Old Age Fund bill: 263-290
	204 10tai	-#880 (March 12, 1958), Triboulet		18 Valois Radicals	DIII: 203-290
	1 Valois Radical	amendment to Constitutional re-		—	•
	3 Morice Radicals	vision report tending to limit	,	20 Total	
,	2 Faure Radicals	number of occasions where con-			-#692 (October 18, 1957), Pinay
	16 Independents	fidence and censure motions can	7	2 Socialists	investiture (unsuccessful): 198-
		apply: 281-211		10 UDSR	248
	22 Total			15 Valois Radicals	•
-		-#971 (April 15, 1958), Govern-		1 Gaullist	
	4 Morice Radicals	ment motion to postpone debate		1 Other	•
	2 Faure Radicals	onFranco-Tunisian relations (un-		 ,	
	10 Independents	official confidence motion: Gail-		29 Total	
	1 Peasant	lard Government falls): 255-321		o troop	-#52 (March 12, 1956), Arrighi
	17 Mak 1 :	•	6	2 UDSR	amendment to bill authorizing
	17 Total	SETT (36am 61 10EM) 35.41.		2 Valois Radicals	special powers in Algeria: 278–305
_	12 Indones Janes	-#571 (May 21, 1957), Motion of		2 Gaullists	,
	13 Independents 3 Peasants	confidence regarding Government fiscal project (Mollet Govern-		62 MRP 5 Others	-
	Orcusania .	ment falls): 213-250		2 Omnis	
	16 Total	ment rana). 210-200		73 Total	
_		-#690 (September 30, 1957), Mo-		10 10001	-#104 (May 2, 1956), Paquet
	3 Morice Radicals	tion of confidence regarding	` 5	5 Valois Radicals	counter-project to Old Age Fund
	3 Faure Radicals	Government project on Algerian	•	2 Faure Radicals	bill: 178-369
	4 Gaullists	institutions (Bourges-Maunoury		5 Gaullists	•
	10 Independents	Government falls): 253-279		7 MRP	
	• '	i	4	1 Independent	
20 7	Cotal `	•			•
		-#772 (January 16, 1958), Con-		20 Total	
	3 Gaullists .	fidence motion posed against			-#163 (June 21, 1956), Confidence
10	0 Independents	agenda propositions of Confer-	,4	1 Valois Radical	motion on National Solidarity
		ence of Presidents, especially		9 Faure Radicals	bond bill: 314–123
	13 Țotal	relating to veterans' allowances: 253-233		4 Gaullists	
	S .	-#366 (December 10, 1956), Con-		5 Independents	:
	1 Gaullist	fidence motion regarding budget		19 Total	•
	12 Independents	for Posts, Telegraphs and Tele-			-#239 (August 2, 1956), Supple-
		phones: 228-204	3	2 Faure Radicals	mentary budget for 1956: 286-130
	13 Total	-	_	26 Independents	
_		-#813 (February 4, 1958), Post-			
	1 Valois Radical	ponement of debate on organiza-		28 Total	
	2 Faure Radicals	tion of Army: 322-248		- <u></u>	-#6 (January 31, 1956), Mollet
	6 Independents		2	25 Independents	investiture (successful): 420-71
	3 Peasants			7 Peasants	•
	1 Other	• .			* *
				32 Total	## AF - 1 10 - 10 PO - 0 - 0 - 0 -
	13 Total	4994 (March 19 1050) Co. 5		10 T- J 1	-#54 (March 12, 1956), Confidence
	0 Valois Dadis-1-	-#884 (March 18, 1958), Confi-	1	19 Independents	motion on project authorizing
	9 Valois Radicals	dence motion regarding adoption		2 Peasants 1 Pouiadist	Algerian economic expansion
	1 UDSR 3 Gaullists	of dispositions revising Constitu- tion of 1946: 282-196		1 roulament	project: 451-72
	4 Independents	WOM OF 10.10. WOW. 100		22 Total	•
	1 Peasant	i			-#303 (November 19, 1956), Loi-
	2 Others	·	Ö	1 Gaullist	cadre on construction: 490-59
	·	•		4 Independents	
	20 Total			2 Peasants	
		-#304 (November 20, 1956), Oppo-		40 Poujadists	
	6 Peasants	sition to previous question in		1 Other	
	30 Poujadists	debate on Financial project for .	7	 .	•
	,	1957: 187–382		48 Total	1
	36 Total	1010 /T 1 - 11 10MM TO 1 11 -			
•	140 0	-#210 (July 11, 1956), Priority of		•	•
	149 Communists	Government ordre du jour in			
_	1 Peasant	Euratom interpellation debate:			•
7	150 Total	389–181			
	150 Total	i			*

cals (those who supported the position of Pierre Mendès-France). In between were ranged the Morice and Faure Radicals and the remainder of the Gaullists, Independents and Peasants. Since the reliable supporters of the Government did not constitute a number sufficient to assure a majority, this intermediate element held the balance of power in the Assembly throughout the entire period from late 1956 to the Spring of 1958.

The alignment of deputies on Scale B bears some resemblance to that of Scale A, but there are also important differences, as Table 2 reveals. In the early months of the Legislature the majority elements included the Communists as well as the Socialists, the UDSR and part of the Valois Radicals (this time including the supporters of Mendès-France, who was still a member of the Government throughout most of this period). But the MRP deputies were at best sometime supporters, although their support was generally forthcoming on confidence motions. The Poujadists were in opposition, as were a somewhat larger number of Independents and Peasants than were in opposition in the Scale A period. Valois and Faure Radicals, Gaullists, and many of the Independents are ranged in between, although because of the support of the sizeable Communist bloc, the Government did not, strictly speaking, need the intermediate votes to retain its majority. The Communists were not regarded as part of the Government's official majority, however. In fact the Mollet Government at this time regarded itself as a "minority Government" which charted its own course and relied upon the good sense of the centrist groups to prevent a situation wherein the Government must rely upon the Communists' votes to survive.25

As events in the Algerian War pushed the Mollet Government more and more toward a policy which the center-right of the Assembly could support, the Communists and the Mendèsist Radicals began to cool toward Mollet and the Socialist leadership. This incipient left opposition became more selective in voting during the summer and early fall of 1956 (the period when votes are found falling on either scale). Finally, in the wake of the Suez crisis and the Hungarian revolt, the Communists turned to systematic opposition. Soon the Mendèsists were voting fairly consistently against the Government and Mollet was talking as if a "new contract" existed (implicitly with the MRP, the dissident Radicals, and perhaps even some of the Gaullists and Independents).²⁶

A comparison of the positions of deputies on scales A and B, presented in Table 3, will facilitate the identification of types of deputies according to the threefold classification advanced at the outset of the article (consistent supporters, intermediates, and consistent opponents). Note that deputies who are unclassifiable for one of the scales because of excessive absences or non-scalar votes cannot be included in the table. On each scale there are two cutting points which define the outer limits of tolerance of members of the Assembly. They are the cutting points which fall closest to the confidence votes in each scale wherein the largest and smallest number of deputies respectively supported the Government. For Scale A the cutting point between classes 8 and 9 is vote #971. Though not officially a confidence motion, it was regarded as such by the Gaillard Government, which fell as a consequence of the adverse vote. It can be considered the most negative confidence vote on the scale for any of the three governments whose lives Scale A votes spanned.27 The least negative confidence vote on the scale is #254, the closest cutting point to which is that between classes 1 and 0. However, Class 1 is populated by Poujadist and ex-Poujadist deputies who actually abstained on vote #254 and who consistently refused their support to any Government on any confidence motion. Hence it is preferable to move up the scale to the cutting point between classes 1 and 2, which falls closest to the second most positive confidence vote on the scale, #694, the vote on which the Gaillard Government was invested. Below this line of demarcation are the deputies who were consistent opponents to all governments throughout the period covered by Scale A. Above the line between classes 8 and 9 are the consistent supporters of all three governments. For scale B the counterparts are the cutting point between classes 0 and 1 and that between classes 5 and 6.28

Above Class 8 on Scale A and to the left of Class 5 on Scale B are found the consistent

²⁶ *Ibid.*, pp. 80, 97–99.

²⁷ #693, immediately to its negative side, was the unsuccessful second investiture attempt of Guy Mollet, thus not a confidence vote for an active Government.

²⁸ #104 is chosen for the dividing line between the consistent majority and the intermediates rather than #692, which is the unsuccessful investiture attempt of Antoine Pinay.

²⁵ See L'Année politique, 1956, pp. 4-22.

TABLE 3		COMPARISON	OF	SCALES	A	AND	В	(1956)	
---------	--	------------	----	--------	---	-----	---	--------	--

	9	8	7	6	5	4	3	2	1 1	0
10	92 Soc. 5 V.R.	8 V.R.	1 Soc. 5 UDSR 5 V.R. 1 Other	2 UDSR 1 V.R. 1 Gaul. 61 MRP	1 V.R. 1 F.R. 7 MRP	1 M.R 2 F.R.				
9			1 M.R.		2 M.R.	3 Ind.	2 F.R. 10 Ind.	2 Ind.		
8			3 M.R.	-	1 F.R. 1 Ind.	1 F.R. 1 Ind.	2 Ind.	2 Ind. 1 Peas.	3 Ind.	
7				-	,	1 Ind.	5 Ind.	5 Ind. 2 Peas. 1 Other		
6			1 Gaul.	1 M.R. 1 Gaul.	1 M.R. 1 Gaul.	3 F.R.	3 Ind.	4 Ind.`	3 Ind.	
5			-		1 Gaul.	1 Gaul.	4 Ind.	4 Ind.	2 Ind.	
4						1 Gaul.	2 Ind.	1 Ind.	5 Ind.	3 Ind.
3					1 V.R.	2 F.R.		2 Ind. 1 Peas. 1 Other	2 Ind.	1 Peas.
2		3 V.R. 1 UDSR	4 V.R.		1 Gaul.			1 Ind.	2 Ind. 1 Peas.	1 Ind. 2 Oth.
1	,									30 Pouj. 6 Oth.
0	146 Com.	1 Com.								1 Peas.

supporters of all governments during the entire Legislature. Below Class 2 on Scale A and to the right of Class 1 on Scale B are the consistent opponents. In the remaining occupied cells are the intermediate deputies, those who supported one or more governments up to a point or who supported one or two governments consistently but not all three. Below are listed the deputies belonging to each type, grouped according to party affiliation:

Consistent Supporters	Intermediates	Consistent Opponents
93 Socialists	147 Communists	1 Peasant
7 UDSR	1 UDSR	30 Poujadists
19 Valois Radicals	9 Valois Radicals	6 Others
1 Morice Radical	8 Morice Radicals	
1 Gaullist	12 Faure Radicals	37 Total (7%)
61 MRP	7 Gaullists	
1 Other	7 MRP	
•	74 Independents	
183 Total (37%)	6 Peasants	
	4 Others	
	275 Total (56%)	

The key to the Legislature is to be found in the intermediate category. Lacking a majority cf consistent supporters governments were forced to choose between two mutually exclusive combinations determined by the inclinations of different kinds of intermediate deputies. A majority of the left could be obtained by collaborating with the deputies in the lower left hand corner of the table (Communists and Mendesists). But the moment a Government sought to pursue a course of action which these left elements could not approve, it was forced to the right, where there were not enough reliable deputies to put together a lasting majority. All three governments fell as a result of the defection of deputies toward the upper right corner of the table, deputies in Scale A classes 6, 7 and 8 who had generally opposed the Mollet Government during its early months. All three classes were weighted heavily with Independents, the most prominent intermediate group other than the Communists. Quite clearly the balance of power which governments of the center-left faced during the period from late 1956 until the Spring of 1958 was held by deputies whose coloration was well to the right of center.²⁹

III. THE 1958-1962 LEGISLATURE

North African issues played an important role again in the 1958 Legislature, as the

²⁹ The interpretation of the 1956 Legislature advanced here does not differ significantly from MacRae's intra-party scale analysis of the National Assembly in the Fourth Republic. See Parliament, Parties and Society in France: 1946-1958, op. cit., pp. 157-178. Inter-party scale analysis does seem to bring out two features more clearly: (1) the sharp break in voting alignments occurring in late 1956; and (2) the unidimensional pattern extending through 21 governments from late 1956 to April 1958. MacRae does note differences in scalar patterns for both the "Moderates" (Independents and Peasants) and the "Radicals" (Valois Radicals and UDSR) as between the early and late parts of the Mollet Government. He sees the cut-off point for the Radicals, however, as being in the Spring of 1957, rather than in late 1956: ibid., pp. 171-173. Yet, in December, 1956, a substantial proportion of the Mendèsists voted against three confidence motions on the budget (#365, #366, and #367), although they were not vet joined by Mendès-France himself. (Indeed his three positive votes on these motions were non-scalar with respect to the rest of his voting pattern and made it impossible to give him a score.) This break-away behavior by a significant group of Radicals on motions of confidence certainly must have meant a basic re-positioning of deputies within the party by late 1956.

Beyond very general statements it is difficult to compare MacRae's results with those for this study for three reasons: (1) Scale analysis is more sensitive to slight variations in individual voting patterns within individual parties than within the Assembly at large, since individual inconsistencies are counterbalanced in the latter by the monolithic consistency of large parties like the Communists and the Socialists, (2) Since he could only employ roll call votes on which the party was divided internally, MacRae's sample of votes consulted for any given party was likely to be smaller than that used here for the Assembly as a whole and unlikely to be at all representative of it. (3) MacRae endeavored to reduce roll calls to nearly dichotomous items by interpreting abstentions as either positive or negative votes, or by creating two items out of one, interpreting the abstentions first as + votes and second as - votes. This certainly makes for a more rigorous

Algerian crisis continued to plague the French political system. However, several other issue areas shared equal time in the Assembly, as can be seen in the following list:³⁰

Category	Symbol	Number of Votes	
North Africa	N	10	
Procedural questions	\mathbf{Pr}	10	
Agriculture	Ag	9 .	
Budget	\mathbf{B}^{-}	9	
Church-state	$\mathbf{C}\mathbf{h}$	8	
Overseas possessions	O	5	
Government (general)	G	4	
Military	M	4	
Social welfare	\mathbf{s}	3	
Constitutional revision	Co	1	
Economic policy	\mathbf{Ec}	1	
Veterans	V	1	

Procedural questions are, for the most part, votes taken on the new rules of procedure adopted by the Assembly at the outset of the Legislature. North African votes include, among others, four dealing with extremist activity in both Algeria and Metropolitan France and the measures taken by the Government to curb it.

Only six groupes parlementaires existed in the Legislature, partly as a result of the rules change which elevated the minimum number of deputies eligible to constitute a groupe from 14 to 30. In the following list the names used for purposes of this study ignore the fact that several of these groups are marriages of con-

pre-condition to scaling than is true of the procedure used in the present study, wherein abstentions were ignored in the original pairing and in the eventual cr calculation. However, I feared that an arbitrary assignment of abstentions to the + or - side would distort the pattern of majority and opposition voting for a string of items. Admittedly, however, in the procedure used here distortion occurs in the scoring, where it is also necessary to interpret abstentions as + or votes. I consider this method (see footnote 22, supra) less arbitrary than MacRae's for the purpose of capturing the relative positions of deputies vis-à-vis the Government, which was not MacRae's central purpose. For MacRae's scaling procedures see ibid., pp. 339-352.

³⁰ The 65 votes examined are from a total of 196 taken during the Legislature.

SCALE A (1958)

Scrutin	Type	Date	Scrutin	\mathbf{Type}	Date
151	Ag	Oct. 12, 1961	84	Ag	May 19, 1960
153	Ag	Oct. 18, 1961	27	\mathbf{Pr}	June 3, 1959
196*	Co	Oct. 4, 1962	17	\mathbf{Pr}	May 28, 1959
66	В	Dec. 17, 1959	188	\mathbf{Ee}	June 21, 1962
112	M	Oct. 18, 1960	120	В	Nov. 13, 1960
191*	G	July 16, 1962	78	Ag	May 12, 1960
130*	M	Dec. 6, 1960	116	В	Oct. 27, 1960
177	В	Dec. 11, 1961	73	Ch	Dec. 23, 1959
122*	M	Nov. 22, 1960	7	\mathbf{Pr}	Jan. 21, 1959
179	В	Dec. 12, 1961	72	Ch	Dec. 23, 1959
185	G	Apr. 21, 1962	32	\mathbf{Ch}	July 1, 1959
113*	\mathbf{M}	Oct. 24, 1960	33	\mathbf{Ch}	July 1, 1959
36	\mathbf{Pr}	July 21, 1959	14	S	May 14, 1959
80	$\mathbf{A}\mathbf{g}$	May 18, 1960	70	\mathbf{Ch}	Dec. 23, 1959
9	Pr	Apr. 28, 1959	34	\mathbf{Ch}	July 2, 1959
76*	\mathbf{Pr}	May 5, 1960	28	N	June 10, 1959
46	В	Oct. 29, 1959	1	G	Jan. 16, 1959
58*	G	Nov. 27, 1959	71	$\mathbf{C}\mathbf{h}$	Dec. 23, 1959

venience of a number of parties and isolated individuals:

Official Designation	Name Employed in This Study
Groupe socialiste	Socialists
Union pour la Nouvelle	
République	$_{ m UNR}$
Républicains populaires et	
Centre démocratique	MRP
Entente démocratique	Radicals
Unité de la République	Algerians
Indépendants et Paysans	
d'Action sociale	Independents

Several smaller party units remained outside these formations for all or part of the four year period, being unable to constitute groupes parlementaires for want of 30 members. Most notable of these were the Communists, whose ranks had been reduced to ten through the impact of the electoral law, which had replaced proportional representation with the second ballot plurality system. Since they are easily identified, the Communists will be treated hereafter as if they were an official group.

Scale analysis of the 65 items reveals the striking finding that there was a more complex multidimensional voting pattern in the First Legislature of the Fifth Republic than in the last Legislature of the Fourth Republic. Three distinct scales were pulled out, numbering 36, 11 and five items. Only the first two will

be analyzed, since they contain votes on motions of censure while the third scale does not. The 36-item scale (Scale A) is analyzed above in terms of the categories of votes represented:

Altogether, 55 percent of the total number of items appear on the scale. The percentage is higher for the first half of the Legislature: 58 percent of the votes taken during 1959 and 1960 appear on the scale (72 percent for 1959).

31 Of the five votes on the third scale, three deal with procedural questions (#5, #10 and #18) and two concern agriculture (#30 and #195). For speculation as to the meaning of this juxtaposition, see David M. Wood, "The Shifting Bases of Legislative Majorities in the French Fifth Republic: A Guttman Scale Analysis," paper delivered at the 1966 meeting of the Midwest Conference of Political Scientists, Chicago, April 30, 1966. The 13 non-scalar votes are widely distributed among substantive types. Three are budget votes (#63, #165 and #166), two deal with North Africa (#74 and #184), two with social welfare measures (#99 and #100), two with agriculture (#106 and #109), one with procedure (#3), one with overseas territories (#77), and one with veterans (#118). One of the North African votes (#184) was a censure motion. It differed in voting distribution from that of the main 1958 scale (see Table 4, infra) only in the inversion of position of some of the Algerian and Independent deputies toward the negative end of the scale.

alone) as opposed to 47 percent of the votes for 1961 and 1962. This distribution is not as strikingly skewed as that for the 1956 Legislature, however. More arresting is the fact that the higher numbered votes (i.e., those taken later in the Legislature) tend more than the lower numbered votes to fall at the negative end of the scale, indicating a tendency for support for the Government to fall off as the Legislature progressed. An examination of the dates of the seven motions of censure will reinforce this impression.

Of the eight classifications having four or more of the original 64 votes, only two, North Africa and Overseas possessions, are underrepresented among the votes in the scale. Of the five remaining, three (Procedural questions, Agricultural and Budget) are fairly evenly distributed along the scale from the positive to the negative end, whereas two are weighted more heavily toward one end of the scale or the other. Military issues proved to be relatively troublesome for the Government, while Church-state questions accounted for six of the ten most positive votes.

The second scale identified (Scale B) reveals noteworthy differences in content from Scale A. As the following listing shows, all 11 of the votes are of the North Africa and Overseas possessions types:

the 1956 Legislature. The votes on Scale A (1958) are differentiable from those on Scale B more in substantive content than in time. The Scale A dimension continued to be the most prominent dimension in the second half of the Legislature, but it can not be said that unidimensionality prevailed at any time during the four-year period.

Table 4 exhibits the most prominent alignment of deputies in the Assembly during the 1958 Legislature. The table shows that, aside from the UNR, the Communists and the Socialists, the parliamentary groups were widely divided internally vis-à-vis the Government. Aside from a few renegades who actually departed from the party in the late stages of the Legislature (those in classes 5, 6 and 7), the UNR members solidly supported the Government. Communists, Socialists, and most of the Radicals were consistently in opposition. For most of the votes in the scale the Government enjoyed a comfortable majority, but important test votés beginning in May, 1960 showed that the support for the Government among the MRP, the Algerians and the Independents was not altogether reliable (see classes 3 through 6). Finally, in the censure vote on October 4, 1962, the Government lost the support of a key group dominated by the MRP and the Independents (Class 7). With this vote the

Scale B (1958)

Scrutin	Type	Date	Scrutin	Type	Date
121	N	Nov. 15, 1960	89	0	June 9, 1960
172	N	Nov. 30, 1961	162	N	Nov. 9, 1961
87	N	June 1, 1960	102	O	July 20, 1960
161	N	Nov. 8, 1961	104 .	O	July 20. 1960
190	N	July 5, 1962	103	О	July 20, 1960
187*	N	June 5, 1962			,

Since the question of the independence of overseas possessions was involved in both kinds of votes, Scale B can be characterized as quite homogeneous in substantive content. However, the time element is also important in distinguishing this scale from Scale A. All of the Scale B votes occurred after 61 percent of the Scale A votes; and the median Scale B vote in time (#121) was taken later than 72 percent of the votes constituting Scale A. Thus the second dimension became an important factor only toward the end of the Legislature. Still, it did not erase the dominant dimension of the early months of the Legislature as had happened in

Government's support was reduced to a minority of the Assembly, comprising the UNR itself and a handful of other deputies (see classes 9 and 10).

Table 5 presents the essential information for Scale B. On the Algerian policy of General de Gaulle, as it began to move perceptibly toward acquiescence in Algerian independence, the Government could count upon massive majorities consisting of the disciplined parties on the left and the bulk of the UNR and MRP deputies in the center of the spectrum. Opposition came from the Independents and Algerians, as well as from a few MRP and Radical

	TABLE 4. SCALE A (1800)		TABLE O. SCALLE B (1900)			
Class	Group Composition	Cutting Point	Class	Group Composition	Cutting Point	
9	169 UNR 5 MRP 3 Algerians 3 Independents 11 Others 191 Total		6	10 Communists 42 Socialists 155 UNR 36 MRP 6 Radicals 4 Others		
8	15 UNR 3 Radicals 5 Independents	-∮151 (October 12, 1961), Agriculture price project: 173-270	5	253 Total 8 UNR 3 MRP	-#121 (November 15, 1960), Request for suspension of detention of Pierre Lagaillarde: 201-219	
	3 Others — 26 Total			1 Radical 1 Algerian	`	
7	5 UNR	-#196 (October 4, 1962), Motion of censure on constitutional re-		13 Total	-#172 (November 30, 1961),	
	14 MRP 2 Radicals 2 Algerians 26 Independents 4 Others	vision: 280 pour	4	2 UNR 7 MRP 15 Radicals 24 Independents 1 Other	Amendment to budget bill making local force in Algeria inte- gral part of French armed forces: 218–230	
6	1 UNR 12 MRP 1 Radical 13 Independents	-f191 (July 16, 1962), Motion of censure in budget debate relating to force de frappe and European policy: 206 pour	3	9 UNR 2 MRP 9 Radicals 7 Independents	-#87 (June 1, 1960), Request for suspension of Lagaillarde deten- tion: 165-268	
	— 27 Total			27 Total		
5	6 UNR 5 MRP 21 Algerians 15 Independents 5 Others	-#179 (December 12, 1961), Final vote on Financial Law, overriding Senate objection: 307–192	2	1 UNR 4 MRP 1 Radical 1 Algerian 15 Independents 3 Others	-#161 (November 8, 1961), Credits for Algeria: 332-138	
4	1 Radical 3 Algerians 24 Independents 1 Other 29 Total	-#36 (July 21, 1959), Assembly rules of procedure: 294-126	1	25 Total 3 UNR 4 Radicals 8 Algerians 12 Independents 6 Others	-#89 (June 9, 1960), Project ap- proving Independence Agree- ments with Mali Republic: 355–68	
3	1 MRP 1 Algerian 11 Independents 13 Total	-F76 (May 5, 1960), Motion of censure for President's refusal to convoke extraordinary session: 122 pour	0	33 Total 1 UNR 13 Algerians 35 Independents	-\$102 (July 20, 1960), Project approving agreements with Central African Republic, Congo (Brazzaville) and Chad: 384-62	
2	5 MRP 3 Radicals 1 Algerian 5 Independents 1 Other	-#46 (October 29, 1959), Fiscal reform project: 380-95		11 Others — 60 Total		
harries had a re-	15 Total	-#27 (June 3, 1959), Assembly			defectors (the deputies classes 0 through 3, plus	
1	4 MRP 6 Radicals 2 Independents 2 Others	rules of procedure: 427-91	some retain of the	of those labelled ing its strong ba spectrum, the (1 "Others"). Hence, while se of support in the center Government compensated center support on Algeri-	
0	14 Total 10 Communists 44 Socialists 11 Radiçals	-#32 (May 18, 1960), Amendment to Social Promotion project specifying application to private institutions: 441-73	an qu the Co group	estions by attra ommunists and s, however, did	cting the solid support of Socialists. The latter two not extend their support as covered by votes on	

TABLE 6. COMPARISON OF SCALES A AND B (1958)

	. 6	. 5	4	3	2	. 1	. 0
9	139 UNR 4 MRP '7 Others	5 UNR 1 Other	2 UNR 1 MRP 1 Ind.	6 UNR 1 Ind. 1 Other	1 Alg.		,
8 .	8 UNR 2 Rad.	3 UNR	2 Ind.	2 UNR 2 Rad. 1 Ind.			
7	11 MRP 1 Other	1 Rad.	2 MRP 12 Ind.	1 Rad. 2 Ind.	3 Ind.	4 Ind.	2 Ind. 1 Other
6	7 MRP	1 MRP	2 MRP 1 Rad. 3 Ind.		1 UNR 4 Ind.		2 Ind.
5	1 MRP		1 MRP 2 Ind. 1 Other	2 MRP	3 Ind. 1 Other	1 UNR 5 Alg. 1 Ind. 1 Other	12 Alg. 7 Ind. 5 Other
4			1 Rad.		· 4 Ind.	1 Alg. 2 Ind.	11 Ind. 2 Other
3	1 MRP					, 3 Ind.	1 Alg. 5 Ind.
2	3 MRP			1 Rad. 1 Ind.	1 MRP	1 Rad. 1 Alg. 2 Ind. 2 Others	4 Ind.
1	2 MRP 1 Rad.		1 Rad.	2 Rad.	2 MRP		1 Ind. 2 Others
0	. 10 PC 42 Soc. 1 Rad.		7 Rad.	-			

Table 6 shows that there is very little correlation between them, considerably less than between the two 1956 scales. Deputies are scattered more widely among the cells, leaving only 31 percent of them unoccupied, as against 59 percent for the 1956 scales. Consistent supporters of the Government are found above Class 7 on Scale A, having refused to vote the fatal motion of censure of October 4, 1962, and to the left of Class 1 on Scale B. All but ten of the deputies to the left of Scale B Class 1 refused to vote for the motion of censure of June 5, 1962, condemning the Government's Algerian policy, the only censure motion on the scale. None of these ten is found above Class 7 on Scale A. Consistent opponents of the Government are found below Class 3 on Scale A and to the right of Class 2 on Scale B. The cutting point between Scale A classes 2 and 3 (#46) is the closest on the scale to the least troublesome censure motion faced by the Government (#58 of November 27, 1959). The remaining deputies on the chart are the intermediates. The following listing shows the distribution of the three types:

Consistent Supporters	Intermediates	Consistent Opponents
165 UNR	10 Communists	1 Radical
5 MRP	42 Socialists	1 Algerian
4 Radicals	2 UNR	7 Independents
1 Algerian	36 MRP	4 Others
5 Independents	17 Radicals	
9 Others	19 Algerians	13 Total (3%)
	71 Independents	3
189 Total (46%)	12 Others	·
· .		
	209 Total (51%)	

Here it can be seen that the Government enjoyed the support of a near majority of the Assembly in the face of all of the major issues which generated censure motions. Needing only a small percentage of votes to round out the majority, the Government had potentially available to it a large pool of intermediate deputies upon whom to draw for support on particular votes. The only danger to the Government was the uniting of the intermediates against it, and, given the heterogeneous nature of the intermediate pool, this could happen only as a result of the accumulation of a variety of specific complaints. In fact this did occur during the course of the period 1960 to 1962. First procedural disagreements, then military policy, then Algeria, then Europe, and finally constitutional revision peeled away elements of the Government's majority.32 Had General de Gaulle not decided to change the mode of Presidential election, or had he followed a more orthodox means of revising the Constitution, the Government's life might have been prolonged through the continued support of the Class 7 deputies on Scale A. But this would have meant a different strategy for the next legislative elections, and very likely a less successful one from the Gaullist standpoint.33

IV. THE 1962 LEGISLATURE

The legislative elections of November 1962 produced a Legislature with a decidedly Gaullist coloration.34 The UNR could count on a stable majority resting upon its own nearmajority numbers and about 30 Républicains Indépendants (ex-Independent supporters of Finance Minister Valery Giscard d'Estaing). Apart from these defectors to the Gaullist camp, the Independent group was eclipsed by Gaullist opponents, and the MRP was seriously hurt as well, although it was still able to field a parliamentary group with the help of a few former Independents and members of the Entente Démocratique who were unwilling or unable to join the Radicals in their new formation, the Rassemblement Démocratique. On the left, the Radicals, Socialists and Communists all increased their strength in the elections. The groupes parlementaires in the 1962 Legislature were as follows:

³² Careful analyses of voting trends on censure motions during the 1958 Legislature appear in Jean-Luc Parodi, Les rapports entre le Législatif et l'Exécutif sous la Ve République (Paris: Fondation Nationale des Sciences Politiques, 1962); and Macridis and Brown, Supplement to "The De Gaulle Republic" (Homewood, Ill.: The Dorsey Press, Inc., 1963), pp. 58-61.

33 See Andrews and Hoffmann, op. cit., pp. 88-98.

²⁴ A good capsule description of the re-alignment following the 1962 elections is to be found in *L'Année politique*, 1962, pp. 140-141.

Group	Main Element
Groupe communiste	Communists
Groupe socialiste	Socialists
Union pour la Nouvelle	$\overline{\text{UNR}}$
République	
Rassemblement démocratique	Radicals
Centre démocratique	MRP
Républicains indépendants	Independents (Giscardiens)

The 1962 Legislature comes the closest of the three examined to true unidimensionality. Of the 47 votes studied for the period December, 1962 to November, 1965, 45 fit a single scale! Thus a single dominant alignment existed for the entire first three years of the Legislature. The original sample of 47 items necessitates a restatement of the categories used to identify the kinds of issues involved:

Category	Symbol	Number of Votes
Budget	В	8
Military	${f M}$	7
Political	Po	5
Foreign policy	\mathbf{F}	4
Administrative	Ad	3
Economic policy	$\mathbf{E}\mathbf{c}$	3
Housing	\mathbf{H}	3
Justice	J	3
North Africa	N	3
Agriculture	Ag	2
Education	$\mathbf{E}\mathbf{d}$	2
Government (general)	\mathbf{G}	2
Labor	L	- 2

The category labelled "Political" includes items dealing with the reorganization of

³⁵ There was a total of 254 votes taken during the four-year period studied. The two non-scalar votes are #75 (housing) and #234 (North Africa). Neither was a motion of censure.

³⁶ As an additional indicator of the high degree of unidimensionality, the 1962 scale has the highest overall coefficient of reproducibility of the five scales examined here:

Scale		cr
1956	(A)	.976
1956	(B)	.988
1958	(A)	.970
1958	(B)	.977
1962		,993

municipal elections and the policy respecting political broadcasts on the state-owned radio and television facilities. The three Justice votes deal with the project establishing a State Security Court to replace the extraordinary military tribunal created during the Algerian crisis. Administrative votes involve the reorganization of the Paris region and the budget of the Ministry of the Interior.

The following list sets forth all of the 45 items included in the above-mentioned scale, beginning with the item with the smallest positive percentage:

end, tend not to overlap to any great degree. The distribution of groups is quite similar to that for Scale A (1958) if account is taken of the realignment that took place in the center of the spectrum in the wake of the 1962 election. The arrangement for the 1962 Legislature differs from the bi-dimensional pattern of the 1958 Legislature in the absence of the deputies on the right-hand side of Scale B (1958), who had opposed the Government's Algerian policy. This element was virtually unrepresented in the new Legislature. Of the 74 Metropolitan deputies in classes 0 and 1 of Scale B (1958),

1962 Scale

Scrutin .	Type	Date	Scrutin	Туре	Date
50	H	Oct. 9, 1963	24	J	Feb. 13, 1963
51	\mathbf{H}	Oct. 9, 1963	33	В	May 29, 1963
44	\mathbf{H}	July 19, 1963	2	$\mathbf{A}\mathbf{g}$	Dec. 18, 1962
226	N	Oct. 25, 1965	28	В	May 8, 1963
104	Po	May 28, 1964	68	\mathbf{M}	Nov. 7, 1963
43	${f L}$	July 17, 1963	111	\mathbf{Ad}	June 11, 1964
57	N	Oct. 28, 1963	58	${f F}$.	Oct. 29, 1963
118	Po	June 18, 1964	241	В	Oct. 28, 1965
94	Po	May 21, 1964	159	В	Nov. 9, 1964
11	J	Jan. 4, 1963	115	Ad	June 12, 1964
193	M	May 6, 1965	65	\mathbf{Ed}	Nov. 6, 1963
146*	\mathbf{G}	Oct. 27, 1964	41	${f L}$	July 17, 1963
153	Ag	Nov. 5, 1964	235	Ed	Oct. 19, 1965
87	Po	May 20, 1964	1	G	Dec. 13, 1962
238	\mathbf{F}	Oct. 20, 1965	70	В	Nov. 9, 1963
239	\mathbf{Ad}	Oct. 25, 1965	237	M	Oct. 21, 1965
15	J	Jan. 11, 1963	78 -	В	Dec. 6, 1963
203	\mathbf{M}	May 26, 1965	23	В	Jan. 25, 1963
161	M	Dec. 2, 1964	197	Ec	May 13, 1965
242	Ec	Nov. 5, 1965	160	Ec	Nov. 26, 1964
35	${f F}$	June 13, 1963	36	\mathbf{F}	June 13, 1963
106	Po	May 28, 1964	3	В	Dec. 18, 1962
162	M	Dec. 2, 1964			•

The ordering of votes on the scale shows no evident trend toward either greater or less support for the Government during the course of the three year period. Note that support for the Government's budget was relatively high throughout the period, while housing policy and the Government's position on political matters and North African affairs received relatively weak support.

Table 7 gives the group distribution for the scale. In comparison with the scales for the two preceding legislatures, groups on this scale are quite compact and, except at its lower

only nine survived the 1962 legislative elections.

Table 7 can be used to determine the distribution of deputy types. The only censure motion voted on during the period (#146) will serve as the dividing line between consistent supporters and the rest of the Assembly. The closest cutting point is that separating classes 6 and 7. Thus the consistent supporters are those above Class 6 on the scale. The consistent opponents can be demarcated by the initial vote of approval received by the

TABLE 7. 1962 SCALE

Class	Group Composition	Cutting Point
11	146 UNR	
	3 RI (Républicains Indépendants)	, , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , ,
·	1 Other	
	150 Total	
	100 10041	#50 (October 9, 1963), Laurin amendment to
10	55 UNR	Tinguy amendment to Housing Construction
	•	bill: 148–310
		-#51 (October 9, 1963), Tinguy amendment to
9	11 UNR	Housing Construction bill: 250-210
		•
		-#44 (July 19, 1963), Amendment to Financia
8	17 UNR	project to suppress credits for state-supported
	1 Other	building societies: 228-224
	18 Total	
•		NOOR (O. I. T. OF TOAT) TO I I I
7	28 RI	#226 (October 25, 1965), Request for special commission to study indemnification of re
•	2 Others	patriated Frenchmen: 237–225
		patrialed Frontinen. 20, 220
	30 Total	<i>,</i> ,
	,	
		#118 (June 18, 1964), Third reading of Municipa
6	13 CD (Centre Démocratique)	Councillors' bill: 257-206
	3 RI	•
	3 Others	
	19 Total	
	IV LOUM	#242 (November 5, 1965), Project approving
5	26 CD	Fifth Plan: 283–184
	1 Other	
	27 Total	

Pompidou Government at the outset of the Legislature (#1).³⁷ This falls closest to the cutting point between classes 2 and 3 on the scale. Thus the consistent opponents are those below Class 3. Intermediates are those between classes 3 and 6, inclusive. Below are listed the compositions of the three types for the 1962 Legislature:

Consistent Supporters	Intermediates	Consistent Opponents	
229 UNR	13 RD	41 Communists	
31 RI	52 CD	67 Socialists	
4 Others	3 RI	25 RD	
	4 Others .	2 CD	
264 Total (56%)		3 Others	
	72 Total (15%	,) . 	
*	,.	138 Total (29%)	

The most striking feature of this distribution, is, of course, the comfortable majority of consistent supporters enjoyed by the Government. Although the intermediate pool was markedly reduced relative to the previous legislatures, the Government had no need of the less reliable type of support. Further comparison of this distribution with those for the other legislatures is undertaken in the concluding section.

³⁷ There is no requirement for an investiture vote in the 1958 Constitution. Nevertheless, the vote on the Premier's policy statement can be regarded as an expression of the degree of support existing at the outset of the Legislature for the particular Government which Pompidou headed.

TABLE 7 (continued)

Class	Group Composition	Cutting Point				
	10 CD -	#68 (November 7, 1963), Military Expenses				
4	13 CD	article of Financial project: 297-160				
3	13 RD (Rassemblement Démocratique)	-#41 (July 17, 1963), Previous question opposed to project regarding strikes in public services: 146-315				
		-#78 (December 6, 1963), Text of Financial law				
	12 RD	proposed by mixed commission: 316-139				
	2 CD					
	1 Other					
	15 Total	4.				
· 		-#160 (November 26, 1964), Project regarding				
1	2 Communists	Fifth Plan: 353-120				
	3 Socialists					
	6 RD 2 Others					
	Z Others					
	13 Total					
		#3 (December 18, 1962), First part of Financial				
0 39	39 Communists	law: 321-113				
	64 Socialists	· ·				
	7 RD					
		•				
	110 Total	,				

v. conclusion

The principal concern of this article has been to ascertain empirically whether or not the apparent trend toward a simplified majorityopposition confrontation in French politics has been evident over the last decade at the level of legislative behavior. Two criteria have been employed to measure trends in voting behavior in the National Assembly: (1) the degree of unidimensionality in voting patterns, and (2) the distribution of role types among deputies according to the three-fold typology outlined in the opening section. Concerning the first criterion, analysis of voting patterns for the three legislatures studied leads to a rather ambiguous answer. Using the strict standards of unidimensionality employed in Guttman scaling, the most unidimensional pattern has been found for the most recent of the three legislatures studied. However, it cannot be said that a consistent trend in the direction of unidimensionality has been found. Whereas more than one dimension was discovered in the voting patterns of both the first and second legislatures in chronological order, it is possible to divide the time-span of the earliest Legislature (1956) into two subperiods, in each of which there was substantial unidimensionality. From late 1956 until the Spring of 1958 the degree of unidimensionality was very nearly as great as that found for the first three years of the most recent Legislature (1962). In the intervening Legislature (1958) a mildly multidimensional pattern was found. Thus, at first glance, there seems to have been no clear-cut trend.

If, on the other hand, we were to adopt a less rigorous conception of dimensionality, a somewhat different answer might emerge. In both the 1956 and the 1958 legislatures governments found themselves facing less an opposition than two alternative sets of partners, each seeking to influence policy (especially regarding North Africa) in a distinct direction and to preven the alternative element from sharing in power While left-right terms have been used sparingly in this article, there can be no question that, in the traditional parlance of French politics,

the governments of these two legislatures were governments of the center; the two dominant dimensions of each legislature involved voting cooperation of the center supporters of the governments with the right against the left on one dimension and with the left against the right on the other. The central base of support shifted noticeably to the right as a result of the 1958 elections, which decimated the ranks of the left parties and swelled the ranks of the MRP, the Independents and especially the Gaullists.

By the 1962 Legislature, however, the far right, which had included in its ranks the only consistent opponents in the two preceding legislatures as well as the fringe supporters of the center-right voting alignments, had virtually dropped out of the picture. Suddenly the Gaullists found themselves on the right-hand side of the party spectrum in the Assembly.³⁸ The single dimension which emerged in that Legislature reflected the fact that the Gaullists had no real alternative set of voting partners

38 The Gaullists themselves object to the "rightist" label, and their voting behavior in the 1956 and 1958-legislatures certainly strengthens their claim to "centrist" status. Unfortunately for their claim, if not for their majority status, they emerged from the 1962 elections with nothing but thin air to their right. The Républicains Indépendants were the least right-of-center of the old Independents, and the Centre Démocratique was predominantly composed of MRP, or center, deputies. All three groups (UNR, RI and CD) could be said to occupy roughly the same ideological space: from dead center to moderate right. To be sure, de Gaulle's foreign policy puts the Gaullists to the left of center on the spectrum, but their outlook on the Constitution, with emphasis upon a strong executive, is traditionally a right-wing position in France. Thus, the extremes of their "ideological profile" go beyond those of the other two parties; but, if it were possible to devise a multi-dimensional measure of ideological position, it is likely that the UNR would be close to the other two parties, at least in a measure of central tendency. The impressions of the author are drawn from interviews in Paris with candidates of the "Fifth Republic" alliance and the Centre Démocratique during the campaign for the March, 1967 legislative elections, as well as from examination of campaign statements of the party leaders appearing in Le Monde during the campaign. A useful pre-election compilation of party positions on the primary issues of the moment is to be found in Le Dossier politique de l'Electeur français (Paris: Editions Planète, 1967).

and opponents. The roles of the various parties had become frozen. To a large degree, of course, the new situation reflected the fact that the Algerian question had virtually disappeared from French politics. Once again a single prevailing structure of roles and expectations could develop in the Assembly, there being no transcendent issue which could disrupt the existing set of commitments. When the voting patterns are viewed in this more general, less technical, sense it becomes clear that, while there was not a consistent trend toward unidimensionality between 1956 and 1965, the kind of unidimensionality that prevailed in the period 1962-65 was considerably more conducive to a simplified majorityopposition confrontation than that prevailing between 1956 and 1962.

The contrast between the 1962 Legislature and its two immediate predecessors becomes all the more apparent when the percentage distributions of deputy types in the three legislatures are compared:

Demoke termina	Ι	Legislatur	е	
Deputy types	1956	1958	1962	
Consistent supporters	37%	46%	56%	
Intermediates	56	51	15	
Consistent opponents	7	3	29	
,	100%	100%	100%	

Only in 1962 do we see the beginnings of a real opposition in the National Assembly. Although it is still overpowered by the cohesive majority, it is possible to point to a single area of the political spectrum and identify it as the Opposition, even though it was still in the 1962–65 period a delicate plant, divided between three parliamentary groups and lacking a single leader.³⁹ Prior to 1962 we see govern-

39 It is possible to hazard an assessment of the distribution of deputy types at the outset of the 1967 Legislature. An estimate can be made from the analysis of votes for the first censure motion of the Legislature appearing in Le Monde, May 23, 1967, p. 9. By assuming (1) that the members of the group Progrès et Démocratie (primarily the Centre Démocrate) who voted for the motion are intermediates, (2) that members of the two left groups, Communists and Fédération des Gauches are consistent opponents, (3) that deputies who did not vote for the motion are consistent supporters; and using their earlier scale scores to

ments threading a dangerous course between two actively hostile part-time oppositions. However, the Gaullist influx in 1958 decisively altered the stalemate situation that had prevailed between 1956 and 1958. The Government now had enough reliable support that it could afford to choose among potential voting partners from the intermediate ranks. This made it possible for a solution to the Algerian problem to be achieved without a complete break-down of the parliamentary mechanism.

The Algerian War thus can be seen as a factor of transcendent importance to an understanding of French politics during the period under consideration. The nature of its impact was different at different times, however. In 1956 it made for inflexibility and stalemate. In 1958 it generated events which were to result in a much more flexible and mobile system. And in 1962 its conclusion resulted in a considerable simplification of the system. To be sure, other factors contributed to these results:

the personality of General de Gaulle, the institutional changes of the Fifth Republic, as well as more problematical long-term developments, such as the decline of localism in French politics in the face of the increasing importance of national leadership under the influence of the mass media, and the reputed decline of ideology in Western Europe, especially on the left side of the political spectrum. But the Algerian War was the catalyst which brought the more immediate factors to life and which conditioned the expressions which the longer-term trends would take. Whether, on balance, it hastened or retarded the appearance of a more simplified majority-opposition confrontation cannot be ascertained from the data reviewed here. The difficulty with longitudinal analysis of French politics is that it is virtually impossible to find a "normal" period sometime in the recent past with which to compare more recent developments.

classify the isolated deputies who voted for the motion, one arrives at the following distribution:

Sı	upporters	Inte	ermediates	Opponents			
3	UNR, etc. CD, etc. RI		CD, etc. Other	121	Communists FGDS, etc. Others		
	Others Total (52%)	39	Total (8%)	196	Total (40%)		

(One isolated deputy voting for the motion, who was not a member of the 1962 Legislature, is not included in this break-down.) Here we see the further advance of the opposition and the further decline of the intermediates, with the growth trend of the majority being halted and somewhat

reversed. Despite the last development, however, it is striking to note the 7 percent increase in the combined strength of the majority and opposition at the expense of the intermediates.

Too much stock should not be placed in these figures as predictive of what the character of the new Legislature will be. The characterization of the Communists as consistent opponents may not withstand the test of events if the Assembly faces any foreign policy issues. As early as April. 1966 a censure motion advanced by the Socialists attacking de Gaulle's NATO policy failed to get the support of the Communists, thus joining the two ends of the 1962 scale against the middle: see L'Année politique, 1966, pp. 34-37. This should be sufficient warning, incidentally, that the "1962 scale" characterizes only the first three years of the 1962 Legislature and not necessarily the entire four, the year 1966 not having been examined.

COMMUNISM AND ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT*

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I. INTRODUCTION

One of the major efforts of students of comparative politics in recent years has been directed at establishing, more or less systematically, relationships between economic development and political change. Much of the literature in this area, perhaps because of its stated or unstated value and policy orientation, has been concerned with the conditions and the prospects for democracy. In the present article, we attempt to correlate economic development with another phenomenon of political change, that of Communism and, more specifically, the strength of Communist parties.

We begin with the hypothesis that the relationship between economic development and Communist party strength is curvilinear. In underdeveloped countries—and these included all Communist-ruled countries at the time the Communist party came to power except East Germany and the Czech sections of Czechoslovakia—Communist parties may be regarded as merely one variety of the modernizing movements that evolved in these countries in response to the impact of Western industrialism.²

* The authors are indebted to their colleague at Washington University, John Sprague, for advice on statistical matters. Financial support of the Washington University Computing Facilities through National Science Foundation Grant G-22296 is also gratefully acknowledged.

¹ The interesting research note by Robert M. Marsh and William L. Parish, "Modernization and Communism: A Re-Test of Lipset's Hypotheses," American Sociological Review, 30 (December, 1965), 934-942, establishes that Communist party strength is not inversely related to economic development, as had been suggested by Seymour Martin Lipset, Political Man: The Social Bases of Politics (Garden City, N. Y.: Doubleday, 1960). Whereas Marsh and Parish attempt a critical evaluation of existing theoretical propositions, we are attempting to utilize evidence for the purpose of hypothesis testing.

² This interpretation of Communism rests on the analysis of one of the present authors, John H. Kautsky, "An Essay in the Politics of Development," in Kautsky (ed.), *Political Change* Where no or virtually no modernizing movements have as yet developed, because there has been relatively little impact of Western industrialism and little economic development. there should, then, be no or practically no Communist parties. As economic development proceeds, modernizing movements, and hence also Communist parties, are composed largely of intellectuals and are therefore small. With the further progress of economic development and consequent social mobilization. however. these movements may grow, sometimes to considerable size, as they attract support not only from more intellectuals, but also from incipient and growing labor movements, from urban middle strata, and, more rarely, from peasants.

In the now industrially more advanced countries, where economic development came from within rather than without. Communist parties historically grew out of anarchosyndicalist or socialist movements representing some intellectuals and large numbers of workers more or less alienated from and hostile to their societies and governments. Where, in these countries, economic development is relatively backward (though more advanced than in any of the underdeveloped countries just mentioned) and workers find themselves in a minority in a largely anti-labor society, Communist parties can be expected to be strong. It is at this level of economic development that they reach their greatest strength, especially since they represent not only sizeable labor movements and intellectuals in sympathy with them, but also draw support from small peasants and the middle strata of shopkeepers and artisans, still numerous, but feeling threatened by industrialization. As economic development proceeds, however, these latter groups are absorbed by the advanced industrial economy, either to disappear or be con-

in Underdeveloped Countries: Nationalism and Communism (New York: John Wiley & Sons, 1962).

³ The concept of social mobilization is developed by Karl W. Deutsch, "Social Mobilization and Political Development," this Review, 55 (September, 1961), 493-514.

Predicted Relationship between Level of Economic Development and Communist Party Strength




Fig. 1

verted into farmers or small businessmen, and workers become integrated into the society and are no longer alienated. With high economic development, then, Communist party strength may be expected to be very low.

In the interpretation of our findings we shall draw some further distinctions between types of societies at various levels of economic development and between Communist parties aggregating different interests in such societies, but the above suffices as a statement of our hypothesis.

II. THE EVIDENCE

Figure 1 presents graphically the relationship we predict between Communist party strength and level of economic development. We hypothesize that Communist party strength is lowest at the lowest stage of economic development, rises gradually with economic development, crests at a fairly high level of such development, and declines sharply with the highest level.

We have three potential measures of Communist party strength, our dependent variable: estimated membership of the Communist party, membership of the Communist party as a percentage of the working-age population, and per cent of total vote cast for the Communist party in national elections. There are

difficulties with each of these, which finally limited our selection principally to one—estimated membership of the Communist party (see Appendix A). To be sure, that

4 Data on estimated membership of Communist parties and on Communist party percentage of total votes cast in national elections appear in U.S. Department of State, Bureau of Intelligence and Research, World Strength of the Communist Party Organizations (January 1965). See pp. 1-5 of this report for a discussion of the reliability of the data. It goes without saying that Communist party membership figures are likely, for most parties, to be neither precise nor reliable. The State Department report itself states (p. 4): "The reader is reminded . . . that although the best usable sources have been consulted, communist membership figures are very difficult to obtain and are not subject to verification." Indeed, in the case of illegal Communist parties and especially of "fronts," "crypto-Communist" and divided parties, it may even be difficult to define "the" Communist party. We are, nevertheless using the State Department's 1965 estimates as the best membership figures available and feel that, for our purposes, they are adequate. Examination of the 1966 report, which became available only after our analysis was completed, indicates relatively little change in State Demeasure does not show Communist membership as a percentage of the total population of the country, but the significance of that proportion is dubious, especially in traditional societies where modernization is just beginning and where the politically active strata of the society are small. We should really know what proportion of these active strata the Communist party membership constitutes, but no such data are available.

Per cent of the vote given to the Communist party in national elections might be superior to the other measures in some respects, but here also data limitations make use of this measure impractical. Above al, there are no national elections or only one-party elections in many countries, or Communist parties do not participate in elections, or published election results are unreliable or not subject to comparison. Membership of the Communist party as a percentage of the total working-age population (see Appendix A) removes some of the possible limitations found in the Communist party membership indicator. It is used only as a check on the latter measure to allow the amount of congruence between the two indicators to be computed. All that we are willing and able to assert is that our measures of Communist party membership provide at least strong partial indicators of Communist party strength.

On economic development, our independent variable, we took data and measures from Banks and Textor, A Cross-Polity Survey. Six commonly used indices of economic development were selected from the Banks and Textor code (see Appendix B):

- 1) level of urbanization
- agricultural population as a percentage of the total population
- 3) gross national product
- 4) per capita gross national product
- 5) status of economic development
- 6) international financial status

Three screening procedures eliminated all but our sample of 91 countries (see Appendix A for the country listing). First, all countries

partment estimates of world Communist party membership. Membership figures for the Communist Party of the United States, which are not given by the State Department, were obtained from *The New York Times*, June 22, 1966, Section 3, p. 1.

were eliminated for which we had no estimates of Communist party membership. Secondly, since Communist strength is obviously affected by different factors in Communist-ruled countries than in non-Communist ones and is hence not comparable, we omitted all Communist-ruled countries from our sample. Thirdly, only countries on which A Cross-Polity Survey contains data were selected.

To test the hypothesized relationship between Communist party strength and level of economic development, contingency coefficients, frequency distributions and percentages were computed comparing our measures of Communist party strength—party membership and party membership as a percentage of the working-age population—to the six measures of economic development presented above. If our hypothesis is correct, the countries should be spread along the predicted path, as in Figure 1 above, when the dependent variable, Communist party membership, is compared to the measures of economic development.

First, to view the reliability between the two measures of Communist party strength, the mean and range for the contingency coefficients relating the two Communist party strength indicators and the six economic development measures are presented. The mean contingency coefficient between Communist party membership and the economic development measures is .59, whereas it reaches .55 when Communist party membership as a percentage of the working-age population and the economic development measures are related. The range of the contingency coefficients between Communist party membership and the economic development measures is from .47 to .70. and .53 to .67 between the economic development measures and Communist party membership as a percentage of the working-age population.

Two representative measures of economic development, per capita gross national product (contingency coefficient .60) and agricultural population as per cent of total population (c.c. .51), were selected to present the results of the analysis. To put the data in convenient form, ar index was constructed for the purpose of evaluating the shape of the plotted relationship between economic development measures and Communist party membership. Table 1 is an example of a raw table out of which the index was constructed.

⁶ The contingency coefficient is appropriate for tests of association for nominal and ordinal categories and non-linear relationships.

⁵ Arthus S. Banks and Robert B. Textor, A Cross-Polity Survey (Cambridge, Mass.: M.I.T. Press, 1963).

TΓA	RIE	

Communist Party Membership	High	. 9	1		, 1	
	•	8.	1	1	1	- Annual Control
,		7				
•		6				
		5	***************************************	2		1
		4		2 ,	2	1
		3	1	2	2	2
		2	1	2	2	***************************************
	Low	1	40	17	6	3
	•	-	over 66%	34-66%	16-33%	under 16%
	,	Agricul	tural Popu	lation as P		Population
Index Mean			1.41	2.04	2.93	2.57

The index for Communist party membership is simply a 9-point scale which corresponds to the coded categories for Communist party membership shown in Appendix B. The frequencies in each cell were multiplied by the rank in the scale, and the mean for each total category was computed by dividing the result of the multiplication by the column frequency.

Figures 2 and 3 demonstrate the closeness with which the relationship of our economic development measures to Communist party membership agrees with our hypothesized relationship presented in Figure 1.

III. INTERPRETATION

Our evidence shows, then, that a definite curvilinear relationship exists between degree of economic development and Communist party strength. A correlation, however, is not an explanation; rather, it requires one. Since our initial hypothesis has been corroborated, we may now present a somewhat more refined version of it as our explanation, or at least interpretation, of the relationship we have established.

Even though all Communist parties profess to adhere to the same well-codified ideology, to accept the same organizational model and to pursue the same ultimate goal, and all have, until a few years ago, looked for inspiration, guidance, and support to the Soviet government, we suggest that Communist parties in different types of societies aggregate different interests. We shall now briefly describe five roughly distinguishable types of societies and in each identify the major interests, if any, aggregated by the Communist party.

As stated earlier, we regard Communist parties in underdeveloped countries as modernizing movements. Both their elites and their mass following, if any, are drawn from the same social strata as those of non-Communist modernizing or so-called nationalist movements, and their goals are similar and may be summed up in the interrelated demands for political and economic independence from the

⁷ Our typology of Communist parties is not dissimilar from that developed by Almond, as expanded by Burks. Gabriel A. Almond, The Appeals of Communism (Princeton, N. J.: Princeton University Press, 1954), distinguished between the sectarian or deviational parties of the advanced Western industrial countries and the mass proletarian parties of France and Italy. R. V. Burks, The Dynamics of Communism in Eastern Europe (Princeton, N. J.: Princeton University Press, 1961), adds a third category of national and anti-Western Communist parties to be found in underdeveloped countries, including those of Eastern Europe.

⁸ Cf. Robert C. North, Kuomintang and Chinese Communist Elites (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1952).

Communist Party Membership and Agricultural Population as Percent of Population




Fig. 2

West, rapid industrialization, and land reform. Indeed, in the past two decades, many policies of the two movements have become more and more alike, the formerly sharp distinctions between Communist and non-Communist modernizers with respect to the symbols they have employed have become more and more blurred, and in the last few years even the distinct organizational character of Communist parties has been breaking down.³

The anti-colonial and anti-traditional modernizing movements with their characteristic

⁹ For evidence, see John H. Kautsky, "Soviet Policy in the Underdeveloped Countries," in Kautsky, Communism and the Politics of Development: Persistent Myths and Changing Behavior (New York: John Wiley & Sons, 1968), and works cited there.

love-hate attitude toward the West (which Communism shared with the others from its beginnings in Russia) are clearly a response to the impact of Western industrialism on traditional societies. The first type of society we must distinguish, then, is one in which this impact has so far been so slight as to elicit little or no response in the form of modernizing movements. Since the interests the Communist parties aggregate in underdeveloped countries are here virtually or entirely nonexistent, it is not surprising that Communist party strength in countries at the lowest level of economic development is, as we found it to be, near or at zero. Among countries to be included in our Societal Type I are Afghanistan, Saudi Arabia, Libya, Ethiopia, Liberia and some of the most backward former French colonies in West and Equatorial Africa.

Communist Party Membership and Per Capita Gross National Product




Fig. 3

In societies in the early stages of economic development (Type II), modernizing movements are composed mainly of intellectuals, that is, of those relatively few natives who, usually in the course of acquiring an advanced education by Western standards, whether at home or abroad, have absorbed the Western-industrial values of the desirability of material progress and abundance, of growing social equality and political participation. In their industrially backward environments, they become anti-colonial revolutionaries favoring industrialization, and where applicable, land reform. Among these intellectuals may be those

who think of themselves as Communists, whether they are organized in parties or not, and whatever relation of affiliation or rivalry to other modernizing movements they may have. Since modernizing movements are small in this type of society and Communists account generally for only a fraction of them, Communist parties, if they are organized at all, are very small at this level of economic development. Among countries included in Societal Type II are many in Africa and the Middle East not included in Type I as well as some of the least developed countries of Central and South America.

If economic development proceeds (in Societal Type III), at first under the influence of economic colonialism and then perhaps under regimes of revolutionary intellectuals, labor movements of plantation workers and miners, transportation and factory workers may emerge. They are led by intellectuals and furnish a more or less substantial mass base for their modernizing movements-Communist or non-Communist or both. Thus, in India, some trade unions are close to the Congress, others to the Communists; in Indonesia most unions were, until the coup of 1965, Communist-led; in Tunisia they are non-Communist "nationalist"; in Cuba, in pre-Castro days, some were Communist-controlled; in Argentina most have been Peronist.

Advancing economic development may also threaten the old urban middle class of artisans and shopkeepers who may then become politicized and provide some strength for the anti-colonial movement. And in some instances, where intellectuals are driven out of the cities, they may turn to the peasants, whose traditional village communities may be disintegrating under the impact of economic development, and may organize them to support the modernizing movement, again whether it be Communist or non-Communist. Thus, in China, peasant guerrilla warfare was Communist, in Algeria non-Communist "nationalist," in Vietnam it may be both.

Communist party strength varies widely in countries in Societal Type III. In some, where what mass movements have been developed have come under the leadership of non-Communist intellectuals, the Communist party may be non-existent, as in Ghana and Guinea, or small, as in Egypt (where it dissolved itself in 1965) and in Turkey. In others, however, where the Communist party has organized mass support, especially among workers and peasants, as in India and, above all, until 1965, in Indonesia, it can become a very sizable party. Among underdeveloped countries (other than Communist-ruled ones) it is in those in Societal Type III, i.e., those with the relatively highest economic development, that Communist parties attain their greatest membership strength.

The modernizing movements, Communist or non-Communist, may or may not actually advance their society to the status of industrial ones. If they do, they in effect destroy themselves and are replaced in power either by a combination of other groups, e.g., labor and business groups, or by a technical-managerial intelligentsia. Such an intelligentsia may, then, constitute another type of

Communist party that appears where an underdeveloped Communist-ruled country becomes rapidly industrialized. This has happened in Russia beginning under Stalin and is probably happening in Eastern Europe and possibly in China now. Since we are excluding Communist-ruled countries from our comparative survey, we mention this type of society here only parenthetically. There is no need to assume, however, that the replacement of revolutionary intellectuals by managerialtechnical intellectuals cannot also take place in non-Communist underdeveloped countries. as may be the case in Mexico. One can assume that the Communist party in such countries should be weak, since a non-Communist one will perform its functions as the organization representing the technical-managerial intelligentsia.

Our first three societal types are found in countries to which economic development has come from without, under the impact of Western industrialism. They represent roughly three levels of economic development and, on the whole, one can expect that the greater the Western impact and economic development the more support there is for the anti-colonial modernizing movement and the better the chance for a big Communist party.

Countries where economic development took place indigenously, too, may be subdivided by the degree to which such development has progressed. In some of them (Type IV), as compared to the most advanced countries, industrialization came late and slowly and has still not penetrated the entire economy. In such societies. Communist parties express the protests of people drawn chiefly from three strata, two of them large enough to provide mass support for Communism. The principal one is industrial labor, a class that remains a minority in the population and whose trade unions are both numerically and organizationally weak as compared to their counterparts in more advanced countries. Confronting a seemingly permanent strong anti-labor majority of both industrial and preindustrial propertied groups, many workers are alienated, turn their backs on their society and political system, and look for some kind of radical change. This attitude was expressed in the anarcho-syndicalist tradition at the turn of the century, to which Communism has fallen heir.

The second major stratum consists of propertyless or propertied but relatively poor small peasants and of the old middle class of shopkeepers and artisans, groups still very numerous in the non-industrialized regions of the country. They feel threatened by the

advances of big industry and big commercial organizations and can thus be attracted by either the Fascists' or the Communists' anticapitalist posture. Many are ideologically still preoccupied with their ancient fight against the Old Regime and its present-day remnants in the Church, the army and the bureaucracy, and the old revolutionary tradition is hence still alive among them. Since the Communists have inherited much of this, too, such members of the peasantry and old middle class may support the Communist party.

The third stratum from which the Communists draw some strength are the intellectuals. They, too, are frequently deeply attached to the revolutionary tradition, whose ideology their predecessors did so much to fashion. Also, they tend ideologically to associate themselves, often due to a sense of guilt, with the under-

privileged proletariat.

Since industrialization has progressed relatively slowly, at least until recently, the groups mentioned above and the social and economic order against which they protest have been subject to little change. Protest has become a permanent feature of the political landscape and so has the vehicle of that protest, the Communist party. The party is thus not only large but also very stable in the support it enjoys and in its organizational structure. It is deeply entrenched in the trade unions and in many social organizations as well as the organs of local government in both industrial and rural areas and thus, paradoxically, becomes a well established and, indeed, widely respected part of the society it professes to reject.

This description, obviously, applies most nearly to France and Italy. In the underdeveloped southern regions of Italy, however, the Communist party may function in part as a modernizing movement, especially as the organizer of a peasantry demanding land reform. With advancing industrialization in Spain, it is conceivable that the formerly anarcho-syndicalist workers and poor peasants may turn to the Communist party there. And possibly the Communist parties of Greece and Finland, too, serve functions of interest aggregation similar to those of France and Italy. It is in countries of Societal Type IV, the "less developed advanced" countries of Europe, especially France and Italy, that Communist parties attain their greatest strength, because the interests they represent in these societies are numerically very large.

Quite a few now more advanced industrialized countries (Type V) share the traditional past of France of a feudal-aristocratic society.


As industry grew in their hierarchical environments, workers reacted in large numbers by adhering to class-conscious socialist movements. Historically, the Communist parties of these countries originated from these movements and they have maintained some strength among radical workers and especially intellectuals in sympathy with them. However, unlike many workers of France and Italy, most of the workers in these advanced countries are not alienated. Through their economic and political power, they have become integrated into their societies and have come to share their growing wealth. As a result, workers, and intellectuals ideologically attached to the labor movement, have turned to socialist labor parties, leaving only insignificant Communist parties to exist on the fringe of the labor movement. As the socialist labor movement is now rapidly losing its radicalism and class consciousness and labor parties are making the corresponding political adjustments, a few workers and particularly some intellectuals deeply attached to the crusading socialist tradition, may yet move over to the Communist parties. Whatever slight gain may accrue to them from that source is likely to be more than offset, however, by losses due to death and defection among old-line adherents for whom the new society produces no replacements. Britain (and perhaps also Australia), Sweden and Denmark and probably Norway, Belgium and the Netherlands, Germany and Austria, and, to a large extent, Japan, all fit into this Societal Type V. In these highly industrialized countries,10 then, Communist parties must be expected to be very weak.

Some other societies that developed advanced industry from within, but have no significant traditional aristocratic background, need not be sharply distinguished from the last-mentioned category for our purposes here. As industrial labor grew in them, it developed class consciousness or a socialist tradition only exceptionally among some groups of recent immigrants not yet fully adjusted to their new environment and especially among isolated groups of workers, like miners and lumbermen in syndicalist organizations. It was from these

¹⁰ Agriculture is not necessarily insignificant in these countries, but their peasants—now more accurately described as farmers—are thoroughly integrated into the industrial system with respect both to what they produce and what they consume.

¹¹ On the relationship between labor radicalism and social isolation, see S. M. Lipset, *op. cit.*, pp. 232-236, 248-252.

The Societal Types and Agricultural Population as Percent of Population



Agricultural Population as Percent of Population

Contingency Coefficient .72

Index Mean 1.80 2.96 4.43 4.71

Fig. 4

sources that the Communists received some initial support in these societies, but they were destined to disappear by absorption. What little is left of Communist strength can hardly be explained in terms of any major social group or movement. It would seem to consist largely of individuals who joined the party in response to needs arising out of personal maladjustment. The United States and Canada are major examples of such societies, though Switzerland, too, and, to some extent, Australia and Norway would seem to fit into this category (which we include in Societal Type V).


IV. SOCIETAL TYPES, ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT, AND COMMUNIST PARTY MEMBERSHIP

We have now interpreted the relationship between economic development and Communist party strength, which we demonstrated earlier, in terms of different functions performed by Communist parties in different types of societies. We have allocated each nonCommunist-ruled country for which adequate data are available to one of our five societal types (see Appendix C). In applying the criteria of the five societal types outlined above, we have made frankly qualitative judgements. Since the criteria are by no means sharply defined, there are many borderline cases in which these judgements have, no doubt, been somewhat arbitrary and are subject to disagreement.

As a check on our allocation of countries to societal types and thus on our interpretation of the curvilinear relationship between economic development and Communist party strength, we related our five societal types both to economic development and to Communist party membership.

To establish whether our societal types measures are highly associated with Banks and Textor indicators of economic development, we computed a five-point index in a manner similar to that used in the index for

The Societal Types and Per Capita Gross National Product



Per Capita Gross National Product

Contingency Coefficient .74

Index Mean 1.81 2.55 3.30 4.20 4.91

Fig. 5

Figures 2 and 3 above. Figures 4 and 5 report linear relationships and contingency coefficients at a level which allows us to assume close correspondence between our measures of economic development and our societal types.

Finally, Figure 6 relates the five societal types to Communist party membership. The curve is closely congruent to those in Figures 2 and 3, above, which related Communist party membership to two different measures of economic development.

V. CONCLUSION


Our evidence shows that Communist party membership strength differs with different levels of economic development and our interpretation of this relationship suggests that Communist parties perform different functions, especially with respect to interest aggregation, in different types of societies. Though they have all borne the same name, Communist parties are not all alike. On the other hand, this also suggests that their Communist character,

however it may be defined, does not make them unique but leaves them functionally comparable not so much with each other as with other parties and movements, especially those that perform similar functions in similar social and political environments.

It follows further that comparative analysis of Communist parties may best proceed within similar types of societies or societies grouped at similar stages of economic development. If Communist parties are to be compared using countries from different societal types or different levels of economic development, care has to be taken to provide control devices to hold the social and economic development factors constant so as to preclude actually comparing stages of economic development or modernization rather than Communist parties.

As the study of comparative politics has, in recent years, moved from the analysis of individual countries toward a truly comparative approach, there has been a growing

Communist Party Membership and Societal Types



awareness among political scientists of the need to integrate the analysis of the politics of the Soviet Union and of other Communist-ruled countries with the study of comparative politics. Economists have for some time applied the same concepts regarding economic development to Communist and non-Communist societies, but it has been historians who have first pointed to some similarities in the political processes accompanying economic development in Communist and non-Communist countries, while political scientists have been relatively slow to study Soviet and Communist politics as a form of the politics of development.

12 H. Gordon Skilling, "Soviet and Communist Politics: A Comparative Approach." The Journal of Politics, 22 (May, 1960), 300-313; an unpublished address by Gabriel A. Almond to the Conference on Soviet and Communist Studies at the annual meeting of the American Political Science Association, September 10, 1964; H. Gordon Skilling, "Soviet and American Politics: The Dialectic of Opposites," Canadian Journal of Economics and Political Science, 31 (May, 1965), 273-280; H. Gordon Skilling, "Interest Groups and Communist Politics," World Politics, 18 (April, 1966), 435-451; Robert C. Tucker, "On the Comparative Study of Communism," World Politics, 19 (January, 1967), 242-257; Alfred G. Meyer, "The Comparative Study of Communist Political Systems," Slavic Review, 26 (March, 1967), 3-12; John H. Kautsky, "Communism and the Comparative Study of Development," ibid., pp. 13-17.

15 For example, Hugh Seton-Watson, "Twentieth Century Revolutions," The Political Quarterly, 22 (July-September, 1951), 251-265, and the same author's Neither War Nor Peace (New York: Frederick A. Praeger, 1960); Robert C. Daniels, The Nature of Communism (New York: Random House, 1962); Theodore von Laue, Why Lenin? Why Stalin? A Reappraisal of the Russian Revolution, 1900-1930 (Philadelphia: Lippincott, 1964).

14 For an attempt by one of the present authors, see Kautsky, "An Essay in the Politics of Development," op. cit. and Communism and the Politics of Development. Communist and nationalist

As the Soviet Union has moved from the ill-defined status of a "developing" country to that of a developed one, efforts at comparison with other industrially advanced societies have been made. Economists have noted uniformities in the industrialization process with respect to managers and workers; 16 sociologists have pointed to the evolution of similar individual values, including a consumer ethic; 16 and more recently two political scientists have undertaken a bold pioneering effort to compare certain aspects of the political systems of the Soviet Union and the United States. 17

Now that political systems ruled by Communist parties are beginning to be drawn into the purview of comparison both with underdeveloped and advanced non-Communist systems and it is thus being recognized that the element of Communism does not render these systems unique, the time may be ripe for a comparison of non-ruling Communist parties with non-Communist parties and movements. It is our hope that our research, reported here, may help open the way to such a further development of the study of comparative politics.

(EDITOR'S NOTE: For further discussion of the comparative study of Communist-ruled systems, see the article by Paul Shoup, pp. 185-204.)

single-party systems in underdeveloped countries are, along with Fascist ones, compared as "three species of a single political genus" by Robert C. Tucker, "Towards a Comparative Politics of Movement-Regimes," this Review, 55 (June, 1961), 281-289.

¹⁵ For example, Clark Kerr, John T. Dunlap, Frederick H. Harbison and Charles Myers, Industrialism and Industrial Man: The Problems of Labor and Management in Economic Growth (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1960).

¹⁶ Especially Alex Inkeles and Raymond A. Bauer, *The Soviet Citizen: Daily Life in a Totalitarian Society* (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1959).

¹⁷ Zbigniew K. Brzezinski and Samuel P. Huntington, *Political Power: USA/USSR* (New York: Viking Press, 1964).

APPENDIX A

Alphabetical List of Countries and
Their Communist Party Membership

Country	C.P. Membership ¹⁸	C.P. Member- ship as Per Cer of Working Ag Population 19
Afghanistan	No known membe	rs .000
Australia	5,000	.078
Austria	35,000	.760
Belgium	11,000	.186
Bolivia	6,500	N.A.
Brazil	31,000	N.A.
Burma	5,000	N.A.
Burundi	Nil	.000
Cambodia Cameroun	100 Nil	.004
Canada	3,500	.000
Central African Republic	Nil	.000
Ceylon	1,900	.040
Chad	Nil	.000
Chile	27,500	.650
Colombia	13,000	N.A.
Congo (Brazzaville)	Nil	.000
Congo (Leopoldville)	Very small	N.A.
Costa Rica	. 300	.051
Cyprus	10,000	3.243
Dahomey	Nil	.000
Denmark	5,000	.170
Ecuador	2,500	N.A.
El Salvador	200	.023
Ethiopia Finland	Nil 40,000	.000 1.441
France	260,000	.905
Gabon	Nil	.000
Germany, Federal Republic		. 138
Ghana	Nil	.000
Greece	20,000	.366
Guatemala	1,300	N.A.
Guinea	Nil	.000
Honduras	2,400	. 261
Iceland	1,000	.999
India	135,000	.055
Indonesia	2,000,000	3.800
Iran	1,500	.015
Iraq Ireland	15,000	.474 .006
Israel	100 2,000	.156
Italy	1,350,000	4.190
Ivory Coast	Nil	.000
Jamaica	Nil	.000
Japan	120,000	.200
Jordan	500	N.A.
Laos	100	N.A.
Lebanon	3,000	N.A.
Liberia	Nil	.000
Libya	Nil	.000
Luxemburg	500	. 221
Malaysia	2,000	.060
Mali Mauritania	Nil	.000
Mauritania Mexico	Nil 50,000	.000
Morocco	50,000	.275 .017
Nepal	1,250 3,500	N.A.
Netherlands	12,000	.169
New Zealand	500	.039
Nicaragua	250	.031

APPENDIX A (continued)

Country	C.P. s	C.P. Member ship as Per Cent of Working Age Population ¹⁹		
Nigeria	Less than 100	N.A.		
Norway	4,500	. 199		
Pakistan	3,000	.007		
Panama	400	.070		
Paraguay	5,000	.600		
Peru	8,500	.180		
Philippines	1,800	.013		
Portugal	2,000	.035		
Rwanda	Nil	.000		
Saudi Arabia	Negligible	N.A.		
Senegal	Nil	.000		
Sierra Leone	Nil	.000		
Somalia	Nil	.000		
Spain	5,000	.025		
Sudan	2,500	.382		
Sweden	20,000	.402		
Switzerland	Less than 6,000	. 167		
Syria	4,000	.190		
Tanganyika	Nil	.000		
Togo	Nil	.000		
Trinidad	Very small	N.A.		
Turkey	1,000	.007		
Uganda	Nil	.000		
United Arab Republic	1,000	N.A.		
United Kingdom	34,372 (claime	ed) .114		
United States	12,000 (claime	ed) .007		
Upper Volta	Nil	.000		
Uruguay	10,000	.600		
Venezuela	30,000	.760		
Yemen	Negligible	N.A.		

¹⁸ Source: U. S. Department of State, op. cit.
¹⁹ Calculated from working-age (15-64) population figures obtained from United Nations Statistical Yearbook (New York: United Nations Statistical Office, 1963).

APPENDIX B

Code

The following measures and categories were used in our research. 20

- (1) Membership of Communist parties:
 - 1. 5,000 and below
 - 2. 5,001- 10,000
 - 3. 10,001- 20,000
 - 4. 20,001- 35,000
 - 5. 35,001- 50,000
 - 6. 50,001- 75,000
 - 7. 75,001- 100,000
 - 8. 100,001-1,000,000
 - 9. 1,000,001 and above 10. N.A.

²⁰ The economic development measures are taken from Banks and Textor, op. cit., where explanations of the measures are provided.

- (2) Membership of Communist party as per cent of working age population:
 - 0. .25 and below
 - 1. .26- .50
 - 2. .51-1.0
 - 3. 1.1-5
 - 4. N.A.
- (3) Level of urbanization:
 - 1. High (20% or more of population in cities of 20,000 or more and 12.5% or more of population in cities of 100,000 or more)
 - Low (less than 20% of population in cities of 20,000 or more and less than 12.5% of population in cities of 100,000 or more)
 - 3. Ambiguous
 - 9. Unascertained
- (4) Agricultural population as per cent of total population:
 - 1. High (over 66%)
 - 2. Medium (34-66%)
 - 3. Low (16-33%)
 - 4. Very low (under 16%)
 - 9. Unascertained
- (5) Gross national product:
 - 1. Very high (\$125 billion and above)
 - 2. High (\$25-124.9 billion)
 - 3. Medium (\$5-24.9 billion)
 - 4. Low (\$1-4.9 billion)
 - 5. Very low (under \$1 billion)
- (6) Per capita gross national product:
- 1. Very high (\$1200 and above)
 - 2. High (\$600-1199)
 - 3. Medium (\$300-599)
 - 4. Low (\$150-299)
 - 5. Very low (under \$150)
- (7) Status of economic development:
 - 1. Developed (self-sustaining economic growth; GNP per capita over \$600)
 - 2. Intermediate (sustained and near selfsustaining economic growth)
 - 3. Underdeveloped (reasonable prospect of attaining sustained economic growth by the mid-1970's)
 - 4. Very underdeveloped (little or no prospect of attaining sustained economic growth within the foreseeable future)
 - 8. Ambiguous
- (8) International financial status:
 - 1. Very high (UN assessment of 10% or above)
 - 2. High (UN assessment of 1.50-9.99%)
 - 3. Medium (UN assessment of 0.25-1.49%)

Chile

- 4. Low (UN assessment of 0.05-0.24%)
- Very low (minimum UN assessment of 0.04%)
- 9. Unascertained

APPENDIX C

Countries by Societal Types

Type I	Colombia
	Costa Rica
Afghanistan	Cyprus
Burundi	Ecuador
Cambodia	Ghana
Central African	Guatemala
Republic	Guinea
Chad	India
Dahomey	Indonesia
Ethiopia	Iraq
Gabon	Ireland
Ivory Coast	Israel
Laos	Jamaica
Liberia	Lebanon
Libya	Mexico
Mali	
Mauritania	Morocco
Nicaragua	Pakistan
Niger	Peru
Saudi Arabia	Philippines
Sierra Leone	Portugal
Togo	Sudan
Upper Volta	Trinidad
•	Turkey
Type II	United Arab Republic
Cameroun	Uruguay
Congo (Brazzaville)	Venezuela.
Congo	$Type \ IV$
(Leopoldville)	••
El Salvador	Finland
Honduras	France
Iran	Greece
Jordan	Italy
Malaysia	Spain
Nepal	Type V
Nigeria	-
Panama	Australia
Paraguay .	Austria
Rwanda	Belgium
	Canada
Senegal	Denmark
Somalia	German Federal
Syria	Republic
Tanganyika	Iceland
Uganda	Japan
Yemen	Luxemburg
Type III	Netherlands
-	New Zealand
Bolivia	Norway
Brazil	Sweden
Burma	Switzerland
Ceylon	United Kingdom
Chile	TT '1 1 Ct 1

United States

POLICY MAPS OF CITY COUNCILS AND POLICY OUTCOMES: A DEVELOPMENTAL ANALYSIS*

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I. THE PROBLEM

In spite of common challenges stemming from the common environment shared by all cities in a metropolitan region, continued and even increasing social and economic differentiation among and within cities rather than homogenization and integration are the most significant features of the contemporary metropolitan scene.1 Cities within the same metropolitan region are not only maintaining but also developing distinct and unique "public life styles."2 Urban sociology and urban geography have raised a multitude of questions and given a multitude of answers in seeking to account for the fact that cities facing basically similar challenges from the environment react so differently to these challenges. Most relevant research deals with the problem of differentiation and its effects on the develorment of cities in terms of historical settlement

- * The larger project of which this analysis is a part, the City Council Research Project, is sponsored by the Institute of Political Studies, Stanford University, and is supported by the National Science Foundation under contract GS 496.
- ¹ See, for instance, the recent work by Oliver P. Williams et al., Suburban Differences and Metropolitan Policies: A Philadelphia Story (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 1965).
- ² Oliver P. Williams in a recent paper has argued that metropolitan regions are collections of small groups of residents and the economic superstructures necessary to sustain them. Each group is characterized by the choice of a distinctive life style, and because members of the various groups wish to live in congenial environments they tend to be found in similar locations throughout the region. Precisely where they are located is a matter of economics and the remnants of past land uses in the region, but the fact of congeniality is a major cause cf similarity in location choice. See "A Framework for Metropolita" Political Analysis," prepared for the Conference on Comparative Research in Community Politics, held at Athens, Georgia, November 16-19, 1966.

patterns, economic location and growth, or geographical space distribution.³

But differences in municipal life styles may also be the result of differences in public policies deliberately pursued by local governments in the metropolitan area. If this is so, the common pressures from the environment are evidently interpreted differently in the process of public decision-making that seeks to cope with them. It would seem, then, that metropolitan cities are in different stages of policy development. Leaving aside momentarily the meaning of "stages of policy development," we can ask a number of questions that may shed light on the relationship between environmental pressures and public policies designed to meet these pressures. If cities are in different stages of policy development, how can the stages be identified? Is policy development linear and "progressive," or is it reversible? Do the stages of policy development in fact correspond to relevant conditions of the environment? But if there are no differences in environmental challenges, what makes for arrested development in one city, while a similarly challenged city takes off or another is highly developed? On the other hand, if cities are in different stages of development, is it due to their possessing uneven resource capabilities by which environmental problems can be solved? But how can one explain why cities with equal resources adopt quite different public policies? What is the character of the policies designed to meet environmental challenges? Are they attempts to adjust the city to the changing environment, or are they attempts to control the environment, or both?

Questions like these in turn direct our attention to the need for exploring the policy perspectives of urban decision-makers. How do municipal policy-makers perceive their com-

³ See, for instance, F. Stuart Chapin, Jr. and Shirley F. Weiss (eds.), *Urban Growth Dynamics* (New York: John Wiley & Sons, 1962); Wilbur R. Thompson, *A Preface to Urban Economics* (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1965); the relevant literature is legion.

munity's environment and problems stemming from environmental conditions? What are their short-term policy positions, and what are their long-range policy images of the future? Are their perceptions of problems, policy orientations and expectations related to the city's stage of policy development? And if this is the case, what are we to make of the relationship from a theoretical point of view? Although we do not propose to deal with all of these questions, it seems to us that they provide the cutting edge of an empirical theory of urban public policy.

II. THE PROJECT

This study of the policy maps of city councils in relationship to city policy development is part of a much larger project on municipal legislative bodies conducted in the ninety-odd cities of the San Francisco Bay metropolitan region since 1964.

The data used in this report come from the following sources: (a) city size, density and growth data from the 1960 and 1965 Censuses of Population; (b) city per capita assessed valuation data and expenditure data for planning and amenities from the Annual Report of Financial Transactions concerning Cities of California, for the fiscal years 1958–1959 to 1965–1966, published by the State Controller; and (c) data concerning council policy maps from interviews with city councilmen conducted in 1966 and 1967.

The interviews, using both open-ended and closed questions, averaged about three hours in length. In addition, councilmen were asked, at the end of each interview, to fill out a written questionnaire. Interviews were held, as the tabulation below shows, in 89 cities located in eight counties around the San Francisco Bay. Two councils refused to cooperate altogether, and in four others not enough councilmen were interviewed to permit analysis at the council level. Inadequate budget data in the case of six cities incorporated after 1959 further reduced the number of councils available for this analysis to 77. One city, incorporated after interviewing had begun, has been excluded from the study as has been the city-county of San Francisco because its Board of Supervisors is a much more professionalized legislative body than the other councils of the region.

III. THE MODEL

The model guiding the analysis is a partial one, and we shall not be dealing in the analysis

	Number of Councils	Number of Councilmen
Interview targets Access refused	89 - 2 	488 - 10
Deficient council data	- 4 	- 12
Interview refusals		- 31

No budget data avail- — 6
able for analysis ——
77 (87%)

with all of its relevant empirical components.4 The model predicts city policy development as a response to external and internal features of the urban environment. The external features include, but are not exhausted by, city size, density and growth as the most immediate symptoms of common challenges from the environment, as well as city resources as environmental constraints on policy outcomes. The internal features include, but are not exhausted by, the demands for certain policies made by individuals and groups as well as the policy orientations which local decisionmakers themselves bring to or formulate in the course of the policy-making process. The model seeks to order these component variables and relate them to each other in a theoretically meaningful manner.

The model assumes that city size, density and growth as well as resources are antecedent variables; that individual or group demands and decision-makers' policy orientations are intervening variables; and that policy outcomes and resultant stages of policy development are consequent variables. Of course, in empirical reality neither city size, density or growth nor city resources are truly independent precisely because public policies may be

⁴ More complete studies, using multiple correlation and regression analyses, will appear in forthcoming publications of the City Council Research Project. But see also our earlier report: Robert Eyestone and Heinz Eulau, "City Councils and Policy Outcomes: Development Profiles," in James Q. Wilson (ed.), City Politics and Public Policy (New York: John Wiley & Sons, 1968).

designed to control the city's environment or increase its resources. But for the purpose of short-term analysis we can assume these variables to be independent.

Although we shall not deal with individual or group demands in this paper, they are likely to be related to the city's demographic features. For instance, the larger a city's population, the more and the more diverse demands are likely to be made on policymakers (and, moreover, the more and more diverse demands for policies coping with problems stemming from environmental challenges are likely to be made). On the other hand. decision-makers' policy orientations should be independent of environmental variables, though they are likely to be related to the policy preferences of individuals or groups that are not independent of pressures from the environment.

Policy outcomes are assumed to follow each other in a characteristic sequence that constitutes the city's policy development. These outcomes are responses to environmental challenges, such as those occasioned by high population density or a high growth rate. Moreover, they are indicative of policy-makers' willingness to utilize city resources. Changes in city size or density due to growth as well as in resource capability bring about changes in policy outcomes that move the city along from one stage to another in the developmental process. The process of policy development need not be uni-directional; at least temporary reversals are possible.

Environmental challenges may or may not be perceived by policy-makers as "problems" requiring action. Even if problems are not perceived and no action is taken, there is a policy that is reflected in policy outcomes. Policy-makers' sensitivity to environmental challenges is influenced by the demands that are made on them as well as by their own policy preferences and policy images. Therefore, city policy development is not only due to changes in the environment but is mediated by policy-makers' orientations to action. For instance, whether or not resources are mobilized for development depends to a large extent on demands made on government as well as on the policy preferences of policy-makers.

However, policy-makers' perceptions of problems, policy positions and policy images—their "policy maps," so to speak—are themselves not independent of policy development. Because policy development is cumulative in that past policy outcomes constrain current policy proposals—what is feasible and what is not—policy maps are likely to be formu-

lated, consciously or unconsciously, within the restrictive context of the stage of development in which a city is momentarily located. In other words, policy-makers cannot do as they please. The model assumes, therefore, that lecision-makers' policy maps reflect as well as shape policy development.

Not all the propositions that can be derived from the model will be tested in this study. We present the model to give direction to the analysis. Particular hypotheses derived from the model will be introduced as we proceed. Our major objective is to demonstrate the utility of the typology of policy development that we construct from city budget data as indicators of policy outcomes and, indirectly, of public policy.

IV. THE CONCEPTS AND MEASURES

1. Policy and policy outcomes. "Policy" is defined as the relationship of a governmental unit to its environment. It finds expression in general programs and specific decisions, or in policy declarations of decision-makers. But because a policy need not be declared to be a policy, analysis cannot rely on manifest statements or overt decisions alone but must concern itself with policy outcomes. By policy outcomes we mean the concrete manifestations of policy—revenues, expenditures, regulations, court decisions, the exertion of police power, and so on. Policy outcomes, then, reflect the orientations of policy-makers, regardless of whether or not a conscious decision has been made. On the other hand, because policy outcomes may at times represent unanticipated results not intended by policy-makers, policy analysis cannot altogether ignore policy declarations. In fact, the relationship between policy intentions and policy outcomes challenges the analyst of public policy.

To develop our concept of policy further, we conceive of public policy as a response of government to challenges or pressures from the physical and social environment. Changes in public policy either adjust or adapt the political system to environmental changes, or they bring about changes in the environment. Which course of action is chosen depends on a multitude of factors—the structure of the political system, its human and physical capabilities, the degree of mass or elite involvement in the political process, the vitality of private associations making public demands; and, last but not least, the perceptions, preferences and orientations of policy-makers.

The problematics of policy-making arise out of the relationship between changes in the

environment that require some response, the ways in which these changes are experienced as challenges by decision-makers, and the values that decision-makers may seek in formulating policy. Policy, then, is a response to environmental pressures, both physical and social, as well as anticipation of a future state of affairs. If this is the case, a change in policy is both causal and purposive: it is "caused" by environmental challenges, but it is also directed toward a goal and shaped by a purpose. The tension arising out of the simultaneous impact of causal and purposive "forcings" is a basic dilemma in the scientific study of polities.

Analysis of policy outcomes through time requires a classification of policies. We distinguish between "adaptive" and "control" policies. The measure used as an indicator of an adaptive policy is the percentage of total government expenses spent for health, libraries, parks, and recreation. These major accounting categories used to report expenditures presumably include the major amenities offered by cities. A "high amenities" city differs from a city with a traditional services orientation in that it spends less of city income for fire and police services or public works.

The measure used to indicate a city's control policy is the percentage of all general government expenses spent by the planning commission. General government expenses include essentially all administrative expenses and salaries not included under fire, police or recreation categories, and so on.⁸

- ⁵ Much classificatory activity, in the field of public policy analysis as elsewhere, is a game. Either the inventors of classifications and typologies do not make it clear just what analytical purpose the classification is to serve, or they may even imply that by having a classification they have explained something. We make this point to have it understood that we are not interested in justifying or defending the particular typology of policy development that we have constructed, but in examining its utility in the analysis at hand.
- ⁶ Since education and public welfare policies are not made at the city level in California, we cannot use expenditures in these areas as measures of policy outcomes.
- ⁷ The amenities measure is an attempt to tap Williams' and Adrian's concept of amenities. See Oliver P. Williams and Charles R. Adrian, Four Cities: A Study in Comparative Policy Making (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 1963), pp. 198-225.
- 8 Expenses by the planning commission include both expenses and outlays, therefore encompass-

2. Policy development and its measurement. Policy outcomes are responses to changes and challenges in the environment. Policy development refers to a set of policy outcomes that follow each other sequentially through time. If the annual outcomes are similar, we speak of the resulting profile as a stage of policy development. Three stages will be identified: retarded, transitional, and advanced. The median of medians for all cities with respect to planning and amenities expenditures over a period of eight years serves as the criterion of similar or dissimilar outcomes.

The definition of a set of sequential and similar outcomes as a stage presupposes continuity and stability. But the conception of development implies that one stage may, sooner or later, be followed by a new stage. It is unlikely that one stage will suddenly yield to another. Not only may development revert; even if development is "progressive," the transformation from one stage to the next may involve a series of dissimilar outcomes—some outcomes characteristic of an earlier stage, others characteristic of a later stage. If this

ing the range of items from paper supplies to salaries of full-time city planners to special outside studies commissioned by the city planning commission. California State law requires every city to have a planning commission, but this body may be, and frequently is, a standing committee of citizens appointed by the city council and incurring no expenses charged against the city. Therefore, the actual dollar amount spent by the planning commission would seem to be a good indicator of the extent of a city's commitment to the idea of planning as a way to control the environment. General government expenses are used as the percentage base rather than total government expenses in order to make planning definitionally independent of amenity expenditures.

9 It is important to keep in mind that while we are using categories reminiscent of such concepts as "traditional," "transitional." and "modern" used in the literature of comparative politics, our observations cover only a small segment of that part of the historical developmental process usually called "modern." It is all the more significant that, even within this small part, we can locate cities in clearly different stages of policy development. This suggests that a concept like "modern" disguises a great deal of the variance that more microscopic analysis can reveal. The point is that our stages "correspond" only analytically to similarly conceived stages used in the long-term analysis of national development.




Fig. 1. Categories of policy outcomes over eight-year period.

occurs, an eight-year profile cannot easily be assigned to one stage or another. Put differently, we cannot easily predict whether the system will remain in the earlier stage or move into a later stage.

To cope with this possibility, we define a serof sequential but dissimilar policy outcomes as a phase of development. The notion of phase suggests that the sequence is less clearly bounded and, perhaps, of shorter duration than a stage. As we are constructing three stages of development, we must provide for two phases—an emergent phase that indicates movement from the retarded to the transitional stage, and a maturing phase that is located between the transitional and advanced stages.

Figure 1 illustrates how annual policy outcomes are assigned to a stage or phase of policy development. If planning and amenities expenditures fall below the grand medians in every year of the eight-year sequence, the profile is classified as retarded (cell I); if one or the other type of expenditures falls above the grand medians, the profile is designated as transitional (cells II and III); and if both planning and amenities expenditures are above the medians in all eight years, the profile is being assigned to the advanced stage of development (cell IV). If during the eight-year

sequence expenditures move across the median lines, the profiles represent phases of development: outcomes moving from cell I to cells II cr III (arrows A) are classified as *emergent*; those moving from cells I, II or III into cell IV (arrows B) are designated as *maturing*.

Cases of "reversals" for which the model does not provide are being assigned to stages or phases of development in such a way that "reversal errors" are reduced as much as possible. This involves informed but hopefully not arbitrary assignment decisions. We are satisfied that the reversals are not sufficient to invalidate the typology of policy development. As Table 1 shows, for the 82 cities whose policy profiles can be identified over an eightyear period, there were 572 opportunities for change in annual outcomes. Of these oppor-

¹⁰ For a more detailed discussion of how the development typology was constructed and cities assigned to a stage or phase of policy development, see Eyestone and Eulau in Wilson, op. cit.

¹¹ This calculation is made as follows: over eight years, each city's annual outcomes could change seven times. This would make for 82×7, or 574 opportunities for all cities. However, as we missed data for the first fiscal year in two cities, we must deduct two opportunities, giving us the 572 figure.

TABLE 1. DEVELOPMENT	AL TYPOLOGY	OF	CITY	POLICY	PROFILES	WITH	OPPORTUNITIES	
	FOR CHAI	4GE	AND	REVERS	ALS			

D1	Cities	O	· Nu	mber of	Reversa	als	Reve	ersals
Development Type	Cities Opportunities – $N = N =$		(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	N =	<u></u> %=
Retarded	·11	76	7	2		,	11	14.
Emergent	14	98	5	5	1		. 18	18
Transitional	26	182	9	6		1	25	14
Maturing	15	104	5	6	1		20	19
Advanced	16	112	4	1			6	5
•		-						
	82	572	30	20	2	1	80	14

tunities eighty, or fourteen per cent, represented reversals from one year to the next. In the other 86 per cent of opportunities, there either was no change, that is, all outcomes remained in the same stage over all eight years; or change occurred in the hypothesized ("progressive") direction. Reversals in stable stage cities are due, of course, to the assignment of some "impure" cases where reversals seem to be only temporary deviations from the regular pattern.

A validity test. In order to test the validity of the typological constructs and the underlying assumptions, we can divide the eight-year period into two four-year periods and assign each period's profile to either a stage or phase of policy development. Cross-tabulation permits us to inspect the internal movement of the policy profiles from one period to the next. If our assumptions and assignments are reasonably valid, we should be able to predict, from knowledge of a profile's location on the development scale in the first four-year period, where it will be located in the second four-year period. We predict that cities in a stage of development are less likely to move than cities in a phase of development. We also predict that when there is movement, it is more likely to be in the hypothesized "progressive" direction than in a reversed direction. Table 2 presents the results.

It is readily evident that, with some exceptions, both predictions are supported by the data. Of the 50 cities in stages of development during the 1958-1961 period, thirty or 60 per cent remained in the same stage during the following 1962-1965 period; but of the 32 cities in a phase of development during the earlier period, only nine or 28 per cent remained there in the later period. If we consider the direction of movements, it appears that of the 20 cities in stages during the earlier period that did move, sixteen or 80 per cent

advanced in the expected direction. But this result is, of course, largely a function of the boundaries set to the typology: retarded cities can only move forward and advanced cities can only move backward. More significant, therefore, is the fact that none of the advanced cities reverted, suggesting that once this plateau is reached, institutionalization of policies makes reversal unlikely; and the further fact that of the ten transitional cities that did move, six moved forward and four backward. Similarly, of the 14 emergent cities that moved, ten or 71 per cent moved forward as expected and only four returned to the retarded stage in the later period; but of the nine moving maturing cities, a bare majority of five reverted to the transitional stage. Of course, these results, whether "favorable" or not from the developmental standpoint, may be influenced by the original data. Some policy outcomes as measured are in some cases very close to the median of medians cutting point that serves as the criterion for assignment, so that we may be dealing here with errors over which we have no control. Nevertheless, we believe that the weight of the evidence is sufficient to warrant our interpretation of Table 2. It is also noteworthy that few of the movements, either forward or backward, exceed one step at a time. Of the 26 cities moving forward and having an opportunity to do so by more than one step (i.e., those retarded, emergent and transitional in the first period), twenty-one or 81 per cent moved one step only; and of the nine cities moving backward and having an opportunity for more moves (i.e., those transitional and maturing in the first period), all but one reverted only one step.

Reversed development is an empirical fact of life. While stages of development as conceived by historians are inevitably consecutive and irreversible, policy development is in fact

TABLE 2. POLICY DEVELOPMENT O	F CITIES IN DEVELOPMENTAL	SEQUENCE FROM 1958-61 TO 1962-65
-------------------------------	---------------------------	----------------------------------

State of Downloam out	State of Development in 1962-65						
State of Development in 1958-61	Retarded $N=11$	Emergent $N=14$	Transitional $N = 26$	Maturing $N=15$	Advanced $N = 16$		
Retarded $N = 16$	6	9			' 1		
Emergent $N = 16$	4	2	7	3			
Transitional $N = 24$	1	3	14	5	1		
Maturing $N = 16$			5	7	4		
Advanced $N = 10$					10		

reversible. Although we assume that in general stages and phases follow each other in "progressive" order, an assumption that the results of Table 2 certainly do not falsify, no rigid assumptions need or should be made about the direction of change. Policy is the creation of men and can be changed by men, within certain constraints imposed by environmental necessities, in whatever direction they prefer. Otherwise the concept of policy would make little sense.

3. Resource capability. A city's resource capabilities can be measured in a variety of ways. Ideally, we would like to think of resource capability as the maximum amount of income a city can expect annually when serious efforts are made to tap all possible income sources, including current revenues from taxes. borrowed funds, grants in aid, or income from utilities, and so on. However, we have no way to determine whether such efforts have been made. Moreover, were we to use the readily available city income figures as a measure of resource capability, the measure would contravene our assumption that some cities are more pressed for revenue than others. Nor can we use a measure equivalent to per capita gross national product that is used in the comparative study of nations. 12 For a high proportion of the production of any city crosses city boundaries and is not available to support local government expenditures. Needed is a measure of the wealth remaining wholly within city limits and available to local taxation or such state taxation as is refundable to the city.

The measure we are using is, therefore, total assessed valuation per capita subject to local taxation for fiscal 1965–1966, as determined by the California State Board of Equalization.

¹² For a discussion of system capabilities, see Gabriel A. Almond, "A Developmental Approach to Political Systems," World Politics, 17 (January, 1965), 195-203.

In using this measure we assume that wealth in the form of private, commercial and industrial property will be a potential source of revenue, and that per capita assessed valuation is a rough indicator of a city's resource capability. A city will hesitate to institute new programs or expand old ones if it has a low level of assessed valuation per capita, but may be more inclined to do so if it has a high level of valuation.

4. Policy maps. Policy, we must remember, is a theoretical concept imposed on observed reality. Regardless of whether specific decisions have been deliberately made or not, what we observe are policy outcomes from which city policy is inferred. If, as we shall suggest, policy outcomes as summarized in the typology of policy development are positively related to indicators of what we may consider environmental challenges, the presumption that the policy was intended to meet the pressures of the environment is strong, but it is only a presumption. And because it is only a presumption, the investigation of policymakers' "policy maps" becomes an important component of policy analysis.

What do we mean by "policy map"? In the first place, we assume that if policy is a response to environmental challenges, these challenges will have been perceived by policymakers. They may choose, consciously or unconsciously, not to act, but such non-action is also a response that will be reflected in policy outcomes. By being perceived the environmental challenges become "problems" or

¹⁸ Assessed valuation includes private houses and property, commercial property and industrial property. From private property a city derives personal property revenues and a portion of state income tax revenues; from commercial property it receives property and sales tax revenues; and from industrial property it gets property tax revenues.

"policy issues." In order to tap this facet of the policy map, we asked this question:

Mr. Councilman, before talking about your work as a councilman and the work of the council itself, we would like to ask you about some of the problems facing this community. In your opinion, what are the two most pressing problems here in (city)?

The policy map consists, secondly, of the policy-maker's recommendations for action or "policy positions"—those preferences that he either brings into the policy-making situation or evolves in the course of decision-making. Again, his not consciously entertaining a policy position on an issue is yet to be considered a policy orientation and a component of his policy map. We therefore asked this question: "

Now, looking toward the future, what one community-wide improvement, in your opinion, does this city "need most" to be attractive to its citizens?

Finally, we assume that the policy map includes the policy-maker's "ends-in-view" or values—those hopes and expectations concerning the future which policy decisions are to bring about. The following question was designed to yield what one may think of as the "policy image":

Now, taking the broadest view possible, how do you see (city) in the future? I mean, what kind of a city would you personally like (city) to be in the next twenty-five years?

Whether these three components of the policy map constitute a consistent whole, a "perspective" as Harold Lasswell would call it, 16 is an empirical question not central to the present study, but one we shall speculate about in the conclusion. Needless to say, perhaps, knowledge of the policy map does not permit prediction about the outcome of decision-making on any particular policy issue. But we proceed on the assumption that policy maps represent important linkages between environmental challenges and public policies.

¹⁴ This is not the only question we asked in this connection. For instance, we also asked a great many closed "agree-disagree" questions some of which we used in the earlier analysis, in Wilson, op. cit.

¹⁵ See Harold D. Lasswell and Abraham Kaplan, *Power and Society: A Framework for Political Inquiry* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1950), p. 25.

5. Units of analysis and interpretation. Although the data on policy maps come from interviews with individuals, our analysis uses councils as the units of analysis. Decisionmaking by legislative bodies is a collective act. Not the individual councilman but the council, as a whole or under the majority rule, is the effective policy-maker. Past research on legislatures, following in the wake of voting studies, has analyzed the behavior of individuals in the legislature in order to make statements about the behavior of legislatures. This procedure presents serious problems of inference. Because policy outcomes as measured by budget data are due to collective decisions (or non-decisions), the legislative group rather than the individual legislator is the more viable unit of analysis. Council perceptions, positions or images are therefore constructed or reconstructed from data about individuals or provided by individuals, permitting us to make statements about city councils and not about city councilmen. We shall report the rules followed in this procedure in the text or footnotes.16 This type of analysis is of course made possible by the relatively large (though for satisfactory statistical purposes still all too small) number of legislative groups being investigated. As far as we know, no similar type of analysis using as many as eighty or so units has ever been undertaken in the comparative study of legislative bodies.

In reading and interpreting the tables, a number of methodological considerations must be kept in mind. In the first place, we are dealing with data that come from truly independent sources—the federal Census reporting population characteristics, city budgets reporting financial allocations, and interviews with city councilmen. These different kinds of data are used to construct quite different properties of the units—city councils—that we are observing. The Census yields data that are best interpreted as representing the council's "contextual" properties; the budget data are representative, in a very direct sense, of the council's "emergent" properties; and the interview data provide the basis for "aggregate"

15 This is not the place to discuss the methodological problems and procedures involved in "stepping up" the data from the level of the individual (micro-analysis) to the level of the group (macro-analysis). Suffice it to say that our empirical results justify the viability of the procedures, although we would be the first to admit that many technical problems remain to be solved.

Table 3. relationships between city-size, density and growth and policy development*

•	Policy Development						
	Retarded $N=11$	Emergent $N=14$	Transitional $N = 26$	Maturing N=15	Advanced $N=16$		
Population Size	-		•				
<10,000	82%	79%	35%	13%	0%		
10-50,000	18	21	46	67	44		
>50,000	0	0	19	20	56		
	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%		
Density		-			•		
<2,000	73%	58%	19%	41%	0%		
2-4,000	18	28	50	26	44		
>4,000	9	14	31	33	56		
	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%		
Growth Rate							
<10%	54%	36%	43%	13%	19%		
10-50%	46	49	39	47	62		
>50%	. 0	14	19	40	19		
	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%		

^{*} Size and density data for 1965; growth rate for 1960-65.

properties.¹⁷ To relate properties as diverse as these is extraordinarily difficult. But for this reason one cannot simply write off even modest relationships between variables as not significant.

Second, the typology of policy development that serves as our major device for ordering the data is not a simple continuum. While the five types constitute an ordinal ranking on a scale from "more developed" to "less developed," they also represent qualitative differences associated with different levels of development. In other words, a city's movement from one stage into another may be due to structural changes

¹⁷ Paul F. Lazarsfeld has written in many places about the variety of "group properties" that need to be distinguished in analysis lest errors of inference be made. See, for instance, Paul F. Lazarsfeld, "Evidence and Inference in Social Research," in Daniel Lerner (ed.), Evidence and Inference (New York: The Free Press, 1959), pp. 117–125; or Paul F. Lazarsfeld and Herbert Menzel, "On the Relation between Individual and Collective Properties," in Amitai Etzioni, Complex Organizations (New York: Holt, Rinehart and Winston, 1961), pp. 422–440. We are not dealing with the global, structural or relational properties of councils in this analysis.

in causal factors rather than simple gradual increases. This means that variables related to city policy development may well exhibit sharp changes at certain points in the developmental sequence rather than incremental changes from one stage to another. For instance, a council's orientation to action may change radically after it has left the retarded stage and entered the emergent phase and then not change at all. Also, variables need not change monotonically across the five developmental types. Development may be related, for instance, to city growth in the early stages or phases but may decline in the advanced cities. Or cities at the three intermediate levels of policy development may show characteristics not shared by the least and most developed cities. Or cities in the two phases of development may be more similar to each other than to cities in the immediate neighboring stages.

Finally, we are less impressed by "significant differences" in a statistical sense that we might find than by patterns in the distribution of the data that make theoretical sense. The small number of cases also makes difficult the controlling of one variable by another that is so necessary if spurious relationships and false interpretations are to be avoided. We have used the control technique in relating resource

capability to policy development, but we have not done so with the interview data, largely because the frequencies of cases in particular cells of the tables would be greatly strained by the procedure. This makes it all the more necessary to view each table not as an isolated entity unrelated to any other table. Rather, it is the weight of all the tables inspected simultaneously that must be considered in making inferences or drawing conclusions.

V. THE ANALYSIS

1. Environmental challenges and policy development. City size, density and growth rate are direct indicators of challenges from the environment that every city faces. They bring in their wake problems that the city council may seek to solve through policies that adapt the city to the environment or that control environmental pressures. As the typology of city policy development is built on outcomes that reflect such policies, it follows:

Hypothesis 1a: The larger a city's size, the more developed is city policy likely to be.

Hypothesis 1b: The greater a city's density, the more developed is city policy likely to be.

Hypothesis 1c: The greater a city's growth, the more developed is city policy likely to be.

Table 3 shows that the three hypotheses are not falsified by the data. Moreover, the data show a pattern of policy development that, with two exceptions, is highly linear. We have no explanation for the deviation from the pattern of the transitional cities in the low density category. With regard to growth we note, as we perhaps might have expected, a levelling-off of the effect of growth in the advanced stage, the terminus of development. Apparently, once policy development has reached the advanced stage, growth is likely to be marginal in its effect on city policy.

The data suggest that city councils adopt policies which are congruent with needs rooted in pressures from the environment. Whatever the declared policy objectives of city fathers, they tend to follow policies that either adapt the city to or seek to control the environment.

2. Resource capability and policy development. The resources available to a city government are an important constraint on the expenditures it can make and the policies it can follow. Resource capability is largely an objectively limiting factor, but it is also subjective in that its limiting effect is interpreted by the city council before it becomes a factor in the policymaking process. For instance, the council estimates how high a tax rate city residents are willing to approve. High resource capability

is necessary for policy development, but it is not sufficient. Nevertheless, we hypothesize:

Hypothesis 2: The higher a city's resource capability, the more developed is city policy likely to be.

Table 4, Part A, shows that there is no support for the hypothesis. In fact, more of the retarded cities seem to have high resource capability than any of the other cities in various stages or phases of development. However, the distributions may be misleading. As we suggested, policy development is dependent on policy-makers' willingness to mobilize resources, and their willingness to do so may depend on the intensity of pressures from the environment regardless of available resources. Therefore, one must control the relationship between resource capability and policy development by such indicators of environmental challenges as size, density or growth rate. Table 4. B, reports the findings.

In the smaller cities, presumably less subject to environmental challenges, fewer of the more developed than of the less developed cities are low in resource capability, just as hypothesized; but development also declines in cities of the same size with high capability, counter to the hypothesis. In the larger cities, on the other hand, resource capability is highly related to policy development in the advanced stage.

Controls for density reveal the same pattern even more distinctly. In the low density, high capability cities policy development declines, counter to the hypothesis; but in the densely populated cities high resource capability is related to policy development across the continuum in linear order.

Finally, if resource capability is controlled by growth rate, the developmental process clearly follows the hypothesized pattern only in the high growth cities with high assessed valuation (and again in linear fashion except for levelling off in the advanced stage). The data do not permit us to say anything about the slow-growing, low capability cities; but in the slow-growth, high capability and the high growth, low capability cities Hypothesis 4 is clearly falsified.

Policy-makers evidently respond to environmental pressures less in terms of the resources that are available than in terms of their willingness to mobilize these resources. It is for this reason that inquiry into policy-makers' perceptions of city problems, policy positions and policy images becomes an important part of policy analysis.

3. Problem perceptions and policy develop-

TABLE 4. RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN CITY RESOURCE CAPABILITY AND POLICY DEVELOPMENT

		Policy Development						
	essed Valuation Per Capita	Retarded $N=11$	Emergent $N=14$	Transitional $N=26$	Maturing $N=15$	Advanced N=16		
Part A			·		v			
	>\$2,600.	54%	28%	38%	33%	44%		
	\$1,700-2,600	18	44	24	47	25		
	<1,700	27	28	38	20	31		
		100%	100%	100%	100%	100%		
Part B	•				•			
Size <	25,000	, ,			•			
	<\$1,700	27%	28%	24%	13%	6%		
	>\$1,700	73	72	39	54	6		
Size >2	25.000					•		
	<\$1,700			15 ⁻	7	25		
	>\$1,700		` 	23	27	62		
		100%	100%	100%	100%	100%		
Density								
<2,000					•			
	<\$1 ,700	9%	14%	0%	7%	0%		
	>\$1,700	63	44	19	.33	. 0		
>2,000								
	<\$1,700	19	14	38	13	32		
,	>\$1,700	9 .	28	43	47	68		
,		100%	100%	100%	100%	100%		
					•			
Growth <10%				•		_		
70	<\$1,700	9%	0%	19%	0%	6%		
	>\$1,700	46	36	23	13	13		
>10%			ı		•			
- 10 /0	<\$1,700	18	28	19	20	25		
	>\$1,700	27	36	39	67	. 56		
		100%	100%	100%	100%	100%		

ment. Environmental challenges are not self-evident. They become evident only if and when they give rise to "problems" that come to the attention of policy-makers. The perception of a problem means that traditional ways of doing things—policies—are inadequate or at the very least that their adequacy is in question. It is through the perception of problems, then, that the policy process is set in motion. But, if policy-makers do not respond to problems

generated by environmental challenges, either by not perceiving them or not acting upon them, this does not mean that there is no policy. It simply means that prevailing policy continues.

In collegial bodies like legislatures or councils a problem is a problem if the members between them are aware of the problem, but it is not necessary for all or even most of the members to perceive it. Different members

TABLE 5. RELATIONSHIP			

Diversity		F	olicy Developmen	t	•
Score Quartile	Retarded $N=9$	Emergent $N=12$	Transitional $N=25$	Maturing $N=15$	Advanced $N=16$
I. (Most)	45%	33%	20%	27%	- 6%
II.	22	17	28	20	44
II.	22	33	28	13	31
IV. (Least)	. 11	17	24	40	19
		*****************		************	• ;
	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%
Index	. +34	+16	-4	-13	-13

have access to different aspects of the environment. Because of varied membership elected collegial bodies can be more sensitive to the environment than administrative hierarchical organizations. "Problem diversity" therefore refers to the absolute number of different problems articulated by a council, adjusted for comparison across councils by the total number of mentions in each council. 18 Because as we have seen, the more developed cities face more severe environmental challenges, we formulate:

Hypothesis 3: The more diverse the problems perceived by a council, the more developed is city policy likely to be.

Table 5 shows that this hypothesis is falsified by the data. In fact, problem diversity is

18 That is, the absolute number of individual problems named was divided by all problem responses made in a council. The resulting scores, that could range from zero to one, were rank-ordered and divided into the quartile ranges used in the analysis.

greatest among the councils of the retarded cities where one might least expect it and declines almost linearly in the following stages and phases, though there is some levelling off at the more developed end of the development continuum.

How can one interpret this finding? One plausible answer is that policy develops in response to few but intensively felt problems, while a multitude of minor problems that are not critical do not stimulate the policy process. If this is so, we should expect that problems are more "visible" to the council as a whole in the more developed than in the less developed cities. A measure of "problem visibility" must take account not only of the absolute number of problems that are articulated, but also of the number of councilmen who articulate any one problem. 19 We postulate.

¹⁹ That is, the number of problems named was multiplied by the number of respondents and divided by all responses squared. The resulting score was subtracted from one to rank-order the

TABLE 6. RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN PROBLEM VISIBILITY AND POLICY DEVELOPMENT

Visibility	Policy Development								
Score Quartile	Retarded $N=9$	Emergent N=12	Transitional $N=25$	Maturing $N=15$	Advanced N=16				
I. (High)	22%	17%	28%	40%	12%				
II.	11	33	24	13	45				
III.	0	25	36	20	31				
IV. (Low)	67	25	12	27 .	. 12				
	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%				
Index	-45	-8	+16	+13	0				

TABLE 7. RELATIONSHIP	BETWEEN	AGREEMENT	ON	SPECIFIC	PROBLEM	AND	GENERAL
PR	DBLEM ARE	A AND POLIC	Y D	EVELOPM	ENT	•	

Single	•	·	olicy Developmen	t	
Problem Agreement	Retarded $N=9$	Emergent N=12	Transitional $N=25$	Maturing N=15	Advanced $N = 16$
67–100% 51–66% 50–50%	22% 45 33	50% 25 25	36% 32 32	. 47% . 20 33	46% 43 13
	100%	100%	100%	,100%	100%
Index	-11	+25	+4'	+14 ,	+33
Problem Area Agreement		` .			- Ampril
67–100% 51–66% 0–50%	33 % 0 67	17.% 8 75	32% 16 52	13 % 54 33	37% 13 50
	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%
Index	-34	-58	_20	-20	-13

Hypothesis 4: The more visible problems are to the council, the more developed is city policy likely to be.

Table 6 tends to support the hypothesis, although there is some dropping-off at the advanced stage. One might expect this because, as the very concept "advanced" suggests, a council in this stage of policy development is likely to have the challenges stemming from the environment well in hand. As a result, not only are fewer problems perceived in this stage, but the few problems are so self-evident that, though of great urgency, they fail to stand out as particularly visible.

Problem visibility may be thought of as setting the council's legislative agenda. The more visible a problem, the more likely it is to be considered by the council. But the visibility is at most a necessary and not a sufficient condition for legislative action. In order to act, the council must in fact be agreed that the problem is a problem. We therefore measure the degree of council agreement on the single most visible problem as well as council agree-

councils from high to low. The formula then is: $1-NP\times NR/r^2$, where NP=number of problems, NR=number of respondents, and r=number of total responses.

ment on the general policy area that seems most problematic.²⁰ We propose:

Hypothesis 5: The more agreement on the single most visible problem, the more developed is city policy likely to be.

Hypothesis 6: The more agreement on the most visible problem area, the more developed is city policy likely to be.

Table 7 tends to support these hypotheses, but we note an interesting deviation from the expected patterns in the cities of the emergent phase. While on the single problem measure more councils in the emergent phase reveal high agreement, these councils are least agreed on the general area of problems facing their cities. We can only speculate on these

²⁰ The measure of agreement on a single problem is simply the proportion of councilmen among all respondents who mentioned the most frequent problem. For the measure of problem area agreement, the number of responses in the area receiving the most responses was divided by the number of responses in all areas. Five "problem areas" were provided for classification of individual problems: Services and Utilities, Amenities, Promotion and Development, Social and Remedial Problems, and Governmental and Intergovernmental Problems.

TABLE 8. PROBLEMS AND PROBLEM AREAS PERCEIVED AS PRESSING BY CITY COUNCILS

			Policy Deve	lopment		
Types of Problems Perceived	Retarded $N=9$	Emergent N=12	Transitional $N=25$	Maturing N=15	Advanced N=16	Total N=77
Services & Utilities			•	-		,
Sewerage & drainage	1	- 1	5	2	. —	6
Sanitation & disposal		1		<u> </u>		1
Water sources	. 1	-	1 . `		. 1	3
Financing services		1	2	4	3	10
Total in Area	2	3	. 8	6	4	23
Per cent in Area	22%	25%	32%	40%	25%	30%
Amenities	/0	70	7 70	70		- 10
Total in Area	·		***************************************			
Promotion & Development	•					
Planning, master plan	· , _	: 1			3	4
Zoning & maintenance	2	1	4		_	7
Transportation & traffic		î	5	2	3 ·	11
Attract business & industry		· î	. 2		_	3
Urban renewal & developmen	t	1			3	4
Assessment and taxes		/ <u> </u>		2		$\overset{\pm}{2}$
Assessment and taxes					. —	
Total in Area	. 2	5	11	4	9	31
Per cent in Area	22%	42%	44%	27%	57 %	40%
Social & Remedial	22 /0	12 /0	11/0	21 70	01 /0	10 /0
Water pollution					1	, í
Race & ethnic problems					1	i
Educational problems				1	· .	. 1
Housing	1	~~~	,	1 ,		1
nousing	1		******		,	1
Total in Area	1			1	2	4
Per cent in Area	11%	0%	0%	7%	12%	5%
Governmental & Intergovernme		. 0 70	0 %	1 70	12%	3%
Annexation	11 tai					1
Local government personnel	1	1	*******	— .		
	, —	1		,	1	1 1
Citizen participation	. —	-	*house#		1	1
Total in Area	1	1			1 .	3
Per cent in Area	11%	-8%	0%	0%	6%	$\frac{3}{4\%}$
Not Classifiable	3 ,	3 95 <i>0</i> 7	6	4 .	0	16
	34%	25%	24%	26%	0%	21%
Grand total	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%

results. It may be that being in the emergent phase is, on the one hand, a disorienting condition that makes it difficult to achieve agreement on the general area of problems that require action; but that, precisely because of this condition, high agreement can be reached on the single most urgent problem. However, we also note that all councils, regardless of level of policy development, can evidently

reach agreement more readily on a specific problem than on a general area of related problems.

What kinds of problems or problem areas are most salient to city councils? And is such salience related to policy development? Although we do not propose to introduce a formal hypothesis, we are altogether unprepared for the results obtained. Taking all those councils

financial

uncontrolable

Inevitable-

Political

Trong of		Pcli	cy Development*		
Type of Reasons	Retarded $N=9$	Emergent $N=12$	Transitional $N=25$	Maturing N = 15	Advanced $N = 16$

36%

84

12

TABLE 9. REASONS GIVEN FOR PHOBLEMS AND POLICY DEVELOPMENT

8%

92

17

where at least three councilmen had named the same problem, we obtain the findings reported in Table 8.

22%

78

11

As Table 8 shows, no three councilmen in any council, whatever the city's stage or phase of development, articulated problems relating to amenities; and only a few councils on various levels of development mustered enough members who considered planning or zoning as especially pressing problems. We shall leave it to another occasion to interpret the full implications of the results reported in Table 8. Suffice it to say here that problems involving provisions for amenities clearly do not rank high on the agenda of problems considered pressing. Put differently, amenities appear to be luxuries that councils are willing to indulge in only after other urban problems, notably sewerage and drainage, financing of services and transportation, have been solved. But planning and zoning also do not stand out as pressing problems. Either these matters are being satisfactorily handled already, so that they are perceived as problems by only a few councils, or they are not recognized as viable means for coping with environmental challenges.21

²¹ Our measure of salience, as mentioned in the text, was whether a problem or problem area was mentioned by at least three respondents. We shall not try to interpret the proportions obtained for the services and utilities as well as promotion and development areas across the developmental continuum because the results may be an artifact of council size. As five councils in the transitional stage, three in the maturing phase and seven in the advanced stage had more than five members (usually seven), and as no retarded or emergent council had more than five members, clearly any one problem had more of a chance to be named by at least three respondents

When asked why they considered a problem to be a problem, a variety of reasons were given by councilmen that could be coded into three categories-operational and financial, political, and inevitable or uncontrollable. Councils were characterized in terms of the dominant set of reasons that were given.22 We do not entertain any particular hypothesis about how councils on various levels of development are likely to rationalize their city's problems. But we note two results in Table 9. First, great majorities of councils in all cities, regardless of level of policy development, attribute community problems to circumstances beyond their control. This is to say that a substantial number of problems, as we have speculated all along, have their roots in environmental conditions. But we also note that "political" reasons are given by more councils as we move from the retarded to the advanced stage of development. The linearity of the data suggests that politicization of the decision-making milieu in these cities may well be related to policy development. The more politicized the social environment, the more likely it seems to be that policy development takes place.

20%

73

27

25%

62

38

4. Policy positions and policy development.

in the more developed cities. But as, for instance, nine of the advanced councils had only five members, yet all advanced councils are accounted for in naming at least one problem, the council size factor does not seem to have too much of a distorting effect. But we note it as interesting that the more developed a city's policy, the more councils tend to mention problems related to utilities and services and to promotion and development.

²² The dominant set of reasons was simply defined as that set which included the most responses among all sets, regardless of absolute number.

^{*} Percentages total more than 100 since any one council could give sets of reasons that are numerically tied.

mante 10	DIST AMEGNOTIS	TO TOUR WHAT TO THE BY	TACTORIONISTERNO	TATE THE POST OF THE PARTY OF T	A STTS	DOLLOW	DEVELOPMENT
TABLE IO.	RELATIONSHIP	BETWEEN	IMPROVEMENT	DIVERSITI	AND	PULICI	DEVELOPMENT

Improvement		P	olicy Developmen	n t	
Score Quartile	Retarded $N=9$	Emergent $N=12$	Transitional $N=25$	Maturing $N=15$	Advanced $N = 16$
I. (Most)	33%	50%	20%	13%	31%
II.	33	17	36	33	0
III.	11	· 8	16	27	57
IV. (Least)	22	25	28	27	12
	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%
Index	+11	+25	- 8	-14	+19

Once problems have been identified and agreed upon as agenda items, the legislature or council will seek to evolve a policy position. A policy position by the council, whether held by all members or only a majority, is of course an emergent property of the council following upon interaction, deliberation and possibly compromise, and it is not simply the addition of individual members' policy preferences. What we are tapping, then, when we ask individual councilmen to suggest the "most needed" community-wide improvement and then aggregate these recommendations, is not the council's policy as it emerges in the voting situation, but rather the initial state of a council position before the legislative process has had an opportunity to affect the decisional outcome.23 But as actual council policy is re-

²³ We could argue our case more liberally on statistical grounds and possibly test it if we had more and numerically more diverse legislative bodies available for analysis: the larger a legislative body, the more likely it is that averaged individual preferences will approximate, if not correspond to, the preference of the collectivity.

flected in the policy outcomes out of which the typology of policy development is constructed, inquiry into the hypothetical initial state of the policy process can shed light on the dynamics of policy-making. We shall first explore the diversity and visibility of improvement recommendations made by councils in varying stages and phases of policy development. Again we stipulate:

Hypothesis 7: The more diverse improvements recommended in a council, the more developed is city policy likely to be.

And again, as with problem perceptions, we find the diversity hypothesis falsified by the data.²⁴ As Table 10 shows, highly diverse improvement proposals are just as likely to be made in the less developed as in the most developed councils. However, though problem and improvement proposal diversity is low in the more developed cities, and perhaps because of it, we expect that the improvement

²⁴ The improvement diversity measure was constructed in the same way as the problem diversity measure. See fn. 18, above.

TABLE 11. RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN IMPROVEMENT VISIBILITY AND POLICY DEVELOPMENT

Improvement Score Quartile	Policy Development					
	Retarded $N=9$	Emergent $N=12$	Transitional $N=25$	Maturing $N = 15$	Advanced $N=16$	
I. (High)	11%	25%	28%	7%	31%	
II.	22	_ 17	16	4 6	31	
III.	33	25	24	40	13	
IV. (Low)	33	33	32	7 .	25	
	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	
Index	-22	- 8	- 4	0	+ 6	

Improvement Area Agreement

67-100%

51-66%

0-50%

Index

Single Improvement Agreement	Policy Development					
	Retarded $N=9$	Emergent N=11*	Transitional $N=25$	Maturing N=15	Advanced $N = 16$	
67-100%	11%	0%	12%	7 %	6%	
51-66%	0	36	20	33	19	
0-50%	89	64	68	60	75	
	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	
Index	-78	64	-56	-53	-69	

TABLE 12. RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN AGREEMENT ON SPECIFIC IMPROVEMENT AND GENERAL IMPROVEMENT AREA AND POLICY DEVELOPMENT

* One council in this type could not be properly	measured and had	to be dropped from the t	abula-
tion.			

40%

28

32

100%

+ 8

45%

45

10

100%

+35

recommendations that are made are highly visible in these cities. Hence:

22%

45

33

100%

-11

Hypothesis 8: The more visible the improvements recommended in a council, the more developed is city policy likely to be.

Table 11 supports the hypothesis.²⁵ Recommendations for improvements are more visible in the developed than the less developed cities, and only in maturing and advanced cities do a majority of councils fall into the two upper visibility quartiles.

We expect on the basis of this finding that councils in the more developed cities are more agreed on what specific improvements or what general improvement areas are needed than councils in the less developed cities:

Hypothesis 9: The more agreement there is in a council on the single most needed improvement, the more developed is city policy likely to be.

Hypothesis 10: The more agreement there is in a council on a general improvement area, the more developed is city policy likely to be.

Table 12 presents the data.26 They represent

²⁵ The improvement visibility measure was constructed in the same manner as the problem visibility measure. See fn. 19, above.

²⁶ The improvement agreement measures are the same as those used in connection with problem agreement. See fn. 20, above.

some interesting findings. In the first place, with respect to agreement on the single most visible improvement proposal made, there is a very low level of agreement regardless of a city's location on the policy development continuum. Only few councils are highly agreed, and only a few more manage to achieve better than simple majority agreement. In all types of city policy development, majorities of the councils fall below the majority criterion needed for agreement. Interestingly, and though the percentage differences are small, fewer councils in both types of "phase" cities are in the non-agreement category than councils in the "stage" cities. But, in general, we must consider Hypothesis 9 as being falsified by the data.

60%

33

7

100%

+53

37%

44

19

100%

+18

If we turn to the less demanding Hypothesis 10—less demanding because agreement is needed only on a general area rather than on a specific case of improvement—the data give only weak support to the hypothesis. Although few of the retarded councils are high on improvement area agreement and the more developed councils tend in the expected direction, the significant aspect of the table is that only one council in each of the two types of "phase" cities is unable to achieve a minimal level of agreement. The tendency already noted in connection with single improvement agreement is exaggerated under the less demanding

100%

Improvement Area	Policy Development					
	Retarded N=9	Emergent $N=11$	Transitional $N=25$	Maturing $N=15$	Advanced $N=16$	
Services and						
utilities	0%	0%	0%	7%	0%	
Promotion and					37.7	
development	0	' 8	4	14	25	
Amenities	11	25	28	26	25	
Less than 3						
informants	89	67	. 68	53	50	

100%

100%

TABLE 13. RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN NEEDED IMPROVEMENT AREAS AND POLICY DEVELOPMENT

condition of general improvement area agreement.

100%

What are we to make of these unexpected findings? Are they merely due to random fluctuations in the data, or are they of theoretical significance? We must seek an explanation in the nature of the emergent and maturing phases of policy development as these were defined. Cities in these phases undergo sudden bursts of activity, reflected in policy outcomes, that move them from one stage into another. It would seem that this unfolding of policymaking "energy" is greatly aided by pre-decisional agreement or at least by relatively little disagreement in councils as to what improvements or areas of improvement are most needed. This finding and our interpretation suggest that we are tapping a very real component of the policy process by aggregating individual responses into a group response.27

What types of improvement were recommended by the councils that are agreed? Because of the dispersion of single improvement recommendations, we shall present only the data on improvement areas.²⁸ What is of interest in the data presented in Table 13 is, first of all, that the improvement areas are quite different from the comparable problem areas of Table 8. Only one council in a maturing city suggested services and utilities as an

²⁷ We would like to point out here that we had very similar results in the earlier study in which we used a *closed* agree-disagree scale measuring attitudes concerning the scope of government activity and in which we used *individual* councilmen as our units of analysis: see Eyestone and Eulau, in Wilson, (ed.), op. cit.

²⁸ An improvement area was assumed to be salient in council preferences if at least three respondents articulated problems in the area.

area needing improvements. But while no council had perceived amenities as a problem, a fourth of the councils in each of the developmental types, except the retarded, reported that amenities constitute an area where improvements are needed.

100%

This discontinuity in council policy maps from problem perceptions to policy positions requires explanation. Does it mean that councils do not behave rationally? One might be inclined to think so, but discontinuity is not necessarily the same thing as inconsistency. Because amenities are not recognized as "problems," it does not follow that councils may not wish to pursue policies to obtain amenities for their cities. For policies, we argued, are not simple conditioned responses to environmental challenges; they are also the products of those ends-in-view, values or images of the future that policy-makers carry with them into the policy-making situation. While the policy positions articulated in response to the question about needed improvements may not be relevant to the problems that councils perceived and articulated, they are certainly not inconsistent with them. The results suggest that policy images are important components of the council's policy map as a whole.

5. Policy images and policy development. What kind of future a legislative body envisages is likely to color its perceptions of environmental challenges and its current policy preferences. But images of the future are also likely to be projections of current trends in a city's policy development. They tend to orient the council toward the future and may influence future development, but they are not independent of present tendencies. Moreover, the more limited the legislature's jurisdiction, the better-defined its image is likely to be. In the case of municipal

TABLE 14. RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN POLICY IMAGE AND POLICY DEVELOPMENT

Content of Image	Policy Development					
	Retarded $N=9$	Emergent $N=12$	Transitional $N=25$	Maturing N=15'	Advanced $N=16$	
Residential- recreational	56%	50%	52%	27%	13%	
Split or non- classifiable	22	8	12	7	19	
Balanced and/or industrial	22	42	3 6	66	68	
	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	

councils whose tasks are well set by statutory requirements and limitations we can expect that long-range goals are well-defined.

Because we know that policy development varies with demographic indicators of environmental challenges such as size, density and growth, and because we also can assume that these indicators are highly related to ecological factors such as residential patterns or level of industrialization, we hypothesize:

Hypothesis 11a: The more developed a city's policy, the more will councils tend to envisage the city's future as "balanced" or industrial.

Hypothesis 11b: The less developed a city's policy, the more will councils tend to envisage the city's future as residential and/or recreational.

The ease with which it was possible to classify responses into the categories of "residential" or "recreational," on the one hand, and of "balanced" or "industrial," on the other hand, supports our speculation that longrange images or goals are likely to be well-defined in legislative bodies with limited

scopes of action.²⁹ As Table 14 shows, the reciprocal Hypotheses 11a and 11b are well supported by the data.

Because policy images are well-defined, we hypothesize that there is a great deal of agreement within the councils on policy goals. But as, by definition, the less developed cities are engaged in a more limited range of activities than the more developed ones, we can expect the difference to be reflected in the level of agreement:

Hypothesis 12: The less developed a city's policy, the greater the proportion of councils reaching high agreement on the image of city future.

Table 15 supports the hypothesis. It not only supports it but reveals an extraordinarily

²⁹ Because an "industrial" future was envisaged in only a handful of councils, we combined this category with the "balanced" category which implies that the council envisages a balance in residential, commercial and industrial development.

TABLE 15. RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN AGREEMENT ON POLICY IMAGE AND POLICY DEVELOPMENT

Policy Image Agreement	Policy Development					
	Retarded $N=9$	Emergent $N=12$	Transitional $N=25$	Maturing $N=15$	Advanced N=16	
100%	78%	67%	52%	53%	50%	
67-99%	0	25	32	27	31	
51–66% Split or non-	0	0	4.	13 ,	0 .	
classifiable	22	· 8	12	7	19	
,,	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	

high level of agreement, especially in the retarded and emergent cities where two-thirds and more of the councils are unanimously agreed on the policy image. But in the transitional, maturing and advanced cities, too, most councils agree on long-range goals by overwhelming majorities. We are dealing here, it seems, with that substantive consensus on values that facilitates the democratic process of bargaining, compromise and adjustment. It is within this consensus that disagreements over particular policies can be resolved and lasting community conflicts be reduced to manageable format. However, the fact that agreement on future goals is inversely related to policy development represents a profound dilemma for democratic theory.

VI. CONCLUSION

A metropolitan city's development toward distinct and differentiated styles of social life is powerfully shaped by policies that are responses to challenges from the metropolitan environment. Whether a city stands still, moves forward to reach a new level of development or reverts to an earlier state depends on the strength of such challenges as can be measured by city size, density or growth rate. In general, development involves the adoption of policies that either adapt the city to the changing environment or control the environment. In this process of adjustment and control through appropriate policies the city's resource capabilities seem to play only a limited part. It appears that policy-makers' willingness to tap city resources in order to adopt appropriate policies is a critical component of the policy development process.

Policy-makers' willingness to set their city on a course of development depends on the content of their policy maps—how they perceive the problems facing the city, what preferences they entertain with regard to

policy alternatives, and how they envisage the city's future. In general, it seems that municipal decision-makers' policy maps constitute a consistent whole, although there may be discontinuities and deviations. It also appears, in general, that the various components of the policy map are meaningfully related to the stage or phase of city policy development. There is in the councils of a metropolitan region such as that around the San Francisco Bay a satisfactory level of agreement on what the problems are that cities in different stages of development face, and there is very high agreement on what the city's future should be like. There is less agreement, as one might expect, on the specific policies that should be adopted to obtain the goals that are envisaged. but there is sufficient agreement on the general area of issues that needs attention.

It has been the burden of our argument that the systematic study of public policy cannot be content with correlating indicators of environmental challenges or indicators of resource capability to policy outcomes. Rather, it was our assumption that policy development is greatly influenced by the predilections, preferences, orientations and expectations of policy-makers-in short, by the political process itself. The data presented in the analysis, though limited, confirm the validity of this assumption. Yet, as we noted, the fact that level of agreement on policy goals seems to be inversely related to policy development raises many problems for the policy-maker. Not the least important is the question of how a developed community can maintain a sufficient consensus on public goals. In the city councils of the San Francisco Bay metropolitan region a high level of agreement on policy goals still exists. Whether it will continue to exist in the face of increasing differentiation of areas within the city challenges the urban political

THE INSTITUTIONALIZATION OF THE U.S. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES*

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Most people who study politics are in general agreement, it seems to me, on at least two propositions. First, we agree that for a political system to be viable, for it to succeed in performing tasks of authoritative resource allocation, problem solving, conflict settlement, and so on, in behalf of a population of any substantial size, it must be institutionalized. That is to say, organizations must be created and sustained that are specialized to political activity. Otherwise, the political system is likely to be unstable, weak, and incapable of servicing the demands or protecting the interests of its constituent groups. Secondly, it is generally agreed that for a political system to be in some sense free and democratic. means must be found for institutionalizing representativeness with all the diversity that this implies. and for legitimizing yet at the same time containing political opposition within the system.2

* This paper was written while I was a Fellow at the Center for Advanced Study in the Behavioral Sciences. I want to thank the Center for its incomparable hospitality. In addition, the study of which this is a part has received support from The Rockefeller Foundation, the Social Science Research Council, Weslevan University, and the Carnegie Corporation of New York, which granted funds to The American Political Science Association for the Study of Congress. H. Douglas Price has been a constant source of ideas, information, and criticism. I gratefully acknowledge also the assistance of Barry Rundquist, Edward Dreyfus, John Neff, Andrew Kleinfeld, and Miriam Gallaher, whose efforts contributed greatly to the assembly of a large number of the historical time series reported here. My colleague Paul Kay took time from his own work to suggest ways in which they could be presented. An earlier version was presented at the 1966 meetings of the American Political Science Association.

- ¹ A good recent summary of literature bearing on this point as it applies to the study of political development may be found in Samuel P. Huntington, "Political Development and Political Decay," World Politics, 17 (April, 1965), 386-430.
- ² Robert A. Dahl speaks of "the three great milestones in the development of democratic institutions—the right to participate in governmental decisions by easting a vote, the right to be

Our growing interest in both of these propositions, and in the problems to which they point, can begin to suggest the importance of studying one of the very few extant examples of a highly specialized political institution which over the long run has succeeded in representing a large number of diverse constituents, and in legitimizing, expressing, and containing political opposition within a complex political system—namely, the U.S. House of Representatives.

The focus of my attention here will be first of all descriptive, drawing together disparate strands—some of which already exist in the literature3—in an attempt to show in what sense we may regard the House as an institutionalized organ of government. Not all the necessary work has been done on this rather difficult descriptive problem, as I shall indicate. Secondly, I shall offer a number of speculative observations about causes, consequences, and possible lessons to be drawn from the institutionalization of the House.

The process of institutionalization is one of

represented, and the right of an organized opposition to appeal for votes against the government in elections and in parliament." In enumerating these three great achievements of democratic government, Dahl also implies that they are embodied principally in three main institutions: parties, elections, and legislatures: Robert A. Dahl (ed.), Political Oppositions in Western Democracies (New Haven and London: Yale University Press, 1966), p. xi. See also William Nisbet Chambers "Party Development and the American Mainstream," especially pp. 18-19, in Chambers and Walter Dean Burnham (eds.), The American Party Systems: Stages of Political Development (New York: Oxford, 1967).

³ See for example, Nelson W. Polsby, "Congressional Research and Congressional Data: A Preliminary Statement" (mimeo) delivered at the Conference on Congressional Research, sponsored by the Inter-university Consortium for Political Research and the Social Science Research Council at the Brookings Institution, Washington, D.C., April 3-4, 1964; H. Douglas Price, "The Congressman and the Electoral Arena" (mimeo, 1964); and T. Richard Witmer, "The Aging of the House," Political Science Quarterly, 79 (December, 1964), 526-541.

the grand themes in all of modern social science. It turns up in many guises and varieties: as Sir Henry Maine's discussion of the change from status to contract in the history of legal obligations,4 as Ferdinand Tönnies' treatment of the shift from Gemeinschaft to Gesellschaft,5 as Max Weber's discussion of the development of "rational-legal" modes of legitimization as an alternative to "traditional" and "charismatic" modes,6 as Durkheim's distinction between "mechanical" and "organic" solidarity in his treatment of the consequences of the division of labor, and finally dare we say finally?—as the central process at work in the unfolding of organizations that are held to obey Parkinson's Law.8

Such theoretical riches are bound to prove an embarrassment to the empirical researcher, since, unavoidably, in order to do his work, he must pick and choose among a host of possibilities—not those that initially may be the most stimulating, but those that seem most likely to be reflected in his data, which, perforce, are limited. Thus the operational indices I am about to suggest which purport to measure empirically the extent to which the

- ⁴ Sir Henry Sumner Maine, Ancient Law London: John Murray, 1908), pp. 220-325.
- ⁶ Ferdinand Tönnies, Community and Society (Gemeinschaft und Gesellschaft) (East Lansing: Michigan State University Press, 1957). See, in particular, the introductory commentary by Charles P. Loomis and John C. McKinney, "The Application of Gemeinschaft and Gesellschaft as Related to Other Typologies," ibid., pp. 12–29.
- Max Weber, The Theory of Social and Economic Organization (Glencoe: The Free Press, 1947), pp. 328ff.
- ⁷ Emile Durkheim, The Division of Labor in Society (Glencoe: The Free Press, 1947).
- ⁸ C. Northcote Parkinson, *Parkinson's Law* (Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1957).
- The only successful modern attempt I am aware of that employs a classical theory of institutionalization in an empirical study of something other than a bureaucracy is Harold W. Pfautz's "Christian Science: The Sociology of a Social Movement and Religious Group" (unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, Department of Sociology, University of Chicago, 1954). See also Harold W. Pfautz, "The Sociology of Secularization: Religious Groups," The American Journal of Sociology, 41 (September, 1955), 121-128, and Pfautz, "A Case Study of an Urban Religious Movement: Christian Science" in E. W. Burgess and D. J. Bogue (eds.), Contributions to Urban Sociology (Chicago and London: University of Chicago Press, 1963), pp. 284-303.

U.S. House of Representatives has become institutionalized may strike the knowledgeable reader as exceedingly crude; I invite the ingenuity of my colleagues to the task of suggesting improvements.

For the purposes of this study, let us say that an institutionalized organization has three major characteristics: 1) it is relatively wellbounded, that is to say, differentiated from its environment. Its members are easily identifiable, it is relatively difficult to become a member, and its leaders are recruited principally from within the organization. 2) The organization is relatively complex, that is, its functions are internally separated on some regular and explicit basis, its parts are not wholly interchangeable, and for at least some important purposes, its parts are interdependent. There is a division of labor in which roles are specified, and there are widely shared expectations about the performance of roles. There are regularized patterns of recruitment to roles, and of movement from role to role. 3) Finally, the organization tends to use universalistic rather than particularistic criteria, and automatic rather than discretionary methods for conducting its internal business. Precedents and rules are followed; merit systems replace favoritism and nepotism; and impersonal codes supplant personal preferences as prescriptions for behavior.

Since we are studying a single institution, the repeated use of words like "relatively" and "tends" in the sentences above refers to a comparison of the House of Representatives with itself at different points in time. The descriptive statement: "The House of Representatives has become institutionalized over time" means then, that over the life span of this institution. it has become perceptibly more bounded, more complex, and more universalistic and automatic in its internal decision making. But can we find measures which will capture enough of the meaning of the term "institutionalization" to warrant their use in an investigation of the process at work in the U.S. House of Representatives?

I. THE ESTABLISHMENT OF BOUNDARIES

One aspect of institutionalization is the differentiation of an organization from its environment. The establishment of boundaries in a political organization refers mostly to a channeling of career opportunities. In an undifferentiated organization, entry to and exit from membership is easy and frequent. Leaders emerge rapidly, lateral entry from outside to positions of leadership is quite common, and persistence of leadership over time is rare. As an organization institutionalizes, it stabilizes

its membership, entry is more difficult, and turnover is less frequent. Its leadership professionalizes and persists. Recruitment to leadership is more likely to occur from within, and the apprenticeship period lengthens. Thus the organization establishes and "hardens" its outer boundaries.

Such measures as are available for the House of Representatives unmistakably show this process at work. In the 18th and 19th centuries, the turnover of Representatives at

TABLE 1. THE ESTABLISHMENT OF BOUNDARIES: DECLINE IN PERCENTAGE OF FIRST TERM MEMBERS, U.S. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, 1789–1965

Congress	Year of 1st Term	% 1st Term Members	Congress	Year of 1st term	% 1st Term Members
1	1789	100.0	45	1877	46.6
2	1791	46.5	46	1879	42.3
3	1793	56.5	47	1881	31.8
4	1795	38.9	48	1883	51.5
5	1797	43.1	49	1885	38 0
6	1799	36.0	50	1887	35.6
7	1801	42.5	51	1889	38.1
8	1803	46.9	52	1891	43 8
9	1805	39.9	53	1893	38.1-
10	1807	36.2	54	1895	48.6
11	1809	35.9	55	1897	37.9
12	1811.	38.5	56	1899	30.1
13	1813	52.6	57	1901	24.4
14	1815	42.9	58	1903	31.3
15	1817	59.2	59	1905	21.0
16	1819	40.8	60	1907	22.5
17	1821	45.2	61	1909	19.9
18	1823	43.2	62	1911	30.5
19	1825	39.4	63	1913	34.4
20	1827	33.2	64	1915	27.2
21	1829	41.0	65	1917	` 16.0
22	1831	38.0	66	1919	22.7
23	1833	53.7	67	1921	23.6
24	1835	40.0	68	1923	27.1
25	1837	48.6	69	1925	16.3
26	1839	46.3	70	1927	13.3
27	1841	37.7	71	1929	17.7
28	1843	66.7	72	1931	19.0
29	1845	49.0	73	1933	37.2
30	1847	50.4	74	1935	23.4
31	1849	53.1	75	1937	22.7
32	1851	53.3	76	1939	25.5
33	1853	60.5	` 77	1941	17.0
34	1855	57.5	78	1943	22.9
35	1857	40.2	79	1945	15.8
36	1859	45.1	80	1947	24.1
37	1861	53.9	81	1949	22.3
38	1863	58.1	82	1951	14.9
39	1865	44.3	83 .	1953	19.5
40	1867	46.0	84	1955	11.7
41	1869	49.2	85	1957	9.9
42	1871	46.5	86	1959	18 2
43	1873	52.0	87	1961	12 6
44	1875	58.0	88	1963	15 2
			89	1965	20 9

Data for 1st through 68th Congresses are from Stuar: A. Rice, Quantitative Methods in Politics (New York: Knop., 1528), pp. 296-297. Data for 69th through 89th Congresses are calculated from Congressional Directories.

each election was enormous. Excluding the Congress of 1789, when of course everyone started new, turnover of House members exceeded fifty per cent in fifteen elections—the last of which was held in 1882. In the 20th century, the highest incidence of turnover (37.2 per cent—almost double the twentieth century median) occurred in the Roosevelt landslide of 1932—a figure exceeded forty-seven times—in other words almost all the time—in the 18th and 19th centuries. As Table 1 and Figure 1 make clear, there has

TABLE 2. THE ESTABLISHMENT OF BOUNDARIES:
INCREASE IN TERMS SERVED BY INCUMBENT
MEMBERS OF THE U.S. HOUSE OF
REPRESENTATIVES, 1789-1963

Congress	Beginning Term	Mean Terms of Service*	Congress	Beginning Term	Mean Terms of Service
1	1789	1.00	45	1877	2.11
2	1791	1.54	43	1879	2.21
3	1793	1.64	47	1881	2.56
4	1795	2.00	43	1883	2.22
5	1797	2.03	49	1885	2.41
6	1799	2.23	50	1887	2.54
7	1801	2.25	51	1889	2.61
8	1803	2.14	52	1891	2.44
9	1805	2.36	53	1893	2.65
10	1807	2.54	54	1895	2.25
11	1809	2.71	55	1897 `	2.59
12	1811	2.83	56	1899	2.79
13	1813	2.31	57	1901	3.11
14	1815	2.48	58	1903	3.10
15'	1817	1.93	59	1905	3.48
16	1819	2.15	60	1907	3.61
17	1821	2.23	61	1909	3.84
18	1823	2.29	62	1911	3.62
19	1825	2.42	63	1913	3.14
20	1827	2.68	64	1915	3.44
21	1829	2.55	65	1917	3.83
22	1831	2.59	66	1919	3.74
23	1833	2.15	67	1921	3.69
24	1835	2.23	68	1923	3.57
25	1837	2.13	69	1925	3.93
26	1839	2.17	70	1927	4.26
27	1841	2.30	71	1929	4.49
28 🤸	1843	1.76	. 72	1931	4.48
29	1845	1.90	73	1933	3.67
30	1847	2.00	74	1935	3.71
31	1849	1.92	75	1937	3.84
32	1851	1.84	76	1939	3.91
33	1853	1.69	77	1941	4.24
34	1855	1.81	73	1943	4.22
35	1857	2.04	79 `	1945	4.50
36	1859	2.02	80	1947	4.34
37	1861	1.83	81	1949	4.42
38	1863	1.75	82	1951	4.73
39	1865	2.00	83	1953	4.69
40	1867	2.12	84	1955	5.19
41	1869	2.04	85	1957	5.58
42	1871	2.11	85	1959	5.37
43	1873	2.07	87	1961	5.65
44	1875	1.92	88	1963	5.65

^{*} Total number of terms served divided by total number of Representatives.

Mean percentage of first-term members




Fig. 1. The Establishment of Boundaries: Decline in Percentage of First Term Members, U.S. House of Representatives, 1789–1965.*

* Data from Table 1.




Fig. 2. The Establishment of Boundaries: Increase in Terms Served by Incumbent Members of the U.S. House of Representatives, 1789–1963.*

^{*} Data from Table 2.

been a distinct decline in the rate at which new members are introduced into the House. Table 2 and Figure 2 make a similar point with data that are partially independent; they show that the overall stability of membership, as measured by the mean terms of members (total number of terms served divided by total number of Representatives) has been on the rise.

These two tables provide a fairly good indication of what has happened over the years to rank-and-file members of the House. Another method of investigating the extent to which an institution has established boundaries is to consider its leaders, how they are recruited, what happens to them, and most particularly the extent to which the institution permits lateral entry to and exit from positions of leadership.

The classic example of lateral movement—possibly the most impressive such record in American history—is of course contained in the kaleidoscopic career of Henry Clay, seventh Speaker of the House. Before his first election to the House, Clay had already served two terms in the Kentucky House of Representatives, and had been sent by the legislature to the U.S. Senate for two nonconsecutive short terms. Instead of returning to the Senate in 1811, he ran for the Lexington seat in the U.S.

House and was elected. He took his seat on March 4, 1811, and eight months later was elected Speaker at the age of 34. Three years later, he resigned and was appointed a commissioner to negotiate the Treaty of Ghent with Great Britain. The next year, he returned to Congress, where he was again promptly elected Speaker. In 1820 he resigned once again and left public office for two years. But in 1823 he returned to the House, served as Speaker two more terms, and then resigned again, to become Secretary of State in John Quincy Adams' cabinet. In 1831, Clay became a freshman Senator. He remained in the Senate until 1844, when he resigned his seat. Five years later he re-entered the Senate, this time remaining until his death in 1852. Three times (in 1824, 1832, 1844) he was a candidate for president.10

Clay's career was remarkable, no doubt, even

10 On Clay, see Bernard Mayo, Henry Clay: Spokesman of the New West (Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1937); Glyndon G. Van Deusen, The Life of Henry Clay (Boston: Little, Brown, 1937); Mary Parker Follett, The Speaker of the House of Representatives (New York: Longman's, Green, 1896), pp. 69-82; and Booth Mooney, Mr. Speaker (Chicago: Follett, 1964), pp. 21-48.

TABLE 3. THE ESTABLISHMENT CF BOUNDARIES: YEARS SERVED IN CONGRESS BEFORE FIRST SELECTION AS SPEAKER

Date of Selection	Speaker	Years	Date of Selection	Speaker	Years	
1789	Muhlenberg	1 or less	1861	Grow	10	
1791	Trumbull	3	1863	Colfax	8	
1795	Dayton	4	1869	Pomeroy	8	
1799	Sedgwick	11	1869	Blaine	6	
1801	Macon	10	1875	Kerr	8	
1807	Varnum	12	1876	Randall	13	
1811	Clay	1 or less	1881	Keifer	4	
1814	Cheves	5	1883	Carlisle	6	
1820	Taylor	7	1889	Reed	12	
1821	Barbour	6	1891	Crisp	8	
1827	Stephenson	6 `	1899	Henderson	16	
1834	Bell	7	1903	Cannon	28	
1835	Polk	10	1911	Clark	26	
1839	Hunter	2	1919	Gillett	26	
1841	White	6	1925	Longworth	22	
1843	Jones	8	1931	Garner	26	
1845	Davis	6	1933	Rainey	28	
1847	Winthrop	8	1935	Byrns	25	
1849	Cobb	6	1936	Bankhead	15	
1851	Bo yd	14	1940	Rayburn	27	
1855	Banks	2	1946	Martin	22	
1857	Orr	7	1962	McCormack	34	
1859	Pennington	1 or less				

in a day and age when the boundaries of the House of Representatives were only lightly guarded and leadership in the House was relatively open to lateral entry. But the point to be emphasized here is that Clay's swift rise to the Speakership is only slightly atypical for the period before the turn of the 20th century.

Table 3 demonstrates that there has been a change over time in the seniority of men selected for the Speakership. Before 1899, the mean years of service of members selected for the Speakership was six; after 1899, the mean rises steeply to twenty-six. Figure 3 and Table 4 summarize the gist of the finding in compact form.

Just as 19th-century Speakers arrived early at the pinnacle of House leadership, many left early as well and went on to other things: freshman Senators, state legislators, Cabinet members, and judges in the state courts. One became President of the U.S., one a Justice of the Supreme Court, one a Minister to Russia, one the Mayor of Auburn, New York, and one the Receiver-General of the Pennsylvania land office. Indeed, of the first twenty-seven men to be Speaker, during the first eighty-six years of the Republic, none died while serving in the House of Representatives. In contrast, of the last ten Speakers, six died while serving, and of course one other sits in the House today. Table 5 and Figure 4 give the relevant information for all Speakers.

TABLE 4. THE ESTABLISHMENT OF BOUNDARIES:
SUMMARY OF YEARS SERVED IN CONGRESS
BEFORE FIRST SELECTION AS SPEAKER

	Before, 1899	1899 and after
8 years or less	25	0
9-14 years	8	0
15-20 years	0	2
21-28 years	0	10
		-
	33 Speakers	s 12 Speakers

The importance of this information about Speakers' careers is that it gives a strong indication of the development of the Speakership as a singular occupational specialty. In earlier times, the Speakership seems to have been regarded as a position of political leadership capable of being interchanged with other, comparable positions of public responsibilityand indeed a high incidence of this sort of interchange is recorded in the careers of 19th century Speakers. That this sort of interchange is most unusual today suggests—as do the other data presented in this section—that one important feature in the development of the U.S. House of Representatives has been its differentiation from other organizations in the political system, a stabilization of its membership, and a growing specialization of its leaders




Fig. 3. The Establishment of Boundaries: Mean Years Served in Congress Before First Becoming Speaker by 20-year Intervals.*

^{*} Data from Table 3.

TABLE 5. THE ESTABLISHMENT OF BOUNDARIES: EMERGENCE OF CAREERS SPECIALIZED TO HOUSE LEADERSHIP

Speaker (term)	Elapsed years between last day of service as Representative and deat	now Speakers nnisned
1. Muhlenberg (1789-90, 1793-94)	6	Receiver-general of Pennsylvania Land Office
2. Trumbull (1791-92)	14	Governor of Connecticut
3. Dayton (1795-98)	25	Senator 1805; private life
4. Sedgwick (1799-1800)		Judge of Supreme Court of Massachusetts
5. Macon (1801-06)		Senate
6. Varnum (1807-10)	10	U.S. Senate and State Senate, Massachusett
7. Clay (1811-13, 1815-19, 1823-24)	. 27	Senate
8. Cheves (1814)	42	President, Bank of U.S.; Chief Commissioner of Claims under Treaty of Ghent; private life
9. Taylor (1820, 1825–26)	21	State Senate, New York; private life
10. Barbour (1821-22)		Associate Justice, U.S. Supreme Court
11. Stevenson (1827–33)		Minister to Great Britain; Rector, University o Virginia
12. Bell (1834)	28	Senate; private life
13. Polk (1835–38)	10	President of U.S.
14. Hunter (1839-40)	40	State Treasurer, Virginia; Collector, Tappahan nock, Virginia
15. White (1841-42)	1	Judge, 19th Judicial District, Virginia
16. Jones (1843-44)		Representative to Virginia State House of Delegates and Speaker
17. Davis (1845–46)	12	U.S. Commissioner to China, Governor of th Oregon Territory
18. Winthrop (1847-48)	44	Senator by appointment; unsuccessful candidat for Senate, Governor; private life
19. Cobb (1849–50)	11	Secretary of Treasury, Buchanan cabinet; Confederate major general; private life
20. Boyd (1851-54)	4	Lt. Governor of Kentucky
21. Banks (1855-56)	3	Served many nonconsecutive terms after Speak ership; unsuccessful candidate; private life
22. Orr (1857–58)	14	Minister to Russia
23. Pennington (1859-60)	1	Failed of reelection; died soon after
24. Grow (1861–62)	4	Speaker in 37th; later private life; later still re- elected to Congress; declined renomination private life
25. Colfax (1863–68)	16	Private Life; Vice-President
26. Pomeroy (1869)	36	Speaker 1 day; Mayor of Auburn, New York private life
27. Blaine (1869-74)	. 17	Secretary of State; President, Pan-America Congress
28. Kerr (1875)	0	Speaker at his death, 1876
29. Randall (1876–80)	- 0	House of Representatives
30. Keifer (1881–82)	22	Not renominated to House after served a Speaker; Major General in Spanish America War; Returned later to House; private life
31. Carlisle (1883-88)	20	Senate, Secretary of Treasury; private life
32. Reed (1889–90, 1895–98		Private life; law practice
33. Crisp (1891–94)	0	U.S. House of Representatives (nominated for Senate at time of death)
34. Henderson (1899-1902)	3	Private life; retired, House of Representatives

TABLE 5 (continued)

	Speaker (term)	Elapsed years betwee last day of service as Representative and dea	How Speakers Inished their careers			
35.	Cannon (1903-10)	3	Retired, House of Representatives			
36.	Clark (1911-18)	0	House of Representatives			
37.	Gillett (1919-24)	10	Senate; private life			
38.	Longworth (1925-30)	0	House of Representatives			
39.	Garner (1931-32)	32 +	Vice-President; private life			
40.	Rainey (1933-34)	0	House of Representatives, Speaker			
41.	Byrns (1935-36)	0	House of Representatives, Speaker			
42.	Bankhead (1936-39)	0	House of Representatives, Speaker			
43.	Rayburn 1940-45, 1947-52, 1955-61)	0	House of Representatives, Speaker			
44.	Martin (1946-47, 1953-5	1+	Defeated for renomination, 1966, in his 82nd year and his 44th consecutive year of House service			
45.	McCormack (1962-67)	0+	House of Representatives, presently Speaker (1967)			




Fig. 4. The Establishment of Boundaries: Emergence of Careers Specialized to House Leadership.*

^{*} Data from Table 5.

to leadership of the House as a separate career. 11

11 This pattern has been suggested before, by Douglas Price and myself, in unpublished papers (see Footnote 3). It is apparently not unique to the House. David Rothman, on what seem to me to be tenuous grounds, suggests something similar for the U.S. Senate in Politics and Power: The U.S. Senate 1869-1901 (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1966). Consider, for a better example, where the United States gets its military leaders today and compare with this observation on the Mexican war period:

The President [Polk] now undertook to offset this Whig advantage by making a number of Democratic generals.... He thereupon proceeded to name numerous Democrats to command the new divisions and brigades.... Even this flock of Democratic generals did not erase Polk's fears. After he had committed the command to Scott he considered giving the top authority to a civilian. He wanted to commission Senator Thomas Hart Benton a lieutenant general, and give him overall command....

(Roy F. Nichols, The Stakes of Power: 1845-1877 New York: Hill and Wang, 1961, pp. 16, 17.) One would expect civilians to serve high in the officer corps in wars of total mobilization, such as the Civil War and World War II, but not in a conflict involving only a partial mobilization, such as the Mexican War, Korea or Viet Nam. Nevertheless, the full professionalization of our army took place only in this century. During the Spanish-American War, another war of partial mobilization, the business of fighting was still carried on partially by militia and by federal volunteer reigmentsirregulars-who fought side by side with, but independently of, regular troops. See Walter Millis, Arms and Men (New York: G. P. Putman's Sons, 1956), pp. 167-210. See also a contemporary Washington newsman's report: Arthur Wallace Dunn, From Harrison to Harding (New York: G. P. Putnam's Sons 1922), Vol. I, pp. 240ff, 272-274. Dunn says (Vol. I, pp. 240-41): "From the very beginning politics cut a leading part in the war. The appointments of generals and many other officers were due to influence rather than to merit or fitness . . . One of these [appointments] was General Joe Wheeler, a member of Congress from Alabama. When he appeared with the twin stars of a major general on his shoulders, he joyously exclaimed: 'It is worth fifteen years of life to die on a battlefield'.... 'He will have twenty thousand men under him [remarked a critic] who do not share his opinion, and they will not care to lose fifteen years of their lives to give Joe Wheeler a glorious death.' " See also Samuel'P. Huntington, The Soldier and the State (Cambridge: Harvard U. Press, 1957), esp. pp. 222-269. Huntington dates the rise of the American military as a profession from after the Civil War.

The development of a specifically House leadership, the increase in the overall seniority of members, and the decrease in the influx of newcomers at any point in time have the effect not only of separating the House from other organizations in the political system, but also

Consider also the following observation about the U.S. Supreme Court: "In the early years, resignations tended to occur for all sorts of reasons; Chief Justice Jay resigned to assume the governorship of New York, for example. But as the Court's prestige increased, justices found fewer reasons to step down from the bench": Samuel Krislov, The Supreme Court in the Political Process (New York: Macmillan, 1965), p. 9. David Danelski has suggested in a personal communication that while in its earliest years, the U.S. Supreme Court was neither a prestigious nor well-bounded institution, it became so more rapidly than the House, as the following table indicates:

Decade Appointed	Number of Justices Appointed	Average Tenure		
1789-99	12 justices	10.3 years		
180009	4	25.0		
181019	2	29.0		
1820-29	3	18.0		
1830-39	6 '	20.3		
1840-49	4	18.7		
1850-59	3	12.3		
1860-69	. 5	21.0		
1870-79	5	18.0		
1880-89	7	13.6		
1890-99	6	16.1		
1900-09	· 4	14.2		
1910-19	7	15.0		
1920-29	5 ;	14.0		
1930-39	6 '	20.0 +		
		(Black and		
		Douglas		
	• •	still on)		
1940-49	8	9.4		

It is, of course, not uncommon for students of the Court to view the leadership of Chief Justice Marshall as highly significant in stabilizing the role of the Court in the political system and in enlarging its influence. Other indicators useful in tracing the institutionalization of the federal judiciary might be to study changes in the professional training of persons who have become federal judges, the increase in the number of judges on inferior federal courts, the codification of procedures for dealing with constitutional questions, the routinization of procedures for the

of facilitating the growth of stable ways of doing business within the institution, as we shall see shortly.

II. THE GROWTH OF INTERNAL COMPLEXITY

Simple operational indices of institutional complexity and universalistic-automated decision making are less easy to produce in neat and comparable time series. As for the growth of internal complexity, this is easy enough to establish impressionistically, but the most obvious quantitative measure presents a drastic problem of interpretation. The temptation is great to measure internal differentiation by simply counting the number of standing committees in each Congress. This would produce a curiously curvilinear result, because in 1946 the number of standing committees was reduced from 48 to 19, and the number has since crept up only as far as 20.1^{12}

But the "streamlining," as it was called, ¹³ of 1946 can hardly be said to have reduced the internal differentiation of the House. On the contrary, by explicitly delineating the legislative jurisdictions of the committees, by consolidating committees with parallel and overlapping functions, by assigning committees exclusive oversight responsibilities over agencies of the executive branch, and by providing committees with expanded staff aid, the 1946 reorganization contributed to, rather than detracted from, the reliance of the House upon committees in the conduct of its business. Thus the mute testimony of the sheer numbers of

granting of certiorari, and the growth of a bureaucracy to administer the federal court system. See, inter alia, Mr. Justice Brandeis' dissent in Ashwander vs. T.V.A. 297 U.S. 346-348; Edwin McElwain, "The Business of The Supreme Court as Conducted by Chief Justice Hughes," Harvard Law Review, 63 (November, 1949), 5-26; Merlo J. Pusey, Charles Evans Hughes (New York: Macmillan, 1951), Vol. II, pp. 603-690; Frederick Bernays Wiener, "The Supreme Court's New Rules," Harvard Law Review, 68 (November, 1954), 20-94; and Chief Justice Vinson's address before the American Bar Association, "The Work of the Federal Courts," September 7, 1949, reprinted in part in Walter F. Murphy and C. Herman Pritchett (eds.), Courts, Judges and Politics (N. Y.: Random House, 1961), pp. 54-58.

12 The combined totals of standing committees and subcommittees might be a better guide; but reliable information about subcommittees only exists for the most recent two decades.

¹³ I believe the word is George Galloway's. See *Congress at the Crossroads* (New York: Crowell, 1946), p. 340.

committees cannot be accepted as an appropriate index of internal complexity. I shall therefore attempt a more anecdotal accounting procedure.

Briefly, the growth of internal complexity can be shown in three ways: in the growth in the autonomy and importance of committees, in the growth of specialized agencies of party leadership, and in the general increase in the provision of various emoluments and auxiliary aids to members in the form of office space, salaries, allowances, staff aid, and committee staffs

A wholly satisfactory account of the historical development of the House committee system does not exist. But perhaps I can swiftly sketch in a number of plausible conclusions from the literature.

From the perspective of the present-day United States, the use of standing committees by Congress is scarcely a controversial issue.14 Yet, in the beginning the House relied only very slightly upon standing committees. Instead of the present-day system, where bills are introduced in great profusion and automatically shunted to one or another of the committees whose jurisdictions are set forth in the rules, the practice in the first, and early Congresses was for subjects to be debated initially in the whole House and general principles settled upon, before they were parceled out for further action-fact-finding, detailed consideration or the proposal of a bill-to any one of four possible locations: an officer in the

14 It certainly is, on the other hand, in the present-day United Kingdom, where purely legislative committees are regarded as a threat to the cohesion of the national political parties because they would give the parliamentary parties special instruments with which they could develop independent policy judgments and expertise and exercise oversight over an executive which is, after all, not formally constituted as an entity separate from Parliament. Thus committees can be construed as fundamentally inimical to unified Cabinet government. For an overview see Bernard Crick, The Reform of Parliament (Garden City: Doubleday Anchor, 1965); 'The Political Quarterly, 36 (July-September, 1965); and Andrew Hill and Anthony Whichelow, What's Wrong with Parliament? (Harmondsworth: Penguin. 1964), esp. pp. 64-82. See also a most illuminating essay by Robert C. Fried on the general conditions under which various political institutions (including legislatures) are strong or weak within their political systems: Comparative Political Institutions (New York: Macmillan, 1966), esp. p. 31.

Executive Branch, a Committee of the Whole, a Select Committee formed ad hoc for the reception of a particular subject, or a standing committee. Generally, one of the alternatives to standing committees was used.

Of the First Congress, Harlow writes:

The outstanding feature of procedure in the House was the important part played by the Committee of the Whole. Much of the business in the House of Delegates of Virginia was transacted in that way, and the Virginians were influential enough to impose their methods upon the federal House.... It was in Committee of the Whole that Congress worked out the first tarriff bill, and also the main outlines of such important measures as the laws organizing the executive departments. After the general principles were once determined, select committees would be appointed to work out the details, and to frame bills in accordance with the decision already agreed upon in Committee of the Whole. Considerable work was done by these select committees, especially after the first session.16

And Alexander says:

In the early history of the House the select committee... was used exclusively for the consideration of bills, resolutions, and other legislative matters. 16 As business increased and kindred subjects became scattered, however, a tendency to concentrate inaugurated a system of standing committees. It rooted itself slowly.

16 Ralph V. Harlow, The History of Legislative Methods in the Period Before 1825 (New Haven: Yale, 1917), pp. 127-128. See also Joseph Cooper, "Jeffersonian Attitudes Toward Executive Leadership and Committee Development in the House of Representatives 1789-1829," Western Political Quarterly, 18 (March, 1965), 45-63; and Cooper, "Congress and Its Committees in the Legislative Process" (unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, Department of Government, Harvard University, 1960), pp. 1-65.

16 On changes in the use of select committees, Lauros G. McConachie says: "Business of the earlier Houses went to hosts of select committees. At least three hundred and fifty were raised in the Third Congress. A special committee had to be formed for every petty claim. A bill founded on the report of one small committee had to be recommended to, or carefully draited by, yet another committee. But the decline in the number of these select committees was strikingly rapid. In twenty years, at the Congress of 1813–1815 with its three war sessions, it had fallen to about seventy": Congressional Committees (New York: Crowell, 1898), p. 124. See also Galloway, op. cit., p. 88.

There was an evident distrust of the centralizing influence of permanent bodies. Besides, it took important business from the many and gave it to a few, one standing committee of three or five members often taking the place of half a dozen select committees.¹⁷

It is difficult to disentangle the early growth of the standing committee system from concurrent developments in the party system. For as Alexander Hamilton took control of the administration of George Washington, and extended his influence toward men of like mind in Congress, the third alternative to standing committees—reference to a member of the Executive Branch—became an important device of the Federalist majority in the House.

By the winter of 1790 [Harlow writes] Hamilton was attracting attention because of his influence over Congress. . . . His ready intelligence grasped the truth at once that Jefferson spent more than ten years learning: that not even the Constitution of the United States could keep apart two such inseparable factors in government as executive and legislature. 18

In the first two Congresses Hamilton is said to have used the Federalist caucus to guide debate in the Committee of the Whole, and also to have arranged for key financial measures to be referred directly to himself for detailed drafting.¹⁹ This practice led, in the Second Congress, to sharp clashes with followers of Jefferson, who

made it perfectly clear that if they should ever get the upper hand in Congress, they would make short work of Hamilton, and restore to the House what they considered to be its constitutional authority over finance.²⁰

The Republicans did in fact gain the upper hand in the Third Congress (elected in 1792) and they restored detailed power over finances to the Committee of the Whole. This did not work satisfactorily, however, and in the Fourth Congress a Committee on Ways and Means was formed. Harlow says:

The appointment of ... standing committees, particularly ... Ways and Means, was in a way a manifestation of the Republican theory of government. From their point of view, the members of the House, as the direct representa-

- ¹⁷ DeAlva Stanwood Alexander, *History and Procedure of the House of Representatives* (Boston: Houghton-Mifflin, 1916), p. 228.
 - 18 Harlow, op. cit., pp. 141.
 - ¹⁹ Ibid., pp. 120-150.
 - ²⁰ *Ibid.*, p. 151.

tives of the voters, ought to be the mainspring of the whole system. Hitherto, the Federalists had sold their birthright by permitting the executive to take a more active part in the government than was warranted by the Constitution. The Republicans now planned to bring about the proper balance between the different branches, by broadening at once the scope of the operations of the House, and restricting the executive. It was the better to enable the House to take its assigned part that the new type of organization was worked out. Just as the heads of departments were looked upon as agents of the executive, so the committees would be considered as the agents of the House.²¹

During the presidency of Thomas Jefferson, committees were constituted and employed as agents of the President's faction in Congress which was in most matters actively led by the President himself. Binkley says:

... When the House of Representatives had elected its Speaker and the committee chairmen had been appointed it was apparent to the discerning that lieutenants of the President had not appointed them, but his wishes, confidentially expressed, had determined them just as surely as if he had formally and publicly nominated them. Here was the fulfillment of Marshall's prediction that Jefferson would "embody himself in the House of Representatives."

There is, however, some doubt as to Jefferson's absolute mastery over committee appointments, since it is also reported that Speaker Macon was extremely important in constituting the committees, and, in particular, in keeping John Randolph on as chairman of the Ways and Means Committee for some time after Randolph had repeatedly and violently broken with the Jefferson administration.²³

²¹ Ibid., pp. 157-158.

²² Wilfred E. Binkley, *President and Congress* (New York: Vintage, 1962), p. 64.

²³ Of Randolph's initial appointment as chairman of the Ways and Means Committee, in the Seventh Congress, Noble Cunningham writes: "in view of the close friendship of [Speaker] Macon and Randolph, it is unlikely that Jefferson had any influence in the choice of Randolph as Chairman of the Ways and Means Committee": Jeffersonian Republicans in Power (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1963), p. 73. See also Henry Adams, John Randolph (Boston: Houghton-Mifflin, 1886), pp. 54-55, 123-165ff; and Adams, History of the United States of America During the Administrations of Thomas Jefferson

Recently the suggestion has been made that the direct evidence is slight and contradictory that political parties in Congress went through rapid organization and differentiation in the earliest years of the Republic. This revisionist interpretation lays greater stress upon boarding house cliques, more or less sectional and more or less ideologically factional in their composition, as the heretofore neglected building blocks out of which the more conventionally partisan Congressional politics of the Jacksonian era eventually grew.²⁴

But even revisionists concede to Jefferson a large influence over Congressional politics; the conventional accounts of the growth of the committee system are pretty much undissurbed by their critique. In essence, by the early years of the 19th century, the House committee system had passed through two distinct phases: the no-committee, Hamiltonian era, in which little or no internal differentiation within the institution was visible; and a Jeffersonian phase, in which factional alignments had begun to developthese were exploited by the brilliant and incessant maneuverings of the President himself, who selected his lieutenants and confidants from the ranks of Congress ad hoc, as political requirements and opportunities dictated. During this period a small number of standing committees existed, but were not heavily relied upon. Their jurisdictions were not so securely fixed that the Speaker could not instead appoint select committees to deal with business that ought to have been sent to them.25

The advent of Henry Clay and the victory of the War Hawk faction in the elections of 1810 brought the committee system to its third phase. Clay for the first time used the Speaker's prerogative of appointment of members to committees independently of Presidential designs. There is some question whether Clay's appointment policies were

and James Madison (New York: Boni, 1930), Vol. III, p. 128.

²⁴ This interpretation is the brilliant achievement of James S. Young in *The Washington Community:* 1800–1828 (New York: Columbia University Press, 1966). It harmonizes with Richard P. McCormick's notion of a series of historically discrete American party systems. See McCormick, *The Second American Party System* (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1966).

²⁵ See Wilfred Binkley, "The President and Congress," *Journal of Politics*, 11 (February, 1949), 65-79.

calculated to further his policy preferences or merely his popularity (and hence his Presidential ambitions) within the factionally divided house, 26 but there seems no reason to doubt that Clay won for the Speakership a new measure of independence as a power base in the American political system. Under Clay five House committees were constituted to oversee expenditures in executive departments, the first major institutionalization of the Congressional function of oversight. William N. Chambers writes:

[By] 1814 the committee system had become the dominant force in the chamber. Thus effective power was exercised not by the President, as had been the case with Jefferson, but by factional Congressional leaders working through the speakership, the caucus, and the committees.²⁷

For the next 100 years the committee system waxed and waned more or less according to the ways in which committees were employed by the party or faction that dominated the House and elected the Speaker. Figures from the latter decades of the 19th century testify amply to the leeway afforded Speakers—especially new ones—in constituting committees regardless of their prior composition. In part, it was Speaker Cannon's increasing use of this prerogative in an attempt to keep control of his fragmenting party that triggered the revolt against his Speakership in 1910–11, and that led to the establishment of the committee system as we know it today.

Under the fourth, decentralized, phase of the committee system, committees have won solid institutionalized independence from party leaders both inside and outside Congress. Their jurisdictions are fixed in the rules; their composition is largely determined and their

26 See Young, op. cit., pp. 131-135.

²⁷ William Nisbet Chambers, *Political Parties in a New Nation* (New York: Oxford, 1963), p. 194.

²⁸ See Nelson W. Polsby, Miriam Gallaher and Barry Spencer Rundquist, "The Growth of the Seniority System in the Selection of Committee Chairman in the U.S. House of Representatives" (mimeo., October, 1967).

²⁹ Ibid. Chang-wei Chiu says, "The power of appointing committees by the Speaker was a real issue in the attempts to reform the House. In the eyes of the insurgents no change would be of any real and permanent value to the country if that change did not take away from the Speaker the power of appointing standing committees": The Speaker of The House of Representatives Since 1896 (New York: Columbia University Press, 1928), pp. 71-72.

leadership entirely determined by the automatic operation of seniority. Their work is increasingly technical and specialized, and the way in which they organize internally to do their work is entirely at their own discretion. Committees nowadays have developed an independent sovereignty of their own, subject only to very infrequent reversals and modifications of their powers by House party leaders backed by large and insistent majorities.

To a degree, the development over the last sixty years of an increasingly complex machinery of party leadership within the House cross-cuts and attentuates the independent power of committees. Earlier, the leading faction in the House elected the Speaker and the Speaker in turn distributed the chairmanships of key committees to his principal allies and opponents. Thus the work of the House was centralized to the extent that the leading faction in the House was centralized. But differences of opinion are not uncommon among qualified observers. The Jeffersonian era, for example, is widely regarded as a high point of centralization during the 19th century. Harlow reports:

From 1801 to 1808 the floor leader was distinctly the lieutenant of the executive. William B. Giles, who was actually referred to as "the premier, or prime minister," Caesar A. Rodney, John Randolph of Roanoke, and Wilson Cary Nicholas all held that honorable position at one time or another. It was their duty to look after party interests in the House, and in particular to carry out the commands of the President. The status of these men was different from that of the floor leader of today... They were presidential agents, appointed by the executive, and dismissed at his pleasure. 30

But another observer, a Federalist congressman quoted by Noble Cunningham, suggests that the Jeffersonian group was not at all times well organized:

The ruling faction in the legislature have not yet been able to understand each other. . . . There evidently appears much rivalry and jealousy among the leaders. S[amuel] Smith thinks his experience and great address ought to give him a preponderance in all their measures, whilst Nicholson evidently looks upon these pretensions of his colleague with contempt, and Giles thinks the first representative of the Ancient Dominion ought certainly on all important occasions to take the lead, and Johnny Randolph is perfectly astonished that his great abilities should be overlooked. There is likewise a great number of other

³⁰ Harlow, op. cit., p. 176.

persons who are impatient of control and disposed to revolt at any attempts at discipline.²¹

This certainly squares with the reports of Jefferson's own continued attempts, also revealed in his letters, to recruit men to the House with whom he could work.³²

Despite Jefferson's difficulties, he was the most consistently successful of all the 19th century Presidents in "embodying himself in the House of Representatives." After Jefferson, the Speaker became a power in his own right; not infrequently he was a candidate for the Presidency himself, and the House was more or less organized around his, rather than the President's, political interests. There was no formal position of majority leader; the leading spokesman for the majority party on the floor was identified by personal qualities of leadership and by the favor of the Speaker (or in the Jeffersonian era, of the President) rather than by his institutional position.³³

Later, however, the chairman of the Ways and Means Committee—a key post reserved

³¹ Cunningham, op. cit., p. 74. The quotation is from a letter from Roger Griswold to John Rutledge, December 14, 1801.

²² See Jefferson's letters to Barnabas Bidwell and Wilson Cary Nicholas cited in *ibid.*, pp. 89–92. Also Henry Adams, *History*, op. cit., Vol. III, pp. 166–171.

33 Randall Ripley, in his forthcoming Brookings study, Party Leadership in the House of Representatives (mimeo, 1966) says: "The Majority leader did not become a separate and consistently identifiable party figure until some time around the turn of the century." Ripley also discusses the indeterminancy of the minority leadership in the mid-19th century. Of an earlier period (1800-1828) Young (op. cit., pp. 126-127) writes: "Party members elected no leaders, designated no functionaries to speak in their behalf or to carry out any legislative task assignments. The party had no whips, no seniority leaders. There were no committees on committees, no steering committees, no policy committees: none of the organizational apparatus that marks the twentieth-century congressional parties. . . ." On pp. 127-130 Young argues that although there were a number of party leaders in the House, there was no fixed majority leader. "[W]hile the names of Randolph, Giles, Nicholas and Rodney appear more frequently, at least twenty Republican legislators in the eight years of Jefferson's administration are either explicitly identified as leaders in the documentary record or are associated with activities strongly suggesting a role of presidential spokesmanship" (p. 130).

for the chief lieutenant of the Speaker—became de facto floor leader, a natural consequence of his responsibilities in managing the tariff bills that were so important in 19th century congressional politics. Occasionally the chairman of the Committee on Appropriations was the de facto leader, especially during periods of war mobilization, when the power of the House in the political system was coextensive with the power of the purse. In the last part of the 19th century, however, the Committee on Appropriations was temporarily dismantled, and the chairman of Ways and Means Committee began to receive the formal designation as party leader.

The high point of the Ways and Means chairman's power came in the aftermath of the 1910 revolt against the Speaker. The power of committee appointments was for Democrats lodged in the Ways and Means Committee. Chairman Oscar Underwood, in cooperation with President Wilson, for a time (1911–1915) eclipsed the Speaker and the committee chairmen by operating the majority party by caucus.³⁵

But Underwood's successor as Chairman of Ways and Means, Claude Kitchin (majority leader 1915–1919), disapproved of Wilson's war policies; this made it cumbersome and impractical for the leader of the majority on the floor and in caucus to hold this job by

Stevens left the chairmanship of Ways and Means (a post he had held from 1861–1865) to become chairman of the new Committee on Appropriations. See Samuel W. McCall, *Thaddeus Stevens* (Boston: Houghton-Mifflin, 1899), pp. 259–260. McCall says, oddly, that at the time the Appropriations Committee was not very important, but this is hard to credit. From 1895–1899, Joseph G. Cannon was floor leader and chairman of Appropriations. See Edward T. Taylor, A History of the Committee on Appropriations (House Document 299, 77th Congress, 1st Session) (Washington, Government Printing Office, 1941).

se George Rothwell Brown, The Leadership of Congress (Indianapolis: Bobbs Merrill, 1922), pp. 175-177, 183-184; Oscar King Davis, "Where Underwood Stands," The Outlook (December 23, 1911), 197-201. At p. 199: "Every move Mr. Underwood has made, every bill he has brought forward, he first submitted to a caucus. . . . Not until the last man had had his say was the vote taken that was to bind them all to united action in the House. Every time that vote has been either unanimous or nearly so, and invariably it has approved Mr. Underwood." See also Binkley, "The President and Congress," op. cit., p. 72.

virtue of what was becoming an automatic succession through seniority to the chairmanship of Ways and Means. A separation of the two roles was effected after the Democrats became the minority in 1919.36 Ever since then, the majority leader's job has existed as a fulltime position; the incumbent now holds a nominal, junior committee post but he rarely attends committee meetings. At the same time. the majority leader has become less of a President's man, and the caucus is now dormant as an instrument of party leadership -although it now sometimes becomes a vehicle, especially at the opening of Congress, for the expression of widespread dissatisfaction by rank-and-file House members. Thus, while binding votes on policy matters have not been put through the caucus by party leaders, the Republican caucus has three times in recent years deposed party leaders and the Democratic caucus has deprived three of its members of their committee seniority.

Formally designated party whips are, like the differentiated post of majority leaders, an innovation principally of the twentieth century. The first whips date back to just before the turn of the century. In the early years, the designation seems to have been quite informal, and it is only recently that an elaborate whip system, with numerous deputies, a small staff, and formal procedures for canvassing members, has been established by both parties in the House.³⁷

Thus, we can draw a contrast between the practices of recent and earlier years with respect to formal party leaders other than the Speaker:

- (1) Floor leaders in the 20th century are officially designated; in the 19th, they were often informally designated, indefinite, shifting or even competitive, and based on such factors as personal prestige, speaking ability, or Presidential favor.³⁸
 - (2) Floor leaders in recent years are sepa-
- ³⁶ See Ripley, op. cit.; Hasbrouck, op. cit., p. 94; and Alex M. Arnett, Claude Kitchin and the Wilson War Policies (Boston: Little, Brown, 1937), pp. 42, 71–72, 75–76, 88–89 and passim.
- ³⁷ See Randall B. Ripley, "The Party Whip Organization in the United States House of Representatives" this Review, 58 (September, 1964), 561-576.
- ³⁸ See, e.g., Alexander, op. cit., pp. 111-114. "[W]ith very few exceptions, the really eminent debaters... were in the Senate; otherwise, MacDuffie [who served 1821-1834], Chief of the Hotspurs, could scarely have justified his title to floor leader," p. 114.

rated from the committee system and elected by party members; earlier they were prominent committee chairmen who were given their posts by the Speaker, sometimes as a side-payment in the formation of a coalition to elect the Speaker.³⁹

(3) Floor leaders today rely upon whip systems; before 1897 there were no formally designated whips.

A third indicator of the growth of internal organization is the growth of resources assigned to internal House management, measured in terms of personnel, facilities, and money. Visitors to Washington are not likely to forget the sight of the five large office buildings, three of them belonging to the House, that flank the Capitol. The oldest of these on the House side was built just after the turn of the century, in 1909, when a great many other of our indices show significant changes.

Reliable figures, past or present, on personnel assigned to the House are impossible to come by; but it is unlikely that a commentator today would agree with the observer early in this century who said:

It is somewhat singular that Congress is one of the few legislative bodies that attempts to do its work almost entirely without expert assistance without the aid of parliamentary counsel, without bill drafting and revising machinery and without legislative and reference agencies, and until now it has shown little inclination to regard with favor proposals looking toward the introduction of such agencies.⁴⁰

Indeed, the only major contemporary study we have of congressional staff speaks of present "tendencies toward overexpansion of the congressional staff," and says that "Three-fourths of the committee aides interviewed" thought that professional staffs of committees were sufficiently large to handle their present work load.⁴¹

- ³⁹ Ibid., p. 110: "In selecting a floor leader the Speaker often names his party opponent."
- ⁴⁰ James W. Garner, "Executive Participation in Legislation as a Means of Increasing Legislative Efficiency," Proceedings of the American Political Science Association at its Tenth Annual Meeting (Baltimore: Waverly Press, 1914), p. 187.
- ⁴¹ Kenneth Kofmehl, Professional Staffs of Congress (Lafayette, Indiana: Purdue University Press, 1962), pp. 97–99. The quotation is at p. 99. Kofmehl presents a short, nonquantitative historical sketch of the growth of committee staffs on pp. 3–5. See also Samuel C. Patterson "Congressional Committee Professional Staffing: Capabili-

TABLE 6. THE GROWTH OF INTERNAL COMPLEXITY: EXPENDITURES MADE BY THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES*

Fiscal Year	Expenditures (1000s dollars)	Fiscal Year	Expenditures (1000s dollars)	Fiscal Year	Expenditures (1000s dollars
1872	1,952	1915	5,081	1961	47,324
1873	3,340	1916	4,917	1962	50,295
1874					52,983
1014	2,687	1917	5,400	1963	
1055	0.000	1918	5,331	1964	55,654
1875	2,030	1919	5,304	1965	58,212
1876	2,201				
1877	2,232	1920	7,059	1966 (est.)	65,905
1878	2,183	1921	6,510	1967 (est.)	70,883
1879	2,230	1922	6,001		
		1923	6,588		
1880	2,137	1924	6,154		
1881	2,191				
1882	2,188	1925	7,761		
1883	2,339	1926	7,493		
1884	2,405	1927	7,526		
	. ,	1928	7,623		
1885	2,466	1929	7,813		•
1886	$\frac{2,100}{2,379}$	1020	7,010		,
1887		1090	0.000		
	2,232	1930	8,260		
1888	2,354	1931	8,269		
1889	2,416	1932	8,310		
	2	. 1933	7,598		
1890	2,567	1934	7,154		
1891	2,520				
1892	2,323	1935	8,007		
1893	2,478	1936	8,377	,	
1894	2,844	1937	8,451		
		1938	8,139		
1895	2,945	1939	8,615		
1896	2,843		,	•	
1897	3,108	1940	9,375		
1898	2,948	1941	9,511		
1899	3,063	1942	9,678		
1000	0,000	1943	9,361		
1900	2,981	1944			
			10,944		
1901	3,066	1945	11,660		
1902	3,088	1040	14.040		
1903	3,223	1946	14,243		
1904	3,247	1947	16,012		
1005	0.00-	1948	18,096		•
1905	3,367	1949	18,110		
1906	3,517	1950	20,330		
1907	3,907				
1908	4,725	1951	21,053		
1909	5,005	1952	23,474		
	•	1953	23,622		
1910	4,897	1954	23,660		
1911	5,066	1955	26,610		
1912	4,741		,		
1913	5,148	1956	34,587	•	
1914	5,012	1957	36,738		•
	,,,,,,,	1958	39,524		
		1959	43,882		
		1959 1960	43,882 44,207	•	

^{*} Sources: U.S. Executive Office of President. Bureau of the Budget. The Budget of United States Government. Annual Volumes for 1921-1967. Washington, U.S. Government Printing Office U.S. Treasury Department. Combined Statement of Receipts, Expenditures and Balances of the United States Government. Annual volumes for 1872-1920. Washington, U.S. Government Printing Office.

Needless to say, that work load has grown. and, though it is impossible to say precisely by how much, congressional staffs have grown as well. This is roughly reflected in figures that are more or less comparable over time on that portion of the legislative budget assigned to the House. These figures show the expected increases. However, except for the jump between 1945 and 1946, reflecting the new provisions for staff aid of the Legislative Reorganization Act, the changes in these figures over time are not as abrupt as is the case with other of our time series. Nor would changes over time be even as steep as they are in Table 6 if these figures were corrected for changes in the purchasing power of the dollar. So we must regard this indicator as weak, but nevertheless pointing in the expected direction.

III. FROM PARTICULARISTIC AND DISCRE-TIONARY, TO UNIVERSALISTIC AND AUTOMATED DECISION MAKING

The best evidence we have of a shift away from discretionary and toward automatic decision making is the growth of seniority as a criterion determining committee rank and the growth of the practice of deciding contested elections to the House strictly on the merits.

The literature on seniority presents a welter of conflucting testimony. Some commentators date the seniority system from 1910;⁴² others say that seniority as a criterion for determining the committee rank of members was in use well before.⁴³ Woodrow Wilson's classic account of Congressional Government in 1384 pays tribute both to the independence of the committees and their chairman and to the absolute discretion of the Speaker in the committee appointment process.⁴⁴ It is clear that the

ties and Constraints," a paper presented at the Planning Conference of the Comparative Administration Group, Legislative Services Project, Planting Fields, New York, December 8-10, 1967; and Lindsay Rogers "The Staffing of Congress" Political Science Quarterly, 56 (March, 1941), 1-22.

⁴² George B. Galloway, op. cii., p. 187; George Goodwin, Jr., "The Seniority System in Congress" this Review, 53 (June, 1959), p. 417.

43 Chiu, op. cit., pp. 68-72; James K. Pollock, Jr., "The Seniority Rule in Congress," The North American Review, 222 (1925), 235, 236; Asher Hinds, "The Speaker of the House of Representatives," this Review, 3 (May, 1909), 160-161.

⁴⁴ Woodrow Wilson, Congressional Government (New York: Meridian Books, 1956) (First edition, 1884). See, for example, on pp. 85-86: "The Speaker is expected to constitute the Committees Speaker has no such power today. In another paper my colleagues and I present a detailed preliminary tabulation and discussion on the extent to which seniority in its contemporary meaning was followed in the selection of committee chairmen in the most recent 40 Congresses. The central finding for our present purposes (summarized in Table 7 and Figure 5)

TABLE 7. THE GROWTH OF UNIVERSALISM: VIOLATIONS OF SENIORITY IN THE APPOINTMENT OF COMMITTEE CHAIRMEN, U.S. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES 1881–1963

Percentage of	Committees o	n which	the	chairman	was	not
selected by ser	niority, average	d by deca	des			

				,
Congress:	47-51	52-56	57-61	62-66
Years:	1881-89	1891-99	1901-09	1911-19
Average:	60.4%	49.4%	19%	30.8%
Violations of Seniority				
			/	
Congress:	67-71	72-76	77-81	8288
Years:	1921-29	1931-39	1941-49	195163
Average:	26%	23%	14%	.7%
Violations				

is that the seniority system—an automatic, universally applied, nondiscretionary method of selection—is now always used, but that formerly the process by which chairmen were selected was highly and later partially discretionary.

The figures for before 1911 can be interpreted as indicating the use of the Speaker's discretion in the appointment of committee chairmen. After 1911, when committee appointment powers are vested in committees on committees, the figures principally reflect the growth of the norm that no one man should

in accordance with his own political views . . . [and he] generally uses his powers as freely and imperatively as he is expected to use them. He unhesitatingly acts as the legislative chief of his party, organizing the Committees in the interest of this or that policy, not covertly or on the sly, as one who does something of which he is ashamed, but openly and confidently, as one who does his duty. . . ." Compare this with p. 82: "I know not how better to describe our form of government in a single phrase than by calling it a government by the chairmen of the Standing Committees of Congress. This disintegrate-ministry, as it figures on the floor of the House of Representatives, has many peculiarities. In the first place, it is made up of the elders of the assembly; for, by custom, seniority in congressional service determines the bestowal of the principal chairmanships. . . . "

45 Polsby, Gallaher, and Rundquist, op. cit.




Fig. 5. The Growth of Universalism; Decline in Violations of Seniority, Committee Chairmen, U.S. House of Representatives, 1881-1963.*

serve as chairman of more than one committee. Congressmen often sat on a large number of committees, and senior men rose to the top of more than one committee, but allowed less senior men to take the chair, much as the custom presently is in the U.S. Senate. After 1946, when the number of committees was drastically reduced, this practice died out, and a strictly automated system of seniority has asserted itself.

The settlement of contested elections on some basis other than the merits seems in earlier years to have been a common phenomenon. To this point, we can bring the testimony of a number of quotes and anecdotes, widely separated in time. Here are a few examples:

(95: A foreshadowing of future developments arose in the contested election of Joseph B. Varnum, of Massachusetts, in the Fourth Congress. This case became the focus of a struggle for power between the Federalists and the Anti-Federalists. It is an early instance of the triumph of the rule that all too often might makes right, at least in the settlement of election contests in the House of Representatives.

Varnum's election was contested on the principal ground that the Board of Selectmen of his home town (of which Board he was a member) had returned sixty votes more than there were qualified

^{*} Data from Table 7.

voters in the town. Since he had been elected with a certified overall plurality of eleven votes, investigation was warranted. Theodore Sedgwick, leader of the Federalists in the House, suggested that testimony be taken ... inasmuch as the House alone had the power to compel the town clerk to produce the records containing the names of the illegal voters, if indeed any existed. Varnum, an Anti-Federalist, strongly protested against such a procedure. . . . He proposed . . . that petitioners . . . should present the names of the illegal voters, if they could do so. . . . This was impossible, since only the town clerk had access to the voting records of the town. The Anti-Federalists, who controlled the House at the time, on a party-line vote sustained Varnum's objections . . . in fact, the controlling faction even went so far as to adopt a resolution, again by a partisan vote, declaring that "the charges against [Varnum] are wholly unfounded. ..." "Thus, amidst an outburst of derisive laughter, the incident closed like a harliquinade."43

1860's: I served in my second term on the Committee on Elections. . . . Election cases in the House up to that time were . . . determined entirely by party feeling. Whenever there was a plausible reason for making a contest the dominant party in the House almost always awarded the seat to the man of its own side. There is a well-authenticated story of Thaddeus Stevens, that going into the room of the Committee on Elections, of which he was a member, he found a hearing going on. He asked one of his Republican colleagues what was the point in the case. "There is not much point to it," was the answer. "They are both damned scoundrels." "Well," said Stevens, "which is the Republican damned scoundrel? I want to go for the Republican damned scoundrel."47

⁴⁰ John Thomas Dempsey, "Control by Congress over the Seating and Disciplining of Members" (unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, The University of Michigan, 1956), pp. 50-51. The final quotation is from Alexander, op. cit., p. 315.

⁴⁷ George F. Hoar, Autobiography of Seventy Years (New York: Scribner, 1903), Vol. I, p. 268. Hoar claims that during the time he served on the Elections Committee in the Forty-second Congress (1871–73), contested elections were settled on the merits.

1869: All traces of a judicial character in these proceedings are fast fading away.... Each case is coming to be a mere partisan struggle. At the dictate of party majorities, the Committee [on Elections] must fight, not follow, the law and the evidence.... This tendency is so manifest . . . that it has ceased to be questioned, and is now but little resisted . . . [E]fforts...to hold the judgments of the Committee on Elections up above the dirty pool of party politics have encountered such bitter and unsparing denunciation, and such rebuke for treason to party fealty, that they are not likely often to be repeated.48

1890: The [elections] committee usually divides on the line of party . . . and the House usually follows in the same way. ... The decision of election cases invariably increases the party which organized the House and ... appoints the majority of the Committee on Elections. Probably there is not an instance on record where the minority was increased by the decision of contested cases. . . . It may be said that our present method of determining election cases is . . . unjust to members and contestants and fails to secure the representation which the people have chosen.49

1895: A most casual inspection of the workings of the present system of deciding election contests will show that it barely maintains the form of a judicial inquiry and that it is thoroughly tainted with the grossest partisanship.... When it is alleged that members of a minority do not generally contest seats, a striking tribute is paid to the partisanship of the present system. 50

1899: The Republican majority in this House

⁴⁸ Henry L. Dawes, "The Mode of Procedure in Cases of Contested Elections," Journal of Social Science (No. 2, 1870), 56-68. Quoted passages are at p. 64. Dempsey, op. cit., pp. 83-84, identifies Dawes as a one-time chairman of the House Committee on Elections. See also C. H. Rammelkamp, "Contested Congressional Elections," Political Science Quarterly, 20 (Sept., 1905), 434-435.

⁴⁹ Thomas B. Reed, "Contested Elections," North American Review, 151 (July, 1890), 112–120. Quoted passages are at pp. 114 and 117. See also Alexander, op. cit., p. 323.

⁵⁰ Report from Elections Committee No. 3, Mr. McCall, chairman, quoted in Rammelkamp, op. cit., p. 435.

[56th Congress] was reduced about fifty from the previous Congress, but before the [first] session closed, a dozen or more Democrats lost their seats in election contests, which gave the Republicans a comfortable majority with which to do business.⁵¹

1905: Today it is simply a contest between two parties for political influence and the rewards of office, or sometimes a contest between the majority in the House and a constituency of the minority party.... In the period [1865-1905, 39th through 58th Congresses]... the majority deprived itself of seats only nine times, while it deprived the minority of seats eighty-two times.²²

A journalist writing at the beginning of the twentieth century summarizes the situation as he had encountered it over a twenty-year period:

It may be said... that there is no fairness whatever exercised in ... contests for seats, especially where the majority needs the vote for party purposes. Hundreds of men have lost their seats in Congress, to which they were justly entitled upon all fair, reasonable, and legal grounds, and others put in their places for purely partisan reasons. This has always been so and doubtless will continue so.... 63

In fact, it has not continued so; nowadays, contested elections are settled with much more regard to due process and the merits of the case than was true throughout the nineteenth century. By 1926, a minority member of the Committee on Elections No. 1 could say:

In the eight years I have served on Elections Committees and six years upon this Committee, I have never seen partisanship creep into that Committee but one time. There has not been any partisanship in the Committee since the distinguished gentleman from Utah became Chairman of that Committee. A Democrat was seated the last time over a Republican by this Committee, and every member of the Committee voted to seat that Democrat.⁵⁴

This quotation suggests a method by which

- ⁵¹ O. O. Stealey, Twenty Years in the Press Gallery (New York: published by the author, 1906), p. 147.
- ⁵² Rammelkamp, op. cit., pp. 421-442. Quoted passages are from pp. 423 and 434.
 - ⁵³ Stealey, op. cit., p. 147.
- ⁵⁴ Quoted in Paul De Witt Hasbrouck, *Party Government in the House of Representatives* (New York: Macmillan, 1927), p. 40.

the development of universalistic criteria for settling contested House elections can be monitored, namely, measuring the extent to which party lines are breached in committee reports and in voting on the floor in contest cases. I have made no such study, but on the basis of the accumulated weight of contemporary reports such as I have been quoting, I predict that a time series would show strict party voting in the 19th century, switching to unanimity or near-unanimity, in most cases, from the early years of the 20th century onward.

Attempts to establish legal precedents for the settlement of contested elections date from the recommendations of the Ames Committee in 1791. In 1798 a law was enacted prescribing a uniform mode of taking testimony and for compelling the attendance of witnesses. This law was required to be renewed in each Congress and was allowed to lapse in 1804. Bills embodying similar laws were proposed in 1805, 1806, 1810, 1813, and 1830. Not until 1851 was such a law passed, which provided for the gathering of testimony forming the bases of the proofs of each contestant's claim, but not for rules concerning other aspects of contested elections. More significant, however, was a clause permitting the House to set the law aside in whole or in part in specific cases, which apparently the House availed itself of with some regularity in the 19th century. With a few modifications this law is still in effect.55

The absolute number of contests shows a decrease in recent decades, as does the number of contests in relation to the number of seats. This suggests that the practice of instigating contests for frivolous reasons has passed into history; contemporary House procedures no longer hold out the hope of success for such contests. ⁵⁶ Table 8 and Figure 6 give the figures, by decades.

55 See U.S., Revised Statutes of the United States, Title II, Ch. 8, Sections 105–130, and Dempsey, op. cit., pp. 55–60. For indications of attempts to routinize the process of adjudication by setting up general criteria to govern House disposition of contested elections, see two 1933 cases: Gormley vs. Goss (House Report 893, 73rd Congress; see also 78 Congressional Record, pp. 4035, 7087, April 20, 1934) and Chandler vs. Burnham (House Report 1278, 73rd Congress; see also 78 Congressional Record, pp. 6971, 8921, May 15, 1934).

⁵⁶ On the relatively scrupulous handling of a recent contest see Richard H. Rovere, "Letter from Washington," *The New Yorker* (October 16, 1965), 233-244. Rovere (at p. 243) identifies criteria governing the report on the 1965 challenge

TABLE 8. THE GROWTH OF UNIVERSALISM: CONTESTED ELECTIONS IN THE HOUSE BY DECADES, 1789–1964

Congress	Number of Contested Seats		% Seats Con- tested Per Congress*
1- 5 (1789-1798)	16	89.8	3.56
6-10 (1799-1808)	12	126.6	1.90
11-15 (1809-1818)	16	166.4	1.92
16-20 (1819-1828)	12	202.6	1.18
21-25 (1829-1838)	11	230.0	.96
26-30 (1839-1848)	17	231.8	1.46
31-35 (1849-1858)	23	233.0	1.98
36-40 (1859-1868)	73	. 196.4	7.44
41-45 (1869-1878)	72	273.0	5.28
46-50 (1879-1888)	58	312.2	3.72
51-55 (1889-1898)	87	346.8	5.02
56-60 (1899-1908)	41	374.4	2.20
61-65 (1909-1918)	36	417.4	1.72
66-70 (1919-1928)	23	435.0	1.06
71-75 (1929-1938)	25	435.0	1.14
76-80 (1939-1948)	15 ,	435.0	.68
81-85 (1949-1958)	12	435.0	.56
86-88 (1959-1964)	8	437.0	.90

^{*} Column 2 divided by column 3, over the number of Congresses (5 except in last instance).

Sources: Dempsey op. cit., Appendix I, and George B. Galloway, History of the U.S. House of Representatives (House Document 246, 87th Congress, 1st Session) (Washington: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1962), pp. 215-216.

There is today, certainly, no wholesale stealing of seats. If any bias exists in the system, it probably favors the protection of incumbents irrespective of party,⁵⁷ and hence (we may surmise not incidentally) the protection of the boundaries of the organization.

IV. CAUSES, CONSEQUENCES, CONCLUSIONS

It seems reasonable to conclude that one of the main long-run changes in the U.S. House of Representatives has been toward greater institutionalization. Knowing this, we may wish to ask, at a minimum, three questions: What caused it? What follows from it? What can this case tell us about the process in general? It is not from lack of space alone that our

by the Mississippi Freedom Democratic Party to the entire Mississippi House delegation in the following passage: "... the majority could find no way to report favorably [on the challenge] without, as it seemed to them, abandoning due process and their constitutional responsibilities. Neither, for that matter, could the minority report, which went no further than to urge continued study."

⁶⁷ See, e.g., the assignment of burden of proof in Gormley vs. Goss and Chandler vs. Burnham, loc. cit.

answers to each of these questions will be brief and highly speculative.

Not much, for example, is known about the causes of institutionalization. The best theoretical guess in the literature is probably Durkheim's: "The division of labor varies in direct ratio with the volume and density of societies, and, if it progresses in a continuous manner in the course of social development, it is because societies become regularly denser and generally more voluminous."58 "Density" in at least some sense is capable of being operationalized and measured separately from its institutional consequences. For present purposes, the proposition can probably be rendered as follows: As the responsibilities of the national government grew, as a larger proportion of the national economy was affected by decisions taken at the center, the agencies of the national government institutionalized. 59 Another, complementary, translation of the density theorem would be that as organizations grow in size, they tend to develop internally in ways predicted by the theory of institutionalization. Size and increasing workload seem to me in principle measurable phenomena.60 Size alone, in fact, seems almost

- 58 Durkheim, op. cit., p. 262. Durkheim in turn cites Comte as describing this mechanism. Weber's notion, that the central precondition for the development of bureaucratic institutions is the money economy, strikes me as less interesting and less plausible. See H. H. Gerth and C. Wright Mills (eds.), From Max Weber: Essays in Sociology (N. Y.: Oxford University Press, 1946), pp. 204–209. See, however, Weber's comment (p. 211): "It is obvious that technically the great modern state is absolutely dependent upon a bureaucratic basis. The larger the state, and the more it is or the more it becomes a great power state, the more unconditionally is this the case."
- ⁵⁹ Cf. Young, op. cit., pp. 252-253, who seems to put great stress on public attitudes and local political organization as causes of the growth in the influence of the central government.
- of George Galloway's History of the U.S. House of Representatives, 87th Congress, 1st Session, House Document No. 246 (Washington: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1962), pp. 215-216, has a convenient scorecard on the size and party composition of the House for the first 87 Congresses. Mere size has been found to be an indifferent predictor of the internal complexity of bureaucratic organizations. See Richard H. Hall, J. Eugene Haas and Norman J. Johnson, "Organizational Size, Complexity, and Formalization," American Sociological Review, 32 (December, 1967), 903-912.




Fig. 6. The Growth of Universalism: Contested Elections in the House by Decades, 1789-1964.*

* Data from Table 8.

too easy. Until a deliberative body has some minimum amount of work to do, the necessity for interaction among its members remains slight, and, having no purpose, coordination by means of a division of labor, rules and regulations, precedents and so on, seem unlikely to develop. So a somewhat more complicated formula has to be worked out, perhaps relating the size of an organization to the amount of work it performs (e.g., number of work-days per year, number of full-time as opposed to nominal members, number of items considered, number of reports rendered) before the strength of "density" and "volume" can be tested as causes of the process of institutionalization.

A discussion of the consequences of the House's institutionalization must be equally tentative. It is hard—indeed for the contemporary observer, impossible—to shake the conviction that the House's institutional structure does matter greatly in the production of political outcomes. A recent popular account begins:

A United States Congressman has two principal functions: to make laws and to keep laws from being made. The first of these he and his colleagues perform only with sweat, patience and a remarkable skill in the handling of creaking

machinery; but the second they perform daily, with ease and infinite variety.61

No observer who focuses upon policy results, or who cares about the outputs of the American legislative process, fails to note the "complicated forms and diversified structure" which "confuse the vision, and conceal the system which underlies its composition." All this is such settled knowledge that it seems unnecessary to mention it here. Still, it is important to stress that the very features of the House which casual observers and freshman legislators find most obstrusive are principal consequences of (among other things) the process we have been describing. 53

⁶¹ Robert Bendiner, Obstacle Course on Capitol Hill (N. Y.: McGraw-Hill, 1964), p. 15.

62 Woodrow Wilson, op. cit., p. 57.

63 This is not to say, however, that the policy output of the House is exclusively determined by its level of institutionalization. The 88th, 89th and 90th Congresses all represent more or less equivalent levels of institutionalization, yet their policy outputs varied greatly. Nevertheless if the casual observer asked why it took thirty years, more or less, to get the New Deal enacted in the House, and what sorts of strategies and circumstances made the legislative output of the 89th

It is, however, not merely the complexity of the venerability of the machinery that they notice. These, in our discussion so far, have been treated as defining characteristics rather than consequences of institutionalization. What puzzles and irks the outside observer is a partial displacement of goals, and a focus of resources upon internal processes at the expense of external demands, that come as a consequence of institutionalization. This process of displacement is, of course, well known to social theory in other settings. A closer look at the general character of this displacement is bound to suggest a number of additional consequences.

For example, representatives may find that the process of institutionalization has increased their incentives to stay within the system For them, the displacement of resources transforms the organization from a convenient instrument for the pursuit of social policies into an end value itself, a prime source of gratification, of status and power.⁶⁵

The increasing complexity of the division of labor presents an opportunity for individual Representatives to specialize and thereby enormously increase their influence upon a narrow range of policy outcomes in the political system at large. Considered separately, the phenomenon of specialization may strike the superficial observer as productive of narrow-minded drones. But the total impact of a cadre of specialists operating over the entire spectrum of public policies is a formidable asset for a political institution; and it has undoubtedly enabled the House to retain a measure of autonomy and influence that is quite exceptional for a 20th century legislature. 66

Congress possible, answers would have to refer quite extensively to structural properties of the institution.

et See, e.g. Peter M. Blau, The Dynamics of Bureaucracy (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1955), passim; Philip Selznick, TVA and the Grass Roots (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1953), esp. pp. 250ff.

⁶⁵ See Philip Selznick, *Leadership in Administration* (Evanston: Row, Peterson, 1957).

66 This position disagrees with Sidney Hyman, "Inquiry into the Decline of Congress," New York Times Magazine, January 31, 1960. For the argument that 20th century legislatures are on the whole weak see David B. Truman, "The Representative Function in Western Systems," in Edward H. Buehrig (ed.), Essays in Political Science (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1966), pp. 84-96; Truman, The Congressional Party (New York: Wiley, 1954), pp. 1-10; Tru-

Institutionalization has, in the House, on the whole meant the decentralization of power. This has created a great many important and interesting jobs within the House, and thus increased the attractiveness of service therein as a career. Proposed reforms of Congress which seek to move toward a recentralization of Congressional power rarely consider this fact. But it is at least possible that some moves to restore discretion to the Speaker, or to centralized party agencies outside Congress, would reduce the effectiveness of Congress far below the level anticipated, because the House would come to be less valued in and of itself, its division of labor would provide less of a power base for subject matter specialists, and the incentives to stay within the organization would sharply decline.

Thus we can argue that, along with the more obvious effects of institutionalization, the process has also served to increase the power of the House within the political system and to spread somewhat more widely incentives for legislators to participate actively in policymaking.

A final possible consequence of institutionalization can be suggested: that the process tends to promote professional norms of conduct among participants. Indeed, something like these norms are built into the definition of institutionalization by some commentators. Eut the built-in norms typically mentioned in discussions of "organization men" have to do with the segmental, ritualized interaction that characterizes organizations coordinated by hierarchical means; slightly different predictions about norms would have to be made for more decentralized, more egalitarian institutionalized legislative bodies.

In fact, there is coming to be a sizeable body of literature about the norms of professional legislative conduct. Time and again, the norms of predictability, courtesy, and reciprocity are offered by professional legislators as central to the rules of the legislative game. 68 Thus, we can

man, "Introduction: The Problem and Its Setting," in Truman (ed.), The Congress and America's Future (Englewood Cliffs: Prentice-Hall, 1965), pp. 1-4. For the beginning of an argument that the U.S. Congress may be an exception, see Nelson W. Polsby, Congress and the Presidency (New York: Prentice-Hall, 1964), pp. 2, 31-32, 47-115.

⁶⁷ See Weber, op. cit., p. 69, pp. 330-34; and Gerth and Mills, op. cit., pp. 198-204.

⁶⁸ See, for example, Dorald Matthews, "The Folkways of the U.S. Senate," this REVIEW, 53 (December, 1959), 1064-1089; John C. Wahlke,

suggest a hypothesis that the extent to which these norms are widely applied in a legislative body is a direct function of that body's structural institutionalization. Appropriate tests can be made cross-sectionally, by comparing contemporary legislatures that vary with respect to boundary-maintenance, internal complexity, and universalistic-automated internal decision making. Historically, less satisfactory tests are possible, since a number of vagaries enter into the determination of what is recorded and what is not, and since antecedent factors may account for both structural and normative institutionalization. This makes it hard to estimate the dispersion and importance of norms of conduct.

Nevertheless, the history of the House does suggest that there has been a growth in the rather tame virtues of reciprocity, courtesy, and predictability in legislative life since the turn of the century. Clem Miller describes human relations in the House of today:

One's overwhelming first impression as a member of Congress is the aura of friendliness that surrounds the life of a congressman. No wonder that "few die and none resign." Almost everyone is unfailingly polite and courteous. Window washers, clerks, senators—it cuts all ways. We live in a cocoon of good feeling. . . . 69

No doubt there are breaches in the fabric of good fellowship, mostly unpublicized, but the student of Congress cannot refrain even so from comparing this testimony with the following sampling of 19th century congressional conduct:

Upon resuming his seat, after having replied to a severe personal arraignment of Henry Clay, former Speaker White, without the slightest warning, received a blow in the face. In the fight that followed a pistol was discharged wounding an

Heinz Eulau, William Buchanan, and Leroy C. Ferguson, The Legislative System (New York: Wiley, 1962), pp. 141-169; Alan Kornberg, "The Rules of the Game in the Canadian House of Commons," The Journal of Politics, 26 (May, 1964), 358-380; Ralph K. Huitt, "The Outsider in The Senate," this Review, 55 (September, 1961), 566-575; Nicholas A. Masters, "Committee Assignments in The House of Representatives," this Review, 55 (June, 1961), 345-357; Richard F. Fenno, Jr., "The House Appropriations Committee as a Political System: The Problem of Integration," this Review, 56 (June, 1962), 310-324.

69 Clem Miller, Member of the House (John W. Baker, ed.) (New York: Scribner, 1962), p. 93. See also pp. 80-81 and 119-122.

officer of the police. John Bell, the distinguished Speaker and statesman, had a similar experience in Committee of the Whole (1838). The fisticuffs became so violent that even the Chair would not quell it. Later in the day both parties apologized and "made their submissions." On February 6, 1845, Edward J. Black, of Georgia, "crossed over from his seat, and, coming within the bar behind Joshua R. Giddings as he was speaking, made a pass at the back of his head with a cane. William H. Hammett, of Mississippi, threw his arms round Black and bore him off as he would a woman from a fire. . . ."

When Reuben M. Whitney was before a committee of investigation in 1837, Bailie Peyton, of Tennessee, taking offense at one of his answers, threatened him fiercely, and when he rose to claim the committee's protection, Mr. Peyton, with due and appropriate profanity, shouted: "You shan't say one word while you are in this room; if you do I will put you to death." The chairman, Henry A. Wise, added: "Yes; this insolence is insufferable." As both these gentlemen were armed with deadly weapons, the witness could hardly be blamed for not wanting to testify before the committee again.

"These were not pleasant days," writes Thomas B. Reed. "Men were not nice in their treatment of each other."

Indeed they were not: Nineteenth century accounts of Congressional behavior abound in passages like these. There is the consternation of members who put up with the presence on the floor of John Randolph's hunting dogs. There is the famous scene on May 22, 1851, when Representative Preston Brooks of South Carolina entered the U.S. Senate and beat Senator Charles Sumner senseless with a cane, 22 and the record contains accounts of more than one such occasion:

⁷⁰ Alexander, op. cit., pp. 115-116. The internal quotations are from John Quincy Adams' Diary and from an article by Reed in the Saturday Evening Post, December 9, 1899.

ⁿ Mayo, op. cit., p. 424; William Parkes Cutler and Julia Perkins Cutler (eds.), Life, Journals and Correspondence of Reverend Manasseh Cutler (Cincinnati: Robert Clark and Co., 1888), Vol. II, pp. 186-189.

⁷² A motion to expel Brooks from the House for this act was defeated; but soon thereafter Brooks resigned anyway. He was subsequently reelected to fill the vacancy caused by his resignation. See Biographical Directory of The American Congress, 1774–1961 (Washington: Government Printing Office, 1961), p. 604.

When Matthew Lyon, of Kentucky, spat in his face, [Roger] Griswold [of Connecticut, a member 1795–1805] stiffened his arm to strike, but remembering where he was, he coolly wiped his cheek. But after the House by its vote failed to expel Lyon, he "beat him with great violence," says a contemporary chronicle, "using a strong walking-stick." ¹⁷³

With all the ill will that the heat of battle sometimes generates currently, the House has long since left behind the era of guns and dogs, canings and fisticuffs, that occupied so much of the 19th century scene. No doubt this reflects general changes in manners and morals. but it also reflects a growth in the value of the House as an institution capable of claiming the loyalty and good behavior of its members.74 The best test of the hypothesis, to be sure, remains the cross-sectional one. If American state legislatures, for example, can be found to differ significantly with respect to structural institutionalization, they may also be found to vary concomitantly with respect to the application of the norms of professional legislative life.75

⁷³ Alexander, op. cit., pp. 111-112. Other instances of flagrant misbehavior are chronicled in Ben Perley Poore, Perley's Reminiscences of Sixty Years in the National Metropolis (Philadelphia: Hubbard, 1886), Vol. I, pp. 394-395; and William Plumer, Memorandum of Proceedings in the United States Senate (Everett Somerville Brown, ed.) (New York: Macmillan, 1923), pp. 269-276.

74 A report on decorum in the 19th Century House of Commons suggests that a corresponding toning down has taken place, although Commons was palpably a good bit less unruly to start with. Says an ecstatic commentator, "Like so much else that is good in the institutions of Parliament, the behaviour of the House has grown straight, or, like a river, purified itself as it flowed": Eric Taylor, The House of Commons At Work (Baltimore: Penguin, 1961), pp. 85-87. Anthony Barker says: "The close of the 19th Century has been described by Lord Campion as the ending of informality and the beginning of rigid government responsibility for policy in the procedures of the House of Commons": "'The Most Important And Venerable Function': A Study of Commons Supply Procedure," Political Studies, 13 (February, 1965), p. 45.

⁷⁵ Perhaps secondary analysis comparing the four states (California, New Jersey, Tennessee, Ohio) in the Wahlke, Eulau, Buchanan, and Ferguson study (op. cit.) will yield an acceptable test of the hypothesis. This study has good in-

Finally, the study of the institutionalization of the House affords us a perspective from which to comment upon the process in general. First, as to its reversibility. Many of our indicators show a substantial decay in the institutional structure of the House in the period surrounding the Civil War. In sheer numbers, the House declined from 237 members in the Congress of 1859 to 178 in the Congress of 1861; not until a decade later did the House regain its former strength. Frivolous contests for seats reached a height in this period, and our rank-and-file boundary measures reflect decay as well. It may be true, and it is certainly amusing, that the strength of the British Admiralty grows as the number of ships declines:76 but that this illustrates an inflexibly narcissistic law of institutional growth may be doubted. As institutions grow, our expectations about the displacement of resources inward do give us warrant to predict that they will resist decay, but the indications of curvelinearity in our present findings give us ample warning that institutions are also continuously subject to environmental influence and their power to modify and channel that influence is bound to be less than all-encompassing.

Some of our indicators give conditional support for a "take-off" theory of modernization. If one of the stigmata of the take-off to modernity is the rapid development of universalistic, bounded, complex institutional forms, the data presented here lend this theory some plausibility." The "big bang" seems to come in the 1890–1910 period, on at least some of the measures.

In conclusion, these findings suggest that increasing hierarchical structure is not a necessary feature of the institutionalization process. Organizations other than bureaucracies, it seems clear, also are capable of having natural histories which increase their viability in the modern world without forcing them into uniformly centralized patterns of authority.

formation on the diffusion of legislative norms; it is less strong on structural data, but these might be relatively easy to gather.

76 Parkinson, op. cit., p. 39.

77 The growth of political institutions does not play a particularly important part in the interpretation offered by W. W. Rostow in *The Stages of Economic Growth* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1960), see, e.g., pp. 18-19, but these may afford at least as good support for his theory as some of the economic indicators he proposes.

THE TRANSMISSION OF POLITICAL VALUES FROM PARENT TO CHILD*

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In understanding the political development of the pre-adult one of the central questions hinges on the relative and differentiated contributions of various socializing agents. The question undoubtedly proves more difficult as one traverses a range of polities from those where life and learning are almost completely wrapped up in the immediate and extended family to those which are highly complex social organisms and in which the socialization agents are extremely varied. To gain some purchase on the role of one socializing agent in our own complex society, this paper will take up the specific question of the transmission of certain values from parent to child as observed in late adolescence. After noting parent-child relationships for a variety of political values, attention will be turned to some aspects of family structure which conceivably affect the transmission flows.

I. ASSESSING THE FAMILY'S IMPACT

"Foremost among agencies of socialization into politics is the family." So begins Herbert Hyman's discussion of the sources of political learning.1 Hyman explicitly recognized the importance of other agents, but he was neither the first nor the last observer to stress the preeminent position of the family. This viewpoint relies heavily on both the direct and indirect role of the family in shaping the basic orientations of offspring. Whether the child is conscious or unaware of the impact, whether the process is role-modelling or overt transmission, whether the values are political and directly usable or "nonpolitical" but transferable, and whether what is passed on lies in the cognitive or affective realm, it has been

* Revised version of a paper delivered at the annual meeting of the American Political Science Association, New York, September, 1966. Financial support for the study reported here comes from The Danforth Foundation and the National Science Foundation. We wish to acknowledge the assistance of Michael Traugott in the preparation of this paper.

¹ Herbert Hyman, *Political Socialization* (New York: Free Press of Glencoe, 1959), p. 69.

argued that the family is of paramount importance. In part this view draws heavily from psychoanalytic theory, but it is also influenced by anthropological and national character studies, and by the great emphasis on role theory in sociological studies of socialization. In part the view stems also from findings in the area of partisan commitment and electoral behavior indicating high intergenerational agreement. Unfortunately for the general thesis, such marked correlations have been only occasionally observed in other domains of political life. Indeed, other domains of political life have been rarely explored systematically with respect to the central question of articulation in parent-child political values.2 Inferences, backward and forward extrapolations, and retrospective and projective data have carried the brunt of the argument.

A recent major report about political socialization during the elementary years seriously questions the family's overriding importance. In contrast to the previously-held views that the family was perhaps preeminent or at least co-equal to other socializing agents stands the conclusion by Robert Hess and Judith Torney that "the public school is the most important and effective instrument of political socialization in the United States." and that "the family transmits its own particular values in relatively few areas of political socialization and that, for the most part, the impact of the family is felt only as one of several socializing agents and institutions."3 Hess and Torney see the primary influence of the family as the agent which promotes early attachment to country and government, and which thus "insures the stability of basic institutions."4

- ² Most of these few studies, cited by Hyman, op. cit., pp. 70-71, are based on extremely limited samples and nearly all took place between 1930-1950.
- ³ Robert D. Hess and Judith V. Torney, The Development of Basic Attitudes and Values Toward Government and Citizenship During the Elementary School Years, Part I (Cooperative Research Project No. 1078, U.S. Office of Education, 1965), pp. 193, 200.
 - 4 Ibid., p. 191.

Hence, "the family's primary effect is to support consensually-held attitudes rather than to inculcate idiosyncratic attitudes." The major exception to these conclusions occurs in the area of partisanship and related matters where the family's impact is predictably high.

The Hess and Torney argument thus represents a major departure from the more traditional view. They see the family's influence as age-specific and restricted in its scope. In effect, the restriction of the family's role removes its impact from much of the dynamic qualities of the political system and from individual differences in political behavior. The consensual qualities imparted or reinforced by the family, while vital for comprehending the maintenance of the system, are less useful in explaining adjustments in the system, the conflicts and accommodations made, the varied reactions to political stimuli, and the playing of diverse political roles. In short, if the family's influence is restricted to inculcating a few consensual attributes (plus partisan attachment), it means that much of the socialization which results in individual differentiation in everyday politics and which effects changes in the functioning of the political system lies outside the causal nexus of the parent-child relationship.

The first and primary objective of the present article will be to assay the flow of certain political values from parent to child. Our attention will be directed toward examining the variation in the distributions of the offsprings' values as a function of the distribution of these same values among their parents. This is not to say that other attitudinal and behavioral attributes of the parents are unimportant in shaping the child's political orientations. For example, children may develop authoritarian or politically distrustful attitudes not because their parents are authoritarian or distrustful but because of other variables such as disciplinary and protection practices.6 Such transformations, while perhaps quite significant, will not be treated here. Rather, we will observe the degree to which the shape of value distributions in the child corresponds to that of his parent. Most of the values explored do not reflect the basic feelings of

attachment to the political system which supposedly originate in the early years, but much more of the secondary and tertiary values which tend to distinguish the political behavior of individuals and which contribute to the dynamics of the system.

Study Design. The data to be employed come from a study conducted by the Survey Research Center of the University of Michigan in the spring of 1965. Interviews were held with a national probability sample of 1669 seniors distributed among 97 secondary schools, public and nonpublic.8 The response rate for students was 99 percent. For a random third of the students the father was designated for interviewing, for another random third the mother was designated, and for the other third both parents were assigned. In the permanent absence of the designated parent, the other parent or parent surrogate was interviewed. Interviews were actually completed with at least one parent of 94 percent of the students, and with both parents of 26 percent of the students, or 1992 parents altogether. Among parents the response rate was 93 percent.9 Two features of the student and parent samples should be underscored. First, since the sample of students was drawn from a universe of 12th graders, school drop-outs in that age cohort, estimated at around 26 percent for this time period, were automatically eliminated. Second, due mainly to the fact that more mothers than fathers constitute the head of household in single-parent families, the sample of parents is composed of 56 percent mothers.10

- ⁷ In addition to the Hess and Torney report, evidence for this is supplied by, inter alios, Fred I. Greenstein, Children and Politics (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1965); and David Easton and Jack Dennis, "The Child's Image of Government," The Annals, 361 (September, 1965), 40–57
- ⁸ Of the original ninety-eight schools, drawn with a probability proportionate to their size, eighty-five (87%) agreed to participate; matched substitutes for the refusals resulted in a final total of ninety-seven out of 111 contacted altogether (87%).
- 9 Additional interviews were conducted with 317 of the students' most relevant social studies teachers and with the school principals. Some 21,000 paper-pencil questionnaires were administered to all members of the senior class in 85 percent of the sample schools.
- 10 In any event, initial controls on parent (as well as student) sex suggest that parent-student agreement rates on the values examined here

⁵ *Ibid.*, p. 192.

⁶ Illustrative of this argument is Frank A. Pinner's careful rendering in "Parental Overprotection and Political Distrust," The Annals, 361 (September, 1965), 58-70. See, in the same issue, Fred I. Greenstein, "Personality and Political Socialization: The Theories of Authoritarian and Democratic Character," pp. 81-95.

Our basic procedure will be to match the parent and student samples so that parent-student pairs are formed. Although the actual number of students for whom we have at least one parent respondent is 1562, the base number of pairs used in the analysis is 1992. In order to make maximum usage of the interviews gathered, the paired cases in which both the mother and father were interviewed (430) are each given half of their full value. A further adjustment in weighting, due to unavoidably imprecise estimates at the time the sampling frame was constructed, results in a weighted total of 1927 parent-student pairs. 12

Using 12th graders for exploring the parental transmission of political values carries some distinct characteristics. In the first place, most of these pre-adults are approaching the point at which they will leave the immediate family. Further political training from the parents will be minimal. A second feature is that the formal civic education efforts of society, as carried out in the elementary and secondary schools, are virtually completed. For whatever effect they may have on shaping the cognitive and cathectic maps of individuals, these various formal and informal modes of citizenship preparation will generally terminate, although other forms of educational preparation may lie ahead, especially for the college bound. A final consideration is that while the family and the educational system have come to some terminal point as socializing agents, the preadult has yet to be much affected by actual political practice. Neither have other potentially important experiences, such as the establishment of his own nuclear family and an occupational role, had an opportunity to exert

differ little among parent-student sex combinations. This will be discussed in more detail below.

¹¹ The alternative to half-weighting these pairs is to subselect among those cases where both mother and father were interviewed. Half weighting tends to reduce the sampling variability because it utilizes more data cases.

12 It proved impossible to obtain accurate, recent figures on 12th grade enrollment throughout the country. Working with the data available and extrapolating as necessary, a sampling frame was constructed so that schools would be drawn with a probability proportionate to the size of the senior class. After entry was obtained into the sample schools and precise figures on enrollments gathered, differential weights were applied to correct for the inequalities in selection probabilities occasioned by the original imprecise information. The average weight equals 1.2.

their effects. Thus the 12th grader is at a significant juncture in his political life cycle and it will be instructive to see the symmetry of parental and student values at this juncture.

Adolescent Rebellion. It should be emphasized that we are not necessarily searching for patterns of political rebellion from parental values. Researchers have been hard-pressed to uncover any significant evidence of adolescent rebellion in the realm of political affairs.13 Pre-adults may differ politically from their parentsparticularly during the college years—but there is scant evidence that the rebellion pattern accounts for much of this deviance. Data from our own study lend little support to the rebellion hypotheses at the level of student recognition. For example, even of the 38 percent of the student sample reporting important disagreements with their parents less than 15 percent placed these disagreements in a broadlydefined arena of political and social phenomena. And these disagreements do not necessarily lie in the province of rebellion, as one ordinarily construes the term.

There is, furthermore, some question as to whether adolescent rebellion as such occurs with anything approaching the frequency or magnitude encountered in sociological writings and the popular literature. As two scholars concluded after a major survey of the literature dealing with "normal" populations:

In the large scale studies of normal populations, we do not find adolescents clamoring for freedom or for release from unjust constraint. We do not find rebellious resistance to authority as a dominant theme. For the most part, the evidence bespeaks a modal pattern considerably more peaceful than much theory and most social comment would lead us to expect. 'Rebellious youth' and 'the conflict between generations' are phrases that ring; but, so far as we can tell, it is not the

¹³ Hyman, op. cit., p. 72, and n. 6, p. 89. See also Robert E. Lane, "Fathers and Sons: Foundations of Political Belief," American Sociological Review, 24 (August, 1959), 502-511; Eleanor E. Maccoby, Richard E. Matthews, and Anton S. Morton, "Youth and Political Change," Public Opinion Quarterly, 18 (Spring, 1954), 23-39; Russell Middleton and Snell Putney, "Political Expression of Adolescent Rebellion," American Journal of Sociology, 58 (March, 1963), 527-535; and Robert H. Somers, "The Mainsprings of the Rebellion: A Survey of Berkeley Students in November, 1964," in Seymour Martin Lipset and Sheldon S. Wolin (eds.), The Berkeley Student Revolt (Garden City, N.Y.: Doubleday, 1965), p. 547.

ring of truth they carry so much as the beguiling but misleading tone of drama.¹⁴

To say that rebellion directed toward the political orientations of the parents is relativelrare is not to say, however, that parent and student values are consonant. Discrepancies can occur for a variety of reasons, including the following: 1) Students may consciously opt for values, adopted from other agents, in conflict with those of their parents without falling into the rebellion syndrome. 2) Much more probable are discrepancies which are recognized neither by the parent nor the offspring.15 The lack of cue-giving and object saliency on the part of parents sets up ambiguous or empty psychological spaces which may be filled by other agents in the student's environment. 3) Where values are unstable and have low centrality in a belief system. essentially random and time-specific responses to stimuli may result in apparent low transmission rates. 4) Another source of dissonanrelationships, and potentially the most confounding one, is that life cycle effects are operative. When the pre-adult reaches the current age of his parents, his political behavior might well be similar to that of his parents even though his youthful attitudes would not suggest such congruency. This is an especially thorny empirical question and nests in the larger quandry concerning the later life effects of early socialization.

II. PATTERNS OF PARENT-CHILD CORRESPONDENCES

Confronted with a number of political values at hand we have struck for variety rather than any necessary hierarchy of importance. We hypothesized a range of correlations dependent in part on the play of factors assumed to alter the parent-student associations (noted above). We have purposely deleted values dealing with participative orientations and, as noted previously, those delving into sentiments of basic attachment and loyalty to the regime. The values selected include party identification, attitudinal posi-

¹⁴ Elizabeth Douvan and Martin Gold, "Modal Patterns in American Adolescence," in Lois and Martin Hoffman (eds.), Review of Child Development Research (New York: Russell Sage Foundation, 1966), Vol. II, p. 485.

15 For an analysis of students' and parents' knowledge of each other's political attitudes and behavior, see Richard G. Niemi, "A Methodological Study of Political Socialization in the Family" (unpublished Ph.D. thesis, University of Michigan, 1967).

tions on four specific issues, evaluations of socio-political groupings, and political cynicism. For comparative purposes we shall glance briefly at parent-student congruences in the religious sphere.

To measure agreement between parents and students we rely primarily on correlations, either of the product-moment or rank-order variety. While the obvious alternative of percentage agreement may have an intuitive appeal, it has several drawbacks. Percentage agreement is not based on the total configuration of a square matrix but only on the "main diagonal." Thus two tables which are similar in percentage agreement may represent widely differing amounts of agreement if deviations from perfect agreement are considered. Moreover, percentage agreement depends heavily on the number of categories used, so that the degree of parent-student similarity might vary for totally artificial reasons. Correlations are more resistant to changes in the definition of categories. Finally, correlations are based on relative rankings (and intervals in the case of product-moment correlations) rather than on absolute agreement as percentage agreement usually is. That is, if student scores tend to be higher (or lower) than parent scores on a particular variable, but the students are ranked similarly to their parents, a high correlation may be obtained with very little perfect agreement.

Party Identification. Previous research has established party identification as a value dimension of considerable importance in the study of political behavior as well as a political value readily transmitted from parents to children. Studies of parent-youth samples as well as adult populations indicate that throughout the life cycle there is a relatively high degree of correspondence between respondents' party loyalities and their parents'. Our findings are generally consistent with those of these earlier studies.

The substantial agreement between parent and student party affiliations is indicated by a tau-b (also called tau-beta) correlation of .47, a statistic nearly unaffected by the use of three, five, or all seven categories of the party identification spectrum generated by the question sequence.¹⁶ The magnitude of this

16 This figure is based on parent-student pairs in which both respondents have a party identification; eliminated are the 2 percent of the pairs in which one or both respondents are applitical or undecided. The product-moment correlation for these data is .59. The standard SRC party identification questions were used: see Angus Camp-

statistic reflects the twin facts of the presence of a large amount of exact agreement and the absence of many wide differences between students and parents. When the full 7×7 matrix of parent-student party loyalties is arrayed (Table 1), the cells in which parents and students are in unison account for a third of the cases. The cells representing maximum disagreement are very nearly empty. Despite our earlier contention, collapsing categories and considering percentage agreement in the resulting table does make good substantive sense with regard to party identification. In this instance the collapsed categories have a meaning beyond just broader segments of a continuum, and are associated with a general orientation toward one party or the other or

bell, Philip E. Converse, Warren E. Miller, and Donald E. Stokes, *The American Voter* (New York: Wiley, 1960), Ch. 6.

toward a neutral position between them. Thus arrayed, 59 percent of the students fall into the same broad category as their parents, and only seven percent cross the sharp divide between Republicans and Democrats.

The observed similarity between parents and students suggests that transmission of party preferences from one generation to the next is carried out rather successfully in the American context. However, there are also indications that other factors (temporarily at least) have weakened the party affiliations of the younger generation. This is most obvious if we compare the marginal totals for parents and students (Table 1). The student sample contains almost 12 percent more Independents than the parent sample, drawing almost equally on the Republican and Democratic proportions of the sample. Similarly, among party identifiers a somewhat larger segment of the students is but weakly inclined toward the chosen party.

TABLE 1. STUDENT-PARENT PARTY IDENTIFICATION

			1	Students				
Parents	Strong Dem.	Weak Dem.	Ind. Dem.	Ind.	Ind. Rep.	Weak Rep.	Strong Rep.	Total
Party Identifica	tion	MM						
Strong								
Dem.	9.7%	8.0	3.4	1.8	.5	. ģ	.5	24.7%
Weak								
Dem.	5.8	9.0	4.2	2.6	.7	1.6	.7	24.7
	(32			(13.2)		(3	.6)	(49.4)
Ind.								
Dem.	1.6	2.1	2.1	1.7	.8	.7	.2	9.3
Ind.	1.1	1.6	1.6	2.7	1.2	.9	.5	9.7
Ind.								
Rep.	.1	.5	.8	.9	.9	1.3	. 5	4.9
-	(7.	.0)		(12.7)		(4.	1)	(23.9)
Weak					,			
Rep.	.3	2.1	1.6	2.3	1.9	5.0	1.9	15.0
Strong								
Rep.	.2	.9	.8	.8	2.4	3.3	3.5	11.7
	(3.4)			(9.7)		(13.6)		(26.7)
Total	18.8%	24.2	14.5	12.8	8.4	13.6	7.7	100.0%
	(43.	.0)		(35.7)		(21.		, ,
	•		u-b = .47	,		•	N = 1852	2

^a The full 7×7 table is provided because of the considerable interest in party identification. For some purposes, reading ease among them, the 3×3 table is useful. It is given by the figures in parentheses; these figures are (within rounding error) the sum of the numbers just above them.

Nor are these configurations simply an artifact of the restricted nature of the parent sample, since the distribution of party identification among the parents resembles closely that of the entire adult electorate as observed in November, 1964 (SRC 1964 election study).

A number of factors might account for the lesser partisanship of the students, and we have only begun to explore some of them. On the one hand, the students simply lack their parents' long experience in the active electorate, and as a consequence have failed as yet to develop a similar depth of feeling about the parties.¹⁷ On the other hand, there are no doubt specific forces pushing students toward Independence. The experience of an ever-widening environment and the gradual withdrawal of parental power may encourage some students to adopt an Independent outlook. The efforts of schools and of teachers in particular are probably weighted in the same direction. If these forces are at work, high school students may be gradually withdrawing from an earlier position of more overt partisanship. But, whatever the exact nature of the causes, they clearly draw off from the partisan camp a small but significant portion of the population as it approaches full citizenship.

Opinions on Specific Issues. One way in which political values are expressed is through opinions on specific issues. However, as Converse has shown, many opinions or idea elements not only tend to be bounded by systems of low constraint but are also quite unstable over relatively short periods of time among mass publics. Hence in comparing student responses with parent responses the problem of measurement may be compounded by attitude instability among both samples. Rather than

17 This is suggested by an analysis of different age groups among the active electorate: see *Ibid.*, pp. 161ff. For evidence that the depth of adult attachment to party is not necessarily uniform across electoral systems see M. Kent Jennings and Richard G. Niemi, "Party Identification at Multiple Levels of Government," *American Journal of Sociology*, 72 (July, 1966), 86-101.

¹⁸ Philip E. Converse, "The Nature of Belief Systems in Mass Publics," in David E. Apter (ed.), *Ideology and Discontent* (New York: Free Press of Glencoe, 1964), pp. 206–261. The following section borrows from Converse's discussion. Robert E. Agger takes a somewhat different view of instabilities in "Panel Studies of Comparative Community Political Decision-Making," in M. Kent Jennings and L. Harmon Zeigler (eds.), *The Electoral Process* (Englewood Cliffs: Prentice-Hall 1966), pp. 265–289.

being a handicap instabilities actually sharpen the test of whether significant parent-to-child flows occur. One would not expect unstable sentiments to be the object of any considerable political learning in the family. It seems unlikely that many cues would be given off over matters about which the parents were unsure or held a fluctuating opinion. Even in the event of numerous cues in unstable situations, the ambivalent or ambiguous nature of such cues would presumably yield instability in the child. In either case the articulation between parent and child beliefs would be tempered.

We have selected four specific issues for examination. Two involve public schools: given the populations being studied, schools are particularly relevant attitude objects. Furthermore these two issues envelope topics of dramatic interest to much of the public-integration in the schools and the use of prayers in schools. After an initial screening question weeded out those without any interest at all on the issues, the respondents were asked if they thought the government in Washington should "see to it that white and Negro children go to the same schools" or if the government should "stay out of this area as it is none of its business." On the prayers in school question the respondents were asked if they believed "schools should be allowed to start each day with a prayer" or that "religion does not belong in the schools."19 Taken in the aggregate the high school seniors proved less likely to sanction prayers in school than did the parents (although a majority of both answered in the affirmative) and more willing to see the federal government enforce segregation than were the adults (with both yielding majorities in favor). These differences are moderate: no more than 14 percentage points separate like-paired marginals on the prayer issue and no more than 10 points on the integration issue. The crosstabulation of parent and student responses produces moderately strong coefficients, as shown in the first two entries of Table 2.

Combining as they do some very visible population groupings along with topics of more than usual prominence in the mass

19 Sizeable proportions of both parents and students elected to state a middle or "depends" response, particularly on the first question. Such responses occupy a middle position in our calculation of the rank order correlations. On the first issue 10 percent of the pairs were dropped because either the parent or child opted out on the initial screen; the corresponding figure for the second issue is 19 percent.

TABLE 2. CORRELATIONS BETWEEN PARENT-STUDENT ATTITUDES ON FOUR ISSUES

Federal government's role in integrating the schools	2.48
Whether schools should be allowed to use	.01
prayers	.29
Legally elected Communist should be	
allowed to take office	. 13
Speakers against churches and religion	
should be allowed	.05

^a Each of the correlations (tau-b) in this table is based on at least 1560 cases.

media and local communities, it would be surprising if there were not at least a moderate amount of parent-student overlap. The wonder is not that the correlations are this high, but rather that they are not higher. If correlations no higher than this are produced on issues which touch both generations in a manner which many issues assuredly do not, then one would speculate that more remote and abstract issues would generate even less powerful associations.

This hypothesizing is borne out by the introduction of two other issues. Both parents and students were asked to agree or disagree with these two statements: "If a Communist were legally elected to some public office around here, the people should allow him to take office"; and "Îf a person wanted to make a speech in this community against churches and religion, he should be allowed to speak." In general, the pre-adults took a slightly more libertarian stance on the two issues than did the parents, but the differences in any of the like-paired marginals do not exceed 14 percent. These similarities mask extremely tenuous positive correlations, however, as the second pair of items in Table 2 reveals.

These two issues carry neither the immediacy nor the concreteness which may be said to characterize the two issues dealing with integration and prayers in the schools. Indeed, one might question whether the two statements represent issues at all, as the public normally conceives of issues. At any rate it is improbable that the students are reflecting much in the way of cues emitted from their parents, simply because these topics or related ones are hardly prime candidates for dinnertable conversation or inadvertent cue-giving. Nor do they tap some rather basic sentiments and attitude objects which permeate the integration and prayers issues. Such sentiments are more likely to be embedded in the expressive value structure of the parents than are those having to do with some of the more abstract "fundamental" tenets of democracy as exemplified in the free speech and right to take office issues. That adults themselves have low levels of constraint involving propositions about such fundamental tenets has been demonstrated by McClosky, and Prothro and Grigg.²⁰ Given this environment, the lower correlation for the two more abstract propositions is predictable.

Although the issues we have examined by no means exhaust the variety of policy questions one might pose, they probably exemplify the range of parent-student correspondences to be found in the populace. On all but consensual topics—which would perforce assume similar distributions among virtually all population strata anyway-the parent-student correlations obtained for the integration and prayer issues probably approach the apex. In part this may be due to unstable opinions and in part to the effects of agents other than the family. It is also possible that the children will exhibit greater correspondences to their parents later in the life cycle. But for this particular point in time, the articulation of political opinions is only moderately strong on salient, concrete issues and virtually nil on more abstract issues.

Evaluations of Socio-Political Groupings. Collectivities of people which are distinguished by certain physical, locational, social, religious, and membership characteristics (the list is obviously not exhaustive) often come to serve as significant political reference groups for individuals. While distinguishable groups may carry affective neutrality, it seems to be in the nature of mass behavior that these groups most often come to be viewed with greater or lesser esteem. The intersection of group evaluations and the political process comes when claims or demands are made by or upon significant portions of such groupings. The civil rights movement of the past decade is perhaps the most striking contemporary example. As Converse has suggested, social groupings are likely to have greater centrality for mass publics than abstract idea elements per se.21 Thus when particular issues and public policies become imbued with group-related properties,

²⁰ Herbert McClosky, "Consensus and Ideology in American Politics," this Review, 58 (June, 1964), 361-382; and James W. Prothro and Charles W. Grigg, "Fundamental Principles of Democracy: Bases of Agreement and Disagreement," Journal of Politics, 22 (May, 1960), 276-294.

²¹ Converse, op. cit.

the issues acquire considerably more structure and concreteness for the mass public than would be the normal case.

To what extent is the family crucial in shaping the evaluations of social groupings and thus—at a further remove—the interpretation of questions of public policy? Some insight into this may be gained by comparing the ratings applied by the parents and students to eight socio-political groupings. While the groups all carry rather easily recognized labels, they do differ in terms of their relative visibility and their inclusive-exclusive properties. They include Protestants, Catholics, Jews, Negroes, Whites, Labor Unions, Big Business, and Southerners.

To measure the attitudes toward these groups, an instrument dubbed the "feeling thermometer" was used. The technique was designed to register respondents' feelings toward a group on a scale ranging from a cold 0 to a warm 100. In the analysis we will treat this scale as interval level measurement. We have also examined the data using contingency tables and ordinal statistics; our conclusions are the same regardless of the method used.

Turning first to the mean ratings, given in Table 3, we find a striking similarity in student and parent aggregate scores. The largest difference is five points and the average difference is only 2.2 points. Additionally, the standard

TABLE 3. CORRELATIONS BETWEEN PARENT-STUDENT GROUP EVALUATIONS

Group	Parent-Student	Mean Ratings			
Evaluated	Correlations	Parent	Student		
Catholics	.36ª	72	70		
Southerners	.30	66	62		
Labor Unions	.28	60	60		
Negroes	.26	67	69		
Jews	.22	67	63		
Whites	.19	84	83		
Protestants	.15	84	7 9		
Big Business	.12	64	63		

^a Each of the product-moment correlations in this table is based on at least 1880 cases. The corresponding tau-b's are (top to bottom) .28, .22, .22, .20, .18, .19, .13, .08.

deviations for the two samples (not shown) are extremely similar across all groupings. Nor were there significant tendencies for one sample to employ more than the other the option of "unawareness" or "no feelings" (a reading of 50 on the thermometer) about the groupings. Moreover, the aggregate differences which do occur are not immediately explicable. For example, students rate Southerners slightly lower than parents, as we expected, but the difference in ratings of Negroes is negligible, which was unanticipated. Students rate Whites and Protestants somewhat lower than parents. This is not matched, however, by higher evaluations of the minority groups—Jews, for example.

Given these extraordinarily congruent patterns it is rather startling to see that they are patently not due to uniform scores of parentchild pairs. As shown in Table 3, the highest correlation between the parent and student ratings is .36 and the coefficients range as low as .12. Even the highest correlation is well below that found for party identification (where the product-moment coefficient was .59 for the seven-fold classification), and for several groupings the relationships between parent and student scores are very feeble. If the child's view of socio-political groupings grows out of cue-giving in the home, the magnitude of the associations should exceed those observed here.

It is beyond the task of this paper to unravel thoroughly these findings. The range of correlations does provide a clue as to the conditions under which parent-student correspondences will be heightened. In the first place the three categories producing the lowest correlations appear to have little socio-political relevancy in the group sense. Whites and Protestants are extremely inclusive categories and, among large sectors of the public, may simply not be cognized or treated in everyday life as groupings highly differentiated from society in general. They are, in a sense, too enveloping to be taken as differentiated attitude objects. If they do not serve as significant attitude objects, the likelihood of parent to child transmission would be dampened. In the third case—Big Business—it seems likely that its visibility is too low to be cognized as a group qua group.

As the parent-student correlations increase we notice that the groupings come to have not only highly distinguishable properties but that they also have high visibility in contemporary American society. Adding to the socio-political saliency thereby induced is the fact that group membership may act to increase the parent-student correlations. One would hypothesize that parent-student pairs falling into a distinguishable, visible grouping would exhibit higher correlations in rating that same grouping than would nonmembers. Taking the four groupings for whom the highest correlations

were obtained, we divided the pairs into those where both the parent and the child—except in the case of labor unions—were enveloped by the groupings versus those outside the groupings. Although none of the hypothesized relationships was contravened, only the coefficients for evaluations of Southerners provided a distinct demarcation between members and nonmembers (tau-b=.25 for Southern pairs, .14 for non-Southerners). It is quite possible that measures capturing membership identification and intensities would improve upon these relationships.

As with opinions on specific issues, intrapair correlations on group evaluations are at best moderately positive, and they vary appreciably as a result of socio-political visibility and, to a small degree, group membership characteristics. What we begin to discern, then, is a pattern of congruences which peak only over relatively concrete, salient values susceptible to repeated reinforcement in the family (and elsewhere, perhaps), as in party identification and in certain issues and group evaluations. It is conceivable that these results will not prevail if we advance from fairly narrow measures like the ones previously employed to more global value structures. We now turn to an illustrative example. It so happens that it also provides an instance of marked aggregate differences between the two generations.

Political Cynicism. Political cynicism and its mirror image, trust, offer an interesting contrast to other variables we are considering. Rather than referring to specific political issues or actors, cynicism is a basic orientation toward political actors and activity. Found empirically to be negatively related to political participation, political cynicism has also been found to be positively correlated with measures of a generally distrustful outlook (personal cynicism). Political cynicism appears to be a manifestation of a deep-seated suspicion of others' motives and actions. Thus this attitude comes closer than the rest of our values to tapping a basic psycho-political predisposition.

Previous research with young children suggests that sweeping judgments, such as the essential goodness of human nature, are formed early in life, often before cognitive development and information acquisition make the

²² Robert E. Agger, Marshall N. Goldstein, and Stanley A. Pearl, "Political Cynicism: Measurement and Meaning," *Journal of Politics*, 23 (August, 1961), p. 490; and Edgar Litt, "Political Cynicism and Political Futility," *Journal of Politics*, 25 (May, 1963), 312–323.

evaluated objects intelligible. Greenstein, and Hess and Easton, have reported this phenomenon with regard to feelings about authority figures; Hess and Torney suggest similar conclusions about loyalty and attachment to government and country.²³ Evaluative judgments and affective ties have been found among the youngest samples for which question and answer techniques are feasible. This leads to the conclusions that the school, mass media, and peer groups have had little time to influence these attitudes.

It seems to follow that the family is the repository from which these feelings are initially drawn. Either directly by their words and deeds or indirectly through unconscious means, parents transmit to their children basic postures toward life which the children carry with them at least until the development of their own critical faculties. Although our 12th graders have been exposed to a number of influences which could mitigate the initial implanting, one should expect, according to the model, a rather strong correspondence between parent and student degrees of political cynicism.

To assess the cynicism of parents and students, a Guttman scale was constructed from five questions asked of both samples. All questions dealt with the conduct of the national government.²⁴ In each sample the items formed

²³ Greenstein, op. cit., Ch. 3; Robert D. Hess and David Easton, "The Child's Changing Image of the President," Public Opinion Quarterly, 24 (Winter, 1960), 632-644; and Hess and Torney, op. cit., pp. 73ff.

24 The items are as follows:

- Do you think that quite a few of the people running the government are a little crooked, not very many are, or do you think hardly any of them are?
- 2) Do you think that people in the government waste a lot of the money we pay in taxes, waste some of it, or don't waste very much of it?
- 3) How much of the time do you think you can trust the government in Washington to do what is right—just about always, most of the time, or only some of the time?
- 4) Do you feel that almost all of the people running the government are smart people who usually know what they are doing, or do you think that quite a few of them don't seem to know what they are doing?
- 5) Would you say that the government is pretty much run by a few big interests looking out for themselves or that it is run for the benefit of all the people?

a scale, with coefficients of reproducibility of .93 and .92 for parents and students, respectively. The aggregate scores reflect a remarkably lesser amount of cynicism among students than among parents. This is apparent in the marginal distributions in Table 4, which show the weight of the parent distribution falling much much more on the cynical end of the scale. Similarly, while a fifth of the students were more cynical than their parents, three times this number of parents were more cynical than their children. The students may be retreating from an even more trusting attitude held earlier, but compared to their parents they still see little to be cynical about in national political activity.

Here is a case where the impact of other socialization agents—notably the school looms large. The thrust of school experience is undoubtedly on the side of developing trust in the political system in general. Civic training in school abounds in rituals of system support in the formal curriculum. These rituals and curricula are not matched by a critical examination of the nation's shortcomings or the possible virtues of other political forms. Coupled with a moralistic, legalistic, prescriptive orientation to the study of government is the avoidance of conflict dimensions and controversial issues.25 A direct encounter with the realities of political life is thus averted or at least postponed. It would not be surprising.

²⁵ These are old charges but apparently still true. After a survey of the literature on the subject and on the basis of a subjective analysis of leading government textbooks in high schools, Byron G. Massialas reaches similar conclusions: see his "American Government: 'We are the Greatest'," in C. Benjamin Cox and Byron G.

then, to find a rather sharp rise in the level of cynicism as high school seniors move ahead in a few years into the adult world.

Students on the whole are less cynical than parents; relative to other students, though. those with distrustful, hostile parents should themselves be more suspicious of the government, while those with trusting parents should find less ground for cynicism. Against the backdrop of our discussion, it is remarkable how low the correspondence is among parentstudent pairs. Aside from faint markings at the extremities, students' scores are very nearly independent of their parents' attitudes (Table 4). The cynicism of distrustful parents is infrequently implanted in their children, while a smaller group of students develops a cynical outlook despite their parents' views. Political cynicism as measured here is not a value often passed from parent to child. Regardless of parental feelings, children develop a moderately to highly positive view of the trustworthiness of the national government and its officials.

These findings do not mean that parents fail to express negative evaluations in family interaction nor that children fail to adopt some of the less favorable attitudes of their parents. What is apparently not transmitted is a generalized cynicism about politics. Thus while warmth or hostility toward specific political objects with high visibility may be motivated by parental attitudes, a more pervasive type of belief system labelled cynicism is apparently subject to heavy, undercutting influences out-

Massialas (eds.), Social Studies in the United States: A Critical Appraisal (New York: Harcourt, Brace, & World, Inc., 1967), pp. 167-195.

TABLE 4. RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN PARENT-STUDENT SCORES ON THE CYNICISM SCALE	TABLE 4	. RELATIONSHIP	BETWEEN	PARENT-STUDENT SC	CORES ON	THE	CYNICISM SCALE
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	Students Least Cynical Most Cynical			n 1	Row	Marginal		
Parents	1	2	3	4	5	6	Totals	Totals ^a
Least Cynical—1	25%	27	33	13	1	2	101%	8%
$^{\circ}$	19	28	38	9	1	5	100	12
3	18	28	37	10	3	4	100	33
4	16	23	41	13	3	4	100	17
5	15	19	35	19	3	9	100	9
Most Cynical—6	12	22	36	18	4	8	100	21
Marginal Totals	17%	25	37	13	3	5		100%
			tau-b=	= .12			N = 1869	, ,

^a Marginal totals show the aggregate scaler patterns for each sample.

side the family nexus. These influences are still operative as the adolescent approaches adult status.

Working with another encompassing set of values we encountered much the same patterns as with cynicism. After obtaining their rank orderings of interest in international, national, state, and local political matters the respondents were allocated along a 7-point scale of cosmopolitanism-localism through an adaptation of Coombs' unfolding technique.²⁶ On the whole the students are considerably more cosmopolitan than the parents, and the paired correlation is a modest .17. Both life cycle and generational effects are undoubtedly at work here,²⁷ but the central point is that the students' orientations only mildly echo those of their parents.

What results from juxtaposing parents and their children on these two measures of cynicism and cosmopolitanism-localism is the suspicion that more global orientations to political life do not yield parent-student correspondences of greater magnitude than on more specific matters. If anything, the opposite is true—at least with respect to certain specifics. It may be that the child acquires a minimal set of basic commitments to the system and a way of handling authority situations as a result of early experiences in the family circle. But it appears also that this is a foundation from which arise widely diverse value structures, and that parental values are an extremely variable and often feeble guide as to what the pre-adult's values will be.

Religious Beliefs. Up to this point we have traversed a range of political and quasipolitical values, and have witnessed varying, but generally modest degrees of parent-student correspondences. To what extent does this pattern also characterize other domains of social values? For comparative purposes we can inject a consideration of religious beliefs. Like party preference, church affiliation among pre-adults is believed to be largely the same as parental affiliation. Such proves to be the case among our respondents. Of all parent-student pairs 74 percent expressed the same denomina-

²⁶ A description of this operation and some results are given in M. Kent Jennings, "Pre-Adult Orientations to Multiple Systems of Government," Midwest Journal of Political Science, XI (August, 1967), 291-317. The underlying theory and technique are found in Clyde Coombs, A Theory of Data (New York: Wiley, 1964), esp. Ch. 5.

²⁷ This is discussed in more detail in Jennings, op. cit.

tional preference. That this percentage is higher than the agreement on the three-fold classification of party identification (Democrat, Republican, Independent) by some 15 percent suggests that by the time the preadult is preparing to leave the family circle he has internalized the church preference of his parents to a moderately greater extent than their party preference.

There are some perfectly valid reasons for this margin. To a much greater extent than party preference, church preference is likely to be reinforced in a number of ways. Assuming attendance, the child will usually go to the same church throughout childhood; the behavior is repeated at frequent intervals; it is a practice engaged in by greater or lesser portions of the entire family and thus carries multiple role-models; formal membership is often involved; conflicting claims from other sources in the environment for a change of preference are minimal except, perhaps, as a result of dating patterns. Religious affiliation is also often imbued with a fervid commitment.

In contrast, party preference is something which the child himself cannot transform into behavior except in rather superficial ways; reinforcement tends to be episodic and varies according to the election calendar; while the party preference of parents may vary only marginally over the pre-adult years, voting behavior fluctuates more and thus sets up ambiguous signals for the child; other sources in the environment-most noticeably the mass media-may make direct and indirect appeals for the child's loyalty which conflict with the parental attachments. Given the factors facilitating intrafamilial similarities in church preference, and the absence of at least some of these factors in the party dimension, it is perhaps remarkable that congruity of party identification approaches the zone of churchpreference congruity.

We found that when we skipped from party identification to other sorts of political values the parent-student correlations decreased perceptibly. May we expect to encounter similar behavior in the realm of religious values? One piece of evidence indicates that this is indeed the case. Respondents were confronted with a series of four statements having to do with the literal and divine nature of the Bible, ranging from a description of the Bible as "God's word and all it says is true" to a statement denying the contemporary utility of the book.

Both students and parents tended to view the Bible with awe, the parents slightly more so than the students. But the correlation (tau-beta) among parent-student pairs is only a moderately strong .30. As with political values, once the subject matter moves our from central basic identification patterns the transmission of parental values fades.²⁸ And, as with political values, this may be a function of instability—although this seems less likely for the rendering of the Bible—the impingement of other agents—particularly likely in this case—or the relative absence of cue-giving on the part of the parents. The more generalizable proposition emerging from a comparison of political and religious orientations is that the correlations obtained diminish when the less concrete value orientations are studied.

III. FAMILY CHARACTERISTICS AND TRANSMISSION PATTERNS

We have found that the transmission of political values from parent to child varies remarkably according to the nature of the value Although the central tendencies lie on the low side, we may encounter systematic variations in the degree to which values are successfully transmitted according to certain properties of family structure. That is, whether the transmittal be conscious and deliberate or unpurposive and indirect, are there some characteristics of the family unit which abet or inhibit the child's acquisition of parental values? We shall restrict ourselves to a limited set of variables having theoretical interest.

In order to dissect the parent-student relationships by controlling for a variety of independent variables, we shall retain the ful parent-student matrices and then observe correlations within categories of the control variables.²⁹ The political values to be examined include party identification, political cynicism political cosmopolitanism, four specific politi-

²⁸ To compare directly the amount of correspondence on interpretation of the Bible with church membership information, which is nominal-level data, we used the contingency coefficient. Grouping parent and student church affiliations into nine general categories, the coefficient is .88, compared to .34 for the Bible question.

²⁹ A more parsimonious method is to develor agreement indexes and to relate the control variables to these indexes. This results in a single statistic and contingency table for each control variable rather than one for each category of the control variable. Experience with both methods indicates that similar conclusions emerge, but retaining the full matrices preserves somewhat better the effects of each category of the control variable.

cal issues, and the ratings assigned to three minority population groupings—Catholics, Negroes, and Jews. This makes ten variables altogether, but for some purposes the issues and the group ratings are combined into composite figures.

Parent and Student Sex Combinations. Varicus studies of adolescents have illustrated the discriminations which controls for sex of parent and sex of child may produce in studying the family unit.³⁰ Typically these studies have cealt with self-development, adjustment problems, motivational patterns, and the like. The question remains whether these discriminations are also found in the transmission of political values.

Part of the common lore of American political behavior is that the male is more dominant in political matters than the female, in his role both of husband and of father. And among preadults, males are usually found to be more politicized than females. While our findings do not necessarily challenge these statements. they do indicate the meager utility of sex roles in explaining parent-student agreement. The correlations between parent-student values show some variation among the four combinations of parent and student sex, but the differences are usually small and inconsistent across the several values. Of the sixty possible comparisons for the ten political variables (i.e., $\binom{4}{3} = 6$ pairs of correlations for each variable). only eight produce differences in the correlations greater than .10, and thirty-three fall within a difference of less than .05. The average parent-student correlations for these variables are: Mother-Son, .22; Mother-Daughter. .24: Father-Son, .20; Father-Daughter, .22. Thus the values of the father are not more likely to be internalized than those of the mother; nor do sons register consistently different rates of agreement than daughters. Finally, the particular sex mix of parent and child makes little difference. We also found that the use of sex combinations as controls on other bivariate

³⁰ See, e.g., Charles E. Bowerman and Glen H. Elder, "Adolescent Perception of Family Power Structure," American Sociological Review, 29 (August, 1964), 551-567; E. C. Devereux, Urie Bronfenbrenner, and G. J. Suci, "Patterns of Parent Behavior in the United States of America and the Federal Republic of Germany: A Cross-National Comparison," International Social Science Journal, 14 (UNESCO, 1963), 1-20; and Morris Rosenberg, Society and the Adolescent Self-Image (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1965), Ch. 3.

relationships usually resulted in minor and fluctuating differences. Whatever family characteristics affect differential rates of value transmission, they are only marginally represented by sex roles in the family.

Affectivity and Control Relationship. Another set of family characteristics employed with considerable success in studies of the family and child development has to do with the dimension of power or control on the one hand, and the dimension of attachment or affectivity on the other. One salient conclusion has been that children are more apt to use their parents as role models where the authority structure is neither extremely permissive nor extremely autocratic and where strong (but not overprotective) supportive functions and positive affects are present.

Although these dimensions have been employed in various ways in assessing the socialization of the child, they have rarely been utilized in looking at value transmission per se. In the nearest approach to this in political socialization studies, college students' reports suggested that perceived ideological differences between parent and child were higher when there was emotional estrangement, when the parental discipline was perceived as either too high or too low, and when the parent was believed to be interested in politics.32 Somewhat related findings support the idea that affective and power relationships between parent and child may affect the transferral of political orientations.33

Affectivity and control relationships between pre-adults and their parents were operationalized in a number of ways, too numerous to give in detail. Suffice it to say that both parent and offspring were queried as to how close they felt to each other, whether and over what they

Murray Straus, "Power and Support Structure of the Family in Relation to Socialization," Journal of Marriage and the Family, 26 (August, 1964), 318-326. See also Wesley C. Becker, "Consequences of Different Kinds of Parental Discipline," in Martin and Lois Hoffman (eds.), Review of Child Development (New York: Russell Sage Foundation, 1964), Vol. 1, pp. 169-208; William H. Sewell, "Some Recent Developments in Socialization Theory and Research," The Annals, 349 (September, 1963), 163-181; Glen H. Elder, Jr., "Parental Power Legitimation and Its Effects on the Adolescent," Sociometry, 26 (March, 1963), 50-65; and Douvan and Gold, op. cit.

- 32 Middleton and Putney, op. cit.
- 33 Lane, op. cit.; and Maccoby et al., op. cit.

disagreed, the path of compatibilities over the past few years, punishment agents, perceived level of parental control, parent and student satisfaction with controls, the nature and frequency of grievance processing, and rule-making procedures.

In accordance with the drift of previous research we hypothesized that the closer the student felt to his parent the more susceptible he would be to adopting, either through formal or informal learning, the political values of the parent. This turned out to be untrue. The closeness of parents and children, taking either the parent's report or the child's report, accounts for little variation in the parent-student correlations. This is true whether closeness to mother or father is considered and regardless of the student's sex. Similarly, other measures of affective relationships give little evidence that this dimension prompted much variation in the correlations among pairs.

Turning to the power relationships between parent and child we hypothesized two types of relationships: 1) the more "democratic" and permissive these relationships were the greater congruency there would be; and 2) the more satisfied the child was with the power relationships the greater would be the congruency. Where patterning appears it tends to support the first hypothesis. For example, those students avowing they have an "average" amount of autonomy agree slightly more often with their parents than do those left primarily to their own resources and those heavily monitored by their parents. More generally, however, the power configuration—either in terms of its structure or its appraised satisfactoriness - generated few significant and consistent differences. This proved true whether we relied on the parent's account or the student's.

As with sex roles, the affective and control dimensions possess weak explanatory power when laid against parent-to-student transmission patterns. In neither case does this mean that these characteristics are unimportant for the political socialization of the young. It does mean that they are of little help in trying to account for the differential patterns of parent-student congruences.

Levels of Politicization. Another set of family characteristics concerns the saliency and cue-giving structure of political matters within the family. One would expect parents for whom politics is more salient to emit more cues, both direct and indirect. Other things being equal, the transmission of political values would vary with the saliency and overt manifestations of political matters. Cue-giving

TABLE 6. FAMILY	POLITICIZATION	AND PARENT-STUDENT	AGREEMENT
(ON A RANGE OF I	POLITICAL VALUESS	

Frequency of:	Party Identification	Political Cynicism	Cosmopoli- tanism- Localism	Group Ratings ^b	Prayer and Integration Issues	Freedom Issues
Husband-Wife						
Political						
Conversations						•
Very often	.54	.19	.22	.20	.36	.13
Pretty often	.49	.15	.11	.20	.30	.10
Not very often	.45	.11	.14	.24	.28	.06
Don't talk	.32	.08	.22	.23	.32	.08
Student-Parent						
Political						
Conversations						
Several times/w	eek .49	.16	.17	.22	.32	.08
Few times/mont		.12	. 16	.21	.35	.14
Few times/year	.41	.10	.13	.30	.18	05
Don't talk	.47	.02	.12	.20	.26	.06

- ^a Each tau-b correlation in this table is based on at least 82 cases.
- b Average ratings of Negroes, Catholics, and Jews on the "feeling thermometer."
- See p. 175 for a description of these issues.

would structure the political orientations of the child and, in the absence of rebellion, bolster parent-student correspondences. The absence of cue-giving would probably inject considerable instability and ambiguity in the child's value structure. At the same time this absence would invite the injection of other socializing agents whose content and direction might vary with parental values. In either event parental-offspring value correspondences should be reduced in the case of lower political saliency and cue-giving.

Turning to the data, it is evident that while the hypothesis receives some support for party identification and political cynicism, it does not hold generally. Illustratively, Table 6 provides the parent-student correlations for party indentification, cynicism, cosmopolitanism, averaged group evaluations, and two pairs of issues. The two politicization measures capture different elements of family politicization—the extent of husband-wife conversations about politics (reported by parents) and the frequency of student-parent conversations related to political affairs (reported by students). The correspondence between parent and student cynicism is mildly related to both of these measures, while party identification is clearly affected by parental conversations, but not by student-parent political discussions. The other opinions and values show no consistent relationships with either measure of politicization. Similar results were obtained when politicization was measured by the general political interest among parents and students, parent-student disagreements regarding political and social matters, and parents' participation in political campaigns.

That the level of family politicization affects somewhat the flow of party identification and cynicism but is unrelated to the transmission of other variables should not be ignored. The extremely salient character of party loyalties, which results in the higher overall parentstudent correlation, and the summary nature of the cynicism variable suggest characteristics that may determine the relevancy of family politicization for the transmission of political values. The essential point, though, is that the level of politicization does not uniformly affect the degree of parent-student correspondence. Students with highly politicized backgrounds do not necessarily resemble their parents more closely than students from unpoliticized families. Whether it is measured in terms of student or parent responses, taps spectator fascination with or active engagement in politics, or denotes individual-level or family-level properties, varying amounts of politicization do not uniformly or heavily alter the level of correspondence between parent and offspring values.³⁴

Since our findings are mostly on the null side, it is important to consider the possibility that interaction effects confound the relationship between family characteristics and transmission patterns. Previous work suggests that affectivity and power relations in the family will be related to parent-child transmission primarily among highly politicized families. Only if politics is important to the parents will acceptance or rejection of parental values be affected by the parent-child relationship. In order to test this hypothesis, student-parent agreement was observed, controlling for family politicization and affectivity or power relations simultaneously. No strong interaction effects emerge from this analysis. The affectivity and power dimensions sometimes affect only the highly politicized, sometimes the most unpoliticized, and at other times their effect is not at all dependent on the level of politicization.35 The lack of impressive bivariate relationships between family characteristics and the transmission rate of political values is not due to the confounding influence of multiple effects within the family.

With hindsight, reasons for the failure of the hypothesized relationships bearing on family structure can be suggested. But to give a clear and thorough explanation and test alternative hypotheses will be difficult and time-consuming. One exploratory avenue, for example, brings in student perceptions of parental attitudes as an intervening variable. Another is concerned with the relative homogeneity of the environment for children of highly politicized backgrounds versus youngsters from unpoliticized familes. A third possibility is the exisence of differential patterns of political learning and, in particular, a differential impact of the various socializing agents on children from politically rich versus those from politically barren backgrounds.36 It is also possible that

³⁴ Nor was the intensity of parental feelings related in any consistent fashion to the amount of parent-student correspondence.

35 There is a moderate tendency for those children feeling most detached from their parents to exhibit greater fluctuation in agreement with their parents—at various levels of politicization—than is true of those feeling most attached to their parents.

³⁶ At another level, the explanation may be in the lack of validity of students' and parents' reports of family structure. See Niemi, op. cit. Ch. II and pp. 184–185.

knowledge about later political development of the students would help explicate these perplexing configurations.

IV. A CONCLUDING NOTE

In our opening remarks we noted the conflicting views regarding the importance of the family as an agent of political learning for the child. This paper has been primarily concerned with a fairly narrow aspect of this question. We sought evidence indicating that a variety of political values held by pre-adults were induced by the values of their parents. Thus our test has been rather stringent. It has not examined the relative impact of the family visavis other socializing agents, the interaction effects of the family and other agents, nor the other ways in which the family may shape political orientations.

Having said this, it is nevertheless clear that any model of socialization which rests on assumptions of pervasive currents of parentto-child value transmissions of the types examined here is in serious need of modification. Attitude objects in the concrete, salient, reinforced terrain of party identification lend support to the model. But this is a prime exception. The data suggest that with respect to a range of other attitude objects the correspondences vary from, at most, moderate support to virtually no support. We have suggested that life cycle effects, the role of other socializing agents, and attitude instabilities help account for the very noticeable departures from the model positing high transmission. Building these forces into a model of political learning will further expose the family's role in the development of political values.

A derivative implication of our findings is that there is considerable slack in the valueacquisition process. If the eighteen-year old is no simple carbon copy of his parents—as the results clearly indicate—then it seems most likely that other socializing agents have ample opportunity to exert their impact. This happens, we believe, both during and after childhood. These opportunities are enhanced by the rapid socio-technical changes occurring in modern societies. Not the least of these are the transformations in the content and form of the mass media and communication channels, phenomena over which the family and the school have relatively little control. It is perhaps the intrusion of other and different stimuli lying outside the nexus of the family and school which has led to the seemingly

different Weltanschauung of the post-World-War-II generation compared withit s immediate predecessor.

The place of change factors or agents thus becomes crucial in understanding the dynamics at work within the political system. Such factors may be largely exogenous and unplanned in nature, as in the case of civil disturbances and unanticipated consequences of technical innovations. Or they may be much more premeditated, as with radical changes in school organization and curriculum and in

enforced social and racial interaction. Or, finally, they may be exceedingly diffuse factors which result in numerous individual student-parent differences with no shift in the overall outlook of the two generations. Our point is that the absence of impressive parent-to-child transmission of political values heightens the likelihood that change factors can work their will on the rising generation. Shifting demands on the political system and shifting types of system support are natural outgrowths of these processes.

COMPARING COMMUNIST NATIONS: PROSPECTS FOR AN EMPIRICAL APPROACH

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The past decade has witnessed a rapid, but uneven, growth in comparative studies. While certain types of political systems have received the lion's share of attention, others have remained backwaters of comparative research, experiencing little or no development in the application of comparative techniques. The comparative study of communist states, until recently, fell into the latter category—relatively neglected and certainly not enjoying the reputation and prestige of work with newly emerging nations or Western political systems.

Now this state of affairs is undergoing a change, or at least the promise of one. In the past several years, the possibility of developing comparative techniques in the study of communist political systems has become the object of growing interest and has provoked not a little discussion and debate. The opportunities and the problems that face this field—especially in developing empirically oriented comparative analysis—are the subject of the present article.

I. THE RECENT STUDIES OF COMMUNIST SYSTEMS

The comparative study of communist systems, although only recently attracting interest as a source for generating new insights into the nature of communist systems, has roots in a long and productive tradition of cross-national research on the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe. Descriptive comparisons of the political systems of the communist bloc have appeared with regularity since World

¹ H. Gordon Skilling, "Soviet and Communist Politics: A Comparative Approach," Journal of Politics, 22 (May, 1960), 300-313; Robert C. Tucker, "On the Comparative Study of Communism," World Politics, 19 (Jan., 1967), 242-257; symposium on comparative politics and communist systems in Slavic Review, 26 (March, 1967), 1-28. The problems of comparing China and Soviet Russia were the subject of a meeting sponsored by the American Council of Learned Societies in the spring of 1966. Professor Lucian Pye has outlined the problems of comparative research with communist nations in his address, "Comparative Politics and Communist Studies," delivered to the 62nd Annual Meeting of the American Political Science Association, 1966.

War II,² and have recently been utilized in the study of the communist nations of Asia.³ For well over a decade, experts on communist countries have been making contributions to comparative works on political parties, interest groups, public administration and other specialized fields of study amenable to crossnational analysis.⁴ The study of ideological and political developments in the communist world has been conducted largely within a comparative framework,⁵ while an extensive literature has developed on the comparative study of communist legal systems⁶ and differ-

- ² Hugh Seton Watson, The East European Revolution (1951); Ygael Gluckstein, Stalin's Satellites in Europe (1952); Alvin Z. Rubinstein (ed.), Communist Political Systems (1966).
- ³ A. Doak Barnett (ed.), Communist Strategies in Asia: A Comparative Analysis of Governments and Parties (1963); Robert A. Scalapino, The Communist Revolution in Asia (1965).
- ⁴ Joseph LaPalombara (ed.), Bureaucracy and Political Development (1963); Harold Lasswell, World Revolutionary Elites: Studies in Coercive Ideological Movements (1963); Henry W. Ehrmann, Interest Groups on Four Continents (1958); Lucian W. Pye and Sidney Verba, Political Culture and Political Development (1965); Sigmund Neumann, Modern Political Parties (1956).
- ⁵ Zbigniew K. Brzezinski, The Soviet Bloc: Unity and Conflict (1961); Richard Lowenthal, World Communism (1966); Walter Laqueur and Leopold Labedz (eds.), Communism and Revolution: the Strategic uses of Political Violence (1964); H. Gordon Skilling, Communism National and International (1964). Although primarily concerned with international politics, note should also be made of the series of monographs issued under the auspices of the Hoover Institute on War, Revolution and Peace, Stanford University, which includes studies on the Soviet Union and the world communist system, the Mongolian People's Republic, the Korean People's Republic, and the Chinese People's Republic.
- ⁶ A project on the comparative study of the legal systems of the USSR, China, Poland and Yugoslavia has led to the publication of several monographs: Jerome A. Cohen, "The Criminal Process in the People's Republic of China," Harvard Law Review, 79 (1966), 469-474; John N. Hazard, "The Soviet Legal Pattern's Spread

ences and similarities in the process of modernization in China and the Soviet Union. In sheer volume, this material undoubtedly equals and perhaps exceeds comparative studies dealing with Western political systems, or under-developed countries.

It is nevertheless true that this considerable body of literature has not produced a method of studying communist states which could be called distinctively comparative. The use of comparative data has been limited; typologies of communist systems have not developed to any great degree, and there has been conspicuously lacking, in the study of communist systems, a conceptual framework, such as the notion of pluralism or the process of modernization, which could unify and orient empirical studies of communist states along comparative lines.⁸

There are many reasons why this has been so. The need to develop a familiarity with a wide variety of cultures and languages, the paucity of empirical information on communist systems, and the difficulties and dangers involved in carrying out on-the-spot research have in the past discouraged persons from attempting comparative work with communist

Abroad," University of Illinois Law Forum (Spring, 1964), 277-297; Aleksander W. Rudzinski, "The New Communist Civil Codes of Czechoslovakia and Poland," Indiana Law Journal, 41 (Fall, 1965), 33-68. Among many comparative legal studies dealing with communist systems, mention should also be made of Vladimir Gosovski and Kazimierz Grzybowski (eds.), Government, Law and Courts in the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe (1959); Ivo Lapenna, State and Law: Soviet and Yugoslav Theory (1964); Istvan Szaszy, Private International Law in the European People's Democracies (Budapest, 1964). A pioneering work in this field is Samuel Sharp, New Constitutions in the Soviet Sphere (1950).

⁷ Kurt London (ed.), Unity and Contradiction (1962); Walter Laqueur and Leopold Labedz (eds.), The Future of Communist Society (1962); Franz Shurmann, "Comparative Politics of Russia and China," paper delivered to the 61st Annual Meeting of the American Political Science Association, 1965.

⁸ Exceptions have included the work of R. V. Burks, The Dynamics of Communism in Eastern Europe (1961) and Gordon Skilling, whose recent volume, The Governments of Communist East Europe (1966), is a truly comparative text. A pioneering work in comparisons of the United States and the Soviet Union is Zbigniew Brzezinski and Samuel Huntington, Political Power USA/USSR (1964).

countries. In the realm of comparative theory, the fact that existing methodology has been derived largely from experience with Western political systems has created special problems for comparative work with communist states.

Perhaps the single most important factor discouraging comparative research with communist systems in the past was the monolithic uniformity of communist states. Once having analyzed the communist political system as it existed in the Soviet Union, there was usually little to be gained, it seemed, from broadening the scope of the analysis to include a number of communist nations. Even when variations in political forms did exist (such as the presence of a pseudo multi-party system in certain communist countries), the obvious artificiality of the differences in question militated against utilizing the comparative approach.

For a number of reasons the barriers to comparative work just enumerated no longer appear so formidable. Communist political systems are more and more characterized by institutional differences and contrasting economic and social policies. Perhaps even more important is the fact that the evolution taking place in the communist world is for the most part in a "Western" direction. Rightly or wrongly, the consequence of this has been that tested methods of comparative analysis, such as the study of interest groups, now appear applicable to communist political systems for the first time.

The evolution of communist political systems in a direction which encourages the utilization of comparative techniques is not universal, nor is there agreement on its importance. It is still felt by many that communist states, because they are organized from above with little regard for popular feelings or social pressures, are not amenable to most forms of comparative analysis even when they differ one from another. In its extreme form this attitude finds expression in the assertion that only the ideologies and policies of the directing organs of the parties concerned are the determining, and therefore comparable, elements of communist political systems.⁹

Without becoming too deeply involved in the implications of this view of totalitarian political systems, it can be suggested that there has often in the past been manifest an unjustifiably rigid attitude toward the scope of comparative analysis and its applicability to communist nations. In point of fact it is impossible to state categorically that comparative

⁹ Roy Pierce, "Liberty and Policy as Variables," this REVIEW, 57 (Sept., 1963), 659.

analysis will always produce better results with one type of political system than another. Inevitably, a great number of variables influence the outcome of comparative work; as a consequence, the research techniques employed, or the aims of the particular study, may be as important in determining the practicality of employing the comparative method as the identity of the group of nations chosen for the purposes of comparison. This, in fact, has always been true, even when communism was confined largely to the Stalinist totalitarian model.

Several examples may be given to illustrate this point. While some counting techniques apply better to non-communist than to communist systems, there are cases, such as in the comparative analysis of elites, in which mathematical correlations have been more extensively used in comparative work with communist countries than with non-communist ones.10 There are many types of functional problems, such as are apparent in the manipulation of mass communications to enhance the authority of a regime, which can be studied by comparative methods in communist states when such an approach might prove impractical, or less rewarding, when applied to other types of systems. Systems analysis was first employed in comparative work with communist states," and the first proposal to develop a "working model" of an advanced contemporary society was made in conjunction with the Harvard study of the Soviet Union.

In the search for subjects amenable to comparative study, it must be borne in mind that one's concept of the limits of the comparative method necessarily plays an important role. Comparisons of national units, while they constitute an obvious starting point for measuring the utility of comparative research, are not the only way in which work in the field is conducted.

Replicative studies, for example, may make valuable contributions to comparative work and never compare nations as such. There is also a place in the comparative approach for the study of different periods in one nation's development (so-called vertical comparisons) and the analysis of regional differences within one country if they have, as part of their purpose, the study of similarities and differences among political systems. One or another of these methods may, at any given time, prove

more useful or have greater potential than another when dealing with a specific type of political system, and it is a sign of maturity in comparative analysis that the application of one of these methods is not thought to exclude or pre-empt the use of others.

One might sum up the argument so far by suggesting that while the comparative method has not in the past produced distinctive insights or techniques in connection with the analysis of communist political systems, a wide array of comparative approaches is available for use in the study of these systems, and there is no a priori reason why many cannot be applied with equal success to both communist and non-communist nations alike.

The task of applying the comparative method to communist systems nevertheless involves difficult problems of method and theory, if only because the emergence of a new field of comparative research has usually been tied to the development of concepts which form "take-off points" for comparison. It is a perplexing and even sensitive point how such a theory is to emerge in the field of comparative communist studies, or even whether it should be sought for at all. No discussion of the prospects for comparative work with communist systems can avoid the difficulties encountered in the search for a secure foundation on which to build this new field, however, and it is with this fundamental problem that the next*part of the discussion is concerned.

II. THEORETICAL AND METHODOLOGICAL PROBLEMS AND TASKS

The theoretical and methodological problems that must be overcome in developing a new field of comparative studies range over a wide area, from the development of typologies and dynamic concepts of evolution and change, to the problem of gathering data and applying quantitative comparative techniques. For purposes of simplification, the discussion will concentrate on three tasks which have always been of primary importance for the growth of new types of comparative work: developing typologies and classifications of political systems; building models; and compiling and evaluating comparative data.

1. Developing Typologies. The classification and typing of communist systems pose special problems for the comparative political scientist.¹² Within the communist world, while there

¹² The literature on typologies relevant to communist states includes Carl J. Friedrich and Zbigniew K. Brzezinski, *Totalitarian Dictatorship and Autocracy* (1956); Gabriel A. Almond, "Com-

¹⁰ Reference to elite studies will be made in more detail in section III of this article.

¹¹ Systems studies of communist states are discussed below.

is great diversity, there is no obvious pattern of development which would permit one to point to major sub-groups or distinctive system types, with the exception of the now historical system of pure Stalinism. Communist states are not always easy to identify; Cuba comes to mind as a country whose claim to be communist is still open to question, and some persons would also exclude Yugoslavia from the communist camp.

Global typologies, indispensable when discussing contemporary political systems, are nevertheless difficult to utilize in making distinctions among communist states. All too often, plausible and convenient categories. such as totalitarian or authoritarian systems types, tend to break down when communist states begin to evolve out of the standard Stalinist pattern. If the Yugoslav political system has lost its totalitarian characteristics. for example, what exactly has it become? Is it perhaps now authoritarian? Some discussion hints at this, but the term authoritarian hardly seems appropriate to a modernizing elite or a communist oligarchy of the type that rules Yugoslavia today. Should the country then be designated as a newly emerging nation with a one-party system and a modernizing elite? The objection to this suggestion lies in the fact that communist Yugoslavia has always been a "newly emerging" nation with a one-party system; that is, the reason for the re-classification is not suggested in the new category that is being applied as a result of the changes that have taken place in the system. Nor is Yugoslavia's past revolutionary experience adequately accounted for in this description of the country as a newly emerging nation.

The phenomenon of modernization offers another illustration of the imprecision that surrounds the classification of communist political systems. At what stage in the modernization process does one place communist

parative Political Systems," Journal of Politics, 18 (Aug., 1956), 391-409; Gabriel A. Almond and James S. Coleman (eds.), The Politics of Developing Areas (1960); Gabriel A. Almond and G. Bingham Powell Jr., Comparative Politics: a Developmental Approach (1966); Robert A. Dahl, Modern Political Analysis (1963); Karl Lowenstein, Political Power and the Governmental Process (1957); Barrington Moore Jr., "Notes on the Acquiring of Political Power," World Politics, 8 (Oct., 1955), 1-20; Robert C. Tucker, "Toward a Comparative Politics of Movement Regimes," this Review, 55 (June, 1961), 281-293; David Apter, The Politics of Modernization, (1965), pp. 22-25.

states in Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union: are they "modern," "mixed," or "traditional"? Even the most advanced communist state has some characteristics of a developing nation, and all share so many features in common regardless of their level of economic development that the significance of differences in degrees of modernization seems much less clear than when dealing with non-communist systems. In an effort to deal with some of these problems of comparison, Professor Brzezinski once referred to the Soviet Union as "quasi-modern," an interesting observation on the character of Soviet society, but difficult to use for comparative purposes.

Because of these obvious difficulties, the problem of classification of communist systems may have to be dealt with on a common sense basis at first, beginning with an effort to determine what obvious characteristics identify this type of system. What these characteristics are is in itself a debatable point,14 but it would not seem unreasonable to suggest that certain fundamental traits reappear consistently in our conception of the communist form of rule. Ideology is an obvious common denominator of communist governments; party supremacy and the experience of a period of revolutionary rule in which the pre-communist social order is destroyed are others. A descriptive definition of the limits of the group being considered for comparison might then run something along the following lines: communist states should be considered comparable among themselves, or treated as a distinct category for purposes of comparison with other types of political systems, if they have adopted the Marxist ideology, if they have experienced a revolution which has destroyed the power structure of the earlier system, and if the Party has acquired a monopoly in the decision-making processes of the societies in question, exercising decisive control over all major political, economic and cultural organizations.

This common sense definition admittedly has many deficiencies: it relies heavily on the fact that most communist states have their origins in the Stalinist form of communism; it does not provide an unambiguous guide to

¹³ Political Power USA/USSR. Edward Shils has called the Soviet Union a "tyrannically deformed manifestation of potentialities which are inherent in the process of modernization." Frederick C. Barghoorn quoting Shils in Lucian Pye and Sidney Verba, loc. cit.

¹⁴ The problem is discussed by Alfred G. Meyer, "The Comparative Study of Communist Political Systems," Slavic Review, 20 (March, 1967), 5-6.

which systems should be considered part of the communist world and which should not; and it does not solve the problem of making broad distinctions among types of systems within the communist camp.

In practical comparative work, meanwhile, the significance of being able to utilize precise classifications or typologies varies with the nature of the question being asked. In the case of certain types of elite studies, for example, where the method employed is that of accumulating replicative data, the number of countries utilized and their exact location on a taxonomic chart may not be of crucial importance. On the other hand, if one employs statistical data to develop comparisons among major types of political systems, or to identify the salient characteristics of each type of system (as Banks and Textor have done),15 the placement of a country in one category rather than another may materially affect the over-all results, especially if the countries being compared are rank-ordered. To cite a more extreme case, the attempt to construct paradigms of systems types based on pairs of mutually exclusive characteristics such as the Parsonian system of pattern-variables, or the moderntraditional dichotomy, makes extraordinary demands on the typologist,16 far beyond the capabilities of most theoretical work on communist systems undertaken up until the present time.

2. Building Models. Closely related to the development of typologies, but nevertheless a distinct branch of comparative analysis in its own right, is the conceptualization and testing of models of political systems. Models are important for comparative methodology because they seek to establish the central characteristics and interrelationships of a specific type of political system. Out of this work may emerge a variety of comparative insights into functional relationships, stresses and strains characteristic of the system in question, and, hopefully, guidelines for the measurement and comparison of the general performance of the system with other types. Measuring the stability of political systems is a good example of the kind of empirical and comparative analysis

¹⁶ Arthur S. Banks and Robert B. Textor, A Cross-Polity Survey (1963).

¹⁶ For examples of this type of work, see Talcott Parsons and Edward A. Shils, Toward a General Theory of Action (1951), p. 185; Barrington Moore, Terror and Progress (1954), p. 185; Herbert Spiro, World Politics: The Global System (1966), Ch. 3; Gabriel Almond and James S. Coleman, op. cit., pp. 22–23.

that requires some simple model in order to be successful.

Practically all theorizing on communist systems has aimed at creating the elements of a model, and over the years, the number of contending approaches has steadily grown: the totalitarian model (which has received a useful restatement in a comparative context by Harry Eckstein and David Apter);¹⁷ the model of the one party state;¹⁸ the bureaucratic model;¹⁹ and the structural-functional model.²⁰

None of these approaches to communist systems has won complete acceptance. The only one of these models which may be said to be the product of contemporary comparative methodology, the structural-functional model, has introduced some new elements into thinking about communist systems, but when applied to specific cases has proven by and large vague and disappointing.²¹

¹⁷ Comparative Politics: a Reader (1963), pp. 433-439.

¹⁸ Robert C. Tucker, "Toward a Comparative Politics of Movement Regimes," op. cit.

19 Suggested in the works of Bertram Wolfe, Six Keys to the Soviet System (1956); David Dallin, The Changing World of Soviet Russia (1956); Leon Trotsky, The Revolution Betrayed (1937); and Milovan Djilas, The New Class (1957). For a restatement of some of the elements of this approach, see Allan Kassof, "The Administered Society: Totalitarianism Without Terror," World Politics, 16 (July, 1964), 558-575 and Alfred Meyer, op. cit.

²⁰ Gabriel Almond and James S. Coleman, op. cit., David Easton, A Systems Analysis of Political Life (1965) and A Framework for Political Analysis (1965); Frederick C. Barghoorn, Politics in the USSR (1966).

²¹ One may take as an example the suggestion by Gabriel Almond that input activities embracing "interest articulation" are universal functional requisites of political systems, when in communist states they are normally largely dysfunctional in effect. David Easton has encountered similar problems in his model which stresses the entrance of "demands" into the political system, with the implication that without such inputs there could be no political system. In Easton's analysis the autonomy of decision-making in totalitarian states is taken into account by speaking of "within puts," but the difference between them and normal "inputs" into the system is never fully clarified. Other elements of Easton's approach put more stress on elite analysis, and as a consequence, have greater applicability to totalitarian states. For further criticisms of the structural-functional

The problem of constructing working models of communist systems in fact involves one in difficult questions concerning the nature of functional relationships in society and the fundamental characteristics of political systems. It is to the credit of the field of communist studies that investigation of this problem began as early as the 1950's when several ambitious projects were undertaken to create systems models of communist societiesmodels which in turn could be used for locating "vulnerabilities," or strengths and weaknesses of the Soviet system. This research advanced sufficiently to prove the complexity of functional models, but was unfortunately suspended before many of the basic problems could be thoroughly analyzed and essential data collected. 22

This early experience, combined with the insights of the structural-functional school, nevertheless suggests possible ways of approaching model-building in comparative work with communist states. Functional models, if oriented toward developmental problems, are feasible and much easier to work with than the macro-static type of model implied in the systems approach or by structural-functional concepts.²³ By utilizing a wide range of comparisons and combining them with historical

approach, see Robert E. Dowse, "A Functionalist's Logic," World Politics, 18 (July, 1966), 607-622.

²² Clyde Kluckhohn, Alex Inkeles and Raymond A. Bauer, "Strategic Psychological and Sociological Strengths and Vulnerabilities of the Soviet Social System," Russian Research Center, Harvard University (Oct., 1954); Barrington Moore, Jr., "The Strengths and Weaknesses cf the Soviet System," Air University, Human Resources Research Institute, Maxwell Air Force Base (Dec., 1952); Irwin Sanders, "Research for Evaluation of Social Systems Analysis," Air Force Personnel and Training Research Center, Randolph Air Force Base, Texas (Sept. 15, 1957); Raymond Bauer et al., How the Soviet System Works (1956); William A. Lybrand, "Outline of an Analytic Approach to Predicting Societal System Recovery From Air Attack," AFOSR Technical Note 60-1416, ASTIA AD No. 255770 (March, 1961).

²³ The possibilities of developing comparative models based on a dynamic analysis of performance of political systems is dealt with briefly by A. M. Halpern, "Contemporary China as a Problem for Political Science," World Politics, 15 (April, 1963), 361-375 and is stressed by Gabriel Almond and G. Bingham Powell, Jr., op. cit., Ch. 8.

perspectives, the developmental model may be given certain attributes of a static model. For example, through examining the workings of the Stalinist system over time, and under different national conditions, its performance capabilities and functional inter-dependencies can be appraised much more accurately than in the vulnerability studies of the early 1950's. Because Stalinist systems have shown a tendency to excess, forcing certain lines of action to the point of rapidly diminishing returns, functional comparisons might find it useful to experiment with concepts of marginal utility in building models, concentrating on the limits which experience has shown circumscribed the capacities of the Stalinist system under different historical and national conditions. In this way functional analysis might free itself of the difficulties which have resulted from focusing exclusively on "vulnerabilities" (or strengths and weaknesses) or on the systems concept of "total interdependence," when constructing macro-static models.

The generalized notion of systems also contains certain insights which should not go unutilized in comparative work with communist countries. Implicit in the structural-functional model, and explicit in general systems theory, is the distinction between self-regulating social systems in a state of primary equilibrium, and secondary types of systems guided by feedback mechanisms manifest in the activities of the political system. The value of this concept in analyzing the operation of modern governments lies not simply in the emphasis which is thereby placed on the activities of communication and decision-making, but in the suggestion that complex societies can only operate efficiently if the political system performs a feedback function, regulating and sustaining highly specialized and complex activities which in turn may themselves perform important control functions in the society in question. When the state nevertheless seeks to replace these processes and institutions with its own bureaucratic forms of rule, entirely new functional problems are created, about which there has been much speculation, but little methodical comparative analysis aimed at the development of working models.24

These exercises in model-building by no means exclude the study of power relation-

²⁴ See Zbigniew Brzezinski and Samuel Huntington, op. cit., p. 124, where the Soviet political system is described using cybernetic terminology. Also relevant are Ludwig von Bertalanffy, "General Systems Theory," General Systems Yearbook (1956), Vol. I, pp. 1–100.

ships, and above all, re-examination of the concept of totalitarianism in such a way as to make it more amenable to empirical research. Any comparative study of the Stalinist system would necessarily have as one of its goals the clarification of the dynamics of the totalitarian form of government. This being the case, there does not appear to be any more justification for the position that the comparative approach will replace totalitarian theory than for the thesis that communist systems, because they are (or were) totalitarian, cannot be subjected to comparative forms of analysis.

3. Compiling and Evaluating Comparative Data. Developing a fund of comparative data is perhaps the most crucial of the three tasks facing the field of comparative communist studies. Unless new sources of information can be found and reasonably accurate data accumulated, there is the danger that comparative studies of communist systems will remain suspended in limbo, unable to build on a solid empirical foundation. And while prospects for gathering data on communist countries have improved dramatically in recent years, great problems remain-both in evaluating the extent and reliability of materials originating from communist sources, and in utilizing this information productively in comparative research.

Of the various types of data used for comparative work, statistical materials, or "aggregative data" as Karl Deutsch has called it, is by far the most important. In the communist nations, it is available in widely differing quantities and degrees of reliability. On mainland China, only one census has been carried out (in 1953), and even after its completion, official Chinese figures on the size of the Chinese population varied greatly, sometimes by as much as 24 million in a single year. Chinese data on the size of the state apparatus, social mobility, social stratification and income differentials is limited largely to statistics from the mid-1950's on the number of persons

²⁶ See his remarks in Richard L. Merritt and Stein Rokkan, Comparing Nations: the Use of Quantitative Data in Cross National Research (1966), p. 41.

²⁶ Amrit Lal, "China's Perennial Census Problem," Eastern World, 18 (May, 1964), 10-12. For a useful summary of statistical information available on China, still accurate in most particulars, see Lawrence Kraider and John Aird, "Sources of Demographic Data on Mainland China," American Sociological Review, 24 (Oct., 1959), p. 623.

engaged in certain occupations²⁷ and recently acquired material from the same period on salary scales in non-agricultural occupations.²⁸ Aggregative data on social, economic and political conditions in other Asian communist countries, and on Cuba, is also sparse or unavailable in a form convenient for comparative research.²⁹ Information on the Mongolian Peoples Republic is difficult to obtain, although available in somewhat greater amounts than for the communist states of the Far East.³⁰

By way of contrast, aggregative data on several Eastern European countries is relatively plentiful and reliable, even by Western standards. In Yugoslavia, three censuses have been held since the communists came to power (in 1948, 1953 and 1961). A wide range of aggregative data is made available through the statistical services of the federal, republic and local governments, and quantitative analyses of such activities as local government, workers councils, problems of urbanization and modernization, the distribution of incomes, size of the bureaucracy and other topics have been carried out by individual scholars and government-sponsored research institutes.³¹

²⁷ John Philip Emerson, Non-Agricultural Employment in Mainland China, 1949-1958 (1965).

²⁸ At the time of writing, still in the process of translation. See also Central Intelligence Agency, Average Annual Money Earnings of Workers and Staff in Communist China, 1949-1950 (Oct., 1960). The most recent source of data on mainland China is U.S. Congress, Joint Economic Committee, An Economic Profile of Mainland China, (1967), Vol. II.

²⁹ For data on Cuba, see The Cuban Economic Research Project, A Study on Cuba (1965). Sources for North Vietnamese statistical materials are cited in 12 chaû, Le Viet Nam Socialiste: Une Économie de Transition (1966).

30 See G. G. S. Murphy, Soviet Mongolia (1966).

satistical summaries to analyses in depth in which aggregative data have been employed in Yugoslavia include: Savezni zavod za statistiku, "Narodni odbori srezovi i opština: sastav odbora i izborni rezultati" [Peoples Councils of the Districts and localities: composition of committees and elections results], No. 134 (1959); Zavod SR Slovenije za statistike, "Prikazi in študije," No. 6 (1964), which deals with the membership of the workers councils in Yugoslavia; Savezni zavod za statistiku, "Rezultati popisa službenika i-x-1956 [Results of the Census of Functionaries i-x-1956] (1957); Dušan Čalić,

Poland and Hungary have developed their statistical reporting rapidly in the last decade, providing valuable information on demographic problems, social stratification, the standard of living, and other areas of interest for comparative work.³² While other Eastern European countries and the USSR have not equalled this output, they are improving their statistical services steadily and now make available basic information on the population, economy and social structure unobtainable a decade ago.³³

Industrializacija Jugoslavije [The Industrialization of Yugoslavial (1963); Petar J. Marković, Strukturne promene na selu kao rezultat ekonomskog razvitka period 1900-1960 [Structural Changes in the Village as a Result of the Economic Development of the Period 1900-1960] (1963). A guide to decision making by the federal government is provided by a description of the decisions made by the federal government in Savezna Narodna Skupština, Izveštaj Savezno Izvršnog Veča [Report of the Federal Executive Committeel, annual report. Incomes are reported by branch of industry and percentage of employees receiving certain levels of income in the Statistical Annual (Statistički godišnjak): more methodical and revealing data on income differentials of various segments of society has been gathered by the Slovenian statistical bureau and published in its bulletin, Statistično Gradivo. Studies employing sample survey data and analyses of elections will be cited below.

32 A number of the more important Polish works using aggregative data will be cited in the discussion to follow. Of general interest are Andrzej Karpiński et al., Problemy rozwoju gospodarczego Polski Ludowej 1944-1964 [Problems of the Economic Development of People's Poland, 1944-1964] (1965); Adam Sarapaty (ed.), Przemiany społeczne w Polsce Ludowej [Social Change in People's Poland] (1965); Ryszard Turski, Dynamika przemian społecznych w Polsce [The Dynamics of Social Change in Poland] (1961); Edward Rosset, Oblicze demograficzne Polski Ludowej [The Demographic Face of People's Poland] (1965).Studies issued by the Hungarian Statistical Office, Központi Statisztikai O Hivatal, have dealt with a wide variety of social and demographic problems; a number are cited below.

²³ Basic data on economic and social activities in the USSR appears in the statistical annual Narodnoe khoz@istvo SSSR [The National Economy of the USSR] which resumed publication in 1957 after a lapse of almost two decades. Aggregative data on education, occupational

Many difficulties accompany the use of this data for comparative purposes, and a great deal of cooperation is necessary at the international level if national statistics are to be gathered and presented in a way that permits meaningful comparisons. Communist statistics, while they must be used with great care, do show signs of becoming more truly comparable than in the past. Although the Soviet Union, above all, has displayed great reluctance in cooperating with Western nations in order to make available comparative data in the social sciences—and has produced data comparing communist and Western systems largely for propaganda purposes34—there has been an increasing awareness within the bloc that

structure, national composition of the population of the USSR and other subjects may be found in the statistical journal Vestnik Statistiki and in the annual SSSR v tsifrakh (also published for a number of the Union Republics). For a recent study on the Soviet Union giving a compilation of demographic data from Soviet sources, U.S. Congress, Joint Economic Committee, New Directions in the Soviet Economy, Part III, The Human Resources (1966). All of the remaining East European governments have published statistical yearbooks; all have held one or more censuses in the post-war period.

34 An example of the Soviet approach toward sharing comparative data was provided by the 1958 Prague conference of social scientists sponsored by UNESCO; the American participant remarked that the Soviet social scientists "never quite admit that studies of social and economic conditions, to be truly comparable, must include free and open use of data from the Eastern (Communist) countries, as well as from others. In some deep sense, they regard their case as different": Everett C. Hughes, Comparative Studies in Society and History, 1 (March, 1959), 290. For Soviet publications giving comparative statistics on the bloc. Ekonomika Sotsialisticheskikh stran v tsifrakh [The Economies of Socialist Countries in Figures (1965); Ia. Ia. Kotkovskii et al., Sopostavlenie urovnei ekonomicheskogo razvitisa sotsialisticheskikh stran [Determining the Level of Economic Development of Socialist Countries] (1965). For comparison of the Soviet and American economies with a clear propagandistic intent, "Nauchnasa konferentsifa po voprosam metodologii spostavlenifa osnovynkh ekonomicheskikh pokazateleĭ SSSR i S Sh A [Scientific Conference on the Question of Methodology in Establishing the Basic Economic Indicators of the USSR and the USA], Vestnik Statistika, No. 1 (1963), 29-73.

accurate comparative data on common economic and social problems is essential. Through Comecon committees and scholarly conferences, steps are being taken to develop uniform standards for the bloc in the compilation of data on economic problems, the standard of living, and other subjects. At the same time, the fund of Western knowledge on national incomes, levels of consumption and the budgetary expenses of Eastern European countries and the Soviet Union is steadily growing, providing valuable data which is more accessible than that made available in communist countries. 36

There are obvious drawbacks to using aggregative data from communist countries. Most statistics are not directly concerned with politics (we shall deal with some exceptions shortly), and are restricted largely to Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union. What is available nevertheless constitutes an indispensable basis for comparing both the social determinates of political action and the stages of development through which communist countries are presently passing. Most of this material has until now gone unutilized in the study of communist countries.

In comparative research, aggregative data should be supplemented by sample survey data where possible. Thus, if reliable electoral statistics are not available, survey research may still tell us something about the feelings of people toward their government. Information obtained in this way provides a means of

²⁵ Publications of Comecon include Metodologicheskie polozhenia pokazatelei statistiki truda stran chlenov SEV [Methodological Positions Concerning Statistical Indicators of Labor in Member Countries of COMECON], (1963); Metodologicheskie polozhenia pokazatelei statistiki naselenia stran chlenov SEV [Methododological Positions Concerning the Population of the Countries of COMECON]. In another area, see M. Mód (ed.), The Standard of Living: Some Problems of Analysis and International Comparison (Budapest, 1962).

³⁶ See the volumes issued under the Research Project on National Income in East Central Europe, Columbia University, Czechoslovak National Income and Product in 1947-48 and 1955-56 (1962); Hungarian National Income and Product in 1955 (1963); Polish National Income and Product, 1954, 1955, and 1956 (1965). Much of this information is summarized by Maurice Ernst, "Postwar Economic Growth in Eastern Europe (A Comparison with Western Europe)," New Directions in the Soviet Economy, op. cit., Part IV, pp. 875-916.

testing for cross-cultural differences on a wide range of political issues, as the work of Almond and Verba has demonstrated.³⁷ Sample surveys may also be the only way in which to obtain certain types of purely factual information, for example, on consumption habits, or in respect to patterns of communication.

In the study of communist countries, sample survey data has been obtained in several ways. One method has been to interview refugees, escapees, or persons from communist countries who are temporarily abroad. A modest number of projects utilizing this type of information have been organized over the years; the value of such work has varied considerably from the highly respected and influential Harvard study of Soviet refugees to the little utilized data gathered from Hungarian Freedom Fighters by several research teams in 1956 and 1957.38 Although the number of escapees from Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union has diminished

37 The Civic Culture (1963).

38 The earliest and most successful of these studies was the Harvard project on the Soviet Union. Its results have been given in Alex Inkeles and Raymond A. Bauer, The Soviet Citizen: Daily Life in a Totalitarian Society (1959). Studies on Eastern Europe have included the interviewing of refugees by Siegfried Kracauer, Satellite Mentality: Political Attitudes and Propaganda Susceptibilities of Non-communists in Hungary, Poland and Czechoslovakia (1956); the survey of between 500 and 600 refugees from the Hungarian revolution by the Special Operations Research Office in early 1957, the results of which can be found in Special Operations Research Office, Socio-Psychological Information on Hungarian Refugees, 3 vols. (no date); the work on Hungarian Freedom Fighters carried out under the auspices of Columbia University, the results of which have not been published but are on file in the Columbia University Library. Information from this project was utilized by Paul Zinner, Revolution in Hungary (1962). Under the auspices of the Free Europe Press, Henry Gleitman and Joseph J. Greenbaum carried out interviews of Hungarian refugees from the 1956 revolution. The results of this study were presented in several articles by the two organizers of the project: "Hungarian Socio-Political Attitudes and Revolutionary Action," Public Opinion Quarterly, 24 (Spring, 1960), 64-76; "Attitudes and Personality Patterns of Hungarian Refugees," Public Opinion Quarterly, 25 (Fall, 1961), 35-65. A fourth study of Hungarian refugees was carried out by International Research Associates, Personal Interviews with 1,000 Hungarian Refugees in Austria (1957).

over the years, efforts to question persons who have resided in the Soviet Union continue.³¹ At the same time, Radio Free Europe and other organizations interested in the Soviet bloc interview persons temporarily in the West to gain information on public opinion in Eastern European nations.⁴⁰ An important pioneering effort in comparative research was carried out by John Armstrong through interviewing West European diplomats and businessmen familiar with Soviet administrative practices, comparing these practices to European methods of public administration.⁴¹

Sample survey methods have also been employed to gain information on China from Mainland Chinese now residing in Hong Kong. Political obstacles, and the difficulty of administering questionnaires to respondents who are largely illiterate, have nevertheless limited the scope of these projects, 42 and most

³⁹ Interviewing of persons from the Soviet Union has been going on under the auspices of the Center for International Studies, Massachusetts Institute of Technology, in connection with the study of communications in communist countries. For more on the study of communications, see Part III below.

⁴⁰ In the past six years, Radio Free Europe has interviewed over 20,000 East European citizens visiting in the West, preparing reports on such issues as "The Psycho-Political Climate in Bulgaria" (Dec., 1960); "The Attitude of Young Czechoslovaks Regarding War and Peace" (Feb., 1966); and "Flight Motivation of Refugees from Four Soviet Bloc Countries (Sept., 1963). A summary of the results of these studies can be found in "What Do East Europeans Think," East Europe, 15 (March, 1960), 26-28.

⁴¹ John Armstrong, "Sources of Administrative Behavior: Some Soviet and Western European Comparisons," this Review, 59 (Sept., 1965), 643-655.

42 In the Chinese case, the problems facing sample survey work with displaced persons were evaluated as "appalling" at a conference held on the subject in 1962 under the sponsorship of the American Council of Learned Societies. Prior to that time two major studies had been organized. One was under the auspices of the UN and dealt with the problems of refugees, but contained data of interest for the political scientist: Dr. Edvard Hambro, The Problems of Chinese Refugees in Hong Kong (1955). The other early study was carried out under the direction of the Special Operations Research Office and involved the interviewing of approximately 2,000 Mainland Chinese on various aspects of communications in communist China, especially word of

material gathered from Chinese escapees has been obtained through interviews conducted by individual scholars on a small scale.⁴³

Fortunately for comparative communist studies, these limited sources of sample survey data have been augmented in recent years by studies carried out by social scientists in Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union, Their findings, although occasionally suffering from respondent bias and lax methodology (the former has been particularly evident in some Yugoslav projects), are bound to have an impact on both comparative and non-comparative research on communist systems. As a result of extensive polling and interviewing, data on social mobility, the impact of modernization, the attitudes of the younger generation and patterns of communication is becoming available in ever-increasing amounts.44 Re-

mouth communications. Unclassified results of this study are available through the organizer of the research, Barton Whaley: "Propin China: A Study of Word of Mouth Communications in Communist China." In 1964-65, Paul Hiniker, working under the auspices of the Center for International Studies, Massachusetts Institute of Technology, interviewed over 400 Chinese refugees on the effects of mass communications: "The Effect of Mass Communication in Communist China," (unpublished Ph.D. thesis, MIT June, 1966).

⁴³ For a recent example of this type of work, see A. Doak Barnett, Cadres, Bureaucracy and Political Power in Communist China (1967)

44 Polish interest in public opinion sampling dates from 1956; since that time the most active group in the field has been the Public Opinion Research Center (OBOP). The OBOP has worked with a national quota sample of some 3,000 persons and until recently some 25 studies a year were being carried out under its auspices. Despite a reaction against public opinion polling by the Communist leadership in Poland, work of this kind continues. Descriptions of Polish sample survey work include Wladyslaw Markiewicz, "Sociological Research in People's Poland," in Stanislaw Ehrlich (ed.), Social and Political Transformations in Poland (1964), pp. 221-254; Andrzej Sicinski, "Public Opinion Surveys in Poland," International Social Science Journal, 15 (1963), 91-109; Emilia Wilder, "Sociology in Eastern Europe: Poland," Problems of Communism, 14 (Jan.-Feb., 1965), 62-66. Among the many Polish studies, the following may be noted as genuine contributions to our knowledge of the political attitudes of groups in Poland: Stefan Nowak, "Srodowiskowe determinanty ideologii społeczney studentow Warsearch on many types of institutions characteristic of communist societies such as youth work brigades, or workers councils, is feasible, using cross-national data gathered by sociologists in Eastern Europe. It is now not uncommon for Western and Eastern European scholars to collaborate in studies aimed at testing cross-cultural or cross-national differences: the work of David McClelland in measuring achievement motivation among Polish enterprise managers and American businessmen is an outstanding example of the fruitful results of such cooperations. 45 Research which has been carried out by the University of Pennsylvania on attitudes towards local government, with the cooperation of social

szawy [Environmental Determinants of Social Ideology of Warsaw Students]," Studia Socjologiczne (1962), 143-180; Józef Koszek, "Postawy spoteczno-polityczne chtopów," [Social-Political Attitudes of the Peasants], Studia Socjologiczno Polityczne (1964), 207-249; Stefan Nowak, "Egalitarian Attitudes of Warsaw Students,". American Sociological Review, 25 (April, 1960), 219-231. Yugoslav sample survey work has been carried out chiefly through the Institute for Social Sciences, Belgrade, and the Institute for Sociology and Philosophy at the University of Liubliana. Studies have included testing of a national sample for opinions on the Yugoslav constitution, the party congress, and the national question; sampling of local functionaries to gain information on decision-making in local government and in the workers council; studies of mass communications; and polling of the attitudes of the younger generation. Important sources for this material include: Stanislaw Skrzypek, "The Political, Cultural and Social Views of Yugoslav Youth," Public Opinion Quarterly, 29 (Spring, 1965), 87-106; publications of the Institute for Social Sciences, including the series Jugoslovensko javno mnenje [Yugoslav Public Opinion]; Javno mnenje o prednacrtu novog Ustava [Public Opinion on the Draft of the New Constitution] (1964); Vojin Hadžistević et al., Tendencije i praksa neposrednog upravljanja radnika u ekonomskim jedinicama [Tendencies and Practice in the Direct Administration of the Workers in Economic Units] (1963); Slavko Milosavljevski, Saveti narodnih odbora: organizacija i funkcionisanje [Councils of the People's Committees: Organization and Functioning (1963). Slovenian studies can be found in Institut za Sociologijo in Filizofijo pri univerzi v Ljubljani, Informativni Bilten, passim. Studies on social mobility, modernization and communications are cited below.

⁴⁵ The Achieving Society (1961).

scientists from both Yugoslavia and Poland, is a unique effort to test cross-cultural values with a political content. Studies in political sociology in Poland have on occasion tested for cross-cultural differences between Polish and Western societies, replicating Western studies. The studies of the studi

Poland and Yugoslavia (especially the former) have taken the lead in gathering sample survey data, while in some cases (Bulgaria, Rumania), public opinion polling is still in its infancy and heavily influenced by political and propaganda considerations.⁴⁸ Sample survey work in the Soviet Union stands

⁴⁶ The progress of the study is described in International Social Science Council mimeographed report, "International Studies of Values in Politics: Report of the Third International Roundtable, Warsaw, Poland, July 16–26, 1966" (1966).

⁴⁷ Antonina Kłoskowska, "National Concepts and Attitudes of Children in a Middle Sized City in Polish Western Territories," The Polish Sociological Journal, No. 1-2 (June-Dec., 1961), 43-56 (in which the author applied the questionaires of O. Klineburg and W. E. Lambert, given in International Social Science Journal, 11 (1959), 221-238, on national attitudes to Polish children); Jozef Kadzielski, "Miedzypokoleniowa ruchliwosc społeczna mieszkancow Lodzi [Inter-Generational Mobility of Lodz Inhabitants]," Przeglad Socjologiczny, 17 (1963), 114-218, in which aggregate data on mobility in Lodz is compared with similar data for the cities of Indianapolis and Aarhus.

⁴⁸ The Bulgarians have now set up a "Methodical Research Office" under the Bulgarian State Radio to carry out opinion polls of radio listeners.

Rumania has been calling for greater objectivity in the social sciences, but has been slow to set up any polling organizations. The Hungarians are well-advanced in market research and have carried out time-budget studies, polls on the use of leisure time and of mass media. The Czechs now have established a sociological institute under the Academy of Sciences which is working in this field, and in 1966 an institute for the study of public opinion was formed in Prague. This is in addition to the institute for sociological research in Bratislava, which was the first to carry out sample-survey studies. For some reports on this activity, Ralph K. White, "Social Science Research in the Soviet Bloc," Public Opinion Quarterly, 28 (Summer, 1964), 20-26; Edward Taborsky, "Sociology in Eastern Europe: Czechoslovakia," Problems of Communism, 14 (Jan-Feb., 1965), 62-66; Peter C. Ludz, "Sociology in Eastern Europe: East Germany," ibid., pp. 66-67.

somewhere between these extremes, having produced what are largely propagandistic studies on attitudes of the youth, ⁴⁹ but at the same time allowing the advocates of quantitative research in the social sciences to popularize their views and to produce studies of interest on the working class, the use of leisure time, and certain other subjects. ⁵⁰

At one time the Chinese communists engaged in a limited amount of polling; rural social surveys were conducted and village histories compiled with the assistance of members of the Young Communist League. The object of this work was, however, not to gather scientific information on conditions in the villages, but to obtain evidence that could be used to convince the peasant that living conditions in the villages had improved under communist rule.⁵¹

Even in this brief summary it is clear that the situation in respect to the gathering of data on communist countries is changing rapidly, opening new avenues of research which should greatly assist the development of comparative communist studies. The limits to our knowledge are, nevertheless, impressive and sobering. Obviously the fund of data is growing unevenly, and in the case of China (and perhaps Albania) may even be deteriorating in value as time passes. Putting the data that are available into comparative form presents many methodological difficulties, especially when one is working with the results of sample survey studies. Even in areas where the use of comparative data is relatively simple, such as the analysis of elites, great difficulties may arise in obtaining comprehensive and reliable information for all countries under examination.52 More often than not, the task is

49 Boris A. Grushin, V. Chikin, Ispoved' pokolenita [Confessions of a Generation] (1962).

50 A useful review of these studies can be found in Elizabeth Ann Weinberg, "Soviet Sociology: 1960–1963," Center for International Studies, MIT, Oct. 11, 1964. For Soviet accounts, Akademiß Nauk SSSR, Institut Filosofii, Kolichestvennie metodi v sotsiologii [Quantitative Methods in Sociology] (1966). For opposition to the use of quantitative methods in studying Soviet society, see L. A. Baĭdel'dinov, Statistika v sotsiologicheskom issledovanii [Statistics in Sociological Research] (1965).

⁵¹ H. Lethbridge, "Classes in Class," The Far Eastern Economic Review, Aug. 8, 1963, pp. 333-334; Maurice Freedman, "Sociology in China: A Brief Survey," British Journal of Sociology, 13 (June, 1962), 173.

⁵² Carl Beck, on the basis of his experience with East European elites, has remarked that "Combeyond the capacities of the lone researcher, and requires a team effort.

Nevertheless, it is to be hoped that the trend toward making increasing amounts of data available will ease the task of applying quantitative techniques to comparative work with communist countries. Information is slowly being made available on political subjects (the social background of party members, for example)⁵³ which for years were considered sensitive or off limits. There is now a reasonable hope, inconceivable a decade ago, that social scientists in communist countries will assume much of the burden of gathering and analyzing data on such basic problems as social stratification, modernization, and to a limited extent, power elites. Finally, consideration must be given to the existence of great amounts of unutilized data, especially in connection with the study of Asian communism: John Lewis has demonstrated that significant results with comparative implications can be gathered from such materials, often of local or regional origin.54

The problems of theory and methodology which we have touched on in the preceding pages—classification, model building, and data collection—are clearly of a kind which will challenge the comparative political scientist to the utmost. What success can be expected in these areas is, of course, a highly speculative question, difficult to answer in a field which is still just beginning to explore its potentialities.

On balance, it seems reasonable to conclude that the field of comparative communist studies is not yet in a position to become a

munist statistics on the social composition of the party are unreliable, not comparable, and unavailable for certain periods of time": "Bureaucracy and Political Development in Eastern Europe," in LaPalombara, cp. cit., p. 292.

63 For example, Czechoslovakia did not release data on the party's composition until recently. Although most of this information must be gained from scattered reports of party congresses and plenums, compilations of data are sometimes made available by the communist parties. An excellent example of this type of publication is the valuable volume of the Uzbekistan party, Kommunisticheskatā Partiia Uzbekistana v tsifrakh: Sbornik statisticheskikh materialov 1924–1964 gody [The Communist Party of Uzbekistan in Figures: Collection of statistical Materials 1924–1964] (Tashkent, 1964). The Soviet party census of 1927 is discussed below.

⁵⁴ John W. Lewis, "The Study of Chinese Political Culture," World Politics, 18 (1966), 503-524. quantitative discipline, in the sense that hypotheses will be routinely generated and then confirmed by methods of statistical probability, rank ordering, or other counting techniques. On the other hand, a more modest but no less important goal, that of placing comparative work with communist countries on a firm empirical basis, seems feasible and highly desirable.

Perhaps the chief obstacle to developing a distinctive field of comparative communist studies is no longer the difficulty of obtaining data, but the problem of whether it is possible for comparative work with communist systems to develop a unifying concept with the aid of which the field can develop its own distinctive theories and research strategies. No such concept exists (either as a derivative of totalitarian theory, or of the structural-functional approach) which could win general acceptance among students of communist systems at the present time. It is evident, in this connection, that comparative work with communist systems is developing in a context different from that which characterized the emergence of other areas of comparative work. For it is the departure of communist practice from its unifying concept—the Stalinist pattern of totalitarianism—which is largely responsible for stimulating interest in comparative analysis, rather than the bringing of order out of diversity through the identification of common developmental problems, or structural characteristics (modernization, or democracy).

For this reason, the rapid development of all-inclusive models or typologies seems less likely than the appearance of several different types of models, and perhaps even a number of methods of classifying communist political systems, each serving its own particular purpose. Rather than relying on abstract theory to tie these models together, the comparative study of communist systems must be given a sense of unity through the realization that in communist ideology, party rule, and the experience of totalitarian methods of control (either in the present or in the past), there is combined a distinct and unique response to the demands of contemporary society and the competitive struggle for survival which is the product of the present-day nation-state system. Values and institutions are still similar enough throughout the communist world that a balance between unity and diversity-admittedly so useful in comparative analysis-is maintained and can be exploited for research purposes. Even in such widely differing systems as those that exist in China and Yugoslavia, for example, there are enough

basic forces acting in common to make the comparative study of the two systems (and phenomena within those systems, such as regionalism) a worthwhile and rewarding task.

Does this mean that the comparative study of communist systems will nevertheless remain an ill-defined field of research, seeking but never attaining the theoretical insights associated with the development of comparative studies in other areas? Admittedly one can draw this conclusion from the preceding discussion, although juxtaposing communist and non-communist comparative studies is a deceptive practice, often resulting in an exaggerated estimate of the results which have been achieved in the latter field.

The potentialities of comparative communist studies cannot be accurately gauged, however, without considering all forms of on-going research, both that which is related to the development of typologies, models and the utilization of empirical data, and problemoriented, or "middle-range" studies. While it is not possible to examine the latter category in as great detail as might be desired, a few observations on the status of middle-range comparative work are indispensable. Out of these remarks may also emerge the hint of a strategy for comparative analysis of communist systems which will make maximum use of the empirical materials now becoming available on communist nations.

III. MIDDLE-RANGE COMPARATIVE STUDIES

It is characteristic of most research in the comparative field—especially that which seeks to utilize empirical materials—that it encompasses both a very small number of truly comparative works and a very large number of studies which are not strictly comparative but provide information in a form which may be utilized for comparative purposes. So it is in the case of middle-range comparative work with communist countries today. The number of comparative empirical studies, uncompromisingly defined, is small, beginning with the pioneering work of E. V. Burks, and including the elite studies now being carried on by Carl Beck,55 the cross-cultural investigations of Armstrong and the University of Pennsylvania team mentioned earlier, some of the comparative analysis of China and the Soviet Union, and perhaps also the effort of Brzezinski and Huntington to compare the United States and the Soviet Union.

It is a distinctive feature of middle-range

⁵⁵ See the discussion of elites that follows.

research, in addition, that it often approaches its subject matter not with the intent of adding to our knowledge of the political process as a system, but through the utilization of elite theory, the investigation of principles of social stratification or modernization, or with the aid of other concepts having a comparative orientation but not concerned with comparing nations or political systems as such. Most of this type of research will be something more than "middle-range," more often than not involving quite complex and fundamental theoretical problems. This, of course, complicates the work of comparative analysis by introducing new theoretical considerations into the picture but, practically speaking, may be the more fruitful approach as long as general political systems theory remains in a state of

If one can accept this approach as part of the natural process of expanding comparative empirical research into a new area, and at the same time agree to consider studies which have evident comparative implications even if they are not, strictly speaking, cross-national in scope, then a rich and varied pattern of middle-range work on communist countries is already discernible, much of it going on within the communist countries themselves.⁵⁶

56 In locating empirical studies originating in communist countries, the following bibliographies are useful: International Bibliography of the Social Sciences, series on political science and sociology; U.S. Department of Commerce, Bureau cf Census, Bibliography of Social Science Periodicals and Monograph Series: Foreign Social Science Bibliographies Series (Poland, Czechoslovakia, North Korea, China, Yugoslavia, and the USSR); Jerzy J. Wiatr, "Political Sociology in Eastern Europe: A Trend Report and a Bibliography," Current Sociology, 13 (1965). For recent Soviet works in the Social Sciences: Murray Feshbach, "A Selected Bibliography of Recent Soviet Monographs," Joint Economic Committee, Congress of the United States, op. cit., Part IV, pp. 977-1026. A guide to early empirical work in Yugoslavia is found in the mimeographed report of the Institute for Social Sciences, Belgrade, Bibliografska anatocija dela empirijskog karaktera iz oblasti drustvenih nauka [Annotated The study of social stratification and social mobility, of great importance in assessing the impact of ideology and politics on communist societies, is especially advanced in Poland.⁵⁷ Materials on social stratification are also appearing in other communist countries and basic data in this field is now available for a majority of the communist systems of Eastern Europe. Although comparative studies of social stratification are still a rarity, valuable work has been done by Western scholars on

field of sociology for the period 1958-1961, in Trybuna Ludu, April, 29, 1964. For China, see Peter Berton and Eugene Wu. Contemporary China: A Research Guide (1967): Hungarian materials listed in Központi Statisztikai Hivatal, Könyvtara, Magyar Közgazdasági és Statisztikai Irodalom: Bibliografia . . . [Hungarian Bibliography of Economics and Statistics! (1963), For Bulgarian works, L. Dzherova and H. Toteva, Bibliografia NA Bulgarskata statisticheskafa literatura, 1878-1960 [Bibliography of Bulgarian Statistical Literature, 1878-19601 (1961); Czech studies are reported in Karel Kozelka and Čeňek Zatloukal, "Sociologie: Přehled české a slovenské výběr ze zahraniční literatury [Sociology: A Survey of Czech and Slovak and a Selection of Foreign Literature," Prehled Literatury, No. 3 (1965). A partial guide to the NEP period in Russia is provided by Katalog knig po obshchestvennim Voprosam [Catalogue of Books on Social Questions] (Moscow, 1926) and Sistematicheskii ukazatel'sotsial'no-ekonomicheskol literaturi izdannoĭ Gosizdatom za vremía s 1919 po 1924 Systematic Index to Social-Economic Literature Published by Gosizdat from 1919 to 1924! (Moscow, 1924).

67 Outstanding for its concern with empirical analysis of social stratification in Poland has been the series "Z badan klasy robotniczej i inteligencji" [Research on the Working Class and Intelligentsia] edited by Jan Szczepanski, which now runs to 20 volumes. A major contribution to the theoretical literature has been made by Stalinslaw Ossowski, Class Structure in the Social Consciousness (1963). Other significant Polish works include B. Gatęski (ed.), Spofeczno-Ekonomiczna Strukture Wsi (Social Economic Structure of the Peasantry] (1961); Adam Sarapaty (ed.), Socjologia Zawodow [Sociology of

individual communist states, especially the Soviet Union, Germany and Czechoslovakia.⁵⁸ Social mobility in China has recently been treated in the context of the process of industrialization and the impact of the "cultural"

58 Among many works, the following may be cited as representative and providing a wide variety of data on social stratification in Eastern Europe and the USSR: Karl Lungwitz, Über die Klassen Struktur in der Deutschen Demokratischen Republik: eine Sozial-ökonomisch-statistische Untersuchung (Berlin, 1962); Akademia Nauk SSSR, Institut Istorii, Izmeneniia v chislennosti i sostave sovetskogo rabochego klassa: Sbornik statei [Changes in the Number and Composition of the Soviet Working Class: Collection of Articles (1961): A. Bogarskii, "O tak nazyvaemoĭ 'sotsial'noi mobilnosti'," [On So-Called Social Mobilityl Vorrosy Filosofii (1958), pp. 64-73; Alex Inkeles, "Social Stratification and Mobility in the Soviet Union, 1940-1950," American Sociological Review, 15 (1950), 465-473; Janina Markiewicz-Lagneau, "Les Problèmes de Mobilité Sociale en U.R.S.S.." Cahiers du Monde Russe et Soviétique, 7 (April-June, 1966), 161-188; Sčítání lidu, domů a bytů v Československé Socialistické Republice k 1 březnu 1961, Díl II: Sociální, ekonomická a profesionální skladba obyvatelstva (Census of Population, Housing and Flats in the Czechoslovak Socialist Republic of 1 March, 1961, Part II: Social, Economic and Professional Composition of the Population]; Daniel Kubat, "Social Mobility in Czechoslovakia," American Sociological Review, 28 (1963), 212; Központi Statisztikai Hivatal, Társadalmi Rétegződés Magyarországon (15,000 Háztartás 1963) [The Social Stratification of Hungary (15,000 Households)] (1966); Republica Populară Romînă, Direcția Centrală de Statistică, Recensămîntul Populatiei Din 21 Februarie 1956: Structura Social-Economică A Populației..., [Population Census of 21 February 1956: Social-Economic Structure of the Population] (1960); Miroslav Pecujlić, Promene u socijalnoj strukturi Jugoslavije [Changes in the Social Structure of Yugoslavia] (1963); Miloš Ilif et al., Socijalna struktura i pokretlivost kadničke klase Jugoslavije [Social Structure and Mobility of the Working Class in Yugoslavial (1963); Marko Markov, Kam vprosa za klasovite izmenenja I NRB [Problems of Class Changes in the BPR (Bulgarian Peoples Republic) | Sofia, 1960; Pavel Machonin, "Structure Sociale de la Tchechoslovaquie Contemporaine," Reserches Internationales a la Lumiére du Marxisme (May-June, 1966), pp. 41-58; Petru Dimitriu, "Elemente der Einheit und der Differenzierung in der Klassenstruktur der

revolution."⁵⁹ Analysis of the distribution of employed persons among various types of occupations has been carried out by both Western and communist social scientists, and serves as a valuable additional source of data on social stratification in communist systems.⁶⁰

Meanwhile, research on elites is being pressed by American political scientists and has been taken up, if cautiously, by the East Europeans. 61 Aggregative and sample survey

Ostblockstaaten," Ost Europa, 12 (1962), 403-420; R. Lukić and Ljubomir Marković, Klasni Sastav u socijalističkim zemljama [The Class Structure in Socialist States] (1960).

⁵⁹ John W. Lewis, "Political Aspects of Mobility in China's Urban Development," this REVIEW, 60 (Dec. 1966), 899-912.

60 John Philip Emerson, op. cit.: Murray S. Weitzman and Andrew Elias, The Magnitude and Distribution of Civilian Employment in the USSR, 1928-1959 (April, 1961); Gertrude Schroder, "Industrial Wage Differentials in the USSR," Soviet Studies, 17 (Jan., 1966), 303-317; J. Pacuraru, "Planned Development and Labour Force Structure in Rumania, 1950-1965," International Labor Review, (Dec., 1966), 535-549; János Timár, Planning the Labour Force in Hungary (1966); Werner Bosch, Die Sozialstruktur in West und Mitteldeutschland (Bonn, 1958); T. Frejka, "Dlouhodobý vývoj odvětvové struktury společenské pracovní síly" [Long-Range Evolution of the Branch Structure of the Society's Working Force] Politická Ekonomie, (Aug., 1966), 661-673; Minko Minkov, Naselenieto i rabotnata sila v Bulgarita [Population and the Working Force in Bulgarial (Sofia, 1966). Polish and Yugoslav works have been cited earlier in connection with social stratification and availability of aggregative data.

61 John A. Armstrong, "Party Bifurcation and Elite Interests," Soviet Studies, 17 (April, 1966), 417-430; Grey Hodnett, "The Obkom First Secretaries," Slavic Review, 24 (Dec., 1965), 636-652; Zygmunt Bauman, "Economic Growth, Social Structure, Elite Formation: The Case of of Poland," International Social Science Journal 16 (1964), 203-216; Jeremy R. Azrael, Managerial Power and Soviet Politics (1966); John A. Armstrong, The Soviet Bureaucratic Elite: A Case Study of the Ukranian Apparatus (1959); Daniel Kubat, "Patterns of Leadership in a Communist State: Czechoslovakia 1946-1958," Journal of Central European Affairs, 21 (Oct., 1961), 305-318; K. Valentin Müller, Die Manager in der Sowietzone: Eine Empirische Untersuchung zur Soziologie der Wirtschaftlichen und Militärischen Führungsschicht in Mitteldeutschland (1962); Charles C. Moskos Jr., "From Monarchy

data on mass communications in communist societies is accumulating in the West and in Eastern Europe, and researchers at the Center for International Studies, MIT, have been using this material and their own data to develop models of communist communication systems. 62 Studies of elections, with all the

to Communism: The Social Transformation of the Albanian Elite," in Herbert R. Barrington et al., Social Change in Developing Areas (1965), pp. 205-221; R. C. Angell et al., "Social Values and Foreign Policy Attitudes of Soviet and American Elites," Journal of Conflict Resolution, 8 (Dec., 1964), 330-491; Frederick C. Tiewes, Provincial Party Personnel in Mainland China 1956-1966 (Columbia University, East Asian Institute, 1967); John W. Lewis, Leadership in Communist China (1963); Zygmunt Bauman, "Struktura władzy społeczności lokalnej: Konceptualizacja badań [Pattern of Power in a Local Community: Conceptualization of Research]," Studia Socjologiczno Polityczne, No. 12 (1962), 7-30; J. Jerovšek, "Neformalne strukture odlučanje na nivoj opčine [Informal Structure of Decision Making at the Level of the opstinal," Sodobnost (Ljubljana), No. 12, 1964; Radošin Rajović, Proces stvaranja opštinskih pravnih propsia [The Process of Creating Opstina Ordinances] (1962). Among on-going research projects whose results were not available for this article, special note should be taken of the study of East European elites using computer techniques at the University of Pittsburgh. Some results are included in Carl Beck, "Bureaucratic Conservatism and Innovation in Eastern Europe," paper delivered to the 1966 Annual Meeting of the American Political Science Association.

62 A sizeable literature on communications and propaganda in communist countries now exists. Some studies of relevance for comparative work using empirical data, or relying on sample survey methods, include Richard R. Fagen, "Mass Media Growth: A Comparison of Communist and Other Countries," Journalism Quarterly, 41 (Autumn, 1964), 563-567 and 572; Alex Inkeles, Public Opinion in Soviet Russia (1958); Raymond Bauer and David B. Gleicher, "Word of Mouth Communication in the Soviet Union," (Maxwell Air Force Base, Human Resources Institute, 1953); Special Operations Research Office, "Propin China: A Study of Word of Mouth Communications in Communist China," op. cit.; Paul Hiniker, "The Effects of Mass Communication in Communist China," op. cit. Some of the materials produced by the Center of International Studies, MIT, Research Program on Problems of International Communication and Security include Alan P. I. Liu, "Growth and

obvious difficulties they entail, have been carried out in Yugoslavia and Poland, and provide certain insights into political behavior when used in conjunction with other types of information.⁶³ In recent years American schol-

Modernizing Function of Rural Radio in Communist China," Journalism Quarterly, (Autumn, 1964), 573-577; ____ _, "The Use of Traditional Media for Modernization in Communist China," Center for International Studies, MIT (Oct., 1965); F. Gayle Durham, "Radio and Television in the Soviet Union," Center for International Studies, MIT (June, 1965). For Polish materials, see Andrzej Sicinski, "Surveys of Mass Communication of the Public Opinion Research Center," Polish Sociological Journal, No. 1-2 (June-Dec., 1961), 97-101. The best work on communications in Yugoslavia has been carried out by the Institute for Sociology and Philosophy at the University of Ljubljana; the results can be found in the bulletin of the institute, Institut z sociologije, Informativni Bilten. See also Institut društvenih nauka, Sredstva masovnog komuniciranja u Jugoslaviji [Media of Mass Communication in Yugoslavial (1966): and Samuel L. Popkin, "A Model of a Communication System," The American Behavioral Scientist, 8 (May, 1965), 8-11.

63 See Austin Ranney (ed.), Essays on the Behavioral Study of Politics (1962), 235-251; J. Wiatr, "Niektóre zagadnienia opinii publicznej w świetle wyborów 1957 i 1958 [Several Problems of Public Opinion in the Light of the Elections of 1957 and 1958]," Studia Socjologiczno Polityczne, No. 4 (1959); Z. A. Pelczynski and D. E. Butler (ed.), Elections Abroad (1959), 119-166; Stanislaw Bereza, "Wybory do Dzielnicowej rady narodowej Warzawa-Ochata w roku 1958 [Elections to the Peoples Council Warsaw-Ochata During 1958], Studia Socjologiczno Polityczne, No. 2 (1959), 161-164. These studies have analyzed class and regional participation in Polish elections according to the number of registered voters that participate in elections, and the percentage voting for the front. In addition, the process of "negative selection" in Polish elections, by which it is possible to cross names off the single slate of candidates and thus change the order in which persons are elected from that given on the official list, has been used to determine the popularity of various types of persons as candidates for office. Perhaps the best summary of the economic and social influences on voting detected by these methods, cast in the form of an explicit comparison with assumptions concerning electoral behavior in the West, can be seen in Jerzy J. Wiatr, "Economic and Social Factors of Elecars have turned to the study of interest groups in communist societies, and Eastern European social scientists have been following suit.⁶⁴ Finally, the study in Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union of contemporary social problems and trends—urbanization, raising the standard of living, aiding lesser developed regions, to cite a few examples—is growing both in scope and scholarly value.⁶⁵

The appearance of this material signals something of a revolution in the study of communist societies by persons both inside and outside the communist orbit. The fact that these empirical studies do not always live up to the exacting standards required of comparative work is nevertheless apparent. Their shortcomings resemble those discussed earlier: there is far from complete coverage of all communist states (even in Eastern Europe); the quality of individual studies varies widely; and the emphasis is generally on the study of communist societies, rather than political systems.

toral Behavior," The Polish Sociological Journal, No. 3-4 (Jan.-June, 1962), 65-75. In communist countries the presence of two candidates is practically unknown, but when Yugoslavia briefly experimented with such a system in 1953, issues and attitudes began to emerge among the electorate. See Thomas F. Hammond, "Yugoslav Elections: Democracy in Small Doses," Political Science Quarterly, 70 (March, 1955), 57-74. For the 1965 elections, Institut društvenih nauka, Skupštinski izbori 1965 [Parliamentary Elections 1965] (1966).

64 H. Gordon Skilling, "Interest Groups and Communist Politics," World Politics, 18 (April, 1966). 435-451; Henry W. Morton (ed.), Soviet Policy Making: Studies of Communism in Transition (1966). Włodzimierz Weselowski, "Class Domination and the Power of Interest Groups." The Polish Sociological Journal, No. 3-4 (Jan.-June, 1962), 53-64; Jovan Djordjevic, "Interest Groups and the Political System of Yugoslavia," in Henry W. Ehrmann, Interest Groups on Four Continents (1958), 197-228; Michael Lakatos, "K niektorým problémom štruktury našej politickej sústavy [On Some Problems of the Structure of Our Political System]," Pravni Obzor, 1 (1965), 26-36, cited by H. Gordon Skilling, op. cit: T. H. Kuliev, Problema interesov v Sotsialisticheskom obshchestve [Problems of Interest in Socialist Society (1967).

⁶⁵ For Polish works in this field, see earlier references on aggregative data. Also representative of this type of analysis are Dolfe Vogelnik, *Urbanizacija kao odraz privrednog razvoja FNRJ* [Urbanization as an Expression of the Economic

A further problem, evident in practically all current empirical work carried on both in Eastern Europe and in the West, is the failure of theory to keep up with practical research and the collection of data. The theoretical difficulties that middle-range research has been encountering are actually two-fold: the need to refine theory in the chosen realm of research (interest groups, elites and the like), and the difficulties that arise in taking into account those aspects of communist political systems which set them apart from other systems types. Theorizing on elites in communist systems, for example, has larged behind the collection of data in recent years, notwithstanding a number of attempts, by Western and Eastern European scholars, to develop a set of theoretical propositions concerning elite structurs in communist and non-communist societies.66

In the study of interest groups, on the other hand, the difficulty arises that uncritical application to communist systems of comparative concepts developed for the analysis of Western societies may obscure and confuse differences between the two types of systems. Even when the Western concept is tailored to fit the situation prevailing in communist

Development of Yugoslavia] (1961); László Lengyel, "Vélemények és Tények as Életszinvonalrol [Opinions and Facts About the Living Standard]," Statisztikai Szemle, No. 2 (Feb., 1966), 139-157 and No. 3 (March, 1966), 227-244; Branko Kubović, Regionalno aspekt privrednog razvitka Jugoslavije [Regional Aspects of Economic Development in Yugoslavial (1961); M. V. Bakhrakh, "Issledovanie urovnía ekonomicheskogo razvitifà ratona (na primere Moldavskof SSR) [Investigation of the Level of Economic Development of Regions (Using the Example of the Moldavian SSR)]" in Akademifa Nauk SSSR, Voprosi Metodiki Issledovanića Razmeshcheniià ProizvodstvaQuestions Method in Research on the Location of Production] (1965), 26-46; N. M. Rimashevskafa, Ekonomicheskii analiz dohodov rabochikh i Sluzhashchikh [Economic Analysis of the Incomes of Workers and Functionaries (1965); Stanislaw Ehrlich (ed.), Social and Political Transformations in Poland (1964). Western sources on modernization and the standard of living are cited below.

the Ruling Class (1963); Carl Beck et al., A Survey of Elite Studies (Special Operations Research Office Memo 65-3, March, 1965); Raymond Aron, "Social Structure and the Ruling Class," British Journal of Sociology, 1 (March, 1950), 1-16 and 126-143; ______, La Lutte de Classes (1964).

states, it is hard to escape the implication that the barriers separating Western and communist systems are being levelled, even to the extent that there is no longer any essential difference between the two system types. Thus, in the very process of developing methods for comparative communist analysis, the study of the field is robbed of its distinctiveness.

These problems are by and large recognized by those engaged in empirical research on communist countries, and, with greater sophistication and knowledge, it is to be hoped that a satisfactory balance will be struck between emphasizing what is unique to communist political systems and what they share in common with other types of systems. At the same time, growing awareness of the data now available on communist systems should spur the search for new areas of middle-range research, giving the field more balance and depth.

One such area for future work might be that of modernization. Although the concept does pose difficulties when applied to communist states, there is a great deal that can be done by way of clarifying the character of the modernization process in communist systems. This involves the utilization of existing studies of the modernizing process, both theoretical and data-oriented, and material now becoming available in the communist countries themselves (the recent volume, Yugoslavia, A Multi-National State, by Jack Fischer, is a pioneer effort in this area). 67

67 There are a number of excellent studies in which data for the global analysis of modernization is gathered and analyzed, using information from communist countries as well as noncommunist, but the results are not given in a form which can be used for the comparative analysis of communist systems. See Leo F. Schnore, "The Statistical Measurement of Urbanization and Economic Development." Land Economics, 37 (Aug., 1961), 229-245; Norton Ginsburg, Atlas of Economic Development (1961). Some interesting insights into the pattern of industrialization in communist nations can be gained from Brian J. L. Berry, "An Inductive Approach to the Regionalization of Economic Development" in Norton Ginsburg (ed.), Geography and Economic Development, University of Chicago Department of Geography Research Paper No. 62 (1960), 97. Data on relative levels of consumption prior to World War II-and the problems that arise in making such a comparative analysis—are given in M. K. Bennett, "International Disparities in Consumption Levels," The American Economic Review, 11 (Sept., 1951),

Another form of middle-range research, relatively neglected in the past, involves the study of historical systems. This approach is applicable not only to the Stalinist-type systems of Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union, but also to the period of the NEP in Russia. Although not strictly comparable to later developments in other communist countries, the NEP produced an interesting body of statistical information and other forms of empirical data. Some of this material, such as the party census of 1927, has utility in conjunction with comparative work on contemporary communist systems.⁶⁸

A different type of approach utilizing quantitative information involves the analysis of relatively clear-cut types of data which pose interesting theoretical and practical problems concerning communist systems. Thus one might wish to ask why party membership in communist countries usually remains within certain more or less well-defined limits, measured as a percentage of the total population of communist states. Investigation of this

632-649. Important for comparative analysis of the standard of living in the post-war period are Maria-Elisabeth Ruban Die Entwicklung des Lebensstandards in der Sowjetunion (1965); Central Intelligence Agency, A Comparison of Consumption in the USSR and the United States (1964): Václav Holešovský, "Personal Consumption in Czechoslovakia, Hungary and Poland, 1950-1960, A Comparison," Slavic Review, 24 (Dec., 1965) 622-635; Janet G. Chapman, Real Wages in the Soviet Union since 1928 (1963). For other quantitative approaches to measuring development, see Charles K. Wilbur, "A Nonmonetary Index of Economic Development," Societ Studies, 17 (April, 1966), 408-416, and Jack Fischer, op. cit.

68 Aggregative data appeared in this period on a wide variety of subjects important for crossnational and comparative analysis, including social stratification (class differences and occupational breakdowns), data on communications (mail turnover, number of radio stations, and the like), and economic and demographic data. From this period date some of the few statistics ever published on the size of the party in administrative organs, trade unions, and other important institutions in Soviet society. Statistics on the number of arrests and related information on crime were also published in this period, and data can even be found from the early 1920's on the size of the security organs. Valuable data is also available from the early 1920's on the social composition of the party and local government organs at the local level. Two censuses (in addiproblem would require both analysis in depth, and cross-nationally.⁶⁹

In dealing with middle-range research one must consider not only the type of problem to be investigated, but the units to be chosen for comparison. This problem, although we have reserved it for last, is in many ways the most troublesome in middle-range comparative work with communist countries. Not only do the limitations of the analyst in language skills, area competency and so on act as a restraining factor, but the peculiar problems of crossnational work with communist states often place limits on the types of strategies or techniques which may be employed when utilizing comparative data.

Thus research based on comparisons among the thirteen or fourteen communist states now in existence must take into account the small number of units involved; that in respect to any given problem only a certain percentage of these countries will have the right type of data; and that in a still smaller number of cases will the information be utilizable in comparative form.

These problems are not confined to the comparative study of communist systems, but do apply to the communist states with special force. In the case of such quantitative methods as rank-ordering or factor analysis, the small number of nations involved poses an especially serious problem; such techniques have usually dealt with communist states only

tion to a number of industrial censuses and the party census of 1927) were carried out in 1920 and 1926. The main sources for this data are Trudy Tsentral'nogo Statisticheskogo Upravlenita [Works of the Central Statistical Administration] in which the results of the censuses are included; Statisticheskii ezhegodnik [Statistical Annual]; Narodnoe khoziaistvo SSSR [National Economy of the USSRI, published through 1932; Statisticheskii otdel Tsentral'nogo komiteta Vsesofūznoĭ Kommunisticheskoĭ Partii (Bol'shevikov). Bsesouznata partiinata perepis' 1927 [All-Union Party Census for 1927] 8 vols. (1927); Bsesofuznafa Kommunisticheskafa Partifa (Bol' shevikiv) Tsentraln'yi komitet BKP (b) Organizatsionno-instruktorskii Otdel, Sostav VKP (b) v tsifrakh [Composition of the All-Union Communist Party in Figures], 11 Vols.

es For data on the membership of communist parties U.S. Department of State, Bureau of Intelligence and Research, World Strength of Communist Party Organizations. Compilations of prominent officials in communist countries are available in the State Department volumes, Intelligence Research Aid.

within the context of broad, global, samples, and even in this case the results have not always been satisfactory.⁷⁰

Under the circumstances, it may be that in whatever area middle-range research choses to work (elites, modernization, or some aspect of the political process), the best results may be achieved by maintaining a flexible frame of reference. Case studies might be used to generate hypotheses and refine existing concepts, and these could be combined with crossnational comparisons at whatever levelnational, regional or local—is most convenient under the circumstances. Rank-ordering or regression techniques, if employed, might experiment with intra-national and crossnational regional comparisons of nation-states. Already a certain amount of success has been achieved using this method in the study of regionalism in China.71 In recent years, the desirability of developing data banks on regional and local differences has been debated;72 in Poland, regression analysis has actually been applied in a comparative form in the study of local government.73

This is only the bare suggestion of a strategy, and one which at that deals with only a single aspect of the comparative study of communist nations. The immediate need is to stress a balanced approach in which middle-range research, basic theoretical work, and the study of communist values and ideologies would all play an equal role. Karl Deutsch aptly described the challenge that lies ahead when he pointed out (in reference to the comparative field generally) that "there is before us an intellectual need and a desperately difficult task, a task which cannot be accomplished in itself by committees or conferences, but can only be pioneered by individuals and then

76 Philip Cutright, "National Political Development: Measurement and Analysis," American Sociological Review, 28 (April, 1963), 253-264; Ivo K. Feierabend, "Correlates of Political Stability," paper delivered to the 1963 Annual Meeting of the American Political Science Association; Phillip M. Gregg and Arthur S. Banks "Dimensions of Political Systems: Factor Analysis of a Cross Polity Survey," this Review, 59 (Sept., 1965), 602-614.

⁷¹ See the discussion in John W. Lewis, "The Study of Chinese Political Culture," op. cit.

⁷² Stein Rokkan (ed.), Data Archives for the Social Sciences (1965), pp. 122-127.

⁷³ Stanislaw Rokita, "Analiza czynnikowa w badaniach regionalynch [Factor Analysis in Regional Research]," *Przeglad Statystyczny* (1966), 245–260.

developed by the criticisms, the discussions, and the cooperation of many scientists over many years. It is necessary to put together . . . three types of theory—the broad general perspective, the hard specific findings, and the middle-range models and techniques so that we will eventually get a choice of broad intellectual systems, encompassing a wide range of phenomena and permitting the recognition of rich and complex patterns."⁷⁴

On balance, there is no reason why the comparative analysis of communist systems cannot follow this path sketched for comparative studies in general. We lack convenient typologies and unifying concepts for communist systems, but we are on sound ground in treating these systems as distinctive and separate from other major types of systems, amenable to model-building and other forms of basic comparative research. Not being bound in any way by an "ideal type" or evolu-

⁷⁴ Richard L. Merritt and Stein Rokkan, op. cit., p. 32.

tionary model, we are free to assemble building blocs of data applicable to a wide variety of situations (both past and present) and to encourage the broadest possible utilization of new and existing comparative techniques. If the communist systems continue in their present course of widening diversity and (in most cases) evolutionary change, efforts to gather data and develop theory can be subjected to continuous on-going review and validation.

To do all of this, of course, requires confidence and a desire to work on the frontiers of political science. It also seems important to remind ourselves that comparative analysis cannot be considered as "replacing" existing methods of analysis or traditional theoretical frameworks, but rather as reinforcing them, making them more effective. If we can maintain this attitude, and keep the new field broad and flexible so that it may grow, there is no doubt that it will eventually make a major contribution to the study of communist political systems.

A THEOREM ABOUT VOTING*

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The objective of this essay is to present a simple decision-theoretic model of individual rational voting in a single-member district, using the simple-majority single-ballot system of election, and to derive the following theorem from the model: The rational voter votes for the candidate (party) associated with the outcome he (the voter) most prefers.

The model and theorem may interest students of voting for at least two reasons. First, the theorem contradicts the classical argument that "there is one eventuality in a multiparty system that does not arise in a two-party system: a rational voter may at times vote for a party other than the one he most prefers." The theorem asserts, by contrast, that what is true for the two-party case is also true for the multi-party case. Thus, the model and theorem sharply differ from the classical theory of party systems. The ramifications of this conflict may affect some conventional views about the decline of third parties, the differences between two-party and multi-party systems, as well as (perhaps) other topics.

Second, within the model, rational voting is a very simple thing. The rational voter needs to know neither the numerical probabilities of the outcomes nor the outcomes' numerical utilities for him. Thus, from the perspective of survey research on voting behavior, the model is realistic in the sense that it does not require the rational voter to make elaborate calculations. This suggests the possibility that studies of the psychology of voting may be integrated with studies of rational (mathematical) decision-making, with prospects of

- * The original proof of the theorem was privately circulated in April, 1965. The penultimate version of this paper was appended to the author's doctoral dissertation, "The Decline of the British Liberal Party: A Comparative and Theoretical Analysis," (Michigan State University, 1966), Appendix 1. The author is indebted to several persons for their private criticisms but especially to Harold T. Casstevens II for suggesting an elegant simplification of the original proof.
- Anthony Downs, An Economic Theory of Democracy (New York: Harper & Brothers, 1957), p. 47. See also Maurice Duverger, Political Parties, trans. Barbara and Robert North (New York: John Wiley & Sons, Inc., 1955), pp. 223-226.

theoretical advantages for both types of analysis.

The model adopts the most widely accepted rule for rational decision-making: The voter (decision-maker) maximizes the expected value of utility.² The model also assumed a single-member district operating under the simple-majority single-ballot system of elections.³

Denote the candidates (parties) by C_1 , C_2 , \cdots , C_n . The alternative courses of action available to the voter are to vote for C_1 , or to vote for C_2 , \cdots , or to vote for C_n . (The problem is how the voter should vote rather than whether or not he should vote.) These possible votes are denoted by V_1 , V_2 , \cdots , V_n . The possible outcomes, ignoring ties, are that C_1 will win, or C_2 will win, or C_n will win. Denote these outcomes by W_1 , W_2 , \cdots , W_n . The voter's relative evaluation of these outcomes (his utilities) are designated by U_1 , U_2 , \cdots , U_n .

The (objective) conditional probability that a particular outcome W_1 will occur, given a

- ² "In fact, use of this criterion is often cited as a necessary (if not sufficient) condition for rational choice." Russell L. Ackoff, Scientific Method (New York: John Wiley & Sons, Inc., 1962), p. 38. A diffuse intellectual debt is owed to Ackoff's stimulating book.
- ³ The restriction to a single district is consistent with Downs' analysis of the entire nation as a single district (op. cit., pp. 23-24) and with Duverger's remarks about local bi-partism (op. cit., p. 223). The restriction fits by-elections (special elections) in Britain, Canada, the United States and elsewhere, but the general election situation is more complex. Although the theorem is derived for simple-majority single-ballot systems, an implication appears to be that (for many analytical purposes) first preference votes in preferential systems (e.g., Australia) are equivalent to votes in plurality single-ballot systems, but this conjecture is not proved in the present paper.
- ⁴ Ignoring ties is similar to ignoring the possibility that a coin will fall on its edge. This simplification is convenient since there is no voting choice uniquely associated with a tie, but it should be noted that if a tie occurs, then there is no election. (The man named Nobody is not an incumbent skin to the *status quo* which may reign after motions are defeated in committee: voting.)

particular decision to vote for C_j , can be represented by $P(W_i/V_j)$. The possible outcomes and alternative courses of action, as well as the corresponding conditional probabilities, are represented in the following matrix:

Possible Outcomes

It seems clear that the voter's decision has some (although, perhaps, only a very slight) effect upon the probabilities, that is, that a particular candidate's chances are somewhat enhanced if the voter decides to vote for that candidate.⁵ This means, in formal terms, that $P(W_1/V_1) > P(W_1/V_2), \cdots, P(W_1/V_1) > P(W_1/V_n)$, and similarly for the probabilities in each of the other columns. A corollary is that $P(W_i/V_i) > 0.6$

If EV_i is the expected value of the *i*th course of action, the three-candidate problem is given by the following set of equations:

(1)
$$[P(W_{1}/V_{1})]U_{1} + [P(W_{2}/V_{1})]U_{2}$$

$$+ [P(W_{3}/V_{1})]U_{3} = EV_{1}$$
(2)
$$[P(W_{1}/V_{2})]U_{1} + [P(W_{2}/V_{2})]U_{2}$$

$$+ [P(W_{3}/V_{2})]U_{3} = EV_{2}$$
(3)
$$[P(W_{1}/V_{3})]U_{1} + [P(W_{2}/V_{3})]U_{2}$$

$$+ [P(W_{3}/V_{2})]U_{3} = EV_{3}$$

The voter should select the V_i that maximizes the expected value.

These equations can be simplified by postulating that, if the voter changes his decision from V_i to V_j , then the probability of C_i winning decreases and the probability of C_j winning increases, but the probability of C_k winning is not affected. Thus, in the three-

- ⁵ This postulate seems to be intuitively obvious, although its consequences (perhaps) are not. The Shapley-Shubik *a priori* power index is suggestive for this axiom. See L. S. Shapley and Martin Shubik, "A Method for Evaluating the Distribution of Power in a Committee System," this Review, 48 (1954), 787-792.
- ⁶ This corollary (roughly speaking, that if any voter decides to vote for any candidate, then that candidate has some chance of winning) follows directly from the preceding postulate but, nevertheless, appears to conflict with the classical theory of parties.
- ⁷ This reduction postulate is not intuitively obvious, and as a result, subjective probabilities are not used in the present model. Although the

candidate case, $P(W_1/V_2) = P(W_1/V_3)$, $P(W_2/V_1) = P(W_2/V_3)$, $P(W_3/V_1) = P(W_3/V_2)$, and the simplified equations are:

(4)
$$[P(W_1/V_1)]U_1 + [P(W_2/V_1)]U_2$$

$$+ [P(W_3/V_1)]U_2 = EV_1$$
(5)
$$[P(W_1/V_2)]U_1 + [P(W_2/V_2)]U_2$$

$$+ [P(W_3/V_1)]U_3 = EV_2$$
(6)
$$[P(W_1/V_2)]U_1 + [P(W_2/V_1)]U_2$$

$$+ [P(W_3/V_3)]U_3 = EV_3$$

Subtracting Equation (5) from Equation (4), we obtain:

(7)
$$[P(W_1/V_1)]U_1 - [P(W_1/V_2)]U_1 + [P(W_2/V_1)]U_2 - [P(W_2/V_2)]U_2 = EV_1 - EV_2$$

When the terms in Equation (7) are recombined, we successively obtain:

(8)
$$U_{1}[P(W_{1}/V_{1}) - P(W_{1}/V_{2})] + U_{2}[P(W_{2}/V_{1}) - P(W_{2}/V_{2})] = EV_{1} - EV_{2}$$
(9)
$$U_{1}[P(W_{1}/V_{1}) - P(W_{1}/V_{2})] - U_{2}[P(W_{2}/V_{2}) - P(W_{2}/V_{1})] = EV_{1} - EV_{2}$$

Since the possible outcomes are assumed to be mutually exclusive and exhaustive, the probabilities in each row of the original matrix have a sum equal to one, and as a result, so do the probabilities in each of the Equations (1)—(6). Thus, with respect to Equations (4) and (5), the following result holds:

(10)
$$P(W_1/V_1) + P(W_2/V_1)$$

= $P(W_1/V_2) + P(W_2/V_2)$

and transposing we obtain:

(11)
$$P(W_1/V_1) - P(W_1/V_2)$$

= $P(W_2/V_2) - P(W_2/V_1)$

If $K=P(W_1/V_1)-P(W_1/V_2)$, then K is a positive real number (K>0) and Equation (9) can be reduced to:

$$(12) KU_1 - KU_2 = EV_1 - EV_2$$

and recombined as:

(13)
$$K(U_1 - U_2) = EV_1 - EV_2$$

Therefore, the ordinal ranking of the expected

postulate does not contradict the mathematical theory of probability, and although such small magnitudes cannot be empirically measured (at least at the present time), the consequences of the postulate (in a theoretical context) certainly deserve to be tested. The theorem presented in this paper is, of course, such a testable consequence.

values depends solely upon the ordinal ranking of the utilities. A corollary is that the rational voter does not need to know the (objective) conditional probabilities.

By convention the voter most prefers C_1 's winning—that is, W_1 is preferred to W_2 and W_1 is preferred to W_3 —and, hence, $U_1 > U_2$ and $U_1 > U_3$. Thus, with respect to Equation (13), $EV_1 > EV_2$. The rational voter selects V_1 instead of V_2 , and by a similar argument the rational voter selects V_1 instead of V_3 . Thus, in the three-candidate situation, the rational voter votes for the candidate (party) associated with the outcome he most prefers. A corollary is that the rational voter does not need to know the numerical values of his utilities.

This type of argument is obviously quite general and holds for any number of candidates in a single-member district using the simplemajority single-ballot system of election.

The decision rule (viz., maximize the expected value of utility) and the analysis of probabilities are, of course, the core of the present model. These may be illustrated, and the relationship between the model and the classical theory of political parties can be indicated, by an imaginary but numerical example.

Let us suppose that the voter intends to vote for the third candidate C_3 , viz., intends to select V_3 as a course of action, and that the (objective) conditional probabilities are: $P(W_1/V_3) = .34$, $P(W_2/V_3) = .33$, and $P(W_3/V_3) = .33$. Further, let us suppose the voter changes his mind and decides to vote for the second

⁸ Simple preferences are universally accepted as the basis for calculating utilities. The debate pivots about how to transform the non-numerical preferences into numerical utilities, but an isomorphic ordinal ranking is generally accepted as a fundamental characteristic of a suitable transformation. See R. Duncan Luce and Howard Raiffa, Games and Decisions (New York: John Wiley & Sons, Inc., 1957), Chapter 2.

⁹ Start by subtracting Equation (6) from Equation (4).

candidate C_2 , and that the (objective) conditional probabilities become: $P(W_1/V_2) =$.34, $P(W_2/V_2) = .35$, and $P(W_3/V_2) = .31$. With this hypothetical case, the (let us say) "absolute" probability that C_1 will be elected has not changed but the (let us sav) "relative" probability that C_1 will be elected has strikingly changed: the voter's switch makes C_2 rather than C_1 the most likely winner. The classical theory of party systems seems to have focused upon "relative" probabilities; perhaps its implicit decision rule has been: Never vote for the candidate you least prefer; of the remaining candidates vote for the one who (if you vote for him) has the best chance of winning. This decision rule may be "rational" in some sense, but it is not the decision rule incorporated in the present model.

The present model has the advantage, from the perspective of the psychology of voting, of not postulating calculations by the rational voter. Thus, perhaps, the difference between rational voters and actual voters is smaller than is commonly assumed. This possibility deserves examination by survey research,10 but the distinction between preferring a candidate's personality and preferring a candidate's winning must be carefully drawn. A highest preference for a particular candidate's personality or stands on the issues or party affiliation, is not equivalent to a highest preference for that candidate's winning; in the language of decision theory, the latter is an outcome, the former are not. If this distinction can be successfully drawn in questionnaires, studies of the psychology of voting might be integrated with studies of rational decisionmaking, with prospects of theoretical advantages for both types of analysis, by construing the so-called socio-economic determinants of voting choices as determinants of preference structures.

¹⁰ An appropriately designed survey study of a British by-election, pitting Conservative-Labour-Liberal candidates against one another, might serve as a "crucial experiment" for the model and theorem.

A MEASURE OF THE POPULATION QUALITY OF LEGISLATIVE APPORTIONMENT*

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This paper attempts to examine carefully the problem of determining a numerical measure which reflects the quality of the population apportionment in a legislative body. We desire a single index, an index which takes advantage of the available population data, and an index which is readily understood. It should be said that we are not concerned with the much more difficult problem of legislative districting—actually drawing district boundaries on a map—but concentrate our attention only on the quality of apportionment in the particular, but important, sense of population equality.

In order to accomplish this purpose I review a number of increasingly complex possibilities and eventually arrive at a measure which superficially seems somewhat esoteric, but which turns out ultimately to be easily interpretable.

It will be convenient to proceed heuristically with the development by carrying along a small concrete example. For this purpose, consider the six congressional districts of Connecticut. For the 89th Congress, the population of each of these districts was:

District	Population
1 .	422,766
2	411,919
3	409,693
4	482,135
5	404,520
6	404,201

* Computations for this paper were done on the CDC 1604 of the University of Wisconsin Computing Center under a grant from the University of Wisconsin Research Committee. Since this Center is partially supported by the National Science Foundation and by the Wisconsin Alumni Research Foundation, these agencies are acknowledged. Mr. Andrew Porter and Mrs. Betty Porter assisted in the computations.

A preliminary description of the coefficient b developed in this paper appeared in the author's, "An Objective Method for Establishing Legislative Districts," Midwest Journal of Political Science, 10 (May, 1966), 200-213.

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Our problem here is to combine these numbers in some meaningful fashion to yield a single number or index; again, a number; which explicates the notion of quality of population apportionment (or, conversely, of population malapportionment).

Now, for the above data, the average, or mean, district population is 422,539. It seems clear, that, if the population apportionment were ideal, each of the six districts would have a population equal to this average district population. Of course, this ideal would probably never occur exactly in practice (particularly when the average district population is not a whole number!).

We can determine numerical deviations from this ideal by subtracting the average district population, 422,539, from each of the actual district populations given above. Carrying out the desired subtractions, we have:

District	Deviation Populations		
1	+227		
2	-10,620		
3	-12,846		
4	+59,596		
5	-18,019		
6	-18,338		

To combine these six deviation populations into a meaningful index, the obvious thing to do would be to take their sum or their average value. However, the obvious thing is meaningless, for the algebraic sum of the district deviation populations is zero and, more generally, will be zero for any problem. (A mathematical proof of this is given in almost any statistics text.) A second thought would be to ignore the negative signs for the deviation populations of districts 2, 3, 5, and 6 and find the mean absolute (i.e., always positive) deviation.

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¹ These data were obtained from: U.S. Bureau of the Census. Supplement to Congressional District Data Book. Redistricted States. Connecticut (Districts of the 89th Congress), U.S. Government Printing Office. Washington, D.C., 1965.

For the above data, this figure is 227+10,620 +12,846+59,596+18,019+18,338 divided by six, which is 19,941. This mean deviation serves as a measure of population malapportionment (population malapportionment because clearly this measure becomes larger as the quality of population apportionment becomes worse). But the mean deviation, mathematically, is a statistic to be eschewed; it is virtually impossible to handle algebraically and, despite its simple interpretation, has been almost completely abandoned by professional statisticians since the turn of the century.

A second way to get rid of the negative signs in the district deviation populations is to square each of them, and then, for an overall measure of malapportionment, find the average of these squared deviations. For our problem, the six congressional districts of Connecticut, this mean squared deviation is 748,417,5773. The computation we have just described yields what technically is known as the variance, and is the most common measure of dispersion in statistics. Redundant with the variance is its positive square root, called the standard deviation, which for our problem is 27,357.2. For descriptive purposes the standard deviation is usually preferred to the variance because it is measured in the same units as the original data.

As a general measure of malapportionment the standard deviation of the district populations, as outlined above, may be criticized because it is very much affected by the size of the district populations themselves. For example, in our problem, a district with half the average district population would have a deviation population of $-211,269\frac{1}{2}$, while for a legislative body with an average district population of 10,000, an equally malapportioned district (in the sense of having half the ideal population) would have a deviation population of only -5,000. To develop a measure of malapportionment which is independent of the average district population, we simply divide all the district populations by their average, thus rendering all subsequent analysis relative to the average district population. The ratio of a district population to the average district population is termed the population ratio of that district; for Connecticut's congressional districts, the population ratios are as shown in table (see col. 2). It is clear that the ideal value for a population ratio is one, and that consequently a population ratio gives the proportion of the ideal population that a given district is. Note that, regardless of the quality of apportionment, the average population ratio is always exactly

District	Population Ratio		
1	1.0005		
2 .	.9749		
3	.9696		
4	1.1410		
5	.9574		
6	.9566		

equal to one.² Thus, upon subtracting one from each of the above population ratios for Connecticut, squaring and summing the resulting deviation population ratios, and dividing by six, we have the variance of the population ratios, 0.004189. Taking the square root of the variance, we have the standard deviation, 0.06472. The standard deviation of figures whose average is one has a special name: the coefficient of variation. As a measure of malapportionment, the coefficient of variation was first suggested by Schubert and Press.³

Schubert and Press, noting that the coefficient of variation became larger as the quality of apportionment became worse, sought an index which would reverse the direction of measurement so that larger values of the new index would correspond to better apportionment. To this end they defined the inverse coefficient of variation, ICV, as

$$ICV = \frac{1}{1+c},$$

where c is the coefficient of variation. For our Connecticut problem ICV = 1/(1+0.06472) = 0.9392.

Under perfect apportionment, the coefficient of variation is zero; upon substituting c=0 in the above formula, we have the maximum value of the ICV of one:

$$ICV(max) = 1.$$

Note that as c, the coefficient of variation, becomes larger than zero, the ICV becomes smaller than one. It may be proved mathematically that the largest possible value of c is $\sqrt{k-1}$, where k is the number of districts

² Let n_j be the population of the jth of k districts and let $n = \sum n_j$ be the total population. Now the average district population is n/k so that a population ratio r_j is kn_j/n . Then $\sum r_j = \sum kn_j/n = kn/n = k$. Since the sum of the k population ratios is k, their average value must be one.

³ Glendon Schubert and Charles Press, "Measuring Malapportionment," this Review, 58 (June, 1964), 302-327.

under consideration; thus, the smallest possible ICV is:

$$ICV(min) = \frac{1}{1 + \sqrt{k-1}}.$$

For k=2 districts, ICV(min) = 0.5; for k=82 districts, ICV(min) = 0.1.

We suggest that it is unfortunate that the minimum possible ICV is a function of the number of districts: strictly speaking, it is not appropriate to contrast ICVs for two legislatures which are of different sizes, although we note that $ICV(\min) \rightarrow 0$ as $k \rightarrow \infty$.

A second objection to the ICV (and all the other measures considered so far) is somewhat more subtle. Consider the above population ratios for Connecticut's congressional districts: while their mean value is necessarily exactly equal to one, four of them are less than one and two of them are greater than one. In other words, the population ratios are not symmetrically placed about their mean. That this should occur is not surprising, for observe that while the minimum possible population ratio is zero, the maximum possible population ratio is k, where again k is the number of districts. For k greater than two, then, there is a much larger range of possible values for population ratios' deviating positively from their mean of one than for such ratios' deviating negatively. But since the algebraic sum of the deviations must be zero, the result typically is fewer, generally larger, positive deviations and more, generally smaller, negative deviations, as illustrated by our Connecticut example.

A distribution of population ratios, such as that just portrayed, is said to be positively skewed, because the most common technical measure of skewness, the parameter γ_1 , takes on positive values when the skewness is in the direction described. For our Connecticut problem $\gamma_1 = +1.5985$. The generality of this observation—positive skewness of population ratios—is shown in data given by Schubert and

It is readily seen that the worst possible apportionment occurs when the entire population is in one of the k districts. When this occurs we have one population ratio deviation of k-1 and k-1 deviations of -1. The sum of the squared deviations is then $(k-1)^2+(k-1)(-1)^2=(k-1)(k-1+1)=(k-1)k$. The mean squared deviation, or variance, is (k-1)k/k=k-1, and the root mean square deviation, or standard deviation, is $\sqrt{k-1}$.

⁵ Maurice G. Kendall, The Advanced Theory of Statistics, Volume I (London, 1948, 4th ed.), pp. 81-82.

Press: of the 99 state legislative chambers in the United States (remember that Nebraska has a unicameral legislature) 93 have positively skewed distributions of population ratios.

Now, in the statistical description of distributions, it is usually considered undesirable to deal with skewed distributions: it is preferable to perform some sort of transformation on the data to render the distribution symmetric. When faced with a positively skewed distribution, the most common transformation used for attempting to symmetrize a distribution is to take the logarithm of each value in the distribution. This suggests that for our problem it would be wise to find the logarithms of the population ratios.

A test of the validity of dealing with the logarithms of population ratios lies in the answer to the question, "Consider a district with a population ratio of two-a district with twice as large a population as is ideal. What population ratio would a district have which is equally malapportioned in the other direction?" If the answer to this question is one-half, implying that it is just as inequitable to have a district with half the ideal population as it is to have a district with twice the ideal population, then a decision to take logarithms is correct. Were one to deal directly with the population ratios, as in the ICV and other measures considered above, then a district with a population ratio of zero-no one at all in the district—would be one whose malapportionment implicitly would be considered no worse than a district with twice the ideal population, in the sense that two and zero are equally spaced from one.

One particular way effectively of looking at the (sum of the) logarithms of the population ratios, without actually taking logarithms, is to consider the product of the population ratios. (Remember that the logarithm of a product is the sum of the logarithms.) As a very simple example, take a k=2 district legislature, where the two districts have population ratios r_1 and r_2 , and where $r_2=2-r_1$ because the sum of the two population ratios must be two. Now let us view the product of the population ratios, r_1r_2 , as a function of r_1 and $r_2(r_1 \le r_2)$.

From the following figures (see page 211) it is clear that the product of the population ratios becomes larger as apportionment becomes better, assuming a value of zero when the apportionment is the worst possible, reaching a value of one

⁶ Glendon Schubert and Charles Press, "Malapportionment Remeasured," this REVIEW, 58 (December, 1964), 966-970.

r_1	r_2	r_1r_2
1.0	1.0	1.00
0.8	1.2	.96
0.6	1.4	.84
0.4	1.6	.64
0.2	1.8	.36
0.0	2.0	.00

when the apportionment is perfect. This suggests that, more generally, we may take the product of the population ratios as a measure of the quality of apportionment.

$$\Pi r_i$$

where r_j is the population ratio of district j and the capital pi indicates the operation of taking the product. However, this quantity has the undesirable feature of being affected by k, the number of districts; to remove this characteristic we find g, the kth root of the product.

$$g = \sqrt[k]{\prod r_j}$$
.

The quantity g is the well-known statistical measure of central tendency, the geometric mean. In our special case, where the sum of the numbers under consideration is a constant, the geometric mean functions as a measure of dispersion, as is desired for our problem.

For a given set of positive numbers, it may be proved mathematically that the geometric mean is less than or equal to the arithmetic mean (i.e., less than or equal to the usual average). Thus the geometric mean for our problem is less than or equal to one, and becomes increasingly less than one as the legislature under consideration becomes more malapportioned. For our Connecticut problem the geometric mean is 0.9980, reflecting the very good apportionment for these six districts.

But the geometric mean g takes on values quite close to one even under substantial malapportionment. As a simple example, consider again a legislature with only two districts having population ratios of 0.4 and 1.6, i.e., a legislature where one of its two districts has four times the population of its other district. In this instance $g = \sqrt{(0.4)(1.6)} = \sqrt{0.64} = 0.8$,

⁷ Consider a k district legislature with half the districts having population ratios r_1 and the other half having population ratios r_2 , $r_2 \neq r_1$. Clearly, $\prod r_j$ goes to zero as k becomes large. However, in this example, $g = \sqrt{r_1 r_2}$, regardless of k.

a seemingly large index for such a badly apportioned two district legislature.

To establish a measure which appears better to reflect the quality of apportionment, but a measure which is functionally related to the geometric mean, consider again the special case of k=2 districts. Let r_1 and r_2 be the two district population ratios with, of course, $r_1+r_2=2$. Also let r_1 be the smaller population ratio—a population ratio which is less than or equal to one. Now if $b=r_1$ ($b \le 1$), let us find the relationship between b and g. The geometric mean here is the square root of the product of the two population ratios

$$g = \sqrt{r_1 r_2}.$$

This may be expressed as

$$g=\sqrt{r_1(2-r_1)},$$

since $r_2=2-r_1$. But $b=r_1$, as defined above, so that we can write

$$g = \sqrt{b(2-b)}$$
.

This equation gives g as a function of b; to find b as a function of g, square both members of the equation above to obtain,

$$q^2 = b(2-b),$$

rearrange terms,

$$b^2 - 2b + g^2 = 0,$$

and solve the resulting quadratic equation for h.

$$b = 1 - \sqrt{1 - a^2}$$

taking the negative sign in solving the quadratic, since $b \le 1$. Knowing the geometric mean, g, of the population ratios, we can, with this last formula, find b. The maximum possible value of g is one, therefore the maximum possible value of b is

$$b(\max) = 1 - \sqrt{1-1}$$

= 1.

The minimum possible value of g is zero, therefore the minimum possible value of b is

$$b(\min) = 1 - \sqrt{1 - 0}$$

= 0.

Thus, as the quality of apportionment varies from the worst possible to perfect, b varies from zero to one. But note that unless g is exactly equal to zero or one, b is always smaller than g; in the example above with two districts with population ratios $r_1 = 0.4$ and $r_2 = 1.6$, g = 0.8, but $b = 1 - \sqrt{1 - g^2} = 0.4$, better revealing the malapportionment.

More generally, we shall compute b, our measure of the quality of apportionment,

⁸ Kendall, op. cit., pp. 33-34.

using this formula, regardless of the number of districts. For the Connecticut problem

$$b = 0.9373.$$

It must be admitted that the calculation of b, by hand, is troublesome and tricky, requiring the informed use of logarithms. On the other hand, with the assistance of an electronic computer, the calculation is extremely simple.³

Let us now turn to a crucial question, namely: how is the measure b to be interpreted; does it have any simple meaning, or is it an abstract index which may be understood only through experience?

To interpret the meaning of b, consider its derivation. It is exactly the smaller population ratio in a two-district legislature. Thus, it is seen that $\frac{1}{2}b$ is the minimum proportion of the total population which is capable of electing half, i.e., one, of the legislators in a two district legislature. The question arises of whether this relationship holds for legislative bodies with more than two districts. From the data at the beginning of the paper, the three smallest congressional district populations of Connecticut are 409,693, 404,520 and 404,201. Dividing their sum, 1,218,414 by 2,535,234, the total population of Connecticut, we obtain 0.481 the minimum proportion of the population able to elect half the congressmen. But for these data, one half of our measure b is 0.9373/2=0.469-. Half of our index b is then slightly less than the minimum proportion of the entire population capable of electing half the legislators. Or, the minimum proportion of the electorate that can elect half the legislators is at least as large as ½t. This relationship holds not only for our example but for all problems this assertion is proved mathematically in the final section of this paper.

Consider now the classic Dauer-Kelsay index. 10 It is given by the minimum proportion of the total population able to elect a majority of the legislators, and obviously is always larger than the minimum proportion able to elect half the legislators. Consequently, it is also true that half our measure l is less than the Dauer-Kelsay index. In symbols, if d is the Dauer-Kelsay index and d^* is the minimum proportion of the population

 9 A Fortran version of a program to compute b, given the district populations, is available from the writer. More generally, please write regarding any computational problem involving the measure b for a particular set of data.

¹⁰ Manning J. Dauer and Robert G. Kelsay, "Unrepresentative States," *National Municipal Review*, 44 (1955), 515-575, 587.

able to elect half the legislators, then we have, for all problems

$$2d > 2d^* \geq b$$
.

So that our measure b, despite the circuitous route by which it was developed, has a particularly simple interpretation: $\frac{1}{2}b$ must always be a conservative estimate of the Dauer-Kelsay index.¹¹

Knowing these relationships between the Dauer-Kelsay index and b prompts us to propose verbal labels to be attached to various possible values of b:

b	Quality of Apportionment
0.95-1.00	excellent
0.90-0.95-	good
in the 0.80s	fair
in the 0.70s	poor
below 0.70	terrible

This taxonomy is suggested with some diffidence as it implies value judgments which, strictly, are beyond the scope of this paper.

A natural question arises: why have we gone to all the trouble of developing the measure b, a measure whose rationale is complicated and a measure which, with primitive equipment, is troublesome to compute, when half of it is merely a lower bound to the Dauer-Kelsay index? Why not simply obtain the Dauer-Kelsay index? The answer is that the Dauer-Kelsay index can be misleading; in particular, it can suggest a well-apportioned legislature that is very badly apportioned. For example, consider a five district legislature with population ratios:

District	Population Ratio
1	0.00
$\frac{1}{2}$	1.25
3	1.25
4	1.25
5	1.25

"The discussion here has been rendered somewhat cumbersome by having defined b to range from zero to one. Had we originally defined it as half as large it would numerically have been more directly comparable with the Dauer-Kelsay index. However, most indices in science vary from zero to one and consequently we have followed this convention in our definition of b.

Fifty percent of the population here is able to elect a majority (3 of 5) of the legislators—seemingly a good apportionment. Yet one of the districts has no population at all! 12 For this extreme case, our measure b is zero, appropriately showing the absurdly bad apportionment. Another way of looking at this distinction is to point out that our index b considers all the population ratios (except in the extreme case of a population ratio exactly equal to zero), while the Dauer-Kelsay index effectively groups together (and fails to distinguish among) the smaller districts, and groups together (and fails to distinguish among) and larger districts.

Another criticism of the Dauer-Kelsay index is that both its minimum possible value and its maximum possible value are affected by k, 13 and thus, as for the ICV, strictly speaking it is not appropriate to compare Dauer-Kelsay indices for legislatures of different sizes.

As further numerical examples, in Table 1 are given the values of k, $b, \frac{1}{2}b, d^*$, the minimum proportion of the population able to elect half the legislators, and d, the Dauer-Kelsay index, for each state's delegation to the U.S. House of Representatives.14 (Not included, of course, are those small states with only one representative. Also not included are Hawaii and New Mexico, each of which elected two congressmen at large. In Table 1 the reported ks for Maryland, Ohio, and Texas are one less than their congressional apportionment for the 89th congress, as each of these states elected one congressman at large.) It is seen that the correlation between b (or $\frac{1}{2}b$) and d^* is almost perfect. The lack of close correlation between b $(or_{\frac{1}{2}}b)$ and d is due almost entirely to the artifactually large Dauer-Kelsay indices for

 12 Regardless of k, the number of districts, it is always possible to construct an example where the Dauer-Kelsay index is at least 0.50, and still have one of the districts with no population.

13 The maximum possible value for the Dauer-Kelsay index is (k+2)/2k for k even, and (k+1)/2k for k odd. The minimum possible value is 2/k for k even, and 1/k for k odd. From these formulas it is seen that when k gets small the Dauer-Kelsay index becomes spuriously inflated.

¹⁴ These data are for districts of the 89th Congress, using population figures from the 1960 census. The basic reference is: U.S. Bureau of the Census. Congressional District Data Book. (Districts of the 88th Congress), U.S. Government Printing Office. Washington, D.C., 1963. Eight states redistricted between the 88th and 89th Congress; revised figures for these states were obtained from pamphlets, for which a typical reference is given in footnote 1.

the small states, as discussed in footnote 13, a bias which is shown also by the strong negative relationship between the number of districts and the Dauer-Kelsay index. On the other hand, the correlation between k and b is almost exactly zero, suggesting the essential independence of the number of districts and our measure.

As a final comment I point out that it is possible to use b not only as a measure of the quality of apportionment, but to use it also actually to carry out an apportionment. This is done by maximizing b in dispensing legislative seats. The rationale and technical details of this method of apportionment will appear in a forthcoming paper.

MATHEMATICAL APPENDIX

In this mathematical appendix we prove that, for a given set of data, twice the Dauer-Kelsay index is necessarily greater than the quantity b developed in this paper.

Let r_1, r_2, \dots, r_k be the population ratios of the districts, where k is the number of districts, where

$$\sum_{i=1}^{k} r_i = k, \tag{1}$$

and where the population ratios are ordered such that

$$r_1 \le r_2 \le \cdots \le r_k. \tag{2}$$

Then the Dauer-Kelsay index d is given by

$$d = \sum_{i=1}^{(k+2)/2} r_i/k, \tag{3}$$

for k even, and

$$d = \sum_{j=1}^{(k+1)/2} r_j / k, \tag{4}$$

for k odd.

The quantity b is defined as

$$b = 1 - \sqrt{1 - g^2}, \tag{5}$$

where g is the geometric mean of the population ratios:

$$g = \left(\prod_{i=1}^{k} r_i\right)^{1/k}.$$
 (6)

We shall now prove that:

$$2d > b. (7)$$

Let

$$d^* = \sum_{i=1}^{k/2} r_i / k \tag{8}$$

for k even, and

$$d^* = \left(\sum_{j=1}^{(k-1)/2} r_j + \frac{1}{2} r_{(k+1)/2}\right) / k \tag{9}$$

TABLE 1. MEASURES OF THE QUALITY OF APPORTIONMENT OF THE CONGRESSIONAL DELEGATIONS OF THE U. S. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

State	\boldsymbol{k}	<i>b</i>	$rac{1}{2}b$	d^*	d	Quality of Apportionment
Alabama	8	.896	.448	.459	.586	fair
Arizona	3	.547	.273	.321	.490	terrible
Arkansas	4	.771	.386	.388	.678	poor
California	3 8	.859	.430	.448	.473	fair
Colorado	4	.924	.462	.468	.718	\mathbf{good}
Connecticut	6	.937	.469	.481	.643	good
Florida	12	.736	.368	.405	.487	poor
Georgia	10	.890	.44 5	.454	.558	fair
Idaho	2	.771	.386	.386	1.000	poor
Illinois	24	.851	.426	.441	.482	fair
Indiana	11	.764	.382	.407	.449	poor
Iowa	7	.923	.466	.475	. 547	good
Kansas	5	.866	.433	.447	.548	fair
Kentucky	7	.811	.406	.421	.489	fair
Louisiana	8	.798	.399	.424	.544	poor
Maine	2	.957	.479	.479	1.000	excellent
Maryland	7	. 596	.298	.314	.374	terrible
Massachusetts	12	.928	.464	.471	.557	\mathbf{good}
Michigan	19	.988	.494	.495	.521	${\sf excellent}$
Minnesota	8	.910	.455	.460	. 589	\mathbf{good}
Mississippi	5	.762	.381	.406	. 509	poor
Missouri	10	.904	.452	.458	.559	${f good}$
Montana	2	.813	.406	.406	1.000	fair
Nebraska	3	.890	.445	.455	.624	fair
New Hampshire	2	.907	.453	.453	1.000	good
New Jersey	15	.751	.376	.396	.429	poor
New York	41	.915	.458	.465	.477	\mathbf{good}
North Carolina	11	.842	.421	.439	.486	fair
North Dakota	2	.946	.473	.473	1.000	good
Ohio	23	.734	.367	.396	.417	poor
Oklahoma	6	.681	.340	.365	.539	terrible
Oregon	4	.740	.370	.412	.704	poor
Pennsylvania	27	.855	.428	.446	.464	fair
Rhode Island	2	.930	.465	.465	1.000	good
South Carolina	6	.813	.407	.426	.600	fair
South Dakota	2	.537	.269	.269	1.000	terrible
Tennessee	9	.695	.347	.384	.440	terrible
Texas	22	.619	.309	.333	.377	terrible
Utah	2	.714	.357	.357	1.000	poor
Virginia	10	.832	.416	.432	. 527	fair
Washington	7	.883	.442	.458	. 528	fair
West Virginia	5	.871	.436	.447	.553	fair
Wisconsin	10	.982	.491	.493	. 593	excellent

for k odd. The quantity d^* is the minimum proportion of the population able to elect half the legislators (in contrast to the Dauer-Kelsay index's being the minimum proportion of the population able to elect a majority of the legislators). For k odd, half the population ratio of

the middle, i.e., the (k+1)/2, district is included in computing d^* . Note that this index d^* is half the mean of the first k/2 population ratios. It is obvious that

$$d > d^*$$
. (10)

Now let

$$g_L = \left(\prod_{j=1}^{k/2} r_j \right)^{2/k} \tag{11}$$

and

$$g_U = \left(\prod_{j=(k+2)/2}^k r_j\right)^{2/k}$$
 (12)

for k even, and

$$g_L = \left(r_{(k+1)/2}^{1/2} \prod_{i=1}^{(k-1)/2} r_i\right)^{2/k} \tag{13}$$

and

$$g_U = \left(r_{(k+1)/2}^{1/2} \prod_{j=(k+3)/2}^k r_j\right)^{2/k}, \tag{14}$$

for k odd. The quantity g_L is the geometric mean of the population ratios of the smaller k/2 districts and g_U is the geometric mean of the population ratios of the larger k/2 districts. For k odd, we have assigned half the population ratio of the middle district to g_L and half to g_U .

Now $2d^*$ is the arithmetic mean of the smaller k/2 districts; consequently,

$$2d^* \ge g_L, \tag{15}$$

since the arithmetic mean is always greater than or equal to the geometric mean.

The geometric mean g of all k population ratios is given by (6); using (11) and (12) or (13) and (14) it is seen that

$$g = \sqrt{g_L g_U}. (16)$$

Substituting (16) in (5), we have

$$b = 1 - \sqrt{1 - g_L g_U}. \tag{17}$$

The arithmetic mean of the population ratios of the k/2 larger districts is $2-2d^*$, since, remembering (1), the sum of the arithmetic means of the smaller k/2 and the larger k/2 districts must be two. Then

$$2 - 2d^* \ge g_U \tag{18}$$

again because the arithmetic mean must be greater than or equal to the geometric mean. From (15)

$$2 - 2d^* \le 2 - g_L, \tag{19}$$

and thus, from (18) and (19),

$$2 - g_L \ge g_U. \tag{20}$$

Consider the quantity

$$a = 1 - \sqrt{1 - g_L(2 - g_L)}$$
. (21)

Using (20) in contrasting (17) and (21), we see that

$$a \ge b$$
. (22)

But from (21)

$$a = g_L. (23)$$

Upon combining (10), (15), (23), and (22),

$$2d > 2d^* \ge g_L = a \ge b,$$
 (24)

and we see that 2d > b, which was to be proved.

IMAGE OF A PRESIDENT: SOME INSIGHTS INTO THE POLITICAL VIEWS OF SCHOOL CHILDREN*

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The map of the child's political world is slowly beginning to be filled in. The areas best filled in so far are his view of certain government officials (President, judges, policemen, etc.) and his understanding (or lack of understanding) of the operation of specific political institutions (legislatures, parties, etc.).1 Of all persons in government none is as well known as the President of the United States. Even at an early age children know his name and even his party affiliation.2 Best documented so far is the nature of the child's affection for the President. Apparently he enjoys the child's deep respect, admiration, loyalty, and even love.3 Some scholars have gone so far as to imply that he symbolizes nation, leadership, and father all in one.4 This being the case, it seems imperative that we ask: Is the President merely a symbol of leadership who will be loved irrespective of the political stands he takes, or is he seen as a genuine political figure who stands for specific political principles, legislation, etc.? At the moment this is the area about which we know least. It is but a slight exaggeration to say that we know very little indeed about the child's cognitive awareness of policy stands and differences among major officials, presidential candidates, etc. Even more unknown to us is what they asso-

- * Support for this investigation came from a grant from the National Institute of Health (MH 10112-01).
- ¹ Fred Greenstein, *Children and Politics* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1965), especially pp. 12-14.
- ² Ibid.; also see the work of David Easton, Robert Hess, and Jack Dennis, especially: Robert D. Hess, "The Socialization of Attitudes Toward Political Authority: Some Cross National Comparisons," International Social Science Journal, 15 (1963), 542-559; Robert D. Hess and David Easton, "The Child's Changing Image of the President," Public Opinion Quarterly, 24 (1960), 632-644; and David Easton and Jack Dennis, "The Child's Image of Government," The Annals, 361 (1965), 40-57.
 - ³ Ibid.
- ⁴ Judith Torney and Robert Hess, "The Child's Idealization of Authority," a paper presented to the American Psychological Association meeting at St. Louis in 1962.

ciate with the name of a specific President that could be classified as being genuinely political. Precisely because we know so much of their affective orientation towards him, it seems important to know how much—if any—political content children associate with a specific President in office.

The opportunity to ask and answer that question presented itself when my colleagues and I undertook a large-scale survey of school children's reactions to the death of President Kennedy.⁵ In the course of the interview schedule we introduced a number of questions designed to elicit the political image children had of the late President. We considered these questions as strictly exploratory since the literature on children did not permit us to develop any rigorous hypotheses. Consequently, we proceeded from two different and mutually exclusive assumptions: If the child's image of even so vivid and articulate a political figure as John F. Kennedy should prove to be void of political content, then his orientation to the political world is indeed almost exclusively affective, as had been suggested by some previous research. If, on the other hand, children do remember the late President for specific political acts or stands, we would feel safe to conclude that children's orientation towards the President is political and should not be equated with generalized trust of authority.

As benchmark for political awareness we used the existing knowledge of adults' awareness of the political stands taken by Presidents and presidential candidates. The findings of the major public opinion institutes as well as the classic voting behavior studies of Paul Lazarsfeld and his associates all seem to indi-

Aspects of Political Socialization: School Children's Reaction to the Death of a President," in Martha Wolfenstein and Gilbert Kliman (eds.), Children and the Death of a President: Multi-Disciplinary Studies (New York: Doubleday, 1965), pp. 30-59; and Roberta S. Sigel, "Television and the Reactions of School Children to the Assassination," in Bradley S. Greenberg and Edwin B. Parker (eds.), The Kennedy Assassination and the American Public: Social Communication in Crisis (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1965), pp. 199-219.

cate that American adults are not well informed on the stands and policy preferences of the Chief Executive. What is known that is unique to him usually concerns personal attributes (such as his looks, family, etc.) while the political "image voters have of candidates [and Presidents] is influenced by their party images . . . often the image [of party and man] is highly interwoven."7 The findings of the Survey Research Center, for example, found that the Eisenhower image actually became less rather than more political as he approached his second term while citizens' references to his likeable personal qualities "rose substantially."8 Eisenhower may, of course, have been a special case, but the fact remains that Americans do not maintain a detailed check over the political actions of the Chief Executive: rather they are aware of some of the more dramatic issues with which his administration is popularly associated while for the rest they are content to evaluate him in terms of personality, party, and prosperity. Under these circumstances, we would say that a child's view of the President shall be considered. political if he can associate the President with specific political actions, stands, or causes which transpired during his term of office but that the number of such recalls need not be numerous or deep.

I. METHODOLOGY

The political questions were embedded in a lengthy questionnaire whose main focus was children's reactions to the assassination and to the subsequent apprehension and murder of his assassin. The questionnaire was a paper and pencil instrument administered within twenty-one days after the assassination to 1,349 primary and secondary school children (grades 4–12) in metropolitan Detroit. The children were told that the questionnaire meant to explore their reaction to certain public events, that it was in no way related to their school standing, and that their answers were anonymous. Their teachers were not present during the administration. Grades six and up com-

- ⁶ See especially Paul F. Lazarsfeld, Bernard Berelson, and Hazel Gaudet, *The People's Choice* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1948); Angus Campbell, Philip E. Converse, Warren E. Miller, and Donald E. Stokes, *The American Voter* (New York: Wiley and Sons, 1960), pp. 171–183.
- ⁷ Roberta S. Sigel, "The Effect of Partisanship in the Perception of Political Candidates," Public Opinion Quarterly, 28 (1964), p. 496.
 - 8 Campbell et al., op. cit., p. 28.

pleted the questionnaire in the customary manner. But to the fourth-graders each item was read aloud, one at a time, before requesting an answer. The sample constitutes a good cross-section of the metropolitan Detroit school population, including all social classes and ethnic and religious groups. The schools were so chosen as to have good representation from upper, middle, blue collar class and slum neighborhoods and to have sufficient representation of children from the various ethnic, racial, and religious groups characteristic of the city. The schools were not, however, chosen on a strict probability basis.

We asked two types of political or potentially political questions:

- (1) information questions which were forced choice and clearly political, such as one concerning the President's party affiliation and a check list of eight items featuring relatively recent political events (foreign and domestic) where children were asked to check off only those events with which the President had been involved during his term of office;
- (2) four open-ended questions of which only one requested specific political information. All answers were coded as political which referred to political issues, policies, acts, events or tasks performed by Kennedy during his administration. The four open-ended questions were introduced early in the questionnaire, long before we had touched upon political content. The questions requested children to complete the sentence (a) "what I remember most about the President," (b) "what I liked about him,"9 (c) "what kinds of things can people do to make sure that President Kennedy is remembered?", and (d)—the only clearly political question-"what can you remember that President Kennedy did as President? Write of the things he did in his job as President, not what he did in his private life."10 Questions a, b and c, of course, do not convey any political cues; they are neutral and, therefore, are intended as a test of children's political sensitization. Only the child for whom
- ⁹ The question about liking was asked after the question about remembering to avoid forcing an affective response in the last instance.
- 10 We used the phrase "did in his job" rather than to talk about his political contribution in order to make it comprehensible for 4th-6th graders. Initially we were concerned that the phrase "in his job" might be too ambiguous and would not focus children's attention on the specifically political. Experience with the pilot interview reassured us that children understood the question.

politics has salience would give spontaneous political responses here. Question d, on the other hand, clearly requests political information and, therefore, does not constitute a test of spontaneous political reaction; rather it constitutes a test of complete political unawareness. The child who cannot recall anything political when asked to make a political recall must be judged to be politically unaware and to relate to the President in non-political terms. The four questions are useful for yet another purpose: they can tell us something about the nature of the child's political image of the President—is it merely role-prescriptive ("he signs treaties and enforces the law"), or is it issue-oriented and discriminates the individual President from the office? Answers were coded as being "political" when they referred to policies ("He was for the Medicare Bill"), issues ("He favored Civil Rights"), or role ("He enforces the laws passed by Congress"). For purposes of analysis, issue- and policytype answers were treated separately from role-type answers whenever feasible.

II. THE POLITICAL IMAGE

Children's image of the late President was far more political in an issue-oriented sense than the literature might have led us to believe.11 The issues may have been perceived in a shallow and naive manner, but they were perceived. To be sure, his image was not exclusively political or issue-oriented. For most children the memory of John F. Kennedy evoked a mixture of personality, political achievement or failure, and office-related tasks ("he looked after our country"; "he met with Khrushchev and other important people to lead our country"). But political issues and acts also featured prominently in this image: children did not ignore the major issues and policies of his administration: they were part and parcel of the Kennedy image. In short, his image is not a bland one of the Great Leader, nor is it merely symbolic of the Presidency; rather it is politically differentiated and somewhat issue-oriented.

What is even more significant is that politically-aware answers, such as "he tried to get us Medicare but failed" or "he was a leader and defender of my Negro race" was volunteered not in answers to any probings about Kennedy's achievements but simply as a response to the neutral question, "What I remember most about President Kennedy is . . . ," a question which was asked early during

¹¹ Greenstein, op. cit., Chapter 4, especially tables on pp. 58-59.

the questionnaire and before any political cues had been introduced. Political answers to this non-political question were volunteered by only a third (32 percent) of the children while 55 percent referred to personal characteristics of the President, but we are impressed by the fact that as many as a third spontaneously thought of the late President in political terms and not just in personal or symbolic ones. Even when they were asked for affective responses ("What I liked about President Kennedy"), 20 percent gave political answers. And still more impressive is the fact that as early as the fourth grade—a stage at which children supposedly are almost totally oblivious of the existence of political issues and ideologies-24 percent volunteered political answers. Political awareness does not seem to be a function of social class. Working class children who usually tend to show much less political interest than upper middle class children¹² —were politically aware, although it must be conceded that they recalled different and fewer political events.

The political component of the Kennedy image became clearest when children thought about him in connection with his "job" as President.¹³ Almost all then offered political answers and only 16 percent offered recollections referring to personal attributes (such as his kindness, courage, etc.). Many children, especially the older ones, recalled more than one action of the late President.¹⁴ The average number of political issues recalled is 1.2, but many 10th and 12th graders found time to discuss four and more political events.

And what do children recall of the politics of the Kennedy era? They recall him as the peacemaker and crusader for civil rights. Children's concern for peace and sensitivity to the tensions on the international scene were marked. There is no doubt that even young children were aware that they were living in troubled times full of international conflicts and dangers of war. Foreign affairs and peace together were mentioned more frequently than any other issues. However, when peace is separated from foreign affairs, civil rights

- ¹² Wilbur Schramm, Jack Lyle, and Edwin B. Parker, *Television in the Lives of Our Children* (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1961), p. 233.
- ¹² The discussion which follows above refers to responses to the question: "What can you remember that President Kennedy did as a President?"
- ¹⁶ It is, of course, possible that younger children, too, recalled more but just had more trouble writing it down.

 4th	6th	8th	10th

TABLE 1. "WHAT I REMEMBER MOST ABOUT PRESIDENT KENNEDY"

Type of	All	4th	6th	8th	10th	12th
Response	Children			Grade		
Personal*	55%	54%	49	51	59	63
Political	. 32	29	32	35	31	32
Miscellaneous**	10	11	17	12	7	3
No Answer	3	6	2	2	3	2
	100%	100%*	100%	100%	— 100 <i>%</i>	100%
	n=1,349†	264	281	339	249	216

^{*} Refers to answers which only talked about the President's personal or private life.

becomes the most frequently recalled issue; peace ranks second, and foreign affairs third. These three items alone account for half of all the responses.

The tremendous impact of the civil rights struggle will be discussed later. Let us consider here the children's views of Kennedy the peacemaker. They felt deeply indebted to him because they believed he had averted war, and he "was always trying to stop new wars." What was it that had made children so conscious of the likelihood of war? Mostly the Cuban Crisis. The possibility of a World War over the presence of Russian missiles in Cuba apparently had been very real and frightening to many children. An eleven year old girl thought Kennedy "saved the world [from a war| when there was the Cuban Crisis." Rare indeed was the child who in this context did not refer to the Cuban Crisis.

The threat of nuclear war entered the con-

sciousness even of some very young childrenreference to nuclear weapons, missiles, etc., occurred often-and caused children to welcome the Test Ban Treaty, overtures to Soviet Russia, diplomatic negotiations, and other attempts to reduce the threat of war. The extent to which peace and family security are intertwined is symbolized in the comment of a 13 year old lower class girl: "I liked President Kennedy because he prevented war, and my father has a better job now."

An 18 year old girl from an upper middle class background liked President Kennedy for "his ability to make me feel secure," and later, when she was asked to tell what he did in office, mentioned a long list of foreign affairs activities—almost all on behalf of peace.15 A

15 While concern for peace may well have been sparked by the Cuban Crisis, not all youngsters approved of Kennedv's handling of it (a 17 year

TABLE 2. THE THINGS PRESIDENT KENNEDY DID IN HIS JOB AS PRESIDENT

TO 6	All	4th	$6 ext{th}$	8th	$10 ext{th}$	12th
Reference to	Children			Grade		
Personal traits	16%	37%	25%	8%	6%	1%
Political actions:					,	
Civil Rights	25	5	14	28	32	51
Peace	18	19	23	14	15	16
Foreign Affairs	16	5	11	24	26	13
Misc. Political	15	15	15	16	13	15
No Answer	9	16	8	9	7	4
Misc. Uncodable	1	3	4	1	1	0
	$\frac{-}{100}\%$	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%

^{**} Inappropriate and uncodable answers included in miscellaneous.

[†] Column ns are the same in Tables 2, 3-A, 3-B, and 4.

9 year old girl explained, "He made peace because he did not want war."

The Cuban Crisis then was perhaps the first vivid threat to peace and security which this generation of school children could recall. It filled them with worry and with gratitude for the man who had averted the threat of war, who had made them feel secure again. Consequently, they thought of him as a man-of-peace.

Some children (notably upper middle class boys) gained this sense of security not so much from Kennedy's peaceful overtures during the crisis as from the decisiveness with which he challenged the Russians. They were happy that he "settled the Cuban situation outright, no pussyfooting around" (12th grade boy) and that he "made Khrushchev sweat" (10th grade girl). To these children his great service lay in the fact that "he stood up to Khrushchev [and thus] prevented World War III" (8th grade son of a wealthy executive).

Closely related to the image of Kennedy the peacemaker is that of Kennedy the man in search of the friendship of all nations, large and small, poor and rich.16 Frequent references are made to his foreign aid program ("he sent money to foreign countries," 7th grade girl), his desire to win friends for the United States through the Peace Corps, his efforts on behalf of disarmament (the Test Ban Treaty is mentioned frequently), and in general "his ability to keep peace and help other countries" (13 year old boy). No other attempt on behalf of better international relations impressed them quite as much as his efforts to establish more cordial relations with Premier Khrushchev and the Soviet Union, or as a 13 year old prepschooler put it, "his ability to maintain a friendship with Communist countries." Some children went so far as to equate these efforts with "signing a peace treaty with Russia," and they thought of his exchanges with Khrushchev as "peace talks."

Civil rights was the single issue most associated with the late President. They seem to have seen him as a latter-day Abraham Lincoln, an emancipator bent on granting the Negroes freedom and equality. Awareness of the civil rights issue was highly dependent on age and rose more sharply and dramatically

old boy thought he had "goofed," and a 13 year old girl said: "he made me mad the way he handled the Cuban Crisis").

¹⁶ Peace, for example, is mentioned by 19 percent of the 4th and 16 percent of the 12th graders; foreign affairs by 5 percent and 13 percent respectively.

with age than did awareness of other issues (although awareness of all issues rose with age). In the 4th grade only 5 percent associated the President with civil rights, but in the 12th grade 51 percent did so. Maybe this was because civil rights is a more abstract concept than peace or "a job for dad" and hence harder for younger children to comprehend. Maybe the explanation can be found in the schools themselves; as a rule it is not an issue discussed in elementary school—some even tend to avoid it. School notwithstanding, the President-in the eves of Detroit youth-was better known for his efforts on behalf of equal rights for Negroes than he was for any other efforts. Negro children, of course, were even more aware of this. But the image of the President as the champion of civil rights and "the defender of the Negro race" cut across race and prevailed for all children.

The impact of the civil rights crusade is best illustrated by sample quotations from the children's protocols. A 9 year old white boy wrote: "he stopped the war, he made sure the Negroes could get in, he upheld the Constitution," and a 9 year old Negro boy wrote: "he would try to help the Negro people." A 6th grade 10 year old white girl put it this way: "He tried to pass the Civil Rights Bill; stopped the Mississippi scandal"; another white girl (age 11): "President Kennedy worked on programs for civil rights, less segregation, and physical fitness," while an 11 year old Negro girl in a slum school wistfully wrote: "He tried to let Negro people live an intelligent life." A 14 year old 8th grade Negro boy was far less enthusiastic: "Well, he didn't do such a good job helping the Negro" and refused to speculate further on any other accomplishment during Kennedy's term in office.

Further evidence for the potency of the civil rights issue can be deduced from children's replies to another question. We presented them with a checklist of eight items featuring relatively recent political events (foreign and domestic) and asked them to check off only those events with which the President has been involved during his term of office. To Only 27 percent identified all items correctly; but 69 percent correctly identified the item "forcing Governor Barnett to let James Meredith go to the University of Mississippi." Even in the 4th grade 41 percent knew of it, and in the 6th grade the event was known to a majority (see Tables 3-A and 3-B).

¹⁷ The check-list was offered much later than the other question so as not to suggest answers to them.

Extent of	All	4th	$6 ext{th}$	$8 \mathrm{th}$	10th	$12 \mathrm{th}$
Knowledge	Children			Grade		
100% Correct Information	27%	6%	13%	26%	47%	52%
Partially Correct*	72	92	86	73	53	47
Omitted Answers	1	2	1	1	0	. 1
	ADDITION OF THE PERSON		www.Whone		The second second	-
	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%

TABLE 3-A. KNOWLEDGE OF POLITICAL EVENTS WITH WHICH PRESIDENT KENNEDY WAS CONNECTED

For full impact these figures must be contrasted with the children's total score: In the fourth grade only 6 percent achieved a perfect score but 41 percent knew of Mississippi; and in the 6th only 13 percent has a perfect score but 62 percent knew of Mississippi. Even when only those children with imperfect scores are examined, knowledge of the Mississippi episode remained high (38 percent for 4th graders and 57 percent for 6th graders). Specific political knowledge may for the most part be negligible in the early grades but not knowledge of some of the dramatic episodes of the times. I doubt, however, that it was merely the drama which accounted for the recall.18 Reading the protocols cannot help but convince one that children were concerned with the nature of the issue itself, and much less with the dramathus, for example, the Meredith affair per se is cited rarely in the open-ended question but the right to equal schooling is.

Other political issues or actions for which the President is remembered deal with economics;

¹⁸ Greenstein, op. cit., p. 99, suggests that politics do not interest children but dramatic events, such as satellites and integration crises, do.

the conflict with the steel industry and the possibility of a steel strike were mentioned. the pending tax cut got attention from quite a few junior high and high school students, but most of all they referred to economic measures on behalf of the poor; jobs first and foremost but also Medicare, food stamps, and other related measures. For example: Fourth grade Negro boy: "He help people get a job and eat." Eighth grade white boy: "He kept my dad working." Eighth grade Negro girl: "Well, he bought stamps for poor which mean you pay \$38 and get \$66 in stamps...." Tenth grade Negro boy: "He asked for \$1.25 an hour for worker." Twelfth grade white girl: "He tried to help unemployment though it is doubtful if he really did."

Interestingly enough, some of the Kennedy measures which related to youth, such as the Physical Fitness Program, the Anti-Dropout Campaign and the Peace Corps, received relatively scant attention.

Age, as we would expect, was significantly related to a child's political awareness. Thus over a third (37 percent) of the 4th graders still thought of him only in personal terms but only 1 percent of the 12th graders did so. In 8th grade almost all children (except for

TABLE 3-B. AWARENESS OF KENNEDY'S STAND IN MEREDITH EPISODE

Awareness	All	4th	6th	8th	10th	$12 \mathrm{th}$
of Stand	Children			Grade	4	
Aware of it	72%	41%	62%	78%	90%	92%
Unaware	27	57	37	21	10	7
Omitted Answers	1	2	1	1 .	0	1
	******		***************************************		****	
	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%

^{*} No child answered all items incorrectly.

Number of	All	4th	6th	$8 \mathrm{th}$	10th	$12 \mathrm{th}$
Responses	Children			Grade		
No Answer or Blank	8%	11%	6%	8%	7%	4%
Too Vague	4	7	9	2	0	1
Answer not Political	21	49	33	14	8	2
One Political Response	35	28	40	44	35	23
Two or More Political						
Responses	32	5	12	32	50	70
_					-	
	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%

TABLE 4. NUMBER OF POLITICAL RESPONSES TO QUESTION "WHAT KENNEDY DID IN HIS JOB AS PRESIDENT"

8 percent) thought of Kennedy in political terms.19 The 8th grade seems to constitute a rather sharp breaking point on a number of other items as well.20 These changes are so abrupt as to suggest that at this stage important departures from more childish ways of thinking about politics take place which make subsequent changes in the 10th and 12th grades comparably smaller. In this same vein, the richness of recall (measured here by the number of different political items recalled on question d) also increases with age, and again the sharp rise sets in at the 8th grade (see Table 4). The average number of political issues recalled for the whole population is 1.2. For the fourth grade it is .4 and for the 6th .7. but for the 8th it is 1.4. For the 10th and 12th grades it is 1.6 and 1.8 respectively. As one would also expect (if one takes adult political cognition as a guide) richness of political recall has a social class basis.21 Fortytwo percent of blue collar children could recall only one political issue; most children of businessmen could recall several (only 18 percent recalled just one). We thus see repeated in vouth the same political pattern to which we are accustomed in adults: Higher social status is associated with higher knowledge and/or interest in politics.22

¹⁹ It is, of course, possible that other, less colorful Presidents would evoke less politicized an image. The findings with respect to Eisenhower (see p. 217 above) lend plausibility to this argument. Follow-up research with other Presidents is, therefore, called for.

²⁰ See Sigel, "An Exploration . . . ," op. cit., pp. 45, 48.

²¹ The only information relevant to SES available to us was father's occupation.

22 The necessary controls on age were run but did not yield a pattern different from the one

Age and social status also seem to affect political sophistication. When asked "What kinds of things can people do to make sure that President Kennedy is remembered?". most children felt that something should be done to commemorate him. The methods, however, varied with age and social class. Younger children tended to think in concrete, tangible terms, such as the buying of souvenirs (39 percent in 4th grade). Hardly any of the older children (2 percent) thought of this, but 23 percent suggested carrying out his policies. Only one fourth grader gave this answer. As anticipated, middle class children, especially those from upper strata, gave such political answers more frequently—twice as frequently in fact—than did blue collar children. Conceptually, there is a big gulf between buying souvenirs and seeing that policies are carried out. The former is concrete, non-manipulative: the latter is abstract and implies—at least theoretically—an awareness of political processes and manipulations. To buy souvenirs the person needs to take no interest and/or action in the political process. It is a private act. To see that policies are enacted implies surveillance of and possible intervention in the political process. Not having probed into the children's responses, we do not know whether children did indeed make these distinctions. The age and class distribution for these answers suggests, however, that some such distinction might well have been operative. Not only do few younger children make the manipulative recommendation, but also more blue collar children of all ages suggest buying souvenirs and thus give the concrete and less

described above. Controls were undertaken for all variables but are not discussed separately unless they affected the relationships. manipulative answer. This accords with what others have said about blue collar children.²³ Apparently we have here one more testimonial that readiness to manipulate the political environment and the ability to think about it in a non-concrete, process-oriented manner is found more typically among middle class than among working class children.

III. KENNEDY, THE MAN

How did Kennedy, the man, appear to children? The personal trait which seems to have impressed children the most was his kindness (83 percent of all personal responses). Compared to it all other personal characteristics fade into insignificance (family ranks second and courage third). It seems particularly significant that references to his family ("he was a good father," etc.) were made by but 5 percent. In view of the intense publicity his family had received at all times and especially during the post-assassination TV coverage and in view of the alleged popularity of his immediate family (what Greenstein calls the "respectful awareness of the Kennedy family even . . . among pre-schoolers"24) I find it remarkable that only 5 percent saw fit to mention this role as the one best remembered. Could it be that children think of a President first as an official or at least a public personage, and only secondarily as a private man, a family man? Studies undertaken with adults have shown that a President's personal qualities have relatively low saliency, that adults too emphasized job-relevant traits in preference to personal ones when asked what they most valued in a President.25

With respect to two of the frequently recalled personal characteristics, kindness and courage, it is also possible to raise the question: are these exclusively personal traits, or could they have political overtones? Do some (certainly not most) of the children think of courage as political courage and of kindness as a sense of social justice, for example? We do not know. It is, however, not inconceivable that the responses have political overtones since a faint social class pattern can be seen

²³ Edgar Litt, "Civic Education, Community Norms, and Political Indoctrination," American Sociological Review, 28 (1963), 69-75; Martin S. Lipset, Political Man (New York: Doubleday & Co., 1963), pp. 87-182.

²⁴ Greenstein, op. cit., p. 32.

²⁵ Roberta S. Sigel, "Image of the Presidency—Part II of an Exploration into Popular Views of Presidential Power," *Midwest Journal of Political Science*, 10 (1966), 123–137.

in them. Lower class children chose kindness more frequently than did upper middle class ones, while the latter in turn were more impressed with courage. (The difference, however, was not statistically significant.) Preference for "kind" (social welfare) governmental measures, after all, is characteristic of lower class adults. Maybe children also had governmental kindness in mind since they often talked of his kindness and helpfulness in the following fashion: "he wanted to help everyone of any race" (8th grade white girl); "he didn't really care too much about himself he cared more about other people" (8th grade girl); "he cared about people" (8th grade boy); "he always treated people equal" (8th grade girl). Maybe it is reading too much into these responses to say they have faint political overtones, but the fact remains that they were all made by lower class children.

Children also were intrigued with his approachability and his warmth: "his closeness to the common person, not being aloof"; "he was accessible to people"; "he didn't hate no one." Frequent references also were made to the fact that he seemed to derive happiness and joy from life.

His speeches and the way he handled himself on TV and during press conferences were also mentioned. Many a child recited the famous lines from his Inaugural Speech, "Ask not..." A thirteen year old girl poetically, although ungrammatically, wrote "He made good speeches and it went right to my heart."

Equally noteworthy is what children tended to ignore. Only infrequently did they mention any of the more obvious personal traits of the late President, such as looks, wit, intelligence, energy, and athletic prowess. It is interesting that children failed to mention intelligence. In view of the fact that college students made such frequent references to his intelligence, we had expected our older students, especially those from the exclusive private high schools, to do likewise. But even they ignored intelligence in favor of courage and/or kindness.

²⁶ Fred I. Greenstein, "College Student Reactions to the Assassination of President Kennedy," paper prepared for the Albert Einstein College of Medicine Conference on Children's Reactions to the Death of the President, New York City, April 3-4, 1964. Paul B. Sheatsley and Jacob J. Feldman, "The Assassination of President Kennedy: A Preliminary Report on Public Reactions and Behavior," Public Opinion Quarterly, 28 (Summer 1964), noted, p. 205, that 80 percent of adults were impressed with Kennedy's intelligence.

Adults, like college youth, seem to consider intelligence as a crucial presidential qualification (in one study it ranked second to honesty) while they showed scant concern for kindness.²⁷

This general preference for kindness notwithstanding, it must be pointed out that there were great variations in the Kennedy image. some of which clearly were related to social class position. Thus at least two Kennedy images appeared: Kennedy the kind, warm man who "was concerned with other people." and Kennedy the cool, crisp, efficient man of courage who got things done. Upper middle class children often tended to see him in this latter fashion: as one such youngster: (10th grade prepschool) put it, "I liked his get-up and go, his determination." An 8th grade prepschool boy characterized him as "a determined young man who got things done." The frequent kindness references so prevalent among lower class youth were references to his kindness towards all people or towards groups such as the Negroes and the poor ("he ben kand to us Negroes," 9 year old working class boy).

The relatively large group of children who talked of the President's desire to be helpful did not refer to individual children or even adults but to his desire to help groups ("that he tried to help us Negroes most of all," 11 vear old girl). The answers seem to imply that children felt quite peripheral to the President's concerns. We were very struck with this observation because it held for all other questions as well. We found no traces of manifest egocentrism or child-centeredness in their attitudes toward the President. Contrary to what the literature might have led us to expect, we found no references to the President as the child's best friend who wants to help him, who protects him, cares what he writes in letters to the White House, etc.28 We encountered no comments to the effect that he liked children, cared for youth, would want to help a voungster if he asked for help, etc. Children did not remember him for what he did for a sick child or a Peace Corps youth: rather they remembered him for what he did for the country, for other countries, for specific groups, for the peace of the world, etc. Or, if they liked him for himself, it was because he was an attractive person, had done interesting or exciting things, etc. They saw him as an important actor on the political stage, and it is quite clear that the children seldom confused this stage with the one on which they themselves performed. In fact, the protocols suggest that he was seen as quite aloof from their daily world and its problems. Images such as these cannot be characterized as child-centered, let alone egocentric. And it is the very absence of child-centered responses which makes us doubt that the President is viewed as a nurturant father surrogate or as part of a reciprocal relationship with the child, an idea frequently advanced in the literature.

We had not anticipated this distance and lack of child-centeredness in their attitudes toward the President, and so did not probe sufficiently to explore it further. We did, however, follow it up in a later study and found that children reject outright the idea that the President would want (or even has the power) to interfere in their personal problems or those of their parents.29 These findings in no way contradict those of Greenstein and others who hold that children see him as the "benevolent leader." They do describe the boundaries of the area in which children see his benevolence as being operative. As far as they are concerned. his "benevolence" is exercised in important matters of statecraft.

This special type of benevolence is probably much closer to the image adults have of the Presidency. The evidence accumulated over the years seems to indicate that Americans have a remarkable amount of trust in the basic good will and competence of their top officials. The public may disagree with a President on specific policies and issue and still not "lack . . . faith in the President's dedication to the public interest," but neither does it look upon him as the source of all strength and wisdom. Children apparently react in much the same way.

IV. ROLE AND PERSON

We have seen, then, that children do have considerable political awareness. Previous studies, notably those by Greenstein and by Hess and Easton, also had shown this. Their evidence has suggested that the President has great visibility for children. Our findings tend to confirm theirs. And I would add that such visibility entails knowledge of political issues,

²⁷ Sigel, "Image of the Presidency . . . ," op. cit., p. 126.

²⁸ See especially the writings of Easton and Hess cited above.

²⁹ Roberta S. Sigel, "Pclitical Socialization— Some Reactions to Current Approaches and Conceptualizations," paper prepared for delivery at the 1966 Annual Meeting of the American Political Science Association in New York City.

³⁰ Sigel, "Image of the Presidency . . . ," op. cit., p. 127.

policies, and conflicts associated with a specific President—a fact heretofore not stressed by the literature.

Most current research also finds that youth has some, albeit hazy, understanding of the tasks and scope of the office and of the great power held by its occupant. By inference. however, these findings suggest that children respond to the Presidency and take next to no notice of the politics espoused by the individual President-in short, that children do not discriminate between the office and the occupant of the office. Our findings lead me to say that this interpretation does not give children adequate credit for political cognition. We found very few children who were so office-oriented that they gave us role-descriptive responses.31 ("He made the laws, He kept our country going," 9 year old boy). Much of what children said about Kennedy could apply to Kennedy and Kennedy only and was not characteristic of the Presidency per se. Most of their answers, as we have seen, centered around political issues. Children thus brought to their evaluation of the late President more than what they had learned in civics textbooks about the Presidential office.

One may, of course, argue that this high issue awareness was merely a function of the TV coverage during the tragic weekend. We know that children, like adults, spent a great deal of their time in front of the television screen during those days.32 But it must also be remembered that TV coverage over that weekend by no means concentrated exclusively, or even preponderantly, on the policies of his administration. Children had ample opportunity to pick up other cues from TV-his childhood, his Navy career, his family, the manner of his death, his ceremonial functions, etc. The fact that they recalled political issues more than office-related or personal events would seem to lend credence to the conclusion that political issues are more salient to children than we had believed up to now. To be sure, the very drama of the issues which transpired during Kennedy's administration and the manner of his death may have heightened children's issue awareness and may represent the outer limits of what we can expect of them. Nonetheless, our results suggest that a President is seen more as a political actor than as a father, friend, celebrity, or symbol of the nation. Though he may be liked

TABLE 5. COMPARISON OF RESPONSES TO WHAT
I REMEMBER ABOUT PRESIDENT KENNEDY
WITH RESPONSES TO WHAT I LIKED ABOUT
PRESIDENT KENNEDY

Type of Response	Remembered Kennedy	Liked Kennedy
Recall of Personal Traits	55%	72%
Kindness	(42	(56
Courage	6	10
Love of his family	7)	5)*
Recall of Political Acts	. 32	20
Miscellaneous	10	4
No Answer	3	4
	100%	100%
,	n = 1,349	n = 1,349

^{*} Due to rounding-off, the three figures in parentheses do not add up to 72%.

personally, it is not his personality but his politics which has salience for them (see Table 5). If these findings are replicated under different circumstances, they will require us to restructure some of our thinking about youth and politics.

V. SUMMARY

The Kennedy image was rich, specific, and considerably more politicized than we had anticipated. He was particularly well remembered for his efforts on behalf of peace and civil rights. One cannot help feeling that children thought that if it had not been for President Kennedy we might well have gone to war with Russia and Cuba. The imminence of war and its avoidance during the missile crisis seem to have left a deep impression on children. As a result they are also impressed with subsequent efforts to "encourage good foreign relations" (8th grader). On the civil rights issue they recalled him for his efforts to end segregation (especially in schools), to have the Civil Rights Bill passed, and to improve the lot of Negroes. Both White and Negro children saw him as the defender of the Negro cause and the champion of equal treatment for all men. They disagreed about how successful his efforts had been, but few (mostly children from white working class schools) quarrelled with the goal. His concern for the poor and the unemployed, especially his desire to create jobs, was another vital component of the political image.

In summary, then, the Kennedy political profile looked something like this (although

³¹ Even very few of the 4th graders restricted themselves to office-related responses.

³² Sigel, "Television and the Reaction . . . ," op. cit., pp. 199-219.

not all highschoolers, let alone younger children, would be able to write such a complete sketch as this 12th grader)

President Kennedy began the Peace Corps, the Alliance for Progress in South America, an active Civil Rights Bill, a bill for lower income tax, he gave other leaders of the world a faith and confidence in the United States and the people of America. He especially eased tension with the Soviet Union. He brought action instead of talk.

Kennedy the man, as distinct from Kennedy the President, was liked and remembered fcr his kindness and courage. For most children it was the Kennedy warmth, not his competence, which stood out. They liked him for his liking of others, his ability to care and to respond. Quite often a child expressed gratitude and astonishment that a millionaire could have been so little stand-offish and so devoted to people. The Kennedy traits most noticeable to adults—intelligence, competence, immensed rive and self-confidence—escaped many children.

To conclude: Detroit school children were by no means ignorant of their political environment; they seem to have known the centrally important issues of their time and what transpired during the President's term of office. To be sure, their image lacked depth and detail as well as sophistication, but the same can well be said of most adults. They too responded only to the most dramatic in politics and then only in highly general terms, "revealing an important informational gap." This being the case, the gap which separates children from adults in political sophistication may well be smaller than generally believed.

Nothing, however, seems to me quite as significant as the fact that children saw the President as a political figure and not merely as a symbol. They may have been attached to him, but not solely as a father figure, or as the benevolent leader, or as a symbol of national unity. They were also attached to him because he was a political actor associated with vital political issues. He may have been their leader, but he was a leader with a political cause. Future research should explore in depth the nature of children's perceptions of leadership before we accept unquestioningly the notion that children relate to the President in primarily affective and symbolic ways.

³³ Robert E. Lane and David O. Sears, *Public Opinion* (Englewood Cliffs: Prentice-Hall, Inc., 1964), p. 61.

COMMUNICATIONS

TO THE EDITOR:

In an article in this REVIEW ("Political Ethos and the Structure of City Government," June, 1966) we compared the population characteristics of cities with various alternative political institutions (mayor or manager: partisan or nonpartisan ballot; councilmen elected from wards or at large) in an attempt to test a theory formulated and promoted most conspicuously by Edward C. Banfield and James Q. Wilson in City Politics (Cambridge, 1963). This "ethos theory" attributed a bundle of "private-regarding" preferences (for mayors, partisan ballots, and ward-elected councilmen, among other things) to persons of foreign stock and an opposite syndrome to old Americans. Previous research relating municipal institutions and populations seemed to confirm the ethos theory and was so accepted by Banfield and Wilson. At the nationwide level our findings did too, but when we analyzed our data within each of the country's regions, these relationships vanished. In reply (this REVIEW, December, 1966), Banfield and Wilson asserted that they had never really meant to suggest that such gross and unrefined categories as generation or residence in the United States had any predictive value with respect to their theory, or even any descriptive validity. This disavowal, while improving the ethos theory's credibility, reduced its clarity, for Banfield and Wilson did not reformulate their position on just who was supposed to be "private-" and/or "public-regarding," except to nominate for "private regardingness" several hundred thousand voters of Czech and Polish extraction in Cleveland and Chicago (on the basis, however, of their votes on bond issues, not governmental forms).

Now Robert L. Lineberry and Edmund P. Fowler have launched a new attack on our methods and conclusions ("Reformism and Public Policies in American Cities," this Review, September, 1967), chiefly by ignoring and misrepresenting what we said and did. They said that we substituted "the gross and unrefined variable of 'region' for more refined demographic data" (p. 707). We did not. We did examine the following relationships: 1) between ethnicity and region; 2) between region and governmental institutions; 3) between ethnicity (and other demographic items) and institutions; and 4) between ethnicity and institutions within regions. This

is scarcely substituting region for ethnicity as a hypothesized independent variable.

We found that not only was region a far better predictor than ethnicity without controlling for other variables, but also that ethnic differences disappear when we controlled for region. Lineberry & Fowler said that regional variations in the dependent variables are an artifact of regional variations in ethnicity. This claim ignores three important considerations: 1) Regional variations in the dependent variables are far greater than ethnic variations. 2) Ethnicity means different things in different places. 3) Outside the southern and border states, cities within each region vary enormously in their foreign stock populations (these data are summarized in our Table 9).

Furthermore, Lineberry & Fowler might have reflected that for the South, whose "reformed" cities contribute most of the national relationship between low ethnicity and "public-regarding" institutions, there might be other explanations for, say, using nonpartisan ballots. If not, they then may have come across the real explanation of southern politics: not the Civil War, the race problem, and a one-party system, but the absence of ethnics. Doubtless some of the late V. O. Key's students would dispute this thesis if were stated more explicitly; nevertheless, we urge Lineberry & Fowler to do so and thereby establish forever their place in the history of political science.

Next, Lineberry & Fowler misinterpreted us on another point:

Presumably, their assumption is that there is a simple linear relationship between sheer numbers (or proportions) of, say, middle class persons and their political power: the larger the size of a group in the city's population, the easier it can enforce its choice of political forms (p. 707).

We said:

Obviously it would be unwise to assert that there is a simple causal relationship between public attitudes toward a particular governmental feature and the likelihood that that feature will be adopted . . . [our method] does not deny the existence of other independent variables, but it does require that the ethos be of sufficient importance so that, in the aggregate [emphasis in original] its influence will be discernible (pp. 311-12).

Finally, they complained about "time-

order: independent variables are measured with contemporary census data, while the dependent variables are results of decisions made ten to fifty years ago" (p. 707). As we pointed out, "1960 levels of ethnic populations are a fairly reliable index of each city's relative ethnicity over the past fifty years" (p. 311). If Lineberry & Fowler have contradictory data on this point, they should say so; if not, their objection seems to be little more than free association. Moreover, municipal institutions are no less susceptible to change now than they were in the past; if ethnics lean in one direction and old Americans in another. why should the present generation be any less capable of changing local government to its taste?

In order to test their own propositions about how "reformed" and "unreformed" cities differ in their responsiveness to group demands, Lineberry & Fowler must resolve several conceptual and methodological questions. By explicating these questions and the authors' answers to them, we should be able to evaluate their study.

1. Is it their proposition that "reformed" cities (those with "public-regarding" institutions) are less responsive to all groups? Their answer clearly is "yes." This may seem to fly in the face of common sense, which suggests that different institutional arrangements might favor different interests, e.g., electing councilmen from wards would benefit residentially segregated people, while electing them at large helps dispersed groups like businessmen. Nevertheless, Lineberry & Fowler's answer can be reconciled with the ethos theory, which tells us that only some elements (which they call "minorities") actually make selfish demands, while other kinds of people, being "public regarding," care for the good of the community as a whole. "By muting the demands of private-regarding groups, the electoral institutions of reformed governments make public policy less responsive to the demands arising out of social conflicts in the population" (p. 716). If Lineberry & Fowler had had the opportunity to be Alexander Hamilton's ghost

¹ In a four-page passage from Richard E. Dawson and James A. Robinson's "The Politics of Welfare" that they cited for another purpose, Lineberry & Fowler evidently overlooked this sentence: "The rank-order correlation between the 1941 and 1960 indices [for states] of ... per cent of foreign born or per cent with one or more foreign-born parents is .97." See Herbert Jacob and Kenneth N. Vines (eds.), Politics in the American States (Boston, 1965), p. 401.

writers, doubtless they would have had him say, "Your people, sir, is a great public-regarding beast."

2. How does one define the stimuli to which governments respond or fail to respond? Lineberry & Fowler tackled this problem in two ways. a) Their first approach was that governmental decisions are responses to "cleavages," a term that connotes disunity, bitterness, and conflict. We find it difficult to think about measuring "responses to cleavages," for how does one learn what the cleavage wants? Does a cleavage make demands? Would the spokesman for a cleavage cry, like Shylock, "If you prick us, do we not bleed?" b) The authors' second approach avoids this problem by specifying various demographic groups which are thought to make characteristic demands on local governments.

3a. Assuming that a government can "respond to a cleavage," what are some valid indices of cleavages and what is the predicted response? Lineberry and Fowler worked with twelve indices which "represent a variety of possible social cleavages which divide urban populations . . ." (p. 703). This curious list includes a city's 1960 population, as well as its percentage of gain or loss since 1950; the median education and percentage of high school graduates; the percentage making less than \$3000 a year and that earning over \$10,000; the percentage in owner-occupied housing, the proportion of second-generation Americans, and so on. The authors did not explain how a city's size is a basis of social division or why they included some measures which essentially duplicate each other; nor did they seem to consider that some of these indices, e.g., foreign stock population, are far more meaningful social indicators in some parts of the country than in others. In no case did they provide evidence that these items are indices of social conflict, to say nothing of politically relevant demands. They computed multiple correlation coefficients for "reformed" and "unreformed" cities, using taxes and then expenditures as their dependent variables. They found that the coefficients were bigger for the "unreformed" cities and concluded that these cities were more "responsive to cleavages," while the "reformed" cities were governed "more on the basis of the rationalistic theory of administration" (p. 710). The meaning of these findings is vitiated by the absence of any prediction of the direction of the relationships, which is particularly puzzling since it appears that some of the independent variables are negatively related to each other (we are not told how they are interrelated); nor

was there any indication in this section of how much of the variance was contributed by each of the twelve variables. One can learn something about this last point by examining the data in the next section, where simple correlation coefficients were presented for most of the independent variables combined in these multiple correlations. Such an examination reveals that one of the twelve variables, owner occupancy, accounted for more than half of the variation in four of the seven multiple correlations computed to show relationships between "cleavages" and taxation. In cities with the commission form of government, the twelve variables together accounted for 62 per cent of the variation in taxes; owner occupancy alone accounted for 53 per cent of the variation.

3b. In the next section simple correlations were reported between "reformed" and "unreformed" cities' tax and expenditure levels on the one hand and single demographic variables on the other. The generic proposition was that "unreformed" cities would be more responsive, i.e., yield higher correlation coefficients. This requires data on the preferences of various demographic groups, so that one can predict the relationship. It seems that survey data would be the best source of this information and that distinctions should be made between different kinds of taxes and expenditures; a group's willingness to support "municipal services" might have something to do with just what kinds of services were being proposed: roads, schools, welfare, and so on. But Lineberry & Fowler did not make such distinctions, nor, with one indirect and fruitless exception, did they use survey data to ascertain various groups' preferences.

Their propositions based on correlations with income, education, and occupation were disconfirmed, both for the direction of the relationship and its greater strength in "unreformed" cities. After finding comfort in correlations using owner occupancy as an independent variable, Lineberry & Fowler came to the key independent variable in the ethos theory: ethnicity. They extracted their proposition that "ethnic and religious minorities" (Swedes, Mormons, Jews, Japanese, Italians?) prefer higher taxes and expenditures from Dawson and Robinson's finding of high state-by-state correlations between welfare expenditures and percentage of foreign-born residents.² This

² Ibid., pp. 398-401. A complete reading of the Dawson & Robinson article would have revealed another problem: the proportion of total state welfare expenditures contributed by local govern-

procedure poses several difficulties apparently overlooked by Lineberry & Fowler: 1) The dependent variable in these correlations is a simple measure of gross expenditures that does not reflect each state's financial capacity. Since states with more ethnics are much richer. isolating the variance contributed by ethnicity as a variable would be impossible without controlling for income, which Dawson and Robinson did not do here. 2) The ethos theory, to which Lineberry & Fowler are devoted, states that ethnics are parsimonious. 3) By interpreting the Dawson & Robinson data as evidence for the proposition that ethnics favor expenditures, the authors assumed "that the size of an ethnic population is an accurate indicator of influence of ethnic groups," an assumption which they termed "dubious" on p. 707. In fact, this same objection could be made to their basic method, which assumes that higher correlations between an index of a demographic group's proportionate size and an output variable reflect more political influence, i.e., that the proportion of a group in the municipal population reflects its proportionate political power. In their attack on us Lineberry & Fowler seemed to feel very strongly about the "difficulty of inferring configurations of political power from demographic data" (p. 707). Perhaps, having exhausted their hostility to this assumption on page 707, they found it easier to rely on it themselves on pages 710-

Lineberry & Fowler, while describing their study as a "starting point," ignored an earlier example of the same approach to the responsiveness of different municipal institutions. In the course of our article, we compared correlations between ethnicity and per capita city planning and urban renewal expenditures in mayor and manager cities. The ethos theory predicted negative correlations, higher in the

ments ranges from zero to more than a third. A glance at the relevant table (pp. 382-383) reveals pronounced regional patterns in this respect. Lineberry & Fowler alluded to the problem of expenditure allocation, but dismissed it quickly: "We think it important, however, that our independent variables explain a large proportion of the variation in municipal outputs as we measured them. No doubt one could explain an even larger proportion of the variation in measures which specify different functional responsibilities of cities" (p. 704n). On the other hand, of course, this more accurate specification might reduce rather than increase the proportion of the variance.

mayor cities, because they supposedly are more vulnerable to the demands of ethnic groups, which the ethos theory deems hostile to city planning and urban renewal. Our data, controlled for size and region of cities, produced no consistent relationships in either direction. Lineberry & Fowler's failure to acknowledge this finding is understanable, for it presented them with a cruel dilemma: either our method (similar to theirs) was valid, in which case the ethos theory was contradicted; or our method (and theirs) was invalid and the ethos theory was irrelevant to our data.

Lineberry & Fowler concluded that

If they [disputes] do enter the political process, an impersonal, 'non-political' bureaucracy may take less account of the conflicting interests and pay more attention to the 'correct' decision from the point of view of the municipal planner.

These conclusions are generally consistent with the ethos theory developed by Banfield and Wilson (p. 716).

Once again, Lineberry & Fowler seem to have forgotten not only their own earlier strictures, but also Banfield and Wilson's most recent characterization of the ethos theory:

We make certain assertions about attitudes, [emphasis in original] not institutions. Our theory suggests that certain groups, provisionally [if unspecifically] defined along lines of income and ethnicity, have conflicting views about the nature and purpose of politics; ... (pp. 998-999).

We end this letter on a note of puzzlement. Has the ethos theory been revised again, this time to refer to the consequences of certain institutions as well as attitudes toward them? Perhaps our letter of complaint will be accompanied by a similar one from Banfield and Wilson. Then again, perhaps they agree with this most recent revision of their theory. With the ethos theory, who can predict?

RAYMOND E. WOLFINGER JOHN OSGOOD FIELD Stanford University

TO THE EDITOR:

While we suggested several points on which we differed from Wolfinger and Field, we trust that our article was not construed as a launching pad for a wholesale attack on their methods and conclusions. Indeed, as we said (p. 706), we generally agreed with their analysis. Several

that region as a variable was "an undifferentiated potpourri of socio-economic, attitudinal, historical and cultural variations." (p. 707) We did not argue that "regional variations" in the city governments "are an artifact of regional variations in ethnicity." It is thus understandable that we find all three of the considerations raised by Wolfinger and Field (plus their exegesis on Key) to be well-taken, but irrelevant to our point that when one "controls" for a variable, one should know what one is controlling for. While they discussed other of our references at length (e.g., Dawson and Robinson), they did not comment on our citation of an eminent social statistician about the pitfalls of "region" as a causal variable.

2. We also suggested that Wolfinger and Field made tenuous assumptions in what purported to be a causal analysis—specifically, the time-order problem. Granted that we are not aware of (nor apparently is Wolfinger) research correlating previous and present-day ethnic composition of cities, we are not comfortable with the assumption that cities today are pretty much the same as they always were—given the ethnic assimilation, the suburban migration, etc, etc. To argue that "well, after all, groups even today could change the form of government," is to turn a possibly solid empirical hypothesis into mere conjecture.

3. We are puzzled by the query over the measurement of cleavages. It seemed to us that municipal decision-makers could respond to cues from two principal sources: (a) from the environment, i.e., "inputs" arising out of socio-economic cleavages or inter-group conflict (which we tried to measure, of necessity rather crudely); or, (b) from "withinputs," in the form of professional opinions of planners, managers and bureaucrats. Multiple correlations (which do not measure direction of relationship) suggested that socio-economic data predicted much less variation in reformed cities' policies than in unreformed cities' policies. We reasoned that if a city's policy-making took account of one side or the other (our data permitted us to measure this indirectly), we could say that it was "responsive" or sensitive to the cleavage. The only objection here was that we did not "predict the direction of the relationships." However, we used multiple R's precisely because we wanted to know how responsive institutions were to a group of popu-

¹ Unfortunately, Dawson and Robinson's data

lation characteristics taken together, whether their individual effect was to raise or lower spending.

Obviously, we are willing to grant that different institutions might favor different interests. Nevertheless, we tested a proposition articulated by the reformers, that reformed cities should be less sensitive to any group that makes a demand. This implies to us that while particular decisions may well favor particular groups, policy-making in the aggregate will not show such a close relationship to indicators of political cleavage (or indicators of inter-group conflict, if Wolfinger and Field prefer).

4. At the start of the analysis we had our doubts about assuming that the size of a demographic group always and accurately represented its political power, yet it seemed equally dubious to assume that the demographic characteristics of a city were completely unrelated to distributions of power. Our main interest, it will be recalled, was whether institutional forms could influence how much variation demographic indicators could explain in city spending. Thus we were expecting to find some relationships. If relationships were going to be found en route to our principal interest, we felt some obligation to predict their nature with such little resources as we had at our disposalthere was little direct evidence on the subject, so we had to content ourselves with the indirect. (We too wish that we had had available survey data on attitudes of various groups, but unfortunately the resources for graduate student research at Chapel Hill simply weren't up to it.) We developed what we thought were reasonable expectations for our findings, without any intention of inferring from those findings "configurations of political power." Our article then proceeded immediately to its primary focus, which was that for whatever reason city government responded to different groups. it responded less sensitively if it were a reformed government. That is, one could infer rather confidently the relative size of two different relationships, it would be more difficult to be precise about the absolute meaning of a single relationship. By such inferential gymnastics, we hoped to escape both the Scylla of reading too much into the data and the Charybdis of being too cautious to infer anything.

5. Finally, we object to having our allegiance

² "In Child's schema, the interest group is anathema to the public interest and should be expunged from the body politic." John P. East, Council-Manager Government: A Biographer of its Founder, Richard S. Childs (Chapel Hill, 1965), p. 96.

pigeonholed. While we think Banfield and Wilson's theory insightful (and hardly upset by Wolfinger and Field's otherwise valuable article), we are not "devoted" to it. Unlike Wolfinger and Field, we twice acknowledged (pp. 707 and 711) that the ethos theory dealt with attitudes and we carefully avoided the implication that we had "tested" the theory. Our words were that our findings were "generally consistent with the ethos theory." (p. 716)

Granted that there are always complexities in the analysis of aggregate data, we fail to see that Wolfinger and Field have vitiated the central conclusion of our research: that "the translations of social conflicts into public policy and the responsiveness of political systems to class, racial and religious cleavages differs markedly with the kind of political structure." (p. 715) It would have helped if they had offered (a) alternative methods to our own: (b) alternative explanations for our relationships: or (c) alternative evidence (other than a few simple correlations between ethnicity and some dubious data on planning expenditures and federal urban renewal grants, 'controlled' as usual by 'region.') We too think Shakespeare had the answer, in a well-worn line about protesting.

ROBERT L. LINEBERRY EDMUND P. FOWLER

TO THE EDITOR:

What makes for relatively stable and progressive parliamentary democracy? That question was a major concern of many of the articles in the December 1967 Review.

Kenneth Vines and Henry Glick find in a highly informative article, "The Impact of Universal Suffrage: A Comparison of Popular and Property Voting," pp. 1078-1087, that permitting everyone—including the poor—to vote in Louisiana today does not damage or threaten the propertied interests, that Nineteenth Century American constitutional theorists such as Chancellor James Kent who thought otherwise were wrong. But isn't it possible that social conditions in New York in 1821 and Louisiana in 1965 significantly differ, that the wealth created and distributed in America in the last 150 years removes a threat from universal suffrage that in other circumstances is real?

V. Subramaniam convincingly argues in "Representative Bureaucracy: A Reassessment," pp. 1010-1019, that not only do our so-called representative bureaucracies turn out to be more elitist and ascriptive than our democratic ideologies would have us believe,

but that the ruling elites of poor and economically polarized parliamentary democracies would be threatened by bureaucracies truly representative of the disinherited masses. Seemingly objective criteria of recruitment subjectively help to keep such people out of power. Where traditional power groups are threatened in their control of the army, banks, administration, etc., they may well join and resort to a coup to remove the disquieting democratic system.

According to Dean Neubauer's careful calculations in "Some Conditions of Democracy." pp. 1002-1009, Japan, West Germany and Italy are all more democratic than the USA. Was this true 25 or 50 years ago? If not, why the change? Is the development of communications networks more important than defeat in World War II which discredited and-with the help of the USA-violently destroyed or debilitated many anti-democratic groups and institutions? Is a certain amount of directed violence needed to establish the threshold conditions of democracy to which Mr. Neubauer alludes? Must that elitist administrative apparatus which Mr. Subramaniam so shrewdly discusses be crushed and recreated before it can be peacefully captured in a parliamentary manner by non-elite groups?

Glaucio Soares and Robert Hamblin ask what makes for the alienated voters who opt for the radical left in Chile in "Socio-Economic Variables and Voting for the Radical Left: Chile, 1952," pp. 1053-1065. It is a profound insight that even those who act within the electoral system are not necessarily committed to the social order it protects. Similarly, people committed to that social order do not always act within the electoral system. I look forward to Soares' and Hamblin's succeeding study of to what end Chile's elite-or others in Latin America-tolerate open radicalism. Time after time Latin American elites have moved from parliamentary democracy to military dictatorship when that democracy threatened their social positions.

We return then to Vines' and Glick's important hypothesis. What is the impact of universal suffrage and democratic standards in poor countries where it no longer seems legitimate to many of the sons of the elite that the disinherited suffer so inequitably, where it seems all should have an equal birthright to a share of the economic pot and the job plums? One result may be a tendency toward polarization between a frightened anti-democratic elite and a legitimized mass, a polarization in which the military forces of the great powers are called on to help one side or the other. As the USA helped create democracy in Germany and Japan, we cannot ignore America's role in a list of crucial variables which undermined democracy in Brazil or the Dominican Republic. Do the anti-democratic elites of such countries act heedless of how Washington will act or react?

In the real world in which we live, which may be a bit less than the best of all possible ones, it may be close to impossible to create parliamentary mobilizations which include all the people and produce rapid progress and relative stability. Only a Westphalian political scientist can afford to weigh variables making for evolutionary democracy in small and weak countries caught up in the cold war and ignore the at-times overwhelming impact of international relations, violent discontinuities and foreign military power. If American actions hinder needed revolutionary violence in a situation where the forces of parliamentary democracy are too weak to succeed, then what is the relevance of a political science which looks to secondary internal factors and ignores primary international factors and limiting historical conditions? Instead of advising the elites of poor countries as to how they should go about establishing parliamentary democracy, perhaps we should heed Voltaire's agronomical advice.

EDWARD FRIEDMAN University of Wisconsin

BOOK REVIEWS AND NOTES

Beginning with the issue of September, 1968, Professor Richard F. Fenno, The University of Rochester, will succeed Professor James W. Prothro as Book Review Editor. *Beginning immediately*, however, all books intended for review should be sent to:

Richard F. Fenno, Book Review Editor American Political Science Review 575 Mount Hope Avenue Rochester, New York 14620

BOOK REVIEWS

Jardin, Correspondance d'Alexis de Tocqueville et de Gustave de Beaumon Melvin Richter	
Jouvenel, The Art of Conjecture. James A. Robinson	
Pesonen, Scandinavian Political Studies. Christian Bay	
Furniss, The Western Alliance: Its Status and Prospects. Lerche, Last Chance i Europe: Bases for a New American Policy. Frederick H. Hartmann	
Deutsch et al., France, Germany, and the Western Alliance: A Study of Elit Attitudes on European Integration and World Politics. Donald D. Searing	
Geiger, The Conflicted Relationship: The West and the Transformation of Asia Africa and Latin America. Pincus, Trade, Aid and Development: The Rich an Poor Nations. H. Bradford Westerfield	d
Anderson et al., Issues of Political Development. Wolf, United States Policy and the Third World: Problems and Analysis. Arpad von Lazar	
Daland, Brazilian Planning: Development Politics and Administration. John T. Dorsey, Jr	
Thompson, Organizations in Action. Vroom, Methods of Organizational Research TODD LA PORTE	
Heller, New Dimensions of Political Economy. Harvey C. Mansfield	
Reports and Symposia of the Group for the Advancement of Psychiatry, Psychiatr and Public Affairs. Harold D. Lasswell.	
BOOK NOTES	
Political Theory, History of Political Thought, and Methodology	
American Government and Politics	
Foreign Governments and Comparative Politics	
International Politics, Law, and Organization	

BOOK REVIEWS

Correspondance d'Alexis de Tocqueville et de Gustave de Beaumont. Texte établi, annoté et préfacé par André Jaedin. (3 volumes; Paris: Gallimard, 1967. Pp. 621, 470, 644. 120 F.) Tome VIII, Oeuvres Complètes d'Alexis de Tocqueville, Edition définitive publiée sous la direction de J. P. Mayer.

Tocqueville's reputation among American political scientists has withstood many a change in fashion. When Democracy in America appeared well over a century ago, its reception in this country was enthusiastic, so much so that it became the first best-selling textbook on American government. Since at least half of all subsequent students of that subject have devoted themselves to capturing a position that combines so agreeably prestige and profit, it is scarcely surprising that Toccueville's book is no longer used for that purpose. But unlike its successors, the Democracy was an indubitable masterpiece, which almost immediately became one of the most influential books of its century throughout the world. It still retains its original power to open minds and set them in motion along unstereotyped lines. Yet it was Tocqueville's first book, not his last, a fact that somehow has not registered on many of Tocqueville's warmest admirers among American political scientists. S. M. Lipset, for example, has recently hailed Tocqueville as one of the founders of political sociology; he has concluded further that practitioners of that discipline could improve it greatly both by a return to the problems posed by Tocqueville, and to his method, comparative analysis. Yet in Political Man, Professor Lipset refers to no other work of Tocqueville than Democracy in America. What is at issue is not the pedantic point that no part of a theorist's work may be used before all of it has been read, but rather that we may understand his original point far better after we see what he made of it after considerable practical experience and further intellectual reflection. Surely Tocqueville's use of the comparative method is best understood after reading the Old Regime and the Revolution in addition to Democracy; his view of society, after reading his Recollections; his treatment of the conditions of stable democracy along with that of the causes and effects of revolution.

It is one of the merits of the Tocqueville-Beaumont correspondence now made available in its entirety for the first time, that it provides reliable materials for reconstructing Tocqueville's attitudes towards his participa-

tion in politics, and indeed makes it possible to understand the effect of this participation upon the development of his abstract ideas. Although Tocqueville's Recollections discuss these issues, what he says there must be used with caution. for like Henry Adams in his Education, he presents an extraordinary vision of society, politics, and history in a style so telling that the unwarned reader is apt to accept as conclusive what is in fact an apologia for the author and his defeat in a world unworthy of him. These volumes provide us with what Tocqueville and Beaumont were saying before and during the period when they reached the climaxes of their political careers (1848-1851); the Olympian tone and the hindsight of the Recollections, from being nearly all that we knew about Tocqueville in this period, can now be put in perspective.

This is only one of the contributions of these three volumes, so magnificently edited by M. André Jardin, whose introduction marks a qualitative leap forward in our knowledge of Tocqueville and his political milieu. One day M. Jardin will give us the definitive political biography of Tocqueville. What he has written here supersedes everything else thus far known about Tocqueville's political career. Nor is the picture that emerges purely of historical interest, although these letters will immediately become important sources for the style of French local and national politics during the July Monarchy, a period that developed many of the patterns of political action and institutions usually attributed to the Third and Fourth Republics.

The revelation of these volumes is how much his career in politics mattered to Tocqueville. It simply is not true that in his own eyes he was essentially an analyst and writer, that he ever accepted the notion of himself prevalent today as a great theorist who happened to have been also a mediocre Deputy and sometime Foreign Minister. His entire perspective and method were affected by his commitment to political action. Henceforth it will be more difficult for interpreters of Tocqueville to treat him as a disillusioned, if penetrating observer of democracy; as the implacable critic of mass society; as the eternal aristocrat sickened by modern life in general and its politics in particular. No one who devoted himself with such single-mindedness to the politics of a free society could have held such views. Tocqueville curiously combined objectivity with engagement. His correspond-

ence makes it clear that while writing Democracy, Tocqueville hoped to gain by it a reputation that would enable him to be elected to the Academy of Moral and Political Sciences, or to the French Academy itself, both of which ends he in fact achieved. Once established as a notable, he could launch his political career. Beaumont, like Tocqueville born an aristocrat. was his friend, travelling companion, and collaborator. He also thought it necessary to establish himself by a book, and although Marie, his novel about slavery in America was not sufficient, Beaumont's political sociology of Ireland (one of the key insights of which he owed to Tocqueville) enabled him also to become an Academician and Deputy.

Although Tocqueville deplored the effect of literary intellectuals upon French politics, he was realist enough to adapt himself to the pattern. For those who imagine that the quality of politics in a society is to any considerable extent determined by the quality of the minds and training of its political elite, the July Monarchy is a crucial test case. A startlingly high number of those prominent in its politics were writers of greater or lesser distinction. Guizot, who dominated its final years, was an important historian; in this correspondence. Tocqueville and Beaumont are to be found lamenting the fact that Thiers, ostensibly the leader of the Opposition, for several years neglected his duties so that he could complete his thirteen volume history of the Napoleonic Wars. No such charge could be made against Tocqueville himself. He did not write again until he had decided that Louis Napoleon's victory made any further participation in politics impossible. Even then, Tocqueville wrote only in desperation, so that he could distract himself. He had the greatest difficulty in isolating a topic and no less trouble in writing what is perhaps his most perfect book, The Old Regime and the Revolution. An incidental surprise, and an encouraging one for lesser mortals, are the proofs of how much time and torture went into the writing of an apparently effortless and elegant classic. His practical political experience in the July Monarchy, the Revolution of 1848, the Second Republic, and the rise to power of Louis Napoleon, no less than his own research and reflection led him to reconsider many of the positions he had taken in Democracy—his favorable views of interest groups and the political functions of religion to mention only two-and to develop much else that was embryonic or altogether unconsidered in that volume. Nevertheless the intellectual fruits of maturity meant less to Tocqueville than his

brief period of high office under the Second Republic. Despite the high value he placed on political stability and peaceful change, he relished the time of troubles that began with the Revolution of 1848. The game of politics under the bourgeois king. Louis Phillipe, had bored Tocqueville. Although he had disapproved of the Revolution of 1848, both he and Beaumont rose to high office under the Second Republic. Their correspondence began to hum with excitement once Cavaignac sent Beaumont to London as Ambassador, as both friends were named to serve on the committee drawing up the new Constitution for the Second Republic, as Tocqueville became Foreign Minister and Beaumont was named French Ambassador at Vienna. Both their private and official correspondence during this exciting period are included in this edition. But after the coup d'état of 1851, the two friends found themselves out of politics never to return again. Tocqueville had never been deceived about the prospects for the Second Republic. His letters prove that he anticipated the coup, and also that he soon predicted that although the Second Empire would not be permanent, it would outlast him before it expired in a military catastrophe. Thus he did not confuse his personal political fate with that of all human societies, as did his former private secretary, the Comte de Gobineau, whose racial theory declared the world to have been irretrievably corrupted by racial miscegenation.

More than 1700 pages cannot be readily summarized in a brief review. But it will come as good news that these three volumes are equipped, not only with M. Jardin's indispensable editorial comments, but with a formidable index that demonstrates how modernization has penetrated to some previously recalcitrant areas of French life. It is more than fifteen years that this new and definitive edition in French of Tocqueville began to be published under the direction of J. P. Mayer. Some thirteen volumes have now appeared of the twenty-three projected. Since this Review has not previously noticed this edition, a few comments on it may not be altogether out of place. The most recent volumes have been highly satisfactory new editions of the Tocqueville-Gobineau correspondence, of the Souvenirs, and most revelatory of all, Tome III, Volume I, which collects Tocqueville's speeches and writing on slavery and colonialism, including the unfinished manuscript he began on the British conquest of India. The Tocqueville-Beaumont correspondence is fully up to the standards of its immediate predecessors in this edition. But although they

establish the fullest possible record of the relationship between Tocqueville and Beaumont. including hitherto unknown disagreements and even quarrels, these three volumes do not substantiate one of the original claims made to justify the need for a new edition. For it was said that all previous work on Tocqueville must be called into question since it relied on the nine volume edition published by Beaumont, who not only was guilty of deceptive and over-selective editorial practices, but falsified Tocqueville's actual opinions and positions. M. Jardin, in his introduction, concludes that such a verdict is not justified. In his own view, and no one is better qualified to judge than M. Jardin, Beaumont made a sincere and not altogether unsuccessful effort to present Tocqueville's political life and thought. The publication of the Tocqueville-Beaumont correspondence is to be welcomed, not because it corrects the allegedly fatal defects of Beaumont's edition, but simply because, like the rest of this new edition, it rounds out the complete picture by giving us new data in an editorial form that meets modern standards. This is justification enough, and had this been admitted from the beginning, the expectations of Tocqueville scholars might have been more moderate. The truth is that this new edition has not transformed our image of Tocqueville. but has added depth and detail to it, and, on occasion, opened some new perspectives.

MELVIN RICHTER

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The Art of Conjecture. By BERTRAND DE JOUVENEL; TRANSLATED BY NIKITA LARY. (New York: Basic Books, Inc., 1967. Pp. x, 307. \$7.50.)

This book is at once learned, important, and disappointing. The range of knowledge upon which de Jouvenel draws embraces almost all domains of inquiry. From an encyclopedic acquaintance with classical, historical, and contemporary scholarship, the author illustrates the major methodological problems involved in efforts to anticipate futures. Such erudition, however, does not diminish the work's originality, wherein lie both its importance and its disappointment for scholars.

De Jouvenel's objective is nothing less than the reorientation of modern political science. Together with a small (but, I sense, growing) coterie of political scientists on both sides of the Atlantic, de Jouvenel hopes to redirect our occupation with past and present politics to concern for future political configurations. My personal "forecast" is that the "behavioral

era," characterized by its emphasis on science, theory, quantification, and social psychology, will gradually yield to a more disciplined, more integrated, less diffused, less eclectic attention to possible future states of affairs, from among which societies (through their policy-making processes) can deliberately and knowledgeably choose alternative prospects according to their dominant value orientations. Whether the label that we attach to this next stage in political theory is "social change," "policy sciences," or some other, it will concentrate on merging the often academically divorced interests in knowledge and action, in normative theories and political practices. Prerequisite to an effective policy science is an explicit, systematic orientation to the future. The contents of this book refer to the ground rules of such an orientation. Hence, the book's importance.

The author's major themes must be summarized briefly. Knowledge about the past (the traditional object of scholarship) differs fundamentally from knowledge about the future. The past is knowable, within limits to be sure, but in principle recordable, testable, and verifiable. The future is not knowable, because man can affect it in alternative ways. It is uncertain; therefore, "the expression knowledge of the future' is a contradiction in terms" (p. 5). But for purposes of action, "useful knowledge" relates to the future. Because the rate of social change is without precedent, much of what we know from custom or from history is irrelevant to the future.

De Jouvenel makes explicit his metaphysics; he sides with Voltaire against Maupertius. We cannot know the future as we know the past; because the future is not yet determined, knowledge of it will not yield to some extra degree of intellectual effort or to some ingenious discovery. It is within our powers to anticipate "what may happen," not "what will happen." "The result of this work [prevision or forecast] is a fan of possible futures, or of futures which seem likely to us. But when we have completed this work to the best or our ability, we cannot say with certainty which of the seemingly possible futures will actually come about, nor even whether the future which will actually come about is contained in our fan of possible futures" (p. 16). Thus, as the title implies, the author distinguishes conjecture from knowledge and contrasts pro-ferences regarding possible futures with inferences about past and present states of affairs. As the above quotation indicates, no assurance exists that "futuribles," systematic thinking about the future, will exhaustively enumerate possible futures. The limits on prevision are severe; the effort is justified by its necessity—nay, inevitability: "...for my part, I would willingly say that forecasting would be an absurd enterprise were it not inevitable. We have to make wagers about the future; we have no choice in the matter" (p. 277).

"The great problem of our age," de Jouvenel writes, "is that we want things to change more rapidly, and at the same time we want to have better knowledge of things to come" (p. 45). The reconciliation of these values is the object of "futuribles." De Jouvenel reviews the available methods of forecasting-treating the future as "pre-existing" and studying it as one studies the past, which his metaphysics rejects; assuming the "prolongation of a ten-dency" (i.e., extrapolation), which he easily dismisses; reasoning by analogy; assuming the repetitiveness of history; searching for social causes; relying on a priori assumptions; adopting dynamic systems (like Marxism); using the principles of sufficient similarity, statistical legality, the average man. Each of these is effectively disposed of. The originality lies not so much in their exposure as in their inventory.

Then follows the original thrust of the book. ways of conceiving the future. And here is where disappointment begins to stir in me. The trenchant critiques of inadequate modes of forecasting are not matched by the exposition of "futuribles" or of the "surmising forum." Indeed, references to de Jouvenel's personal and organizational efforts are consigned to footnotes. The tools, if we may call them that, to be adapted for political forecasting that receive mention include game theory, growth rates, mathematical models, short- and long-term forecasting, simulation. and surmising forums. Usually de Jouvenel comments wisely and pungently concerning each of these, but systematic exposition and criticism are wanting. The author's objective, to improve political forecasting, is lost despite his parenthetical reminder, when he allocates chapters to economic forecasting. A reader feels he has been led up a mountain, atop which he expects to overlook a beautiful valley: instead, his expectations are dashed by another series of rugged climbs beyond the mist.

The discussion of simulation, in particular, is elementary, though apt. I am disappointed also at the inattention to American efforts to establish decision seminars, to experiment with prototypes, and to generalize systems analysis. It is not, of course, that de Jouvenel is unacquainted with American scholarship; it is that his selections are spotty. A reader by Guetzkow gets a footnote, but not his substan-

tive work. And no mention is made of Lasswell's and Pool's contributions, to name but two authors concerned with the same problems. I have recently noted in writings of Raymond Aron and Maurice Duverger similar inattention to certain kinds of American political scholarship. This kind of provincialism is as inappropriate on the Saint-Germain Boulevard as it is on North Oval Drive, Columbus.

James A. Robinson

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Scandinavian Political Studies. Ed. By PERTTI PESONEN. A Yearbook Published by the Political Science Associations in Denmark, Finland, Norway, and Sweden. Vol. I. (Helsinki: Academic Bookstore, and New York: Columbia University Press, 1966. Pp. 341. \$7.00.)

Empirical research and theory in sociology and political science have been among the most successful American export commodities on the intellectual world market in recent decades. In the last ten years or so deep inroads have been made even into the bastions of marxist social science; in fact in Poland (a special case) only the German occupation had effectively interrupted a long record of empirical research. In the Scandinavian countries there were hardly any sociologists or students of political behavior prior to the last world war; at the present time there are literally hundreds, and a number of them now enjoy international reputations.

A yearbook of Scandinavian political studies must be welcomed, therefore, and not only as a feedback record. This first volume does reflect primarily American influence, but it is not without original perspectives; and it is to be hoped that future editions of the vearbook will do more justice to the considerable amount of original interdisciplinary work in Scandinavia, which has involved also psychologists. philosophers, anthropologists, economists, and jurists. The present volume is unduly restricted to the academic disciplines of political science, sociology, and history. Also the extensive bibliography reflects a narrow conception of "political studies," a conception that has been predominant also in the United States but which may now be on its way out.

In fact, in the entire volume there is not a single paper addressing itself to issues concerning the objectives of politics, human needs to be served by social or political organization, or conditions for justifying the constraints of government. Much like geography or the climate, existing political institutions and

behaviors are treated as given, and all the research discussed in the major papers, at any rate, seeks to describe or analyze aspects of the ongoing system. There are in these papers no attempts at normative frameworks that could make the facts and relationships more meaningful and useful; there is no vision of politics in the service of justice, in some sense, as distinct from the ongoing bargaining and electoral games of interest-group pseudopolitics. There is no apparent interest in the study of alternatives, or in the study of needs as distinct from expressed wants and demands. Scandinavian political scientists, like many of their American counterparts, have tended to form a sort of interest group of their own, whose saleable specialty is electoral and pressure group behavior research; a worthwhile commodity, to be sure, but hardly the whole subject matter of politics.

Within that field, this is a useful book. It contains eight papers, followed by succinct accounts of recent political—i.e., mainly electoral—developments in Sweden, Denmark, Norway, and Finland (the fifth Scandinavian country, Iceland, is left out this time, but will be included in subsequent volumes). Before the concluding bibliography there is also a most informative and revealing section surveying recent political research in Scandinavia; many readers will be impressed by the wide differences in the amounts of research and levels of sophistication among these four Nordic countries, within the book's framework of "political" studies.

Their rank order, to judge by these summaries, is quite clearly as follows: Norway-Finland-Sweden-Denmark. In Denmark there is as yet only a beginning toward political behavior research; in Sweden, in spite of Tingsten's early work, Gothenburg is the only research center to reckon with till now; in Finland there is wide and varied research activity; and in Norway political and related empirical research has become a major enterprise, with two of its research institutes (Oslo's Institute for Social Research and Bergen's Michelsens Institute) among the world's leading centers for political research. Stein Rokkan, undoubtedly Scandinavia's most influential political scientist, has had a hand in establishing both, and is the author of this survey article.

Why these sharp contrasts? Sociologists of science would find Scandinavia a good natural laboratory. Part of the explanation is undoubtedly in the antediluvian processes of university government in Scandinavia (and in many other countries outside North America,

of course): All effective power has traditionally rested with the full professors, i.e., mostly elderly gentlemen who "own" their own fields and have limited visions outside: unlike American universities, the Scandinavian ones have tended to resist change, and also to discourage research that could bring up that dangerous subject, politics. In Denmark and Sweden the old hierarchies have been more firmly established, and are only now yielding ground to a younger generation (I don't know what happened in Gothenburg); in Finland and Norway there were strong influences outside the universities to bring about winds of change-including the scars of war, perhaps, which at least in Norway drew together a core of highly determined young social science activists, most of whom were interested in politics, too, and active in radical politics, and yet were given ample funds for developing social research in their country.

Now the papers. While the first two are theoretical and methodological, the remaining six deal with either "Nominations and Elections" or with "Parties, Pressures, and Ideological Structures." Three papers are written by Finns, two by Swedes, two by Norwegians, and one by a Dane.

Jan-Magnus Jansson (U. of Helsinki) discusses conceptions of political science, pure and applied, and argues for the necessity of an explicit moral decision on the purposes to be served by applied research before one takes on this kind of work. Iikka Juhani Heiskanen (U. of Helsinki), author of the second theoretical paper, carries the same argument much further, but is less concerned with moral choice than with advancing the explanatory power of political theory; he warns against premature empirical closure as a result of (unacknowledged) concern with research applications.

Björn Molin's (U. of Gothenburg) paper on Swedish party politics is atheoretical and of interest mainly to Scandinavians. Knut Dahl Jacobsen's (U. of Oslo) paper on the role of the expert in state-supervised agricultural reform, on the other hand, is a real feat: the author's judicious choice of concepts and theory makes Norwegian historical data appear quite relevant and useful in predicting and seeking to control aspects of economic development in the third world today. Olavi Borg's (U. of Helsinki) study of Finnish party ideologies, using a factor analytical approach to content analysis, is a methodological tour de force whose political or theoretical significance may be considerable but is not spelled out, or even hinted at.

Henry Valen (Institute for Social Research. Oslo) contributes an entirely descriptive study of the recruitment of political nominees in Norway. Mogens N. Pedersen's (U. of Aarhus) study of Danish preferential voting, just as competently executed, is equally lacking in theoretical perspective. The same goes for the last paper, Bo Särlvik's (U. of Gothenburg) sophisticated analysis of stability and change in Swedish voting preferences. While useful enough for the intelligent campaign strategist in each country, respectively, the utility of these papers is on the level of consumer research, from the perspective of competitive sales managers; the product might have been cigarettes or soap as readily as votes. In pluralist fashion, voters become groups of decorous players of the game with all interests equally legitimate, rather than people (some privileged, some stymied, some both or neither) with a human nature and genuine needs. In Scandinavia, of all places, one would on occasions like these hope to encounter an occasional political scientist with a concern for the substance and not only the processes of politics.

The next volume needs to have one responsible editor rather than a committee, if only to ensure more careful proofreading and the elimination of many awkward Scandinavianisms. All in all, this yearbook series promises to become a valuable addition to the international political behavior literature. And the increasing international attention to what goes on in Scandinavian political research should have a beneficial influence on academic developments there, even in the most staid of the Scandinavian university faculties.

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The Western Alliance: Its Status and Prospects. Ed. By Edgar S. Furniss, Jr. (Columbus, Ohio: Ohio State University Press, 1965. Pp. vii, 182. \$4.75.)

Last Chance in Europe: Bases for a New American Policy. By Charles O. Lerche, Jr. (Chicago: Quadrangle Books, 1967. Pp. 221. \$5.95.)

These two books on NATO and Europe are very different in style and content. Both, it is true, address the same questions, but not in the same time frame. Furniss's book, published in 1965, reflects a NATO approaching deep trouble. Its several contributions look at what is ahead—with varying degrees of clairvoyance. Lerche's book, published in 1967, speaks to a NATO obviously already in great disarray—such disarray that Lerche suggests a radical

alteration in U.S. policy for Europe as his remedy.

It will help to examine these two books in the order of their appearance, going on then to the larger perspectives in which both should be weighed.

The eight contributions to Professor Furniss's volume represent papers originally read to audiences at Ohio State during the winter of 1965 and subsequently revised. Included are selections from Dirk Stikker, former Secretary General of NATO; Cortlandt V. R. Schuyler, former Chief of Staff at SACEUR; Richard Goold-Adams, Chairman of the British Institute for Strategic Studies; and others of equivalent backgrounds and experience from France, Germany, and Norway. The two concluding essays are by Frederick E. Nolting, former Deputy Chief, U.S. Mission to NATO; and by Professor Furniss.

As it is so frequently with books produced in this fashion, the selections are of uneven interest. Especially thoughtful are the chapters by Jens Boyesen, Evelyn Shuckburgh, and Furniss. Interesting for its information on relations between DeGaulle and the NATO Secretary General is Stikker's essay. The book succeeds well in bringing out national differences in viewpoint over strategy-compare for example Stehlin's chapter (French attitude) to that of Horst Blomeyer (on the German attitude). But when one has said all this it still remains true that there is much in this volume that has since been said at least as well elsewhere, and the passage of time alone since its publication has lessened the book's impact.

Lerche's book has an impact. This, his last book, is in many ways his best book. It has none of the impatience which often characterized his writing and sometimes diluted its effect. This book delivers a deliberate argument, and Lerche secures his logical flanks carefully before advancing each time to the attack.

His first chapter outlines the gradual postwar shift of U.S. interest away from Europe. His explanation of why it happened is interesting: he points to the residual anti-European feeling, to the increasingly apparent strategic stability there, and the formalization of relations within NATO. Finally there is the factor of increasing crisis in Asia. "What is really involved here is the old—but never resolved—question of priorities of American foreign policy" (p. 27). In addition, there is our disillusionment with our own idealization of NATO, making it "difficult for Americans generally to appreciate that European members. . . regard it as "just another alliance" (p. 85). Our "non-

historic (or perhaps antihistoric) bias" gives us "a sublime faith in precedent" but little belief in "constant change as the norm of human experience" (p. 97). We did, in establishing NATO, what needed doing. We liked it, and we controlled it; we wanted to keep it that way. But NATO's very success changed the basic relationship.

These points of Lerche's arguments are not novel but the language and imagery he uses are provocative. The central part of his book recounts Europe's regaining of strength and the erosion of the Iron Curtain. He points to the 1956 watershed (Suez) when policies first significantly diverged between the U.S. and our major European allies-and all that this was later to imply. Lerche's adroit choice of Congressional and official U.S. statements to delineate our attitudes in the 1960's is firstrate in sketching in the assumptions which continued to guide us long after Europe no longer accepted them. His treatment of the "nonissue" of "nuclear sharing" in NATO is especially good.

Lerche proposes (in some detail, starting on p. 183) a new approach: a partnership in European-American relations. The "essence of partnership is that the United States . . . accept the fact that it is no longer a free agent." Accomplishing this change rests upon giving Europe not an equal role but an equal status in handling "those areas of interest that are common . . ." (p. 187). Consultation must be real consultation. But the "working partnership" will have to deal with problems that Europeans consider are real problems, not simply with mustering unwavering opposition to monolithic communism under U.S. leadership. The actual ways in which this would be done are sketched out in Lerche's last chapter. Almost inevitably it is here that readers who have sympathized with the analysis will likely raise the most questions, but Lerche's final suggestions are too complicated to summarize here. A basic structural change he recommends is the abandonment of an integrated military command in peacetime.

Neither book does justice to the military implications for a NATO which is now deployed in a much more confined geographical space. Neither book gives adequate attention to the somewhat mystical notion, now much discussed, of converting NATO from a "mere alliance" to some sort of economic-political instrumentality leading toward all-European union or at least detente. Neither book really gives an adequate appraisal of the critical importance of German reunification politics

in the shaping of a new Europe. But then a really thorough treatment would take more space than these slim volumes command.

Perhaps these books, by their omissions and their emphases, help to suggest where attention might usefully be turned in appraising NATO's future possibilities. One reason why the European NATO nations no longer believe as fervently in the threat of Russian aggression is the obvious preoccupation of the Soviet Union with a rising political-ideological-military challenge on both flanks of her East-West axis. Lerche gives attention to the growing preoccupation of the U.S. with Asia. But the same is true in another way of the U.S.S.R. A really full treatment of NATO would have to take more account of the three-cornered, intricate relationship of the U.S., China, and Russia in Asia today.

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France, Germany, and the Western Alliance; A Study of Elite Attitudes on European Integration and World Politics. By Karl W. Deutsch, Lewis J. Edinger, Roy C. Macridis, and Richard L. Merritt. (New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1967. Pp. xi, 314. \$6.95.)

This elaborate quantitative study poses a problem in statistical additivity: does Deutsch plus Edinger plus Macridis plus Merritt yield a whole greater than or equal to the sum of its parts. Happily, it yields both. The whole is sometimes enriched through the confluence of four particular talents, and even when only additive, the components often include valuable analyses in themselves. A product of unified research efforts in trend analysis within the European political environment, the volume includes four major parts. Merritt discusses research design, sampling, and procedural problems; Macridis French elite opinion; Edinger German elite opinion; while Deutsch compares the results and presents aggregate data from the project's other phases. Structured interviews with 147 French and 173 German elites provide the central data base for forecasting trends in European integration, arms control-disarmament problems, and domestic affairs.

Given the study's projective purposes, we might consider its methodology at the outset. The authors do not claim that their respondents represent random samples of French and German elites (only 30 per cent of those contacted were interviewed), though there is evidence that the samples are at least "analogous."

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Yet, in order to forecast trends, they are compelled to generalize to the elite universe in each political system. Methodologically oriented readers and particularly those who work with relatively accessible mass opinion data may pale, but it should be emphasized that they did interview a total of 320 national clites and that perhaps their sampling procedures are as exacting as may be expected with national leaders in complex political systems.

Recent literature on prospects for European unity finds some observers arguing the durability of past trends in functional integration. Others however, caution that integration becomes increasingly difficult as the Six move beyond tractable economic issues. The present study offers a wealth of evidence supporting the latter expectation: the authors conclude that since 1957 movement towards structural European integration has either stopped or significantly slowed down-and Deutsch adds that for the coming decade strong nation state policy outputs are to be expected rather than growth in supranational European institutions. Evidence from elite opinion is not wholly conclusive, revealing at the same time some of the problems in multiple authorship. While Macridis and Edinger generally concur in Deutsch's interpretation of their elite findings. they are more cautious in drawing conclusions and projections from this data base. Macridis. for instance, expects French leaders to strive for greater European unity after de Gaulle, while both he and Edinger note that although elite expectations for European unity in the near future are pessimistic, there are strong elite preferences favoring such developments. The strongest evidence for an atrophying in European integration is derived not from elite opinion, but from other data sources-particularly the imaginative analysis of aggregate data on international transactions including trade, travel, migration, and mail. An index of relative acceptance based on trade flows, for example, demonstrates that structural integration among EEC countries during the last quarter century is actually lower than for the period 1913-1938, and has "virtually stood still since 1957." Unfortunately, given space limitations. these data as well as other sources summarized in Deutsch's section (including mass opinion data and General Inquirer content analysis of elite press), are often not presented in sufficient detail for careful evaluation by the reader.

Domestic issues afforded Macridis and Edinger an opportunity for some of the most interesting analysis in the volume. The point of departure here is a contrast between divided French elites and their consensual German counterparts. Macridis finds that French political orientations have been restructured in recent years such that party lines are no longer homologous with attitudinal and policy opinion clusters. Ideological bickering is considered a thing of the past. A majority associates many features of the present regime with de Gaulle, and the author concludes that system prospects after the General's departure are for relative instability and a return to coalition cabinets. German elites, on the other hand, express a broad consensus supporting the system. though they seem to feel it has yet to prove itself in crisis situations.

By and large, the entire project brings powerful social science research instruments to bear on data collection concerning particular policy trends. While the aggregate data base seems potentially formidable for such purposes, survev research data may ultimately prove somewhat less fecund, especially when structured around specific policy questions. As the authors repeatedly emphasize, attitude is only one component in elite behavior, which, in turn, may play a quite variegated role in policy outcomes. Moreover, questions directed to highly particular attitudinal objects out of situational contexts (e.g., NATO) may elicit opinions both ephemeral and little related to behavior patterns, in contrast to relatively stable and diffuse underlying orientations. Highly focused opinions then, may not prove strong indices in forecasting policy outcomes. For example, two recent major policy events in France and Germany (French withdrawal from NATO and the German CDU-SPD coalition) could not have been anticipated in the current study's data on the subject. The data can be utilized partially to "explain" these events ex post facto (French leaders did desire changes in NATO, and German leaders perceived little difference between the CDU and SPD), but the events could not have been forecast—let alone probabilistically predicted—with such opinion data. Nonetheless, the study does provide valuable information about the current state of elite opinion in France and the Federal Republic. and about crucial trends in European structural integration. More significantly perhaps, it develops valuable tools for elite and integration analysis, while whetting the appetite for more extensive theoretically oriented work of this

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The Conflicted Relationship: The West and the Transformation of Asia, Africa and Latin America. By Theodore Geiger. (New York: McGraw-Hill Book Co., 1967. Pp. xiv, 297. \$7.95.)

Trade, Aid And Development: The Rich and Poor Nations. By John Pincus. (New York: McGraw-Hill Book Co., 1967. Pp. xv, 396. \$10.00.)

America's foreign aid program is in deeper trouble at home. The increasingly evident obstacles to successful modernization assistance are being highlighted by conscientious, scrupulous friends as well as by enemies of the concept, while the much advertised "end of the Cold War" is withering the kind of motivation that can confront these freshly recognized obstacles with a kind of "damn the torpedoes, full speed ahead" determination and perseverance. The psychologically predictable next step is a spreading conclusion that "it doesn't really matter": What happens in the underdeveloped countries won't really matter much to our well-being (most of them won't go totalitarian, and those that do will only fight each other); it doesn't really matter if they don't develop very fast (real population pressure will be localized, and we've exaggerated how much will-to-develop these peoples really have); it doesn't really matter if foreign aid doesn't grow (we haven't learned to spend it effectively anyway).

So 'tis said.

No doubt it would be unfair to Theodore Geiger and John Pincus to imply that they subscribe to most of these comforting assertions. At least Pincus still manages to convey some sense of engagement. Yet it is a mark of how far we have gone since we were called in 1961 to get the world moving in a Decade of Development that now the Chief of International Studies of the National Planning Association, Geiger, writes an Atlantic Policy Study for the Council on Foreign Relations in which the main theme is that "freed from the self-intoxication of our own rhetoric, we can see that speed is not of the essence in helping them to deal with their problems; knowledge is." Knowledge that we don't have—so time out now for research. Thus Geiger rebuffs those "ardent advocates of foreign aid [who] with the best of intentions will impatiently dismiss this conclusion, urging the 'critical' nature of the situation in Asia, Africa and Latin America and the magnitude of these countries' 'needs."" Few scholars are likely to quarrel with the plea for more systematic empirical appraisals of foreign aid practices, as an integral part of the

ongoing program. But Geiger's principal objective would be much more time-consuming. His ambition is that the primacy hitherto of economists in the study and the formation of America's development policies for Asia, Africa, and Latin America be largely superseded by the advancing wisdom of other social scientists and historians. Should we really wait for that?

How long a wait it might have to be is perhaps indicated in the weakness of Geiger's own presentation of what he thinks social science has to teach us today about the fundamental problems of Asia and Africa. His theme here is the quest for identity in transitional, particularistic, still largely traditional societies. Lucian Pye has already developed this theme more convincingly by concentrating on a few specific countries. Without some confirmation by footnotes (which are mostly omitted in Atlantic Policy Studies), I myself am not persuaded by Geiger's insistence that Africans and southern Asians are fundamentally the same, basically searching identity, although Latin Americans are quite different. Geiger comes very close to arguing at length that East is East (Asia and Africa) and West is West (Europe and both Americas) and never the twain shall meet. I find the demonstration tenuous.

But on Latin America Geiger does command attention. There one does not need footnotes (nor need always agree with him) to feel confident of his mastery of the subject. He is lucid, stimulating, provocative. The chapters on Latin America by themselves could have made a first-rate hundred-page essay. But the longer book he has given us overgeneralizes so grossly about Asia and Africa that for me it is spoiled. The claims of behavioral science to shape AID policy are not likely to be much advanced by such simplified condensation of others' complex and tentative research results.

John Pincus is of course one of those economists and development believers that Geiger is warning us against. But to my taste his Atlantic Policy Study is a better book than Geiger's, much more carefully substantiated by precise empirical data and much more cautiously qualified in its judgments and predictions. Indeed perhaps too much so to be quite as usable as it might be by policy makers. Almost all of Pincus's important propositions are explicitly shown to rest on inconclusive evidence, the best he can find but still inconclusive. Yet there is a virtue in this. The counterarguments and much of the counterevidence are there before us. We can apply our own discount factor if we wish, page by page.

My own chief regret is that Pincus refused to extend himself to a disquisition in ethical theory even though it is crucial to the engagement which animates his work. Part I to me is his most interesting section; there he reviews the possible interests that North Atlantic countries have been said to have in the economic development of the Third World and contends that none of them suffices without belief in the moral imperative of redistributing income. His rejection of the cogency of national security and economic considerations forms an impressive analysis; but then Pincus simply asserts, very briefly, his belief in international redistribution as though it were self-explanatory. "I am not prepared to exhort." Yet surely if, as he believes, the conventional Western justifications for trade and aid policies assisting development must increasingly be recognized to be so unconvincing that only inertia will maintain even the present levels of support, it is incumbent on one who favors assistance for redistribution of income to show just why this should be a moral imperative. At least it should be incumbent on him to show that he recognizes that more complex considerations than exhortation are involved. For example: Does redistribution of income, as an ethical claim, rest on a worth ascribed to individuals or to countries, to a Javanese or to Mauretania? Why? Should exercise of restraint in population growth affect the moral calculus? Why not? Pincus usually talks about the needs of countries, apparently with their present arbitrary boundaries, as though they were operationally equivalent to the needs of individuals and perhaps of groups. If one is moved by Western security or economic interests, this usage may not matter; but if redistribution must be the ultimate justification. it almost surely would matter, and the policies discussed in the rest of the book would have to be appraised accordingly. Pincus mostly ignores these analytical difficulties (and Myrdal has hardly exhausted the subject!).

In Pincus's appraisal attention is directed elsewhere. He compactly summarizes the economic literature on development since Adam Smith, adopts a tentative, eclectic stance of his own, and concentrates on a searching review of the chief economic policy issues: trade barriers, commodity marketing, aid-burden sharing, and (briefly and indifferently) private investment. He sees little hope for increased rich-poor contributions in any of these areas except farm surplus disposal, birth control, education, debt conversion, preferential tariffs, and management contracts as a substitute for private investment. Of these his heart is

chiefly in tariff preferences, to be provided as an advance award to underdeveloped countries of reductions that would become generalized on the most-favored-nation principle after a fixed number of years. Pincus's relative optimism about this plan seems to me unconvincing unless important exceptions were made that would much restrict its value for the underdeveloped countries. Witness the cotton textile trade problem.

Clearly not much hope is left—except a notion that a hundred years from now we'll all be so rich it will hardly matter any longer. Geiger would add: "Then what's the rush? You yourself have shown how little we can yet be sure of about development policies." Yet Pincus remains an activist, though he doesn't fully explain why.

Let us hope that the Council on Foreign Relations can find some others to do so, soon.

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Issues of Political Development. Ed. by Charles W. Anderson, Fred R. von der Mehden and Crawford Young. (Englewood Cliffs, New Jersey: Prentice-Hall, Inc., 1967. Pp. 248. \$3.95 paper.)

United States Policy and the Third World: Problems and Analysis. By Charles Wolf, Jr. (Boston: Little, Brown and Co., 1967. Pp. 204.)

Political development is becoming the star performer of the political science curriculum just as it passes the libido of insight, scholarly analysis and trivia. We cannot complain any more—as Anderson et al. allude to it—about the fact that history constantly outruns the accumulation of knowledge. Indeed, if anything, the accumulation of knowledge has far too much outpaced the ability to conceptualize and present a coherent framework of analysis. But not so, as far as the Issues of Political Development is concerned! If there is a complainant to the fact that little has been done in social science research to narrow the gap between the levels of "universal theory" and specific case studies drawn from the myriads of developing countries, well, then the authors of this volume managed to come up with a most satisfying example to the contrary.

The establishment and the maintenance of political order and the relationship of developmental models to political ideology are the central concerns of the authors. Creating national cohesion and identification through cultural pluralism signifies not only the activation of internal latent conflicts but also the forced realization for all that nation-building and the

successful functioning of a political system depend upon the acceptance of continuous conflict within society with a concurrent search for their resolution. And quite correctly, the authors state that this notion of a competitive (but necessarily also coexistive) cultural pluralism will have to find its reconciliation with the ever tempting exclusivity of nationalism. The very fact that this conflict has not been resolved is reflected in the second part of the book where the issue of the maintenance of the political order is placed within the context of the confrontation of stability versus political violence.

It is at this point that I believe the authors have succeeded to the greatest extent in integrating case studies with a general framework of propositions for the sources of decisions to seek political solutions for violence. The discussion (and probably the very choice) of the Burman, Colombian and Congolese cases sets a pattern of search for common denominators, such as alienation and dissatisfaction with personal role, the loss of existential meaningfulness and a quest for political activity, simple indignation, the use of terror and even the proposition of "revolution as a way of life." This part, together with a section on the meaning of revolution in the developing world, makes probably for the most fascinating and challenging reading in today's profusion of academic output.

But what appears as the most compelling and attractive overall contribution of this book is the authors' commitment to heterogeneity and the acceptance of the fact that ideology is indeed an important predetermining factor in the developing world. I presume the authors are basically pluralists and, as such, view with some concern the various manifestations of authoritarianism emerging periodically in most of the developing political systems. Still, their value judgments seldom enter into the discussion when projecting the developmental effects of authoritarian features. Luckily, we are not treated to the artificial rigidity of trying to classify and analyze political systems according to differing "stages of development"—reflecting so much our ingrained socio-political values. For these authors political development is apparently a fairly openended proposition, one in which no single pattern of evolution is truly dominant a priori. Still one wonders if revolution might not well be viewed as a phase of development, not necessarily in its Trockyan sense, but rather as a phase of providing for institutional changes effecting the totality of the political system. What I am suggesting here sotto voce is the notion that maybe after all it is not political development that we are after but change on the system level—alas an embarrassing notion for many to consider.

At this vantage point it might be appropriate to suggest that much too much attention has been given to the way and method through which political legitimacy is gained by and through the mere fact that institutions function and perform their apparent tasks. What do we have as a consequence: enormous input, deliriously laboring systems and zero output as far as socio-political changes are concerned. It is only when the frustrated hopes of anticipation set in, that we discover that development per se without meaningful and far-reaching institutional changes provides only for a mirage of what a colleague aptly called "dynamic stagnation." Should maybe the suggestion of India, Chile, or even Uruguay sound familiar? But these are merely the digressions of a reader who has found no reason but to give unqualified praise to this excellent venture.

Some books manage to be controversial, others stimulating or maybe maddening. Charles Wolf's is all these three in one. The focus of United States Policy and the Third World is the inter-relationship of political, economic, and military-strategic conditions in the Tiers Monde and the policy instruments that are available to the United States to effect these conditions. Quite understandably, military and security considerations weigh in heavily throughout the body of the work.

The author accepts the notion that lack of internal stability, disaffection and frustration characterize the ambiente of most of the develoring countries. Quite perceptively, it is noted that modest improvements in living conditions often create reverse effects of growing hostility and cynicism toward the system. It is at this point that the author's vision regarding the essential nature of United States policy and objectives is expressed with the greatest clarity: "The problem of maintaining and strengthening noncommunist political systems and of enhancing prospects for a progressive expansion of pluralistic and democratic institutions may be viewed as one of achieving balance among the three factors discussed above: economic development, distributional equity and the responsible use of force." This, in short suggests that preferences are highly stacked on the side of the economic developmental criteria combined with the necessity for internal security as defined through the prism of United States political goals and values.

The stress is on the controlled nature of change and the concurrent "responsible" use

of force. On the other hand, the emphasis of this factor raises the question of how far one could anticipate such responsibility in the utilization and manipulation of force from the side of an essentially traditional, narrowly representative group of power wielders operating within the framework of an unreformed institutional structure. One wonders if "controlled change" does not imply control without change and the "responsible use of force" a tool to implement it?

Probably the most challenging and provocative part of this work is to be found in the section on insurgency and counter-insurgency. As the author states, the most we could expect from the governments of many underdeveloped countries is to mitigate some of the reasons for discontent that give rise to guerilla movements. The "winning popular support" approach has been the mainstay of arguments how to counter the ever present real or latent thrust of insurgency. Wolf's challenge to this assumption is based on the notion that such an approach is costly (with too great of an expenditure of resources and capabilities) and it has little chance of success (support gained is temporary and easily lost). Thus, the alternative proposal rests on the premise that it is not loyalties and attitudes that should be won but rather behavior to be influenced, and I presume, controlled. Increasing the cost of insurgency operations and efficiency in the uses of resources are the primary goals.

On the whole, this book leaves the reader perplexed by its imaginative reassessment of some popular tabus and scholarly theses, while belaboring the reader with persistency on points where the arguments end before their full exploration. There is plenty of excellent data and analysis included, but one wonders if to such a military-political analysis there isn't really more political than aluded to. Maybe the Pope has no divisions, but alas he might have a hell of a lot of foot-soldiers!

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Brazilian Planning: Development Politics and Administration. By ROBERT T. DALAND. (Chapel Hill: The University of North Carolina Press, 1967. Pp. viii. 231. \$6.00.)

Professor Daland has capitalized on years of professional concern with governmental planning to produce an important study of Brazilian planning experience. The reasons for its importance are two: it makes an illuminating contribution to the still regrettably small English language literature on politics and administration in Brazil, and secondly, it adds

substantially to the newly growing body of materials on planning in relation to development.

The argument of the book is that in Brazil (and possibly by extension, in comparable political systems—i.e., those classifiable as reconciliation systems having a transitional economy with a modern sector) the preparation of "a national development plan" serves the regime in power in several ways. Such a plan generates public relations benefits by asserting "that the regime knows where it is going and that it is working for the common good." Secondly, it helps to focus efforts to arrive at a consensus on policy. Thirdly, it is a sine qua non in bidding in the international market for foreign aid. And finally, at least in Brazil, it serves as an important part of strategies to enhance presidential powers (pp. 4, 208). But the implementation of "a national development plan" has negative consequences for the regime, because it comes into conflict with the more basic and non-instrumental functions of the bureaucracy. These are "(1) to provide a channel for upward mobility for the educated middle class, (2) to provide permanent incomes for that portion of the middle class which provides support for the regime, (3) to provide a low level of certain services, and (4) to provide opportunities for private entrepreneurship based on the powers attaching to certain offices" (pp. 4, 210). These functions, it is argued, are related to certain features of the political system.

In support of this argument, the author sketches the context and traces the history of planning in Brazil, beginning with the latter years of Getulio Vargas's Estado Novo. Noting that "Brazil has backed slowly and haltingly into central planning..." Professor Daland examines the first, ineffectual, efforts under Vargas. He goes on to the better known SALTE plan initiated by President Dutra just after World War II and administered briefly by Vargas who had regained the Presidency by election in 1950. The Programa de Metas ("Program of Goals," or "Targets") of President Kubitschek was a more comprehensive plan, and more successful, if account is taken of its contribution to the building of national planning institutions. Then came the Plano Trienal prepared by Celso Furtado under President Goulart-Brazil's most sophisticated plan until then, but one which had to be significantly modified under the pressure of political forces, and which became inoperative with the overthrow of Goulart by the military in 1964. But the succeeding military regime, under President (Marshal) Castelo Branco,

produced its own *Program of Action*, which turned out to be very similar to the Furtadc plan, "with some shift of emphasis" in goals (p. 69).

A chapter on "The Substance and Process of Planning" compares the scope and the goals of successive plans, showing how they have evolved from lists of proposed public works to take into account, first, key sectors of the economy, then the economy as a whole, and eventually important social objectives. In the same chapter and in the following one entitled "The Administration of Planning." the author delineates the evolution of planning processes from ad hoc arrangements to more continuous and institutionalized activities in the form of a Ministry of Planning and an Advisory Planning Council that includes representatives of interest groups as well as governmental planners. Yet he reaches the conclusions that "If the government is successful in combatting the critics of the [Castelo Branco] Program, it is conceivable that it will prove to have been the first Brazilian plan to achieve substantial movement toward its goals" (p. 81) and that "the relation between planning and consequent development patterns is yet to be established" (p. 3).

One chapter is devoted to an intensive case study of the politics of planning in Brazil (the development and demise of Furtado's Plano Trienal) and the concluding chapter is entitled "Planning in an Unstable Political System." But the study is informed throughout by sensitivity to the demands and constraints of Brazilian politics and administration. Thus Daland is able to sustain the significant point that while in the U.S. plan making (policy) is usually considered a political function, and implementation a technical-administrative process, in Brazilian practice "planmaking has been technical, while implementation is patently political" (p. 212).

These are provocative, sobering, arguments and conclusions. Yet with one exception, to be noted below, there are only a few minor points on which the author leaves openings for criticism. For example, in discussing the postwar growth in the popularity of the idea of economic development (p. 26), he does not mention that some powerful groups were opposed to industrialization as a means. And on page 128 he sees the relatively rapid passage by Congress of much of Castelo Branco's program as one sign of the "strength of the alliance which sustains the revolutionary government. . . ." One needs to recall that this was a purged and cowed Congress whose acceptance of anything proposed by the government should not be given great weight. But these are relatively insignificant slips, and do not damage the principal lines of argument and citations of evidence.

One wonders, however, whether Professor Daland may have overstated his characterization of the bureaucracy's functions as noted above with reference to the preparation and implementation of plans. Surely not all agencies are as "prismatic" and ineffective as this list of functions asserts (Daland makes use of the Riggs model in seeking to understand the Brazilian bureaucracy). Roads, dams, and electric power installations have been built. Brasília was constructed in a remarkably short period of time. Admitting that these and similar accomplishments also provide numerous examples of graft, patronage, and mismanagement that can be explained by the logic of the "prismatic" model, should we ignore that indeterminate but not negligible number of bureaucrats and agencies whose competence and dedication do result in some important things getting done? Also, while the preparation of development plans performs latent political functions for the regime that are distinct from their manifest functions, can we write off such contributions to development as data gathering and the publication of increasingly sophisticated economic analyses, and the stimulation of managerial skills and planning perspectives in a context of national development?

These reservations by no means detract from the general quality and significance of the book, for they are ascribable to the theoretical framework adopted. The research has not yet been done that might answer the questions just raised. Professor Daland has charted a course and broken ground that as far as our knowledge of such matters in Brazil was concerned was heretofore largely unexplored. The book will be of obvious value to many Brazilian specialists, and also to the much more heterogeneous company of scholars and professionals concerned with problems of development, regardless of geographic focus.

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Organizations in Action. By James D. Thompson. (New York: McGraw-Hill Book Co., 1967. Pp. 192. \$7.95.)

Methods of Organizational Research. Ed. By Victor H. Vroom. (Pittsburgh: University of Pittsburgh Press, 1967. Pp xii, 211, \$3.95.)

Of the half dozen or so books very recently issued in the rapidly growing, disparate litera-

ture relevant to the study of complex organizations, these two books throw down a challenge of significant proportion to students of public administration and government. The first. Thompson's Organizations in Action, is a tightly written theoretical essay packed with well ordered formal propositions attempting to capture and extend a goodly portion of the sociological thinking on complex organization. It fairly shouts for empirical testing and its major variables are particularly applicable to the study of large technological-based public organizations. The second, Methods of Organizational Research, is a collection of four review essays summarizing, and in some cases extending, oft used methods of the behavioral sciences in the study of structure and behavior in large complex organization. These summaries are framed in wavs which make them directly complementary to the first book and, if mastered, would add greatly to the rigor and usefulness of studies in public organizations. This is particularly the case for "Organiza-Field Experiment tional Change and Methods," by Louis B. Barnes, and "The Comparative Study of Organizations," by Tom Burns. Together these books suggest a set of concepts and variables and methods of examining them which could be of great aid to political scientists interested in moving the study of public organizations off the conceptual "dead center" we now seem to be inhabiting.

Organizations in Action begins and ends with the behavior of organizations; "behavior within organizations is considered only to the extent that it helps us understand organization in the round" (p. ix). Its focus is "limited to instrumental organizations which induce or coerce participation," (p. viii) although much of the work can also be applied to voluntary organizations, including political ones.

For Thompson, uncertainty is the central fact of organizational life and virtually all organizational actions are responses to uncertainty and the need to reduce it. The primary sources of uncertainty are, as we might expect, the organization's surrounding environment and its internal technology. Fixation on reducing internal uncertainty produces the "closed-system strategy" typified by earlier traditions in administrative studies and employs the rational model of organizational behavior. On the other hand, the "natural system" tradition emphasizes the social interdependence of the organization upon its environment and leads the theorist to the expectation of uncertainty and factors which are not under organizational control. Attempting to integate these two traditions, Thompson conceives of the "complex organization as open systems, hence indeterminant and faced with uncertainty, but at the same time as subject to criteria of rationality, and hence determinantness and certainty" (p. 10). In essence, organization is the search for certainty in an uncertain world.

The rest of the essay builds upon the notion that organizations must develop mechanisms and sectors for coping with uncertainty in the environment, "protecting" other sectors to carry on the relatively predictable technical activities necessary to the work of the organization. The type of technology employed by the organization is largely the determinant of what is considered salient uncertainty in the environment, and Thompson has an intriguing discussion of variations in technologies which is the basis for most of the remaining development. Given the type of technology, i.e., "longlinked, mediating, or intensive," and their mixtures within the organization, a number of other things follow: for example, the character of the "buffering units" needed to reduce variation and fluctuation of the important segments of the environment; the "domains" in the task environment that require control or dominance, etc.

Power and dependence of the organization is based on the degree to which it has the capacity to meet the needs of another organization and its relative monopoly over that capacity. This way of approaching power and dependence is central to the second part of the book dealing with behavior within the organization. Furthermore, it orders a number of concepts current in the literature, e.g., competition, cooperation, cooptation. The type of technology employed by the organization and its relative power over elements in the environment are also crucial to the structure of the organization, its degree of hierarchy, departmentalization, the problems of assessment and organizational goals.

The last sections attempt to describe individual behavior in relation to the prior conceptual development, and include many of the predictable topics in this literature, e.g., decision-making, administrative discretion, organizational control, etc. Its concluding thrust celebrates the notion of organizational rationality, and the "basic administrative functions of co-alignment." "Survival (of the organization) rests on the co-alignment of technology, task environment with viable domain, and of organizational design and structure appropriate to that domain" (p. 147). Not a startling statement as such, but it is set within an ordered and sometimes fresh combi-

nation of concepts and variables which adds greatly to its theoretical vitality.

Its major weakness is also one of its moderate strengths. It is unclustered by biquitous references to massive literature, but occasionally needs more persuasive use of them than is apparent. The book's thrust is engaging and its integration of variables in organizational literature is potentially useful in giving us a level of better categories and prediction in understanding the behavior of large complex public organizations.

Methods of Organizational Research is the product of the final seminars in the Social Science of Organization series held under the auspices of the University of Pittsburgh and supported by the Ford Foundation. It presents some of the alternative points of view in methodological and conceptual approaches to the study of organization. The four papers deal with field experiments (Barnes) and a broad attempt to develop a general typology of comparative organization (Burns), in the two papers noted above, Karl Wieck's paper on experimental laboratory methods Thornton Roby's paper on computer simulation models. Each paper, while meant to review and familiarize other students of organization, is so spare a summary of a large area that inevitably the reader feels he could have gained a good deal more if he were already familiar with the literature being reviewed.

Students of public administration will feel most comfortable with the Burns paper, a bit less so with Barnes on change and experimental field studies. Those interested in mathematical models obviously will turn first to the Roby piece. Taken together the concepts and methods encouraged here provide the kinds of operational detail and methodological pathway lacking in the Thompson book. Burns suggests guides for a typology including technology and the surrounding environment as well as other variables closely related to Thompson. The other authors spell out many of the possibilities and problems associated with potentially rich means of testing and examining many of the Thompson propositions as well as the hundreds of "ad hoc" hypotheses we seem condemned to include in the study of public organization.

These two books, whose bibliographies are almost devoid of political scientists, highlight the painfully apparent conclusion that political scientists and students of public administration are largely absent from the recent contributions to refined conceptual understanding of complex organizations. This at a time when government organizations are massively complex, based largely on sophisticated technologies and a characteristic political phenomenon of the present. Serious examination of materials such as these could bring our contributions into more appropriate proportion.

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New Dimensions of Political Economy. By WALTER W. HELLER. (Cambridge, Massachusetts: Harvard University Press, 1966. Pp. viii, 203. \$3.50.)

When a man has, like the author of these Godkin lectures, had a leading share in educating two presidents in the merits and policy implications of the "new economics," raised to an unprecedented height the status and utility of a central institution of government that depends on status and utility for its influence, and seen crowned with success the major innovation in fiscal policy associated with his name, the tax cut of 1964—when he has accomplishments of this order to show for four strenuous years in office and comes away still on his feet, at the top of his reputation, he is entitled to crow a little. A roosterish note comes through now and then in this book, along with due acknowledgment of the importance of luck. But the dominant theme is a confident, articulate and incisive exposition of the potentialities of modern economics for social good—"replacing emotion with reason" (p. 9). Limiting conditions are noticed—Vietnam is mentioned again and again—but not elaborated. And with minor and harmless exceptions Heller avoids inside gossip or personal revelations.

The book is in three chapters. The first deals with the place of economic advice and the role of the Council of Economic Advisers; the second, with the basic concepts the Council applied and popularized during Heller's chairmanship and the record it made; and the third, with his departing dream for the post-Vietnam future when mounting federal surpluses will make large "fiscal dividends" imperative if full employment is to be maintained and when massive block grants to the states, rather than tax cuts, can at once solve that problem and enable state and local governments to cope better with their staggering social responsibilities, and so restore a more viable federalism. It is easier for a political scientist to share his enthusiasm than to pass so lightly over the difficulties in all three topics.

As to the first, the strength and the weakness of the CEA (assuming its professional expertise) is its position, unique among western

governments, suspended above the departmental structure—its identification with the incumbent president. It is plain that Heller's CEA enjoyed the advantages of an extraordinary combination of favorable circumstances under both Kennedy and Johnson and exploited these advantages to achieve real breakthroughs in policy, style and techniques. But it is implicit in what he says generally about the role of economic advice that the new-model CEA, once demonstrated, will become the stock model of the future. Two activist presidents in a row, even two as different as these two, do not ensure that the CEA's recent good fortune will continue.

As with the institution, so with the policy. The unorthodox 1964 tax cut, in a time of rising prosperity, which promised accelerated growth in return for making an existing deficit temporarily larger; was impressively vindicated by the event: the growth absorbed the deficit. But in 1967, with an even larger deficit and an upward wage-price movement in progress, when the doctrine apparently called for a tax increase, its logic was not politically so compelling. It is not enough that the President be convinced; fiscal policy is the province also of the House Democratic Committee on Committees, i.e., the Ways and Means majority members. If they follow Heller, it is as yet a coincidence.

The proposal for block grants to the states or the "per capita revenue-sharing" he prefers -as the best way of offsetting the "fiscal drag" in the tax structure as the economy grows, is worked out in a good deal of detail and makes a strong case. But, to paraphrase Heller's terminology, while it is good macro-economics it is bad micro-politics, at least in the foreseeable near term. Against it run both the vertical functional alliances of bureaucracies and interest groups in health, housing, education, etc., which oppose broader budgetary discretion for governors, and the partisan alliances of mayors, congressmen and Democratic presidents who see no pay-off in rescuing Republican and Dixiecrat governors from their fiscal anxieties. Heller puts his faith in the coming reform in the social outlook of state governments, and acknowledges that Vietnam has postponed practical consideration of other fiscal dividends. His proposal is imaginative and he thinks "we have no time to lose in putting our minds to it" (p. 121). So do Republican governors. But the last time that federal authorities had to worry about what to do with surplus revenues (as he notes) was in 1837, and a depression then promptly made the issue moot. If the new economics can reverse the hitherto inexorably nationalizing trends in federalism since that event, it has constitutional implications too.

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Psychiatry and Public Affairs. Reports and Symposia of the Group for the Advancement of Psychiatry. (Chicago: Aldine Publishing Company, 1966. Pp. xi, 465. \$8.95.)

Many of the most able psychiatrists in the United States came back from World War II with a renewed determination to make psychiatry more effective as a method of treatment and as a factor in transforming society. The Group for the Advancement of Psychiatry (GAP), organized in 1946, operated through panels and symposia which led to a stream of published reports many of which were intended to contribute to the formation of public policy. The current volume is a selection from among these outputs, and affords us an unusual opportunity to consider the past and prospective role of psychiatry and psychiatrists as participants in the shaping of national, transnational and sub-national policy.

What can be expected from those who specialize in studying the mentally ill? Presumably they become aware of the constellation of factors in the social process that impair our human resources by mental illness, and hence are in a position to help devise strategies for changing the institutional practices that generate illness. Perhaps GAP members take most pride in their analysis of the "Psychiatric Aspects of School Desegregation" (May, 1957) which examines the consequences of desegregation for both castes, and came to the attention of influential figures in the Court, the Congress and general opinion.

GAP has been ambitious to make itself effective in the arena of international affairs. Hence GAP members have applied psychiatric insights to cross-cultural communication, to the person who works abroad, to the problem of coping with the use of nuclear energy, and to the prevention of nuclear war. In the Chinese Revolution and the Korean War the nation was astonished and alarmed by the alleged success of coercive indoctrination. GAP papers were prepared for the purpose of putting these strategies in an intelligible frame of reference.

Psychiatrists are accustomed to operate in a one-to-one situation or as small group leaders. Hence they are aware of the possible role of the psychiatrist as a tension-reducing agent in diplomatic negotiation, and in other decision contexts. A statement made in 1950 (reprinted

page 111 ff.) tries to show the full range of the opportunity open to the psychiatric profession in the field of international relations.

What can be said about the initiatives thus far taken by the policy science wing of this branch of the medical profession? Clearly the reports are most convincing when they deal with information that is new to the layman and bears directly on action problems. In connection with "forceful indoctrination," for example, we are presented with admirably succinct summaries of the effects of "physical and social isolation," "sleep deprivation," "brain injury," "semi-starvation," and "pain."

The reports are less convincing when the perspectives and operations of large groups are referred to. The psychiatrist now testifies as an expert witness who has obtained certain impressions from his practice. He would be far more trustworthy if he organized a central data service and summarized salient social

characteristics and attitudes of each patient or subject. In the past, initiatives of this kind have often been taken and have as often failed, partly because psychiatrists did not realize or care that every case is important for the study of trends in the distribution of attitudes by culture, class, interest, personality and level of crisis. I know of data gathering and processing initiatives that failed in the middle thirties, during World War II and since.

Thanks to the numerical growth of the profession and to its improved exposure to the social and behavioral sciences, it is highly probable that more psychiatrists will be motivated to utilize their remarkable opportunities to improve their contribution to the description, analysis and modification of dangerous collective situations.

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NOTES

POLITICAL THEORY, HISTORY OF POLITICAL THOUGHT, AND METHODOLOGY

Sociological Analysis and Politics: The Theories of Talcott Parsons. By William C. Mitchell. (Englewood Cliffs, New Jersey: Prentice-Hall, Inc., 1967. Pp. xiv, 222. \$5.95.)

Talcott Parsons is one of the major social theorists in the social sciences. Some of the key ideas of his framework of analysis have influenced the conceptual work of political scientists during the past decade or more. William C. Mitchell, in Sociological Analysis and Politics: the Theories of Talcott Parsons, argues that the scope of Parsons' influence on political scientists has been less than it should have been. In part, this is because Parsons has only recently begun to write systematically on the polity. A second possible reason for his failure to have more influence on political scientists is a writing style that makes his works extremely difficult to read. Professor Mitchell says that he has taken the role of a friendly critic in order to be able to bring together and clarify those aspects of Parsons' theory that are relevant to understanding the polity. Professor Mitchell succinctly states his purpose in writing the book-"The interpretation is that of a political scientist who has found Parsons interesting, useful, and important in his own work. My purpose is to convince others of the value of his work."

There are many ways in which this is a very

helpful book. Professor Mitchell has done a remarkably thorough job of canvassing the Parsonian bibliography for politically relevant material. The basic framework for interpreting social systems is readily available and many political scientists are familiar with it. But writings relating this specifically to the polity are scattered in a variety of places over a rather long period of time. All of these writings have been integrated into a coherent statement of what Parsons has had to say about the polity.

The book is effectively organized. It begins with a chapter on Parsons as an "incurable theorist" in which many of his intellectual commitments are outlined. There is a chapter outlining the early general theory of action in which he concentrated on the individual actor. The next chapter covers the change of emphasis after 1945 in which the social system becomes the primary object of analysis. The general framework of analysis of social systems is presented in this chapter. The chapter on boundary exchanges is intriguing but disappointing. It points to what is a central problem for any systemic approach, but it treats the subject so generally that it is little help beyond pointing to the general problem. Chapters on the institutional structure of the polity and political process in their social setting follow. The most interesting chapter in the book is

the chapter on change. One of the major criticisms of Parsons has been his lack of attention to change, and this chapter outlines the recent work in which Parsons writes on social change. The final chapter discusses the policy proposals that Parsons has made and the way in which they are related to his basic theoretical and intellectual commitments.

The book is well written and effectively organized. It will serve as a good introduction for those who are unfamiliar with the writing of Parsons. However, the scarcity of Parsonian writing on the polity and the modest size of the book (192 pages) combine to curtail any detailed examination of Parsons' thought. One would hope that the book would call attention to the need for a more detailed examination of Parsons' thought on the polity, and, by indicating the nature of the gaps in Parsons' writing on the polity, would influence Professor Parsons to turn more of his attention to these problems.—George R. Boynton, University of Iowa.

Survey Research in the Social Sciences. Ed. By Charles Y. Glock. (New York: Russell Sage Foundation, 1967. Pp. xxi, 543. \$9.00.)

Professor Glock's aim in compiling this volume is "to make explicit the characteristics which distinguish survey research from other modes of inquiry," and to "communicate the elementary logic of survey design and analysis, and provide, for each discipline, an evaluation of how survey research has been used and conceivably might be used to deal with the central problems in each field."

The book is not a "cookbook"—it provides little technical guidance on such problems as sampling, questionnaire construction or interviewing. Nor do the authors deal, in any detail, with problems of inference or theoretical linkage in the tradition, for example, of Herbert Hyman's earlier work. What is attempted instead is a brief discussion of some of the uses to which survey methods have been put, and some of the analytical problems encountered, in each of eight fields: sociology, political science, psychology, economics, anthropology, education, social work, and public health. In those disciplines where resistance to survey methods has been prevalent (notably in anthropology and economics), considerable attention is also devoted to the historical development of alternative research techniques in the discipline.

The compilation is interesting from a number of perspectives. It provides, as promised, several telling glimpses of "the other fellow's back yard"—and we find, while peering over fences, some appreciation not only of our differences but of the surprising number of common dilemmas.

Survey research has not flourished in economics, says James N. Morgan, because of the economist's traditional interest in questions of change at the macro level (economic growth, full employment, and the like), where information on individual behavior has not seemed relevant or interesting. Economists, in addition, have assumed "rationality," and have seen no need to modify the model. Theoretical development has been bypassed for indices that "work" in a predictive sense, without leading to an explanation of individual consumer choices. (Shades of the early voting studies!) At the other end of the aggregate behavior-individual behavior continuum, most psychologists who have utilized survey techniques show strong traces of their experimental training. Daniel Katz points out that "the experimentalist bias," or the idea that "a subject is a subject, is a subject—is still the dominant tradition, even when the experimentalists leave their laboratories"-leading not only to careless sampling techniques but, more crucially, to faulty inferences from limited data.

Katz's plea for a marriage of laboratory and field techniques in the building of tested generalizations is paralleled by other authors: John Bennett and Gustav Thiess, for example, are quite hopeful about the future benefits of collaboration between those who conduct holistic anthropological studies and those who prefer more rigorous techniques but who have thus far worked on a relatively narrow range of problems. Robert McClosky and Charles Glock stress the need for political and sociological theory which can guide research combining a variety of techniques.

The limitations of the volume become evident, however, when the discussion of substantive interests and analytical problems in the several disciplines is concluded. Several authors ask for more extensive use of longitudinal or panel studies; several stress the importance of social and institutional contexts in understanding individual behavior—and many of the contributors are highly experienced in such undertakings. Yet very little of this present concern or past work is brought to bear in depth on the linkage problems discussed. Most authors urge boldness in both research design and interpretation of findings, but few new guidelines are laid down beyond the initial cayeats.

There have been past pleas, from scholars in several disciplines, for the development of theory which would unite individual and institutional behavior, and for research designs which might combine e.g., individual, aggregate, and sociometric data. What is needed, it has been argued, is a method for dealing with individual behavior in a social and/or political context. Most of the nine authors of the present work underline this

need—yet little is added that is new or helpful in solving the theoretical and empirical problems.

Perhaps such an undertaking is too much to expect from a collection of this nature (no essay exceeds 100 pages, and most are shorter), and the ground which has been covered certainly can serve as an introduction to several disciplines. Even in this respect, however, several essays appear curiously dated. It is surprising, for example, that the essay on political science does not mention Eldersveld's study of political parties (where several kinds of data were used to supplement survey results) or Agger, Goldrich, and Swanson's volume on community power, where considerable effort was made to introduce a dynamic element into survey analysis.

Survey Research in the Social Sciences should be a useful reference for graduate students and for those who want to keep abreast of several fields. The editor has done an excellent job in avoiding repetition among the several essays—and in addition, there is an admirable lack of jargon unique to specific disciplines. This in itself is no mean feat in a volume attempting to cover eight fields.—Betty H. Zisk, Boston University.

Soviet Sociology: Historical Antecedents and Current Appraisals. Edited with an introduction by Alex Simirenko. (Chicago: Quadrangle Books, 1966. Pp. 384. \$7.95.)

The evaluation of present day Soviet sociology can often lead to two temptations. One is to greet it as a dramatic breakthrough signifying the end of totalitarian obscurantism and dogmatism. The other is to dismiss it as mere ideological window dressing. The editor of this volume has avoided both extremes. His judgments about Soviet sociology are generally sophisticated and balanced. On a few occasions only does he display a slight temptation to overestimate its progress and the extent to which its development has paralleled that of Western sociology.

While the emergence of Soviet sociology over the last decade is significant both from the intellectual and political points of view, its substantive results in themselves are of relatively limited interest to most political scientists. Political sociology as we know it in the U.S. and elsewhere does not exist in the Soviet Union nor would it be reasonable to expect to see it flourishing. The concern with power in Soviet sociologists concentrate their attention on industrial sociology and on what American sociologists call "social problems": the human aspects of efficient production, juvenile deliquency, family instability, alcoholism, rural underdevelopment, the sur-

vivals of religion, the choice of occupations and the like.

The present volume is primarily a collection of articles evaluating rather than presenting Soviet sociology and its remote antecedents. Most of its contents (18 articles or excerpts) come from Western or pre-Soviet Russian sources and only three items were written by contemporary Soviet sociologists. Though in many ways a useful and interesting compendium, it will disappoint those who define sociology more narrowly (and this probably applies to the majority of sociologists in this country) than the editor. It will also fall short of the expectations of readers whose primary interest is current Soviet sociology and its actual products. In his effort to sketch the broadest and furthest possible background of present day Soviet sociology, Professor Simirenko has strayed from the field of sociology proper. In describing the precursors of Soviet sociology hardly any Russian thinker interested in matters social could avoid being mentioned or discussed. True enough, for the historian of ideas the dividing line between social thought, social philosophy and sociology may be an arbitrary one. Yet over the last half century at least these lines have crystallized and have enabled us to separate these pursuits. It might have been, therefore, more appropriate to present this volume as a reader on the evolution of Russian-Soviet social thought rather than one dealing with Soviet sociology. Of a total of twenty selections, nine have only a marginal and remote connection with Soviet sociology, addressing themselves either to various prerevolutionary thinkers (important in their own right) or to the theory of Marxism-Leninism. Of the other 11, 8 are Western commentaries (written by Lewis Feuer, George Fisher, Leopold Labedz and others) on Soviet sociology and only three are written by Soviet authors. More specifically, the sections pertaining to what preceded current Soviet sociology ("The Russian Empire" and "The Stalin Era") take up more than half of the volume. This plus the editor's lucid introduction will still provide the reader with insights into contemporary Soviet sociology, but less than one would expect from a volume of this kind.

Thus the organizing principles of the volume invite further questioning. Is it really necessary for understanding present-day Soviet sociology to know something about the theories of Kovalevsky, Mikhailovsky or Plekhanov? This is not to deny the sociological relevance of all reflections on society, philosophy, history, and economy or to confuse oblivion with insignificance. Yet in the final analysis there is no meaningful continuity except in the most general and generous sense between these thinkers and the

work of contemporary Soviet sociologists. It is just as questionable in what sense can we consider Stalin, Trotsky, or Bukharin sociologists, or even if we do so, what influence they exerted on current sociological activities in the Soviet Union. Welcome as it is for general intellectual edification, the historical perspective adds little to our understanding of present-day Soviet sociology, unless it is the general insight that people have for a long time been pondering the nature of the social world in Russia as they have elsewhere.

Soviet sociology appeared rather abruptly in the late 1950's, taking no discernible account of those whom Professor Simirenko considers to be its precursors. Moreover, if one separates ritualistic affirmations of faith in Marxism-Leninism from actual research, even the real influence of ideology can be questioned. Soviet empirical research is above all highly utilitarian and applied and it had two tangible inspirations: the practical needs of the regime and society and Western quantitative techniques. Marxism-Leninism in itself was impotent as an inspiration of sociological inquiry until political conditions permitted such undertakings. If Marxism has been relevant to what goes on in Soviet sociology today it has been so not in relation to its substantive content and accomplishments but rather in explaining its limitations. Instead of providing genuine intellectual inspiration, ideology has performed the function of defining the boundaries of legitimate inquiry and interpretation. Marxism, by its very nature a form of militant social criticism, could hardly motivate social scientists after it had been converted into a secular religion and an instrument for the legitimation of the existing social order. This, of course, does not apply to the Soviet criticism of Western sociology and societies where ideology is very much in evidence.

As parts of this volume show, Soviet sociology in itself is as unlikely to produce a new era of intellectual enlightenment and political reform as any other sociology. Even if allowances are made for the fact that in the Soviet setting ideas are more explosive than elsewhere, Soviet sociology rather than altering Soviet society will continue to reflect and register the changes which have been initiated in other realms. In doing so, however, it might leave in its wake a greater sense of reality and insights that will benefit not only the decision making elite but also the ordinary citizen.—Paul Hollander, Harvard University

Antonio Gramsci and the Origins of Italian Communism. By John M. Cammett. (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1967. Pp. xiv, 306. \$8.50.)

A neglected figure in Western studies of Marxism-Leninism is Antonio Gramsci, one of the founders of the Italian Communist Party in 1921 and, unlike his successor Togliatti, a first-rate theoretician. His obscurity outside of Italy is due in part to his long imprisonment and early death, and in part to non-marxist perplexity that a marxist thinker who toed the Comintern line after 1921 might also claim theoretical orginality. Gramsci is also discomfiting because most of his extant writings are Leninist, while the party he helped to found was to become the most liberal force in world Communism. Part of his secret was imprisonment, which led him to contemplate the havoc wrought on Italian Communism by the Third International. Having begun as a Leninist, he thus came to adopt a new Communist strategy more closely attuned to Western conditions.

John Cammett has chosen a flamboyant and difficult figure to study in this new book. From his bleak origins in Sardinia and student activism in Turin to his role in the breakaway of the Communists from the Socialist Party in 1921 and his imprisonment and death, Gramsci was caught up in the tumultuous history of Italy in the first part of this century. He was a quiet, crippled intellectual who yet could fire the workers of his factory councils in Turin, out-talk some of Italy's most talented intellectuals, and wheel and deal with the international mafia of the Comintern.

However, Cammett has a tendency to celebrate his here to an extent that will not be appreciated by more impartial readers. The description of Gramsei's early years in Sardinia and Turin is particularly ponderous, and most readers will weary of being lectured on how miserable life could be on a backward Mediterranean island. By the time we reach the critical years when Fascism overtook the new Communist Party, our senses are dulled.

The best part of the narrative catches the mood of the period after the First World War when domestic unrest coincided with international revolution and the old Socialist movement fell apart from the strain. All this is told with care, detail (too much detail) and fascination. Cammett labors valiantly to silhouette Gramsci's role in the complex proceedings, erring perhaps on the side of clarity, for it appears that his hero was not entirely consistent in his relations with either the Comintern, his own associates in Turin, or the majority of the secessionist Socialists in Naples headed by Amadeo Bordiga.

On the historical side, it is never made clear whether Gramsci rose to leadership of the new party through the force of his intellect, which was formidable, or if he was simply muscled in by Lenin's bureaucrats against the strident and unmalleable Bordiga. What is clear is that Gramsei's own policy line underwent sweeping changes between 1919 and 1926, not coincidentally in the wake of shifting Comintern tactics. For example, his creative factory councils of Turin were never heard of again after Gramsci affiliated with the International and the party was bolshevized. Moreover, although Cammett maintains that Gramsei's advocacy of a broad alliance strategy from 1921 onward was a logical followup of earlier writings, most of these early writings had been oriented towards proletarian hegemony, while the new strategy fulfilled the Comintern's popular front idea. The alliance strategy distinetly did not follow logically from Gramsci's stern opposition to other groups on the extreme left in 1921 and 1922.

Part of the difficulty arises from Cammett's technique of dealing with Gramsci's writings and political activities in short and alternate packages, seldom distinguishing between theoretical writings and articles that Gramsci intended for use in the day-to-day political struggle. Thus Gramsci's enthusiasm for the new Catholic Popular Party in 1920, actually only a tactical maneuver, is interpreted as a theoretical preface to Togliatti's post-1945 liberal strategy. Gramsci had welcomed the "popolari" because they were organizing masses of peasants who were immune to organization by the left. He hardly sought what Cammett calls "a system of equilibrium with the spiritual force of the Church," but merely a fertile recruiting ground for party cadres.

A second, and more important, problem involves the question of democracy in Gramsci's writings. The post-1945 Communist Party has claimed Gramsci as a good liberal. Cammett steers clear of this questionable interpretation (only possible in Italy because so few leftists actually read Gramsci's early writings), although he does try to see Gramsci as the embodiment of "the Mazzinian tradition in Socialist terms." But Gramsci, who contrasted a "voluntary" association like the political party to a "representative" organ like the factory council, would not have shared Mazzini's spontaneous republicanism. And it is doubtful whether Mazzini would have approved of Gramsci's conviction that, in organizing the proletariat, the party "expropriates the first machine, the working class itself." Liberalism should start at home, or so it would seem.

Gramsci was a great Leninist. It is true, as Cammett tells us, that he was steeped in Croce and other Italian idealists, but he got from Croce what he might have gotten from Hegel, via Marx: an appreciation of the importance of will and intellect in history and a revulsion against the mechanical determinism that infected the Italian

leit of his day. Thus Gramsei struck out, as had Lenin, against determinism of the right—economism—and determinism of the left—sectarianism. He recognized the importance of the historical conditions of the moment and of acting upon them decisively through a disciplined party, just as Lenin had.

What Gramsci had not learned, however, was that Lenin's strategy, designed for the backward conditions of Russia in 1917, would not do in the modern conditions of Italy in 1921. His support for the Communist split from the Socialists in that year was based on a mechanical fidelity to Lenin in the face of radically different historical conditions. The result was a tragic loss of support for the entire left in the face of rightist violence followed by Mussolini's coup. In other words, Gramsci followed the dictates of the International in 1921 at the cost of his party, his country, and ultimately his own life.

This is why it is so difficult to share Cammett's enthusiasm for Gramsci's role in the origin of Italian Communism. It is true that Gramsci gave the party a theoretical strength from which it was to profit (not without contradictions) after World War II. It is also true that his writings before 1921 were pregnant with incisive interpretations of Italian society, while his political activities-particularly in the Turin factory councils—were extremely creative. But the real lesson of the first few years of Italian Communism was that Gramsci led the party into a historical trap by his failure to re-adapt to the West a Western doctrine-marxism-which had been radically and successfully adapted to the conditions of a non-Western country by Lenin.

It is this tragic failure that makes Gramsci's later writings in prison so valuable, for it was only during his long imprisonment that Gramsci developed an independent line based on his bitter experiences before and after the rise of Fascism. It was then that he arrived at the concept of the party as educator, as well as his trenchant analysis of the Italian Risorgimento and his treatment of the role of the intellectuals in Italian life. How unfortunate, then, that these years of ripe intellectual productivity should be treated by Cammett in so brief and schematic a way. How unfortunate also that he should concentrate on the relatively simple writings on the intellectuals and the Risorgimento, skimming over the complex and aesopian writings on the nature of the party and Gramsci's plans for Communist strategy after the anticipated fall of Fascism. It is in these later writings that Gramsci is linked to Togliatti and to the post-1945 Communist strategy. He is revealed as a Leninist who has learned the hard way that Leninism in a highly advanced industrial society must be

radically revised if the party is to have a chance at power.

Yet despite its faults, John Cammett's Antonio Gramsci and the Origins of Italian Communism brings a wealth of documentation and sensitivity to bear on a fascinating political movement and its founding. It is also one of the first attempts in English to examine the life and thought of this original Marxist leader, and, if for no other reason, it merits the attention of historians and political scientists alike.—Sidney G. Tarrow, Yale University.

Catholic Action in Italy: The Sociology of a Sponsored Organization. By GIANFRANCO POGGI. (Stanford: Stanford University Press. 1967. Pp. xv. 280. \$8.00.)

In many respects this is a very good book. It is well written, objective, informative, and instructive in the application of certain notions of organizational theory. Dealing primarily with the period 1945-1958, Poggi focuses on the problems caused by the relationship of Italian Catholic Action (ACI) with the Church on the one hand, and with society on the other. Expertly drawing from Selznick's model of the "competent organization," the author seeks to demonstrate that ACI's sponsored relationship to the Church "critically limits the chances of its serving the very task for which the Church sponsored it." In more technical language, "the sponsorship relation has a series of dysfunctional consequences for Catholic Action." Basically they issue from the Church's insistence that ACI conduct itself always as "an instrument in the hands of the hierarchy." This is "the requirement of control." Integral to it are two "imperatives." One enjoins lay leaders not to confront the priesthood on an equal footing. The other forbids all "strategies of independence" which would lead lay leaders to selfsustaining control over the operations of the organization. Many difficulties ensue. One is especially severe: ACI lacks enough "functional space" for the emergence of what Selznick calls "institutional leadership."

Poggi's argument is organized into four parts. The first states the theoretical problem, in addition to briefly describing ACI and discussing the Church's dilemma with respect to the challenge of rampant secularization in the world. Part II discusses ACI's authority structure and the impact of the requirement of control on it. In Part III the focus is on the cultural aspect of the sponsorship relation, specifically on ACI's ideology, "where the requirement of faithfulness is paramount" Included here is an excellent discussion of: ACI's "ideological creed"; the manner in which ACI's youth branches are taught to cope with the "every-day values" of education,

politics, sex, love, and the like; and "the ambiguity of ACI's goal." Part IV deals with aspects of ACI's policy in the period 1945–1958, including "organizational expansion," "organizational centralization," political action, attempts at bringing back into the fold secularized Catholics, and what appear to be some afterthoughts by the author concerning the real goals of the Church and functions of ACI.

The book merits a number of criticisms. First, it is heavily strewn with Parsonianisms which are theoretically sterile and capable of diverting attention from the essential procedures of scientific explanation. You will find an endless procession of such brass jewels as "vital functions," "imperatives," "functional requirements," "dysfunctional consequences," and all sorts of things that may be found "at a relatively high level of generality." It is a pity. Of what possible value is it to state that phenomenon X results in "dysfunctional consequences" for Y? How dysfunctional is the consequence? It is sheer medieval thinking not to realize that a given phenomenon may represent a given degree of success with respect to a given goal, never merely a "eufunction" or "dysfunction," except in purely syntactical terms. Poggi does seem to appreciate the importance of relations of variation in science when he suggests that organizational "competence" is "a variable, admitting of degrees ranging from a minimum to a maximum." In this sense, ACI is "relatively incompetent" but "does possess some apostolic effectiveness." Unfortunately, this admission takes all of one paragraph, flung at us en passant after a potentially good analysis has been squandered in meaningless qualitative terminology.

A simple example will clarify my point. The requirement of control allegedly rests on the two imperatives of (1) no "strategies of independence" on the part of lay leaders, and (2) no equality of relationship between them and the hierarchy. My question is this: what happens if some strategies of independence do indeed develop? Is control by the Church then lost entirely? Science would naturally raise questions concerning problems of relative control and relative independence, because that is how the world really is. A primitive functionalism leads Poggi to see phenomena either as functional or as dysfunctional or at the most as being "met only half way." Imagine a physician examining an incapacitated patient and declaring that he is ill!

The point can be made in still another way. Finding "ambiguity in the definition of ACI's goal," Poggi proceeds to argue that this "affects ACI negatively," preventing the pursuit of well-directed action and perpetuating "internal disagreements and contrasts." This is banal. It

goes without saying that an association with a brainless charter, but a strong sense of mission, will flounder in errors, frustrations, helplessness, and strains. The role of scientists is to seek to determine the precise nature and degree of these problems. In the absense of this sort of sensitivity to the scientific quest, Poggi's book is not only bad sociology; it is also irrelevant because it fails to illustrate a sociological problem. It sounds like a sponsored report intended to reveal at a low level of specificity the difficulties afflicting an organization.

One last point: The bulk of the author's analysis proceeds on the assumption that ACI is a lay arm of the Church organized to pursue some specific goal. It is in this sense that he can compare ACI to Selznick's model of the "competent organization." In fact, however, it develops that ACI "seems to afford no reasonably clear. meaningful, and shared definition of a goal." Now, if the goal of the organization is elusive, it is hard to see why one would spend so much time demonstrating ACI's incompetence. Incompetent with respect to what? Many years ago, a fellow countryman of Poggi, Vilfredo Pareto, argued that "if we intend to reason at all strictly, our first obligation is to fix upon the state in which we are choosing to consider" a social system. More recently, philosophers of science like Nagel have solicitously warned functionalists never to neglect to specify the state G in which a social system is analyzed. The lesson still remains unheeded. And we sociologists are having such fun developing our discipline retrogressively .-JOSEPH LOPREATO, University of Texas.

Danilevsky: A Russian Totalitarian Philosopher-By Robert E. MacMaster. (Cambridge, Massachusetts: Harvard University Press, 1967. Pp. xi, 368. \$7.95.)

Professor MacMaster's book is the first comprehensive study of the life and thought of N. I. Danilevsky (1822–1885), who is known in the West primarily as a major theoretician of Panslavism and as a Russian forerunner of Spengler and Toynbee. In a fascinating, though at points methodologically and conceptually questionable analysis, Professor MacMaster takes issue with previous interpretations and argues that Danilevsky "is best seen not as a typical Panslavist or as a forerunner of Spengler but as a would-be political prophet whose thought has some striking and interesting if only general similarities to Bolshevism."

The first part of the book is devoted to a discussion of totalitarianism and includes a suggestive comparison of two different species: Western European totalitarianism and Russian totalitarianism. Danilevsky's historical signifi-

cance, according to the author, lies in the fact that he was a totalitarian philosopher of the Russian variety. On the basis of the fragmentary data available, Professor MacMaster reconstructs the story of Danilevsky's life, his scientific. literary and political activities, paying close attention to his developmental period. Danilevsky's life and evolving philosophy are skillfully related to the important issues and problems of mid-nineteenth century Russia, in particular the problem of modernization. A major part of the book is devoted to an intensive examination of Russia and Europe, Danilevsky's most important and best known work. After a searching analysis of Danilevsky's Panslavism, his theory of civilizations, and his view of Russia's relationship to Europe, MacMaster concludes that in his major intellectual work Danilevsky sought "to call men [and more specifically Russian or Slavic men] to undertake the solution of the problem of spiritual alienation and salvation, a bridging of the gaps between man and God, man and nature, man and man, man and himself-and that through the employment of the apparatus of the modern state, through violence, war, a liturgy of destruction."

De-emphasizing the significance of Panslavism and speculative philosophy in Danilevsky's thought, MacMaster argues that Danilevsky is best classified with revolutionary Slavophilism or Populism. "His attitude toward Russia and the modern age, his naturalism, his political activism, his Russian socialism connect him typologically with Herzen, Bakunin, and the Populists." Danilevsky himself mentioned only Tiutchev, Khomiakov, and some other Slavophiles among his precursors, not Alexander Herzen with whom he disagreed on domestic political issues and in religious matters. Nevertheless, it is indeed Herzen who above all must be considered as having prepared the ground for Danilevsky's Panslavism. In Herzen the ideas of Panslavism were still scattered and unsystematic. Danilevsky unified and systematized them, taking additional ideas from Tiutchev and Khomiakov. The author's suggested classification of Danilevsky, however, is not very useful in view of the fact that neither Slavophilism nor Populism (narodnichestro) constitute clear and precise categories. Moreover, Danilevsky's "typological connection" with Herzen is precisely in the realm of Panslavic ideas, not in the realm of totalitarian ph losophy. The author himself admits that if Danilevsky's totalitarianism is not omitted from consideration "his distance from . . . Herzen is truly stupendous." In view of the author's emphasis of Danilevsky's totalitarianism it seems curious and inconsistent to speak of a "typological connection" with Herzen and, indeed, the main tradition of Russian socialism and radicalism. Classification of Danilevsky with the tradition of revolutionary Slavophilism and Populism as well as his "typological connection" with Herzen, furthermore, clearly call for an elaborate analysis of the affinities between Herzen (and more generally revolutionary Slavophilism and Populism) and Danilevsky. Such an analysis, however, is conspicuously absent in the present volume.

Danilevsky emerges from MacMaster's study as a kind of Dr. Jeckyll and Mr. Hyde. He is portrayed as an intellectual in search of truth, an incipient social scientist and scientific philosopher, and at the same time as an activist, a fanatic, a totalitarian philosopher, and a "dangerously committed man." Although the central thesis of MacMaster's study is persuasively argued, this writer finds it difficult to believe that the key to Danilevsky's thought is his totalitarianism. Undoubtedly, there are totalitarian strains in Danilevsky. However, as the author himself points out, many elements of Danilevsky's thought are difficult to square with his designation as a totalitarian philosopher. Moreover, some of Danilevsky's key concepts are surprisingly pluralistic-for example, his concept of culture and his idea of progress (cf. Rossiia i Evropa, 1871 ed., p. 90). It seems equally difficult to view Danilevsky as a "scientific" thinker in the realm of politics and philosophy. He was much too committed. The claim to the exclusive possession of "an absolute religious faith in its true and pure form" [i.e., Russian Orthodoxy] for a people or an ethnic group clearly goes beyond the framework of, and in fact negates, a scientific theory of cultures and history.

Professor MacMaster's thesis is instructive because it elucidates aspects of Danilevsky's thought which have received insufficient attention. However, it is ultimately tenable only if one makes certain assumptions about the "integrity" of the human spirit and, more specifically, if one assumes that Danilevsky was incapable of believing in two logically contradictory and essentially different systems of ideas, that there must be an underlying explanation and common denominator for the various aspects of Danilevsky's thought—a proposition quod esset demonstrandum.—ROLF H. W. THEEN, Iowa State University.

Le Socialisme Démocratique, 1864-1960. BY JAQUES DROZ. (Paris: Librairie Armand Colin, 1966. Pp. 360. F. 2800.)

This brief survey of democratic socialism in the last hundred years addresses itself to the beginner in the field. However, even more advanced students of modern political ideas and movements who are familiar with major works,

such as G. D. H. Cole's History of Socialist Thought or Carl Landauer's European Socialism, may find the present volume of some interest. In the first place, Professor Droz writes from the perspective of French history and politics-a perspective which is significantly different from that of a Cole or Landauer, and which is particularly useful in the author's discussions of the rise and decline of French socialism. Secondly, Professor Droz possesses the gift of so many French scholars of haute vulgarisation to a considerable extent, and the very brevity of his work compels him to concentrate on essentials. In his remarkably lucid and logical organization of the book, the author manages to present the high points of democratic socialism, and in addition, he is able to include in each chapter some interesting documents, such as party programs, the texts of famous intraparty controversies and disputations, and different views of a more biographical nature on some leading representatives of democratic socialism. Each chapter also includes a bibliography, with an emphasis on studies in French and English and occasional references to works in other languages such as German and Italian.

In the history of democratic socialism, the period of 1864-1960 seems to the author to be the crucial one. The beginning of this period saw the emergence of socialism as an organized political force. The end of the period is, in the eyes of the author, a natural end of an epoch, since, in the decade of the 1950's, socialist parties finally got rid of the last shreds of Marxist or quasi-Marxist tenets, abandoning the doctrine of nationalization of all productive property, defending private property, rejecting excessive planning, and discovering, or re-discovering, some of the advantages of the free market. In terms of geography, the author confines himself to some countries of "old Europe," since in his view only Europe enjoyed, in the nineteenth century, the constitutional framework within which democratic socialism could emerge and prosper. For this reason, he limits himself, in the discussion of Russia, to socialist movements prior to 1914. since he feels that communist Russia hardly fits into a history of democratic socialism. Marx himself was both perspicacious and honest enough to discern the difference between communism and socialism, and he entitled his most famous piece of writing Communist Manifesto and not, Socialist Manifesto. However, presentday communists like to use these two terms interchangeably, and they speak of communist states as socialist states in order to make communism appear more respectable, just as ultraconservatives in non-communist states use socialism and communism interchangeably in order to make socialism less respectable.

While the author is undoubtedly right in stressing the importance of Europe in the development and current condition of socialism, some non-European countries at least might have deserved some mention. For example, the fate of democratic socialism in Canada and South Africa might have thrown some further light on the relations of socialism and the problems of race and nationality—a problem that he discusses so skillfully in his analysis of socialism in the Austro-Hungarian monarchy.

Looking at the future prospects of democratic socialism, the author is in sympathy with mcre recent socialist writers who see liberty rather than property as the ultimate issue of socialism. He notes that the rise of corporate capitalism, run by professional managers rather than by bankers or governmental administrators, poses the threat of authoritarian government to the established parliamentary systems. However, the author is by no means sure that modern man in general, and the socialist clientele in particular, will put liberty above security. In this broad perspective, the problem of democratic socialism essentially becomes the dilemma of democracy.-WILLIAM EBENSTEIN, University of California, Santa Barbara.

Towards a Pax Africana: A Study of Ideology and Ambition. By Ali A. Mazrui. (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1967. Pp. xi, 287. \$5.95.)

Professor Mazrui in this book does for Africa what Professor Louis Hartz did for *The Liberal Tradition in America*. That is the highest praise this reviewer can give to any work on political philosophy. I make the judgment fully aware of the dangers that always lurk behind false or misleading analogies in both the "real" and the academic worlds.

It is, of course, a much harder task to analyze "African 'political theory' "-the double inverted commas are intentional: which political theory is African? is it genuine political theory? than to analyze American political theory, for very simple reasons. Americans have been theorizing about politics for more than two centuries, more self-consciously and more literately, than Africans for a much shorter time span. Moreover, American scholars like Professor Hartz could avail themselves of the critical works of a whole series of distinguished foreign observers of American political thought and practice—from de Tocqueville, a citation of whom appears on the frontispiece of The Liberal Tradition in America, through Bryce, to Laski. Even what little African political thought is available in the literature today has unfortunately received the attention of non-African observers of much lower perspicacity.

There is also the problem of relative temporal distance. While Professor Mazrui is quite as African as Professor Hartz is American, he is, almost necessarily, much more involved in the contemporary struggles of his fellow Africans than an American scholar in the more than two centuries of conflict and consensus in his part of North America. It seems all the more remarkable that Professor Mazrui maintains throughout his book an attitude that is simultaneously critical yet engagé. For this reason, the book is likely to be valued not only by political scientists, but also by African politicians.

In Africa, neither states nor individuals were born free and equal. Indeed, most of the states had not been born at all before 1960, and some are still undergoing their birth pangs. The separate African states were brought to life in an international environment that was none of their making, burdened with the political values and a political vocabulary belonging to that environment and to the generally hostile powers dominating it. Although racial, regional, and continental consciousness had arisen prior to "national" consciousness, Africans could achieve independence as states only-or at least most quickly -by demanding their rights in the conventional "Idiom of Self-Determination" (the title of the book's first chapter). This idiom suited the circumstances and served its immediate purpose, but it has complicated both the articulation and the achievement of "racial sovereignty" and "continental jurisdiction," two "principles" to which Professor Mazrui devotes chapters. The burden of this obsolete vocabulary has also contributed to three dilemmas he discusses: "Peace versus Human Rights," "Nonalignment and the Residuum of 'Pax Brittanica,'" and "Pan-Africanism versus Nonalignment."

The thesis of the book is stated in its title, which Professor Mazrui introduces as:

that concept in the rhetoric of general pacification which, to establish historical continuity, we have called Pax Africana. But the political ambition implied by this concept is not to impose an African peace on others—that would indeed be ambitious. The word 'Africana' in this concept describes both the nationality of the peace-makers and the continental limits of their jurisdiction. For Pax Africana asserts that the peace of Africa is to be assured by the exertions of Africans themselves. The idea of a 'Pax Africana' is the specifically military aspect of the principle of continental jurisdiction.

Pax Africana has obvious implications far beyond Africa. Especially when combined with

the "principle of racial sovereignty," it is, for example, of relevance to contemporary racial strife in the United States. In 1960, Professor Clinton Rossiter called American Negroesmany of whom today prefer to be styled "Afro-Americans"—the most American of all Americans, because, unlike other hyphenated-Americans, they had no culture, language, religion, or ideology of the Old World to identify themselves with or to fall back upon. By now, the impetus of the movement toward a Pax Africana has gone some way toward overcoming this relative disadvantage, with consequences that are being subjected to analysis with only indifferent success so far. In a later generation-if our descendants live that long-another brilliant political scientist may want to address himself to the task of studying the confluence of the American Liberal Tradition and Pax Africana.—HERBERT J. Spiro, University of Pennsylvania.

The Twentieth Century Mind. By Donald Atwell Zoll. (Baton Rouge: Louisiana State University Press, 1967. Pp. vi, 152. \$5.00.)

Professor Donald A. Zoll's little book, The Twentieth Century Mind, is composed of a set of essays covering widely diverse topics which range from a consideration of the role of the artist in the academic community, through an indictment of positivistic political science and a prophesied collapse of the American democracy, to a short analytical history of ideas in the twentieth century. Perhaps it is the breadth of this undertaking that accounts for the wide variation in the quality of the essays. Surprisingly, those essays which are most impressive deal with topics of lesser professional interest to practicing political scientists. This comment is particularly true of Zoll's suggestive and well-written discussion of "The Artist as Academician" and of his title essay, which is generally provocative and thoughtful (whether one agrees with some of his conclusions or not). However, when the author turns to more narrowly "political" topics, the quality of his efforts seems to fall off markedly, at points to no more than the level of haughty polemic. (One exception here is Zoll's engrossing treatment of "Conscience, Law, and Civil Disobedience"; yet compared to what remains, this is a lonely instance.)

Illustrative of this decline is the author's discussion of "the blunderings of the behavioralists in political science" (as the dustjacket describes it). Here, the majority of Professor Zoll's arguments will not appear new to those readers who have paid attention to the overly long-standing polemical dialogue between the behavioralists and their opponents within the discipline. In some cases, however, Zoll's contentions about

behavioralist efforts are blatantly misleading, inaccurate, and polemical. For example, he chides them for not giving more thorough attention to the dynamic psychologies of Freud and Jung, preferring on their own part to ruminate in "the obsolescences of academic psychology" and to "hail with gusto the behavior studies of pigeons, the surveys of the repetition of word usage among female factory employees, the interpersonal attitudes of postmen, and the 'objective' testing of school children." This hardly seems an adequate assessment of the situation. Nor do we have any evidence that Zoll's zeal for a more serious consideration of such concepts as "the collective unconscious" and the "primal memory" (or, for that matter, such Jungian contributions as the "shadow" or the "imago") reflects any widespread consensual judgment by American psychologists as to the pay-off value of such an enterprise. Certainly, the behavioralists are not at odds on this point with any large proportion of their colleagues in that sister discipline of the social sciences.

One novel argument that is advanced in this essay is Zoll's contention that the behavioralists have intentionally ignored "central problems" in ontology, philosophy of science, and psychology because of their adherence to a latent value system based on an "uncompromising defense of egalitarianism, meliorism, and social atomism" that is rooted in a near-pathological hysteria over the possible resurgence of authoritarianism. At least now the behavioralist has a ready justification for the cost of his visits to the analyst.

Zoll's discussion of "The Failure of American Conservatism" is even less convincing than his treatment of the complexes of the behavioralists. The essay centers around a discussion of the causes and implications of the Goldwater defeat. I seriously doubt that Zoll's analysis of that event will send Angus Campbell and his cohorts scurrying to re-analyze their own data on it. The central contention seems to be that the election should not be interpreted as a rejection of conservatism by the American electorate because Mr Goldwater was not a conservative to begin with, and was a poor campaigner to boot. Nevertheless, we are given the impression in the essay that Goldwater was correct about one thing: there does exist a latent conservative vote. One is then left to quibble over what kind of "true conservative" candidate is needed to capture that vote. Zoll provides a profile of this mythical candidate that seems to suit his liking and which bears a strong resemblance to John Galt. I must admit, however, that if one is forced to choose among romantic heroes of this kind, I prefer Byron's Manfred: he has more "character."

The prophesied collapse of American democracy provides the nadir of this little book. Here Zoll's analysis often dreps off to a haughty polemic reminiscent of some contemporary conservative political columnists. It would seem that a serious and meaningful critique of the contemporary American political culture (which I am certain Professor Zoll means this essay to be) can well afford to eliminate references to the common man as the "profanum vulgus," or sweeping descriptions of the contemporary American scene phrased in the following manner:

The tawdry figure of Lyndon Baines Johnson as chief representative of this majestic and honorable nation... vaude-villians in the U. S. Senate... slow-witted ideologues in the United Nations... courthouse barristers on the Supreme

Court... well-washed, Brooks Brothers-draped brigands at the control of industrial combines....
(elipses in orginal text) (p. 13)

Comments like these detract from Professor Zoll's arguments, and he demonstrates elsewhere in his essay that he does not need their emotional assistance. It is unfortunate that one who argues so strongly for moderation elsewhere should not have heeded his own advice. Indeed, this comment provides a good summary of the weaknesses of the book. When Zoll discards this polemical vain he generally provides meaty, interesting arguments. The problem is that he does not discard it often enough.—J. Paul Johnston, University of Alberta.

AMERICAN GOVERNMENT AND POLITICS

Kennedy. Theodore C. Sorenson. (New York: Harper & Row Publishers, 1965. Pp. 783. \$10.00.)

As I write this review it is almost two years since Theodore Sorenson's Kennedy was published. I read the book in 1965, I have just reread it, and I must report that my reactions are no longer those of '65. Then I would have said that for some time to come Sorenson's work would be the indispensable source for Kennedy's thousand days, for the book was written by the man who had the most first-hand knowledge of how the Kennedy presidency worked, what the President thought, and how the chief executive made his decisions. With the exception of the Bay of Pigs adventure, which Sorenson learned about later in the deepest detail from the President, the author had a part in just about all the action at the White House. In 1965 I would have given primacy to Sorenson over Arthur Schlesinger (whose book, A Thousand Days, was published almost simultaneously) because the Harvard historian's work is mostly a reconstruction of events from Kennedv sources or from Democratic White House aides. After the Bay of Pigs Schlesinger was no longer within the inner presidential circles and remained in the Ladies Wing of the White House. Though Schlesinger's portrait of Kennedy is a sparkling and well-informed piece of work, few chapters contain significant material.

On rereading Kennedy I am struck with how less important and more fatiguing a book it is than I hitherto felt. The author devotes more than two hundred pages of his almost eight hundred page book to Kennedy before he became President. Kennedy as a person, senator, politician, presidential contender, and presidential candidate are all examined. These chapters are perhaps the most warm and human in the book.

Sprenson either has total recall of all of Kennedy's wry remarks and funny quips or else he kept notes on everything. The engaging Kennedy brightens the pages, but we all know that historians will inevitably dim this memory when they delve into this early history. Despite the best possible light thrown on these years by Sprenson, it is clear (and has been for some time) that a more balanced view is needed. Kennedy stepped over Massachusetts in his scramble for the presidency and was an undistinguished United Spates Senator. Further, his primary contests, while building up to a crescendo of victory, were less spotless and more expensive than his aides would admit.

The heart of Sorenson's book is concerned with the Kennedy team and the presidency. We can agree that the President chose his cabinet well, by-and-large, and adduce that McNamara was the star and strong-man of the team. But Sorenson barely alludes to McNamara's real imprint on the Kennedy administration. The aggressive Secretary of Defense put his mark not only on the Defense Department, whose business he reorganized and rationalized, but also on international and even domestic affairs. We learn more from Roger Hilsman's book, To Move A Nation, about how McNamara's personality and his reshaping and enlarging of the military machine affected foreign policy than we do from Sorenson. McNamara, brilliant, daring, supremely confident, master of detail, gave John Kennedy the means to promote a strong foreign policy and, as long as the President lived and was his own Secretary of State, the nation at least avoided war. Cuban adventures, a missile crisis, Soviet provocations, and communist probes around the world Kennedy usually handled dextrously. Only when the President left policy to the CIA as in

the Bay of Pigs fiasco, or gave foreign policy a military dimension as in Vietnam, did crisis slide into disaster.

While Sorenson's picture of McNamara lacks the bold colors such an expansive and dynamic person demands, the author's profile of Dean Rusk is even more disappointing. From other sources like Roger Hilsman, and to an extent Arthur Schlesinger, we know that the Secretary of State preferred to be a summarizer of options in foreign policy rather than an advocate of his Department's views. As a result the diplomatic arts of peace became stepchildren to military solutions of problems. Kennedy was unhappy with his selection of Rusk but unwilling to broadcast his own failing, so the President fired Bowles and not the Secretary. For three years Kennedy tolerated an unsatisfactory first minister, depended on his own foreign policy staff, and gave diplomacy a disproportionate share of his time.

Much of this Sorenson overlooks. Rather, he concentrates on a narrative of happenings. But even these chronicles of foreign affairs lack some essential qualities for good history. The writer fails to give us the parry and thrust, the keen judgments on personalities, and the mutual affect of men and events on each other which history demands. We seldom know who is advocating what policy in strategy sessions or who holds what view in free-wheeling discussions. Sorenson has created a giant cross-word puzzle for us to work in names to fit statements and quotations. Moreover, there is a repetitiveness in some chapters—like the one on the missile crisis—which mars the flow of action.

There is no space here to tell of all the other subjects with which Sorenson deals—the fights against inflation and recession and the forming of an economic strategy for economic growth, the civil rights issues, presidential visits abroad, foreign crises, legislation passed and stalled etc. Yet certain themes about the Kennedy presidency and about Kennedy suggest themselves. First, Kennedy began a new arms race by pumping seventeen billion dollars into defense spending, despite the fact that he found no missile gap on taking office. (We even have McNamara's recent admission of this new arms spiral.) That such a large sum of money also helped a lagging economy was not lost on the President. Related to this arms buildup is the question of whether the Cuban missile crisis was necessary. Kennedy suffered a series of affronts-at Vienna, the Bay of Pigs, the building of the Berlin Wall, and was determined to stop the adverse tilt of the world. The President took his stand in October 1962 despite the facts that: no warheads were yet seen in Cuba, the difference between offensive and

defensive missiles was distance, and the missiles in place and to come in no way changed the strategic balance of power between the United States and Russia. The positioning of missiles in Cuba gave a seeming change in the balance of power. For matters of prestige and psychology we faced Armageddon, Second, Kennedy also had what this reviewer can only call "Berlinitis." The President constantly expected a confrontation with the Soviets over that divided city. All of Russia's foreign policy, signalled at Vienna and sealed at the Cuban missile crisis, Kennedy thought had Berlin overtones. Third, Kennedy was so prestige conscious (he had raised the issue of the nation's slipping prestige in his campaign) that he initiated the moon space program to raise the world's opinion of America. He readily consented to the spending of twenty billion dollars on such a project-money sorely needed for domestic reform, stilled since 1937. (Once again the President was aware of what such a large injection of money into the economy over a few years would do to fight recession.) Fourth, no President in a long time had basically done more for business than Kennedy-and we have Douglas Dillon's word for this (p. 464). Fifth, Kennedy, who created a crisis situation after the Vienna conference in order to get a military buildup and a larger and recrganized Army, would not use the same shock tactic to get action to aid the cities and the inhabitants of the squalid ghettoes.

Sorenson would probably not agree that my themes can be found in his book anymore than he would agree with my assessment of Kennedy's career. He designed his book to be a substitute for the book the President intended to write and so he has no particular viewpoint aside from a belief that his chief was a great President. Sorenson has made Kennedy too gentlemanly an account of events. He has written a narrative history with little analysis and no underlying thematic structure. He chose, further, not to write of full-blooded individuals arguing and making decisions and the absence of personalities in many important chapters accentuates the gray, governmental-style prose which weights the book. It is a great pity that the author seldom rises above his major source—his own files. In sum Sorenson refused to give his book a personality, a striking view, a bold thesis. His writer's notion is too much like his advisor's role -he is the gray figure in the background.—AIDA DIPACE DONALD, Baltimore, Maryland.

Springboard to the White House: Presidential Primaries: How They Are Fought and Won. James D. Davis. (New York: Thomas Y. Crowell Company, 1967. Pp. xii, 324. \$5.95.)

Good studies don't always make good books, and rather bad studies sometimes make quite good books. James D. Davis' Springboard to the White House is a good book which is based on a less than excellent study.

Springboard makes good reading. Most of it is well-written and all of it is crisply edited. One finds well-told stories sandwiched between nicely phrased speculations. Most of us can be accused of bookish pedantry, but Davis escapes the charge. His book is quick-moving and his tales are concrete. No chapter is without some topically interesting paragraphs, and few paragraphs are without interesting sentences. Some passages offer almost the same sense of immediacy one expects from writers like White or Styron; one feels that something is happening. The book opens, for example, with this journalistic lead:

The time was 3:00 A.M. in the lobby of the Kanawha Hotel in Charleston, West Virginia. The date was MEy 11, 1960. Senator John F. Kennedy of Massachusetts had just thanked the happy milling throng of West Virginians for their support in pushing him to an upbill victory...

Occasionally, of course, Davis accepts a trite device to produce a fatuous sense of the concrete. We are told, for example, that "Coolidge tidied up the ship of state" after Harding's death (but perhaps I'm being unfair: what witticism would Coolidge himself have chosen?). In any event, the general absence of pedantry compensates for an occasional trite phrase.

Springboard is the kind of book one reads comfortably at home over a long evening. And it is no doubt a good supplementary text for an undergraduate course in American politics and parties. The students will enjoy this book more than many which make a more serious contribution to political science. And they will get more "feel" for presidential politics from it than from more systematic and elegant accounts.

I cannot, however, say that Springboard adds very much to our systematic knowledge of politics. If anything, it presents some useful and carefully compiled data—such as the state-by-state outcomes of presidential primaries since 1912 (pp. 278-305). But the study's commonsense formulation of problems, the Whig historian's methodology, and the undisciplined findings combine to limit Davis' effective contribution to political science.

Davis' main thesis is that presidential primaries have become more important than they once were, and that this trend has been accelerated since World War II, partly by intense television coverage in each state's primary (new medium; new message). In my viscera, I am quite sure Davis is right; but the evidence arrayed here does little to satisfy more cerebral requirements of verification. His thesis is plausible and well

stated, but the study does nothing important to demonstrate its truth.

Too often, Davis offers generalizations which appear either false or tautological. For example, he suggests that, "By 1916 primary laws had been passed in 26 states—those dominated by Progressive forces (p. 28)." The second phrase is either a tautology-Progressive domination being measured by the enactment of primary laws-or it is empirically incorrect: no more general test seems to indicate that the Progressives ever 'dominated' twenty-six states. And there is a note which suggests that national candidates must by definition have demonstrated their possession of charismatic leadership qualities (p. 43n). Max Weber would £nd this assertion surprising, especially if he had lived to watch the likes of Alf Landon and Calvin Coolidge become 'national candidates.' Either Davis is empirically incorrect, or he has redefined charisma to mean something close to its original opposite. These assertions are not, in any event very helpful.

Other, more substantial claims are simply too much for the analyses to sustain. Consider Chapter Four, "Impact of Primaries on Delegate and Fublic Opinion Polls." Here, the author presents a number of tables, showing polls taken before and after various primaries. They show that the popularity of the primary winner is apt to go up. But not even the most rudimentary correlational technique is employed, and the fact that most candidates (including primary losers) obtain increasing delegate support as the campaign goes forward is not used to discount the hypothesis. From this analysis, Davis draws this conclusion

The preponderance of data in this chapter shows that there is a direct causal relation between a candidate's performance in the primaries and the number of delegates listed as pledged or favorable to him in the Associated Press pre-convention delegate polls (p. 97).

Data alone don't show causal relations; careful analytical inferences do, and those offered here are not careful enough. I am quite sure Davis is right, but I am no surer for having seen his analysis.

These specific analyses, good and bad, are not conceptually integrated under a theoretical system—unless one counts those offered by common sense and the institutions themselves. Admittedly, all the chapters are about presidential primaries, but their connection with each other is less clear. In any event, the absence of a theory explains Davis' failure to bring off his effort at comparison: he has no theoretical guides which allow him to find connections which are not defined in parochially American (or German or Canadian) terms (see Chapter 2).

Let me sum up. Springboard is a book worth reading, and I will value my copy of it. Its value is its author's rapport with politics, and his interesting writing. But the study of presidential primaries on which it reports is not a very exciting piece of scholarship.—Douglas W. Rae, Yale University.

The Congressional Process: Strategies, Rules and Procedures. By Lewis A. Froman Jr. (Boston: Little, Brown and Co., 1967. Pp. 217.)

The publication of Lewis A. Froman Jr.'s The Congressional Process should be noted in this journal for at least two reasons. First, it provides students of Congress with the first systematic attempt to explicate the relationship between the formal and informal rule structure of the two chambers of the Congress and the decisions that flow as outputs from those bodies. Second, the book is the first publication under the Study of Congress project financed by the Carnegie Corporation and administered by the American Political Science Association.

Froman's contribution is welcome because it addresses itself to a number of variables internal to the operations of Congress that have not been explored before. The rules and procedures justify attention because as Froman reminds us "...how things are done... may affect what is done."

The book catologues salient differences between the structure of the House and Senate and treats in detail the procedural maze through which legislation must pass in both chambers. The reader is shown how and why each stage of the process opens up new alternatives, options, and possibilities for each issue on its way to decision.

The principal strength of the book is that for the first time we have a study that treats the discharge petition, legislative calendars, suspension of the rules, and questions of germaneness as variables that relate in a significant way to a continuum of decisions and bargains that are made at each stage of the process.

It is encouraging that another student of government and policy-making is taking into account the impact of the legal and institutional environment in which decision-making occurs.

Ironically, the book's major failing is a derivative of its strength. From an innundates the reader with the number and range of procedural conditions that impinge on legislative decisions without providing, in this reader's judgement, an adequate conceptual framework for it all to make sense to the undergraduate.

Each chamber is analyzed at the pre-floor and floor stages with an additional chapter devoted to strategies of adjusting differences in House and Senate passed bills. The structure of the two chambers as formal organizations and Congressional reform are analyzed in the two concluding chapters.

Froman sees bargaining (of specified sorts) as the essential process through which majorities are built and the organization is maintained. The difficulty is that the linkages between the broad and very useful discussion of bargaining in an early chapter and the specifics of House and Senate procedure get lost in the complexity and detail of each rule and strategy that Froman discusses.

In sum, the book fills a real need in the literature and should be widely used for its many insights into a little explored but important dimension of the Congressional process.

As noted, Froman's book is the first publication of the Study of Congress project. That enterprise. being administered by Ralph K. Huitt. Assistant Secretary of Health Education and Welfare. and Robert L. Peabody of Johns Hopkins University, promises a series of books, monographs, and articles intended to "cover ground in one concerted thrust which (scholars) might inch over in a decade." Huitt and Peabody note further in the forward to The Congressional Process that the project is not an integrated research effort in which specific questions and hypotheses are being tested under a master research design. Rather individual scholars are receiving support to investigate areas of interest that they have been pursuing for some time.

Perhaps the state of our knowledge about Congress is so sketchy and the chances of getting several scholars to agree on what research priorities ought to be is so slim that the only strategy of inquiry is the individualistic approach. But it might have been an interesting experiment in seeking a coordinated strategy of research on an important subject to have marshalled the talents of a number of people to study a few mutually agreed upon questions. It would be interesting to know, for example, whether there is some consensus among students of Congress about what ought to be our research priorities.

As it is we can look forward to receiving a number of studies of Congress by several of the best people in the discipline who make that body their special object of inquiry, and it is my opinion that The Congressional Process is a good start.—EUGENE EIDENBERG, University of Minnesota.

Congress and the Citizen-Soldier. By WILLIAM F. LEVANTROSSER. (Columbus: Ohio State University Press, 1967. Pp. 267. \$6.00.)

Congress and the Citizen-Soldier is a discussion of several events in the legislative development of the Federal Armed Forces Reserve. The Preface to the book provides an excellent summary of its contents.

My approach to this area of research has combined both historical and political analyses. I have chosen six major aspects of reserve affairs, perhaps the most crucial in the evolution of the modern reserve components and the most prominent from the standpoint of Congressional participation in reserve policymaking. The list is composed of the following: (1) retirement pay for reserve personnel based on inactive reserve training as well as active duty (Army and Air Force Vitalization and Retirement Equalization Act of 1948); (2) categories of readiness for reserve forces and obligations to serve in them (Armed Forces Reserve Act of 1952 and the Reserve Forces Act of 1955); (3) promotion criteria for reserve officers (Reserve Officer Personnel Act of 1954); (4) retention of paid-drill strength in the Army Reserve (Defense Appropriations Acts for Fiscal Years 1959-61); (5) officer recruitment on the college campus (ROTC Vitalization Act of 1964); and (6) realignment and reduction in strength of units in the Army reserve components (proposal to merge units of the Army Reserve into the National Guard in 1965).

Conclusions from this study have clustered around four major themes.

First, Congressional primacy of interest in reserve affairs has been exceptional in comparison with the ascendancy of the executive branch in national defense policy-making. The maintenance of a relatively large number of drill-pay units and positions can be attributed in large measure to the support Congress has given to the citizen-soldier. Second, the Reserve Officers Association has emerged as an extremely effective interest group in sustaining programs for federal reservists in all components despite changes in defense strategy and military technology. In close liaison with Congressional leaders, it has been remarkably influential in building the federal military reserve. Third, elements of the legislative policy-making process have blurred the exercise of civilian control of the military. The political activities of citizen-soldiers have often encouraged professional military leaders to circumvent the policy proposed by civilian superiors. Fourth, the concept of the citizen-soldier has exhibited great durability by retaining its luster in the nuclear age. The reservist of today has been assigned greater responsibilities, but he has also been awarded some impressive benefits.

Those who are interested in any of these topics may wish to consult the text. However, two reservations seem in order: (1) the six "aspects of reserve affairs" are discussed in outline only with very little factual detail or insight, which often makes case studies interesting; and (2) the conclusions already cited in the Preface are simply reasserted from time to time with no attempt to tie them in with data.—Lewis A. Froman, Jr., University of California, Irvine.

Overcharge. By LEE METCALF AND VIC REINEMER. (New York: David McKay Company, 1967. Pp. xii, 338. \$5.95.)

APSA Congressional Fellowship Programs have always included recipients from law and journalism as well as political science. Overcharge, whose preparation was facilitated by an APSA fellowship, represents a handsome payoff from this professional courtesy. For this book by Senator Metcalf, a lawyer, and his executive secretary, Vic Reinemer, a journalist, substantially enriches our literature.

With a pun, the title indicates the main thesis of the study: because of inadequacies in the regulatory process, the privately owned electric power industry is not passing along to its customers in reduced prices the decreasing cost per unit resulting from technological advances and from rapidly growing mass production. Instead, the major private power companies have been pushing their rate of return far above that allowed by the regulatory agencies and engaging in a massive propaganda campaign that misrepresents their situation and helps support a number of right-wing organizations.

The \$70 billion electric power industry is dominated by the investor-owned utilities 'dubbed "I.O.U.s" by the authors). About 480 I.O.U.s serve 79% of the consumers of electricity in this country. Responsibility for regulating the I.O.U.s rests mainly with the states. However, most state regulatory commissions are woefully inadequate to the task because of lack of resources and sometimes of desire. In 1963, all the state commissions together had less than 500 accountants, 10% of whom were C.P.A.s. and 40% of whom worked for the commissions in only three states-California, New York, and Pennsylvania. Moreover, state commissions are responsible for regulating an average of ten other types of public utilities besides electric, with usually hundreds of companies under their jurisdiction. In 1965, even the Federal Power Commission with just 38 field auditors could plan to audit the books of electric and gas utilities only "every seven to ten years."

Most regulatory bodies have allowed electric utilities about 6% as a reasonable rate of return on their investment. Increasingly since 1957, this standard has been breached. In 1964, the net profit of I.O.U.s averaged 11.1% of their invested capital. Also, I.O.U.s have shifted to their customers the costs of extensive political propagandizing by classifying them as operating expenses. Much of this propaganda campaign has been waged by right-wing organizations, such as the Foundation for Economic Education, with which the I.O.U.s have an intricate nexus of relations involving heavy financial support and interlocking directorates.

According to the authors, if present trends continue, by 1980 the "overcharge" by the I.O.U.s will average \$11 billion annually, and their regulation will be rendered even less effective. To cope with this problem, which they have analyzed so incisively, the authors make a number of very sensible recommendations.

Though it deals with a complicated subject and is heavily documented, this study is eminently readable. Employing a sprightly style, the authors explain the most technical matters lucidly and

interestingly. Because it is relevant to many matters of growing public concern (e.g., consumer protection, lobbying, and federalism), Overcharge should prove valuable to any student of the American political scene.—Kenneth Kofmehl, Purdue University.

Perspectives on the Court. By Max Freedman, William M. Beaney, and Eugene V. Rostow. (Evanston: Northwestern University Press, 1967. Pp. xii, 120. \$3.50.)

Perhaps no institution has been the focal point of so many published lectures as the United States Supreme Court. This book, comprising the 1965 Rosenthal Lectures at the Northwestern University Law School, is the latest entry in the parade. The authors approach the Court from their own professional perspective, journalism, political science, and legal scholarship respectively (although Freedman's views are expressed more as a long-time confidant of Justice Frankfurter than as a journalist).

It is ungenerous to anticipate that all such contributions will be as insightful as Justice Jackson's (undelivered) Godkin Lectures, or as provocative as Learned Hand's address on the Bill of Rights or Herbert Wechsler's exposition of "neutral principles." Nonetheless, there should be greater warrant for publication than the mere participation in an endowed lecture series. We can reasonably ask for an innovative or thoughtful perspective on things judicial or, at least, a well developed and articulated central point. Only Dean Rostow's lecture approaches these qualities; the Freedman and Beaney lectures resemble more a professor's hasty compilation of scattered notes in preparation for an undergraduate class. And even Rostow's presentation makes only a marginal contribution to his selected topic: the well-worn area of the Negro and the Fourteenth Amendment.

Freedman, in an admitted apologia for Frankfurter, briefly discusses the rationales behind some of Frankfurter's more controversial opinions, e.g., his dissents in the Flag Salute Case and Baker v. Carr, and his concurring opinion in the Little Rock Desegregation Case. In the latter case, for instance, Frankfurter has been criticized for writing a separate opinion in the face of an Opinion of the Court signed by all nine justices. This Opinion was one of the rarest displays of unanimity in the history of the Court and had as its object the quieting of public speculation about the Justices' attitudinal differences toward desegregation. But Frankfurter, we are told, was appealing to the "judgment and conscience of thoughtful and responsible members of the Southern bar," and his plea, "deserves something more than negligible honor among the many influences molding a better tradition on racial problems." Freedman also attempts to dispel accounts of personal animosity between Frankfurter and Black by revealing a confidential Frankfurter memo praising Black's liberal spirit and noting his capacity for developing judicial craftsmanship. The memo is dated 1938, however, and tells us little of subsequent Frankfurter-Black relations.

Professor Beanev gives a rather loose treatment to a variety of subjects: what political scientists are doing vis-à-vis the Court, what they should be doing, why they are so enamored of the Warren Court (which he leaves largely unanswered), and whether the Taft Court was the precursor to the Roosevelt Court's civil libertarian activism (it was). Most noteworthy is his listing of four approaches of political scientists to the study of the Court: the historical, the philosophical, the analysis of doctrine and precedent, and the behavioral. While Beaney's delineation is casual and almost unstructured, it provides an interesting contrast to Schubert's considerably more systematic categorizations. For instance, the latter ignores the philosophical approach. (Indeed, the most recent work Beaney cites in this genre is dated 1908.) By contrast, Beaney's view of the behavioral approach is somewhat distended, encompassing not only what Schubert would place under that label, but Schubert's "conventional" category as well.

Evaluatively, Beaney formally opts for a "tolerant eclecticism," but it is clear that his heart does not lie with the behavioral approach. He concedes that the more quantitative analyses of Court voting behavior have "led to some enlightenment," but opines that the illumination has been dimmed by the "dispute as to the reliability or value of such studies." His lecture is punctuated by laments over the increasing disfavor with which "modern" political scientists view the non-behavioral approaches and hints of the danger inherent in the discipline's abandoning the philosophical criticism and doctrinal analysis functions to a bar which is largely hostile to the values found in the decisions of the Warren Court.

The main point of Rostow's lecture is that the relationship between law and the flow of history is not a one-way street. The currents of the day affect the sinews of judicial interpretation, it is true. But Rostow is no positivist. Law, especially fundamental law, has a "moral component," an appeal to conscience, which eventually shapes the currents of tomorrow. To illustrate this point, he discusses the treatment of the Negro at the hands of the Supreme Court.

Although imbued with some well-turned phrases and an undeniable righteous fervor, Rostow's discussion is neither informative nor

particularly provocative. Rather, it is uneven, occasionally irrelevant, and shows little sophistication in linking currents of history with judicial output and vice-versa. Underlying his discussion is an implicit premise that, morally at least, there is but one correct interpretation of the Fourteenth Amendment, one which guarantees the Negro the legal equivalent of Liberty, Equality, and Fraternity. Even so, Rostow offers little in the way of new insights or interpretations concerning the Amendment's checkered judicial history. The Slaughter House Cases opinion, for instance, is analyzed in a very traditional manner at great length, including one direct quotation which spans four pages, and the Civil Rights Cases receive only slightly less elongated treatment.

Rostow concludes by stating that the Civil Rights Acts of 1964 and 1965 "are the final skrmishes in our Hundred Years' War for Liberty and Equality." Advocates of national openhousing legislation will surely shake their heads in doubt and dismay upon reading this. At any rate, liberty and equality before the law is but one front in this war. After Detroit, Newark and lesser uprisings, it is almost superfluous to remind a nation that Fraternity is yet to be achieved. And neither Rostow nor anyone else has done much to clarify whether and how Supreme Court reinterpretations of the Fourteenth Amendment will materially aid the attainment of this goal.—

Bradley C. Canon, University of Kentucky.

Movies, Censorship and the Law. By IRA E. CARMEN. (Ann Arbor: The University of Michigan Press, 1966. Pp. x, 339. \$7.95.)

Professor Carmen's book is an important addition to that growing body of literature which is making us aware of the fact that the decisions of the Supreme Court on constitutional matters are not self-executing. His study of the impact of the Court's decisions in the field of movie censorship is the product of interviews with officials from every state and local agency involved in the prior censorship of movies which was willing to cooperate. It is a body of material which, for the first time, gives us some basis for making a judgment on the various hypotheses which have been advanced concerning the actual consequences on the community level of the Court's decisions in this area.

The interview data, set out at length in the Appendix, fully documents Carmen's conclusion that motion picture censorship "...flouts the supreme law of the land day after day and year after year" wherever it is put into operation. In general, the practice as shown here, is simply to snip out any particular scene which the censors find offensive, with no apparent regard for the integrity of the work or its artistic merit.

While Carmen has done considerable service in bringing this raw material before us, his further development of it in the text of the book is disappointing. Central to his discussion of the reasons behind the striking ineffectiveness of the Court's work in this field, is his conclusion that it is the prior restraint mechanism in itself which is mainly to blame. Although he does make something of a case for this view on the basis of the data, it is a case which really cannot be made effectively without a comparison of prior restraint and the major alternative means for the suppression of obscenity—subsequent punishment. His decision to concentrate solely on agencies of prior restraint has put such an essential comparison beyond the scope of the work.

In addition, there is the question of whether Carmen might not have looked more carefully at the Supreme Court's standards for obscenity themselves and the reasoning behind them in his quest for the causes of their inefficacy. This is an area in which the Court's work has not been notably coherent, and it seems plausible to assume that its lack of practical impact might in large measure be due to this fact. More specifically, this ineffectiveness might be connected with a fundamental contradiction in the logic of the Court's position. The exclusion of obscenity from the protection of the First Amendment is justified by the Court not so much by a course of reasoning from the meaning of the amendment, as by its sense that there exists a "universal judgment" that such material ought to be suppressed. The exception thus has its roots largely in community sentiment. But, as Carmen's interview material makes clear, the spandards which the Court uses in defining obscenity deviate significantly from the standards of the community as reflected in the judgments of censorship officials. Perhaps the problem arises from the contradiction inherent in the Court's attempt to give deference to community sentiment while at the same time attempting to keep that sentiment within limits of its own making. Perhaps it is this which leads the censors to feel that they are being subjected to limitations which are inconsistent with their basic mandate. a mandate which has been given considerable legitimacy by the Court.

Another direction in which the material might have been developed would have involved further generalization about the standards applied by the censors. A thoughtful consideration of the interview material in relation to the literature would surely yield some significant insights. One possibility immediately suggests itself: Professor Henkin has suggested that obscenity is really not a crime but a sin that it is suppressed, not so much for the protection of individuals from injury

as, "... for the purity of the community and for the salvation and welfare of the consumer." Does the interview material bear this out? It seems in fact to do so. Surely such a finding should have considerable impact on our thought about the obscenity doctrine.

Finally, it must be said that the quality of the editorial work evidenced here is hardly up to the standard one has the right to expect from a great university press. Errors in legal usage as well as basic syntax abound, at times obscuring the meaning of significant passages. Comments on style may seem out of place in the discussion of a work which is basically the presentation of a piece of social science research. But, as Robert G. McCloskev has noted, style is more than "...a mere cosmetic, prettifying an intellectual performance but not really enhancing it." In this case, lack of style has to some degree obscured the very real contributions which Professor Carmen has made to our knowledge of movie censorship.—ROBERT S. GERSTEIN, University of California, Los Angeles.

Anatomy of the State Department. By SMITH SIMPSON. (Boston: Houghton Mifflin Company, 1967. Pp. x, 285. \$5.95.)

The author resigned from the State Department to write this book. Whether the Department suffered as a consequence is unclear; that the reader will is a certainty. This book is so embarrassing theoretically, empirically vacuous, and normatively mindless, that one completes it with both relief and alarm.

The contradictory thesis of this book is that bureaupathology in the State Department's "pyramidal mass" has undermined the "integration, coordination, mobilization and consensus" (p. 58) that a "pluralist" society requires if it is going to be up to fighting the Cold War. The book is uninformed by any of the literature on pluralism, and no admission is raised of the problem of reconciling integrated national policies with genuinely pluralistic polities. As Braybrooke, Lindblom, and Wildavsky have shown, fragmented and incremental decision-making is a style of choice consistent with pluralism, rationality, and, perhaps, some measure of democracy. Not everyone, after all, shares Mr. Simpson's nationalistic pieties, dedication to the Cold War, faith in American benevolence, or his reading of post-war international politics. He misses the irony in suggesting that we "stand in the position of ancient Athens" (p. 70).

Some of the author's "reformist" proposals are frightening. He admires the success of interest groups in Congress and suggests that the State Department follow the same tactics. One recommendation: the Department should "prepare

material for a Congressman's constituents, visit his district, sound out the people and work at the grassroots for the support the Department needs from that Congressman and his constituents" (p. 183). This, one gathers, is what is meant by the consent of the governed. But there is more. Mr. Simpson is awed by the way the military has insinuated itself into virtually every interstice of the social order, and the State Department is advised to emulate such practices. If this book represents the thought processes of ranking bureaucrats, Lasswell must be judged as correct in his developmental thesis concerning the rise of the garrison state.

The level of knowledge of society is revealed in the following items selected at random: "the general public demands to be kept as well informed as possible of current world developments" (p. 191); "the military mind is a practical mindsystematic, alert, trained to examine every allied or hostile organization" (p. 85); "almost from the beginning of our Republic to the eve of World War II, our nation sought to avoid profound entanglements in diplomacy" (p. 1); "political power does not accrue to any group of men according to logic, but only according to that group's capacity to assume responsibility" (p. 49). Chapter 9 is a typical chapter and deals with State Department-Congressional relations. It is most memorable for its failure to consider James Robinson's definitive work in the area, or, for that matter, any of the other empirical materials easily available. Mr. Simpson seems to suggest that he has gazed upon terra incognita; as a result, his propositions, when they are not downright silly, are more often wrong than right.

But most of the author's ire is directed against the staffing and administrative policies of the State Department, a worthy topic in itself. Here too, however, the peculiar myopia of this "study" is disconcerting; we are led to believe that we should be surprised by what the author alleges (actually fails) to have substantiated. Is it possible to engage in what is claimed to be a serious analysis of an organization without one reference to Blau, Selznick, Merton, Thompson, Presthus, Simon, Argyris, or anyone else who has dealt systematically with such matters (especially Argyris, who has himself recently completed a study of the State Department)? Instead every cliche in the archaic administrative literature is reiterated. If social scientists ever hoped that the relevance of their work would penetrate beyond academe, here is pause for reflection. To Mr. Simpson, the careerism and dilettantism in the State Department proceed from poor training, frequent rotation, invidious efficiency reports, the lack of a general administrative manager, and the like, and not, apparently, from the distribution of power and cultural values in the broader society. Things are so serious that our failure in Vietnam is laid to such factors. That the failure is one of ideology and not of management, of a counter-revolutionary power in a revolutionary world and not of technique, is a point that the author does not, perhaps cannot, raise. Nor is it clear, as he alleges, that the State Department lacks an overall plan, a grand strategy, in world affairs. A plausible case can be made that there is such a plan, derived from an anti-Communist consensus, a quasi-religious doctrine of a Great Conspiracy, that unites all the power centers of American society from the radical right to the "pragmatic, hard-headed" liberals of whom one hears so much. And so it goes, one unexamined proposition after another, too many by far to touch upon here.

This book is a polemic, a genre of rare social importance when properly exploited. A polemic uninformed by knowledge, however, can be a positive danger to the extent that it misinforms, misleads, perpetuates myths, and fails to examine its own premises. There is no good reason why anyone should read this book, just as there is no good reason why the editors at Houghton Mifflin chose to think otherwise.—L. L. Wade, Purdue University.

The Invention of the American Political Parties. By Roy F. Nichols. (New York: The Macmillan Company, 1967. Pp. xi, 416. \$8.95.)

The achievement of system in the conduct of competitive electoral politics makes the eighteenfifties a landmark in American national development. This is the decade that is thought to have
seen the establishment of the modern party system: dominance of national nominations and
elections by two contending groups, each interregional in its following, cohering around a
formally adopted platform, governed by agreedupon rules and legitimated leaders, and served
by an enduring organizational apparatus.

Here, too, culminated what Roy F. Nichols asserts to be "a long and devious evolution" reaching deep into the old world past. To retrieve the threads of the evolution that eventuated in the party system of the eighteen-fifties is the task he undertakes in this book.

The result is an engaging, well-written traditional political history having all the virtues of its genre. There are no methodological paraphernalia to obtrude upon the text, less than a dozen footnotes to clutter it, no surfeit of hypotheses to smother the subject. Analytic points are cleanly segregated in brief, rare paragraphs, leaving little to stand between the reader and history. And there is sufficient distance from "behavioralism" to remove that obstacle to felicitous prose.

Three main premises underlie the book: that political parties are electoral in origin and function; that the order they bring to a potentially chaotic competition for office is essential to the maintenance of elective government; and that parties, in one or another form, are at least as old as elections in western civilization.

The main concern of the book seems to be to show how the necessary functions of the party were served before modern parties were invented -"invented," in Nichols' sense, meaning instituted by custom rather than by law or constitution. On the proposition that the party is a "folk construct" having behavioral elements that are "both ancient and not indigenous to the United States," the first two-fifths of the book are devoted to carrying the reader from the overthrow of Cynewulf in 757, through English and colonial history, to the first election of George Washington. Thence the book settles into a more conventional narrative of nominating and electoral politics from caucus to convention, on the community, state, and national levels.

This is an edifying excursion, especially in the chapters on party development in the American colonies, which makes the book a lively successor to Dallinger's history of nominations. But there are disappointments.

The profusion of happenings, locales, personalities, and pasts embraced in the book fails to cohere as an evolutionary sequence which yielded, and therefore helps explain, the party developments of the eighteen-fifties. The modern party system springs as suddenly upon the historical horizon as ever, no more predictably, and still more in contrast than in continuity with the pre-institutional politics that apparently preceded it. The reader will judge for himself whether the book's failure to elicit an evolutionary process disproves its premise that the modern American national parties evolved from electoral and non-American origins, or whether this failure arises from the absence of an analytic framework that is salient to the processes of evolution and institutionalization. The result in any case is to make the book less useful as a study of party development than as a history of efforts to influence electoral outcomes.

Another disappointment is that the book's major premise, by acknowledging only an electoral origin and function for parties, tends to preclude consideration of their intragovernmental origins and functions. Despite the fact that governing persons are heavily implicated in the author's treatment of national electoral politics, the possibility that the structure, values, and problems of governing groups at Washington and in the state capitals had as much to do with American party formation as, for example, the

politics of prenational New England, is never analytically confronted. Thus is lost an opportunity to explore, in a period of history which especially invites it, a most promising frontier for students of party development: the relationship between the electoral and the governmental functions of the national parties.

Essential knowledge of the political characteristics and problems of an era which culminated in the institutionalization of national electoral parties and—almost simultaneously—in the collapse of national government thus continues to lie beyond reach. Whether political science is sufficiently interested and innovative to retrieve it remains to be seen.—James S. Young, Columbia University.

Interstate Compacts in the Political Process. By Weldon V. Barton. (Chapel Hill: The University of North Carolina Press, 1967. Pp. 197. \$5.00.)

The interstate compact is a unique device in our system of government, which attempts to solve a mutual problem between the contracting parties (state governments and often the national government) or establish a separate agency or district to attempt the solving. When such an agency or district is established, a new level or style of government is created which lies somewhere between state, national, and local government. Observers often see these compacts and their organizations as nothing more than vehicles set up by state administrators to work with a particular area of mutual concern in some non-political manner.

This is a lively myth—that by placing a governmental function or problem somewhat outside our traditional three-level hierarchy of government in a special district or separate agency, it is thereby removed from the political system, with all its attendant vagaries. These districts and agencies supposedly divorce politics and administration, allowing for economy and efficiency of operation within their special charge.

Weldon Barton analyzes the political rather than the structural and legal aspects of compacts in various areas, and mostly succeeds in dispelling this myth of non-politics in interstate compacts. For example, a compact agency established to regulate an industry of interstate nature becomes part of that industry's elaborate political paraphernalia used to protect and further its interests in the government market place. An organization established to handle a particular metropolitan concern, such as transportation or port facilities, optimizes its chances of success and survival by choosing the least costly and controversial avenue, no matter what other demands or possibilities are asked of it by the original charter or

other governmental bodies—even its parents. An interstate agency providing jointly for a state service becomes a semi-haven of professionalism working against any political or general governmental control. This does not depreciate their efforts, but points out their basic political nature, and the fact that politics follows the allocation of resources, no matter what the organization may be.

You can quibble with certain of Barton's facts and interpretations, for example, in the state service compacts chapter, and ask for more information and analysis in the discussion of the internal workings of the compact agencies. But the overall impact is inescapable—interstate compacts are a part of the political process and in fact are just one particular outcome among the many possible. "After all, the compact device is essentially a tool of the state and interests that make claims on society through the state governments" (p. 187). And he makes the point that the agency is less the representative of the party states than the permanent executive director and his staff, with their view of what the role of the agency is and what must be done.

At the time in our governmental history when the states are turning to interstate compacts more than ever before, analysts and reformers both are beginning to understand that such agencies and districts may actually hamper our system's ability to operate effectively and in some cases can even have exactly the opposite effect as intended when established. For the politics of these agencies is often one of separateness, of protectionism against the general governmental and political system which begat them.—Thad L. Beyle, University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill.

And Promises to Keep: The Southern Conference for Human Welfare, 1938-1948. By Thomas A. Krueger. (Nashville: Vanderbilt University Press, 1967. Pp. xi, 218. \$6.50.)

A complex of Southern problems—social and economic, the region's natural resources, and the potential of its folk have proved irresistable stimulants to a variety of reformers. Single-objective groups have formed around such issues as lynching, poll tax, freight rates, and reapportionment. Other efforts have aimed at broader economic reforms in agriculture and industry. And then there have been those who dreamed of a reformation of the whole. Movements have come and gone and come again. The region has changed. The assessment of the relation between reform movements and change is difficult and rarely attempted.

And Promises to Keep tells the story of one of the most publicized and controversial attempts to establish and maintain a Southwide reform movement. The Southern Conference for Human Welfare sought to weld into one organization the reforming urges that had coalesced around a number of differing interests generally accepted as being associated with the problems of the South. The Conference's successes and failures were closely tied to this diversity of interest and to the events of the period-from late New Deal to early post World War II. The impetus of New Deal activity and the interest of the Roosevelts in the organization were important to its origins; the nation's involvement in the war provided a patriotic cover which facilitated united action. Unity was never complete, however; internal dissensions developed over the Conference's posture towards U.S. foreign policies. The disagreements were exacerbated by the vagaries of Soviet-Nazi relations.

What Thomas Krueger has done in this book is to assemble a large variety of details of organizational life, placed them somewhat loosely into the social framework of the period, and drawn conclusions about the effectiveness of the organization, the causes and impact of its internal disputes, and evaluated some of the actorsindividual and organizational. In doing so he has performed several important services. The fact story, from extant records and latter day interviews, is quite useful and unique in its breadth of coverage. Its relevance extends beyond persons with special interest in the Southern Conference for Human Welfare. It touches events related to the development of the labor movement in the region, to New Deal politics. and to social action movements in the South.

Although the author qualifies statements about the organization's effectiveness, he hardly lays the ground for the harshness of his final evaluation: that pragmatically it was "almost without importance" and that "the balance sheet shows the Conference an over-all failure" (pp. 192–193). I think in this he has been at once realistic in judging the Conference's impact on the affairs of the region and unrealistic in the yardstick employed. Professor Krueger seems to recognize this when he concludes that the Conference's importance was derived from making the effort to promote constructive ideas and not from measurable results. In general, he does not make

the mistake of applying today's standards to yesterday's effort, but his judgment of events is uneven. It is difficult, for instance, to accept, after his own description, that the Conference almost became the leader of all Southern reform organizations (p. 111). Similarly, his explanation of the demise of crucial C.I.O. support seems insufficient for an event so important to the organization's fiscal and political health.

Professor Krueger tackles the tangled web of relations that revolved around the allegations that the organization was significantly dominated or subverted by Communists or their sympathizers. His conclusion is that the Communists were loval Conference participants and in fact less subversive of its goals than other groups which sought to bend it to their own purposes. He denies that some of those chiefly alleged to be Communists were vulnerable to the charge and shows them in the main to have been organizational lovalists. Although he has instructive things to say at this point, and his judgment should be welcomed as the end result of a careful investigation, he has drawn the issues too simply. His judgment could be correct, but it is not supported by the kind of fact which either doubters or objective analysts will find conclusive. It is doubtful that a fact case can be made which would show with finality significant Communist domination or refute it.

The author's main contribution in the discussion of the Communist role is (1) to remind us that the Conference, as an agency for constructive purposes, was more than a battleground for ideologies; and (2) to show the debilitating effects of internal strife where suspicion either begets or is begat by conspiracy. Where a larger community is important to the organization and the battle extends to it, survival itself becomes difficult.

Despite some weaknesses of interpretation of specific events, and the probability of disagreement with portions of his main themes, Professor Krueger's book should be accepted as a worthwhile study of earlier-day social action in the South. There is in this book material worth pondering for those seeking reform today.— EMORY F. VIA, University of Wisconsin.

FOREIGN GOVERNMENTS AND COMPARATIVE POLITICS

The Outlawed Party: Social Democracy in Germany, 1878-1890. By Vernon L. Lidtke. (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1966. Pp. vii, 365. \$10.00.)

Albert Ballin: Business and Politics in Imperial Germany, 1888-1918. By LAMAR CEGIL. (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1967. Pp. xxi, 388. \$9.00.)

The political and economic reconstruction that has characterized Western Germany since 1945 has taken place under disadvantageous circumstances. The immediately preceding re-

gime, having permeated every facet and every level of German life for twelve intensive years, was internationally discredited and was for the next generation of Germans a continual source of embarrassment and shame. Germans therefore sought to lean instead upon the traditions and cultural associations of the earlier Republic and, perhaps more importantly, upon the legacy of the German Empire. It could not have been very surprising therefore that public affairs in Western Germany after 1949 should begin to take on the outward institutions of republicanism and the inner political and ideological dynamics of Wilhelmine Germany. That at least is the view of many careful students of German politics, and that must be the basic relevance to political science of these two excellent studies of class. party, and ideology in pre-World War I Germany.

The survival and prosperity of the Social Democratic Party during its years of outlawry in Germany are the subject of the volume by Vernon L. Lidtke. During the years of the "Socialist Law," which deprived the SPD of any manifest or public activity, the party leaders hurdled the major obstacles in the way of the party's becoming a major political force in Germany. Professor Lidtke has gone to some pains to demonstrate that these years of persecution and exile enabled the party to present a common front at a time of intense factionalism: that the then official hostility of German political elites widened more or less permanently the gap between the Lassallean/Eisenacher Socialists and the bourgeois liberals; and that the estrangement of social democracy from parliamentary liberalism vielded the supremacy of the Radicals under August Bebel and a heritage of uncertainty and ambivalence toward democratic and parliamentary political principles. In the process of the historical narrative Lidtke has unearthed a considerable body of fresh information and imposed on it an intelligent and sensitive interpretation.

The major thrust comes in chapters seven and eight, which treat the problems and implications of the SPD's first significant electoral gains and the consequences for the party of its deepening parliamentary involvement. It was not so difficult for Bebel and Liebknecht to lead the party into "unanimous rejection" of Bismarck's Imperial Social Welfare Program, which after all was one easy way to control the Lassallean "State Cult" within the party. Lidtke is convinced that no self-respecting socialist could have voted for the Accident Insurance Bill of 1884 in view of the harsh repression of his party by the Imperial Chancellor. It was quite another matter, however, to sweep under the rug the whole issue of the party's growth and of its relationship to

the Reichstag after the important gains made in the elections the following fall.

Of some meaning for the growth of the party in the early and middle '80's was the rapid increase in the number of Fachvereine, local associations of skilled craftsmen. These local bodies, while usually beginning under the banner of political neutrality, inevitably gravitated toward the SPD. The net effect was to give an unmistakable impetus to the spread of Social Democratic ideas and attitudes. During the 1880's the Radicals adopted a positive parliamentary role for the party, seeking to retain the spirit of a protest movement while absorbing the common elements of modern parliamentary parties. This intensifying involvement was most evident in Saxony, where the Radicals were in clear control of the Social Democratic delegation to the State Diet. In effect they became parliamentarians. Changes such as these appear to have been accepted grudgingly by some (e.g., Bebel and Bernstein), optimistically by others, such as Wilhelm Liebknecht, who observed, "Our party gradually puts away childish things and emerges from its years of indiscretion" (p. 237).

Acceptance of a bona fide parliamentary status meant bargaining with the bourgeois parties. Added to this potential embarrassment was the larger danger stemming from the fact that most of the election gains of '84 were registered by moderates within the party. This latter fact troubled Bebel, Bernstein, and Engels; but they all, especially Bernstein, seemed to be groping their way toward realization that the SPD "... was necessarily becoming a modern parliamentary party which could not avoid involvement in all phases of the legislative process" (p. 193). Still, erosion of the party's anti-parliamentarism did not in any real sense clarify its commitment to a democratic republic. This issue remained shrouded in doubt and uncertainty and, in Lidtke's judgment, accounts for the failure of the Erfurt Program in 1891 to demand a republic.

This was the important legacy of the Socialist Law. Vernon Lidtke has passed on to the reader his own careful evaluations and familiarity with the political terrain, and he has compressed a long story into a modest volume. Overall it is an orderly and highly readable book.

Lamar Cecil's rather more personal study of Albert Ballin's business and political career covers some of the same ground and touches upon some of the same events and issues discussed in the Lidtke book. Albert Ballin: Business and Politics in Imperial Germany, 1888–1918 is primarily a political biography, incidentally being a survey of the major social and economic changes of late 19th century Germany. There is a good deal of new information, mostly gleaned from

existing documents and from memoirs and personal correspondence, that throws added light on Anglo-German naval rivalry and competition between these countries in commercial shipping at the turn of the century.

Albert Ballin was, among other things, managing director for twenty years of the HAPAG, at that time the world's largest shipping company. He was also a powerful spokesman for the haute bourgeoisie in the counsels of the traditional centers of influence: the royal family and the agrarian Junker nobility. As such Ballin is an appropriate subject for a student of German social history who wishes to delve into the relatively unexplored area of economy and social class in Imperial Germany. It is important for the reader to know, however, that Cecil's book is specifically concerned with Ballin's political and diplomatic associations; and apart from some early and very excellent material describing Germany's industrial and economic expansion. the book is dedicated almost entirely to Ballin's labyrinthine connections with the topmost political, diplomatic and military figures of the day.

It might be some cause for dissatisfaction that the author designs one study and conducts another. Having declared in the Preface that he sought, in concentrating on one man, to explore the question of why liberalism did not accompany industrialization in Germany and to produce a study of "the interaction of business and politics, businessmen and politicians" (p. ix), he then devotes the book to Ballin's sometimes cynical, sometimes quixotic, and always interesting liaisons with the incumbent elites of that period. Maybe this book is a case study, in which case the conclusions are sensible extrapolations from Ballin's career. Then it would make sense to conclude, as Cecil does, that members of the industrial upper middle class exaggerated their political importance, that they simply co-existed with-but were never absorbed by-the Prussian aristocracy; and that they were led by their own misunderstandings to dissociate themselves from the forces for liberal reforms in Germany.

Lamar Cecil's book is a work of careful scholarship written in a stylized manner. Like Lidtke's study it reflects the author's own intimate knowledge of the personalities of the time. Both these volumes have bibliographical essays and helpful indices.—Edward L. Pinney, Washington & Lee University.

The Nazi Seizure of Power: The Experience of a Single German Town 1930-1935. By William Sheridan Allen. (Chicago: Quadrangle Books, 1965. Pp. xi, 345. \$2.45, paper.)

William Sheridan Allen has written an illuminating account of the Nazi take-over in the town of "Thalburg" Germany. This book well deserves the critical acclaim which it has received in the two years since its appearance. It is extremely readable, carefully documented, and involves the reader in the atmosphere and circumstances of the Nazi rise to power. It provides an excellent complement to the studies of Hitler and the power struggle in Berlin in the crucial years of the Nazi rise, also to the general statistics and the theories of the meaning of Nazism to the analytical "man in the street." Seldom have the Nazi successes seemed more "reasonable," than in this concrete and detailed case-study.

Moreover, although the historical study presents a great deal of detail on day to day events in these important years, the author does not hesitate to go beyond these to build a more general explanation and, indeed, a theory of the local seizure of power. Allen emphasizes the divided social structure of the community in the pre-Nazi years, and the preparatory effect of the middle class's nationalism, militarist sympathies, and "paranoid" anti-Socialism. The contributing role of the SPD's outworn revolutionary ideology and insistence on pure class solidarity is also suggested. Both the fear of economic disaster and the limited nature of its impact on the middle class which formed the bulk of Nazi supporters (the workers, though hardest hit, backed the Socialists to the end) are documented. The dynamics of the radicalization and politicization of local life in the period of economic fears, constant political agitation, and virtually continuous election campaigning (there were seven major elections in Thalburg in 1931 and 1932 alone) are strikingly illustrated and analyzed. Both presentation and analysis represent outstanding use of the case-study for the clarification of broader concerns, historical, humanistic, and theoretical.

One major limitation of this excellent study, at least from the point of view of a political scientist, is its failure to draw in more explicit fashion on the previous analyses of the Nazi movement. Thus, the author suggests conclusions of great interest to the students of totalitarian movements without placing them in the context of more general theory. Although all the implications of Allen's findings cannot be discussed in this short space two points are of particular interest:

(I) Thalburg's citizens gave the Nazis over 60% of the vote in the last free elections, but such support did not arise out of masses of anomic individuals, without social and group ties. The town had, apparently, a very extensive social structure, involving the individual in numerous ways in the group life of the small (10,000) community. The social structure was, however,

bifurcated along class lines, with a few exceptions, and this bifurcation seems to have reinforced class misunderstanding and fear. With only a slight oversimplification, one could say that it was not the isolation of the individual which opened him to the appeals of the Nazi movement, but rather his involvement in a context of social fragmentation and political conflict which made him available to any movement which could coalesce his anti-"Marxist" hostilities with an explanation of current problems. Thalburg is the prototype of a fragmented community, not a mass society.

(2) Students of mass movements and public opinion should not overlook the documentation of the impact of continuous political conflict and violence upon the capacity of citizens to tolerate radical, repressive, and violent solutions to political problems. The intense and radical course of political conflict prepared the way, it would seem, for the institutionalization of terror.

Without greatly weakening its numerous positive contributions, the Nazi Seizure of Power also underscores a general problem in the use of historical case-studies: source material limits both description and analysis, and the currents of history erase certain types of data more systematically than others. As the author admits, a major gap in the chain of analysis is the inability to account for the early Nazi organization and support, except by a few hearsay references. The processes of coordination with national party movements, of ideological adaptation to local needs, of tactical decision-making and recruitment, are all unexplored. The memories of the few ex-Nazi supporters interviewed do not seem to have assisted in the analysis of intraparty Nazi activities, except in describing a quasi-resistance movement, or at least reaction against excesses, among the upper class. The materials to consider these matters, Allen notes, were simply not available in Thalburg. Given the pitfalls of historical retrospection and the stigma of past Nazi associations, such material is likely to be absent or systematically distorted in most cases. Social scientists who would use historical sources must continually bear in mind the probability of such bias. Those who have dealt with such data cannot fail to appreciate Mr. Allen's honest recognition of the problem and his scrupulous documentation of all sources .-G. BINGHAM POWELL, JR., University of California, Berkeley.

Cultura e partecipazione sociale nella città in trasformazione. By Umberto Melotti. (Milano: Casa editrice "La Culturale," 1966. L. 4.800.)

Subtitled "sociological research on the new

cultural associations (circoli culturali) of the periphery and on the cultural situation in Milan," this work by a young Italian sociologist reflects some of the strengths and weaknesses of contemporary Italian social science. Melotti is deeply concerned with the cultural desert that has emerged in the poorly planned and socially fragmented neighborhoods around this modern industrial metropolis. He has studied fifty-four of the circoli culturali established to assist the population to understand and alter the environment; these associations organize debates, discussions, films, and many other types of presentations dealing with broadly cultural as well as narrowly political issues.

The author's personal involvement with the subject is obvious throughout; as a result, the book just misses being a polemic. But despite its excessive length and other weaknesses it manages to convey the frustration, alienation, idealism, and hope of the postwar generation growing up in the city that has done most to bring about the economic "boom." The author's attitude toward postwar prosperity is ambivalent. He explicitly rejects the "happy peasant dancing in the square" view of Italian traditional society; yet he continually compares—unfavorably—life in the dormitory sections of Milan with traditional village life. Although he rightly deplores the intellectual and social poverty of much of modern life, he nowhere considers that traditional society may not have offered much better to the millions who are fleeing to the cities. And where other social scientists might talk about the consequences of industrialization, the author blames everything on "neocapitalism," which he seems to consider the cause of all of the problems that face Milan. However, the meat of the book and my major criticisms lie elsewhere.

The research is based largely on local history and, especially, participant observation. The author seems to have visited all of the associations analyzed and to have attended numerous meetings of different kinds organized by them. He knows his area well and speaks with authority of the problems faced by the associations. However, treating each of the fifty-four cultural associations as a case study makes for an unnecessarily long book, renders generalization difficult, and misses a wonderful opportunity for systematic investigation of the leaders' and members' motivations and rewards.

But an author should not be criticized for a book he did not write. This book has several positive features. One is that the sheer repetition of the description of the environment of the various associations and the recounting of the problems that they have faced have a cumulative impact. While the author does demonstrate some

general relationships, the reader can provide additional ones. The importance of political parties for creating and sustaining associations and the inevitable conflicts of interest that result are apparent. Many of the associations met at cooperatives that were themselves related to parties; others used the party headquarters; only a few possessed genuine independence. Most of them attempted, nevertheless, to maintain a critical, autonomous position vis-à-vis political issues. This was true even when the leading personalities of the association were enrolled in the Communist party. The Catholic associations tended to be closer to the church than to the Christian Democratic party; however, they escaped political only to run into religious pressures. This kind of problem seems to be inevitable, for, despite some noteworthy exceptions, without some type of pre-existing organizational base such as could be provided by the church, parties, or cooperatives it was difficult to create and sustain the associations.

One of the reasons for this difficulty was the low level of sophistication of the inhabitants of these neighborhoods. With rare exceptions, the lead in promoting activities was taken by a small nucleus that usually included several individuals with some higher education; these often were deeply involved in party politics, though just as often disillusioned with their party experiences. Several associations "folded" because of conflicts with parties; others ceased to function with the loss of interest or removal of a leader. Compounding the problem of low level of sophistication was that of a conflict of generations. Mutual incomprehension was the rule, complicating relations with parties, cooperatives, and churches alike. Finally, the rapid influx of immigrants from the countryside and from the South of Italy encouraged small, poorly integrated, but aloof enclaves that did not mix with one another and that rendered difficult the growth of community spirit.

As is well known, economic development substitutes one set of problems for another, and Italy in general and Milan in particular are now beginning to face the task of building communities in areas with no tradition, few points of public interaction, ethnic (the term is used by Melotti) diversity, and political and cultural fragmentation. It is the merit of Melotti that he has studied the problem empirically and suggested policies for improving the situation. He has not merely lamented and protested.—Samuel H. Barnes, University of Michigan.

La Fonction Parlementaire en Belgique: Mecanismes D'Acces et Images. By FREDERIC DEBUYST. (Brussels: Centre de Recherche et D'Information Socio-Politiques C.R.I.S.P., 1967. Pp. 447.)

Those political scientists who would rather systematically study the smaller Western European democracies than slip them into general categories on the basis of superficial data, should be delighted with Mr. Debuyst's study of Belgian legislative politics. He presents a wealth of empirical data on a country that has been neglected by students of politics. Belgium's durability alone should have attracted our attention long ago, for a whole range of fascinating theoretical issues are raised when one wonders how this tiny nation has experienced such remarkable political stability despite frequent and intense disputes between Catholics and freethinkers. Flemings and Walloons and a populace that offers, at best, half-hearted support for its political system. This study, though not directly addressed to this problem, contains the kinds of substantive materials one needs before one can make sense of this complex nation.

Using the standard tools of legislative analysis. the author describes the backgrounds, recruitment, and role orientations of Belgian Deputies and Senators. With meticulous care, he first categorizes the SES characteristics of the 387 M.P.s sitting in the 1964-'65 session according to party affiliation and linguistic community. He accounts for much of his data by referring to aspects of the legislative environment, i.e., he explains differences in M.P.s' local political activity by their parties' successes in local elections providing data to support his argument (p. 131). This section is also distinguished by the numerous cross-national comparisons that point to such interesting findings as the higher proportion of Belgian than American, French, British, or Italian legislators with blue-collar backgrounds (p. 110). Regretfully he fails adequately to explain such differences.

Employing the responses from 76 personal interviews, he then explores the legislators' role orientations concentrating on questions of political socialization, strategies of access, and functional and representative roles. Though neither the questions nor the coding procedures are identical with those used by Wahlke et al. in their study of American legislators, one can easily draw comparisons from the two sets of data. After a slight manipulation of coding categories, one discovers that far fewer Belgian legislators, belonging as they do to well-organized, highly disciplined parties, see themselves filling the "Trustee" representative rcle (pp. 336-340). The results of this section are summarized in an imaginative typology including such types as, Le Dirigeant, Le Sage, L'Electoriste (pp. 396-400).

Unfortunately, the author's small sample leads him to generalize about the M.P.s of one party on the basis of only nine interviews. Furthermore, in reporting his findings, he relies far too heavily on illustrative quotes and far too little on tables. Consequently, the reader often feels he is coding the author's interviews rather than reading his results.

By referring to the parties' rules, available statistical data, and numerous case-studies, Mr. Debuyst clearly and expertly depicts how the Belgian parties permit their members to participate in the selection of legislative candidates through an intra-party election called the poll. A provincial view of the political universe, however, prevents him from exploiting the full theoretical richness of his material. Virtually ignoring the extensive literature on recruitment processes relevant to his subject, he explains such potentially provocative findings as differences in turnout for the poll among and within constituencies by vaguely alluding to members' interest and the presence of popular local figures without presenting any supportive data (pp. 262-266). Moreover, apparently not appreciating the uniqueness of the poll, he fails to ask why only Belgian and not British, French, or German parties willingly organize an intra-party election to choose their candidates.

He argues that the complex rules governing the poll tend to stabilize and institutionalize the recruitment process (p. 197). But evidence presented in the case studies suggests that, if the poll itself does not produce difficulties, it at least reflects already existing problems by bringing rival factions out from behind closed doors into the public eye. The poll may even aggravate delicate situations by provoking disputes over candidates' questionable behavior in soliciting members' votes and the application of its complex rules. He also claims that the poll responds to the six criteria used by the party to select their candidates (it is not made clear how he derived these criteria). But he fails to explain why the parties could not find representative candidates more easily, for example, by entrusting selection duties to a small group of party leaders.

A general and more serious difficulty with the study is the absence of any argument, thesis and/or theoretical model uniting the work's three sections. Each section stands as a separate unit independent of the others. No effort is made systematically to explore the possible relations between M.P.s' backgrounds and their role orientations or their backgrounds and how they are recruited.

The most intriguing hypothesis stated by the author is that Belgian political institutions do

not satisfy politicians' power aspirations (p. 33). But in concluding he argues only that the Parliament fails to quench M.P.s' thirst for power. He supports this notion by stating that a number of M.P.s find greater satisfaction in their local than in their national positions (p. 406). But only 13 of 40 M.P.s accorded more *interest* to their local than to their national office (p. 352). This is far from convincing evidence.

These criticisms should not hide the fact that this is one of the first studies to present more than a polemical or legalistic account of Belgian legislative politics. For this reason alone, it is an important study for students of comparative politics and legislative behavior.—Jeffrey L. Obler, University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill.

Teachers and Politics in France: A Pressure Group Study of the Fédération de l'Education Nationale. By James M. Clark. (New York: Syracuse University Press, 1967. Pp. xv, 197. \$6.50.)

As all commentators on France are aware, trade unions in Gaul are divided into three parts: a Communist-led Confédération Générale du Travail, a pro-Christian Democratic Confédération Démocratique du Travail (itself further divided by the reluctance of old faithfuls to abandon the good ship CFTC), and a Socialist oriented Force Ouvrière. Working class disunity in France necessarily drives the political balance to the Right, makes effective action on behalf of labor exceedingly difficult, and thus reinforces the historic alienation of a large part of the nation from parliamentary institutions. The ideological fragmentation of the working class has a parallel in other major social groups. Farmers, businessmen, and such groups as veterans are also generally split among separate organizations with radically different political orientations.

Yet there are some exceptions to the rule of ideological fragmentation. A few groups have gone against the trend and are relatively independent of political parties. The major "autonomous" union in France is the Teachers Union (Fédération de l'Education Nationale-or FEN), with some 281,000 members as of 1961. Another unusual feature of this union is its ability to organize virtually the entire occupational category; well over 90 per cent of all teachers and other employees within the educational system are dues-paying members of the FEN. How has this happened? How successful is the FEN in maintaining its autonomy in view of the ideological divisions within the working class? Professor James M. Clark addresses himself to these questions and also undertakes a general analysis of the role of the FEN within the political system, in this well-researched and able monograph.

The present FEN was created in 1946 as a member union of the CGT. In December 1947 anti-communist elements within the CGT withdrew from that organization and created the Force Ouvrière. At this critical moment the leaders of the FEN also withdrew from the CGT. But they decided to refrain from entering the FO and instead to maintain "autonomy" from all political parties. This decision was ratified in a referendum of the membership by a margin of more than two to one. Professor Clark rightly emphasizes the unique elements of cohesion that permit the FEN to remain autonomous: an ideology of militant laïcité that affords divergent elements a satisfactory rallying point; a flexible structure which enables the opposing forces to be represented and to express their views within the union; and a record of effective collective bargaining on material conditions with the highly centralized Ministry of Education.

Nevertheless, the deep ideological divisions of the country are not entirely avoided. Teachers in the Catholic schools have their own union, whose membership, however, is small. Both the CGT and FO created rival teachers unions after the schism of 1948, though they failed to attract significant support. More important, the rivalry of communist and socialist groups within the FEN has persisted. On the basis of an analysis of votes on motions of general policy, Professor Clark estimates the pro-CGT group at about 25 per cent of the membership, the pro-FO at 10 per cent, and the revolutionary syndicalists at 5 per cent. Perhaps the key factor in the evolution of the FEN has been the keen determination of the leadership to stay out of a communistdominated CGT and to prevent the Communists from taking over the FEN. The "autonomy" of the FEN is a bit misleading, then, since most of the leaders support the parties of the non-Communist Left, while perhaps one fourth of the members sympathize with the Communists.

In order to judge the effectiveness of the FEN as a pressure group, Clark offers case studies of the school laws of 1951 (loi Barangé) and 1959 (loi Debré). In both cases legislation providing for state subsidies to religious schools was passed over the opposition of the teachers. This failure is cited by the author as pointing up "some limitations on the effectiveness of pressure groups." But what about Catholic pressure groups, particularly the Secrétariat headed by Edouard Lizop? These pressure groups turned out to be highly effective. Clark's analysis of the loi Barangé is generally more detailed and more satisfactory than his treatment of the loi Debré. There is no mention in his account of the 1959

law of the role of General de Gaulle, though from other sources (for example, the study by Aline Coutrot) it is evident that he exerted considerable pressure. But my criticism is only an aside. This book is a well-written, model case study of a major French interest group.—Bernard E. Brown, Brooklyn College of the City University of New York.

Soviet Political Schools: The Communist Party Adult Instruction System. By Ellen Propper Mickiewicz. (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1967. Pp. vi, 190. \$6.50.)

In the Soviet Union civics courses never seem to end. From the time he enters school until the time he dies, the Soviet citizen is systematically exposed to a comprehensive political belief system. The communication network that transmits and attempts to internalize such beliefs is indeed formidable. It includes the mass media, the arts, the educational system, and various "transmission belts" in the form of associational groupings. As if that were not enough, the regime also organizes explicit political learning through adult political schools. It is the latter which constitutes the focus of the present study.

The author has carefully examined every component part of this political instructional program. Her estimates of the program's success seem to this reviewer both reasonable and justified by the evidence. In this sense, she has filled an important gap in our knowledge of the Soviet political system.

In other respects, however, the book is less than satisfactory. Mrs. Mickiewicz asserts, for example, that Soviet political schools present the Western analyst with "a fascinating opportunity to explore the process of overt socialization." I agree wholeheartedly but the reader will search in vain for the author's exploitation of this opportunity. For neither explicitly nor implicitly does she use socialization theory to illuminate and evaluate the program she has chosen to study. This omission leads to some serious flaws in her analysis.

Mrs. Mickiewicz generally concludes that adult political schools are not very successful. Among the explanations for this failure, however, she nowhere suggests that the very overt and deliberate nature of the socialization program might be at fault. Yet the increasing literature of political socialization seems to agree that the process is most successful precisely when attitudes and beliefs are acquired unconsciously and unvittingly. Since Soviet political schools are distinguished by the absence of these qualities, one would expect that obvious difference to be raised when speculating about the probable causes for the program's failure.

The author's conclusions likewise leave doubts in this reviewer's mind. She argues that the program continues to exist despite its shortcomings because it eliminates some amount of leisure time, thereby enhancing the state's monopolization of the forces of socialization. This is tantamount to saying that the schools, the media, the "transmission belts," and other socializing agencies have been ineffective in their efforts to produce citizens with reliable political belief systems. Thus the regime is concerned lest its citizens spend too much time among themselves. Mrs. Mickiewicz may be correct, but a claim of this nature requires evidence. At a minimum the reader expects an elaboration of the argument. Nevertheless, the author avoids this necessity by reminding us that "the political instruction system is only one of many different influences that operate on the Soviet adult and it is not within the purview of this study to discuss the full environment of Soviet adulthood."

Personally, I do not share the view that the imposing array of socializing agencies has been ineffective. Even if that were the situation, it is hard to believe that the regime expects to achieve with a problem-plagued political instructional system what it has failed to achieve through the schools and other agencies of socialization firmly under its control.

Nor can I agree that the persisting rationale for the instructional system lies in "the advantages that can accrue to the setting in which group oral agitation takes place." No doubt the officials responsible for the schools cite such advantages as justification for the program. One suspects, however, that a more reasonable explanation might be found in the works of Robert Michels. After reading this book, I cannot help but feel that Soviet political schools represent a classic example of Michel's thesis. The maintenance and perpetuation of a bureaucratic organization has replaced the objectives for which that organization was originally established .-JOEL J. SCHWARTZ, University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill.

The Social Democratic Movement in Prewar Japan. By George Oakley Totten III. [Studies on Japan's Social Democratic Parties, Vol. I] (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1966. Pp. xv, 455. \$12.50.)

Socialist Parties in Postwar Japan. By Allan B. Cole, George O. Totten, and Cecil H. Uyehara (with a chapter by Ronald P. Dore). [Studies on Japan's Social Democratic Parties, Vol. II] (New Haven, Conn.: Yale University Press, 1966. Pp. xvii, 490. \$12.50.)

There have been repeated predictions (made by both Japanese and outsiders) that the Social

Democratic Party would assume power in Japan by obtaining a majority, after a few more elections. Even Socialist activists' hopes have, however, been dashed as the opposition reached but has never surpassed the so-called "barrier of one third," reflected by the number of seats in the Diet. Conservatives have continued to roll up sizeable (if slightly decreasing) majorities. This pair of volumes goes into considerable detail to explain the obstacles faced by the opposition, specifically the non-communist Left, in Japan.

Both volumes will prove to be most useful to specialists on Japan. The second, on postwar socialism, will be more interesting to the political scientist who is a nor-specialist so far as Japan is concerned. Despite Professor Totten's hopes (expressed in Vol. I) to identify "behavioral characteristics important for the comparative study of politics" and simultaneously to illuminate "the process of modernization in Japan." he uses primarily a historical approach. The author assumes considerable familiarity with the history of modern Japan on the part of his readers. His study of prewar social democracy is handled as historically significant in and for itself, and not simply as important for understanding the main opposition in Japanese politics today.

Nevertheless, there is an important tie between the movements, prewar and postwar, and Professor Totten's long analysis establishes the background for the collaborative study (in Vol. II). From the beginning, as the author explains, socialism in Japan displayed the usual Leftist features of factionalism which were overlaid on already divisive tendencies in a modernizing Japanese society.

Added to early and continued factionalism were the hostile environment in Japan, differences of opinion on what the functions of a "proletarian" or "progressive" party were to be, and poorly organized support for socialists among labor, peasants, women, and minority groups. These data are liberally illustrated by the author in numerous graphs and tables.

Perhaps most important in the postwar period, as the authors (of Vol. II) point out, are the profound changes—especially since 1957-59—which have affected Japan's industrial relations, the environment of proletarian politics. These include a spectacular economic growth; technological innovations with shifts in industry and in utilization of labor force; modernization of labormanagement relations; increased productivity of labor; an improvement in income, consumption level, and welfare of most Japanese workers.

In socialist thinking about modern, industrialized societies, there have been two systems: one, operative in Japan and hence capable of concrete evaluation; the other, known to Japanese

only in theory and from the experience of certain other countries. In the post-treaty period, while Japan has enjoyed rapid rates of growth, two leading "socialist" countries were experiencing serious difficulties. Japanese non-communist Marxists thus continued to underestimate the efficacy of monetary and fiscal measures by which "capitalist" governments have succeeded in limiting cyclical troughs to recessions instead of depressions.

Moreover, there has usually been a gap between more theoretically oriented Japanese politicians and intellectuals, on the one hand, and the common people, on the other. This gap is also reflected in two main concepts of the Social Democratic Party's nature, obvious since the first (postwar) convention in 1945: the first holds that it should be based on the working-especially industrial labor-class; the second, that it should reflect the interests of all revisionist strata. Socialists claim they recognize the importance of support by voters who belong neither to Japan's potent elite nor to the industrial working class (this middle strata constitutes 60-70 percent of the population). In fact, as the authors explain in almost agonizing detail, the SDP leans heavily on highly organized labor, particularly on the giant labor federation, Sōhyo; its leadership continues to be deeply factionalized; and it has exceedingly shallow roots, that is, it lacks a nation-wide organization.

To try to explain Socialist frustrations, the authors (of Vol. II) have combined a historical method with political description and analysis. Thus two opening chapters provide a retrospective summary (of what Professor Totten had covered in Vol. I), geared to phases of Party development. Five chapters on "Theories, Tactics and Policies" follow. Although Socialists have more often emphasized and split over foreign policy issues (Chap. 7), the validity and competence of economic proposals are given ample attention (Chaps. 5,6). In this analysis the authors enlisted the support of the Kokumin Keizai Kenkyū Kyōkai (National Economic Research Institute). Two chapters (Chaps. 8,9) on "Organization and Leadership" have been distilled from considerably longer manuscript treatments prepared by the team. One section (Chaps. 10,11,12) deals with "Electoral and Organized Support" (this parallels Part IV of Totten's companion volume). Ronald P. Dore prepared the excellent essay (Chap. 11) on the "Socialist Party and the Farmers." The "Conclusion" (Chap. 12) handles "Prospects and Problems." The study of postwar socialism too is greatly enhanced by graphic charts on chronology, organization, leadership factions, labor federation lineages, and farmers' union lineages; and by five tables.

It is plain from the authors' conclusion that Socialist criticism of "capitalism," "feudalistic survivals," and "authoritarianism"—these have less relevance to the real, contemporary world of Japan. On the other hand, emphasis on peace, collective security through the U.N. and other world agencies, a ban on nuclear testing—these have increased in relevance and carry wide appeal to the Japanese public. Socialists have had, and can continue to exert, an influence on ruling conservative policies.

These volumes are actually only two products of a joint research project, "Studies on Japan's Social Democratic Parties," in which Allan B. Cole, George Totten, Cecil Uyehara and others (including Japanese) have collaborated. Their research had earlier resulted in articles, annotated bibliographies, and monographs. As to the authors, Dr. Cole has written numerous volumes on China and Japan; he is Professor of East Asian Affairs at the Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy, Tufts University. Dr. Totten is Associate Professor of Political Science at the University of Southern California. Mr. Uyehara, who compiled Left-Wing Social Movements in Jaran: An Annotated Bibliography, is now attached to the U.S. Bureau of the Budget .-- ARDATH W. Burks, Rutgers-The State University.

Political Parties and the Canadian Social Structure. EY F. C. ENGELMANN AND M. A. SCHWARTZ. (Scarborough, Ontario: Prentice-Hall of Canada, Ltd., 1967. Pp. 277, index and bibliography, \$3.75 paper.)

The American scholar interested in the Canadian political scene has long complained of the dearth of literature on the party system of his northern neighbor. There are books of readings, chapters in textbooks designed for secondary schools or freshmen classes, and occasional books dealing with specific parties, leaders, or elections. There has been no serious analytic work on the party system. Political scientists should be grateful to Engelmann and Schwartz for having made the first move in this direction.

Unfortunately, perhaps because it is a seminal work, there are many significant weaknesses, particularly with regard to the theoretical and legal aspects.

The social milieu in which the Canadian political system must operate is a peculiar hybrid. The British parliamentary system is transplanted onto a bi-ethnic culture and a federal structure in which loyalties are frequently more provincial or linguistic than national. Compounding the situation is the omnipresence of the gargantuan neighbor to the south whose influence, via the media of mass communications, is pervasive. The book merely scratches the surface

of these factors—particularly the last—which have created the uniquely Canadian political situation.

A few of the book's more obvious weaknesses involve influence groups, choice of leadership, and ecclesiastic influence. The weakest section deals with interest groups in the Canadian setting; and this is attributable to the lack of literature in the field. To the authors' credit they do not accept the longheld Canadian myth that interest groups are virtually non-existant there. They recognize the existence of these groups and concede that "the impact of interest groups on [Canadian] parties makes it possible to have day-to-day opinion affect policy decisions" and that such decisions are "influenced strongly by demands stemming from interest groups." Moreover they note the impact of interest groups on the bureaucracy and royal commissions. But the discussion of pressure groups in the Canadian political system lacks depth and ignores almost completely the legal position of groups, particularly professional associations. This is a serious flaw, for professional interest groups in Canada, unlike their counterparts in the United States, have semi-official status. Thus professional associations in most Canadian provinces have licensing power which is reserved to the state governments in the United States. The result of such legal power can be seen in the difficulty Asian doctors find when they attempt to practice in Ontario, or which osteopaths encounter when they seek legal status in some provinces, or which confront governments seeking to implement policies opposed by such associations. A well-documented literature demonstrating this power exists in the various studies of the Saskatchewan Medicare crisis of 1962. The role of the College of Physicians and Surgeons (Saskatchewan's medical society), in thwarting universal medical insurance in that province for almost ten years and finally forcing modifications in it which weakened it perceptibly, should have been examined to emphasize the legal power of the professional interest groups.

Besides being rather thin, the discussion of the choice of party leader was also outdated before it was published. The removal of Diefenbaker as leader of the Progressive Conservative Partywhich occurred after the book was written but before it was published-belied the authors' thesis that the "tenure of a Canadian party leader extends to his death, retirement, or resignation." Although this may have been the case previously, it is no longer true; the tenure of the leader of an opposition party is no longer at his pleasure. Moreover, the book does not consider the underlying pressures which are vital in the choice of a new party leader. Neither is the convention system analyzed except from an institutional point of view.

On the issue of the role of religion in Canadian politics the authors again make assertions which are open to question. For example, Engelmann and Schwartz claim that "the pervasiveness of the Catholic Church [in Quebec politics] shows signs of weakening." No proof is presented for this statement and a serious study of the 1966 provincial election might well indicate that opposition by clergy to the proposed secularization of the educational system was a deciding factor in the defeat of the Liberal government by the Union Nationals.

A minor weakness which ought also to be mentioned is the inaccuracy of the index: Major C. H. Douglas, the British founder of Social Credit, is several times mistaken for T. C. Douglas, leader of the New Democratic Party.

There is one strong point to the book; its discussion of the relation of provincial to national parties. A provincial party and the national party may have little in common on policy issues, as Engelmann and Schwartz point out. Yet, as the authors make clear, the provincial and national parties cannot ignore each other. The provincial parties influence the choice of national leadership and provincial premiers do, at times, come from the ranks of members of the federal Parliament.

By far the most serious criticism of the book must be its failure to answer the most critical questions now facing Canadian politics: Will Canada's political system remain viable in view of the development of provincial particularism and ethnic difference? Is the modified two party system to remain unimpaired or, assuming that the semi-Socialist New Democratic Party emerges as a major force, will the Progressive Conservatives and Liberals follow the example of the Country and Liberal Parties of Australia and form an electoral alliance to prevent an NDP victory?

Despite omissions and weaknesses this book is an important contribution to the literature of Canadian politics primarily because it opens the path to further work in the field.—Bernard K. Johnpoll, State University of New York at Albany.

Latin American Christian Democratic Parties. By EDWARD J. WILLIAMS. (Knoxville: University of Tennessee Press, 1967. Pp. x, 305. \$7.50.)

Two or three years ago, in a rather extended correspondence this reviewer had with a Catholic bishop in Latin America, who need not be named, he (the bishop) ventured the opinion that Latin America had only two generic political parties that were aware of the plight of the masses and were advancing programs to do something about it: the Communist and the Christian Democratic. He did not, interestingly, include the left-of-

center democratic parties, which may be said to be generically related. Considering the credentials of the author of the comment, inclusion of the first is quite unusual, of the second entirely natural.

Latin American Communists have been extensively and effectively analyzed, notably in the volumes by Alexander and Poppino. The family of Christian Democratic parties receives really its first due—and a very good treatment it is—in Professor Williams' volume. Probably the author himself would be the first to admit that his study is not definitive, that much more plowing could profitably be done. Nonetheless, the present book is an excellent, thoughtful, and comprehensive introduction to the subject.

In three introductory chapters Williams sets the "backdrop" for the movement in Latin America. Six additional chapters consider such aspects as the parties general characteristics and organization, their domestic, economic, and international policies and programs, and their relations with the military, the Catholic Church, and other "political forces." Two concluding chapters provide as assessment, conveniently divided into minuses and pluses.

Election of Eduardo Frei as president of Chile in 1964 seemed to climax a meteoric rise of Christian Democracy in Latin America—essentially a post-World-War-II phenomenon—and to mark the advent of a permanent and major new force on the Latin American political scene; some of its more perferved friends were calling it the wave of Latin America's political future. By now, even Chile's Christian Democratic party, easily Latin America's best organized and most successful, has demonstrated that it is subject to the schisms and frailties that are unfortunately so characteristic of virtually all Latin American parties. But granting their weaknesses, we still must reckon these parties to be a highly significant addition to the general party spectrum in Latin America.

Williams' study is based primarily on secondary materials available in the United States and Venezuela. It would have been improved had the author had an opportunity to observe at first hand the campaigning and elections, the conventions and candidates in Chile and other countries where Christian Democracy is active. That can wait on other students who will till the same field. And it cannot detract from a pioneering venture of outstanding merit.—Russell H. Fitzgiebon, University of California, Santa Barabara.

Comparative Political Development: The Precedent of the West. By G. Lowell Field. (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1967. Pp. xi, 242. \$6.76.)

The application of empirical theory to the rich

resources of Western historical scholarship is the task to which Professor Field's book addresses itself. His endeavor is inherently as interesting as it is ambitious: to classify types of political regimes and to postulate a series of transformation laws which govern the process of political change. The focus of his study is upon European and Europeanized nation-states, but, as the subtitle suggests, he views his study as having general relevance for students of political development.

Professor Field begins his analysis by developing a typology of political regimes and levels of socio-economic development. While he suggests a number of empirical classification criteria, his categories are based essentially upon types of political orientations held by various elite and mass participants in the political system. The author then utilizes his framework in a panoramic analysis of the recent history of Western "polities." He concludes that Western nations have experienced remarkable continuities of regime types. and that most apparent political change has involved only the evolution of specific sub-types. Field continues with a presentation of his formal theory which explains these historical regularities in terms of polar political orientations which he labels "status-assertion" and "management." As societies become bureaucratized, he argues, the first of these orientations gives way to the second—a process which changes the range of alternative approaches to political activity which the elite may effectively employ. He then offers a list of hypotheses to explain the rules governing both viable persistence and transformation of regimes. The concluding chapters deal with the implications of Field's theory for both non-Western societies and highly developed Western nations.

One of the first things to strike the reader about Professor Field's theoretical summary of the developmental process is that, by restricting his analysis almost entirely to the effects of bureaucratization upon elite and mass attitudes, he has taken for granted much of what other theorists have regarded as fascinating material for empirical investigation. Such other development theorists as Gabriel Almond, David Apter, Lucian Pye, and, recently, Robert Holt and John Turner have all been concerned, for example, with the way political systems reach accommodation with the cultural, social, and material setting. Field explicitly rejects this approach and admits that his book "...fails almost entirely to make contact with most extant writings on the subject" (p. 218). He feels that much of the literature aims at finding ways in which "... a governable territorial political entity of greater than tribal scope may be created" while his own approach assumes "... a territorial political entity capable of being governed" and asks by what methods it can be ruled (p. 218). The reader may regret that, by neglecting the main body of scholarship in this field, the author has deprived his theoretical formulation of that infrastructure of theory and empirical research which political scientists have painfully accumulated in recent decades. Indeed, it is remarkable that not even the considerable body of data on mass political attitudes—a matter of some importance to Field's theory—has found its way onto the pages of his work.

While the theoretical system offered by Professor Field raises many perplexing questions, one of its most basic difficulties stems from its lack of mutually exclusive criteria for the classification of political regimes. Field identifies three main categories of regimes on the basis of "... the stereotypes through which political activity is perceived by participants" (p. 15). Two of these, the "consensual" and "main-stem" types, are based respectively upon the degree of value consensus or dissensus among the governing elite. With no apparent consistency, the third category, "utopian regimes," is identified by the fact that its elite professes a single ideology. Such a criterion, of course, leaves open the possibility that utopian elites may also perceive a basic consensus or dissensus of values among themselves. Since an elite may possess more than one of the classifying characteristics, the validity of these criteria as instruments of classification is seriously compromised.

Typical of other problems arising from Field's treatment are the ambiguities created by his frequent use of what might be called quasi-definitions. In setting out the empirical criteria intended to make the theory operational, for example, he has chosen to employ words and phrases that have no precise operational meaning. Hence, we are told that this or that criterion applies when "... the regime obviously accepts a practical subordination . . ." (p. 28), or when ". . . a reasonably well-informed participant would regard such events as within the range of practical politics" (p. 31). The ample stock of such quasi-definitions contained in the first two chapters deprives Field's theoretical statement of much of the significance which it might otherwise have attained.

In spite of the obvious difficulties it raises, Field's theoretical analysis does succeed in bringing a freshness of approach to many familiar concepts. He gives a new perspective, for example, to the difference between ideological and non-ideological styles of politics, and he imparts a new coloration to the old polarity between the political right and left. One's reading of Western history certainly must be altered by the insights that he provides. It may well be that a fuller ex-

plication of the interesting conceptualizations which he offers would remove many of their ambiguities and establish them as genuine contributions. It is, in fact, as a preliminary statement of his theoretical position that Professor Field's work is likely to be received and commented upon by students of political development.—Warren L. Mason, Miami University (Ohio).

Politics in Brazil, 1930-1964. By Thomas E. SKIDMORE. (New York: Oxford University Press, 1967. Pp. xviii, 446. \$8.75.)

Perspectives of Brazilian History. Ed. By E. Brad-FORD BURNS. (New York: Columbia University Press, 1967. Pp. x, 234. \$7.50.)

Brazil projects the image of a stumbling groping young giant unable to master the art of political stability, attain economic prosperity, or provide social justice for its citizens. Two crucial questions exist. First, can Brazil develop a political system which will answer the demands of the majority without a bloodbath? Second, can the United States and Brazil live together as allies or must the two nations face each other as dangerous enemies in the years ahead. Tied in with this last question is the nagging query of how much responsibility must the United States assume for Brazil's internal failures. Professor Thomas Skidmore provides some valuable clues for answering these questions by describing and probing Brazil's political history from 1930 to 1964.

The major point of view of Professor Skidmore is that since 1930 the pace of Brazilian politics has dangerously quickened as populist leaders have appeared. A populist leader, according to Skidmore, is one who appeals to the urban mass electorate and relies on a direct emotional appeal based on economic issues. Men who fit this description are Vargas, Kubitschek, Quadros and Goulart. The book claims a deadlock exists as a result of the populist challenge to the traditional elite, the power brokers, and the old political establishment. When the last of the populists, Goulart, turned out to be so inept and incompetent that he turned too far left without accurately assessing how little real strength there existed in the popular forces, his government collapsed in shambles and the military stepped into the power vaccum.

Another yet unstated major theme which runs through Mr. Skidmore's book concerns the role of the military in the political affairs of the nation. Throughout the fact-crammed eight chapters and the epilogue, the military are constantly singled out for mention. According to the author, when Goulart's administration fell in March, 1964, it demonstrated that the Brazilian army was for the first time united in an ideological

stance against populism. This reviewer feels the case is over stated and that the army was not making a negative move against populism as much as it was taking positive action to prevent the complete destruction of an economic and political structure which had successfully evolved after four hundred years of trial and error. What did shake the electorate and the civilian political establishment was the army's refusal to return to their barracks after the golpe.

Former President Jânio Quadros is let off too easily by Mr. Skidmore. Though Quadros only governed seven months, his election victory in 1960 meant so much to the average Brazilian that his criminal flight from the responsibilities of the Executive Office killed the voters' self-confidence in democratic government. If there is any villain in Brazilian politics from 1930 to 1964 it is Jânio Quadros. And he was not forced out of office by the military. The problem of governing the nation from the isolation of Brasília is clearly brought out.

Mr. Skidmore feels that Goulart's overthrow brought an end to democratic politics. But Brazilian politicians, military and civilian, are very pragmatic. There is always a political bargain to be reached, a compromise to be worked out which covers an amazingly broad spectrum of the population. The book should enlighten many as to the murky course of Brazilian affairs. There is an excellent and comprehensive bibliography.

Professor E. Bradford Burns has brought together nine penetrating essays on Brazilian historiography that will give the North American reader an opportunity to sample the breath, subtlety, and incredible diversity of Brazil's past.

Although each author focuses on a different aspect of Brazil's historical past there seems to be an almost overly self-conscious probing and analysis in an attempt to bring some form and special meaning into the events of the past four hundred years. The various essays also give the impression that one is being let in on a family quarrel concerning how the nation's history should be written. Some sound like a Brazilian version of the Beard-Parrington-Brown type of polemic. The criteria used by editor Burns for the selection of the essays were based on whether they probed Brazil's past, provided wider perspective. served as critical selective guides to the historical literature, and provided some discussion of the major problems posed by the study of the evolution of Brazil, A big order,

With the exception of Karl Friedrich Philipp von Martius and Bradford Burns, all the contributors are Brazilians. The best are those by José Honório Rodrigues who contributed "The Periodization of Brazilian History," "Problems in Brazilian History and Historiography," and "Capistrano de Abreu and Brazilian Historiography." Caio Prado Junior discusses the Second Empire of Dom Pedro II. 1841 to 1889 while Sérgio Buarque de Holanda deftly handles historical thought in twentieth century Brazil. Books on Brazil's recent past according to Buarque de Holanda have simultaneously clarified and distorted facts by characterizing them in a particularly nationalistic manner. To this the author of this review can add a hearty amen. There are also articles by Pedro Moacyre Campos, Oiliam José, and a famous critique of Francisco Adolfo de Varnhagen by Capistrano de Abreu. The interesting quarrel concerning the status of Varnhagen (1816-1878), who is considered the father of Brazilian historiography because of his História Geral published in the years 1854 to 1857 is well aired. Nearly every essayist takes a position on Varnhagen, either to damn the man, praise him or do both. The major charges brought against historian Varnhagen are that he standardized the nation's past, demolished its distinctive features, and in the resulting history the Brazilian colors faded.

In contrast, Capistrano de Abreu, (1854-1927), acknowledged as Brazil's best historian as the result of his Os Capitulos de História Colonial (1500-1800) which appeared in 1907 is considered the "most perfect synthesis ever achieved in Brazilian historiography." An earlier work Os Caminhos Antiguas e o Povoamento do Brasil published in 1889 defined the major themes of the colonial period. Abreu insisted that only by a study of Brazil's backlands and the trails that led into it could one really understand the nation's past. The impact of this book on Brazilian historiography is what Frederick Jackson Turner's frontier thesis was for American historiography.—Jordan M. Young, Pace College.

The Brazilian Revolution of 1930 and the Aftermath. By Jordan M. Young. (New Brunswick: Rutgers University Press, 1967. Pp. xi, 156. \$6.00.)

Students of Brazil will inevitably compare Young's book with Thomas Skidmore's more intensive study covering the same period and published about the same time. The two are complementary in the sense that Young concentrates on the Vargas period and especially the events leading to the 1930 revolution itself, while Skidmore's main emphasis is on the post-Vargas period. Young's discussion of the "revolution" is more skillfully done that that of the "aftermath."

The account is predominantly factual and while much of it is based on secondary sources, a rich increment was obtained from interviews with such key figures as Osvaldo Aranha and General Gões Monteiro among others. Vargas himself invited the author for an interview in 1950, but the U.S. Department of State unfortunately succeeded in convincing the author not to accept.

Despite the author's cautious interpretations, the brevity of the study inevitably magnifies interpretation through the selection of subjects for comment. The book is optimistic with reference to Brazil's prospects for democratic political development, though somewhat unconvincingly. Considerable emphasis is given to political party activity which is a poor indicator of interest aggregation in Brazil, even during the periods of relatively free party activity.

Vargas' strategies in dealing with elements to the left and with the military and economic elites are carefully described. The implications of these moves are left to the reader's imagination. and properly so in view of the plethora of unanswered questions. It might have been useful, however, to pose such questions as why Vargas felt he could (or had to) neutralize the military by encouraging the left (e.g., the release of Prestes from prison in 1945); why Vargas feared elections while cultivating a mass political base and decisively proving his electoral appeal in 1950; why Vargas did not choose to continue to rely on his apparently secure military base and his close relationship with Gões Monteiro? These continue to be some of the tough questions.

Young's book is a fine contribution to the burgeoning literature in English on Brazil. One can raise some questions of emphasis or omission, however, which seem important to this reviewer. Why was there no mention of the role of Vargas in the formation of the PSD and PTB parties? Why was administrative chaos stressed during the Goulart regime when it may be argued that administrative continuity was the only thing that held the country together (in another sense administrative chaos has been endemic since the monarchy)? Goulart's forte was political chaos. Why was the breaking of the hold of São Paulo on Brazilian politics a good thing for the country in view of the alternatives?

Finally, the dominance of executive government in Brazil may be more apparent than real. Brazilian presidents have spent considerable effort in simply assembling the power to govern. It may be a defect of this and most other books on Brazilian politics that there is no discussion of bureaucratic power and the hiatus between president and bureaucracy. The manifest political action of the military has obscured the less decisive but perhaps more continuous power exercised by the civilian bureaucracy, especially since the growth of new state activities which began in the

Vargas era.—Robert T. Daland, University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill.

Boston University Papers on Africa, Transition in African Politics. Ed. by Jeffrey Butler and A. A. Castagno. (Praeger Special Studies in International Politics and Public Affairs, Frederick A. Praeger, New York: 1967. Pp. ix, 342. \$15.00.)

This edited volume consists of twelve papers delivered at a Boston University Seminar on African Politics in the years 1963-1965. In their brief introduction to the work, the editors note that a persistent problem with edited studies is the "time lapse between presentation of the manuscripts and publication," but they argue that the

value of such volumes exists not so much in whether they keep us informed of the most recent events but whether they add to our understanding of political phenomena in Africa.

And, judged by the intuitively more difficult (but empirically, more vague) standard of "adding to our understanding," the majority of the papers in the book achieve considerable and significant success.

Victor C. Ferkiss, in a "Prolegomenon" to "Religion and Politics in Independent African States," has taken the very necessary and useful first step of viewing religious affiliation as "an important variable in the African political process." Frequently the African studies community has tended to dismiss externally imposed and supported religions as vestiges of the colonial period, while at the same time admitting that religious groups have an extraordinary degree of control over educational policies in many parts of independent Africa. Ferkiss reasons forcefully that the origins of religious affiliation are not as important as the behavioral consequences of that affiliation, and that it would be a major error to regard a Christian affiliation as a recent acquisition of little import. At the conclusion of his paper he presents in table form what scant data exists on religious affiliations in independent African states and offers a series of headings for future research.

Dorothy Nelkin's "Pan-African Trade-Union Organization" is the only other paper of the twelve with a continent-wide focus, as the remaining contributions deal with events and issues in individual states. Of these articles, five concentrate on the East African states of Uganda, Kenya and Tanzania. William H. Friedland, for example, offers a valuable and detailed case study of relations between the Tanzanian nationalist party and the trade union movement before and after independence in his "Cooperation, Conflict and Conscription: TANU-TFL Relations,

1955-1964." Friedland's description of Tanzanian events could serve as a model of how African trade unions in the more mobilized independent states lost their freedom of independent action and decision. Friedland relates the cautious alliance between party and union in the pre-independence period, notes the borrowing and further politicization of the more astute union leaders by the party, and discusses the eventual breakdown of rapport in the independence period and the inevitable "conscription" of the union organization to Governmental demands. Friedland neatly summarizes the entirety of the issue by concluding that the

TFL (Tanganyika Federation of Labor) was seen to represent the special interests of a minority of the population seeking to extract maximum concessions for its members at the cost of economic development of the nation.

Of special interest to the student of Tanzanian events is Friedland's discussion of the unions' role in the abortive mutiny of January, 1964. The central Government recovered rapidly after an initial and almost total collapse, and utilized the crisis period to jail close to 200 union leaders, though their role in the essentially military uprising was questionable. Though Tanzania has experienced significant labor problems since that date, the detention of the experienced and vocal union leadership effectively ended the trade union movement as an independent and competitive force in Tanzanian political affairs.

Harvey Glickman's contribution, "Dilemmas of Political Theory in an African Context: The Ideology of Julius Nyerere," is a balanced and practical assessment of the political thought of the Tanzanian President that avoids what Ali Mazrui has recently termed as "Tanzaphilia"an effusive and perhaps excessive admiration for any or all pronouncements of the admittedlyintellectually attractive Nyerere. Further, Glickman is sufficiently wise so as to avoid a characterization of Nyerere as either a complete product of his situation, or as its ultimate producer, and by so doing, he profitably ignores a lengthy discourse on the essential meaning of ideology. Glickman asserts that Nyerere's view of the past and his hope for the future is based on a "solidaristic" conception of society; i.e., Nyerere views African society as both communal and egalitarian. It may not be useful to coin a new term to cover a series of phenomena which (as Glickman notes) Nyerere himself describes as "socialism," especially in light of events in Tanzania since February, 1967, but this is not a major point. What matters is that Glickman has constructed a lucid arrangement and interpretation of the most important statements of Julius Nyerere, and-with skillful simplicity-has placed these statements in the total Tanzanian and African

pclitical context. In combination with the recently published edition of Nyerere's major writings and speeches, Glickman's piece will undoubtedly become required reading in the political thought sections of African politics' seminars.

Joseph S. Nye, Jr. has contributed a most interesting chapter on an insufficiently studied subject in his "TANU and UPC: The Impact of Independence on Two African Nationalist Parties." Nye begins by giving brief, but fairly complete and very useful outlines of the past and present organizations of both the Tanzanian and the Ugandan parties, and notes that independence led TANU to concern itself with a maintenance of a strong position, while Ugandan independence led the UPC to attempt to improve a rather tenuous position. Nye's conclusions are cautious and non-predictive for he admits that many uninvestigated variables are involved, as well as brevity of time elapsed since independence, and these two factors make for an imperfect assessment of the impact of independence on the organization of the two movements. Nve concludes:

... the difference in the impact of independence on the two parties is attributable to the importance of the old colonial government machinery in a condition of scarcity of skilled administrators. In Tanganyika, the government competed with a bureaucratized party for this scarce resource and in doing so weakened the party; in Uganda the government served as a substitute for a non-bureaucratized party and in building up this scarce resource, strengthened the party.

Other contributors to this volume include Arnold Zack, Leslie Rubin, Robert H. Edwardswhose "Political and Constitutional Change in the Bechuanaland Protectorate" provides some very necessary background information on the young nation of Botswana,-George Jenkins, Terrence K. Hopkins, Donald Rothchild and Lucy Behrman. Though the editors have anticipated the standard criticisms of edited volumesthat some papers are out of date and that the contributions are of "uneven quality"—this compilation, as all others, is subject to the same statements. Given these shortcomings, the work as a tenuous whole emerges a cut well above the average, and both the instructor and the researcher will find much of the volume of both interest and utility. FRED G. BURKE AND JOHN R. Nellis, Syracuse University.

Patterns of African Development. Ed. By Herbert J. Spiro. (Englewood Cliffs, New Jersey: Prentice-Hall, Inc., 1967. Pp. 144. \$4.95.)

This book, a collection of essays delivered at the 1965 African Studies Association meeting, illustrates several trends characterizing the study of nations. First is the focus on "development." With their diverse, often conflicting interpretations of development, these five essays reflect the current ambiguous status of this concept. Drawing upon his rich knowledge of constitutional history, Carl Friedrich focuses on development as a legal process. Ibrahim Abu-Lughod and Ali Mazrui consider the cultural, i.e., ideological, aspects of national development. Influenced by the ideas of Samuel Huntington, Claude Welch views modernization as the development of political institutions. In a concluding essay, Herbert Spiro contends that Africa is now experiencing the "development of politics," the meaning of which he never makes fully clear.

A second trend revolves around the attempt to discover empirical similarities in the political development of all nations. These essays do not reveal a geographic provincialism. Rather, the authors seek to understand Africa in light of the political development of other parts of the world, namely, Western Europe, Japan, the rest of Asia, the United States, and the Soviet Union. Thus, a truly comparative perspective emerges in this book. Most of the authors stress the differences between nationalism in sub-Saharan Africa and in the other developing areas. R. P. Dore has previously compared Japan with Latin America. Here Welch makes a similar comparison between Japan and Africa. Again, in terms of prospects for modernization, Japan emerges as a rather atypical state. Likewise, Friedrich does not feel optimistic about the possibilities of constitutional rule taking quick root in the new African nations. Both he and Welch emphasize the special difficulties, particularly the lack of national unity, faced by most African countries. In contrast to Welch and Friedrich, Abu-Lughod voices a more positive view of African nationalism. It differs from its Asian counterpart in the quality and ideological stance of its leadership, its greater receptivity to continental organizations, and its more secular outlook. Whereas the other four authors stress the unique attributes of African nationalism, Ali Mazrui, an African himself, tends to focus on the similarities between developments in the Soviet Union and in Ghana under its former president, Kwame Nkrumah.

Third, a number of political scientists have pointed out the attempts of nationalist politicians in Africa and Asia to synthesize values dominant in Europe and the United States with values unique to their indigenous culture. Although all these essays explore the tension between "repetition" and "innovation," Ali Mazrui's discussion of "borrowed theory and original practice in African politics" most explicitly deals with this theme. Actually, rather than considering politics throughout the continent, Mazrui concentrates on four English-speaking states, Ghana, Nigeria, Kenya, and Tanzania. His most provocative remarks, which have already stimulated con-

siderable discussion among African intellectuals in East Africa, concern his interpretation of President Nkrumah as a "Leninist Czar." Ironically, while the other four authors see Africa in African terms, it remains for an African to perceive Nkrumah in light of European developments. In this respect, Mazrui tends to exaggerate the effects of non-Africans on Africans and Africans on non-Africans but to minimize the effects of Africans on Africans. Is it really true to claim, as does Mazrui, that "Nkrumaism" (misspelled in the text as "Nkrumahism") was the "most important school of African Leninist thought?" Although Nkrumah, like Lenin, did stress the importance of organization, so did American party politicians in the late nineteenth century. After all, the emphasis on organization during the last century has characterized the writings of many theorists and political actors, ranging from Saint-Simon to Karl Mannheim. Moreover, it seems rather far-fetched to argue, as does Mazrui, that Nkrumah held greater significance for militant Afro-Americans than for Africans themselves.

The essays in this collection possess a coherence not usually found in volumes of this type. The authors write clearly. Their scholarship extends beyond Africa to encompass other parts of the world. By placing African events in a truly comparative context, these authors have successfully fulfilled the tasks posed for general studies of the developing areas. They have added to our knowledge of the developmental process, examined the empirical similarities, as well as differences, between Africa's development and development in other regions, and clarified the nature of the ideological synthesis. From this perspective, the book has relevance not merely for Africanists but also for those interested in the new nations generally.-Charles F. Andrain, San Diego State College.

The Myth of Mau Mau: Nationalism in Kenya. By Carl H. Rosberg, Jr. and John Notting-Ham. (New York: Frederick A. Praeger, 1966. Pp. xviii, 427. \$7.50.)

Rosberg and Nottingham's well-written study of "nationalism" in preindependent Kenya fills an important gap in the literature on African political development—although perhaps a different gap than expected. The Myth of Mau Mau is an excellent political history. The authors draw from diverse primary sources as they trace chronologically "the development of African politics in Kenya" (p. vii). The major themes emphasized are the difficulty of bringing and holding together a disciplined country-wide political organization and the problem of articulating a common nationalist ideology in a situa-

tion in which the colonial goal was a multi-racial state and in which from the outset there were among Africans themselves diverse interests and centrifugal tendencies. These tendencies were manifest as early as the 1920s in conflicts between urban (Nairobi) and rural organizations and between "moderate" and "militant" leaders.

The focus is upon two different, but nonetheless inseparable, issues: Kikuyu "nationalism" and Kenyan "nationalism." The authors seek to explain and analyze the former and, as their title suggests, to refute the myth "that 'Mau Mau' was an atavistic flight from reason and the processes of modernization" (p. 320). It is demonstrated how, even more so than other tribes, the Kikuyu, given their geographical position and their grievances over land, encountered problems in asserting themselves. The authors' key question, "Did what occurred in central Kenyaculminating in violence in the early 1950s-constitute nationalism?" (p. 351), is answered affirmatively. It is only regretted that Kenyatta's role vis-à-vis "Mau Mau" is not discussed at greater length, for this remains a highly controverted issue about which there has been intense speculation but little scholarly work.

In developing their main argument, the authors necessarily are led to a more extensive study of a second issue, Kenyan "nationalism." Significantly, only the subtitle, "Nationalism in Kenya" uses the term. Proper stress is given here to the "parochial and fragmented character of African politics" and to the "differential African political response to European domination" (p. 71). The authors recognize the acute problem of distinguishing between Kikuyu nationalism and a wider sense of nationalism within Kenya. The former, with its "issues, slogans, songs, symbols, and values . . . had limited meaning elsewhere" (p. 220). Other tribal "nationalisms" were compatible and complementary with Kikuyu nationalism insofar as their objectives centered on the demand for African rule and, with it, security of land. But in many instances Kenyan nationalism remained disorganized and devoid of a common unifying purpose. Indeed, in present-day Kenya "the complex problems and issues of national integration will long endure" (p. 354).

The authors, correctly, refrain from rewriting Kenya's history to suggest the inevitability of the emergence of a dominant or single party, whether or not led by the Kikuyu. They integrate into their text an unusually broad coverage of relevant material and their treatment is not superficial. However, at times the breadth compromises the depth of their argumentation. There is mention of such groups as veterans, labor unions and urban tribal associations but their respective causal and organizational relationships with

Kenya's "nationalisms" remain unexamined. The absence of tables and statistics regarding economic development, employment and education needs to be noted for they would have provided data not only on the commonplace European/African disparities but also on less obvious differences between and within tribal groups. More regrettable is the omission of a chapter on developments after the end of the Emergency. This might have tied together more explicitly the similarities and contradictions of Kikuyu and Kenya nationalism at this critical juncture in Kenya's history.

Rosberg and Nottingham, no doubt consciously, employ no theoretical or systematic framework for their analysis. They do not construct, apply, or prove any particular theorybarring the alternative explanation of "Mau Mau." Nor do they indicate possible qualifications to contemporary theory or suggest avenues for further research. Nonetheless, they utilize easily a number of relevant terms from the more theoretical works on nation-building. An understanding of nationalism is crucial for their purpose; they discuss its many varied aspects-African, colonial, constitutional, territorial, cultural and militant. But they do so without special rigor. They adopt "the concept of nationalism not so much as a conceptual tool but as a means of describing common processes of political and social mobilization and the search for power and dignity by Africans" (p. 349). Only in the conclusion is the concept carefully and cogently summarized with Kikuyu and Kenya experiences as points of reference.

In sum, the book provides an excellent description and analysis of the history and politics of Kikuyu nationalism including its special manifestation in "Mau Mau." It also provides a good introduction into the intricacies of nationalism in Kenya. It should not be regarded as the definitive text on Kenya. Rather, and to its credit, it should serve to encourage and to complement additional studies focusing more narrowly on specific features of Kenya's politics which it summarizes.—David H. Johns, San Diego State College.

The Kremlin's Human Dilemma: Russia After Half a Century of Revolution. By MAURICE EINDUS. (New York: Doubleday & Company, 1967. Pp. x, 395. \$5.95.)

Speculation on the Soviet political future occasioned by Khrushchev's fall has centered on two main alternatives: overthrow of one-Party rule, or its liberalization and adaptation (see, e.g., Problems of Communism for 1966/1967). Seeking answers, many participants have combed the Soviet press; in particular, however, the political theorists have looked to their models and ideal types, kremlinologists to their charts and files, and reporters either to "authoritative sources" or to the Soviet people themselves.

One of the best of these human interest reporters is Maurice Hindus, a veritable contemporary chronicler of Soviet life writing with undiminished verve since 1923. His latest book, The Kremlin's Human Dilemma, records impressions he gathered during his three visits in 1962, 1963 and 1965, before and after Brezhnev's and Kosvgin's takeover from Khrushchev. I myself have visited the Soviet Union five times since 1955, living twice for months at a stretch in a Soviet University. And I must say that the story Hindus builds out of conversations with people of many occupations and nationalities, anecdotes, interviews and the Soviet press reports rings as true and is as solidly backed as any accounts I have read. Certainly, one might take exception with a minor generalization or two, such as the sweeping statement that Soviet youth as a whole are indifferent to religion. Generally, however, the book is to be highly recommended, for general reader and political scientist alike, as an excellent introduction to the Soviet scene.

The "Kremlin's human dilemma" amounts to this: the rulers in the Kremlin have pushed modernization to the point of incompatibility with their outmoded dogmas and controls. They face a choice, either to retain the latter and see crucial growth plans remain unfulfilled, or to liberalize further at the expense of the role of the Party. which is supposed to be "enhanced" as modernization moves the USSR towards "communism." "You must remember," a noted psychiatrist and old friend told Hindus, "that the age of Stalin was an age of brawn: man was simply a tool of production and only his muscle counted. But the post-Stalin age . . . opened up the age of the mind: self-annulment gave way to selfawareness, and the citizen again began to feel like an individual" (p. vii).

This "citizen" is many kinds of people in Hindus's account: town dwellers (Part I), villagers (Part II) and a variety of religious believers, youth, national minorities, intellectuals who in a variety of ways deviate from the Party's ideal of the "new Soviet man" unquestioningly accepting the Party's moral and social authority (Part III). A taxi driver sounds off on the high cost of living (meat once a week for his family) and tells about the stormy meeting on poetry where his student son and friends participated in an undaunted defense of their non-conformist poet hero against charges of "hooliganism." "Two on a Seesaw" and the twist are allowed in Krasnodar in 1963 even while, in contrast, the political screws are tightened on farms of the surrounding, once fertile Kuban—with disastrous results. Nearby, in Rostov, a young man pours out to Hindus his version of the bloody suppression of a demonstration in Novocherkassk the previous year against the price increases for meat and butter. Suddenly before Hindus's eyes a burly KGB agent attired as a waiter, evidently in league with another police agent watching from a side room, yanks the young informant bodily from his chair and hauls him away to an unknown fate.

Despite the tangible improvements in village and city conditions after Khrushchev's forced retirement. Hindus sees only half measures of reform and a persistent dilemma. For example, in the richly documented and best part of his book. "The Village," ex-farm boy Hindus concludes that the impressively improved post-Khrushchevian new dispensation for the farmer will be a mere palliative unless it allows the peasant greater participation in running his own life. But the dilemma is not only a functional one; it is also pyschological. The Soviet regime boasts that: "Thanks to the enormous educating efforts of the Party, a new man has grown up in our country, a conscious active builder of communism, a convinced collectivist, with a completely new communist psychology" (p. 353). Hindus shows how some of these "enormous educating efforts" are counter-productive or ineffectual. Baptist communities keep on growing. Attempts at forced assimilation of the Jews only increases the Jewishconsciousness of youth despite their general atheism. The reading public cannot be forced to like the works of Party-line hacks. The modernization that Soviet power has brought to national minorities "has in fact accentuated awareness of their own nationality" (pp. 284-285), expecially in the Baltic and Transcaucasian areas.

Some chapters in the book, e.g., the one on sex, fall short of others in immediacy and depth. And although Hindus makes a prediction only with great trepidation, it is questionable in the form he puts it. "Sooner or later a new palace revolution (such as that upsetting Malenkov in 1955 and Khruschchev in 1964], with or without blood, will bring to power a young and sophisticated leadership that will initiate a reformation along the lines of Yugoslavia's socialism, without of course a return to private landholding" (p. 382), which Yugoslavia allowed in 1953 and Poland in 1956. The advent of "a young and sophisticated leadership" is entirely possible—some day. But why, if the Party is still strong enough to prevent a return to private farming, should it allow as sweeping a decentralization as in Yugoslavia? There are other reasons why the Soviets may not simply follow the Yugoslavs. Yugoslavia's Westernized national minorities are much stronger numerically, politically and economically compared with the relatively conservative Serbians than are Balts, Georgians, etc., compared with the relatively conservative Russians in the ruling Soviet apparatus. The Yugoslav League of Communists is a truly federalized party, the Communist Party of the Soviet Union is unitary. Yugoslavia has long been less isolated from the West and, conversely, only recently unified, compared with the Soviet Union, which is territorially close to the old Tsarist Russian empire. "It is always precarious to predict the course of future events in the Soviet Union," says Hindus (p. 382). And it is no less precarious to travel around reporting them. But at that Hindus has few equals .-PETER JUVILER, Barnard College.

Soviet Policy-Making: Studies of Communism in Transition. Ed. by Peter H. Juviler and Henry W. Morton. (New York: Praeger, 1967. Pp. xiv, 274.)

Variety adds spice not only to life but to reading as well. This varied collection of essays and case studies examines contemporary developments in Soviet policy in diverse spheres from politics and economics, to science, literature, and even family legislation. While the editors quite rightly emphasize that the Soviet system remains "indubitably a one-party political monopoly," the collection is designed to illuminate the new and ever-more complex problems facing Soviet policy-makers in every area of the differentiated industrial society that is emerging from the Stalin era. No longer can the Soviet rulers rely on the terror, crude propagandizing, and roughshod methods of primitive Stalinism. By trial and error and rude experience they have had to develop more refined and sophisticated means to achieve their purposes. With the passing of the terror, the professional and intellectual groupings who staff the Soviet state and society have begun to find their voice. Increasingly, the party leadership has had to refer to them for advice, reckon with their arguments, and attend to their debates in its own policy deliberations. Indeed, a not inconsequential factor in Khrushchev's downfall was his blunt and persistent disregard of the "experts" and the "professionals" in such areas as military affairs and agriculture.

However, with the exception of the ideologically sensitive area of literature, these opinion groups still operate within relatively narrow spheres of expertise and know-how. They do not yet represent a genuine movement toward political pluralism in Soviet society. Nonetheless, this development has had a significant political impact on the *modus operandi* of the party dictatorship. Occasionally, these groups have even come close to exercising a restraining, if not a

veto, power over the actions of the party leadership. One remarkable recent example, noted by the editors, was the petition to the party signed by twenty-five leading scientists and artists opposing moves to rehabilitate Stalin on the eve of the 23d party congress last year. It evidently had an inhibiting effect. In brief, the party leadership has had to take as well as give in the policy-making process. It is this board development that the collection of essays investigates in detail from various vantage points. While the editors wisely warn against ruling out the possibility that a leader or faction could win power and severely curb this development, the variegated evidence presented in the articles bears out the editors' view that the model of a totalitarian monolith derived from the experience of Stalinism "no longer fits comfortably."

While a principal interest of the editors is policy-making in the context of the Soviet system as a whole, they are fully aware of the key importance of factional politics at the apex of the party hierarchy and its influence on the course of policy in every part of the system. Two articles by Henry Morton and Robert Slusser focus on the political leadership and appropriately begin and conclude the collection. Morton's opening essay provides a balanced examination of Soviet leadership and policy-making in broad terms. Especially useful are the comparisons he draws between decision-making in the Soviet and other major political leaderships. Here he points to similarities that are often overlooked as well as to the distinguishing characteristics. Slusser's study supplements Morton's by providing a wealth of concrete detail in an interpretive reconstruction of the leadership politics of the Khrushchev years. He traces the tortuous course of Soviet foreign policy during this period and seeks to uncover the factional tensions and conflicts which impinged on Khrushchev's leadership and were involved in this overthrow.

Marshall Goldman contributes an excellent article on economic policy and presents one of the clearest analyses of the Lieberman movement and its significance that I have seen. The article is especially valuable in view of the misconceptions concerning Libermanism which have widely circulated in the West.

Peter Viereck's article on the party's deep troubles with the writers is perhaps the most penetrating and thought provoking in the collection. The conflict in this sphere has been one of the most dramatic and portentous for the long-term future of Russia. However, Viereck tends to overlook one important point regarding Khrushchev's "pendulum" policy toward the writers. In his last years he promoted "thaw" when he was on the political offensive and "freeze" only

when he was forced to take the defensive. A companion article by Maurice Friedberg shows how a kind of Libermanism in Soviet book publishing since 1956 has produced an unprecedented inflow of modern Western literature into the USSR. The Soviet publishers' increasing use of the "best-seller" criterion in publishing has seriously hampered the regime's effort to keep reading matter available to the public ideologically pure, to the obvious dismay of the ideologues.

The party's changing relationship with the community of scientists is illustrated in Loren Graham's revealing account of the debate in the late 'fifties and early 'sixties over reorganizing the Soviet Academy of Sciences. Graham shows how Khrushchev, despite his practical bent, opened the way in 1959 to giving the lead to the "pure" scientists rather than to the "applied" scientists in the Academy of Sciences—a departure from past policy involving adjustments in Marxist-Leninist doctrine and a recognition of the relative autonomy of science.

The two remaining essays cover aspects of social policy. Marianne Armstrong traces the "anti-parasite" campaign initiated by Khrushchev and shows how pressures from the legal community largely succeeded in assimilating, if not liquidating, this extra-judicial method of social control into the established structure of legal administration. The other editor of the collection, Peter H. Juviler contributes a useful and scholarly study of changing family policy since Stalin. Here again the study reveals the influential role played by the experts and their debates on policy. Family policy under Lenin and Stalin have received attention from scholars but developments since Stalin have suffered neglect. The Juviler study helps provide the missing pieces.

The very diversity of the writing styles and subject matters of the collection may be a bit jarring to some readers, but the editors help mitigate any such effect through their prefatory essays. These provide the collection with a unifying thread and also are up-to-date and informative. In sum, the collection is a useful and timely contribution to the deepening and broadening of our knowledge of contemporary trends in the Soviet political system.—Carl A. Linden, St. John's College.

Eastern Europe in Transition. Ed. By Kurr London. (Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins Press, 1966. Pp. 364. \$7.50.)

Eastern European Government and Politics. By Vaclav Benes, Andrew Gyorgy, George Stambuk. (New York: Harper & Row Publishers, 1966. Pp. 247. \$2.50.)

Fortunately for the study of both comparative politics and Eastern Europe, social science literature focusing on Eastern Europe has increased dramatically in the past two years. The two books under review are indicative of that expansion.

There is little evidence that the major analytical problems confronting scholarship which focuses on fragmented political communities, undergoing political and social change, under the rubric of communism have been adequately confronted. Both of the studies under review would be considered "comparative" in subject matter. In reality, the first consists of a series of topical discussions, most of which are distinct contributions; the second consists of country by country surveys of the recent political history of Poland (Vaclav Benes), Czechoslovakia (Vaclav Benes), East Germany (Andrew Gyorgy), Hungary (Vaclav Benes), Yugoslavia (George Stambuk) and Rumania (Stephen Fischer-Galati). These country studies are introduced by a general essay placing "Eastern Europe in Historic Perspective" (Andrew Gyorgy).

Eastern Europe in Transition contains a series of papers delivered at the Fifth International Conference on World Politics, September 13-19, 1965, at Noordwijk, The Netherlands: Although the conference included thirty-three participants from North America, Europe, and Asia and a number of observers, no scholars from Eastern Europe were invited. The editor explains the absence of such participants by stating that "visitors from the 'socialist camp' could only have dispensed their party lines, which would have had no value for the conferees and might indeed have inhibited or even stymied the discussions" (p. x). This statement not only dramatizes the absence in this collection of essays of any analysis of the intellectual and cultural discourses, debates, and conflicts which are certainly a part of "transition" in Eastern Europe, but it also prejudges the situation to the detriment of both the conference and its publication. Certainly the experiences of scholars who have participated with Eastern European scholars in more open international meetings have had significant consequences including even joint research.

The essays in Eastern Europe in Transition include sweeping discussions of major social phenomena (nationalism, Andrew Gyorgy; polycentrism and splittism, Kurt London), case studies (East German, June 16-17, 1953, Wolfgang K. Kraus; the erosion of reformism in Poland, Adam Bromke; the Rumanian national deviation R.V. Burks; the East German economy, Karl G. Thalheim) topical studies related to the area (economic nationalism, John Michael, Montias; the Warsaw Pact, Thomas W. Wolfe; national minorities, George A. Schiopflin) and international relations (bilateral relationships between the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe, Boris Meissner;

Rumania and the Sino-Soviet conflict, Stepher Fischer-Galati; Eastern Europe and Asian communist countries, Ernst Kux; Eastern Europe and the West, Klaus Mehnert and Pierre Hassner) Each of these essays contributes to our knowledge but as in any collection of essays the weight of the contributions varies.

In this collection it is difficult to find threads which lead to cumulative knowledge about the cause or process of transition in Eastern Europe. Nowhere is there really a discussion of the character of transition or the transition process. The absence of integration points out the need for systematic analysis of transition in communist states. In this regard the essay by R. V. Burks should be signaled out for emphasis. Professor Burks in a remarkably candid essay raises the question of why Western regimes and Western experts were unable to see that Rumania was developing policies independent of the Soviet Union. Signals of the tension between Rumania and the Soviet Union were discernible as early as 1958, but not really recognized until the plenum of the Rumania Central Committee in March, 1963. Professor Burks suggests that the experts have been misguided because they have tended to "approach communism from an international standpoint, as a faith which absorbs and transforms particularisms" rather than studying as well, "how parochial groups seize upon the communist view of the universal because it is useful to them in their immediate situations" (p. 111).

We certainly need understandings and explanations of the universalistic and particularistic relationships of ideologically and internationally oriented political forces to power related and parochial forces. Certainly one concept that must be explored in this agenda is nationalism. Nationalism is a topic of discussion in one essay in Eastern Europe in Transition written by Andrew Gyorgy as well as a constant referent in Eastern European Government and Politics. But nationalism is useful when its conceptual characteristics are spelled out with care and when empirical components are related to these conceptual characteristics and to the event or series of events under discussion. This requires among other things rigorous discussion of the structural and behavioral relationships that compose nationalism as well as the norms and values which reinforce nations or cause them to disintegrate. Although the term is used throughout these studies it is never developed with conceptual clarity. It becomes a diffuse and inprecise rubric to reinforce what are essentially judgments about the course of Eastern European politics.

The judgmental rather than the analytical runs through Eastern European Government Politics. Characteristics of various types including emo-

tions are attributed to leaders, regimes, and groups with a modicum of documentation and without empirical references. The book is designed as a text to introduce students to East Europe, but most students will feel the absence of conceptualization and hard information. Still it is a welcome volume as it reflects a concern that comparative politics include Eastern Europe, a part of the world that is generally excluded from traditional "comparative" texts. The reader will find that Eastern Europe in Transition despite its lack of integration will provide him more information and analysis, provided that the topics covered in the study are topics in which he is interested.— Carl Beck, University of Pittsburgh.

Soviet and East European Agriculture. Ed. By Jerzy F. Karcz. (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1967. Pp. xxv, 445. \$10.00.)

The present reviewer is particularly subject to the charge of being unobjective because he is a contributor to the present volume and because it is the third of three volumes on Soviet and Eastern European Agriculture, that started with the first Conference on Soviet Agricultural and Peasant Affairs, which was held at the University of Kansas in 1962 and founded by the reviewer. Admitting the prejudices, I am most pleased by the wav Professor Karcz has carried the work ahead. True, the book may well be charged with exhibiting some of the weaknesses that arise from an attempt to collect under one cover the contributions of many authors, presenting analyses from the point of view of several disciplines. Yet, here is surely the major strength of these volumes, and particularly the one edited by Professor Karcz which is a collection of the papers presented at the August 1965 conference at the University of California, Santa Barbara. Surely, few would disagree with the assertion that no other collection of research papers in the field of Soviet studies includes such a high percentage of authorities recognized as being leaders in a particular area of Soviet affairs. Indeed, in this volume can be found the valedictory work of two of the great pioneers in the field of Soviet Agricultural studies, Lazar Volin and Naum Jasny.

Dr. Volin's and Dr. Jasny's contributions, like several others, deal with the economic problems of agriculture in the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe, but in the volume also can be found contributions by anthropologists, geographers, historians, and political scientists as well as agricultural scientists. Here is original research on several aspects of Soviet agriculture ranging from problems of farm employment to the importance of the corn program and the role of women in the countryside. Moreover, highly informative papers also are included on Yugoslavian, Czechoslo-

vakian, and Polish agriculture. True, some of the essays are more readable than others and some are more informative than others. Nevertheless, every one of the papers must be regarded as a worthy contribution to the growing literature on that most important of the domestic problems of the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe, agriculture.

The 1966 harvest in the Soviet Union produced a bumper crop of grain. Reflecting this success, recent reports from Moscow indicate a new optimism among the Soviet leaders that the greatly increased investment program in agriculture has at long last provided the solution to the agricultural problem. As recorded in this volume, specialists in Soviet agriculture and peasant affairs have long been in agreement that significant new levels of investment in the countryside have been absolutely necessary if the serious problems of agriculture were to be alleviated. Nevertheless, as important as the problem of investments has been, a careful reader of this volume will discover the shortcomings of Soviet and Eastern European agriculture have not been economic alone. Indeed, evidence offered by several of the contributors leaves the impression that in spite of new capital inputs, political and social factors are destined to block any forseeable solution to the problems of Soviet and Eastern European agricultural problems that would be regarded as satisfactory. Those who would understand the recent history of the Soviet Union, or hope to probe for future trends, will need the material presented in this volume.—Roy D. LAIRD, Lawrence, Kansas.

Soviet Mongolia. A Study of the Oldest Political Satellite. By George G. S. Murphy. (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1966. Pp. ix, 224. \$5.95.)

Any scholarly work on the modern political history of Mongolia faces two serious difficulties. The first lies in the problem of proper documentation; the second involves the intelligent evaluation of the available information.

On the former count, Professor Murphy acquits himself well enough. He has dug diligently and gives evidence of having consulted most of the standard sources, as well as some of the more exotic bibliographical items which in the past have not been fully utilized. Even so, there are some strange gaps. For example, one looks in vain for any citation of the volume entitled Revolyutsionnye meropriyatiya narodnogo pravitelstva, Mongolii v 1921-1924gg., compiled by Ts. Nasanbalzhir, edited by Ts. Puntsagnorov, Izd. vostochnoi literatury, Moscow, 1960, 211 pp., an indispensable collection of primary materials on the early years of the regime. The author has tried to piece together the contents of many of the laws and decrees promulgated during that crucial period from scattered references in Soviet literature, when the complete text of nearly all these measures is included in a single handy paperback edition.

As an interpretative analysis of the local political scene, however, the present study is a failure. The author's thesis is simple: everything that has transpired in this corner of the globe since 1921 was planned and supervised by Moscow, hence the very title, Soviet Mongolia. Proving it is another matter, of course, and although Professor Murphy tries mightily, he does not succeed. What he does manage to do is to picture the events throughout in the worst possible light for the Soviets and their Mongol allies, to indulge in fanciful speculation concerning the opposite side's motives and objectives (intentions are freely attributed—"they must have . . . ," "they ought to have . . . "-normally to get around embarrassing data), and to juggle the facts to fit his preconcep-

Indeed, some of the tactics used literally to "score points off" the Bolsheviks, the Comintern and their native "stooges" are in extremely poor taste, to put it mildly. For instance, to show that the entry of Soviet units into Mongolia in 1921 was a purely Soviet move, the author quotes from a letter from Academician Maiskii where, in answer to the question as to who made the decision to commit these troops, the latter writes that the "chief decision-makers were the Soviet Government of the day headed by V. I. Lenin." The only trouble is that this proves nothing more than where the actual directive to initiate the operation emanated from (who else was competent to issue it?) and in no way shows that the Russians acted alone. Or were the Mongols supposed to be in a position to give the Red Army its marching orders? Similarly, in arguing that no revolution took place in Mongolia in 1921, Professor Murphy stresses the apathetic attitude of the average Mongol toward political issues, his stoic resignation to all manner of hardships and abuse, but, curious to note, carefully avoids mentioning the interesting brochure by Sh. Natsokdorzhi, Iz istorii aratskogo dvizheniya vo Vneshnei Mongolii, Moscow, Izd. Akademii nauk SSSR, 1958, which explores the depth of social awareness among the Mongolian masses and their attempts to improve their sorry lot prior to that

The whole book is slanted in this manner. The Mongols who were instrumental in bringing the Russians into the country are portrayed as dupes, fools, or knaves. The Comintern had a masterplan from the very outset for the Communization of Mongolia and the Kremlin immediately sought to convert it into a satellite. From the start, the Mongolian leadership was composed of

people manipulable by Moscow. And so on. Several ingenious reasons are given to explain why the U.S.S.R. did not annex Mongolia, except the true one: it never wanted to, as far as anybody can tell. On p. 148, the Soviet economic concessions to Mongolia after 1954 are described as having been triggered, inter alia, by the emergence of a Mongolian elite eager to modernize the country (presumably on the Soviet model), but on p. 149 the statement appears that "apparently not until 1958 was the Soviet government able to bring sufficient pressure to bear to force the Mongols to do as was expected of them" in terms of nomadic collectivization. After having heard ad nauseam that for three decades Mongolia's rulers were pliable puppets of the Kremlin, one suddenly discovers that before 1958 the Soviets did not have the power to dictate their will to their local agents. And, why would these men have to be coerced into doing what they all agreed ultimately had to be done if they wished to build "socialism"-which they did? All this remains a tantalizing mystery, along with so much of the monograph.

Honest misapprehension? Genuine, but mistaken, conviction? Resolve to teach the Russians not to rewrite history and an urge to set the record straight that fell into the same trap? A desire to epater le borgeois? Whichever, the results are distinctly disappointing.—George Ginsburgs, New School for Social Research.

Warlord: Yen Hsi-shan in Shansi Province, 1911-1949. By Donald G. Gillin. (Princeton: University Press, 1967. Pp. xiv, 334. \$9.00.)

Although there has been a conspicuous burgeoning of interest in the study of China, one important aspect of its modern history—warlordism—remains much neglected. This is regrettable not only because warlordism itself makes a fascinating topic for research, but also because it provides important clues to understanding subsequent development in Chinese politics.

Mr. Gillin's book on Yen-Hsi-shan is a timely and valuable contribution toward remedying such a neglect in our academic inquiry. Although Yen was by no means the most powerful warlord, he reflected in many ways the lives of many other warlords of his time. His story becomes especially interesting because he was probably the only important warlord who had survived the many political crises in a stretch of four decades while his contemporaries had disappeared from the political scene one after another. His demise was brought about only after the whole political system of which he was an integral part had failed to persist in the face of the Communist challenge.

The main emphasis of Mr. Gillin's book is on

the internal political process of the province of Shansi under Yen's rule. The author devotes well over half of the book to describing political reality in that province because it is his belief that the key to analyzing Chinese politics during the republican period lies not so much in the impotent central government as in the various regional governments in the hands of the warlords. This is certainly a sound view and the author has done a remarkable job in amassing a vast amount of data from numerous sources, many of which have never been used extensively by scholars before. He also has the benefit of interviewing Yen personally as well as some of his old associates, a feat which cannot be duplicated in studying other warlords. The result is a book which is meticulously written and which covers a wide range of subjects which will surely interest most students of Chinese politics. The weight of his evidence and the orderly manner of his presentation will not fail to convince most readers of the correctness of his conclusion that the story of Yen is also a story of "a conservative and, by contemporary standards, backward people struggling to adapt itself to the conditions of the modern world under the leadership of a man whose own limitations were among the most formidable obstacles in his path"

What the author has left undone is to fit Yen's personal story into the larger context of Chinese politics. It seems to this reviewer that the author has not given due emphasis to Yen's "external" policies vis-à-vis other warlords and thus has only told a partial story about him while the title of the book suggests a more comprehensive one. This is particularly important since it was in the interwarlord-relations that we could detect some meaningful pattern of behavior with reference to the country as a whole. It is the author's omission to deal with this respect that causes his book to fall short of its objective of contributing to "a broader understanding of warlordism as a political phenomenon, illuminating further the whole subject of regional government in China during the first half of the twentieth century" (p. vii).

The available evidence seems to suggest that Yen's regime was rather atypical of the Chinese warlords in general, a fact which earned him the enviable title of "model governor." His internal policies undoubtedly shed invaluable light on the many problems most other regional governments would expect to face, but his eagerness to solve these problems was quite unique among his political peers. Therefore his story should never allow us to come to the conclusion that most warlords were just as dedicated to industrialization or universal education as he was. His unique performance in no small part explains why he

managed to survive while others had long perished. Therefore, a more thorough picture of Chinese politics of this period will not emerge until more scholars become interested in the dynamics of regional and inter-regional politics. Mr. Gillin's book represents an important first step along a highly promising path that remains to be explored by others scholars. In this lies the main contribution of his book.—HSI-SHENG CHI, University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill.

Nehru's Mantle: The Politics of Succession in India. By Michael Brecher. (New York: Frederick A. Praeger, 1966. Pp. 269, index. \$6.50.)

Professor Brecher is one of the very few western scholars who has been engaged in the study of Indian politics at the central level. Wellknown in India as Nehru's biographer (Nehru: A Political Biography, 1959), he has here given us a detailed and intimate account of the two successions following Nehru's death and an analysis. of central decision-making in the post-Nehru period. The account is based partly on depth interviews with most of the leading actors involved in the two successions and partly on newspaper reports, including frequent—in fact, excessive quotations from India's leading press pandits. Brecher succeeds in reconstructing in a fascinating manner, at times minute by minute, the unfolding of events following Nehru's death and those leading to the selection of a new leader. He brings out clearly the intricate interplay of personal, factional, and regional forces in Congress politics and how they interacted in the selection of both Lal Bahadur Shastri and Indira Gandhi. Little new is revealed from the account, but non-India specialists will find the book a useful introduction to some of the leading personalities and forces operating in all-India politics.

Brecher also uses the two successions and postsuccession decision-making on the issues of language and food as case studies to evaluate the working of Indian democracy and its ability to solve India's social and economic problems. He is full of praise for the way in which the Congress elite handled the two successions, especially the first, which he describes as a "mature, sophisticated, and smooth internal transfer of power" (p. 6). However, Brecher's analysis of post-succession decision-making on the issues of language and food leads him to cast doubt upon the ability of the central government to formulate and implement effective national policies.

On the great issues in Indian politics, Brecher points out that it is often necessary to summon to Delhi the chief ministers of the seventeen states to meet with the central leadership in what he

calls the "Grand Council of the Republic" to reach a consensus. What troubles Brecher is that the consensus is frequently a paper compromise (as on the language issue) or a complete failure (as on the problem of food). The inability of the center to formulate national policies on issues affecting the basic interests or constitutional prerogatives of the states leads Brecher to question whether the method of consensual democracy can solve India's social and economic problems, whether, in short, effective all-India government is possible and the future of Indian democracy is secure. Brecher was also concerned when he wrote about the effect upon the future of the Indian Union of the prospect—which has suddenly and unexpectedly materialized after the 1967 elections—of a situation in which opposition parties came to power in the states while the Congress remained in power at the center.

It seems to this reviewer that Indian democracy deserves neither undue praise for its maturity and sophistication nor dire forebodings about its future. The system of "bargaining federalism," as it has been called, has become and will undoubtedly continue to become more complex-especially when opposition parties come to power at the center. The system is both sustained and inhibited in its functioning by regional and intra-regional diversity of a multi-dimensional variety such as exists in no other single state in the world. Moreover, a flexibility derived from pervasive factionalism and the still limited effect of ideology upon Indian politics in practice makes seemingly impossible combinations and compromises ultimately possible.

On the language issue, compromise is the only possible and effective solution. Nor have the limits of compromise been reached. Moreover, it is questionable whether the issue of food is a valid test of central government effectiveness. In the first place, food is a state subject. Second, the very failure to formulate a national policy on food increases the dependence of the deficit states upon the center. Thus, the opposition government in Kerala may rail against the center as much as it likes, but it cannot effectively challenge central authority as long as it depends upon the center for food.

Professor Brecher's book is a useful chronicle of an important landmark in contemporary Indian political history. It is evaluative rather than theoretical in its analysis of the procedures of Indian democracy. It raises for eboding questions about the future of Indian democrary which cannot be adequately assessed until we have some case studies of center-state relations from the viewpoint of the provincial capitals.—Paul R. Brass, University of Washington.

L'Union pour la Nouvelle République: Etude du pouvoir au sein d'un parti politique. BY JEAN CHARLOT. (Paris: Librairie Armand Colin, 1967. Pp. 362. \$5.80.)

Although much has been published on the subject of de Gaulle and Gaullism, surprisingly little has been written, especially in an analytical way, about the Union for the New Republic. Charlot attempts to fill this gap. His book deserves praise, giving readers a competent introduction to the UNR and providing scholars with a base upon which further research can be cone.

The book covers a broad range of topics. The first part of Charlot's study contains an essentially descriptive history of the UNR since 1958. More analytical are the other three sections. Examined in the second section are the voters and members of the UNR, the structure of the party outside Parliament, the Parliamentary Group structure, and the relationship between the Parliamentary Group and the UNR leadership. The third section includes an analysis of the leaders' backgrounds, an assessment of oligarchical tendencies within the UNR, and an examination of the peculiar relationship which obtains between de Gaulle and the UNR. A study of Gaullism within the UNR is the subject of the fourth section.

For many of the parliamentarians and leaders of the UNR, association with de Gaulle began at least as early as the resistance. As Charlot suggests, however, the resistance and its aftermath produced persons faithful to Gaullism for different reasons. Following Jacques Soustelle, Charlot examines Gaullism within the UNR in terms of three bases for belief. There are, first, the gaullistes de foi: persons who became Gaullists due to their depth of feeling for General de Gaulle. Policy matters little to them. The empirisies form a second category of UNR followers: policy is of central concern to them and their attachment to the UNR is based partly on policy considerations. Yet, empiristes tend to take a pragmatic approach to policy, viewing politics as the art of the possible. This is in contrast to a third category of Gaullists, the doctrinaires. They feel that Gaullism is a reasonsed economic and social doctrine which stems from de Gaulle's pronouncements and writings. Policy should coincide with doctrine in their view.

One senses that relations between the Government and those gaullistes de fci of the Parliamentary Group should be fairly smooth. But, it would seem that relations would be more difficult with the empiristes and even with the doctrinaires, who differ over what constitutes the full meaning of Gaullist doctrine or over what aspects of the doctrine should be given priority.

What, then, promotes amicable relations within the Group and between the Group and the Government? This is one of the questions Charlot focuses on throughout the book. Cohesion is explained partly in terms of the well-known oath taken by members of the Parliamentary Group, which is backed by sanctions (these sanctions have, on occasion, been used). Moreover, a common enemy exists for almost all members of the UNR Parliamentary Group, as well as the Government, in their fear of the return of the fourth Republic's chaotic party system. Finally, the Group's political committee, which controls its members' introduction of questions and legislation, serves as a vehicle for cooperation between the Government and the Group leadership. Periodic meetings between the Premier and the Group are also helpful in promoting smooth relations between the Government and the Group and in maintaining Group cohesion.

This system has not prevented the Group from exerting influence on the Government. While the preponderance of influence is in the hands of the Government or de Gaulle, the Group leaders and backbenchers have been able to initiate, to amend substantially, or to force the recall of several important pieces of legislation. This appears especially to be the case in those fields where the Group's specialized study committees, as described by Charlot, have been most active.

Charlot gives a balanced view of politics within the UNR. The difficulty with his book, as with all introductions, is that subjects have to be compressed in order to be included. We thus miss on occasion some of the depth and care which somewhat narrower research would have produced. Nevertheless, Charlot fulfills well the task he set out to accomplish. His book is excellent as a broad and sometimes extensive introduction to the UNR and opens its readers to a number of avenues for thought and research.—John E. Schwarz, University of Minnesota.

La Vie Politique en France Depuis 1940. By JACQUES CHAPSAL. (Paris: Presses Universitaires de France, 1966. Pp. 592.)

Intended as a textbook in the Thémis series supervised by Maurice Duverger, this work by the Director of the Institut d'Etudes Politiques of Paris turns out to be a first-rate synthesis of much current research and a fascinating history, studded with apt and often pithy quotations, of the internal politics of postwar France.

An introduction, appropriately entitled "Le Poids de l'Histoire," summarizes the legacy of the political culture of the Third Republic. More than half of the volume is devoted to the familiar story of the near stillbirth of the Fourth Republic, its senescence before adolescence, and its final

agony. The rest is a history of de Gaulle's Fifth Republic through the presidential elections of December, 1965.

Interestingly enough, Chapsal's evaluation of the Fourth Republic is not far from the Gaullist indictment. Chapsal observes that the ministerial crisis of the summer of 1953 "well shows that the parliamentary regime was incapable of deciding or choosing." The active interlude of Mendes-France, who simply liquidated problems that had dragged on too long, was an exception that proved the rule, for the regime could not endure his dynamism. The glissement towards the condemned practices of the Third Republic is convincingly documented.

For many readers the value of the book will be found in its treatment of the Fifth Republic and the political forces now undergoing transformation. Chapsal sees two phases in the history of the Fifth: The Algerian phase during which many members of the political elite with apparent relief turned over to the General the intractable Algerian problem; and the more "normal" period since 1962. Both phases, however, have been characterized by the extension of presidential power at the expense of the Prime Minister, the Administration, and the Parliament. The constitutional struggle of 1962 strengthened this trend, as did the political rout suffered by the parties in the November elections, which Chapsal labels a "règlement de comptes avec les partis politiques." Shocked from their traditions, the parties of the Left and Center attempted to regroup, first under Gaston Defferre, who admitted failure in June 1965, and then under François Mitterand, who led a coalition with the far Left into the run-off presidential election later the same year.

Looming large in this history is, of course, the wellhistorische figure of Charles de Gaulle. What strikes the reader is the "great continuity in the views of the General" over the quarter of a century covered in this work. His identification of self and motherland ("Il y a moi et le peuple français"), his recourse to the referendum and his tours of the provinces (both expressions of his mystical connection with the people), his preference for a strong executive coupled with his contempt for political parties, all were apparent before the founding of the Fourth Republic.

Even more striking, however, is his resilience in the face of hard political realities. While Chapsal believes it is "impossible to interpret safely the position of Charles de Gaulle since 1958" on the Algerian War, his analysis suggests that the General tried to sort out the realities and then deal with them. When the African nations in the Community began to move quickly towards independence, he accepted it in good

grace—and maintained French influence there. In spite of his distaste for campaigning and "the certitude of his historical dimensions," his slipping popularity in the 1965 presidential race forced him to descend into the arena and "play the game." In short, Chapsal says de Gaulle is "un empirique" and quotes the General's revealing declaration of 1960:

Il est tout à fait naturel qu'on ressente la nostalgie de ce qui était l'Empire, tout comme on peut regretter la douceur des lampes à huile[,] la splendeur de la marine à voile, le charme du temps des équipages. Mais, quoi, il n'y a pas de politique qui vaille en dehors des réalités.

Excellent bibliographies at the end of each chapter include useful evaluative comments on the more significant works in French and on a few in English.—James M. Clark, *University of Maine*.

Berlin: The Wall is Not Forever. By ELEANOR LANSING DULLES. (Chapel Hill: The University of North Carolina Press, 1967. Pp. 245. \$6.00.)

It is fitting that Eleanor Lansing Dulles add a book to the growing literature on Berlin. Widely known and appreciated in West Berlin as the city's "patron saint," she headed the "Berlin Desk" in the State Department from 1952, when someone was needed "to be responsible for all of the major problems of Berlin" (p. 4) until 1959. She states: "For more than six years, I was fortunate to be able to act in every stage of this [aid] process, to know the people, the problems, and the technical as well as the political realities" (p. 13). On the basis of her experience and expertise, Eleanor Dulles is eminently qualified to write this book. She outlines the development of U.S. policy and aid programs affecting Berlin, traces the postwar history of the city, examines its vulnerabilities and strengths, and describes the "new mood" of criticality and impatience among (especially younger and intellectual) West Berliners and West Germans, as well as characterizing the post-Wall East German situation. The book is broad in scope and it is apparently designed to appeal to scholars, policy-makers, and citizens in both the U. S. and Germany. Her basic position is a defense of U.S. policy, and she is greatly concerned with a "threatened gap in understanding" between Americans and Germans and the dangers that policy-makers in both countries will either "take the present situation for granted" or, worse, fall victim to the "insidious danger of the present Communist 'soft-sell' " and make concessions that would undermine our established German policy. We should be continuously alert to Communist "salami tactics" which might "whittle away" Western rights. We should confront such with "determination, even stubbornness."

She is, however, against complacency, and is very much aware of the need to take the "new mood" of many West Berliners and West Germans into account. She devotes considerable attention to describing this increasingly impatient mood, as evidenced in Brandt's policy of "small steps" designed to increase contacts and trade with East Germany with the objective of a gradual improvement in relations and progress towards re-unification, as well as in more extreme demands and dissatisfaction with the status quo voiced by West Berlin students and intellectuals. She sees here a major dilemma for policy-makers in both countries: the West German policy of "small steps" has its counterpart in the "salami tactics" of the East German regime. The core problem from the Western viewpoint is how to gain something without giving up something essential in return (e.g., our policy of non-recognition of the "German Democratic Republic" or access rights). Professor Dulles offers no solution to this policy dilemma nor does she spell out just what implications for U.S. and German policy are to be drawn from the new mood among West Germans and developments in East Germany. She concedes that present Berlin and German policy may have to be altered, but does not say how. At the least, our present policy should be "shored up" and its "freshness restored." Beyond this, she merely suggests that the new German mood be carefully considered and that new studies and increased U. S.-West German contacts may be needed. Younger West Germans, in particular, need to be reminded of the nature of U.S. aid and support (and the reasons behind it), the accomplishments that have been made, our continued interest in and support of Berlin, and how the problems of Berlin and Germany, though a vital part of U.S. commitments, must be viewed within the broader context of our global involvement. Given her expertise, one might have expected more detailed analysis of specific policy implication's for U. S. and German policy-makers, as well as more insight into how U.S. policy towards Germany was actually made. Although Professor Dulles provides insight into the extent of U.S. aid programs, the problems confronting Berlin, and the new mood in both Germanies, she has failed to give us the book she could have written. -WILLIAM E. WRIGHT, University of Georgia.

The British General Election of 1966. By D. E. BUTLER AND ANTHONY KING. (New York: St. Martins Press, 1963. Pp. xi, 338. \$10.00.)

"To many politicians as well as to newspaper men the 1966 campaign was a great bore. It was a bore because there was so little doubt about the outcome; it was a bore because there had been an election only seventeen months before and electioneering of a sort had hardly stopped for four years; it was a bore because campaign techniques that were new in 1959 had become, on the third time out, established rituals."

The dullness of the campaign was relieved only in part by a few kicky independent candidates, like Screaming Lord Sutch, the pop singer, who gathered 585 votes in running against Prime Minister Wilson. Wilson got 66 per cent of the total, although Butler and King tell us that "press coverage at the local level was almost entirely devoted to Mr. Sutch's misadventures."

This is the seventh in the Nuffield studies of the British general elections since World War II. It is, like the others, descriptive, detailed, journalistic, impressionistic, necessary, useful, and unsatisfactory. These studies tell us a great deal about what happened—but obviously they cannot tell us all that happened, and there is no convincing justification why that which is told is told and that which is left out is left out. It is all reasonably good current history—and since we have as yet no descriptive political science that is better than (or more than) good current history, we are pleased to have that.

The authors know they cannot explain electoral behavior, and they make no such claim; but they do promise us soon ("late in 1967") more elaborate behavioral analysis based on three waves of interviewing in 80 constituencies.

Meanwhile, this study, like the ones before it, is especially helpful to American students because the flavor and texture of British politics is placed in the academic idiom so familiar to Americans—and so much in contrast with the characteristic pre-war British political essays from Bagehot to Laski. It is David Butler's lasting contribution to the Atlantic political science community that he (and his students) write so well about Britain in Americanese, as a generation before Denis Brogan wrote about America in Britishese.

Beyond this overriding contribution that runs through all the Nuffield election studies, the book at hand makes a number of especially relevant observations about the way the British handle their electoral business. Three may be mentioned. First, the local aspects of British general elections are seen as remarkably unpolitical. The constituency agents and the party workers have administrative tasks mainly. Because of the tidy separation of general (national) and local elections—unlike the United States—the workers and the voters can concentrate on a single set of issues and a single set of strategic and

tactical decisions. Both major parties seem to have given up the objective of a party agent for every constituency—and why not, since the agent sent up from London for a two months campaign can serve as well as (perhaps better than) the year-round local?

More important probably is the second observation: the British general election is becoming increasingly and rapidly presidentialized. The ability to dramatize the party, in both the imagebuilding and policy-position senses, is powerfully focused in the leaders. Presidentialization of campaigning is a consequence of "the gradual growth in the power of the Prime Minister and the dramatic ethos of television.... By now both the public and the parties expect the leaders to conduct campaigns of this type." The extent of presidentialization is shown in the disheartening lack of interest in the campaign speeches of secondary leaders, and in what the authors call the "most notable feature of the results, the uniformity of the swing." "Area by area the results varied little. The map showing regional swings which has been used in past Nuffield studies is omitted here because almost all the regions would have been shaded alike." [Compare the French election of 1967 for another example of the profound presidentializing effect of TV and electoral PR on non-presidential systems.]

Finally, Butler and King seem to be telling us that labor is losing the Labour Party. Workingclass MPs are being replaced by middle-class MPs from the professions. But as the class differences narrow it may be that the formal ideological conflicts also diminish. The increasingly egg-head Labourites are not regarded as being more left than the trade-unionists (though the intellectuals of the 30s and 40s were more radical than working-class Members and candidates). The effect on ideology of the increasingly middle-class character of the Parliamentary Labour Party may be both minimal and unimportant in the post-ideology world of Britain (has Britain already followed the U.S. through the end of ideology?). "In the political circumstances of 1966," Butler and King say, "definition of what is meant by left (or right, for that matter) was unprecedentedly difficult." BERNARD HENNESSY, Pennsylvania State University.

Lawyers and the Courts: A Sociological Study of the English Legal System, 1750-1965. By Brian Abel-Smith and Robert Stevens. (Cambridge, Massachusetts: Harvard University Press, 1967. Pp. 468. \$11.00.)

Despite the fact that the subtitle of this book is "A Sociological Study," it is also a work in history

and literature. I am not competent to judge it in ways peculiar to the historian or to the literary critic; nevertheless, I feel that this book smacks strongly of excellence. Though heavily documented, it is not ponderous. Indeed, it is lively. Though bursting with instances of "the law" and bristling with a myriad of facts (names, dates and the like), there is an engaging framework of social, political, and humanistic analysis. Although this book is not a "hard" sociological treatise, it is a highly lucid and insightful exposition and it could become profoundly important in English legal and academic circles. Thus, what portended to be a laborious chore for the likes of me, was not. Of course, I had to read it. Such is the extent of my limitless dedication to the discipline and to the American Political Science Review. So the question remains for me to answer: of what practical use, if any, is this book to the modern, professional American political scientist?

Considering such factors as cost, length, and subject-matter, I doubt that Lawyers and the Courts will become a best-seller even on the college market. A few aficionados may peruse it for sheer literary delight or in order to become the American buff on the topic. But I can see little classroom use for it as a book. On the other hand, it promises to have tremendous research value for those political scientists studying judicial processes and behavior-and particularly for those who have an eye, heart, or stomach for comparative research and teaching. This is a superb case study in comparative developmental legal politics. There is much data and theory on the role and functioning of a legal system under various conditions.

The major theme of this book is that the English legal system is decrepit and that it may become even more so. Abel-Smith and Stevens examine the historical path of its rise and decline and the political factors that have led to the current situation. They view the legal system as being peculiarly inept, as an English societal structure, in adjusting itself to the many drastic changes that have rocked that nation in the midtwentieth century. According to them, England's legal structure has lost much of its social and commercial and political importance and its image has suffered concomitantly. It would not be unfair to suggest that Abel-Smith and Stevens have described that system as being presently an anachronistic irrelevancy. The tone of the book is, however, neither one of quiet desperation nor of loud despair. Rather, the authors discern some grumbling and rumbling in the ruins. The natives are restless.

For instance, two very interesting chapters concern judges and legal education. In the former,

some fascinating social background data is presented about English superior court judges (does it surprise you to learn that 76% of their number are graduates of Oxford and Cambridge?). Commenting upon the survey from which they quote these statistics, the authors wryly remark that "If this [the survey] showed that the judges were upper middle, rather than upper classes, it did nothing to show that they had a very broad view of life." The significance of this chapter is that it tends to demonstrate that the English judge has become, like his American counterpart, a focus of both academic and political scrutiny. If the myth of the robe received its comeuppance in the United States in the thirties, forties, and fifties, we learn now that the English variant of such folklore has begun to be exposed for what it is in the sixties.

All this critical analysis may be having some effect on the judges and their perceptions of judicial structure, judicial role, and the judicial function. Then again, it may not. The authors undoubtedly hope their book will be a prod in the correct place.

Similarly, Abel-Smith and Stevens detect and describe movement—yea, the very stirrings of life—within even the dankest halls of English legalism, i.e., the law schools. However, their hopes are not high for any substantial success for those modern legal academicians who have discovered social science. The mind of the English legal practitioner is a formidable fortress which is not easily scaled.

Will the English system be able to reform itself sufficiently to survive in recognizable form and, as such, perform functions necessary to an evolving English society? No answer could be forthcoming, and none is proferred. You see, dear reader, that's the rub.—Theodore L. Becker, University of Hawaii and New York University.

British Broadcasting and the Danish Resistance Movement, 1940-1945: A Study of the Wartime Broadcasts of the BBC Danish Service. By JEREMY BENNETT. (London: Cambridge University Press, 1966. Pp. xvi, 266. \$10.00.)

Jeremy Bennett, more lately a member of the staff of the British Broadcasting Corporation, undertook the writing of this book as a Churchill Fellow of the University of Copenhagen. The book itself is said to be the first detailed account of any part of the BBC European service in wartime. It will be of more interest to students of Danish affairs than to those interested in wartime propaganda.

This particular corner of the BBC European vice was a small one: it began with a 5-minute past in Danish on the day of the Nazi

invasion of Denmark, for a time consisted of a single daily broadcast of 15 minutes, and for most of the war did not exceed an hour a day. Even within this small compass, however, there was a good deal of confusion. After the first broadcast, it was over a month before a chief was appointed to direct the Danish section; and it was a year or more before it was firmly established what upper echelons, both in BBC and in the British Government, were to give policy guidance to the section.

Some of the British documents dealing with the substantive issues which shaped propaganda policy, moreover, have not been made public. Mr. Bennett appears to have done most of his research in Denmark, and there is no indication that he talked to persons in Britain who might have been able to enlighten him. In the circumstances, it is not surprising that this book has its shortcomings as an account of the objectives and methods of the BBC's Danish service.

Mr. Bennett's narrative occasionally comes alive: it is interesting to learn how the V symbol (originally employed in the BBC's Belgian service) was adopted to the Danish service (Ve vil vinde-"We will win"); and he gives an interesting account of the competition between the BBC and the Swedish radio organization to capture the Danish audience. But the author has let himself get bogged down in minutiae largely of an administrative sort, and is not much interested in broadcast content; so that we learn little about the programming, themes, and appeals of the Danish service. The narrative is marred by repetition (the attitude of the British Special Operations Executive toward radio exhortation to sabotage, for example, is explained four times in one chapter), by much pointless language in the footnotes, and by several instances in which bad punctuation entirely changes the meaning of what the author doubtless intended to say. An editor could have greatly improved the text but the Cambridge University Press apparently did not provide one.—HAROLD GRAVES, Chevy Chase, Md.

Biographical Dictionary of Republican China. Volume 1. Ed. By Howard L. Boorman. (New York: Columbia University Press, 1967. Pp. xv, 483. \$20.00.)

This is the first of a five-volume biographical dictionary of Chinese during the republican period (1911-1949) who distinguished themselves in the fields of politics, military, literature, or science. The articles are contributed by highly qualified scholars and are well written. It promises to be a major reference work to students of that period when it is completed. (HSC)

INTERNATIONAL POLITICS, LAW, AND ORGANIZATION

Domestic Sources of Foreign Policy. Ed. By James N. Rosenau. (New York: The Free Press, 1967. Pp. xiii, 340. \$7.50.)

The Center of International Studies at Princeton has produced some notable symposium books. This book is in that class but not at the top. Its individual chapters are mostly of high quality. But the adaptation to a common frame of reference has been minimal. The editor's attempt to integrate it was too modest in conception to be strong in performance. Rosenau has provided an excellent introduction, yet the book lacks focus. It is useful mainly as a collection and summary of the previous work of its authors. Since that work is neither inconsiderable nor undistinguished, the book should get the attention of informed readers of the foreign policy formulation process.

James N. Rosenau, in setting the frame of reference for the book, contrasts political behavior and processes in the foreign policy "issuearea" with behavior and processes in domestic policy issue-areas. Theodore J. Lowi, in his chapter, claims the contrary, that domestic and foreign policy behavior and process are more identical than distinguishable. Neither author, in my view, deals with this issue adequately for the purposes of this volume. Rosenau is overly concerned with research design. Lowi excludes a priori the distinction between domestic and foreign policy-making which Rosenau is at pains to describe. He does so by setting the latter equal to elitest policy-making and then finding other forms of policy-making in the foreign policy issue-area.

Kenneth N. Waltz also deals with public interest in foreign policy. His objective is to demonstrate that democratic governments do as well as and perhaps better than other forms of government in foreign relations. The grand proportions of this theme fit his own book, Foreign Policy and Democratic Politics (1967), where he first developed it, but not this book. Rosenau sees Waltz focussing "mainly on governmental behavior as it is shaped by the anticipation of future elections and the memory of past elections." That is incorrect. Waltz describes the U.S. public as pliable with respect to foreign relations. Presumably he seeks to show that politicians need not be concerned about public opinion constraints in foreign relations. He is quite clear about the scope and purpose of his contribution; but in the setting of this book it is easy to see his

paper the way Rosenau does, as a statement about the behavior of government officials.

I think Waltz exaggerates the interest of the public in foreign relations. Rosenau is better balanced on this point. But his description of public opinion in the domestic issue-areas goes uncomfortably beyond the available data, flagging the need for more systematic comparison of publics in equivalent terms.

Herbert McClosky has again written a carefully constructed research report, based on fresh survey data, on isolationism as a behavioral deviation. He marshalls skillfully the impressive data available on attitudes about foreign relations. But his categories are too inclusive and too rich in connotations to be comfortable empirical tools. He is never far from a good guys/bad guys dichotomy.

Milton J. Rosenberg has written casually though circumspectly about political attitude patterns and determinants in general. He does not attempt to demonstrate either their particular application to government officials, or the functional relationship between personal attitudes and behavior, on the one hand, and foreign policy as government output, on the other. His proposals for changing attitudes, therefore, stand as excathedra pronouncements about the Cold War.

Johan Galtung and Warren Miller have provided soundly conceived electoral behavior studies, with their inferences carefully drawn. Bernard C. Cohen has summarized and supplemented some of his excellent work on the press and foreign policy. Lester W. Milbrath has speculated about the methods and objectives of interest group representation with respect to foreign policy issues. He repeats some of the contrasts which Rosenau draws between domestic and foreign issue-area transactions. Scott Greer speculates about the quality of the performance in foreign relations from trends in domestic social, economic, and political conditions.

In sum, the book demonstrates at once that work of impressive quality has been done on the foreign relations function of government, the inadequacy of general theory on the subject, and some significant gaps in the field. Taking account of the fact that most of the items here do not address the central issues of the book, the gaps it makes evident are (1) verified propositions about the relationships between internal and external variables; (2) comparable frames of reference for comparing domestic and foreign policy issue-areas, particularly the variations in

public attentiveness and activity; (3) findings about the processing of policy where the linkage between domestic sources and foreign policy behavior can be observed as a process.—Paul Y. Hammond, The RAND Corporation.

Das amerikanische Sicherheitssystem 1945–1949— Studie zur Aussenpolitik der bürgerlichen Gesellschaft. By Ernst-Otto Czempiel. (Berlin: Walter de Gruyter, 1966. Pp. xx, 442.)

In three ways this book constitutes a veritable tour de force: It is a book written by a German, in Germany, which deals with intimate and detailed phases of American foreign policy; American foreign policy is analyzed by using, almost exclusively, the proceedings and materials of Congress; finally, the author attempts to develop a more general theory of foreign relations out of the foreign policy of the most pragmatic nation extant, and out of its most untheoretical branch of government to boot.

As for the first tour, not much can and needs to be said, except that the author has succeeded splendidly. Czempiel (now one of two professors of political science at Marburg University) belongs to the still very small number of German specialists in international politics; as such he has proved extremely sensitive to things American, and in particular to the intricacies of U. S. politics in the area of the conduct of foreign affairs. His use of the respective materials is impeccable.

It is quite surprising how relatively clear and comprehensive a picture of U.S. foreign policy in the postwar years here covered emerges from the study of Congressional records (here comprising all the debates, hearings, votes, etc.). The author traces the emergence of what today would be called a broad "consensus" (in-between the dwindling pole of old-style, prewar isolationism and an equally insignificant new utopian. world-government-type of internationalism), first for U.S. cooperation in building up the UN system of international organization as "model of (genuine) collective security," and then, very soon, for a model of security still referred to as "collective security" that in reality was based upon the formation of alliances and the blocbuilding that culminated in NATO. According to the author both policies, in contrast to prewar unilateralism, were conscious policies of "cooperation" and not of "domination" or coercion, aiming at security and not at territorial expansion or conquest. Befitting a "bourgeois republic" (bürgerliche Republik), the means of this foreign policy were primarily economic (aid, loans). Time and again the author documents the great reluctance of Congress to embrace means more appropriate to non-democratic societies, e.g., in regard to the maintenance, or resumption, of a

non-voluntary military service system; or when it was a question of whether to follow totalitarian regimes into a propaganda war necessitating the setting up of governmental machinery for broadcasting etc., in the place of the traditional private management of these media.

In the foregoing there lies already a hint at the author's more general theory: The U.S. is the prototype of a bourgeois society. Such a society's foreign policy has for its prime objective peace and security for peaceful trade, especially in an age where industrial economy has become less dependent on foreign resources and thus is less interested in the acquisition of colonies or similar dependent areas, in conquest, and (with the exception of the defense sector) in war. More generally. the author asserts that a country's foreign policy is determined less by factors lying in the structure of the international system of which it is a part than by its internal social structure, its culture and tradition, and its style in conducting affairs. Somewhat in contrast to the older German approach we have here a doctrine of the "primany of internal policy" (or, rather, of the internal system), and not of the "primacy of foreign policy" (Primat der Aussenpolitik in the Bismarck-Treitschke sense).

There are some rather obvious shortcomings of this interesting enterprise. One derives from its limitation to Congress as a primary source of documentation. To be sure, the U.S. remains the only major power where parliament not only enjoys comprehensive constitutional-legal powers but still exerts genuine actual influence in foreign policy; yet even here the shift toward the Executive is strong, and was already so in 1945. Moreover, there is the impact of public opinion and its periodic "Great Debates." There are initiatives like George Kennan's in this period on "containment." These are only dimly perceived in the author's presentation. Entire matters in which Corgress happened to have no part are omitted (thus, of all things, American policy in and toward Germany, which at that time was still chiefly "occupation policy" outside the jurisdiction of Congress). The focus on Congress neglects great policy turns such as that away from striving for restoration of German unity toward the setting up of a separate German state integrated with the West.

Beyond this one might take issue with the author's underlying theory. This reviewer would charge disregard of the structural features of the international system and their impact on a nation's foreign policy, such as postwar bipolarity and its effect upon emergence and nature of the alliance, or bloc system of the superpowers, which compelled even peace- and cooperation-minded nations into what frequently amounted

to hegemonial policies and client relationships. This is apart from the question whether the nature of the U.S. "style" in foreign affairs has been interpretated correctly. Major wars, including two world wars, in which America, in fifty years, participated in a crusading spirit (whether justified under "security" considerations, as in World War II, or not, as in Vietnam) make one doubt. Whether, in contrast to the author's theory but in accordance with the Lenin-Hilferding version of the Marxian interpretation of capitalist imperialism (and also with such non-Marxian interpretations of American foreign policy as Charles Beard's), such "bellicism" is in line with the economic interests of a "bourgeois society" or not, the question arises whether noneconomic, e.g., ideological, factors are not overlooked this way. Thus the ideology of anticommunism which now so dominates U.S. policy (without much relation, so it seems, to economic interests) was certainly not absent in the immediate postwar era. It may vet drive this nation (and possibly the world) into a doom which Czempiel's interpretation of the American style would be at a loss to account for. But the book's merit as one of the few attempts to present a more fundamental interpretation of American foreign policy remains unaffected by this criticism .-JOHN H. HERZ, City College of the City University of New York.

Americans and the Soviet Experiment, 1917-1933:
American Attitudes Toward Russia from the
February Revolution Until Diplomatic Recognition. By Peter G. Filene. (Cambridge,
Massachusetts: Harvard University Press,
1967. Pp. viii, 389. \$7.95.)

A significant paradox is that the greatest industrial nation in the world and what became the next greatest industrial nation did not recognize each other for sixteen years. On the American side there was considerable interest, nevertheless, in this new nation called Bolshevik Russia. Peter G. Filene has prepared a very valuable study on American attitudes towards Russia before our recognition of the Soviet Union in 1933. This book growing out of a Harvard doctoral dissertation reads unlike traditional theses in American history. It is vibrant, graphic, and illuminating. What impresses the reader of this book in addition to the intriguing nature of the subject is the thoroughness of the author in combing all possible bibliographical sources. Not only has he gone through the personal papers available in libraries of the principal Americans who molded our first attitudes on Bolshevik Russia like Borah, Gumberg, Harper, House, Norris, John Reed, Robins, Root, Norman Thomas, O. G. Villard, William Allen White, etc.,

but he has carefully sifted the attitudes represented by key American newspapers from coast to coast. Filene's appendices, bibliography and notes take in almost one hundred pages. Filene has read almost every conceivable American magazine published between 1917 and 1933 which said anything about Russia but has also gone through about a dozen American newspapers representing both geographic and political differentiation. It is apparent from reading Filene's work that though his problem was the attitude of various Americans towards the Soviet experiment. Filene soon became involved with a myriad of peripheral questions such as the American attitudes towards capitalism, socialism, democracy and American social institutions.

As all individuals are ambivalent in one way or another in regard to other individuals. Filene would argue that the American attitudes to the Soviets were also ambivalent. Some extreme worshippers at the Soviet scene like Lincoln Steffens said "We have seen the future and it works." Others saw the inability of the Soviets to accomplish anything. Hoover in 1923 called Russia an "economic vacuum." Others saw chaos unless the Russians changed their policies which they did under the NEP. John Dewey is quoted as saving in 1928 "Perhaps the most significant thing in Russia, after all, is not the effort at economic transformation, but the will to use an economic change as the means of developing a popular cultivation, especially an esthetic one, such as the world has never known." One merely can question the esthetic evaluation of Soviet culture today! Notwithstanding, the Soviet revolution is still being debated in its fiftieth anniversary not only by its adherents and devotees but also by many of its close students.

Every American who ever said in a public speech or wrote in a journal or newspaper anything on Russia in this period seems to be quoted by the author. Of especial interest in Filene's book are the case studies of four American journalists who lived in Russia during this period: Anna Louise Strong, Louis Fischer, William Henry Chamberlin and Eugene Lyons. Only Miss Strong has remained a devout believer, while the other three started out as ardent believers in the Soviet system but became disillusioned and have testified in many valuable books their strong anti-Communist positions and the reasons for their disillusionment. This part of the book is sort of anticlimatic. The main portion is a careful analysis of the first sixteen years of Bolshevik rule as seen through key groups in government. business, labor, education and journalism. This is a sound and revealing study. It is hoped that the author will continue his analytical techniques and extend them to successive periods of AmericanSoviet relations.—WILLIAM B. BALLIS, University of Michigan.

Greek Political Reaction to American and NATO Influences. By Theodore A. Couloumbis. (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1966. Pp. 250. \$7.50.)

In 1952 Americans and Greeks of a pro-Western state of mind viewed the emergence of a strong Greek government as an indispensable adjunct to Greece's accession to NATO, and NATO itself is a shield behind which Greece might safely become stronger through economic and social development. However, the strong government that emerged from the general elections of November 12, 1952 soon focused its attention not so much on economic development as on the Cyprus question, with fissiparous effects on NATO's southeastern flank. Mr. Couloumbis' book which deals with the public reactions of Greek politicians and the press to Greece's participation in NATO and its alignment with the West and the United States in particular clearly reveals these effects. Premier Constantine Karamanlis and members of his successive governments between 1955-1963 who attached primary importance to Greece's economic progress, hence to NATO security along lines consonant with U.S. and allied interests, did not remain unaffected by this factor of inter-allied friction which the predecessor government had bequeathed to them by raising the Cyprus issue in the United Nations in 1954. Signs of an independent foreign policyleftward trends in the international arena-soon appeared, culminating in predictions in September 1958 that the position of Greece in NATO would become problematical if the British government insisted on implementing the Macmillan plan in Cyprus. At times, relations with the United States were close to becoming the only remaining link with NATO. The Opposition, naturally, sought to exploit the Cyprus issue to the hilt in order to undermine the government's position with the aim of replacing it in power or, at the least, of sharing power with it in a coalition government, ostensibly in order to deal more effectively with the issue. In public at least, the leaders of what became in 1961 the Center Union (EK) tended to assume attitudes more negative toward the West, NATO, and the United States than they did in 1963-1965 when a new Cyprus crisis occurred and their turn came to shoulder the burden of government and of responsibility for Greek policy as a whole. And the communist facade party, the United Democratic Left (EDA), was able to add new verbal weapons to its arsenal of anti-NATO, anti-American, and anti-Western slogans about a "golden occupation" of Greece and a supposedly colonial exploitation of the country—with ultra-nationalist press organs of the extreme Right wing chiming in.

These are some of the points, explicit and implicit, of Mr. Couloumbis' study, the excellence of which would have been enhanced by the treatment of certain matters which the reviewer now regards as omissions as well as by a somewhat greater verbal caution. The British, for instance, although doing all in their weakness to assist Greece in 1945-1947, can hardly be said to have given "massive" military aid to Greece during that period. And AMFOGE's function was not to "supervise" the Greek elections of March 31, 1946, but to "observe" them, as Byrnes tried to explain to the Soviet leaders at the Potsdam Conference. In the main body of his study. Mr. Couloumbis might have dealt at greater length with the reaction to Greece's accession to the "Eisenhower Doctrine," which a salient feature of American foreign policy in 1957. He might have also dwelt more on the matter of the reaction to the question of the immunities of American nondiplomatic personnel in Greece from the jurisdiction of Greek civil and military courts, especially since he publishes the relevant documents in his appendices. This reaction, incidentally, led to the revision of these agreements under the Karamanlis government. The author, too, should have been a little more careful in checking his UN facts. Thus, in 1954, the General Assembly did include the Cyprus item in its agenda. It did not do so the following year.

In connection with Mr. Couloumbis' remark on r. 211 that it would be fruitful to investigate and analyze Greece's United Nations voting pattern vis-à-vis the United States and other member nations, it should be noted that a study of U.S. influence in the General Assembly between 1946-1955 (R. Riggs, Politics in the United Nations: a Study of U.S. Influence in the General Assembly, Urbana, Ill.: Illinois University Press, 1958, pp. 167-168) reveals that this small noncaucusing UN member was more often in agreement with the United States on noncolonial rather than on colonial questions. In a table that indicates the scores of agreement of various UN members with the United States on fifty-six roll-call votes on noncolonial questions, Greece was ranked eighteenth, as compared with Turkey, which was fourteenth. On the other hand, in a total of eighty-six roll-call votes on questions that also included colonial issues, Greece's rank fell to twenty-ninth as compared with Turkey's, which was eighteenth. This provides a vivid measure of the impact of the Cyprus question on the relations between Greece and the United States. and this even before 1956-1958, when the Cyprus question led to greater divergences between the

two countries.—Stephen G. Xydis, Hunter College of the City University of New York.

A Working Peace System. By DAVID MITRANY. Introduction by Hans J. Morgenthau. Published in Cooperation with the Society for World Service Federation. (Chicago: Quadrangle Books, 1966. Pp. 221. \$5.95.)

It was in one of the William Dodge lectures at Yale in 1932 in discussing the "Communal Organization of World Affairs" that Mitrany first stated his functional conception of building peace. This volume is a collection of seven articles which provide the clearest articulation of his functional approach.

The first section, "A Working Peace System," consists of his essay of that title, which was originally published by the Royal Institute of International Affairs in 1943, to which a new introduction has been added. In essence, he argued in this seminal pamphlet that war and conflict spring "from the division of the world into detached and competing political units," and it will not be eliminated by federations, etc., which will change or reduce the lines of division.

Any political reorganization into separate units must, sooner or later, produce the same effects; any international system that is to usher in a new world must produce the opposite effect of subduing political division. As far as one can see, there are two ways of achieving that end. One would be through a world state which would wipe out political divisions forcibly; the other... would rather overlay political divisions with a speading web of international activities and agencies, in which and through which the interests and life of all nations would be gradually integrated.

The functional approach, he argues, would make "frontier lines meaningless by overlaying them with a natural growth of common activities and common administrative agencies."

The second section on "Political Theory and International Political Development" contains three essays: "The Problem of Equality in Historical Perspective" (originally a paper before the 1955 IPSA Congress); "An Advance in Democratic Representation" (published in International Associations in 1954); and "Problems of International Administration" (a paper for the Institute of Public Administration and the Royal Institute of International Affairs in 1945). In these essays Mitrany considers: (1) the problem of the "transition from national to international control of political power and of material resources, on a general basis of equality-not equality of possession, but opportunity of use"; (2) the potential roles of international nongovernmental organizations in providing broader bases of opinion for national responses to international actions; and (3) the evolution of technical international agencies from a secretarial role to an executive role in dealing with common economic and social interests.

In the third section on the "Functional Approach and Federalism," there are also three essays: "The Functional Approach to World Organization" (from International Affairs, 1948); "Functional Federalism" (published in Common Cause, 1950); and "The Prospect of European Integration: Federal or Functional" (from the Journal of Common Market Studies, 1965). He argues here that it is a fallacy to seek political federations to create peaceful relations, if they leave social and economic activities in the hands of the national members. It is better to seek functional unions than to be hypnotized by dreams of political unification.

All of the last six essays are variations on the themes of the initial one-"A Working Peace System." The real significance of this volume is that it makes readily available this essay which has been out of print for over twenty years. The influence of this essay has been and still is very considerable. The original pamphlet was one of the few academic pieces that was distributed to all the delegates attending the U.N. Charter Conference in San Francisco in 1945, and had an impact on decisions to decentralize international approaches to economic and social activities, and to stress the separate development of the Specialized Agencies of the U.N. The polemics of Mitrany's arguments have been reflected in many treatises on international politics and hardly a text in international organization exists since 1943 that does not react to his functional approach. The late Linden A. Mander, in his Foundations of Modern World Society (Stanford, 1947) was materially influenced by the argument; and Ernst B. Haas's reaction to Mitrany in Beyond the Nation State: Functionalism and International Organization (Stanford, 1964), has redefined functionalism to make a major contribution to theory and model building in the field of international organization-a field that has been too often characterized by an absence of theory. Most writers and many dissertations in the field since 1943 have reacted either for or against the Mitrany conception, probably more negatively than positively, but its stimulative impact has been impressive. It may be a paradox to some that Morgenthau should contribute an introduction to this volume, as his analysis of Mitrany in Politics Among Nations is quite critical, yet it is understandable. No review, in the face of this reaction, could adequately discuss the pros and cons of the Mitrany conception and do justice to the many writers who have reacted to it.

It is apparent therefore that it is useful to

make Mitrany's "A Working Peace System" more readily available because it has been a generating essay. The essay has had a significant formative and creative effect on scholars and practitioners in the field that may be felt more today than when it was issued in 1943.—Thomas Hovet Jr., University of Oregon.

Competitive Interference and Twentieth Century Diplomacy. By RICHARD W. COTTAM. (Pittsburgh: University of Pittsburgh Press, 1967. Pp. 151. \$5.95.)

This excellent and thoughtful book is grounded on the author's belief that there is a strong trend away from the autonomous nation-state and that one of the major reasons for this development is the growth of what he calls "competitive interference" among nations. Professor Cottam defines "interference" so as to include all acts by a government and people designed to limit the freedom of action of the government and people of a target state. He rightly argues that this has led to a significant alteration in the way that foreign policy is conducted. The style of diplomacy that fitted the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries is not appropriate to the twentieth century.

Interference in the affairs of other nations has become unavoidable for a powerful nation. Interference, the author points out, is neither good nor bad in itself. Economic aid, for example, is a form of interference.

In re-evaluating the role of interference a basic first step is to erase the distinction between what is loosely called "normal diplomatic behavior" and interference. To search for a fine line dividing normal diplomatic behavior, interference, and intervention is not only futile but tends to obscure the important point that there is a continuum from slight to intense interference.

Professor Cottam notes that many Americans in the attentive public find interference repugnant. This can hardly fail to make it more difficult for the United States to learn to interfere effectively and to develop an appropriate set of canons concerning legitimate and illegitimate forms of interference. The author analyzes and catalogues various types of interference and discusses those that are likely to be acceptable to the nation interfered with. His use of examples and illustrations is imaginative.

Some of the points that this volume makes have been made elsewhere but these sources did not come to the author's attention. This is a small matter, for much of the author's material is original and, in any case, the points that he makes will need to be made again and again before they are incorporated into day-to-day thinking about the analysis of international politics and the conduct of foreign policy.

The book is oriented toward conflict and the author tends to overlook the extent to which the phenomena of interference are also found in non-conflict situations. His ideas on international politics appear to have taken shape primarily in a period of Cold War and he may not find it easy to think in other terms. In addition, he seems to give undue attention to covert forms of conflict and does not seem to be aware of the extent to which non-convert forms of interference (economic aid, cultural exchange programs, information programs, military aid, etc.) are susceptible to the same style of analysis. His discussion of CIA has already been dated by the exposure of some of its clandestine activities in the spring of 1967 and by the subsequent decisions of the President concerning the Agency's future role.

Professor Cottam goes on to try to analyze power in terms of "leverage" and he develops a typology of levers. This effort seems less successful to this reviewer than his analysis of competitive interference. The book as a whole is somewhat disjointed. These shortcomings, however, do not prevent it from being valuable. The author has a strong analytic mind and gravitates toward problems of significance. He has said new and useful things about an important subject.—Andrew Scott, University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill.

L'Europe au berceau: souvenirs d'un technocrate. By Robert Lemaignen. (Paris: Librairie Plon, 1964. Pp. 217. F 12.35.)

This brief volume, bringing together recollections of the institutional origins and development of the European Economic Community and reflections on its future, is based on the author's experience as one of the original members of the Community's nine-man Commission. Because this is the first view-from-within of the Commission, a perspective shaped by involvement rather than interview, it merits the attention of all those interested in European integration and careful reading by that rapidly expanding group of specialists in Community affairs.

Unlike the Commission's other French member. Robert Marjolin, whose appointment in 1957 was an expected consequence of his leading part in negotiating the Treaty of Rome, Lemaignen's selection was a complete surprise, ostensibly to himself as well as his future colleagues. The constituency represented by the author, implicit in his close relationship with Georges Villiers, President of the Conseil national du Patronat Français, appears to have been the principal determinant of the appointment. Significantly, Lemaignen was not a committed "European," forced to reconcile Resistance-bred and Monnet-inspired aspirations

for the "new Europe" with the unfamiliar and often unglamorous routine of running the Community bureacracy. His faith in the Community enterprise, strongly articulated in this book, proceeded from practical knowledge gained within the structure of the Community institutions and thereby offers a persuasive example of the "demonstration effect" of European integration.

The author's account of the original Commission's early meetings, the method followed to implement a division of labor among its members, the process of recruiting the higher echelon of the bureacracy, and evolution of the Community's decision-making process (impressionistically described) furnishes an impressive image of administrative efficiency skillfully tempered with political prudence. A description of Lemaignen's Direction Générale is complemented by sympathetic sketches of the Commission's most influential members, Walter Hallstein, Sico Mansholt, Jean Rey, and Marjolin, in addition to intriguing glimpses of the elaborate network of formal and informal consultation constructed by the Commission and exploited in unprecedented fashion. An account of meetings among ministers, Commission members, functionaries, and journalists on the Trans-European Express, regularly travelling from Brussels to Paris in less than three hours and a mobile conference table which "rapidly became an annex to the institutions of the Community" (p. 43), provides suggestive material for interpretations of European integration, whether based on the premise of a conspiracy against governments or the imperatives of a technologically advanced society. Happily, considerable evidence is supplied to corroborate available models of Community decision-making.

Lemaignen's principal conclusions, the "irreversibility" of European integration, the folly of unrestrained national egoisms, and the need for France to assume the mantle of leadership for a united Europe of the Monnet-Hallstein variety. are unexceptional and not convincingly supported. The relevant passages of this book are those that further our understanding of the workings of the Commission, a successful example of collective leadership that the new and enlarged commission issuing from the 1967 merger will probably find difficult to emulate. Whether the leadership for the Europe of the Six (or some larger grouping) will be supplied by the technocrats, a sobriquet accepted and defended by the author, or be diffused among national leaders of a Gaullist persuasion, or remain precariously balanced between both groups, is not likely to be soon resolved. This volume, however, can be a useful source for political scientists seeking to explain how the balance has been achieved and sustained.—Howard Bliss, Dartmouth College.

Deutschlands Araberpolitik im zweiten Weltkrieg. By Heinz Tillmann. (Berlin: VEB Deutscher Verlag der Wissenschaften, 1965. Pp. 473.)

The author of this study of German Middle Eastern policies on the eve of, and during, World War II (through July 1943) is a professor of history at the Martin-Luther University Halle Wittenberg, in East Germany.

The volume, though excellent in many specific aspects, as a whole is flawed beyond redemption by a persistent and at times ludicrous intrusion of Marxist stereotypes and by its ideologically determined hypothesis.

One must question the author's approach and treatment when the text is interlarded with such terms as "ruling circles," "the German-fascist foreign minister," "the reactionary West German school of history," "the German fascist radio," and when a well-known writer is referred to as "the renegade Arthur Koestler." Such terms occur on virtually every page, and the author's interpretation of events is closely linked to them. On the other hand, not a word of criticism relates to the Soviet Union. The author condemns the Nazi practice of selling manufactured goods at high prices to Near Eastern states while paying little for that region's agrarian products, but does not mention identical practices by the Soviet Union in relation to its European satellites and to China until a few years ago. He denounces German "liberation" plans for the Arab states even though these projects were couched in terms scarcely distinguishable from Communist projects for the stimulation of wars of national liberation. The Soviet social order is held to represent the highest stage of the organization of human society; the "war on the part of the powers comprising the anti-Hitler coalition had acquired the character of a just war [after the German attack on the USSR]" (p. 266). A list of such examples of rank pro-Soviet prejudice could be continued almost indefinitely.

The volume is based on a pervading thesis, mentioned briefly in the Preface and explicitly on page 446: German imperialism has risen again, with Western aid, and has begun a "neo-colonial" expansion into the Near East, and the "ruling circles" of West Germany, using a "legend" of German unselfish friendship toward the Near Eastern states, are again engaged in a struggle with their Western imperialist rivals. The work is to represent a "contribution" in the battle against the legend, termed a "reactionary and dangerous falsification of history."

Tillmann's volume is massively documented,

with 1297 footnotes referring to 617 sources listed in a bibliography beginning with "31 Classics of Marxism-Leninism," followed by 6 "Theoretical Works of the International Labor Movement." Nevertheless, the omission of certain sources strikes one as peculiar; there is no mention of A. H. Hourani's Syria and Lebanon—A Politica! Essay (London, 1946), of S. H. Longrigg's Syria and Lebanon under the French Mandate (London, 1958), or of Enno von Rintelen's Mussolini als Bundesgenosse (Tübingen & Stuttgart, 1951). Also, certain allegations, asserted repeatedly, are not documented adequately: thus the author claims that German industry actively supported a penetration of the Near East, but no satisfactory evidence is supplied for the 1939-1943 period, and only fragmentary documentation is given for prewar vears.

On the positive side, on the other hand, must be included a valuable discussion of German fifth-column activities in Iran; a fascinating account of the Byzantine intrigues among German agencies about their competence for propaganda in the Near East and of German propaganda techniques used in that area; a perceptive coverage of German-Italian relations from 1937 to 1943; the emphasis placed on organizational weakness of German intelligence agencies: the story of the convolutions of German foreign policy between November 1941 and May 1942 in the effort to avoid an overt commitment to Arab nationalists; the detailed history of the plans to create an Arab Legion; and the meticulous account of German schemes, some as late as the fall of 1942, for the invasion and exploitation of the Near East. Nevertheless, the flaws in approach and consequentially in interpretation outweigh the bulk of the contributions recorded .- GERHARD VON GLAHN, University of Minnesota, Duluth.

Canada and "Imperial Defense": A Study of the Origins of the British Commonwealth's Defense Organization, 1867-1319. By RICHARD A. PRESTON. (Durham, N. C.: Duke University Press for the Duke University Commonwealth-Studies Center, 1967. Pp. xxi, 576. \$12.50.)

Historians of the First and Second World Wars recognize the critical contributions of the British dominions to Allied victory. In 1914, constitutionally committed by Britain's declaration of war, they responded to the call to arms and stayed the long and bloody course. In 1940, Britain stood not entirely alone, and the support of the dominions may well have provided the margin of survival.

The history of the military relations between

the United Kingdom and the old dominions which resulted in their close war-time collaboration is told in Dr. Richard A. Preston's Canada and "Imperial Defense." The author, who is W. K. Boyd Professor of History at Duke University, covers in detail the strategic thinking and military planning during the years 1867 to 1919, the period which opens with the achievement of colonial autonomy and the withdrawal of imperial garrisons and closes with the emergence of a Commonwealth of associated nations. Although he focuses on Canadian attitudes and actions, Professor Preston has included the contemporary relations of the other self-governing colonies with respect to imperial defense so that his subtitle correctly describes the contents of the book. Because almost all studies of the subject have been written from a British point of view and based upon British sources, the author's approach is the pioneering one of utilizing dominion archives to present problems and policies as they appeared to Canadians. Australians, and New Zealanders.

In the period of this study, and even until the opening of the Second World War, the term "imperial defense" was used ambiguously. To many military leaders, politicians, and publicists in Britain, and some colonials of the imperialist school, it meant a centrally planned defense of the Empire under British command, with dominion forces committed to an imperial strategy. They often wrote and spoke in the years before World War I as though this kind of defense system had been achieved, and the illusion was supported by such names as Committee of Imperial Defense and Commander of the Imperial General Staff. To most dominion leaders, however, imperial defense stood for the principle that the colonies had a vital stake in the existerce of the British Empire and that they would help to resist a serious threat to it.

The obstacles to the achievement of the form of imperial defense promoted in official circles in London were insurmountable given the trend of constitutional development in the Empire. Dominion ministers and their electorates were jealous of their autonomy and were not disposed to make commitments of forces or money when they had no voice in British foreign or strategic policy. Some leaders in both Britain and the dominions believed that imperial federation would one day provide the Empire with central organs to deal with foreign affairs and defense, but before World War I the problems of representation, travel, and communications left federal institutions a vision for the future.

Central planning of imperial defense was also impeded by the dominions' varying estimates of the dangers they faced. Until late in the nine-

teenth century, the United States represented the chief threat to Canadian security, and only large land forces could meet invasion from the south. Such forces were beyond the resources of the dominion, and British help was unlikely to arrive in time to avert defeat. Consequently, Canadian governments did little to increase the size and effectiveness of their militia forces, showed little interest in sea power, and pointed to internal development, especially the construction of the Canadian Pacific Railroad, as their contribution to imperial defense. For the Australasian colonies, Russian and later German and Japanese imperialist ambitions in the Far East were the menaces they feared. After the Colonial Conference of 1887, they contributed to the construction of additional ships for the Australian station, although the Admiralty's insistence upon full control of naval dispositions led to continual bickering.

Despite the unwillingness of the dominions to participate in a centralized system of imperial defense, there developed, especially in the decade before 1914, many forms of military cooperation with Britain. Standardization in organization, tactics, and weapons, officer exchanges, and training in military and staff colleges facilitated cooperation and integration when war came.

It is Professor Preston's opinion that "No one can say whether (a centralized system of) imperial defense, had it been attempted, would have been more effective." He does not believe, however, that the achievement of such a system would have been a deterrent to the outbreak of either of the World Wars or enhanced the contributions of the dominions. "The 'ifs' of history," he writes, "are always an unsatisfactory basis for argument, yet it is tempting to suggest that if the imperial defense planners had had their way, and if dominion contributions had been automatic, obligatory, or subject to a British direction that could not be questioned or criticized, the resulting dominion efforts would have been smaller and the two world wars might have taken very different turns." As it was, national sentiment and a common cause produced a maximum response from the Empire when the challenge came.

One would like to see the author's demonstrated skills in research, analysis, and exposition devoted to the subsequent Commonwealth period of military cooperation. In the present book he has laid an admirable foundation.—HIRAM M. STOUT, The George Washington University.

The Illusion of Permanence: British Imperialism in India. By Francis G. Hutchins. (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1967. Pp. xv, 217. \$6.50.)

Professor Hutchins' thesis is that during the nineteenth century the British completely reversed their conception of their role in India. Until about the middle of the century they regarded India as a social laboratory, a pristine nation which through expert British rule could be transformed into a virtual utopia which might surpass even Britain in some ways. Subsequently, those who opposed the growth of democracy in Britain came to see India as a refuge where one still could enjoy the status and power of a stratified, closed society. As this view increasingly predominated, the British no longer conceived of their rule of India as a limited period of tutelage, but believed it would be permanent. Since this belief completely ignored rising Indian nationalism, it was illusory.

This major shift in perspective was not an adverse reaction to the major rebellion of 1857; Hutchins argues that the British simply used this event to rationalize a change in values which already was occurring. Instead the primary reasons were: first, that new theories about the factors productive of various character traits convinced the British that the Indian climate made the defects of the natives unremedial: second, that replacing the rule of the East India Company with that of a royally appointed Vicerov tied national prestige much more tightly to domination of India and made graceful withdrawal much more difficult to contemplate; third, that increasing international competition for colonial empires required that Britain retain all her colonies and even acquire more to prove that she was a great power; and, fourth, that although they might educate their children in England and even leave their families there for vears, the British administrators in India did not desire very strongly to return home because the status which was theirs in India could not be transferred to England—their pretentions to an aristocratic style of life would be shattered upon their return home.

Corresponding to this shift in British imperial values was a change in the quality of British rule in India. Instead of trying to reform the Indians, the British tried to make their rule seem, at least superficially, more oriental. Being less foreign, it would be more acceptable to the Indians and would enable the British to control the country more effectively. Thus, instead of expanding opportunities for the average person to participate in government, as was occurring at home, the British increasingly were willing to govern despotically. Thus they propped up the traditional Indian rulers as puppets through which they controlled the country. The stirrings of Indian nationalism in protest to this rule were regarded by British administrators in India as needless trouble produced by radical democrate agitating in England about better treatment for the Indians. The "bleeding hearts" were provoking a movement which otherwise would never have existed.

While this argument is interesting, it is supported not by rigorous proof but rather by common-sense logic and selective illustration. Hutchins thinks "it was not surprising" that those Englishmen who opposed the growth of democracy should have regarded India as a refuge: so without further evidence he assumes that this was the case. He strongly emphasizes that British administrators were motivated to go to India by the opportunities to gain status and wealth, but presents little evidence beyond a quote or two to explain how he knows what was in these peoples' minds. He argues that life in India was sufficiently uncomfortable to convince a Victorian Englishman, who had enshrined duty as code of life, that he must be doing his duty and, therefore, building his character. India's unpleasantness was precisely what attracted Englishmen. The evidence for this is a onesentence comment by a Lady S. contained in the diary of one William Blunt, neither of whom is further identified. Too frequently Hutchins fails to explain why the people he quotes should be considered either authoritative or representative. He devotes seven pages to summarizing a novel on British life in India by Matthew Arnold's brother, but he shows neither that this book had a widespread impact on British values nor was typical of British fiction of the time on this topic. Thus for all one can tell. Hutchins has presented whatever supported his argument and ignored everything else.

Even should Hutchins' account of British imperial values be representative, a further problem remains: he presents no evidence to link these values with actual British policy. He assumes that the ideas of British intellectuals were shared by administrators in India. True, John Stuart Mill, one of those he quotes, worked for the East India Company for 35 years, but is he to be taken as typical of the colonial administrator? And even if these ideas were part of the intellectual baggage which administrators took with them to India, did they try to implement them? Hutchins does not show that they did. His argument is flawed by an unexplored hiatus between ideas and policy.

As for the subject of the book, Hutchins suggests that it is important to study British imperial values because we can understand Indian nationalism only in terms of the Western values to which it was reacting. Such a study also is significant in providing further evidence about the development of prejudices and stereotypes.

Unfortunately, Hutchins devotes little time to discussing the Indian reaction to British policy and does not relate his findings at all to existing social psychological theory on prejudice.

This book, then, is primarily a history of ideas and chiefly a descriptive history at that. Hutchins reports the change in ideas which he believes occurred, but does not really show why particular ideas developed as they did. For example, granted that Victorian Englishmen accepted the theory that climate produced character and, therefore, made the Indians unreformable, why did they come to believe this theory? Hutchins does not say.

Despite its shortcomings this book does offer on a significant topic some interesting ideas which deserve to be followed up. Perhaps it can serve to stimulate more rigorous research in this area.—

JORGEN RASMUSSEN, Vanderbilt University.

The OAS and United States Foreign Policy. By JEROME SLATER. (Columbus: Ohio State University Press, 1967. Pp. viii, 289, bibliography, index. \$6.00.)

In spite of the long history of the Pan American ideal and the special place of Latin America in the foreign policy of the United States, there has until recently been very little literature of value dealing with contemporary inter-American relations. With a few important exceptions, both United States and Latin American writings in this field have been either largely historical, highly polemical, or excessively legalistic in nature. Against this background, one is all the more grateful for the major contribution which Jerome Slater makes with his new book.

The OAS and United States Foreign Policy is both a study of the activities of the regional organization in several key functional areas and an analysis of its part in the evolving Latin American policy of the United States. More broadly, this volume focuses upon the organization as a dynamic instrument of all member governments, emphasizing its development through the interplay of policies which are themselves continually shifting in response to oftendramatic changes at the domestic political level. Slater stresses the period since the founding of the OAS in 1948, although perhaps regrettablypartly because of publication deadlines—he chooses not to deal with the 1965-66 Dominican crisis, the latest conflict between the U.S. and Panama over the future of the Canal, and the Alliance for Progress. In his work, he has drawn heavily upon his earlier writings (dissertation, monograph, and two articles), made good use of OAS documents and secondary sources, and added much significant information gleaned from interviews.

The Introduction offers a succinct review of U. S. post-war policies. Chapter 1 traces the development of the inter-American system from independence to the present and includes the best brief analysis of the principal OAS organs that this reviewer has seen.

Chapter 2 considers the OAS record in the collective security field from 1948-60. Slater stresses that "the primary function of the OAS has been to cloak and thereby legitimize the predominant role of the United States" in settling hemisphere conflicts, especially in the traditional Caribbean sphere of U. S. influence. He attributes "great significance" to OAS successes, although he points out that "the moral underpinning of collective security is often quite shaky" since it maximizes only the one value of interstate peace at the price of stabilizing the "unjust status quo" of dictatorship.

In Chapters 3-4 the author examines OAS actions as an "anti-Communist alliance" in response to the Korean War and the challenges of the Guatemalan and Cuban revolutions. His choice of terms rests upon his judgment that the organization has applied a double standard to hemisphere threats to the peace, as a rule mediating disputes arising from customary Caribbean intrigues while reacting much more forcefully to conflicts which involve the "imprecise and emotional". concepts of "Communism" and "subversion." Moreover, Slater charges that the OAS has betrayed the collective security ideal in its failure to offer Guatemala and Cuba protection against, or at least to condemn, U. S .sponsored exile invasions. The results, he notes, have been a serious break in the OAS practice of unanimity, an outpouring of anti-American sentiment, and an exacerbation of militarism and endemic political instability in Latin America. On the positive side, the multilateral aspect of the Cuban problem has early and late provided the United States with an excuse to avoid drastic unilateral action against Castro.

Chapters 5-7 are devoted to the OAS operating as an "antidictatorial alliance." Slater emphasizes the contrast between the Dominican case, when vigorous joint OAS-U. S. efforts under the guise of collective security measures paved the way for the Bosch regime's "experiment in democracy," and the Haitian episode, when a majority of governments—despite the prodding of the United States and Latin American democrats—refused to use a diplomatic-military confrontation between Bosch and Duvalier as grounds for bringing strong pressure to bear on the Haitian tyrant. Subsequently, he demonstrates that the Haitian affair was much more in line with the usual OAS posture on the democracy issue.

Slater's most important observations emerge

in the context of his concluding chapter discussion of integrative and disintegrative forces in the OAS. In view of "the wide political, ideological, and cultural differences in the hemisphere." he says, "one might argue that the really striking fact is that the OAS has worked as well as it has." It has done so, he feels, not only because of a genuine (though by no means blanket) commitment to Pan Americanism on the part of many political leaders, but, more significantly, because participation in the organization has held sufficient rewards for all member states. Apart from its value to the United States in pursuit of the central goals of stability and containment of Communism, the organization has been useful to the Latin American states in protecting them from external threats and as a lever over U.S. policies that they otherwise would not have had. Time and time again, the record reveals the United States scaling down its demands in the interest of unanimity.

Slater also effectively dispels the myth that the OAS has been the constant servant of a reactionary coalition of the "Colossus of the North" and venal Latin American dictators. Indeed he highlights the cautious encouragement which the Kennedy administration gave to pro-democracy initiatives and the attempts of both Herter and Rusk to moderate conservative regimes' hard-line stands on the subversion question.

It is Slater's principal criticism of the OAS and the Johnson administration that so little has really been done to support the cause of democracy in the Americas. His concluding pages constitute a reasoned plea for a more enlightened policy in this respect, one which would cast aside the shibboleth of absolute nonintervention and favor, not "indiscriminate intervention," but collective measures against unprogressive dictatorships. In his view, the Kennedy administration's assumption that the removal of dictators who oppose change has an anti-Communist utility is questionable at best; therefore, he would rest the case for pro-democracy intervention largely on its moral validity.

This review would not be complete without mention of a few deficiencies which only slightly dim the overall excellence of this book. Slater's Chapter 7 survey of the ongoing issue of institutionalizing a pro-democracy role for the OAS is too sketchy: much of the record simply is not here. For example, in his examination of the Bogotá Conference he makes no reference to haggling over the binding quality of key Article 5(d) and the matter of membership of non-democratic regimes. The former omission allows him to say that "the practice of democracy is not required of OAS members," which is contrary to

the consensus that emerged from the meeting (requirement of democracy, yes—enforcement, no). From Bogotá he moves to the 1959 Meeting of Foreign Ministers, neglecting the Latin American response to Truman initiatives in the wake of post-war military coups and discussions of recognition norms within the framework of OAS juridical organs. In addition, he underestimates the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights, as witness its active role in the 1965-66 Dominican situation and its success in wresting an expanded mandate from the Second Special Inter-American Conference.

The reviewer would also question Slater's assertion in the Introduction that by the fall of 1963 the Kennedy government had become so disillusioned with its pro-democracy policy that a retrenchment was underway. How is this judgment to be reconciled with the President's firm denial that Assistant Secretary Martin's October statement represented an "apologia for coups" and his own dramatic reaffirmation of the basic principles of his policy in Miami shortly before his death? Slater cites interviews as the source of some of his information in this section: Can it be that he talked to State Department hands whose reading of trends might well have been swayed by the hope that the White House was finally "coming to its senses"? The Kennedy period still needs further investigation.

Another shortcoming of the book is Slater's analysis of the nonintervention rule in Chapter 1. He states that Charter Article 15 "proscribed collective as well as unilateral intervention, thus excluding the OAS itself from involvement in the domestic or even the foreign policies of the member states, except in the case of aggression." Again, he should look more closely at the Bogotá debates, which indicate that the ambiguous phraseology of the article was a product of a difference of opinion as to the desirability of hamstringing the OAS. Slater is likewise remiss in his treatment of the OAS-UN relationship. For instance, he maintains in Chapter 3 that one outcome of the Guatemalan affair was the "exclusion" of UN jurisdiction from the Western Hemisphere. In fact, the "try the OAS first" issue which the Guatemalan case raised reappeared in connection with Cuba with far less definitive results.

One may also quarrel with the author's refusal to grant anti-Communist measures the legitimizing label of collective security. He admits that his decision not to do so is "arbitrary," but it seems excessively arbitrary to this reader. Have the proponents of anti-Communist action been insincere in maintaining that their security has been threatened? Should the label attached hinge upon the "objective" correctness

of their assessment? Must a collective security system treat every threat to the peace and each party to a dispute equally, cr is this a model which is seldom, if ever, approximated in practice?

A last complaint might be that Slater has failed to place his subject in the perspective of a growing body of relevant theory. For all his use of the terms "integrative" and "disintegrative," he does not allude to the work of Haas and others in the field of international integration. Neither does he draw insights from international legal theory in his examination of nonintervention and other Charter norms. Finally, if all or most dictatorships are relatively inept at modernizing, as some political development theorists would have it, a pro-democracy policy may assume a new urgency and an even broader application than Slater intends.—Yale H. Ferguson, Rutgers—The State University.

Overtaken by Events: The Dominican Crisis from the Fall of Trujillo to the Civil War. By John Bartlow Martin. (New York: Doubleday & Company, 1966. Pp. xvi, 821. \$7.95.)

This book, probably the finest as well as the frankest memoir ever written by an American diplomat, is a readable and often exciting account of the critical period before and during the Dominican civil war of 1965. In addition to describing, movingly and compassionately, the social and political chaos in the Dominican Republic, and the absurdity which so frequently prevails in Caribbean politics, it is an interesting first hand account of the inner workings of an embassy and its staff during a period of crisis in a small and turbulent country. The author's portrayal of the spent and disoriented Dominican society which emerged from the death throes of Trujillo's tyrannical order, although perhaps too long, detailed, and somewhat disjointed, is nevertheless fascinating. Mr. Martin, a member of Adlai Stevenson's circle, who later moved to Kennedy's camp, was sent on a fact-finding mission to the Dominican Republic in 1961, at the time when Trujillistas were using the Communist bogeyman to influence us. He later served as ambassador during 1963-64, and again as special envoy of President Johnson during the revolution of 1965. The book covers the Kennedy administration's efforts to help the Dominicans build a free society on the ruins of Trujillo's old order on shaky political foundations, the presidency of Juan Bosch in 1963, and the civil war which swept away the delicate political arrangement that had been so laboriously built.

Divided into four parts, the book, after a brief introductory chapter on Dominican history and an account of the Trujillo era, deals in detail with the events which finally led to the

taking of office of a democratically elected Dominican President for the first time in thirty-two years. Martin then deals with the Bosch regime and categorically asserts that U.S. policy was aimed at maintaining President Bosch in office, never at overthrowing him, and rejects the idea that our deeds constituted intervention. He maintains that we acted as "a moderator among contending forces, as a helping hand in a difficult time," and that every U. S. diplomatic effort was aimed at promoting the freedom of the Dominican people. Part IV relates how the Civil War of 1965 broke out and what he personally was called upon to do as presidential envoy. The book ends with some conclusions concerning United States policy toward Latin America and with some useful appendices. His suggestions regarding our foreign policy provide nothing new, and consist essentially of a plea for a continuation of the Kennedy policy of alignment with the forces at work for change in Latin America. In pointing out past mistakes and failures, he makes several keen observations, as for example when he challenges the idea that a burgeoning middle class will automatically advance political freedom and progressive ideas.

Martin's version of the U.S. armed intervention in 1965 is generally favorable to the administration and certain aspects of his account will be controversial. He maintains that there was a real danger of a Communist takeover, but his evidence is not too convincing. He argues that it was a question of the "bloodbath that fuses men and women of all ideologies into a fanatic mass and erases the fine distinctions that are possible in ordinary times." He further maintains that President Johnson had no choice but to send the troops or in the end a Communist-dominated government would have been established. If the Communists were so poorly organized, divided, and by and large ineffective, as he admits, it is difficult to believe that a Communist takeover was imminent. But even when dealing with these controversial aspects, Ambassador Martin's testimony is always straightforward and honest. In his lively, lucid, and very moving manner, he manages to convey the notion that the Dominican case is infinitely more complex than the majority of the world's public opinion supposed. He reminds us that when Trujillo fell, many believed a bloodbath inevitable. If it did not occur, it was mainly due to the presence of the U.S. fleet, the OAS, and the complicated political arrangements that led the country to elections. Bosch's accession to power collected and focused again all the hopes and aspirations which had been let loose by Trujillo's fall, and his subsequent overthrow cut them loose again. Under the Reid administration that succeeded it, these subsurface currents

continued to undermine the regime. Seen thus, the 1965 upheaval was the end result of a revolutionary process that had been stifled by Trujillo's regime of institutionalized terror and eventually directed into peaceful channels by Bosch's election. Its roots of discontent were held in check first by Trujillo, then the OAS and the United States but they are much alive.

All in all, it is a fine book and a most valuable contribution. Minor sins, likely to be criticized by both U. S. and Latin-American liberals, do not diminish the intrinsic first-rate quality of Martin's memoirs.—Federico G. Gil, University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill.

Soviet and Chinese Communist Power in the World Today. Ed. by Rodger Swearingen. (New York: Basic Books, Inc., 1966. Pp. xii, 126. \$3.95.)

The Communist States and the West. Ed. By Adam Bromke and Philip E. Uren. (New York: Frederick A. Praeger, 1967. Pp. vii, 242, \$6.50.)

Most of the essays in Soviet and Chinese Communist Power in the World Today insist that the USSR and CPR continue to strive for "world domination," and that temporary lapses into a policy of peaceful coexistence should not be interpreted as a deviation from the commitment to create a Communist world. Although the changing international environment with which the Communist states must contend is stressed by Professor Philip E. Mosely, one of the contributors, most of the essays portray Soviet and Chinese foreign policy as primarily determined by the nature of their internal political systems, i.e., the "dynamic of one party dictatorship admits no modification of political structure or objective; they can be restrained only by superior political and military forces" (p. 73).

Since these essays tend to regard Communist "ideology" as synonymous with the more messianic utterances of Lenin, Mao Tse-tung, and Lin Piao, these statements of principle are perceived as the source of immediate policy objectives rather than as pious hopes for the future of the world. Because of this crude conception of ideology, most of the essays analyze Communist policy in terms of the conventional and misleading dichotomy between "ideology" and "power politics." They thereby ignore (1) the statist nature of the ideologies evolved by the Communist leaderships which allows them to represent policies designed to foster their own security needs and objectives as by definition hastening the "revolution," and (2) the close relationship between the analytic statements made by Communist leaders at a particular time,

the existing international situation, and actual Communist foreign policies.

Furthermore, most of the essays fail to differentiate between interstate or governmental relationships and the ruling parties' conception of correct strategy for Communists throughout the non-Communist world. As a result, the authors' distinction between "moderate" and "militant" policies is blurred, while their treatment of the Sino-Soviet dispute is extremely oversimplified, e.g., such assertions as the CPC and CPSU agree that the "major technique" for eroding Western influence is the "war of national liberation" (p. 76), or that "over the question of coexistence, the Soviets are for it, the Chinèse Communists are not" (p. 111).

Nevertheless, both Max Frankel and Professor Marshall Shulman avoid these pitfalls. Frankel attempts to deal with the current complexities within the Communist world while Professor Shulman makes a sophisticated effort to define American-Soviet relations. As opposed to most of the companion essays which stress internal and messianic ideological factors, Shulman emphasizes the "condition of the environment of international politics" as the major determinant of Communist foreign policies.

The essays in The Communist States and the West present a broad spectrum of interpretations of Communist foreign policy. Two of the most interesting are those by Professors Bernard Morris and John Kautsky. Morris presents the view (which would have been considered heresy a decade ago) that much of Soviet foreign policy after World War II was defensive, statist, and more concerned with the construction of a reliable security sphere than with the extension of "world revolution." Probably most significant, Morris sees Soviet policy during Stalin's last years as localized rather than "global" (pp. 23-24).

Kautsky carefully differentiates between Soviet foreign policy and local Communist strategies. contending that the USSR has in actual fact abandoned the idea of Communist-led social revolution as a foreign policy goal and that the CPSU has actually urged the local Communists, particularly in underdeveloped countries, to follow suit. However, he contends that such a major shift in priorities can be perceived only on a policy level and cannot be determined directly from Soviet public pronouncements because the leadership's words "can indeed, not be trusted" (p. 216). Nevertheless, Soviet public discussions of the non-Communist world have made it clear that "revolution" is at best something for the distant future, a fact which has accelerated the disaffection with the CPSU among the local Communists.

Both volumes illustrate the shortcomings of a collection of articles as opposed to a monograph on a particular subject. All but a few of the essays in the volume edited by Professor Swearingen tend to reinforce one particular interpretation, in this case, the conventional cold war wisdom of the late 1950's. In contrast, the essays in the collection edited by Professors Bromke and Uren include such diverse interpretations (which, unfortunately, are not directed toward one another) and cover so many geographic areas, that it is impossible to come to a consensus on the distinctive attributes of Communist foreign policies.—Jonathan Harris, University of Pittsburgh.

The Two Faces of Co-Existence. By Alfred Berzins. (New York: Robert Speller and Sons, 1967. Pp. 335, index. \$6.00.)

Peaceful Coexistence: International Law in the Building of Communism. By Bernard A. Ramundo. (Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins Press, 1967. Pp. 262, index. \$6.95.)

These two books are entirely different in spite of the similarity in titles. The tone of Mr. A. Berzins' book can be gauged by this introductory statement: "... the communist leaders in Moscow are still at the centre of the world communist conspiracy" (p. XI). Anyone who is familiar with the difficulties encountered by Moscow in its relations with the Chinese, Albanian, Cuban, Rumanian and several other parties could hardly agree with this categorical opinion. If the Soviet leaders themselves could read that other statement: "Cuba has, in fact, become a colony of the Soviet Union..." (p. 71), they would probably melancholically remark: "If it only were true!"

While there is no doubt that the Polish party has disappointed the hopeful Polish expectations of October 1956, it is another overstatement to say: "Thus, by and large, the communist dictatorship in Poland was again brought up to Soviet standards" (p. 118). Or is it true that: "... in actuality the communists have not allowed even one crack to appear in their iron curtain" (p. 314)?

The author supports his thesis, among others, by recalling the history of Stalin's imperialism in Eastern Europe. Approximately one half of the book is taken up by this true story which had been told several times before in other books, most of them better documented. Not all of these earlier books have been listed in the bibliography, which frequently does not mention the publication dates for the listed books.

The political purpose of the book is frankly stated: "All armed conflicts in Asia, Europe, Africa, and Latin America since the end of the

Second World War, with the exception of the Suez incident, have been organized and guided mainly by the Soviet Communist party. These facts clearly indicate that the most dangerous adversary of the United States is still to be found in the Soviet Union..." (pp. 303-304). Does the author really believe that the Russian Communists masterminded the Chinese-Indian, the Indian-Pakistani, or the federal Nigerian-Biafran hostilities, to mention a few examples?

The conclusion is logically deduced: "... the building of bridges between the communist regimes of the Soviet Union and the satellite countries, on the one hand, and the Western democracies, on the other, is not only useless, but might actually be harmful to the latter" (p. 316).

Lt. Colonel Ramundo's book is of an entirely different nature. It is a scholarly and richly documented study of the current Soviet interpretation of international law. The limitation of space does not allow for the rendering of full justice to this fine book. It suffices to mention that all the aspects of Soviet doctrine are carefully analyzed: basic concepts, the sources and subjects of international law, socialist international law, sovereignty, peace and war, colonialism, collective security, international organization, peaceful settlement of international disputes, arms control, and peaceful change. Perhaps one of the author's main contributions is his analysis of the Soviet concept of a sort of "natural law." This ius cogens, founded on the Marxist-Leninist "laws" of historical development, holds, according to Soviet lawyers, a place higher than the positive international law. The United Nations Charter in the Soviet interpretation is considered the main source of that ius cogens which is used as the criterion of validity of the rules of positive international law. The invention of that ius cogens allows the Soviet lawyers to select inconvenient treaties or rules of the customary international law and declare them null and void as allegedly contrary to the superior Marxist-Leninist "natural law." This is an easy way for evading the principles of pacta sunt servanda and of respect for generally recognized customary law, which principles the same lawyers dutifully acknowledge as universally binding on states. The concept of ius cogens might be very convenient for the Soviet government. However, if other governments followed suit and picked up what they liked or disliked from the existing international law, this law would become meaningless. What the Soviet lawyers seem to forget is the reciprocity which is the surest guarantee of the observance of international law. While Lt. Colonel Ramundo wisely observes that: "All states attempt to utilize international law

to cloak their foreign policies with the mantle of legality" (p. 1), the Soviet concept of ius cogens goes too far in this direction.

Is this the last word said by Soviet lawyers? The author points out "... the increasingly status quo orientation" (p. 1) of Soviet foreign policy, mindful of Russia's national interests and fearful of nuclear risks. He rightly observes that the Soviet policy-makers are caught between "the conflicting demands of their practical need to support the status quo and their ideological commitment to support the forces of world revolution" (p. 2). He might also be right in the expectation that: "... the underlying premise of peaceful coexistence, a bipolar world of two ideologically opposed camps, is rapidly disappearing and a reformulation of the Soviet approach to international law may become necessary" (p. 234). If it is true that "... the policy of peaceful coexistence contemplates détente between East and West and not a series of confrontations on the issues of national liberation" (p. 234), then one should hope that Soviet lawyers will eventually be instructed to forget their ingenious invention of ius cogens and to interpret the positive international law in the spirit of a reasonable reciprocity.

Lt. Colonel Ramundo has offered to lawyers and political scientists, interested in the Soviet ways of thinking, a valuable reference book.—W. W. Kulski, Duke University.

The Changing Face of Southeast Asia. By Amry Vandenbosch and Richard Butwell. (Lexington: University of Kentucky Press, 1966. Pp. 419. index. \$7.50.)

This book is an up-dating of Southeast Asia Among the World Powers written by the same authors in 1957. The current study is again useful for the layman and the area specialist. It is timely and well-written.

The book begins with a brief introduction covering the role of geography, pre-Western institutions, colonialism, and nationalism in the emerging political systems of the region. Each country is then discussed primarily in a historical context. The study ends with a discussion of the impact of international relations and American foreign policy on the politics of Southeast Asia.

To this reviewer the best parts of the book are the brief analyses interspersed among the vast historical material. Especially good are the assessment of the abortive Communist coup in Indonesia in October 1965, the confrontation of Malaysia, recent American-Philippine relations, and the U Nu and Ne Win governments in Burma. There are a few errors in these chapters. The figure of 1,000,000 Malays living in southern Thailand is too high (p. 75). The United States

did not follow a policy of cultural assimilation in the Philippines during the colonial era (p 114). It is doubtful that the Communist rule established by Ho Chi Minh in North Vietnam after 1954 is similar in theory and practice to the authoritarian rule imposed by Ne Win in Burma after 1962 (p. 128). It is equally doubtful that the Vietnamese people living in northeastern Thailand are "overwhelmingly Communist" (p. 308). And it is probably wrong to predict that neither the United States nor the United Nations can prevent the "ultimate dominance" of Southeast Asia by Communist China (p. 332).

The chapters dealing with international relations and American foreign policy in Southeast Asia are the most provocative and stimulating. They are primarily analytical and interpretative in content. In places they are also ambiguous and contradictory. The reader cannot tell, for example, whether the authors believe that Western influence is decreasing or increasing in the region. In one section they state: "All factors considered. there has been a sharp decline in Western influence in Southeast Asia since the Second World War, particularly in the half-decade, 1960-1966" (p. 321). Shortly thereafter the authors add: "Western influence, though it clearly declined in the first decade after independence, remained strong nonetheless. Particularly did the United States increase its influence in the area during this period. The general decline in Western influence, however, probably impressed many persons more than it should have" (p. 328). No empirical data are presented to measure or assess this important interaction between external influences and Southeast Asia politics. The discussion on Vietnam is likewise uncertain and confusing. This reviewer was not certain whether the authors feel the United States is justified in defending South Vietnam or if they believe the Hanoi government has a legitimate right to promote subversion and aggression against the southern half of the country.

In spite of these shortcomings the book is informative and interesting. It contains much useful statistical data that have not appeared elsewhere. It also has new information on moves toward regional cooperation that has not been published before. It does add to our limited knowledge of the important region of Southeast Asia.—Frank C. Darling, DePauw University.

The Trauma of Decolonization: The Dutch and West New Guinea. By Arend Lijphart. (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1966. Pp. xi, 303. \$7.50.)

Self-assuredness is not the stuff of high drama. The Portuguese colonialism à l'outrance in Angola

and Mozambique has that straightforward and brutish quality of stale melodrama. The British withdrawal from India or Nigeria, on the other hand, lacking even melodrama, suggests nothing so much as the prosaic, unsentimental businessman cutting his losses by liquidating an enterprise which is faring poorly. There is a twinge of regret perhaps, but a brief glance at the accounts ledger soon extinguishes that. The Dutch liason with West New Guinea-as that of France with Indo-China and Algeria-however, has all the makings of great drama. The Hamletesque colonizer is beginning to lose confidence in himself and therefore in his mission to raise others to his estate, but his confidence is not so far sapped as to pass into cynicism. Vacillating between righteous indignation and melancholy, as the difficulties of his position mount, the hero inevitably succumbs, a victim of his own confusion and the taunts of others.

Liphart's sensitive and searching account of Dutch efforts to retain this last symbol of their once mighty empire in the East Indies does full justice to its dramatic potential. First, he disposes quickly and effectively of the Realpolitik explanations of why Holland might have wanted to keep West New Guinea. The economic potential of the Dutch half of the island was-to compare it with another half-island kingdomalmost as lackluster as that of Haiti. Initial dreams of black gold collapsed when two of the three known oil fields were quickly exhausted and production from the third fell precipitously. Hopes that the island could become a homeland for surplus labor from Holland and for "Indies Dutchmen" (Eurasians) experienced a similar fate as colonizing groups went bankrupt and erstwhile pioneers returned home. Limping along on deficits made good by the Dutch Treasury and with little prospect of private gain (Crocodile skins and U.S. military scrap metal left over from W.W. II were among its most prominent exports!), Dutch New Guinea's economic prospects were altogether dreary. The case for the strategic value of New Guinea was equally hollow as SEATO, Australia, and the U.S. all declined to offer even moral support for Holland's position. Far from gaining anything, then, the Dutch stood to sacrifice a great deal for their reluctance to surrender New Guinea especially since it jeopardized their far more valuable interests in Indonesia itself.

One is quite accustomed to discover baser motives lurking behind a veil of righteousness and platitudes. The whole point of Lijphart's argument, however, is that the baser motives were in this case an insubstantial screen behind which more symbolic—albeit misguided—goals were pursued. Ultimately, the forces in Holland

intent on retaining West New Guinea were motivated by sentiments similar to this appeal by one party spokesman: "Let the Netherlands show that it is not a small forgotten country on the North Sea, which is being driven back inside its national boundaries, but that it still possesses that old, tough, and tenacious spirit to make New Guinea into a New Holland" (pp. 120-121). But since such visceral attachments cannot by themselves pass for policy goals in this, the twentieth century, politicians and pressure groups resorted to quite fanciful claims for the strategic and economic value of West New Guinea. The deception as to the objective worth of the island was not so much premeditated as it was the result of selective perception engendered by a strong emotional commitment. Determined to keep New Guinea as an amulet against becoming just another small European nation, Dutchmen convinced themselves for a time that the island was objectively worth keeping too.

While it is somewhat unsportsmanlike to fault an author for neglecting something he did not set out to accomplish, it is regrettable that the dynamics of the psychological attraction of colonialism was not examined more thoroughly. Mannoni's brilliant essay, Prospero and Caliban: The Psychology of Colonization offers a host of

raw propositions about the psychic satisfactions available to the colonizers which might have been profitably examined in this case. Instead, Lijphart confines himself largely to making a case for subjective factors in colonialism by showing the absence of more objective interests.

One last question nags the reader. The author intends to explain the Dutch refusal to decolonize West New Guinea but, in fact, when the going got rough, the Dutch surrendered control quite readily. In Indonesia-where more concrete interests were at stake—sovereignty was only transferred after four years of armed struggle. In Dutch New Guinea, on the other handwhere few if any concrete interests were involved-control was retained as long as the costs were small, but once military and diplomatic pressures reached even modest levels, the territory was abandoned. This comparison suggests that concrete interests (e.g., Indonesia) will be defended against greater odds than symbolic interests (e.g., New Guinea) when all is said and done and thus appears to undermine Liphart's implicit assertion to the contrary.

Neither of these objections should obscure the fact that this work represents a major achievement in the political analysis of decolonization.—James C. Scott, University of Wisconsin.

ANNOUNCEMENTS

The sixty-fourth Annual Meeting of the Association will be held September 3-7, 1968 at the Washington-Hilton Hotel, Washington, D.C.

ARTICLES ACCEPTED FOR FUTURE PUBLICATION

June, 1968

- Charles R. Adrian and Charles Press, "Decision Costs in Coalition Formation"
- Robert Alford, "Voting Turnout in American Cities"
- Steven J. Brams, "Measuring the Concentration of Power in Political Systems"
- S. E. Finer, "Pareto and Pluto-Democracy"
- Carl J. Friedrich, "Some Thoughts on the Relation of Political Theory to Anthropology"
- Lewis A. Froman, Jr., "Organization Theory and the Explanation of Important Characteristics of Congress"
- Dean Jaros, Herbert Hirsch, and Fred Fleron, "The Malevolent Leader: Political Socialization in an American Sub-culture"
- Charles O. Jones, "The Minority Party and Policy-Making in the House of Representatives"
- Fred Kort, "A Nonlinear Model for the Analysis of Judicial Decisions"
- Lewis Lipsitz, "If, as Verba Says, the State Functions as a Religion, What Are We to Do to Save Our Souls?"
- Richard M. Merelman, "On the Neo-Elitist Critique of Community Power"
- Bruce M. Russett, "Commentary on Brams' Measuring the Concentration of Power in Political Systems"
- Michael J. Shapiro, "The House and the Federal Role: A Computer Simulation of Roll-Call Voting"

September, 1968

- Richard Ashcraft, "Locke's State of Nature: Historical Fact or Moral Fiction?"
- Edward N. Beiser, "The Reapportionment Cases: A Comparative Analysis of State and Federal Judicial Behavior"
- Moshe M. Czudnowski, "A Salience Dimension for the Study of Political Culture"
- Jerome M. Gilison, "Soviet Elections as a Measure of Dissent: The Missing One Percent"

- A. James Gregor, "Political Sciences and the Uses of Functional Analysis"
- Kenneth P. Langton and M. Kent Jennings, "Political Socialization and the High School Civics Curriculum in the United States"
- Michael Leiserson, "Factions and Coalitions in One-Party Japan: An Explanation Based on the Theory of Games"
- Milton G. Lodge, "Soviet Elite Attitudes in the Post-Stalin Era"
- Martin C. Needler, "Political Development and Socioeconomic Development: The Case of Latin America"
- Robert A. Schoenberger, "Conservatism, Personality and Political Extremism"
- Joel J. Schwartz and William R. Keech, "Group Influence on the Policy Process in the Soviet Union"
- J. David Singer, Bruce M. Russett, and Melvin Small, "National Political Units in the Twentieth Century: A Standardized List"
- Jack E. Vincent, "National Attributes as Predictors of Delegate Attitudes at the United Nations"
- Raymond E. Wolfinger and Fred I. Greenstein, "The Repeal of Fair Housing in California: An Analysis of Referendum Voting"

December, 1968

- Paul R. Brass, "Indian Party Systems: Coalition Politics and the Formation of Non-Congress Governments in North India"
- M. Margaret Conway and Frank B. Feigert, "Motivation, Incentive Systems, and the Political Party Organization"
- Ernest A. Duff and John F. McCamant, "Measuring Social and Political Requirements for System Stability"
- H. D. Forbes and Edward R. Tufte, "A Note of Caution in Causal Modelling"
- Michael P. Gehlen, "The Soviet Central Committee: An Elite Analysis"
- Ted Gurr, "A Causal Model of Civil Strife: A

Comparative Analysis Using New Indices"
Allan Kornberg and Hal N. Winsborough,
"The Recruitment of Candidates for the
Canadian House of Commons"

Michael Lipsky, "Protest as a Political Resource"

Allan G. Pulsipher and James L. Weatherby, Jr., "Malapportionment, Party Competition, and the Functional Distribution of Governmental Expenditures"

Harry M. Scoble and Robert R. Alford, "Sources of Local Political Involvement"

Ira Sharkansky, "Agency Requests, Gubernatorial Support and Budget Success in State Legislation"

Godon Tullock, "A Note on Censorship"

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
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
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
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
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
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
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
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
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
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
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
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INDEX TO ADVERTISERS

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Allyn & Docon Inc	412, 4	113
Appleton-Century-Crofts Asian Survey	356, 3	357
Asian Survey	3	379
Atherton Press	4	117
Audio-Visual Research		4
Basic Books	318, 3	319
Bedminster Press	3	381
Blaisdell Publishing Company	3	397
Bobbs-Merrill Company, Inc.	344, 3	345
University of California Press	3	339
University of Chicago Press	340, 3	341
Columbia University Press	,383, 384, 3	385
Commentary Reports	Cover	. 11
Congressional Quarterly	3	377
Continental 16	3	378
Thomas V Crowell Company	<i></i> 3	192
Dodd, Mead & Company	3	68
Dorsey Press		5/3
Doubleday & Company, Inc.	3	189
Evnosition Press	3	360
Free Press	372, 373, 3	3,74
G. K. Hall & Company	3	369
Harcourt, Brace & World, Inc.	.409, 410, 4	111
Harper & Row	1, 3	358
Harvard University Press		335
Holt, Rinehart & Winston, Inc.	324, 3	325
Houghton-Mifflin Company	3	398
University of Illinois Press	3	353
John Hancock Mutual Life Insurance Company	3	320
Johns Hopkins Press	326. 3	334
Johnson Reprint Corporation	[.] 3	355
J. B. Lippincott Company	3	380
Little, Brown & Company348,	349, 350, 3	351
McGraw-Hill Book Company	336, 3	351 337
McGraw-Hill Book Company	336, 3	351 337 376
McGraw-Hill Book Company David McKay Company, Inc. Macmillan Company	336, 3 386, 3	351 337 376 387
McGraw-Hill Book Company David McKay Company, Inc. Macmillan Company M.I.T. Press	336, 3	351 337 376 387 415
McGraw-Hill Book Company David McKay Company, Inc. Macmillan Company M.I.T. Press University of Minnesota Press	336, 3 3386, 3 43	351 337 376 387 415 361
McGraw-Hill Book Company David McKay Company, Inc. Macmillan Company M.I.T. Press University of Minnesota Press National Press Inc.	336, 3 336, 3 336, 3 443	351 337 376 387 415 361 382
McGraw-Hill Book Company David McKay Company, Inc. Macmillan Company M.I.T. Press University of Minnesota Press National Press Inc. Northern Illinois University Press	336, 3	351 337 376 387 415 361 382
McGraw-Hill Book Company David McKay Company, Inc. Macmillan Company M.I.T. Press University of Minnesota Press National Press Inc. Northern Illinois University Press	336, 3	351 337 376 387 415 361 382
McGraw-Hill Book Company David McKay Company, Inc. Macmillan Company M.I.T. Press University of Minnesota Press National Press Inc. Northern Illinois University Press Northwestern University Press Oxford University Press 327, 328, 329, 330,	336, 336, 337, 332, 331, 332, 33	351 337 376 387 415 361 382 342 379
McGraw-Hill Book Company David McKay Company, Inc. Macmillan Company M.I.T. Press University of Minnesota Press National Press Inc. Northern Illinois University Press Northwestern University Press Oxford University Press Oxford University Press Descor Publishers 327, 328, 329, 330,	336, 3 386, 3 386, 3 331, 332, 3 406, 4	351 337 376 387 415 361 382 342 342
McGraw-Hill Book Company David McKay Company, Inc. Macmillan Company M.I.T. Press University of Minnesota Press National Press Inc. Northern Illinois University Press Northwestern University Press Oxford University Press Oxford University Press Descor Publishers 327, 328, 329, 330,	336, 3 386, 3 386, 3 331, 332, 3 406, 4	351 337 376 387 415 361 382 342 342
McGraw-Hill Book Company David McKay Company, Inc. Macmillan Company M.I.T. Press University of Minnesota Press National Press Inc. Northern Illinois University Press Northwestern University Press Oxford University Press Oxford University Press Prederick A. Praeger Prentice-Hall. Inc. 401, 402, 403, 404.	336, 3 386, 3 386, 3 331, 332, 3 406, 4	351 337 376 387 415 361 382 342 3407 323 HII
McGraw-Hill Book Company David McKay Company, Inc. Macmillan Company M.I.T. Press University of Minnesota Press National Press Inc. Northern Illinois University Press Northwestern University Press Oxford University Press Oxford University Press Frederick A. Praeger Frentice-Hall, Inc. Princeton University Press 401, 402, 403, 404,	336, 3 386, 3 386, 3 331, 332, 3 406, 4 419, Cover 408, Cover	351 337 376 387 415 361 382 342 379 333 407 323 III
McGraw-Hill Book Company David McKay Company, Inc. Macmillan Company M.I.T. Press University of Minnesota Press National Press Inc. Northern Illinois University Press Northwestern University Press Oxford University Press Frederick A. Praeger Prentice-Hall, Inc. Princeton University Press Rand McNally & Company 363, 364.	336, 3 386, 3 331, 332, 3 406, 2 419, Cover 408, Cover 408, Cover	351 337 376 387 415 361 382 342 379 333 407 323 III IV
McGraw-Hill Book Company David McKay Company, Inc. Macmillan Company M.I.T. Press University of Minnesota Press National Press Inc. Northern Illinois University Press Northwestern University Press Oxford University Press Peacock Publishers Frederick A. Praeger Prentice-Hall, Inc. Princeton University Press Rand McNally & Company Random House & Alfred A. Knopf	336, 3 386, 3 331, 386, 3 406, 2 419, Cover 408, Cover 365, 366, 3 390, 3	351 337 376 387 415 361 382 342 379 333 407 323 HI IV 367
McGraw-Hill Book Company David McKay Company, Inc. Macmillan Company M.I.T. Press University of Minnesota Press National Press Inc. Northern Illinois University Press Northwestern University Press Oxford University Press Oxford University Press Prederick A. Praeger Prentice-Hall, Inc. Princeton University Press Rand McNally & Company Random House & Alfred A. Knopf Ravtheon Education Company	336, 3 386, 3 386, 3 331, 332, 3 419, Cover 408, Cover 365, 366, 3 390, 3	351 337 376 387 415 361 382 342 379 333 407 323 HI IV 367 391
McGraw-Hill Book Company David McKay Company, Inc. Macmillan Company M.I.T. Press University of Minnesota Press National Press Inc. Northern Illinois University Press Northwestern University Press Oxford University Press Oxford University Press Prederick A. Praeger Prentice-Hall, Inc. Princeton University Press Rand McNally & Company Random House & Alfred A. Knopf Raytheon Education Company Ronald Press Company Ronald Press Company	336, 3 386, 3 386, 3 331, 332, 3 406, 3 419, Cover 408, Cover 365, 366, 3	351 337 376 387 415 361 382 342 379 333 407 323 HI V 367 391 405
McGraw-Hill Book Company David McKay Company, Inc. Macmillan Company M.I.T. Press University of Minnesota Press National Press Inc. Northern Illinois University Press Northwestern University Press Oxford University Press Oxford University Press Prederick A. Praeger Prentice-Hall, Inc. Princeton University Press Rand McNally & Company Random House & Alfred A. Knopf Raytheon Education Company Ronald Press Company St. Martin's Press, Inc.	336, 3 386, 3 386, 3 331, 332, 3 406, 4 419, Cover 408, Cover 365, 366, 3 390, 3	351 337 376 387 415 361 3882 342 379 3333 111 1V 367 391 405
McGraw-Hill Book Company David McKay Company, Inc. Macmillan Company M.I.T. Press University of Minnesota Press National Press Inc. Northern Illinois University Press Northwestern University Press Oxford University Press Peacock Publishers Frederick A. Praeger Prentice-Hall, Inc. Princeton University Press Rand McNally & Company Random House & Alfred A. Knopf Raytheon Education Company Ronald Press Company St. Martin's Press, Inc. Science Research Associates	336, 3 386, 3 386, 3 331, 332, 3 409, Cover 408, Cover 365, 366, 3 390, 3	351 337 376 387 415 361 382 342 343 3407 367 391 405 343 416
McGraw-Hill Book Company David McKay Company, Inc. Macmillan Company M.I.T. Press University of Minnesota Press National Press Inc. Northern Illinois University Press Northwestern University Press Oxford University Press Peacock Publishers Frederick A. Praeger Prentice-Hall, Inc. 401, 402, 403, 404, Princeton University Press Rand McNally & Company 363, 364, Random House & Alfred A. Knopf Raytheon Education Company Ronald Press Company St. Martin's Press, Inc. Science Research Associates Scott, Foresman & Company	336, 3 386, 3 386, 3 331, 332, 3 406, 3 419, Cover 408, Cover 365, 366, 3 390, 3	351 337 376 387 415 361 382 342 343 3111 11V 367 391 405 343 416 352
McGraw-Hill Book Company David McKay Company, Inc. Macmillan Company M.I.T. Press University of Minnesota Press National Press Inc. Northern Illinois University Press Northwestern University Press Oxford University Press Oxford University Press Frederick A. Praeger Prentice-Hall, Inc. Princeton University Press Rand McNally & Company Random House & Alfred A. Knopf Raytheon Education Company Ronald Press Company St. Martin's Press, Inc. Science Research Associates Scott, Foresman & Company Charles Scribner's Sons	336, 3 386, 3 386, 3 331, 332, 3 406, 3 419, Cover 408, Cover 365, 366, 3 390, 3	351 337 376 387 415 3882 342 3333 407 323 111 1V 367 391 405 343 343 343 343 343 344 344 344 344 34
McGraw-Hill Book Company David McKay Company, Inc. Macmillan Company M.I.T. Press University of Minnesota Press National Press Inc. Northern Illinois University Press Northwestern University Press Oxford University Press Oxford University Press Frederick A. Praeger Prentice-Hall, Inc. Princeton University Press Rand McNally & Company Random House & Alfred A. Knopf Raytheon Education Company Ronald Press Company St. Martin's Press, Inc. Science Research Associates Scott, Foresman & Company Charles Scribner's Sons University of South Carolina Press	336, 3 386, 3 386, 3 331, 332, 3 406, 3 419, Cover 408, Cover 365, 366, 3 390, 3	351 337 376 387 387 388 341 388 342 342 342 343 3111 367 391 405 343 343 344 347
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McGraw-Hill Book Company David McKay Company, Inc. Macmillan Company M.I.T. Press University of Minnesota Press National Press Inc. Northern Illinois University Press Northwestern University Press Oxford University Press Peacock Publishers Frederick A. Praeger Prentice-Hall, Inc. Princeton University Press Rand McNally & Company Random House & Alfred A. Knopf Raytheon Education Company Ronald Press Company St. Martin's Press, Inc. Science Research Associates Scott, Foresman & Company Charles Scribner's Sons University of South Carolina Press Stackpole Books Syracuse University Press	336, 3 386, 3 386, 3 331, 332, 3 406, 4 419, Cover 408, Cover 365, 366, 3 390, 3 399, 4	351 337 3887 415 3882 342 379 3407 323 111 1V 367 3416 359 3443 416 352 388 346
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McGraw-Hill Book Company David McKay Company, Inc. Macmillan Company M.I.T. Press University of Minnesota Press National Press Inc. Northern Illinois University Press Northwestern University Press Oxford University Press Peacock Publishers Frederick A. Praeger Prentice-Hall, Inc. 401, 402, 403, 404, Princeton University Press Rand McNally & Company 363, 364, Raytheon Education Company Ronald Press Company St. Martin's Press, Inc. Science Research Associates Scott, Foresman & Company Charles Scribner's Sons University of South Carolina Press Stackpole Books Syracuse University Press Teachers Insurance & Annuity Association D. Van Nostrand Company, Inc.	336, 3 386, 3 386, 3 331, 332, 3 406, 2 419, Cover 408, Cover 365, 366, 3 390, 3	351 337 3887 415 3882 342 3333 407 323 111 11V 367 3891 405 3888 347 3688 347 3688 347
McGraw-Hill Book Company David McKay Company, Inc. Macmillan Company M.I.T. Press University of Minnesota Press National Press Inc. Northern Illinois University Press Northwestern University Press Oxford University Press Oxford University Press Peacock Publishers Frederick A. Praeger Prentice-Hall, Inc. Princeton University Press Rand McNally & Company Random House & Alfred A. Knopf Raytheon Education Company Ronald Press Company St. Martin's Press, Inc. Science Research Associates Scott, Foresman & Company Charles Scribner's Sons University of South Carolina Press Stackpole Books Syracuse University Press Teachers Insurance & Annuity Association D. Van Nostrand Company, Inc. Viking Press	336, 3 386, 3 386, 3 331, 332, 3 406, 3 419, Cover 408, Cover 365, 366, 3 390, 3	351 337 3387 415 361 361 362 379 3333 3407 367 367 367 367 369 369 369 369 369 369 369 369 369 369
McGraw-Hill Book Company David McKay Company, Inc. Macmillan Company M.I.T. Press University of Minnesota Press National Press Inc. Northern Illinois University Press Northwestern University Press Oxford University Press Oxford University Press Prederick A. Praeger Prentice-Hall, Inc. Princeton University Press Rand McNally & Company Random House & Alfred A. Knopf Raytheon Education Company Ronald Press Company St. Martin's Press, Inc. Science Research Associates Scott, Foresman & Company Charles Scribner's Sons University of South Carolina Press Stackpole Books Syracuse University Press Teachers Insurance & Annuity Association D. Van Nostrand Company, Inc. Viking Press Wadsworth Publishing Company	336, 3 386, 3 331, 332, 3 419, Cover 408, Cover 365, 366, 3 390, 3	351 337 3387 415 361 382 3379 3333 3407 323 3407 3405 3446 3446 3446 3446 3446 3446 3446 344
McGraw-Hill Book Company David McKay Company, Inc. Macmillan Company M.I.T. Press University of Minnesota Press National Press Inc. Northern Illinois University Press Northwestern University Press Oxford University Press Peacock Publishers Frederick A. Praeger Prentice-Hall, Inc. Princeton University Press Rand McNally & Company Random House & Alfred A. Knopf Raytheon Education Company Ronald Press Company St. Martin's Press, Inc. Science Research Associates Scott, Foresman & Company Charles Scribner's Sons University of South Carolina Press Stackpole Books Syracuse University Press Teachers Insurance & Annuity Association D. Van Nostrand Company, Inc. Viking Press Wadsworth Publishing Company Washington Tapes	336, 3 386, 3 386, 3 331, 332, 3 406, 4 419, Cover 408, Cover 365, 366, 369, 3	351 337 3387 415 361 382 3379 3333 3407 323 3407 367 388 3405 3405 3416 3469 3469 3469 3469 3469 3469 3469 346
McGraw-Hill Book Company David McKay Company, Inc. Macmillan Company M.I.T. Press University of Minnesota Press National Press Inc. Northern Illinois University Press Northwestern University Press Oxford University Press Peacock Publishers Frederick A. Praeger Prentice-Hall, Inc. 401, 402, 403, 404, Princeton University Press Rand McNally & Company 363, 364, Random House & Alfred A. Knopf Raytheon Education Company Ronald Press Company St. Martin's Press, Inc. Science Research Associates Scott, Foresman & Company Charles Scribner's Sons University of South Carolina Press Stackpole Books Syracuse University Press Teachers Insurance & Annuity Association D. Van Nostrand Company, Inc. Viking Press Wadsworth Publishing Company Washington Tapes Wesleyan University Press	336, 3 386, 3 386, 3 331, 332, 3 408, Cover 408, Cover 365, 366, 3 390, 3 399, 4	351 337 3387 415 361 382 342 3333 407 323 11V 367 388 3416 352 388 3416 352 364 367 367 367 367 367 367 367 367 367 367
McGraw-Hill Book Company David McKay Company, Inc. Macmillan Company M.I.T. Press University of Minnesota Press National Press Inc. Northern Illinois University Press Northwestern University Press Oxford University Press Oxford University Press Peacock Publishers Frederick A. Praeger Prentice-Hall, Inc. 401, 402, 403, 404, Princeton University Press Rand McNally & Company 363, 364, Raytheon Education Company Ronald Press Company St. Martin's Press, Inc. Science Research Associates Scott, Foresman & Company Charles Scribner's Sons University of South Carolina Press Stackpole Books Syracuse University Press Teachers Insurance & Annuity Association D. Van Nostrand Company, Inc. Viking Press Washington Tapes Wesleyan University Press John Wiley & Sons, Inc.	336, 3 386, 3 386, 3 331, 332, 3 406, 3 419, Cover 408, Cover 365, 366, 3 390, 3 399, 4 394, 395, 3	351 337 3887 415 3882 3333 3407 3323 III 367 3891 405 3888 347 3646 36418 4114 4354 4359 396
McGraw-Hill Book Company David McKay Company, Inc. Macmillan Company M.I.T. Press University of Minnesota Press National Press Inc. Northern Illinois University Press Northwestern University Press Oxford University Press Prederick A. Praeger Prentice-Hall, Inc. Princeton University Press Rand McNally & Company Random House & Alfred A. Knopf Raytheon Education Company Ronald Press Company St. Martin's Press, Inc. Science Research Associates Scott, Foresman & Company Charles Scribner's Sons University of South Carolina Press Stackpole Books Syracuse University Press Teachers Insurance & Annuity Association D. Van Nostrand Company, Inc. Viking Press Wadsworth Publishing Company Washington Tapes Wesleyan University Press John Wiley & Sons, Inc. World Law Fund	336, 3 386, 3 386, 3 331, 332, 3 406, 3 419, Cover 408, Cover 365, 366, 3 390, 3 399, 4	351 337 3387 415 361 3842 379 3333 3407 367 367 367 367 367 368 369 369 369 369 369 369 369 369 369 369
McGraw-Hill Book Company David McKay Company, Inc. Macmillan Company M.I.T. Press University of Minnesota Press National Press Inc. Northern Illinois University Press Northwestern University Press Oxford University Press Oxford University Press Peacock Publishers Frederick A. Praeger Prentice-Hall, Inc. 401, 402, 403, 404, Princeton University Press Rand McNally & Company 363, 364, Raytheon Education Company Ronald Press Company St. Martin's Press, Inc. Science Research Associates Scott, Foresman & Company Charles Scribner's Sons University of South Carolina Press Stackpole Books Syracuse University Press Teachers Insurance & Annuity Association D. Van Nostrand Company, Inc. Viking Press Washington Tapes Wesleyan University Press John Wiley & Sons, Inc.	336, 3 386, 3 386, 3 331, 332, 3 406, 3 419, Cover 408, Cover 365, 366, 3 390, 3 399, 4	351 337 3387 415 361 3842 379 3333 3407 367 367 367 367 367 368 369 369 369 369 369 369 369 369 369 369

THE AMERICAN POLITICAL SCIENCE



•	•
Political Science and the Uses of Functional Analysis A. James Gregor	425 ·
Pareto and Pluto-Democracy: The Retreat to Galapagos S. E. Finer	440
On the Neo-Elitist Critique of Community Power Richard M. Merelman	451
Measuring the Concentration of Power in Political Systems Steven J. Brams	461
Probabilism and the Number of Units Affected: Measuring Influence Concentration	170
Bruce M. Russett	476
The Minority Party and Policy-Making in the House of Representatives	
Charles O. Jones	481
The House and the Federal Role: A Computer Simulation of Roll-Call Voting	
Michael J. Shapiro	494
Organization Theory and the Explanation of Important	
Characteristics of Congress Lewis A. Froman, Jr.	518
If, as Verba Says, the State Functions as a Religion, What Are We to Do Then to Save Our Souls?	E07
Lewis Lipsitz	527
Some Thoughts on the Relation of Political Theory to Anthropology	· F00
Carl J. Friedrich	536
A Nonlinear Model for the Analysis of Judicial Decisions Fred Kort	546
Decision Costs in Coalition Formation Charles R. Adrian and Charles Press	556
The Malevolent Leader: Political Socialization in an American Sub-culture	
Dean Jaros, Herbert Hirsch, and Frederic J. Fleron, Jr.	564
Communications to the Editor	576
Book Reviews and Notes	
James W. Protho (ed.)	582
Announcements	695

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Current issues are priced at \$3.75 per copy; for back issues prior to 1963 address Johnson Reprint Corp., 111 5th Ave., New York, N.Y. 10003; subsequent to 1963 send request directly to the American Political Science Association.

Applications for membership, orders for the Review, and remittances should be addressed to the Executive Director, The American Political Science Association, 1527 New Hampshire Ave., N.W., Washington, D.C. 20036. Notices of change of address should be received in the Washington office by the 25th day of the month before publication.

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Articles and notes appearing in the Review before the June, 1953 issue were indexed in *The Reader's Guide to Periodical Literature*. The International Political Science Abstracts and the International Index to Periodicals index current issues. Microfilm of the Review, beginning with Volume 1, may be obtained from University Microfilms. 313 North First Street, Ann Arbor, Michigan. A Cumulative Index of the Review, Volumes 1-57: 1906-1963, may be obtained from Northwestern University Press, 1735 Benson, Evanston, Illinois.


Office of publication: Curtis Reed Plaza, Menasha, Wisconsin.

Foreign Agent: P. S. King and Staples, Ltd., Great Smith Street, Westminster, London.

Second class postage paid at Menasha, Wisconsin. Acceptance for mailing at special rate of postage provided for in Section 1103, Act of October 3, 1917, authorized May 12, 1926.

Printed in the United States of America by George Banta Company, Inc., Menasha, Wisconsin.

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The American Political Science Review

VOL. LXII

JUNE, 1968

NO. 2

POLITICAL SCIENCE AND THE USES OF FUNCTIONAL ANALYSIS*

A. JAMES GREGOR University of California, Berkeley

I. INTRODUCTION

Political science, as an empirical enterprise, shares with the other behavioral or social sciences at least one characteristic feature: partial formalization. For a science to most reliably discharge its two principal functions, explanation and prediction, statements embodying acquired knowledge must be systematically organized in subsumptive or deductive relations. Minimally, a set of such systematically related propositions, which include among them some lawlike generalizations, and which can be assigned specific truth value via empirical tests, is spoken of as a theory.2 A theory, in a substantially formalized system, includes as constituents (1) an uninterpreted or formal calculus which provides for syntactical invariance in the system, (2) a set of semantic rules of interpretation which assign some determi-

- * A much revised version of a communication given before the Symposium on Methodology in the Social Sciences held at the University of Rome, March, 1966.
- ¹ For the purposes of discussion social or behavioral science is understood as that knowledge enterprise whose subject matter includes that of psychology as well as that dealing with all adaptively behaving or purposively behaving systems or entities. It is primarily on these grounds that the contention is frequently bruited that explanation in the social sciences is characteristically "teleological" while explanation in the natural sciences is "causal." The distinction, while cognitively useful, is not, as will be argued, substantive.
- ² Cf. R. B. Braithwaite, Scientific Explanation: A Study of the Function of Theory, Probability and Law in Science (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1955), p. 22; R. S. Rudner, Philosophy of Social Science (Englewood Cliffs, N. J.: Prentice-Hall, 1966), p. 10.

nate empirical meanings to the formal calculus thereby relating it to an evidential or empirical base, and (3) a model for the uninterpreted calculus, in terms of more or less familiar conceptual or visualizable materials, which illustrates the relationships between variables in structural form, an alternative interpretation of the same calculus of which the theory itself is an interpretation.³

The virtues of standard formalization need hardly be specified. For our purposes here it is sufficient to indicate that formalization seeks to satisfy the minimal requirements of any serious knowledge enterprise; to provide for syntactical and semantic invariance without which reliable knowledge is simply not conceivable. The language shift, exemplified in any cognitive effort, from ordinary to specialized language style is the consequence of attempting to reduce the vagueness, ambiguity and tense obscurity that afflicts common speech. Semantic and syntactical invariance afford the minimal necessary conditions for drawing out the testable implications of any set of empirical propositions, for identifying the locus in which false propositions are located when a hypothesis fails to meet empirical test, for coordinating research in order that separate findings support each other, for isolating the most strategic propositions for testing and in order to provide the most parsimonious summary of actual or anticipated research efforts.4 Any putative

- ³ E. Nagel, The Structure of Science: Problems in the Logic of Scientific Explanation (New York: Harcourt, Brace & World, 1961), p. 90. This is an obvious simplification; cf. P. Suppes, "What is a Scientific Theory," in S. Morgenbesser, Philosophy of Science Today (New York: Basic Books, 1967), pp. 55-67.
- ⁴ Cf. H. L. Zetterberg, On Theory and Verification in Sociology (3rd ed., Totowa, N. J.: Bedminster Press, 1965), pp. 157-174.

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theoretical effort which cannot achieve, to an appreciable extent, the requisite semantic and syntactic precision can remain substantially insulated against empirical test and is consequently devoid, in large part, of explanatory significance. These are the minimal responsibilities implied in David Easton's injunction that the science of politics, in its efforts at theory construction, attempt to meet the methodological requirements characteristic of the natural sciences.

Partially formalized systems lack, in varying measure, the logical and linguistic precision afforded by full or extensive formalization and are consequently suspect. This cannot be construed to mean that scientific inquiry in areas where formalization has not been achieved must cease until such time as extensive or exhaustive formal systematization is forthcoming. Significant empirical generalizations and a wealth of descriptive material have been the product of diligent enterprise in the partially or minimally formalized sciences. All that car be legitimately implied by the recognition that a discipline is only partially or minimally formalized is that self-conscious efforts should be made to identify sources of error—vagueness. ambiguities, reifications and tense obscurities and the equivocations and vacuities that are their too frequent consequences.

One of the special advantages enjoyed by extensively formalized systems is that the introduction into the system of nonindigenous concepts (borrowed from other disciplines) is accomplished with a minimum amount of hazard. In physics nonindigenous concepts like "all," "not," "or," and so forth are borrowed from logic and employed in its formulations. Chemistry similarly employs nonindigenous physical concepts like "temperature" and "mass." Such concepts are incorporated with minimal obscurity. They enter the system as resource constituents. Since they are fully explicated in their parent discipline their implications for the new can be specified. Thus the hazard of incorporating logical concepts in physics or physical concepts in chemistry is minimal since the parent discipline is formalized and the implications of the use of such concepts can be. for all intents and purposes, adequately characterized.

- ⁵ I have alluded to some of these shortcomings of classical Marxist social theory in A. J. Gregor, A Survey of Marxism: Problems in Philosophy and the Theory of History (New York: Random House, 1965), pp. 261-281.
- ⁶ D. Easton, A Framework for Political Analysis (Englewood Cliffs: Prentice-Hall, 1965), pp. 7f.

Unfortunately, in partially formalized sciences⁷ there is a tendency to incorporate not only considerable conceptual and resource material from other disciplines, but even what passes as "common sense" or "ordinary knowledge" as well. Explanations in history, for example, manifestly traffic in presuppositions, auxiliary assumptions, and conceptual devices borrowed from an array of attendant areas of knowledge including the various social sciences. popular knowledge and common sense, and "theories" in history tend to be collections of vague and loosely jointed generalizations and speculative hypotheses. Political science, in our own time, has shown something of these features, characterized by a marked disposition to assimilate, in all but their entirety, techniques developed in (but not exclusively by) sociology and related disciplines, particularly those conceptual devices identified as "functional or systems analyses."8 Similarly, "theory" in political science tends to be identified with everything from typologies, analytic conceptual schemata, confirmed experimental hypotheses and speculations as well as (traditionally) ethical injunctions.

This article will address itself to some of the general problems in theory construction in political science which attend the uncritical assimilation of non-indigenous concepts borrowed from related but minimally formalized behavioral sciences, particularly when those resource disciplines are characterized by their foremost proponents as "fledgling disciplines" lacking some measure of "intellectual maturity" and possessed of but "scant resources."9 The risks run in borrowing nonindigenous concepts vary in inverse proportion to the degree of formalization of the resource discipline. Sociology, for example, is itself a negligibly formalized enterprise and there is good evidence that functionalist or systems analysis approaches, whatever else they are, are afflicted

- ⁷ Partially formalized sciences feature partially formalized theories which are understood, minimally, to exhibit at least one purportedly deductive connection among their constituent propositions or which determine explicitly the use of at least one of their indigenous concepts.
- ⁸ Cf. O. R. Young, Systems of Political Science (Englewood Cliffs: Prentice-Hall, 1968), chaps. 2 and 3; H. V. Wiseman, Political Systems: Some Sociological Approaches (New York: Praeger, 1966); W. C. Mitchell, Sociological Analysis and Politics: The Theories of Talcott Parsons (Englewood Cliffs: Prentice-Hall, 1967).
- ⁹ R. K. Merton, Social Theory and Social Structure (Revised and enlarged edition, Glencoe: The Free Press, 1957), pp. 6, 7, 9.

with most of the disabilities of ordinary language. The substitution of ordinary with literary and academic language styles does not, in itself, reduce vagueness and ambiguity nor produce the conceptual, predicate and logical invariance requisite to theory construction in science.¹⁰

II. METAPHORS, ANALOGIES AND MODELS

Every scientific language system, as an essential in its generalizing activities, employs metaphor and analogy. In formalized systems metaphor and analogy are explicated in a variety of ways and the hazards entailed in their necessary use significantly reduced. In partially formalized systems, on the other hand, metaphors and analogies function in special ways—some of which are, at best, methodologically suspect. This is particularly true in the case of what is generally called "systems" or "functional" analysis.

Ernst Haas has aptly characterized much contemporary political science inquiry as governed by a "dominant metaphor," and it is a public secret that functionalism and systems analysis have their origins in some one or another form of organicism and specifically homeostatic physiology. Recently, for example, James Miller identified the central thesis of general systems theory as one which seeks "formal identities between various physical systems, the cell, the organ, the individual, the small group or species, and the society," a thesis clearly organismic in conception. Similarly

- 10 The most express criticism of functionalism in this regard is that of C. W. Mills, The Sociological Imagination (New York: Grove Press, 1961), pp. 25-49. Mills is not generally characterized as "objective," but his criticisms about the language shift exemplified in Parsonian functionalism are generally well-taken. More urbane criticism of this sort is to be found in M. Black, "Some Questions about Parsons' Theories," in M. Black (ed.), The Social Theories of Talcott Parsons (Englewood Cliffs: Prentice-Hall, 1961), pp. 279 f.
- ¹¹ E. Haas, Beyond the Nation-State: Functionalism and International Organization (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1964), p. 5.
- 12 J. G. Miller, "General Behavior Systems Theory," in Chicago Behavioral Sciences Publications, No. 1. Profits and Problems of Homeostatic Models in Behavioral Sciences (Chicago: University of Chicago, n.d.), p. 5; cf. J. G. Miller, "Toward a General Theory for the Behavioral Sciences," The American Psychologist, 10 (1955), pp. 513-531. Cf. R. R. Grinker (ed.), Toward a Unified Theory of Human Behavior (2nd ed., New York: Basic Books, 1967), particularly "In-

A. R. Radcliffe-Brown, in an early exposition of functionalist approaches to the study of society, maintained that "the concept of function applied to human societies is based on an analogy between social life and organic life."13 Even today, expositions of functionalism employ, in the effort to clarify the conceptions involved, organismic analogies drawn from biological and specifically physiological phenomena.14 Functional analysis, in effect, employs the techniques characteristic of biological explanation. The object of analysis is some specific item, an observed pattern of behavior or a disposition so to behave (for example, the beating of the heart), occurring in a structurally integrated system (for example, the body of a living vertebrate), with analysis calculated to demonstrate that the specified item satisfies some functional requirement of the system.15 Analogously, for functionalists any recurrent social or political activity (for example, a funeral ceremony or the exercise of the franchise) functions to maintain some process necessary to the structural integrity of the macro-society or the polity.16 The explanatory power ascribed to macro- and micro-functionalist analyses derive, in significant measure, from organismic analogies. In this sense there are many suggestive affinities between the organismic analyses of Robert Redfield and those of the orthodox functionalist.17

troduction to the Second Edition." The organismic thesis has found its way into political science literature in accounts of the following sort: "... Systems have made their appearance as a possible focus, beginning with the smallest cell in the human body as a system and working up through ever more inclusive systems such as the human being as an organism, the human personality, small groups, broader institutions, societies, and collections of societies, such as the international system": Easton, op. cit., pp. 15f.

- ¹³ A. R. Radcliffe-Brown, Structure and Function in Primitive Society (London: Cohen and West, 1956), p. 178.
- ¹⁴ R. F. Spencer, "The Nature and Value of Functionalism in Anthropology," in D. Martindale (ed.), Functionalism in the Social Sciences (Philadelphia: The American Academy of Political and Social Sciences, 1965), p. 2; cf. E. E. Evans-Pritchard, Social Anthropology and Other Essays (New York: The Free Press, 1964), pp. 54f.
- ¹⁵ Cf. C. Hempel, Aspects of Scientific Explanation (New York: The Free Press, 1965), p. 306.
 - 16 Cf. Radcliffe-Brown, op. cit., p. 180.
- ¹⁷ Cf. R. Redfield, Tepoztian; A Mexican Village (Chicago: University of Chicago, 1930); R. Redfield and A. Villa Rojas, Chan Kom: A Mayan

The prevalence of organismic analogies in putative explanations in the behavioral sciences has not gone unchallenged. Functionalists, as purveyors of organismic analogies, have been subject to searching and recurrent criticism. In fact, the literature devoted to the analysis of analogies employed in scientific theory construction and explanation is extensive, and that specifically occupied with organismic analogies employed for explanatory purposes tends to be negatively critical. At least since the time of Herbert Spencer, sociologists have become increasingly suspicious of the use of organismic analogies in the explanation of societal phenomena.

Chalmer Johnson quite correctly alludes to the origins of functionalism in such "uncritical use of the organic analogy."²² He goes on to indicate that "misplaced organic analogies" led analysts to conceive social systems as possessed of life cycles (birth, adolescence, maturity, senility and death) and social systems as entities incapable of reorganizing their internal structure.²³ He argues that the organic analogy is felicitous only in so far as organic "models" are understood to be instances of systems. In effect what is suggested is that the critical analogy obtains between "society" and "systems"

Village (Carnegie Institution, Publication No. 448, Washington, D. C., 1934); see also D. Martindale, The Nature and Types of Sociological Theory (Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1960), p. 92.

¹⁸ Cf. Nagel, op. cit., pp. 520-535, and Logic Without Metaphysics (New York: The Free Press, 1957), pp. 247-283; W. P. McEwen, The Problem of Social-Scientific Knowledge (Totowa: Bedminster, 1963), pp. 203-208.

19 For recent discussions see R. Seeliger, "Analogien und Modelle in der Physik," Studium Generale (1948), I, 125-137; Models and Analogues in Biology: Symposia of the Society for Experimental Biology, No. 14 (New York: Academic, 1960); Nagel, The Structure of Science, pp. 107-117; Hempel, op. cit., pp. 433-447.

²⁰ Cf. J. Rex, Key Problems of Sociological Theory (London: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1963), pp. 61-77.

²¹ Cf. J. Rumney, *Herbert Spencer's Sociology* (New York: Atherton, 1966), chap. 2.

²² C. Johnson, Revolutionary Change (Boston: Little, Brown and Company, 1966), p. 49.

²³ This is of course not true of the best organicists. One need only refer to theorists as sophisticated as Corrado Gini, *Organismo e società* (Rome: Ilardi, 1960), to be disabused of the conviction that organicists are all simpleminded. Cf. M. Marctta, *Organicismo e neo-organicismo* (Milan: Giuffrè, 1959).

rather than "society" and "organisms." As a matter of fact it is evident that the disabilities of analogical argument affect the use of "system" as a "model" of society no less than the use of "organism" as its "model." The critical difficulty inherent in the use of metaphorical and analogical reasoning is that there is no clear specification of where and under what circumstances analogy leaves off and disanalogy begins.24 Recently Walter Buckley has raised significant issues with respect to the application of the "systems" metaphor. He addresses himself to the critical disanalogies which obtain between various "systems," "isolated physical systems," "organic systems" and"higher psychological and sociocultural" systems.25 Easton has similarly alluded to the same disanalogy between "systems."26 One can only wonder at what point one can begin to sense that the employment of the characterization "system" becomes as essentially misleading as the metaphorical use of "organic" is now understood to be, particularly when Morton Kaplan recognizes that "systems theory" can-not pretend to afford a "general theory of all systems" since "systems" as disparate as "the smallest cell in the human body," the "more inclusive systems such as the human being as an organism, the human personality, small groups, broader institutions, societies and collections of societies, such as the international system," while they may in some vague sense "be governed by homologous processes," "require different theories for [their] explanation."27

To speak of the human organism, the polity, the society, the family, the army, the church, the ecology, the economy, the culture, the personality, the social structure and demography as "systems," as does Talcott Parsons and as does Easton on some occasions, is clearly to talk metaphorically.²⁸ The use of terms like "input," "output" and "feedback" are simi-

 24 Cf. V. Pareto, I sistemi socialisti (Turin: UTET, 1951), pp. 285f.

²⁶ W. Buckley, Sociology and Modern Systems Theory (Englewood Cliffs: Prentice-Hall, 1967), pp. 4f., 13-15.

²⁶ Easton, op. cit., p. 25.

²⁷ M. A. Kaplan, "Systems Theory," in J. C. Charlesworth (ed.), Contemporary Political Analysis (New York: Free Press, 1967), p. 154.

²⁸ Cf. T. Parsons, "Power, Party and System," and D. Easton, "An Approach to the Analysis of Political Systems," in S. S. Ulmer (ed.), *Introductory Readings in Political Behavior* (Chicago: Rand McNally and Company, 1961), pp. 128, 140.

larly metaphorically employed as patent analogies of better known and better understood cybernetic and servo-mechanical systems. Until such analogies, given the evident disanologies which obtain between them, are unpacked into specific and testable propositions their use threatens to collapse into belletristic and uninformative profusions.

One of the special confusions which result from the uncritical use of metaphors and analogies in partially or negligibly formalized science is their vague employment as "models." Both Easton and M. Landau move effortlessly from "metaphors" to "models" and such substitutions abound in the literature of political science. That metaphors and models must be distinguished in certain significant respects is evident when one considers their distinctive functions in the knowledge enterprise.

Consider in this regard a certain domain of facts, for example those of neurology, and let no theory be known. In the effort to achieve understanding in this domain the investigator intuits that the central nervous system and a digital computer share certain structural features. Such a computer is understood to display certain neurological properties. It is understood to be, in some sense, an analogue of the central nervous system. Such an analogue is spoken of as a "model," and it is evident that the utility of so conceiving it rests upon the assumption that some analogy obtains between digital computers and the central nervous system. Thus, an unexplored domain of facts is understood to share some significant features with a familiar domain. The claim is that some significant similarities capable of increasing our understanding obtain between the original, more familiar, phenomenon and the phenomenon it is taken to represent. Thus, the flow of a liquid through a pipe is said to illustrate something about the electric current in a wire conductor. Since we know something of the flow of such liquid we can, by extension, say we know something of the analogous flow of electricity—if the model is felicitous. An analogy to be cognitively useful must function in some such fashion.

Loose references to "models" can be misleading. There are a variety of "models" employed in the knowledge enterprise and each type makes different claims and serves significantly different purposes. Analogies that serve as "models" can be classified into at least three principal cognitive types (literary metaphors are appropriately employed in the domain of

²⁹ Easton, Framework, p. 2; M. Landau, "On the Use of Metaphor in Political Analysis," Social Research, 28 (1961), p. 353.

emotive and not cognitive discourse): (1) iconic models which in some way resemble the original by reproducing some of its salient features (the color of the vessel's hull, the shape of its sails and so forth); (2) substantive or symbolic models, which represent phenomena figuratively or in suggestive outline; and (3) analogue or formal models which represent the structural features or patterns of relationship of the original.³⁰

Fortunately the organismic literary metaphors which characterized some of the social science literature at the end of the last century are but rarely found in behavioral science accounts today. Most of such literature was more concerned with charming if cognitively fruitless description, than with generating testable theoretical propositions. To identify the legislature as the "thinking organ" of the body politic and the railways and roadways as the "nervous system" of the social organism is intellectually perverse and fails to enhance our understanding in any way. Such metaphors can be best dismissed as literary curiosities. Of the analogies used to serious purpose, iconic or scale models serve essentially didactic purposes. Models of molecular structures and scale models of mosquitoes exemplify their use. They are used as instructional aids, mnemonic assists. Substantive or symbolic models, on the other hand, are heuristic aids. Easton and Parsons employ, for example, symbolic representations to indicate, graphically and schematically, the system boundaries, input, output and feedback characteristics of the organized aggregates with which they are concerned.31 The most critical use of models employed for explanatory purposes, however, obtains when the models employed are formal or analogue models.

Of the cognitively useful analogies the substantive or symbolic models and the analogue or formal models are significantly different. When scientists conceive the flow of an electric

30 Cf. M. Black, Models and Metaphors: Studies in Language and Philosophy (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1962), pp. 219-243; G. J. DiRenzo, "Toward Explanation in the Behavioral Sciences," in G. J. DiRenzo (ed.), Concepts, Theory and Explanation in the Behavioral Sciences (New York: Random House, 1966), p. 248; D. Willer, Scientific Sociology: Theory and Method (Englewood Cliffs: Prentice-Hall, 1967), chap. 3; M. Brodbeck, "Models, Meaning and Theories," in L. Gross (ed.), Symposium on Sociological Theory (New York: Harper and Row, 1959), pp. 373-403.

31 Easton, "An Approach . . . ," op. cit., p. 137.

current as analogous to water flowing through a pipe, the theoretic yield of such a conception is the consequence of the nomic isomorphism understood to obtain between electric current and hydraulic flow. Thus, fluid flowing with moderate speed through a fairly narrow pipe with a circular cross section is represented according to Poiseulle's law $(V = c \cdot [p_1 - p_2])$ which has the same form as Ohm's law for the flow of electricity via a metallic conductor $(1=k\cdot[v_1-v_2])$. The laws governing water flow and the flow of electricity are formally analogous or isomorphic. They indicate that the same calculus may have more than one physical interpretation. The calculus, for example. of which the kinetic theory of gases is one interpretation, is the same as that of which the theory of elastic collisions in macroscopic mechanics is another. The calculi governing the two sets of phenomena are isomorphic. They are, in fact, the same uninterpreted calculus. Thus we know explicitly in what sense macrophysical mechanics is analogous to, or models, molecular interaction in the kinetic theory of gases. The analogy which obtains does not suffer from the critical difficulty which attends the use of analogical arguments, i.e., the fact that the range of similarities is rarely specified.

Analogies are initially employed in cognitive inquiry to indicate that some similarities obtain, but clearly their application cannot be understood to establish an identity. If such were the case, the classes of phenomena under scrutiny would not be analogous but identical, and the continued use of analogy would be misleading.³² An analogy is a report of a similarity. What is required is a clear indication of the points at which similarity no longer obtains. Until this is specified, the employment of analogy for cognitive purposes is inadequate.

Formal analogies avoid this difficulty. The analogy between water waves and electromagnetic waves covers the syntactical isomorphism, formulated in mathematical terms, which describes discrete aspects of the behavior of water and electromagnetic phenomena. But once such isomorphism has been confirmed, reference to the original analogy is no longer necessary. Explanations and predictive confidence are the consequence of deductive inference employing the appropriate calculus. Water waves and electromagnetic waves are analogous in so far as they are alternate

²² Cf. R. C. Buck, "On the Logic of General Behavior Systems Theory," Minnesota Studies in the Philosophy of Science (Edited by H. Feigl and M. Scriven. Minneapolis: University of Minnesota, 1956), 1, 223-232.

interpretations of the same calculus. A formal correspondence has been established between a set of laws pertaining to a familiar field of inquiry and a corresponding set in the new. Once this is done, the laws can be employed in the explanation of the new domain without reference to the similarities with the more familiar domain which initiated research. Reference to the original analogy, which may have provided the original insight, is no longer necessary and can be dispensed with without prejudice to explanation and prediction. Thus, what is significant in the relatively well-formalized sciences is not mechanistic models of electromagnetic phenomena but the structural relations, in terms of set-theoretical conceptions, understood to map the correspondence between them.33

The empirically confirmed laws which link variables in deterministic or stochastic relations are then incorporated into a hierarchical deductive theoretical system in order to provide the explanations we find so satisfying in the formalized sciences. Such an articulation would deliver the "middle-range" theoretical (i.e., explanatory) constituents to be incorporated into the "mathematical formulation of general theory" to which Easton obliquely refers as the "optimum mode" of theoretical expression.34 Inquiry commences with metaphor and ends with algebra and logical systematization, rendered empirically significant by the coordinating definitions, the semantic rules, which constitute rules of interpretation and which supply the ligaments binding the formal linguistic entity to the object world. Only when a linguistic entity displays such features, which accord it explanatory and/or predictive force, is it appropriate, if one wishes to subscribe to the uses of natural science, to characterize it as "theoretical." "Systems analysis" or "functional analyses" do not pretend to have attained such a level of explanatory competence. They leave us with metaphors and analogies that serve essentially taxonomic purposes, suggesting classificatory affinities between entities in the domain of inquiry, their deployment over the domain remaining a function of the different senses of appropriateness entertained by each investigator.

²⁵ P. Suppes, "A Comparison of the Meaning and Uses of Models in Mathematics and the Empirical Sciences," in H. Freudenthal (ed.), The Concept and Role of the Model in Mathematics and Natural and Social Sciences (New York: Gordon and Breach, 1961), pp. 436f.

²⁴ D. Easton, A Systems Analysis of Political Life (New York: Wiley, 1965), p. 9.

Behavioral scientists, and particularly political scientists, consequently remain concerned by and large, with substantive or symbolic models which serve as preliminary moves in the direction of theory construction. Such models attempt to identify certain essential attributes of disparate classes of entities as sufficiently similar to warrant the ascription to them of a common descriptive term. Such uses abound in the literature of functionalism and systems analysis. Such analogical reasoning can be enormously suggestive as propaedeutic to the study of an unfamiliar empirical domain. In the effort to orient himself in an unfamiliar domain, the empirical scientist very often finds auspicious analogies invaluable. They provide effective heuristic guidance in the initial search for adequate explanation. A felicitous analogy lends itself to some sort of extension from the old domain of inquiry into the new. Behavioral scientists have, on occasion, intuitively grasped a similarity between certain types of systems, organic or otherwise, and that of society. Such similarities may suggest experiments which confirm the putative similarity. The similarities suggest where one might search for variables and the kind of relationship which might obtain between them. If successful, such experiments are stated in terms (generally) or relationships obtaining between (preferably quantified) variables. Such experiments, suggested by the original analogy, now confirm the intuited similarity without further reference to that analogy. The analogy, in and of itself, does not confirm the similarity. Only empirical inquiry in the domain under investigation can begin to accomplish that. Frequently a system, like the human organism, having specific and specified system requisites is seen as analogous to a society. As a consequence certain requisites are imputed to society. These requisites are frequently identified in vague terms such as "pattern maintenance," "adaptation to the environment," "goal attainment" and "integration." Rarely is any effort made to specify what degree or measure of "pattern maintenance" is requisite to the system before the system fails. In the case of the individual organism the requisites for system maintenance are specified in terms of the values certain critical variables can assume and outside of which the system is no longer viable. In the case of society, or the political system, little, if any, attempt has been made to date to specify, even qualitatively (without falling into tautology), the permissible range of variable variation beyond or below which the system would predictably disaggregate.

A signal instance of the effects of this short-

coming is available in Pierre van den Berghe's study of South Africa. The finds the Republic of South Africa riven by "dysfunctions," a lack of value consensus, multiple economic dysfunctions, maladaptions and frustrated goal attainments. And yet the social and political system persists. He suggests, as a solution to the paradox of system persistence in the face of multiple dysfunctions, that functionalist locutions are not fully adequate and must be supplemented by a neo-Hegelian dialectic!

A more defensible conclusion would be that functionalist analyses are not explanatory at all—they are analytic and heuristic—and consequently singularly incapable, in themselves, of providing predictive or explanatory leverage. When Easton defines a "system" as "any set of variables regardless of the degree of interrelationship among them,"36 for example, one can legitimately wonder when one would be disposed to maintain that a "system," political or otherwise, no longer obtains. Such functionalist or systems analysis locutions can best be understood as analytic or definitional heuristic aids. They can pretend to explanatory power only when the initial suggestive analogy between society and whatever system is made sufficiently precise to render testable the formulation of empirical generalizations relating determinate variables in determinate relations. Functionalist or systems analyses are not, in themselves, theories at all.37 They provide analytic conceptual schemata and, as such, make no truth claims. They provide substantive or symbolic analogies between entities or collections of entities they conceive as systems. Such analogies exhaust their cognitive utility by suggesting something about the phenomena that are the subject of inquiry. But it has not been established that society shares syntactical or nomic isomorphism with any nonsocietal empirical system. No specific betterknown non-societal system maps determinate structural relations understood to obtain between societal or political variables. The substantive or symbolic models advanced by functionalism and systems theory suggest something about the societal and political phenomena under scrutiny, the nature of the quasi-mechanical homeostatic processes, which

²⁵ P. van den Berghe, South Africa, A Study in Conflict (Middletown: Wesleyan University Press, 1965).

³⁶ Easton, A Systems Analysis, op. cit., p. 21. ³⁷ Cf. T. B. Bottomore, Sociology: A Guide to Problems and Literature (London: Unwin, 1962), pp. 39f.

relevant variables might influence each other, and so on. But explanatory and predictive power can only be the consequence of verification studies conducted on the primary object of study itself. In other words, the substantive analogies offered by systems or functional analyses can serve neither as indications of nomic isomorphism between domains of inquiry nor as explanations. Substantive analogies serve as heuristic devices often extremely suggestive for taxonomic purposes, but never in themselves as explanations. They are, at best "working hypotheses," always instrumental but never explanations.

Functionalist and systems analysis postulate similarities between various kinds of entities or collections of entities. Postulating such similarities obviously involves a radical simplification; it neglects a multitude of variables of significant, if indeterminate, weight. As such, the correspondences it suggests are always qualified by a tacit recognition that every analogy involves disanalogies of unspecified but significant kind. Such analyses recommend, in effect, highly simplified conceptual schemata. They constitute research suggestions stated in very general terms and with logical rigor little more demanding than that of ordinary language.

In partially formalized sciences experiments capable of confirming the putative similarities suggested by substantive analogies are only forthcoming after special efforts are made to reduce semantic and syntactical variance and variables are defined with sufficient specificity to permit them to be associated in deterministic or stochastic, sequential or coextensive, reversible or irreversible, sufficient or contingent, necessary or substitutable or interdependent relations which explicate the extent of the similiarities which were originally intuited. Until this is accomplished the argument from one class of objects to another via analogies belongs to an uncritical and unreflecting level of reasoning.38

In explanation cognitively useful analogies work, ideally, toward their own exclusion. Neither formal nor substantive analogies are essential parts of explanation. Analogies have at best heuristic and not explanatory function. If an analogy is formal, predictive competence and explanation are served by the use of an uninterpreted calculus which characterizes the structural relationships between variables in two or more classes of phenomena. If the analogy is substantive and describes via an-

³⁸ A. D. Ritchie, *Scientific Method* (Paterson: Littlefield and Adams, 1960), pp. 61f.

alogy some essential feature, hitherto unnoticed or neglected, in an unfamiliar domain, predictive competence and explanation are served by specifying through appropriate verification studies the nature of, and the relationship between, component variables in the specific domain that is the focus of concern.³⁸

Formal analogies, analogue models, are characteristic of formalized sciences. Substantive analogies, symbolic models, are characteristic of partially or negligibly formalized sciences. They share with those sciences their vaguenesses and ambiguities and their syntactical imprecisions. To conceive substantive analogies as anything more than heuristic aids, the preliminary to substantive research, is to mistake shadow for substance.

III. FUNCTIONAL ANALYSIS AND EXPLANATION

Functional analysis—and, in general, systems analysis—as cognitive techniques in a partially formalized science, have special responsibilities. They are required to undertake special efforts at rigor and precision. This is particularly true because of their special dependence on analogical reasoning.

Functional explanations in natural science are generally conceived to be a subclass of teleological explanations, and functional statements are conceived appropriate only in connection with those systems, biological or mechanical, possessing self-maintaining mechanisms for given system traits. Such systems manifest the ability to maintain specific system necessary traits although endogenous or exogenous factors vary within permissible magnitudes. Such systems are dynamically or statically self-equilibrating or functional.40 When Junctionalists employ terms like "equilibrium" and "function" they imply, in general, that societies. families, personalities, armies, churches, political parties, economies and cultures are such directively organized systems.41 Again the persuasiveness of such reasoning trafficks on analogy. To illustrate the selfsustaining features of the political system, Easton, for example, refers to the more "familar biological system . . . the human organism."42 The human organism is, in fact, known to be a teleological or goal-directed system. But f political systems are to be understood to

³⁹ Cf. Hempel, op. cit., pp. 438f.

⁴⁰ For an explication of the meanings of "function" as employed by functionalists, cf. Nagel, Structure of Science, pp. 522-525.

⁴¹ Young, op. cit., p. 28; Kaplan, "Systems Theory," op. cit., pp. 150-155.

⁴² Easton, "An Approach . . . ," op. cit., p. 138.

share critical similarities with such better known systems it is necessary to establish, with some plausibility, that we are capable, at the present time, of adequately characterizing them.

A teleological system, as distinct from a nonteleological system, is one which displays a tendency to move toward some one state or some one class of states out of all its possible states-or to remain in such a state if once achieved. Thus the human body maintains its temperature in a fairly constant state as a consequence of the operation of the thyroid gland, the dilation and contraction of blood vessels carrying blood and radiating heat through the skin, the evaporation of moisture from the body surface, the amount of adrenalin secreted into the blood as well as automatic muscular contractions which produce internal heat—all adaptive or compensatory variations made in response to primary thermal variations in the external environment.

All functional or teleological explanations require the explicit statement or the implicit assumption (1) of a preferred or goal state which characterizes the system, (2) that some conditions or traits are necessary or necessary and sufficient or sufficient but not necessary conditions for the attainment or maintenance of that state, and (3) of a range of values within which condition or trait variations will be compensated for and outside of which the system will fail to attain or display the state description identified as preferred.

Thus an adequate functional analysis of the human organism as a homeostatic system includes a specification of its "equilibrium" or "steady state." Human temperature normally varies from about 97.3°F to 99.1°F and cannot fall below 75°F nor rise appreciably above 110°F without producing probable permanent injury or death. Such temperatures characterize, empirically, the preferred states of the system (the "critical range" of the "essential variables" of the system—to employ Easton's terminology). The ascription of organized directedness to the human organism is warranted by a highly confirmed inductive generalization concerning the disposition of the organism to maintain thermal steady state. Similarly, references to the operations of the thyroid, the presence of adrenalin, dilation and contraction of blood vessels are elliptical references to highly confirmed consequences for the given system of the activities of component parts or processes. Function statements refer to consequences for, while causal propositions state some of the conditions requisite to, the persistence and characteristic organization of the

system. Whatever assertorial force functional explanations have derives from evidence accumulated through the same procedures requisite to any nonfunctional explanation. What makes functional accounts explanatory is the presence in them of generalizations covering initial state descriptions and compensatory intrasystemic variations which maintain a specific goal or preferred state in the system: that is, functional explanation implies the possibility of formulating lawlike statements which relate variables, state coordinates, and their interrelationships in some determinable fashion. Such lawlike statements serve the purpose of predicting the successive states of the system, given variations in its external or internal environment. In other words it is now generally recognized that the explanations forthcoming as a consequence of the application of functional analyses are special cases of deductive or quasideductive nomological explanation not methodologically distinct from paradigmatic explanations in natural science.43 Yet descriptive theorists, the functionalists foremost among them, would be the first to admit that political science possesses precious few of the well-confirmed lawlike generalizations concerning preferred or goal states, the necessary and/or sufficient institutional or functional conditions or traits necessary to the maintenance of the political system in general. much less the "critical range", the "essential variables" any such system can assume without endangering its viability.

What passes for functional accounts in political science are generally explanation sketches of a singularly elliptical sort. They merely indicate vague conditions, neither empirically characterized nor identified as either necessary or sufficient, for the persistence of the system or for the presence of some event of process requisite to the persistence of the system. To maintain that the function of x is y is, for example, in the majority of instances, no more than to claim that usually x, but not only x (for there are functional equivalents of x), produces or aids in producing y which functions essentially in system S. Such statements can tell us no more, and most frequently tell us

43 Cf. Hempel, op. cit., pp. 297-330; Rudner, op. cit., pp. 107-111; R. Brown, Explanation in Social Science (Chicago: Aldine, 1963), p. 110. This is generally recognized by political scientists. Cf. W. G. Runciman, Social Science and Political Theory (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1965), p. 113; V. Van Dyke, Political Science: A Philosophical Analysis (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1960), pp. 32f.

considerably less, than their corresponding nonteleological lawlike statements. Where there are no well-confirmed nonteleological lawlike statements functionalist accounts provide, at their very best, heuristic insights—i.e., "useful ways of thinking."

Functional explanations are most appropriate to systems which exemplify some form of selfregulation and goal directedness. Essential to such explanations is the establishment of appropriate hypotheses of self-regulation and goal directedness in an objectively testable form. This is a particularly critical responsibility in cases where so many entities and aggregates are indiscriminately identified as directively organized, as "systems." It must be possible, for example, to unambiguously designate the system boundaries of the putative systems investigated. How difficult this is, is evident by the dearth of convincing attempts to specify system boundaries for the political system or culture in social science literature. Herbert Spiro speaks of "complex, intricate, overlapping networks of political systems ...," of "kaleidoscopic patterns of expanding and contracting political systems, that overlap with one another. . . . "44 Moreover any effort to characterize the conditions for survival of a society, a culture or a personality is extremely difficult, but functional explanations can hardly be conceived adequate unless such initial determinations are forthcoming. Frequently functional statements are rich in connotation but offer no specific empirical referents for terms like "society," "political culture," "personality," "economic system" and the like or the characteristics which identify system survival or disaggregation. Unless such intrinsically vague concepts are given some specific denotation the entire enterprise is threatened with equivocation and the knowledge enterprise is defaulted.45

The absence of denotation precise enough to unambiguously characterize the state variables which are required for the persistence of a social or political system, much less the system itself, insulate any purported explanation from empirical control. Anything said would be compatible with almost any conceivable matter of fact and with every outcome of empirical investigation into social and political affairs. Once the subject system is adequately specified and the dynamic or static equilibrium supposedly maintained by any constituent item or

process, the functionalist is required to specify the set of state variables whose operation maintains the system in the requisite state and to discover just how those state variables are interrelated to each other and to other endogenous and environmental variables. These relationships can only be specified in lawlike generalizations whose warrant is empirical evidence. Only if all these specifications have been met can the elliptical locution "x has the function y in system S'' be truly informative. It would have no more assertorial force than the unpacked formulations very summarily alluded to above. An adequate functional explanation would minimally include an unambiguous description of x; a specification of the constituents comprising the functional subsystem Y; evidence that x is a constituent of Y; a specification of the state variables of Y; an empirically warranted affirmation that some state properties are properties of x and possibly other entities or processes of Y; an indication of the permissible values that can be assumed by constituent state and environmental variables and the values that would constitute the goal states of the system S of which Y is a functional component.46

Statements which assert that the occurrence of an item x in a cultural, political or personality system is explained by x serving the function y in Y constitute at best the first tentative efforts at classification and are never themselves explanations. They have neither explanatory nor predictive power. In order to serve explanatory or predictive purpose such propositions would have to be condensed statements of an indeterminate set of lawlike propositions and the initial conditions which give them empirical significance. The popularity of functionalist or systems analytic accounts can be explained neither by their explanatory power nor the present measure of their empirical confirmation. Such accounts in political science are, for the present, no more than promissory notes on such explanations. The popularity of such functional accounts is the consequence of their essentially typological or classificatory, and not their explanatory, functions. They constitute programmatic typologies employed in collecting and coding research material. They offer "working hypotheses" which can be best construed as exhortations to treat society, political systems and personality, for example, as self-regulating systems.

Functional analysis serves primarily as an exhortation to conceive the entity, entities,

⁴⁴ H. J. Spiro, "An Evaluation of Systems Theory," in Charlesworth, op. cit., p. 173.

⁴⁵ Cf. R. S. Peters, *The Concept of Motivation* (New York: Humanities Press, 1958), pp. 19f.

⁴⁸ Rudner, op. cit., p. 108.

process or processes under scrutiny as teleological, that is, as having some systemic properties. It is a recommendation to so construe the object or objects of political study. The truth or falsity of such a construction can be established by determining whether in fact the objects in the universe of inquiry do in fact display those properties. The recommendation so to construe them is, in itself, neither true nor false. It makes no truth claims. 47 Such exhortations serve as heuristic aids, to incline the investigator to entertain hypotheses concerning the existence of functional systems, self-regulating and goal-directed entities, and the occurrence of functional relationships among the objects of research.

This seems to be clearly understood by Easton. He refers to his "systems analysis" as a "conceptual framework" which is a "preliminary" to the development of theory, as a way of formulating "appropriate questions" and devising "appropriate ways for seeking answers" rather than providing the substantive answers themselves. 48 Similarly, I. C. Jarvie, analyzing functionalist approaches in anthropology, concludes that functionalist accounts, as such, are not explanatory. Their uses are heuristic.49 William Flanigan and Edwin Fogelman, in their analysis of functionalism in political science, maintain that functionalism has made heuristic, rather than substantive, contributions to the discipline.50 There is, in fact, a general agreement among social science practitioners that functionalist approaches, now and for the foreseeable future, can serve heuristic and not explanatory purposes in their enterprise.

IV. FUNCTIONAL ANALYSIS AS A HEURISTIC AID

Precisely how functional analysis serves as a heuristic aid is best illustrated by a consideration of the work of Talcott Parsons, who is universally recognized as one of the principal proponents of functionalism in social science and whose influence among structural-functionalists and systems analysts is well attested. All share sith Parsons a common language as well as a common conceptual apparatus. A

- 47 Brown, op. cit., p. 110.
- ⁴⁸ D. Easton, "Categories for the Systems Analysis of Politics," in D. Easton (ed.) Varieties of Political Theory (Englewood Cliffs: Prentice-Hall, 1966), p. 154.
- ⁴⁹ I. C. Jarvie, "Limits to Functionalism and Alternatives to it in Anthropology," in Martindale, Functionalism in the Social Sciences, op. cit. pp. 18f.
- ⁵⁰ W. Flanigan and E. Fogelman, "Functionalism in Political Science," *Ibid.*, p. 125

brief review of Parsons' enterprise affords considerable insight into what can be expected from functionalist and systems analysis as well as some of the confusions which attend it.

Parsons employs the phrase "theoretical device" to suggest that functionalist locutions serve as "useful tools." In various places he speaks of "cognitive maps," in which the "concepts," "function" and "system," serve to emphasize "connectedness" between "an ordered aggregate embedded in, and in interaction with, a fluctuating environment" and the mechanisms by virtue of which that aggregate maintains its relative integrity and "defends" itself against extreme environmental fluctuation. 51 In other words, Parsons seems prepared to grant that functionalism is, at its best, a programmatic guide to research. Functionalist locutions are heuristic devices and not attempts at explanation. Parsons indicates that "our conceptual framework guides us to take note of specific system problems and to expect specific system mechanisms or, in their absence, specific system pathologies.... What more can be asked," he continues, "of a 'cognitive map' but that it direct attention of the analyst to relevant questions and to the loci of relevant problems while supplying a conceptual framework wherein 'facts' and the answers to questions and the solutions of the problems become meaningful?"52

Functionalist locutions, therefore, cannot be understood as answers to questions nor solutions to problems. They do not pretend to answer questions, afford explanations and provide predictive control. They are not essentially concerned, in Parsons' words, with the "how and on what terms and with what consequences for each other things are connected." Functional analysis provides the context in which the answers to questions and the solutions to problems become "meaningful." Parsons and the functionalists influenced by him, then, can be best understood not as providing explanations but as (1) issuing implicit or explicit exhortations to social (and consequently political) scientists to so conceive their domain of inquiry that references to "system," "system maintenance" and "function" are appropriate and (2) suggesting some sort of programmatic orientations in empirical research. Functional analyses are, on the one hand, non-theoretical linguistic entities destined for ultimate inclusion in some general behavioral science theory

⁵¹ C. Ackerman and T. Parsons, "The Concept of 'Social System' as a Theoretic Device," in DiRenzo, op. cit., pp. 25-29.

⁵² *Ibid.*, p. 39f.

when the relationship between state coordinates of the putative functional system are specified in confirmed empirical relationships and, on the other hand, programmatic research designs. As such, functional analyses as they are suggested by Parsons are clearly not explanations. Still less are they theoretical in the strict sense. They serve as heuristic working hypotheses preliminary to empirical inquiry and theory construction.

Parsons is, unfortunately, never quite clear on these issues. The preceding references have been to his last definitive statement about his "theoretical devices" and/or "cognitive maps." He moves freely between complex concepts like "frames of reference," "conceptual schemata," "models" and "theories" without any real effort at establishing their respective differences. Thus he speaks of his concern as one involved with the articulation of a "conceptual scheme for the analysis of social systems in terms of the action frame of reference," a concern he nonetheless identifies as a "theoretical enterprise in the strict sense."

The distinction between an analytic conceptual scheme and a theory is that an analytic conceptual scheme makes, in itself, no empirical knowledge claims while a theory does. An analytic conceptual scheme is a non-theoretical classificatory or taxonomic device. It is useful for descriptive purposes but is not itself an empirical or theoretical linguistic entity. It does not seem that the functionalist "frame of reference" can be both an analytic conceptual scheme, an "abstract formula," and a "theoretical enterprise in the strict sense" at the same time. This seems to be confirmed by the fact that Parsons insists that he is not concerned with "empirical generalizations as such nor with methodology. . . . "53 Functional analyses would be non-theoretical formulations which are, in the strict sense, either definitional schemata or analytic conceptual schemata.54

⁵³ T. Parsons, *The Social System* (New York: Free Press, 1964), p. 3.

one hand as "analytically descriptive" and yet elsewhere talks vaguely of "one of the primary tests" his "theoretical scheme" must meet as "usefulness in prediction." T. Parsons, "An Approach to Psychological Theory in Terms of the Theory of Action," in S. Koch (ed.), Psychology: A Study of a Science (New York: McGraw-Hill, 1959), pp. 699, 694. This confusion between analytic conceptual schemata and theoretical linguistic entities seems to afflict functionalists and systems theories" of contemporary political

This analysis appears to be borne out by Parsons' claim that functionalism as a general theory of action aids "in the codification of our existing concrete knowledge."55 This seems to mean nothing more than that whatever knowledge is available in the various social sciences can be rephrased to render it compatible with the taxonomic analytic scheme suggested by Parsons. When he turns his attention to psychology, for example, Parsons explicitly states that "the general theory of action . . . does not purport to discover or state new psychological knowledge, but to show that certain main lines of known psychological analysis can be stated and systematized in terms of the theory...."56

The knowledge delivered by special empirical investigations can be reformulated in the language of functional analysis. Such reformulations can serve as significant aids to the storage and retrieval of information. As such their uses would be didactic and mnemonic. But Parsons further insists that functionalist formulations act as guides to research and provide hypotheses to be applied and subject to test. ⁵⁷ These latter claims are intrinsically more interesting and important and much of functionalism's claim to special heuristic merit turns on their plausibility.

Such claims can be most effectively considered when the functionalist apparatus is applied to particular problems. Parsons (as do functionalists and systems analysts in general) has identified four analytically distinct interactive systems in his general theory of action: the organic, the personality, the social system (with polity as a constituent subsystem), and the cultural system. Psychological systems, or personality systems, organize and control the behavioral organism, social systems organize and control personality systems and cultural systems organize and control social systems. The image is of a nesting series of interpenetrative but analytically distinct systems. The implications of such imagery include the assumption that each constitutes an ordered aggregate of some sort with specified or specifiable state boundaries, system prerequisites and requisites and system-endemic mechanisms of static or dynamic restabilization or re-equilibrization.

science as "analytic, not substantive" and yet in the same sentence characterizes them as "explanatory": Easton, Framework, op. cit., p. 22.

⁶⁵ T. Parsons, et al., Toward a General Theory of Action (New York: Harper and Row, 1951), p. 3.
⁶⁶ Parsons, "An Approach . . . ," op. cit., p. 645.

⁵⁷ Parsons, et. al., Toward a General Theory of Action, op. cit., p. 3.

With respect to biological organisms it would seem that one has an intuitive grasp of system boundaries. One can further specify something of its biological system prerequisites and requisites. One has some conception of the limits with respect to the essential inputs required by the system and the environmental variations such a system can tolerate. But when the transition has been made even to the personality system, for example, we are at once involved in what Parsons admits are far "subtler problems." What is required is not only a relatively precise specification of system boundaries, but a specification of the conditions necessary for maintaining the "minimum stability of personality." We are told that there are, in fact, "minimum conditions of socialization with respect for instance to the relation between affectional support and security, without which a functioning personality cannot be built up. ... These minimum needs of individual actors constitute a set of conditions to which the social system must be adapted."58

What this means in terms of a programmatic guide for verification studies is very difficult to determine. We are told that "personality systems are governed," as are all systems, "by the general prerequisite of maintaining the system" which in the case of personality is the "optimization of gratification" and "minimum stability." We are told of "drives" and "need dispositions" which are satisfied or activated, and we have an elaborate descriptive vocabulary for identifying various putative mechanisms of adaptation, goal achievement, tension management and pattern maintenance, but it is difficult to determine in what sense all this assists in actual applied research.

As Parsons clearly appreciates, any formulations which involve functionalist vocabulary must specify dynamic or static equilibrium conditions for the system under scrutiny in terms of a range of input and output values in relatively well defined categories over the boundaries of the system. This is an inherently quantitative consideration. Yet Parsons has made no attempt (nor have those who operate with variants of functionalism) to provide even approximative quantitative specification of the values any of the state coordinates of the system can assume without becoming dysfunctional or throwing the entire system into disequilibrium or disaggregation.

A system suffering "system pathologies" is understood as that system which makes dysfunctional response to situational stimuli. What makes any response dysfunctional can, however, only be indicated when some behavior x is accurately described and some specification of the constituents which comprise Y, the functional subsystem, are given along with a specification of all the possible states those constituents can assume and the subset of those possible states which are identified as goal states of Y in system S. How enormously complicated such specifications would be with respect to any system is immediately evident. What Parsons' functionalist account of "system pathologies" or "systemic dysfunctions" requires is an effective, even if nonscalar, conceptual distinction between systemic "normality" and "pathology." All of Parsons' discussion of "boundary maintaining equilibrium" carries us not a whit closer to such an effective distinction than do qualitative expressions like "emotional maturity," "reasonable independence," "healthy defense mechanisms," and "good work adjustment" when they are applied to personality as a "system."59 Nor do Parsons' formulations seem to offer more adequate research guides when the polity is construed as a "system." As a consequence the claim that the functionalist conceptual schema offers testable hypotheses is singularly unconvincing. If we are correct, and what Parsons is offering is an analytic conceptual schema, his formulations make no existential claims and consequently suggest hypotheses only in the vaguest sense of "suggest."

For purposes of empirical research, terms like "eufunctional" and "dysfunctional," for example, are no more instructive than "normal" and "abnormal" or "pathological." The treatment of personality as a system, of interpersonal interaction as a system, of the functioning of the social system as a system, 60 and polity as a subsystem seems to have no more to recommend it in so far as guiding research is concerned than the profit attendant upon the consistent use of a particular literary and academic language style. The significance of the adoption of such a style seems to be heuristic only in the sense that minimum vocabulary is provided by which to classify elements and to suggest relationships between elements which must then be independently discovered to obtain in the putative systems studied in the various behavioral sciences.

⁵⁹ Cf. D. Offer and M. Sabshin, Normality (New York: Basic Books, 1966), p. 19 and passim.
⁶⁰ T. Parsons, "The Superego and the Theory of Social Systems," in T. Parsons, R. Bales and E. Shils, Working Papers in the Theory of Action (New York: Free Press, 1963). p. 16.

⁵⁸ Parsons, The Social System, op. cit., p. 28.

The major cognitive advantage provided by functionalist language is as a mnemonic convenience servicing the general storage and retrieval of information. This mnemonic use may be by no means inconsequential. Any technique which assists the storage and ready retrieval of the chief results of empirical research is obviously more useful, for example, than empty speculation or the unorganized collection of individual bits of data. In Nonetheless such uses do not support the contention that functionalism, as such, provides the research scientist with testable hypotheses.

The strongest claim that can be made in behalf of functionalist approaches in the behavioral sciences is that they offer nontheoretical conceptual schemata which conduce the research scientist to construct experimental designs in which instances of "relatedness" and "connectedness" will prominently figure and in which "system" and "function" will be exemplified. At its best functionalism provides a language in which the findings of the various social sciences can be rephrased for storage and recall. As an analytic conceptual schema functionalism can have few empirical pretensions. In itself it can make no truth claims and offer no explanations. At its best functionalism affords the opportunity for the reformulation of available knowledge in the standardized language of systems analysis, best exemplified in works like William Mitchell's American Polity. At its worst functionalism is an effort to purchase a syncretic unity in the behavioral sciences at the cost of employing vague and ambiguous terminology and an obscure syntax. Whatever else it is functionalism is not a theory, for as an analytic system it cannot, of itself, tender knowledge claims.

v. conclusions

Political scientists, as practitioners of a negligibly formalized discipline, tend to be accommodating to formulations and suggested techniques developed in related behavioral sciences. They even tend, on occasion, to speak of psychology, sociology and anthropology as "hard core sciences." Such a characterization seems hardly justified. The disposition to uncritically adopt into political science nonindigenous sociological and general systems concepts tends, at times, to involve little more than the adoption of a specific, and sometimes barbarous, academic vocabulary which is used to redescribe reasonably well-confirmed or intuitively-grasped low order empirical generali-

⁶¹ G. Mandler and W. Kessen, *The Language of Psychology* (New York: Wiley, 1959), pp. 242f.

zations. When revolutions are characterized as the consequence of "multiple systemic dysfunctions" or as occasions when "sub-systems outside the political subsystem disrupt or substitute [themselves] for its ultrastabilizing activities," for example, what seems to be meant is little more than, "When some reasonably well organized aggregate of men becomes restive because its needs are not being met and that restiveness reaches a certain critical level it tends to react violently against the conceived source of its cumulative frustrations." These are low order generalizations and would have to be significantly qualified if they were to be employed in any verification study. What is initially required, should such affirmations aspire to the status of theoretical propositions, would be a specification of biological, personality and general "system" needs and some (even if nonscalar) measure of frustration, a determinate individual or collective tolerance threshold, as well as a catalogue of intra- and extrasystemic countertrend influences. Redescribing the intuitively recognized causal variables and their vague relations in terms of "system," "function," "eufunction" and "dysfunction" is not particularly helpful.

At its worst, what results in such instances is a runic explanation, a redescription in a singular language style, i.e., no explanation at all. At their best, functional accounts as they are found in the contemporary literature provide explanation sketches, the type of elliptical explanation characteristic of historical and psychoanalytic accounts. For each such account there is an indeterminate number of equally plausible ones, the consequence of either the complexity of the subject matter, differing perspectives, conceptual vagueness, the variety of sometimes mutually exclusive empirical or quasi-empirical generalizations employed or syntactical obscurity, or all of them together.

The prevalence of such equally satisfying accounts is one of the principal causes of contending schools in political science. Explanatory accounts in political science, as is the case with respect to such accounts in history or psychoanalysis, tend to be plausible, most effective in accounting for past occurrences, but largely devoid of predictive power. Such accounts are calculated to provide some measure of intellectual satisfaction, at least the seeming abatement of puzzlement. But this kind of satisfaction can be obtained via a variety of both reputable and disreputable means. Certainly psychological satisfaction, the felt resolution of puzzlement, cannot constitute the test of adequacy for an explanation. Our world

abounds in men psychologically satisfied by cognitive absurdities.

The adoption of nonindigenous concepts in any particular science is an obvious necessity. The adoption of such concepts from a formalized empirical or nonempirical discipline entails minimal hazard since the implications of such assimilation are maximally specified. Borrowing concepts from a partially or negligibly formalized science, on the other hand, involves considerable risk. The disposition on the part of some political scientists to be uncritically accommodating to such borrowing threatens to burden political science as a knowledge enterprise with an inventory of vague and ambiguous concepts little calculated to further the efforts to explain and predict.

Functional explanations have been most reliable in biology and physiology (where they originated) and in the analysis of servomechanical and cybernetic systems (to which they have been effectively extended). In these areas we possess a well-standardized body of lawlike generalizations that provide the warrant for such explanations. Neither sociology nor political science has as yet the same resource of well-confirmed lawlike statements. Certainly sociology has few more than political

science. What passes for functional explanation in sociology is all too frequently parasitic upon suggestive analogy and metaphor, trafficking on our familiarity with goal directed systems.

What is advanced as "theory" in sociology is frequently a nontheoretic effort at classification or "codification," the search for an analytic conceptual schema which provides a typology or a classificatory system serviceable for convenient storage and ready retrieval of independently established empirical regularities. That such a schema takes on a hierarchic and deductive character, imparting to the collection of propositions a prima facie theoretical appearance, may mean no more than that the terms employed in the high order propositions are so vague that they can accommodate almost any inference and consequently can be made to apply, without profit, to any conceivable state of affairs.62

of proverbial wisdom. Now it is characteristic of proverbs, and one reason for their use as a substitute for precise thought, that they embody ambiguities making them indefinitely adaptable to almost any circumstances": Black, "Some Questions . . .," op. cit., p. 280.

PARETO AND PLUTO-DEMOCRACY: THE RETREAT TO GALAPAGOS

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(Sartre to Camus): You blame the European proletariat because it has not publicly stigmatized the Soviets, but you also blame the European governments because they allow Spain into UNESCO; in this case I can see only one solution for you: the Galapagos Islands.*

Vilfredo Pareto completed his Treatise on General Sociology in 1912, although it was not published till 1916. It is a vast work of one million words; sprawling, disorderly, and stuffed with minor masterpieces of often pointless erudition. The first three-quarters attacks the scientific status of practically all the various political and moral theories that have sought to pass themselves off as scientifically grounded and it is worth noting that even the most dedicated critics of Pareto have acknowledged the effectiveness of his onslaught.1 Among the positive contributions of the Treatise, five propositions stand out. First, Pareto affirms that social phenomena are not "caused" by any single factor but that all elements in society influence one another reciprocally. Secondly, social phenomena recur in cycles. Thirdly, the bulk of human behavior is not "logical" but only "logicalized", or, as we should say today, not rational but merely rationalized. Fourthly, irrespective of constitutional forms, every society consists of the minority elite governing (leading?) the majority non-elite. Fifthly, parliamentary democracy, or to speak more accurately, "plutodemocracy", is no exception: it comprises a governing elite of highly skilled operators who contrive to remain in power by persuasion and manipulation of the masses. Principally itis for the last three contentions that Pareto is today remembered, or, as I shall show, misremembered, as a "proto-fascist".

Though many circumstances conspired to weaken the intellectual impact of the *Treatise* when it was first published, the odium in which the majority of Western intellectuals and academics have held Pareto's political views must be reckoned as the most potent.

The middle of the First World War was an unpropitious time to launch such a work. Even

- * Raymond Aron, The Opium of the Intellectuals (London, 1959), p. 52.
- ¹F. Borkenau, Pareto (London, 1936), pp. 82-84; M. Ginsberg, Reason and Unreason in Society (London, 1947), pp. 97-98.

after the war, the fact that it was available only in Italian and French limited its appeal: Italy was not noted for its interest in sociology, and after 1922 the dead hand of Fascism stifled any free thinking in this field, while France had its own sociological tradition in the school of Durkheim to which the Paretian approach is entirely alien. When the book finally appeared in English in 1935 (as "The Mind and Society") the timing could not have been more unfortunate. For one thing the very core of Pareto's contribution to sociology, the discovery that made him regard all the previous works in the field as "nothing but romances", i.e., the overwhelming importance of the non-rational in human affairs, was now universally accepted, but thanks to Freud, not Pareto. Furthermore, the way in which Pareto had established this proposition, his concept of the "residues" (the root human impulses) and the "derivations" (the rationalizations thereof) seemed strangely quaint and old fashioned and very unscientific compared with the experimental basis on which Freudians claimed their theories were based.

But on the political level, Pareto's work fared even worse. He had the misfortune to be revered by Mussolini and the Fascists therefore officially claimed him as one of their precursors. Western critics took them at their word; and Pareto's persistent malice for pluto-democracy. his contempt for humanitarianism, his apparent-I repeat, apparent-glorification of violence, could not have come more amiss to western democrats at a time when Mussolini was invading Abyssinia and Hitler was torturing the socialists and liberals whom Pareto had so despised. Most of the notices and critiques of the newly translated Treatise were hostile and some of them are little better than polemics.3 Some sociologists did indeed take a favourable view, chiefly the members of the seminar

- ² In G. De Rosa (ed.), Vilfredo Pareto: Lettere Maffeo Pantaleoni (Rome, 1960 3 vols), 9 April 1897. This collection will henceforth be cited as MPP.
- ³ Among these, particularly: F. Borkenau, op. cit.; E. Faris, The Nature of Human Nature (New York, 1937), Ch. XVI; M. Rader, No Compromise (London, 1939), pp. 55-93, 198-201; and F. Alexander, Our Age of Illusion (New York, 1942), pp. 81-102.

which Professor Henderson established at Harvard to study Pareto's work, notably Homans and Curtiss, and especially Talcott Parsons.⁴ But except among a handful of scholars, the hostile criticisms have prevailed. They are today the received doctrine on Pareto.

In the English-speaking world, with few exceptions, there has been no recent attempt to re-appraise Pareto.5 So it is that for commentary and criticism we are forced back on views expressed thirty years ago about a book that itself had been written nearly thirty years earlier. But in Italy, since the fall of fascism, there has been a steady re-discovery. Furthermore, when the British and American scholars of the inter-war period were writing their critiques, nothing was known of Pareto's life except a bare handful of dates (most of them wrong). Since 1948, however, not only have many articles appeared, but five collections of Pareto's correspondence,7 all meticulously edited. These letters alone compel a reappraisal of Pareto's thought. But so, for that matter, does a rereading of the Treatise, especially in the light of Pareto's other writings, none of which have yet been translated into English. The received opinions begin to seem to require a great deal of qualification. In this paper I shall confine myself to two particular issues. The first is to challenge the current views as to why Pareto felt impelled to develop his peculiar theory. The second will be to re-

⁴ Cf. L. J. Henderson, Pareto's General Sociology (Cambridge, Mass., 1935); G. C. Homans and C. P. Curtis, An Introduction to Pareto's Sociology (New York, 1934); and T. Parsons, The Structure of Social Action (New York, 1937), pp. 178–193.

⁵ Cf. C. Madge, Society in the Mind (London, 1964); and H. S. Hughes, Consciousness and Society (London, 1959), pp. 78-82, 249-274.

⁶ E.g., the work of W. Bobbio, F. Burzio, P. Jannacone and La Ferla. In particular: G. Braga, Forma ed Equilibrio Sociale (Bologna, 1959), pp. ix-li; T. Bagiotti, "Del Giornale Paretiano, etc.," Giornale Degli Economisti (Jan.-Feb., 1958), 1-32; and T. Giacalone-Monaco, Pareto e Sorel, 2 vols. (Padua, 1948).

⁷ G. Sensine, Corrisponenza di Vilfredo Pareto (Padua, 1948), henceforth cited as SP; T. Giacalone-Monaco, Vilfredo Pareto dal Carteggio con Carlo Placci (Padua, 1951), henceforth cited as PP; T. Giacalone-Monaco, Pareto-Walras, 1891-1901 (Padua, 1960), henceforth cited as WP; G. De Rosa, MPP (see footnote 2); and G. De Rosa, Carteggi Paretiani (Rome, 1962), henceforth cited as Carteggio.

examine his theory of the governing elite and notably his conception of pluto-democracy.

I. THE SOURCES OF THE THEORY OF PLUTO-DEMOCRACY

All the nineteen-thirties knew of Pareto's life and the development of his opinions was briefly this. His family was aristocratic Genoese. His father, the Marquis Raffaelle Pareto, fled to France as a young man in 1835 or 1836 on account of his republican and Mazzinian opinions. In exile he pursued the profession of civil engineer, married an obscure Frenchwoman, and had two daughters and one son. This was Vilfredo Frederico Damaso Pareto, born in Paris in 1848. Raffaelle Pareto returned to Piedmont in 1855 and took employment as civil engineer in the Piedmontese civil service. Vilfredo, bilingual in French and Italian, followed his father's profession, studying in the Polytechnic at Turin, and graduating as an engineer in 1869. He immediately secured a post as director of the Rome Railway Company until 1874, when he became the managing director of the Societa Ferriere Italiana, an iron producing company with its headquarters in Florence. In 1889 Pareto married a penniless Russian girl, Dina Bakunin, threw up his managing directorship of the company for a consultancy, and for three years wrote articles and made speeches against the Italian government's protectionist policy at home and militarist policy abroad. These activities led to his acquaintanceship, which soon became a warm friendship, with the economist Maffeo Pantaleoni: this in turn led to an interest in pure economics in which Pareto proved outstanding, thanks to his earlier mathematical training; and this in turn again led to his nomination in 1893 as Professor of Political Economy at Lausanne University, in succession to Walras. His appointment was made permanent in 1894. In 1896 he published a Cours d'economie Politique. In 1898 Pareto inherited from an uncle a fortune which I estimate at about \$500,000 to \$750,000 in today's prices and began to think of retirement so as to be able to pursue research.

His views soon changed radically. From being a crusader for democracy and free trade he became indifferent to active politics and an increasingly bitter enemy of parliamentarism and democracy. The first sign of the change appears in a lengthy article for the Rivista Italiana di sociologia in 1900, and then in his Les Systèmes Socialistes (1902).8 The theory of ir-

⁸ Les Systemes Socialistes (Paris, 1902; 2nd. ed., 1926).

rationalism and of the governing elite, exexpounded in these works, foreshadow the developed system in the Treatise. He carried the two notions further in his next book, the Manuale d'economia politica 1906, translated and somewhat revised in the French edition of 1909. In 1907 Pareto resigned the Chair of Political Economy but continued to deliver his sociology course until 1916. For some time he had been suffering from heart disease and now confined himself almost exclusively to his Céligny home, the Villa Angora, where he lived surrounded by eighteen angora cats and ministered to by one Jane Régis, thirty years younger than himself, who had come into his life after his wife had left him at the end of 1901. He began writing the *Treatise* in 1907 and completed it in 1912. It was published in Italian in 1916 and in a later French edition. After the war two collections of his articles were published: Fatti e Teorie (1920) and Trasformazione della democrazia (1921). In 1923, after securing a divorce from his wife Dina, he married Jane Régis (to whom he had dedicated the Treatise). He died later in the year, aged seventy-five.

The key problem in this record is why Pareto, an extremely radical and republican democrat, should have changed so abruptly in the years 1899-1900 to become what his critics have claimed to be an anti-egalitarian, antidemocratic apostle of violence-in short a "proto-fascist". The record is exiguous—and indeed even more exiguous than the above, since I have filled in certain important particulars which were not known in the 1930's, But this did not prevent commentators from erecting on it the most fanciful theories. One of these explains Pareto's mature opinions as the fruit of an oedipal reaction against his father's Mazzinianism.9 The correspondence shows that Pareto was proud of his father and devoted to his memory. It shows that he did indeed react against his father's views but that those views, on the return to Italy when Vilfredo was only seven years old, were not only not Mazzinian anymore but the reverse. The father had become reconciled to the House of Savoy, his opinions were orthodox or even conservative, and he ended his life full of honors and awards as a faithful servant of the royal house. The son, in contrast, became a fervent admirer of the French Revolution and of democracy, and did not change these views until he was fifty years old. A very odd Oedipus complex!

Borkenau, op. cit., pp. 9-11, and taken over by H. S. Hughes, op. cit., pp. 260-261.

According to another view,10 Pareto's elite concept and his hatred of democracy are explained by his being a "decayed nobleman". Now in the first place this is to misinterpret his notion of the elite. Not only is it not identical with the titled aristocracy, it is set up in contradistinction to this. The elite consists of the ablest in any walk of life: given completely unrestricted vertical mobility (i.e., unrestricted "circulation of elites") those who held office would be identical with those ablest to hold office: in real life, however, factors like hereditary title, property and the like, impede the circulation of ability, so that the capacity of those in office does not correspond to their "label". There is thus a distinction between the elite of merit and the elite by "label"; and Pareto's theory of social change and revolution turns precisely on this difference.

Furthermore, Pareto positively loathed the Italian titled aristocracy. Throughout his life he showed nothing but contempt for what he blisteringly described as "non-rational deference towards some cretin born of princely stock, or some scoundrel who has reached the top of the social pyramid."11 His early letters. in the "Florentine period" (1874-1893), are full of even more savage references to the "gilded youth" and the families who "sucked the blood" of the Italian poor.12 Throughout his life he detested being addressed as "Marchese" and insisted on his titles of merit-"Signore Ingegniere" or "Signore Professore". In short, the theory is not only wrong but upside down. Pareto developed his theory of elite-of a meritocracy-not because he was a friend of the hereditary aristocracy but because, as a meritocrat, he was its bitter and contemptuous foe.

Recently, in a most stimulating and excellent book, H. S. Hughes has also interpreted the meagre factual record. In this case he seeks to explain the origin of Pareto's theory of non-logical action and the "residues", i.e., his theory of irrationalism. This argument is as follows: Pareto, qua economist, was a free-trader and was convinced that protection must necessarily impoverish Italy: instead it made Italy prosperous; and therefore Pareto was forced to account for this by arguing that individuals were moved by non-logical considerations, not the logical ones which economics assumes.¹³

¹⁰ W. Stark, The Sociology of Knowledge (London, 1958), p. 53.

¹¹ PP, 9 February 1894.

¹² PP, 11 November 1894.

¹³ Hughes, op. cit., p. 261.

Now it is true that the Treatise utilizes the theory of nonlogical actions to show how protectionism may in certain cases come to cause the creation of more wealth than it destroys; but this does not prove that Parato invented the theory of non-logical actions in order to make such an explanation. This is a post hoc ergo propter hoc fallacy, and the correspondence shows the facts to be precisely the reverse. For Pareto was still an orthodox free trader as late as 1900, whereas he discovered his theory of non-logical actions in 1897. Furthermore, in 1897 he did not consider that protection had made Italy prosperous. On the contrary he maintained that it had caused the widespread misery and starvation which culminated in the May revolt of 1898. And in that black year of uprising and iron repression he actually published all the forecasts made by himself and his free trading friends in a book, "La liberté economique et les évenements d'Italie'', 14 to vindicate the free trade principles he was still advocating.

Now I have not rejected these various theories out of simple pedantry, but because so long as they persist unchallenged they obscure and prejudge the content of the *Treatise* and the post-*Treatise* writings, and bring us to them in quite a wrong state of mind.

If it is possible ever to reduce the piecemeal and subtle alchemy of intellectual and emotional processess to two crude factors, we can describe the first as Pareto's temperamental reaction to state intervention, and the second as his intellectual reaction to Marxism.

Temperamentally, Pareto was a supreme egotist. Among the six classes of his "residues" there is one called the residue of "the integrity of the individual and what pertains to him"effectively the root impulse to defend one's life, liberty, possessions, expectations and status against social changes which threaten them. Such an attitude underlies Pareto's outlook and behavior throughout his whole life and to an altogether extreme degree. It explains alike his hypersensitivity to criticism, his high sense of personal honor and obligation, his craving for financial independence (and hence his attachment to his uncle's legacy). It also accounts for his political attitudes—hostility to state intervention in economic and also in intellectual life (the latter is witnessed to in his attack on attempts to censor "obscene" literature in his "The Virtuist Myth and Immoral Literature").15 It explains too the long train of

negatives of which his political attitudes came to consist. Pareto was anti-socialist and anti-state-interventionist. He was anti-colonialist and anti-militarist. He was anti-racialist and anti-anti-semite. He was the perennial foe of "prepotenza", i.e., overwhelming arrogance and bullying, no matter from whom or for what purpose. The great change in his attitude in 1899–1901 was due to the fact that, as he saw it, the persons of the "prepotenti" had changed. Up to 1898 they were what he was calling (from 1891 onwards)t he "classe governante" or "classe dirigente" of Italy, the accursed bourgeoisie, battening on the poor with their protective tariffs:

Whom do I call the bourgeoisie? I call bourgeois all those who live comfortably and enjoy protective tariffs, get government jobs for their children and make money through the contractors, and, when the occasion arises, plunder the banks; and besides these, many rich and well to do persons, honest in their private lives but who think it necessary, so as to support their own class and not dry up the sources of money for their friends, to support any knavery on the government's part.¹⁷

But despite his efforts and those of his friends the advance of protectionism and state subsidies continued inexorably and by 1898 Pareto recognised defeat.

There is not the slightest hope of possible victory for economic freedom for the time being. Earlier I had my doubts about the cases of Switzerland and England; now I maintain, not even in Switzerland and England. Hence any practical activity for free trade is useless. One must limit oneself to scientific activities.¹⁸

But at the very moment of apparent triumph for the bourgeois oppressors, Pareto took a second look at the oppressed. "The socialist gentlemen in Italy," he observed, "seek nothing but liberty. Here [i.e., in Switzerland] they have it and immediately take to bullying. They cease to be victims only to become

^{14 (}Lausanne, 1898).

¹⁵ On this work H. S. Hughes comments that

[&]quot;in his view of public morality Pareto was extremely rigorous; in his ideas on private morality he was playfully permissive": op. cit., p. 261. But anybody who cares to consult Pareto's views on the family and on education (Le Mythe Vertuiste et la Litterature Immorale, Paris, 1911, pp. 146 ff) will find this to be the very reverse of the truth. He was the perfect square.

¹⁶ MPP, 6 December 1891.

¹⁷ MPP, 23 December 1896.

¹⁸ MPP, 22 February 1898.

persecutors". 19 Protectionism and socialism were two sides of the same coin. The first was bourgeois socialism, the second popular socialism (a thought to be developed in the Systèmes Socialistes of 1902). Both were equally restrictive of personal liberty. "There are only three parties in Italy: (i) the thieves in power, (ii) the socialists, and (iii) the clericals. I don't want to go along with any of them."²⁰ "I used to be a liberal. Now I recognise my mistake. The choice is simply between one oppression and another."²¹ In this last sentence lies the key to Pareto's change of heart. The thought is expanded in an important article of 1905.

The man who used to believe in all sincerity that he was campaigning for liberty was really, and quite unwittingly, bringing about its destruction. In the past all restrictions [on liberty] served to assist the bourgeoisie and work against the people. Consequently the man who fought against them could honestly believe that he was exerting himself in order to establish an impartial order which would grant no privileges either to one side or to the other. I do not see how such a view could be proved wrong a priori and it seems to me that only the results, today, are capable of providing such a proof—as indeed they have. They show that we have not paused, even for a short moment, at that middle point where no privilege exists; but that on the contrary the privileges of the bourgeoisie have been abolished only to make way for those of the people.... The person who was combating privilege as such really succeeded . . . in substituting one kind of privilege for another 22

Thus one half of the explanation of Pareto's altered attitude lies in his personal and intensely individualistic reaction to the substitution of the *prepotenza* of organized labor for that of the bourgeoisie. The other half lies in a sudden flash of intuition provoked by the burgeoning popularity of marxism especially in Italy. He rejected Marxist theory while respecting and co-operating with the marxists during his free trade agitation;²³ but very early he recognized the almost mystically religious nature of their commitment:

Capital is the gospel of an ever increasing number of men²⁴

- 19 MPP, 20 July 1898.
- ²⁰ MPP, 16 May 1898.
- ²¹ MPP, 16 May 1898.
- ²² V. Pareto, "Il Crepuscolo della Liberta," *Rivista d'Italia* (February, 1905), quoted in *MPP*, Vol. II, p. 436.
 - ²³ MPP, 23 February 1892.
 - ²⁴ MPP, 18 April 1893.

These other believers, who call themselves Socialists.... At Milan I saw youths...sacrificing their whole lives to become apostles of the new religion and who have a faith in the principles of Marx equal to that of the early Christians for the Gospel....²⁶

Brooding over the apparent contradiction between the intellectual falsity of Marxist theory and the devotion of its followers he was suddenly illuminated by one of those flashes of intuition that sometimes occur to men and after which they never see facts in the same inter-relationship again. In his own words:

Men think they are choosing their opinions, but on the contrary these opinions are imposed on them by their mode of life just as fish have to breathe through their gills whereas for mammals it is through the lungs.²⁶

Reason is of little or no importance in shaping social phenomena. The operative forces are different ones 27

The principle of my sociology rests precisely on separating logical from non-logical actions and in showing that in most men the second category is larger than the first.²⁸

From these two sources—Pareto's outraged individualism and his intellectual conviction of the importance of irrationalism in human behaviour—spring the main characteristics of the *Treatise*: the transcending of Marxism, the debunking of ideology, and the contempt for the bourgeois state.

II. THE THEORY RE-EXAMINED

The *Treatise* is crammed with Pareto's personal prejudices, but these are not only not essential to his scientific theory—they obscure it. They are there simply because Pareto enjoyed baiting his intellectual opponents.²⁹ The fact is that the *Treatise* totally abdicates from recommendation. Anyone who has the patience to read through it will find that remarks favourable to one course of action in one place are qualified or negatived somewhere else. The *Treatise* is, indeed, a sociological system; but it was conceived as, and largely is, a system to

²⁵ MPP, 18 April 1893.

²⁶ MPP, 10 April 1898.

²⁷ MPP, 11 November 1897.

²⁸ MPP, 7 May 1897.

²⁹ Cf. "I know that in this way I will provoke the indignation of the humanitarian-democratic sect, but that is precisely my aim": MPP, 2 March 1907.

end all systems. It is, in fact, an anti-system. It is anti-marxist but also anti-bourgeois. It is anti-rationalist, but also anti-ideological. It is anti-parliamentarian, but also anti-authoritarian. And naturally so from what has gone before. Against the strict canons of Pareto's mid-nineteenth century liberalism, his individualism, the world no longer had anything to offer.

The Treatise is an anti-system, first, in that it is a gigantic retort to Karl Marx. Interestingly, however, it does not contradict, it denatures. Pareto's technique is not confrontation but envelopment. Marxism claimed to be a full and final explanation of society; the Treatise tries to show that it is merely a set of particular cases of a much wider and hence completer theory. Marx's class domination theory is shown to be but a special case of the general law of elite domination. Class exploitation is merely a particular case of the more general theory of "spolation" of the "rentier" or fixed income groups by the "speculators", the active entrepreneurial types. The Marxist theory of ideology as a "false consciousness" deriving from class interest and doomed to disappear with the classless society is shown to be a special case of the general theory of irrationalism, i.e., of the residues and the derivations (rationalizations) based thereon-by which token Marxism itself is reduced to the status of the irrational; of an ideology amongst others.

But although it is anti-marxist, this does not mean that the Treatise is proto-fascist. Far from it. There is a second sense in which the Treatise is an anti-system: as the debunker of all ideology. This follows from Pareto's distinction between logical and non-logical action. In the first, the state of affairs which the actor seeks to bring about coincides with the end actually brought about as seen by a detached outside observer. It is not simply logical but (in Pareto's terminology) logico-experimental. Economics, technology and the natural sciences comprise most of the "logical" areas of human conduct. All others are non-logical. In some cases this is because the actor is acting on an erroneous hypothesis. In others, however, it is because the actor's aim is "an imaginary end outside the field of observation and experience" (Treatise, §151). In such a case no outside observer can say whether it has been reached or not. It is for this reason that Pareto treats religion and metaphysics as non-logical; not because they are erroneous but because they are unverifiable, not because they are unscientific but because they are non-scientific. They spring from "residues" and "interests", i.e., from internal psychic states. And on this basis Pareto

had little difficulty in demonstrating that all the great or fashionable moral, religious and political systems of his day and of the past were non-logical, without any scientific basis whatsoever. Some three-quarters of the *Treatise* is, directly or indirectly, concerned to demonstrate this and so well did he do his work that if the *Treatise* achieved nothing else it killed stone dead the tradition of rationalist-positivistic theories of morals and politics.

But Pareto did not stop at showing that what he called these "pseudo-intellectualist" theories were devoid of scientific basis and were, properly speaking, ideologies. He continued by pouring contempt upon the nakedly antiintellectualist ideologies—upon the various theories that "we have within us ideas, notions, concepts that are superior to experience, that 'intuition must take the place of reason', that 'conscience must assert its rights in the face of positivistic empiricism', that 'idealism must replace empiricism, positivism science', etc." (Treatise, §2340). Among these Pareto specifically names such manifestations as antisemitism, nationalism, clericalism and imperialism (Treatise, §2389-§2390)—in short the ideological foundations of what we nowadays style as Fascist-type regimes. Here the critics of the thirties were misled by their own preoccupations. They failed to realize that the Treatise is a pre-1914 work, and that Pareto was concerned with the ideologies of his own daywhich were predominantly those of progress and optimism and democracy. In 1935 these "pseudo-intellectualist" ideologies were on the defensive against the fascist philosophies of blood and faith and intuition. From the critics' point of view Pareto had been attacking the wrong ideologies, i.e., the liberal ones; indeed, even worse, he had demonstrated that they were ideologies! In the heat of the battle they overlooked his equal contempt for the anti-liberal, the "fascist" ideologies. The simple truth is that Pareto was a profoundly a-religious man, moved neither by patriotism nor any other kind of faith: as he acknowledged, "I am, as Papini says, an atheist of all religion."30

But there is another very important respect in which Pareto was the enemy of what later was to be called fascism: his dislike of what he called the "crystallized" or "Byzantine" state, a managerial autocracy whose governing elite is of the conservative-disciplinarian-aggressive type described by him as rich in class II residues (the residues of "persistency of aggregates"). Herein the governing elite is a tightknit and identifiable group, from which all

³⁰ SP, 23 April 1917.

sectional or territorial leadership derives its powers; in which status and functions are rigidly defined and conserved; and in which all authority emanates from the governing group. For Pareto, in 1912, his paradigm case was the Byzantine Empire. In our own times it is Mussolini's Italy, Hitler's Germany, Stalin's Russia, in short, the totalitarian state. Thus, the *Treatise* is not proto-fascist at all, but implicitly anti-fascist; implictly (whereas the anti-marxism is explicit) because marxism was in Pareto's here-and-now, fascism still in the future.

There was still one other alternative for Pareto—the regime in which he had lived, the parliamentary bourgeois-democratic state.

Now this, in Pareto's schema, is conceived as the opposite of the Byzantine states, and all actual regimes are conceived as lying along a continuum between the two polar extremes. Unlike the Byzantine state, democracy is conceived as based upon the relationship of client to patron. The governing class is a polyarchy, a loosely textured network of the patrons of the various clienteles. Their characteristic traits are the opposite of those of the Byzantine governing elite. The latter were of the conservative, disciplinarian, idealistic and aggressive type. The governing elite of the democracy is rich in the Class I residues, those of the so-called "instinct of combining". They are materialistic and individualistic, innovating and risk-taking, pacific and reliant on persuasion and guile ("combinazioni" in the Italian sense) rather than on force. They are the "Athenians" or "foxes", those governing Byzantium are the "Spartans" or "lions". Now Pareto spends far more time criticizing parliamentary democracy than he does over Marxism or Byzantinism. Furthermore he laces his criticisms with a passionate and embittered polemic. Entire passages are nothing but diatribe. It is from this scorn and hatred for the parliamentary regime that critics, especially those of the thirties, have concluded that he was a protofascist.

This conclusion is erroneous. In the first place, the critics of the inter-war years—and some recent ones—have written from the standpoint of their own democratic commitment as though Pareto in his *Treatise* also had a commitment. The whole point of the *Treatise* is precisely that it has none. It is the correspondence that puts us on the right track. The critics felt that since Pareto was against one of the main alternatives the world was facing in the thirties, he must be in favor of the other, or at least of another. But by the time he came to write the *Treatise* Pareto had long de-

spaired of anything the world had to offer. As early as 1896 he had told Pantaleoni that he had given up "trying to straighten the legs of the crippled." "My dear chap", he wrote, "we are like the fish that was asked 'Do you prefer to be baked or boiled?' 'Neither the one nor the other'. 'Fish! Fish! You're evading the question.' "32 Look at the Sartre-Camus conversation at the head of this paper—the dilemma is the same but there is this difference: Sartre never meant his advice about the Galapagos Islands to be taken literally, but this is precisely what Pareto did. His Galapagos was the hermitage at Céligny, and the Treatise is the monument of his abstentionism.

What obscures this withdrawal is the passionate language he used about democracy. But this is a trap and by falling into it the critics drew a false conclusion; for it is not only possible but necessary to separate Pareto's vitrolic asides from his scientific theory, and it then appears that his analysis of the governing elite and of pluto-democracy is not nearly as charged with proto-facist implications as might be thought, if indeed it is so charged at all. And this provokes the further question: why then did Pareto express himself with such emotion? The failure to ask this question constitutes yet another reason for the critics' drawing a false conclusion about the Treatise. These are the points I now propose to elaborate.

III. WHY PARETO IS MIS-INTERPRETED

In the bourgeois democracy, the governing elite or governing class (Pareto uses both terms synonymously) is far from being the closeknit conspiratorial clique that always gets its own way over the expressed opposition of the masses. These are the characteristics of the governing elite of the "Byzantine" or spartan state, not the client-patron state of which the bourgeois democracy is the limiting case. Pareto's portrait of the governing elite of such a regime is painted from life: the Italian "consorteria" of parties that governed in his day. It is conceived as a great polyarchal structure, an interconnected web of the "patrons" each of which has clienteles consisting of sub-patrons and so on, down to the largely indifferent masses. There is nothing inherently "antidemocratic" about such a conception. The best translation of Pareto's "classe governante" is, as Sartori has pointed out, "leading minorities"—"minoranze guidatrice."33

³¹ MPP, 20 May 1896.

³² MPP, 19 November 1899.

³⁸ G. Sartori, *Democratic Theory* (Detroit, 1962), p. 131.

To begin with, the "governing class" is a very wide category indeed. Pareto's examples span whole historical epochs: the era of the later Roman Republic and the era of the rise and collapse of the Roman Empire; likewise, one governing class, the "pluto-democratic", spans the whole era from 1789 to his own day. A fortiori the governing class must never be conceived as identical with one or other of rival parties. For Pareto parties fell into two main types: the "intransigent" parties of fanatical idealists who refused to work in or with the parliamentary system (e.g., the syndicalists of his own day) and the "transformist" parties like the constitutionalist wing of the Italian Socialist party. The latter merely supply a variant leadership to his very broadly conceived "governing class". It is absurd to equate his elites and counter-elites with the struggles of Labour and Conservative, or Republican and Democrat. Both are parts of their respective governing classes.

The governing class is a "connexion" of centers of influence and patronage; and in the modern state, these are increasingly based on economic interest. These various power centers are forever quarrelling and competing with one another but nevertheless have sufficient cohesion to warrant calling them a "class." How does this come about? Emphatically not by conspiracy. Pareto goes to strenuous lengths to deny that the governing class is a "concrete unity" or a "person". "It does not know what it wants, it does not execute preconceived plans by logical procedures", he wrote. Its principal characteristic is "The order, or system, not the conscious will of individuals who may, indeed, in many cases, be carried by the system to points they never would have gone to by deliberate choice. The road . . . followed . . . is the resultant of an infinity of minor actions" (Treatise §2255). Such cohesion as it possesses comes about in three ways. In the first place, all the principals, i.e., the heads of each cluster of influence and patronage, live to some extent by taking in each others' washing. Next, insofar as they are all actuated by economic self interest they naturally tend to act in a common direction without any preconceived design. Finally they are made the more coherent by their "inner government"—a political party, or a cabinet-which controls the public authorities.

How does this "inner government" give it this cohesion? Not by coercion but by "management", by manipulation. The typical plutodemocratic governing class eschews the use of force—increasingly so, according to Pareto, who sees in this a tacit abdication of its capac-

ity to govern, a kind of suicide. The men of the pluto-democratic governing class are those saturated with the Class I residues, those of "combining": they are the "foxes," not the "lions," and their characteristic mode of governance is of this kind. The role of the "inner government", i.e., the political leadership proper, is to keep as many clienteles as possible satisfied at the same time. If it can do so, it will retain office; if not it will be ejected for a group who can and will. Bribery and corruption-either by "honors" or material rewards-are the least important of the means at its disposal, though they attract most censure. The significant method, which shocks nobody's morals, is to "look after" the various clienteles. There need be no explicit understandings with them in this manner. A protectionist government will receive the support and confidence of manufacturers (and as we today know, of workpeople) without necessarily coming to any explicit agreement with them, though it may do so with certain outstanding individuals (Treatise §2257). But governments have all kinds of other means to dispose of, quite apart from tariffs: contracts, shipbuilding, public works, nationalized enterprises, tax policy, social welfare benefits-all provide means to keep the various clienteles sweet. (Treatise §2265). No mere rogue can manage such a system; on the contrary it demands rare political skills. "Ministers do not have coffers that they simply have to open to procure handfuls of cash to dole out among their partisans. They have to survey the field of business with shrewd eye..." (Treatise §2268).

Who then composes this governing class? Here Pareto's answer altered as the regimes from which he drew his picture altered with the extension of the suffrage and the rise of organized labor. In the beginning he identified the Italian "classe governante" or "classe dirigente" with the oppressive Italian bourgeoisie-using this term in a loose Marxist sense. But after his great volte face in 1899-1901, the perspective alters. He sees it then as an alliance of bourgeoisie and working people against the fixed-income groups of the community. Finally, after the war, the perspective alters again as he recognizes that in this alliance, the working classes are obtaining the upper hand. This becomes clear as we examine his final views on pluto-democracy as they appear, not only in the Treatise, but also in the Trasformazione della Democrazia of 1921.

According to this last work, three great tendencies characterized the industrialized societies of the west in the past century. First, wealth had greatly increased; second, it was still very unevenly distributed; and third, the dominant classes in the state had come to be the bourgeois entrepreneurs (the "speculators") and the working classes, at the expense of the military and the various fixed-income groups in the community. If attention were focussed simply on the rise of the bourgeoisie to dominance, the regime ought to be styled "plutocracy"; if it were focussed instead on the rise of the working man, then "democracy" would be the right term. Since both are involved, Pareto coins the expression "pluto-democracy".

Certainly the interests of the two dominant classes conflict, but they have contrived to live in symbiosis and this is expressed in a tacit alliance for both political and economic objects. Its political purpose is to sanction a "new feudalism", i.e., to permit the trade unions and employer associations jointly to "get the upper hand over the State". These are the bodies that make the fundamental decisions: the public authorities and parliaments increasingly come to act merely as ratifying bodies. Its economic purpose is to permit these associations of "producers" to exploit the fixed-income groups of the community. For jointly-agreed wage settlements are simply passed on to the rest of the public in the form of increased prices. Jointly agreed or supported tariff policies, subsidies and the like have the same effect—to exploit the fixed-income groups; and so of course do inflationary policies. Parliament is a necessary part of this arrangement, for it acts as a forum in which these transactions and arrangements between the various clienteles on which government is dependent are "aggregated" and it also acts as a platform by which the masses are persuaded to assent to them. So essential is Parliament to the system that Pareto asserts that the life of one is bound up with that of the other (Transformazione, pp. 73-78).

Thus the governing elite of a modern industrialized democracy is very wide indeed. It comprises the leaders of the unions as well as those of the employer associations, of the pressure groups as well as the political parties, of social democrats as well as conservatives. The result is a wide, untidy, and impersonal order of things-a system. Personalities enter into it only insofar as one party leader or set of leaders is more successful in conciliating the various clienteles than another leader or set of leaders. Nor should we believe that when this wide governing class, the web of patrons, despoils certain sections of the community of their property, it does so simply to enrich itself (Treatise §2267). It does so to reward its supporters among the masses, i.e., to retain itself

in power. It stands towards them as a patron to his clients. Furthermore we are not to suppose that either patron or client is "wholly aware" of violating the moral rules of their society. "In fact", asserts Pareto, "some of them in all honesty identify [their continuance in office] with the best interests of the country" (Treatise \$2267). (The implication, of course, is that some of them don't.)

There are serious shortcomings in this analysis. It overrates the "alliance" between capital and labor and underrates their antagonism. It muddles up "speculator" and "rentier," who are supposed to be psychological types, with "bourgeoisie" and working class, which are socio-economic categories. It escapes from the pitfall of ascribing leadership to a narrowly organized and conspiratorial elite to fall into the alternative of making the "governing class" so wide as to reduce it to all who visibly governso denaturing it. Furthermore, it defines plutodemocracy so broadly that though it shows the common characteristics of, say, the U.S.A., France and Britain, it affords no criteria for distinguishing among them. But for all this, is there really a great deal in the analysis to shock or even disillusion the democrat-particularly one who argues that even if matters are indeed as Pareto described them, they are nevertheless preferable to the marxist or fascist alternatives?

Yet Pareto clearly hated this alternative. He hated it with a passion that often comes near to hysteria. Why? He hated it not for what it was but for what it might have been. His rage and chagrin is that of the lover betraved by his mistress. The key is the sentence already quoted: "We have not paused, even for a short moment, at the middle point where no privileges exist." Until he was fifty, Pareto had dedicated himself like a fanatic to tearing down the privileges of the Italian bourgeoisie. He had stood as a radical candidate against them in 1882. He had written over one hundred and sixty articles against them in the four brief years 1889-93. His meetings had been closed down by the Italian police and he himself had become a marked man. He had given money and shelter to the Italian socialist refugees in 1898. He had espoused the cause of Dreyfus. And at that precise moment his idol crumbled:

After the victory of the Dreyfusards, however, I was amazed to see them employing against their opponents the same villainous methods that they themselves had denounced. At that point I comprehended in all its fullness that if certain persons like myself had been following principles, most people had done just the opposite, and had

their eyes fixed on their interests. And I saw the same thing happen when the workers obtained freedom of association. What in today's language is styled "freedom" grew as what in yesterday's language was "freedom" diminished—by which I mean the power to act: which shrinks every day, save for criminals, in the so-called free and democratic countries. And from that I learned one additional thing: namely that the former liberals [sc. Pareto himself] had been toiling to obtain the exact opposite of what they desired.³⁴

The pluto-democracy had simply changed the nature of exploitation and the person of the exploiters. "Is there a land", he exclaimed in a private letter, "where one section of the population does not rob the other? I do not think so."35 And furthermore, the future of the pluto-democracy was even darker than its present. The working classes were to become more and more dominant in their tacit alliance with the "speculators," and as they did so they forced on their partners one concession after another in the direction of the crystallized, the Byzantine, society. The closed shop, the control of capital movements, the municipalization and nationalization of private industries, the limitation on freedom of personal movement, the erosion of local and federal liberties were signs he noticed well before the war (Treatise §2553). After it he remarked the sharpened animosity of the "have nots" for the "haves" which was intensifying all these Byzantine tendencies (Transformazione, pp. 86-99, 106-109).

Along with pluto-democracy, he naturally rejected the governing class which had sold the pass to his own brand of liberal democracythe hated bourgeoisie. Up to 1900 he had detested it because it used its privileges to feather its own nest and oppress the working people. Now he detested it all the more because when the time had come to call a halt to the reversal of this process it had refused to do so. Here again his private values came into play. Pareto was a very forthright person. He was scrupulously honest, abstemious, and, both physically and morally, most courageous. Once when it appeared that the Italian government was intent on silencing him by sending some hired ruffian to attack him, he welcomed the opportunity: for, as he told his friends, he shot mice with the pistol, while his skill at fence would

give any bravo a very bad quarter of an hour.36 "When all the world bow their heads to the bullies (prepotenti)", he wrote to Pantaleoni on another occasion, "it becomes a duty for the independent man to raise his head and give back blow for blow."37 But this was precisely what the governing class, the cowardly bourgeoisie, refused to do. Contronted by proletarian violence, they responded by continuing their former policy of blandishment, manipulation and surrender. Hence Pareto's furious onslaught on their "humanitarianism". He denounced it not for what it intrinsically was, but because it robbed them of their capacity to retain a grip on power. There is plenty of evidence in the Treatise to show conclusively that Pareto never advocated violence as a substitute for "manipulation". He went out of his way to demonstrate that no government could govern by force alone (Treatise, §2205). His point was simply that force as well as persuasion was necessary if any governing class was to maintain itself. This, of course, was implicitly or explicitly denied by most of the liberal democratic or social democratic theories of his time. And it was for their failure to realize that on occasion violence must be met by violence that he castigated the bourgeoisie of the pre-war epoch. As a result of their humanitarianism they were facing violent overthrow by a counter-elite drawn from the bellicose conservative disciplinarian masses, and with it social convulsion and the rise of a new fully-fledged Byzantine state. And so his anger against the bourgeoisie-including their bourgeoisified social democratic allies—was a compound of rage at the value of what they had yielded, contempt for their weakness, and schadenfreude at their humiliation. And yet he realised they could not, being what they were, do otherwise: "To win, [the bourgeoisie] would have to change its state of mind, to cease to be humanitarian, to cease to be anti-clerical, to cease to be democrat."38 And so his mood varies from insulting their weakness in one passage to enjoying their defeat in others: "My dear fellow, it is urgent that the syndicalists or a like courageous rabble should surge up from the depths and sweep our degenerate elite away."39

IV. CONCLUSION

"To maintain my independence, which is also the most precious thing in life." Thus Pareto had written in one of his first letters in

²⁴ A. Antonucci (ed.), Alcune Lettere di V. Pareto (Rome, 1938), pp. 21-26.

⁸⁵ MPP, 30 November 1899.

³⁶ MPP, 20 January 1892.

³⁷ MPP, 12 January 1898.

³⁸ MPP, 26 October 1907.

²⁹ MPP, 28 January 1908.

the published correspondence; and this sentence contains the clue to his personality. It is also, however, the clue to his political ideal: "Our goal", he was writing at about the same time, "is to have the minimum of government activity—to free ourselves from the clutches of the people who bleed the country white."

By this canon, nothing was to be gained by marxist socialism or by what the world today calls fascism. But at that time, democracy still offered a hope.

"I am not blind to its defects", he had then written, "but it seems that the lesser evil lies on this side. At least it is something to try whereas

⁴⁰ MPP, 23 February 1892.

the trial of the aristocratic regimes (in the true sense of the word—'of the best') has been made and has turned out very bad."⁴¹ On this democracy, then, he pinned all his hopes; it was tried; and it, too, had "turned out very bad". And here the very ardour with which he had embraced it made his disillusion the more embittered. His disgust with democracy was not that of the fascist who rated liberty too low, but of the lover, the outmoded individualist, who rated it too high. Fenced in with what he regarded as a choice of evils he turned his back on all of them—and made his journey to the Galapagos Islands.

41 MPP, 22 December 1891.

ON THE NEO-ELITIST CRITIQUE OF COMMUNITY POWER!

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I. INTRODUCTION

The process of inquiry occasionally exhibits a dialectical pattern in which a series of assertions is advanced and then attacked. A third phase, which consists of an attempt to salvage the first set of assertions, often ensues. The study of American community power has followed this sequence almost classically, and today we find ourselves in the third phase of the dialectic. The first period marked the contemporary emergence of community power as a distinct field of study, mainly through the investigations of Hunter, Mills and their followers. These observers contended that communities were controlled by "elites," usually economic, who imposed their will, often covertly, on non-elites. The second phase was marked by the challenge of another group of observers, the "pluralists." Pluralists contended that the methods and premises of the "elitists" predisposed them to conclusions about community power which were unjustified. Elitists commonly reached their conclusions either by investigating the reputations for power of various members of the community or merely by assuming that all who possessed certain presumed sources of power were in fact powerful. The pluralists claimed that reputations did not guarantee control and demanded evidence that community decisions on political issues, major and minor, were controlled by a reputed elite. The pluralists, after studying community decisions on a variety of subjects, concluded that shifting coalitions of participants drawn from all areas of community life actually controlled local politics. Rarely could a single elite be discovered imposing itself in each area of decision, policy, and conflict.2

¹ I am indebted to Stephen Stephens, Fred Greenstein, and James Eisenstein for cogent comments on earlier drafts of this paper.

² For good statements of positions, see Nelson W. Polsby, Community Power and Political Theory (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1963); Delbert C. Miller, "Democracy and Decision-Making in the Community Power Structure," in William V. D'Antonio and Howard J. Ehrlich (eds.), Power and Democracy in America (Notre Dame: University of Notre Dame Press, 1961), pp. 25-73; Robert A. Dahl, "Equality and Power in American Society," in ibid., pp. 73-91; Raymond Wolfinger, "Reputation and Reality in the Study

Many observers felt that the pluralists had won the day. Their methodology studied actual behavior, stressed operational definitions, and turned up evidence. Most important, it seemed to produce reliable conclusions which met the canons of science. Recently, however, new considerations have been introduced which intend to prop up the elitist Humpty Dumpty on a more substantial wall of theory than the one from which it had previously tumbled. The beginnings of a new position on community power appear in the work of those responsible for the third phase, the "neo-elitists," as I shall call them. That position forms the subject of this analysis.

of Community Power," in Nelson Polsby, Robert A. Dentler, and Paul A. Smith (eds.), Politics and Social Life (Boston: Houghton Mifflin Co., 1963), pp. 703-712. The literature in this area is voluminous. Obviously, not all those who use the reputational method come to elitist conclusions, nor do all those who use the decisional approach come to pluralist conclusions. For example, see Robert E. Agger, Daniel Goldrich and Bert E. Swanson, The Rulers and the Ruled (New York: Wiley, 1964). However, it is fair to say that most investigators using the reputationalist approach start off with elitist premises and most investigators using the decisional approach begin with pluralist assumptions. Hence, I will oversimplify a bit and consider approach and premises as coextensive. Indeed, as John Walton shows, decisional theorists do tend to find pluralist power situations and reputationalists elite situations. This is only partially due to the different arenas they have examined. See John Walton, "Substance and Artifact: The Current Status of Research on Community Power Structure," American Journal of Sociology, 71 (January, 1966), 430-439. It is important to note that, for the most part, in the discussion to follow I take the notion of "elite" as given and meaningful. The substance of my argument does not turn in any crucial way on the obvious difficulties, which have been explicated elsewhere, with definitions of community power elites.

³ The neo-elitist critique relies primarily on the notion of non-decision-making. In particular, I will be treating the writings of Peter Bachrach and Morton S. Baratz, "Two Faces of Power," this Review, 56 (Dec., 1962), 947-952; Bachrach and Baratz, "Decisions and Non-decisions: An

Generally speaking, neo-elitists differ with pluralists over the conclusions which can legitimately be drawn from the study of community decisions in issue areas. Such decisions, say the neo-elitists, actually represent much less than the pluralists suspect. Decisional methodology and pluralist premises are alleged to be deficient in the three following major respects:

- 1) Pluralists misunderstand the way influence expresses itself in the community. According to the neo-elitists, non-elites are encased in values foisted on them by the elite. Elites transmit these values to non-elites by a conscious and unconscious "mobilization of bias." Therefore, non-elites are not even conscious of having major differences with the elite. A "false consensus," created by the elite, limits conflicts and decisions in the community to unimportant matters which do not threaten the elite.
- 2) Pluralists are most successful in assessing power when conflict is occurring. However, there are many situations in which individuals, despite their disagreements with the powerful, anticipate that they have no chance to profit by raising an issue. They realize that their powerful opponents would crush them. In this case, the power of the opponents expresses itself through the phenomenon of anticipated reactions. Under these conditions,

Analytical Framework," in ibid., 57 (1963), 632-642; E. E. Schattschneider, The Semi-sovereign People (New York: Holt, Rinehart and Winston, 1960); and Arthur J. Vidich and Joseph Bensman, Small Town in Mass Society (Garden City: Doubleday, 1960). These writings relate closely to theory exemplified in Felix Oppenheim, Dimensions of Freedom (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1961), chap. 3; and Carl J. Friedrich, Man and His Government (New York: McGraw-Hill, 1963), chap. 3. Recent influential writings which embody traces of "non-decision" theory include Richard E. Neustadt, Presidential Power (New York: Wiley, 1962), passim; and Karl W. Deutsch, The Nerves of Government (New York: The Free Press of Glencoe, 1963), pp. 110-111, et passim.

- ⁴ Schattschneider, op. cit., chaps. 1-3, et passim. ⁵ "False consensus" is a term borrowed from Robert Dahl, "A Critique of the Power Elite Model," this Review, 52 (June, 1958), 463-469,
- ⁶ For complex examples of the phenomenon of anticipated reactions, see Robert Dahl, "The Power Analysis Approach to the Study of Politics," unpublished, April, 1965, 27–28; and James

- there is no conflict, no visible issue and no decision and the decisional methodology is useless. According to Bachrach and Baratz, the major figures among the neoelitists, "To measure relative influence solely in terms of the ability to initiate and veto proposals is to ignore the possible exercise of influence or power in limiting the scope of initiation." In another context, Bachrach and Baratz define power solely to cover situations in which individuals act or do not act in anticipation of the sanctions others may exert upon them. We shall accept this definition to facilitate discussion.
- 3) Pluralists unduly stress decisions made in the governmental realm. However, such emphasis is unwarranted. Even if the anticipation situation breaks down and issues are initiated, they may never reach the stage of governmental decisionmaking. A variety of coercive devices and sanctions-organizational, ideological and procedural-may be used to prevent such concerns from being acted on by government. Threats by and anticipation of the powerful give way to the application of sanctions which obliterate alternatives to desisting. Bachrach and Baratz define this situation as one involving the actual application of force.9 Again, we will accept this definition for discussion.

In summation, non-elites are not even conscious of important differences with the elite. Even if they are, they anticipate that they could only lose by making trouble, and so they bow to the power of the elite. Or the application of force prevents them from having their concerns acted on by government. Each of these situations occupies a position on a "non-decision-making" continuum. "When the dominant values, the accepted rules of the game, the existing power relations among groups, and the instruments of force . . . effectively prevent certain grievances from developing into fullfledged issues which call for decisions, it can be said that a non-decision-making situation exists."10

G. March, "An Introduction to the Theory and Measurement of Influence," this Review, 49 (June, 1955), 431-451, at 443-444.

⁷ Bachrach and Baratz, "Two Faces . . .," op. cit., 952.

⁸ Bachrach and Baratz, "Decisions and Non-decisions . . . ," op. cit., 637.

⁹ Ibid., 636.

¹⁰ Ibid., 641.

II. THE "FALSE CONSENSUS" ARGUMENT

The argument on the problem of "false consensus," as it is presently stated, is not an empirical argument, though it makes certain dubious empirical assumptions. Rather, it is a purely deductive, tautological theory which, if one accepts its empirical assumptions, does not admit of empirical proof or disproof. Therefore, it is of limited utility in the actual exploration of community power structure. Furthermore, the peculiar structure of the argument incorporates a logical fallacy which is inadmissible. Finally, any conditions which can be introduced to make the argument subject to empirical validation indicate its lack of utility. These are serious charges; let us see if they hold.

The argument claims that the conflicts studied by the pluralists are unimportant. Why are they unimportant? Because they do not threaten an elite. We need not consider the conflicts studied by the pluralists unimportant if we don't presume the existence of an elite. But the presumption itself is not justified unless the theory specifies some independent reasons for us to believe an elite exists. The argument specifies no such independent reasons. Therefore, we need not believe an elite exists and, without an elite, we cannot have a false consensus.¹¹

More generally, the terms of the argument make it impossible to disprove the existence of an elite under conditions of conflict and, as we shall see, under any conditions. If a conflict is unimportant (i.e., "does not threaten an elite"), an elite exists. If a conflict does threaten an elite (impossible under the terms of the theory), then an elite also exists, but in this case it will probably be observable since it will be threatened into action. In all cases of conflict an elite exists. Therefore, only by definition, the existence of an elite in cases of conflict is "proved."

The set of problems outlined stems directly from the general nature of the argument. The absence of an event, conflict which threatens an elite, is taken as the evidence for the existence of an elite. However, we have no reason for accepting the absence of an event as evidence for any particular cause, unless it can be demonstrated that the cause (in this case, an elite) produced the absence of the event (threatening conflict). To do so, some threatening conflict must precede the coming of false consensus. But such threatening conflict is incompatible with false consensus as defined. Therefore, false

¹¹ For a similar criticism of the elitists, see Polsby, op. cit., 24.

consensus does not admit the evidence to support itself. To put the point differently, no conflict existing under conditions of false consensus threatens an elite; therefore, no such conflict will cause an elite to show itself. We can never get empirical evidence that an elite exists. The argument reduces itself to a statement of faith.

Furthermore, the argument does not allow us to distinguish between "real" and "false" consensuses. Presumably, a "real" consensus would be defined as a non-elite-controlled consensus. However, since non-elites, under the terms of the theory, are controlled by the mobilization of bias from an elite to them, a real consensus is impossible unless an elite does not exist. But the theory presumes the existence of an elite. Therefore, there can be no "real" consensus. Finally, joining the two sides of our argument, elites exist in all cases of consensus and in all cases of conflict. The argument cannot be falsified.¹²

The theory also suffers in its chief empirical assumption. It contends that non-elites are encased in a series of values which they assimilate from the elite. No evidence for this assertion is proffered. We now have, instead, good reason to doubt the presence of consensus on many fundamental rules and values of the democratic system. Whatever consensus on fundamental values exists, therefore, seems to pertain to values so far not studied. Is it possible that political scientists could have ignored completely those values which are shared and which produce false consensus? Possible, certainly, but unlikely.

Finally, another premise of the argument needs to be explored. The argument assumes that the mobilization of bias operates only downward, from elite to mass. Since little actual behavior of the elite is considered in the theory, it is understandable that no specification of mechanisms whereby the elite transmits its values is forthcoming. Therefore, within the bounds of the argument, no evidence to support the downward mobilization of bias is adduced. But a more fundamental problem exists. In the absence of evidence to the contrary, it is just

¹² On the criterion of falsifiability in theory construction, see Karl R. Popper, *The Logic of Scientific Discovery* (London: Hutchinson, 1959), chap. 4.

¹³ See especially Herbert McClosky, "Consensus and Ideology in American Politics," in Edward C. Dreyer and Walter Rosenbaum (eds.), *Political Opinion and Electoral Behavior* (Belmont, California: Wadsworth, 1966), pp. 37-64; and Robert Dahl, *Who Governs* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1961), chap. 28.

as plausible that any consensus we do find is not controlled by an elite. One can argue that non-elites do not differ with elites precisely because the formers' values are so well embodied by the latter. The neo-elitist critique provides no reason to reject this assertion. Indeed, as Vidich and Bensman admit in their study of "non-decision-making," when elite members do not reflect and conform to widely held values of non-elites, significant conflicts may erupt, in which case power and force come to control. 15

Because the false consensus argument is deductive, non-falsifiable and ridden with undemonstrated assumptions, it is necessary to imagine empirical conditions which might produce an elite-controlled false consensus. In the real world, what conditions are necessary for an elite to erect a successful false consensus? The logic of the argument suggests that the following conditions must hold:

- The elite must succeed in producing consensus on values within the community as a whole.
- 2) Such values must control policy choice.

What factors affect the attainment of these conditions? First, there must be consensus on a wide variety of points within the elite. Value cleavage within the elite may encourage elite factions to look for support outside. If such conflict extends itself, consensus on community values will disintegrate rapidly. Also, value consensus within the elite must control policy choice. If a particular set of approved values does not dictate policy choice, conflicts can again be extended beyond the elite to the community. Should values continue to permit policy conflict, the way lies clear for the introduction of competing values to justify and ex-

14 For a discussion of a variety of constraints on elites, see Polsby, op. cit., pp. 128ff. Put in a rather simplified form, the neo-elitist critique accepts a "Great Man" theory of leadership much at variance with current studies of leadership which indicate the extent to which leaders are constrained to conform to group values. See, for example, the theory of E. P. Hollander: "Emergent Leadership and Social Influence," in Leadership and Interpersonal Behavior, ed. Luigi Petrillo and Bernard Bass (New York: Holt, Rinehart and Winston, 1961), pp. 30-48.

¹⁵ See the discussion of the challenge to the village elite launched by James West in Vidich and Bensman, op. cit., 162–171. I will rely heavily on the Vidich and Bensman study, not through a a paucity of other useful material, but rather because it is interpreted primarily as support of the non-decision argument.

press policy conflicts. In order to attain value and policy consensus, the elite must adhere to some procedure designed to obtain agreement on values and priorities, thereby preventing differences from affecting the community. The substantive and procedural elite consensus required here defies complete and continuous attainment. Conflict within the elite is likely.¹⁶

Elite consensus is itself partially dependent upon a second factor, system autonomy. Individuals in the system, either elite or non-elite, who have some of their needs provided outside the system, may develop competing allegiances and alternative values. Outside contacts offer new means for obtaining goals, new goals, and new models of behavior. External contacts thereby loosen elite controls wherever they exist. And conflict will probably erupt, shattering whatever false consensus exists.

The legal relationships between local, state and Federal governments in the United States, as well as the informal political connections emanating from these arrangements, break down the system autonomy necessary for attainment of false consensus. These arrangements not only provide a forum for the airing and institutionalization of value differences in a community, but also introduce competing value sets, priorities and procedures into communities. Lack of political autonomy for communities lessens the opportunity for local elites to construct a false consensus. Lack of community economic autonomy, increasingly characteristic of American towns and cities, produces a similar effect.18 In short, neither economic nor political self-sufficiency exists in most localities; therefore, this determinant of false consensus is absent also.

Of course, lack of autonomy is intimately related to community stability at its most fundamental levels. The preservation of elite consensus and local autonomy depends partially upon the extent to which demographic, ecologi-

¹⁶ The major difficulty stems from specialization of leadership roles which leads to conflict. The most obvious example is the conflict inherent between staff and line in a bureaucracy. Even the insular, homogeneous elite in Springdale could not continually maintain consensus: *ibid.*, pp. 46–53

¹⁷ For a theoretical statement of the same proposition, see Richard Emerson, "Power-Dependence Relations," *American Sociological Review*, 27 (1962), 31-41, at 32.

¹⁸ For a case study see Robert O. Schulze, "The Bifurcation of Power in a Satellite City," in Morris Janowitz (ed.), Community Political Systems (Glencoe: The Free Press, 1961), pp. 19-81.

cal and sociological characteristics of the community can be controlled. Changes in birth and death rates, economic patterns, and life expectancies are in varying degrees uncontrollable by political leadership in the United States. Such social changes make demands upon local political systems and leaders as constantly and significantly as, in their turn, local political leaders structure community needs. Often, they require dependence of local organs of government upon national levels. If I do not assert, however, that temporary consensuses on policy are impossible or even improbable; I merely suggest the likelihood that any consensus we do find is not "false."

III. THE POWER ARGUMENT

The conditions for the creation of a successful false consensus seem unattainable, and the logic and assumptions of the false consensus argument are faulty. Therefore, we may conclude that power and force control most community decision-making. Let us look at the next alternative, that of the application of power to prevent community issues from being initiated. This argument, like that of false consensus, suffers both in its statement and in its application to the real world.

The neo-elitist critique suggests that power cases of non-decision are most characteristic of situations in which those with little, anticipating reactions from and responding to threats from those with much, do not act. In fact, however, the application of power to forestall action involves all sorts of groups. Therefore, we can conclude little from the mere existence of nondecisions arising from the application of power. For example, the logic of the deterrence formula in American military policy, as Snyder demonstrates,20 is based on a virtually infinite regress of anticipated reactions. Why are so many anticipated reactions, and the inaction based on such anticipation, necessary? Precisely because the parties to the deterrence situation view themselves as equally able to decimate each other. Nor may those with much ignore the possible reactions of those with little.

19 This has become especially true of American cities and metropolitan areas, but is also becoming true for smaller towns wishing to make use of urban renewal funds available from the federal government. On this point see the figures of Martin Anderson, *The Federal Bulldozer* (Cambridge: MIT Press, 1962), p. 44.

²⁰ Glenn Snyder, Deterrence and Defense (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1961), pp. 9-53.

Under most conditions, as Blau shows,²¹ those with much buy legitimacy by anticipating possible unfavorable reactions to their behavior. When such reactions seem imminent, those with much may well not act. Therefore, power cases of non-decisions provide no criteria by themselves for saying anything meaningful about community political patterns.

On the other hand, even if those planning to initiate policies hostile to an "elite" become subject to its power and are constrained to desist, they have still exerted power of their own. The elite has been forced to anticipate them and exert power in return. The power to get others to veto behavior has policy consequences for the others, a fact which neo-elitists often ignore. For all these reasons, the existence of power cases of non-decisions tells us less about community power than the neo-elitist suspects.

Granting the ubiquity and inconclusiveness of power cases of non-decision-making, the neoelitist may shift the grounds of his argument. He may contend that those with much need desist only on issues in which they have relatively little at stake. On the other hand, he might say, those with little must desist when they have relatively much at stake. If we accept this contention, we now have a way of measuring power by examining what was at stake for each group controlled by the anticipated sanctions of others. But this argument leads us in an unfortunate direction. Must we conclude that a group's power varies whenever it is involved in decisions or non-decisions of varying import? Surely not. Rather, we are concerned with the ability of a group to get what it wants no matter what the character of the encounter in which it finds itself.

Furthermore, we may argue that power cases of non-decision-making for all are equally likely to occur when only marginal gains and losses are at stake. Power cases of non-decisions require that there be sufficient precedents to guide all participants, so that they can assess meaningfully whatever threats are made. In cases where there are such precedents, more often than not established programs already exist, thereby restricting current actions to marginal gains and losses. Wildavsky's discussion of the budgetary process provides many examples of the importance of anticipated reactions in governing marginal allocations for well established programs.²² Normally, few or-

²¹ Peter Blau, Exchange and Power in Social Life (New York: Wiley, 1964), chap. 8.

²² Aaron Wildavsky, The Politics of the Budgetary Process (Boston: Little, Brown, 1964), chaps. 2 and 3.

dinary citizens or creative leaders are interested in such areas. Therefore, we need not conclude a priori that groups subject to power cases of non-decisions are losing much.

We might also argue that when there are new programs at stake designed to meet pressing problems which yield few guidelines for policy makers, control by anticipated reactions often gives way to applications of force. Not only are these issues crucial to group survival, thereby necessitating vigorous action, but also they are lacking in those precedents which might provide meaningful assessments of threats. To sum up, those with much anticipate those with little, those with little those with much, and they relatively equal each other when both important and unimportant matters are at stake. The power argument cannot be reformulated to tell us anything a priori about community power.

The logic of the power case has two further weaknesses that require exploration. Elites, we are told, are able, through the application of power, to prevent issues which threaten them from being initiated. But one might argue the exact contrary of this position, using the logic of the argument itself. If the major concern of the elite is to keep threatening issues from being initiated and reaching government, then only the most conflictful, the most intense, the most pressing will be able to mobilize enough support to pass the barriers of power and force erected by the elite. In this case, one could perfectly well argue that the neo-elitist critique strengthens rather than detracts from the pluralist emphasis on governmental decision-making. As presently stated, the power argument leads as plausibly to this conclusion as to the conclusion adopted by the neo-elitists. The point is, of course, that the neo-elitist interpretation of the power case takes only that side of the phenomenon which supports its conclusions.

But suppose we assure ourselves that the issues which are decided through one governmental agency are relatively harmless to ar. elite and of little interest to the non-elite. Suppose, further, that the elite has threatened the non-elite with sanctions if it pursues issues which might change the status quo. May this set of facts be taken as validation of the neo-elitists power argument? No. After all, the initiators may anticipate not only that they will not get a hearing from an agency, but also that the agency is too weak to help them. For example in some large cities the great number of decision-making organs produces as much inaction and non-decision-making as does the application of power aimed at preventing initiation.2

In addition, one could only affirm the importance of the non-decision-making process in this case if the non-elite were unable to find a hearing in other governmental agencies which could aid it. In Springdale, for example, the unwillingness of the village board to handle potentially threatening issues ultimately was purchased by the availability of competent state, local and national agencies to which recourse was had successfully.²⁴

More generally, even though a group attempts to prevent an issue from reaching a governmental agency and the issue does not, we need not assume that the group has succeeded. The availability of other outlets limits the extent to which we can say that an "elite" has succeeded in applying power to prevent decision. The American political system maximizes outlets for decisions, thereby lessening the ability of an elite to produce non-decision-making through the application of power.

So much for ambiguities, unjustified assumptions, and problems of interpretation in the power argument; equally as serious are the difficulties that remain when we attempt to apply the argument to the conduct of research. Ironically enough, both the study and the logic of anticipated reactions as a phenomenon drive us back to research premises virtually identical to those already employed by the pluralists.

In order to meet the problem of anticipated reactions, the pluralist focus on decisions must be expanded to cover patterns of communication within policy areas. If power, defined by Bachrach and Baratz as being based on anticipation, is exercised to "limit the scope of initiation," the powerful must communicate policy preferences and threatened sanctions to the less powerful. Bachrach and Baratz themselves specify that power exercise requires communication.25 A few non-decisions might be based on inferences about elite preferences in the absence of contemporaneous communication, but such situations seem unlikely. If preferences are initially strong enough, potential initiators will make certain that the current desires of those who count are ascertained through some sort of overt communication. Communication is an empirically investigable phenomenon and

²³ See especially the case of New York: Wallac∈

S. Sayre and Herbert Kaufman, Governing New York City (New York: Norton, 1965), chap. 19.

²⁴ I speak here not only of governmental agencies, to which reference will be made later, but to the role of the Community Club at the local level: see Vidich and Bensman, op. cit., pp. 133-135.

²⁵ Bachrach and Baratz, "Decisions and Non-decisions . . .," op. cit., 634.

can be studied through an expansion of the pluralist framework.

But by expanding the scope of inquiry from decisions to communications, we do not skirt all our problems. Having discovered the pattern of communication, we still must infer the controlling pattern of anticipated reactions. Merely knowing who communicated with whom in an issue area over a period of time and who threatened sanctions or promised rewards does not reveal whose anticipated reactions actually carried weight. How can we solve this problem?

We could, of course, simply ask those involved in an issue area what their actual anticipation of reactions is, or, in cases of retrospective research, was. But this procedure is both incomplete and unreliable. We know that many people are often unclear about the influences to which they respond. Many simply forget; others have good reason to lie. Still others rationalize in such a way as to convince themselves that decisions thrust on them from external sources were really their own. For example, Bachrach and Baratz have no difficulty believing that economic dominants who take no role in a decision do so from their own disinterest in the issues at stake.26 However, it may instead be true that, anticipating a defeat they downgrade the importance of the issues. Rationalization is a ubiquitous and powerful defense mechanism.

We are unable to draw the sorts of conclusions about community power from an investigation of communication that would satisfy either the neo-elitists or others. Is there no way of supplementing the study of communication with an additional factor which will allow us to identify, at least fairly well, the determining pattern of anticipated reactions? I submit that we can use the pattern of actual, observable, past and present force applications as a guide to the present pattern of anticipated reactions. These applications of force will occur most often in community conflicts. Such conflicts, of course, are those most likely to be uncovered by a traditional pluralist methodology.

Why should force situations provide our springboard? The answer is that the reactions of a group are anticipated mainly when current or past experience with the group demonstrates that its reactions must be reckoned with. Such experience comes only from the actual application, rather than simply the threat, of sanctions. As Dorwin Cartwright laconically observes, "It appears... that if a person pos-

sesses power he will be inclined to use it."27 Nor was Machiavelli insensitive to the importance of demonstrations of power through sanction application.28 Even Bachrach and Baratz concede this piont. " . . . [T]he use of force in one situation increases the credibility of threats to use it in others."29 However, as we have seen, the major thrust of Bachrach and Baratz's argument runs counter to these notions. To repeat, we have little reason to expect that any group will be listened to unless it has been tested and been forced to apply some of the sanctions it threatens. We must conclude that the only answer to the problem of anticipated reactions in non-decisions is to rely, in practice, on the pluralist investigation of forceful conflict. The power argument in the neo-elitist critique does not suggest a viable alternative.

But, it may be argued, even if we find, either in the community's political history or present political life, a rough index of the operative pattern of anticipated reactions, our problem is not solved. The essence of the anticipated reactions problem, the argument goes, is that no two situations are alike. For example, labor leaders may demand publicly that politicians press legislation governing working conditions. Politicians remember that in the past business leaders, though threatening sanctions, actually did little to impede similar labor legislation governing wages and hours. Nor have they done more than threaten in the current case. But the past and present are unreliable guides to the future. Perhaps business leaders feel more strongly about working conditions. Therefore, we cannot use either past or current experience as an infallible index to present, controlling patterns of anticipated reactions or to subsequent behavior.30 This argument is true

²⁷ Dorwin Cartwright, "A Field Theoretical Conception of Power," in Dorwin Cartwright (ed.), Studies in Social Power (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 1959), p. 202. Here it seems clear that Cartwright is thinking about the disposition to demonstrate power forcefully and visibly when such demonstration is feasible and inviting.

²⁸ "And men have less scruple in offending one who makes himself loved than one who makes himself feared; for love is held by a chain of obligation which, men being selfish, is broken whenever it serves their purpose; but fear is maintained by a dread of punishment which never fails": The Prince and the Discourses (New York: The Modern Library, 1940), p. 61.

²⁹ Bachrach and Baratz, "Decisions and Non-decisions...," op. cit., 636.

30 Of course, no index is "infallible." What we look for is an index which will be reliable under

²⁶ Bachrach and Baratz, "Two Faces . . . ," op. cit., 950.

as far as it goes; strictly speaking, of course, we cannot

But let us look at the matter from the perspective of the politicians caught in the middle. They are faced with public pressures from labor leaders who have made commitments to their followers. Against this present pressure the neo-elitist critique assumes that politicians will weigh more heavily the private threats of other groups in the community who have a history of failing to carry out their threats. We may grant that politicians will consider such threats, but we may wonder how seriously they will view them. One may argue more plausibly that they will heavily discount these threats because they doubt that they are meaningful. Lacking demonstrations of seriousness by those business leaders with whose motives and intentions they are concerned, politicians would rationally support labor. When the businessmen commit themselves and actually apply pressures and sanctions, they make their threats credible. By so doing, of course, they also bring the conflict into view of pluralist methodology. In politics, as in poker, "put up or shut up" expresses a major formula for decision-makers. Also, in politics as in poker, bluffs work consistently only with novices and for short periods. The actions of politicians tend to redeem the utility of pluralist methodology.31

IV. THE FORCE ARGUMENT

It would appear, from the analysis of the power argument, that force holds the major empirical relevance in the area of non-decisions. As a matter of research strategy, it appears clear that applications of force are both easier to study than any behavior falling under the power case and also more likely to structure the pattern of anticipated reactions. A traditional pluralist approach uncovers applications of force which produce non-decision-making; therefore, we need be concerned only with the implications and interpretations of the force argument. The neo-elitist interpretation of the force argument is, I feel, neither entirely justified nor complete.

most circumstances. To put it another way, past and present demonstrations of power are a less fallible index of present anticipations on policy matters than any other index we could use.

at Theory underlying these formulations is drawn primarily from David Braybrooke and Charles E. Lindblom, A Strategy of Decision (New York: The Free Press of Glencoe, 1963), chaps. 4-6; and Thomas Schelling, The Strategy of Conflict (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1960), chap 2.

Suppose we discover that the application of elite force prevented some of a certain group's major concerns from reaching the stage of governmental policy-making. Few would deny that this process occurs. Indeed, a variety of techniques can be used to assure this outcome. Procedural tactics can be employed to side-track issues. Talk about whether to put a matter on the agenda can go on endlessly. Resort to precedent can be used to deny the legitimacy of an issue for governmental decision. Access to precedents, records, and other useful material can be denied the initiators. In extreme cases, intimidation of the initiators may be undertaken. Channels of communication can be closed. 32 All these applications of force coerce the initiators into acceptance of the status quo. However, inferences about these tactics are not as straightforward as the neo-elitists suggest.

We may, of course, infer that the neo-elitist critique has been confirmed. However, we may also infer something else, namely, that the elite has been coerced into exerting sanctions. Initiators have severely restricted the elite's alternatives. Should we not consider this situation evidence of the strength of the initiators as well as of the elite? The neo-elitists may dismiss this interpretation by suggesting that, regardless, the governmental process continues to favor the elite. But the process rewards the the elite, as far as one can tell, only when the elite asks nothing from it but protection from outside interference. Whether in fact the governmental process would favor the elite, should it want positive concessions from government, remains a moot point.

Of course, the neo-elitist might reply, "So what? Those who get the most of what there is to get won't need government to aid them, but only to prevent others from hurting them. Only losers go to government actually to get something positive." This reply, it should be immediately apparent, is an assertion, not a demonstration. Indeed, we have good reason to suspect that government is an aid in getting

²² For examples of many of these and other techniques, see Vidich and Bensman, op. cit., passim. For an examination of the ways in which rules governing decisional priorities are generated and operate in a decision-making body, see James David Barber, Power In Committees (Chicago: Rand McNally, 1966), chaps. 2 and 3.

33 Schattschneider makes this argument about intra-business conflict: "It is the losers in intra-business conflict who seek redress from public authority. The dominant business interests resist appeals to the government": Schattschneider, op. cit., p. 40. Italics his.

things for both winners and losers. If so, we may wonder why the elite itself chooses not to use government for something positive. There are two possible answers to this question. First, we may argue that elites, because of their favored positions, have fewer needs than those who wish to use government. But, on the other hand, their great power should make it easier for them to work through government to get what little they still want. Second, we may argue that the elite members do not feel they could win in attempts to use government. If in fact elites can only prevent others from using government, but feel themselves similarly unable to use it, few of us would wish to label the situation truly "elitist."34 Therefore, we can conclude little from the force argument, unless and until the "elite" itself succeeds in gaining something positive from government.

Neo-elitists ignore the fact that non-elites can often enhance their power by forcing their opponents to use force against them. Non-elites may try to force elites to deny them access to government, hoping that they will gain public sympathy, publicity, and ultimately, political support. What may at first appear to be simply an instance of an elite forcing non-elites into acquiescence may, on deeper examination, turn out to be the opening wedge in a campaign to unseat the elite. No responsible analyst should ignore all the possible interpretations and aspects of force application.

The neo-elitist may wonder if the situation just described bears any relation to the real world. Why, he may say, should individuals be attracted to a cause which has just been forcibly denied even a governmental hearing? The neo-elitist formulation of n-decinosion-making conceals the answer to this question, because it emphasizes only those values which contribute to elite control and support the status quo. But are there no "dominant values," no "accepted rules of the game" which favor the initiators of issues? Are there no Americans who feel that the role of government is to handle grievances put to it? Is not one "rule of the game" that government officials should handle legitimate protests which arise within society, and not conspire to force initiators of such protests to desist? Though we do not have conclusive evidence, there is reason to believe that values and beliefs favoring initiators do exist.35 They constitute both a check on the non-decision-making process and a lever by which those groups discriminated against by non-decision-making acquire supporters and resources. Such groups can occasionally activate these values by forcing elites to deny them the use of government. We need not assume that all the "values," all the "rules of the game" favor the status quo.

What has so far been said leads to another deficiency in the force argument. The argument ignores the political costs of non-decision-making, especially by force but also by power. Such costs affect governmental agencies, public officials, and members of the elite itself. Ultimately, they undercut rule by forceful non-decision-making.

Perhaps the major cost of continued forceful non-decision-making is the lessened possibility of any sort of positive decision-making by the governmental agency in question. Taking an extreme example, Vidich and Bensman note that, as a consequence of its continued unwillingness to hear grievances, "... the [Spring-dale] village board is not usually in a position to act when pressing action is required."30 There are two reasons why continued non-decision-making, whether by force or power, decreases the possibility of positive decision-making.

First, the refusal of one agency to exercise its legal jurisdiction means that other governmental agencies supplant it and, despite legalities, expand their own operative spans of control. Vidich and Bensman indicate that this reorientation of power occurred even in insular Springdale.³⁷ As organizational and bureaucratic theory would suggest, competing centers of power tend to expand their jurisdictions as much as possible.³⁸ Second, and equally costly

(22%) preferred firm and aggressive leadership, honesty and sincerity, to other leadership qualities in a 1960 Roper poll (see Roper Commercial Poll, No. 101, question 21). Similarly, we may note the familiar upsurge of support for a President after his forceful intervention in foreign affairs. This response was most recently exploited by President Johnson in the Tonkin affair. Nor is it any accident that most of those who write on "great" Presidents ordinarily talk about activists such as Lincoln, Roosevelt, etc. The evaluation of greatness arrived at by scholars is reflected in the opinions of most Americans. Support for governmental initiators may well reflect a deeper support for initiators throughout the system.

³⁴ This formulation is reminiscent of Riesman's "veto groups" concept. See David Riesman et al, The Lonely Crowd (Garden City: Doubleday Anchor Books, n.d.), pp. 246-251.

²⁵ Evidence is only suggestive and scattered. However, we can note that more Americans

³⁶ Vidich and Bensman, op. cit., p. 131.

³⁷ *Ibid.*, p. 136.

³⁸ For a sophisticated treatment of conflict strategies and expansionist tendencies in govern-

to agencies engaged in non-decision-making, the effect of an agency's inaction tarnishes its image. Officials of the agency, as well as the general public, lose faith in the decision-making process. Vidich and Bensman report of the members of the Springdale village board:

They are not... able to assess their relationship to a constituency, and this lack of skill leads to the indecision which results in incompetence. What is more, the picture of their performance which emerges to the public level is generally regarded as reflecting a do-nothing, incompetent government agency. The incompetence of the board members is an open and widespread subject of public discussion among all groups in the community, and elected board members are themselves quick to admit to the outside observer that they 'don't know much' about village government.³⁹

The good burghers of Springdale seemed not at all unhappy to preside over the dissolution of village board authority and power in the town. At the behest of economic notables they aided in destroying the power and prestige of village government. Most politicians, however, will not contemplate so passively and sanguinely either their own stained images or the decayed prestige of their organization. They, perhaps even more than the general public, share those values which suggest that the role of a political body is to decide, pro or con.⁴⁰ These values provide an important check on

mental bureaucracies, see Matthew Holden, Jr., "'Imperialism' in Bureaucracy," this Review, 60 (Dec., 1966), 943-952.

39 Vidich and Bensman, op. cit., p. 118.

40 Indications are that political activists are much more likely to be strongly ideological than their followers. Therefore, they will be even more likely than their followers to use the political process actively as a vehicle for obtaining their values. See Herbert McClosky et al, "Issue Conflict and Consensus Among Party Leaders and Followers," this REVIEW, 54 (June, 1960), 406-427. Also, see Lester Milbrath, Political Participation (Chicago: Rand McNally, 1965), chap. 3, for a review of the literature relating political participation to the development of ideological thinking. Finally, Warner et al note the idealistic, activist self-conceptions of federal bureaucrats: see W. Lloyd Warner et a!, The American Federal Executive (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1963), chap. 13. Such role identities seem entirely incompatible with perpetual non-decision-making. their propensity to practice non-decisionmaking. It is at least possible that, at some point, public officials will act to protect their dying prestige. One of the ways they can do so is by assuring groups with grievances that they will at least receive an official decision, should they reactivate their demands. In so doing, whatever non-decision-making process formerly existed would be destroyed.

Nor do the costs of forceful non-decisionmaking fall easily on the elite. Unanimity within the elite is relatively easy to maintain when only threats are involved. But actual application of sanctions, with all the unforeseen consequences of such application, will not elicit so unanimous a response. Indeed, once force is necessary to prevent issues from reaching government, it is quite possible that the elite will be on its way to dissolution. It is not as easy to conceal actual sanction application as it is threats. Nor is it easy to ward off reactions to overt, forceful non-decision-making. We can therefore conclude that the costs of non-decision-making to governmental agencies, public officials and local elites assure that control by forceful non-decision-making will be inherently unstable and, probably, of short duration.

v. CONCLUSION

The neo-elitist critique of community power focuses on the problem of "non-decisionmaking." Non-decision-making may proceed through the application of power, force or the construction of a "false consensus." However, the neo-elitist statement of non-decisionmaking has logical and empirical problems as formulated. The false consensus argument is non-falsifiable and, therefore, not amenable to scientific investigation. The power and force cases are construed in ways which lead to unwarranted conclusions. A pluralist methodology must be adopted to meet the major contentions raised by the power case, because anticipated reactions will be based upon observable instances of force application. However, applications of force are not always understandable in the terms posited by the neo-elitist critique; nor can we expect that forceful non-decisionmaking will provide conclusions that support the critique. For these reasons, we have reason to believe that research based on pluralist premises leads to a reasonably accurate picture of community power. We also have reason to believe that no "elite" can operate for long solely on the basis of non-decision-making.

MEASURING THE CONCENTRATION OF POWER IN POLITICAL SYSTEMS

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I. INTRODUCTION

The unequal distribution of power among the members of a political system is one of the most pervasive facts of political life. Yet, while many studies have confirmed the fact that a few members exercise disproportionate control over many others in most systems, the configurations of power relations that occur among the few have generally not been subjected to systematic comparative analysis. In a few notable empirical studies, attempts have been made to compare the exercise of power in different issue-areas and across different decisions.1 Comparative analyses have suffered, however, from the lack of any means to make tractable and compare, except in a qualitative way, schematic representations of power relations either in different political systems or over different issue-areas in the same system.2 When diagrams of power structures become complex and unwieldy, it is easiest to forget about making precise comparisons about the way power is distributed among decision-makers somehow identified as being influential in the political process.

In this article I shall develop a quantitative index that measures the degree of concentration of power among the actors in a political system. For this purpose I shall assume that three

¹ See, for example, Robert A. Dahl, Who Governs? Democracy and Power in an American City (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1961); Edward C. Banfield, Political Influence (New York: Free Press of Glencoe, 1961); and Robert E. Agger, Daniel Goldrich, and Bert E. Swanson, The Rulers and the Ruled: Political Power and Impotence in American Communities (New York: John Wiley & Sons, Inc., 1964).

² For an imaginative effort to develop a classification of generalized issue-areas relevant to different political systems, see James N. Rosenau, "Pre-theories and Theories of Foreign Policy," in R. Barry Farrell (ed.), Approaches to Comparative and International Politics (Evanston, Ill.: Northwestern University Press, 1966), pp. 27–96. See also Theodore J. Lowi, "American Business, Public Policy, Case Studies, and Political Theory," World Politics, 16 (July 1964), 677–715.


things can be said about the political system (which might comprise anything from a committee of people to a group of conglomerate actors like nation-states) under consideration:

- (1) Which actors have influence (or power) over what other actors;
- (2) For each pairwise influence relationship, whether or not the influence is symmetrical (two-way) or asymmetrical (one-way);
- (3) If asymmetrical, the direction in which influence flows.

The only restriction placed on the influence relation is that no actor can influence himself.

Most systems of actors and relations about which the above things can be said can be considered partly ordered structures, by which I mean loosely structures that are not completely chaotic: they have elements of both order and disorder.3 The task of this article is to suggest one way to make perspicuous the element of order embedded in a system of organized complexity like that defined aboveand, in the process, to show how modern mathematics, in its focus on questions of order and relation instead of questions of magnitude and quantity, can serve as a powerful tool in revealing the anatomy of political systems, just as it has illuminated structures of elements and relations in the natural sciences.4 The articulation of the structural order or form of a system whose actors have nondesultory relations with each other makes possible the explanation of recurring patterns of behavior within it, and I shall conclude by suggesting some possible factors associated with power concentration patterns in political systems.

- ³ See Lancelot L. White, "Atomism, Structure and Form: A Report on the Natural Philosophy of Form," in Gyorgy Kepes (ed.), Structure in Art and in Science (New York: George Braziller, 1965), pp. 20-21; and more generally, Lancelot L. White, Essay on Atomism: From Democritus to 1960 (New York: Harper and Row, 1963).
- ⁴ For some examples of the use of modern mathematics in the social sciences, see John G. Kemeny, "Mathematics Without Numbers," *Daedalus*, 88 (Fall 1959), 577-591.



II. SIMPLIFYING RELATIONAL POWER STRUCTURES

To illustrate the analysis which follows, consider as examples three types of decision-making systems postulated by Charles E. Lindblom. As depicted in Figures 1a, 1b, and 1c, $x \rightarrow y$ means x has influence over y, or in Lindblom's terminology y's decisions are adjusted to x's decisions. Symmetrical influence relationships are indicated by double arrows between two decision-makers and asymmetrical relationships by a single arrow.

As suggested by the diagrams, and discussed by Lindblom, the hierarchical structure can be considered as one extreme form and the mutual adjustment structure, characterized by a variety of symmetrical and asymmetrical relationships, as another; in between we find a mixture of central and non-central decision-making, in which, for example, L in Figure 1c is both a central supervisor (of d, b, and k) and a mutual adjuster (to a, g, and k). From the figures it would appear that power in the mixed system is more concentrated than in the "disorganized" mutual adjustment system and less concentrated than in the "organized" hierarchical system.

At a conceptual level, the identification of different types of decision-making systems, and the power structures associated with each, has considerable heuristic value. But if we were asked to measure and rank the degree of centralization of decision-making, and concentration of power, in several mixed political systems (few systems in practice are pure types), the qualitative categories set forth above would be useless. Can we summarize a diagrammatic power structure in an intuitively reasonable quantitative index of power concentration?

Let us start by grouping into sets those decision-makers in Figures 1a, 1b, and 1c who can influence (directly or indirectly), and be

⁵ The Intelligence of Democracy: Decision Making through Mutual Adjustment (New York: Free Press of Glencoe, 1965), pp. 25-28.


influenced (directly or indirectly), only by every other decision-maker in their sets. These mutual influence sets (or more properly subsets, if we regard the universe as the union of all decision-makers in a system) are given in Figures 2a, 2b, and 2c. At a collective level these sets are defined by the above property that all of the sets possess, and at an individual level by a list of the decision-maker members in each set. These are respectively intensional (or connotative) and extensional (or denotative) definitions of mutual influence sets, and both are necessary to the analysis that follows.

The mutual influence sets are disjoint, for if there were a common member of two different sets this member would connect together all members of the two sets into a single mutual influence set. Further, as well as having a geometric representation these sets have a clear and unambiguous substantive interpretation, which clusters of units generated by statistical (e.g., factor analysis) and interactive grouping and ordering procedures often do not possess.

⁶ See Irving M. Copi, *Introduction to Logic* (New York: Macmillan Company, 1953), pp. 100-105.

⁷ This verbal explanation of a mathematical theorem does not, of course, constitute a formal proof. Instead of encumbering the exposition of the analysis which follows with mathematical derivations, I have endeavored wherever possible to give references where a rigorous treatment of relevant points can be found.

⁸ For a review of some of the recent literature on "cluster seeking techniques," see Geoffrey H. Ball, "Data Analysis in the Social Sciences: What about the Details?," Proceedings—Fall Joint Computer Conference, 1965, pp. 533-559; also, Hayward R. Alker, Jr., "Statistics and Politics: The Need for Causal Data Analysis" (Paper presented at the Annual Meeting of the American Political Science Association, Sept. 5-8, 1967, Chicago).



As Stephen C. Johnson remarked in setting forth criteria for the application of hierarchical clustering methods to similarity measures between pairs of objects:

There should be a clear, explicit, and intuitive description of the clustering; i.e., the clusters should mean something. Some of the published clustering methods have nice algorithms, but when they have been carried out it is difficult to see exactly what problem has been solved.9

Most mutual influence sets consist of only one decision-maker, who is not in a mutual influence relationship with any other decision-maker. There are some sets of two decision-makers, and one which contains seven! Since each decision-maker in this latter set in Figure 2b is connected in a closed sequence with every other decision-maker (including d, which forms a cycle with 1, so that the closed sequence, heighdlbh, includes the cycle ldl), each can ultimately influence and be influenced by, every other. 10

Grouping decision-makers into mutual influence sets constitutes the first step in the analysis.¹¹ These sets, each of which can be influenced (as an entity) by power being exerted

- ⁹ Stephen C. Johnson, "Hierarchical Clustering Schemes," *Psychometrika*, 32 (Sept. 1967), p. 242. I am indebted to Rudolph J. Rummel for this reference.
- 10 A formal definition of a closed sequence and cycle in the theory of directed graphs (digraphs) is given in Frank Harary, Robert Z. Norman, and Dorwin Cartwright, Structural Models: An Introduction to the Theory of Directed Graphs (New York: John Wiley & Sons, Inc., 1965), pp. 40-41. The remainder of the analysis is devoted to showing how a digraph can be behaviorally coordinated with, or serve as a model of, a simplified political system.
- ¹¹ Since the construction of mutual influence sets is equivalent to the condensation of points of a digraph with respect to its strong components


on only one of its members, now become our new units of analysis. In approaching a definition of the concept of power concentration, our next step is to find a principle that would somehow allow us to describe the "concentration" of flows of influence occurring between or among these mutual influence sets.

To this end, let us define an influence relationship between these sets to be concentrated if one mutual influence set can directly influence one or more other mutual influence sets that together contain more constituent decision-makers than the influencing set. 2 Clearly, what we mean by use of the term "concentrated" influence relationship is one characterized by the exercise of minority control—that is, where the "few" influence the "many." Given this notion of power concentration, it now remains for us to define what we mean by the degree of power concentration.

To do this, we must find a way to count up the number of times minority control is exerted between mutual influence sets. (Recall that control between mutual influence sets can never be reciprocal, because our mutual influence sets subsume all instances of symmetrical influence relationships between decision-makers.) We shall do this by defining a mutual influence set to be a minority control set if it directly influences one or more other mutual influence sets containing a total of more constituent

(with the mutual influence sets points of the condensation), the construction is unique. See *ibid.*, p. 55, Theorem 3.2.

12 Cf. this concept of concentration with the concept of evenness, or lack of concentration, of a nation's transaction flows in my "Trade in the North Atlantic Area: An Approach to the Analysis of Transformations in a System," Peace Research Society: Papers, VI (1967), pp. 149-152. Another related concept is that of cosmopolitanism in my "A Note on the Cosmopolitanism of World Regions," Journal of Peace Research, 1968, No. 1, pp 87-95.



decision-makers. (Instances of indirect forms of minority control will be considered later.) In Figures 3a, 3b, and 3c, we have drawn dashed lines around all mutual influence sets that are also minority control sets. In Diagram 3c, for example, the minority control sets $\{a,m\}$ and $\{g\}$ influence both $\{b,h\}$ and $\{L,k\}$ with a combined total of four constituent decision-makers; $\{L,k\}$ is also a minority control set, because it influences $\{b,h\}$ and $\{d\}$ with a combined total of three constituent decision-makers.

III. AN INDEX OF POWER CONCENTRATION

Let us assume that there is at least one nonempty minority control set in a political system.¹³ Given this assumption, we now define an index of power concentration (PC) as follows:

$$PC = 1 - \frac{N_{MC}}{N_T}$$
 0 < PC < 1,

where

 N_{MC} = the number of decision-makers in all minority control sets.

 N_T = the total number of decision-makers in the political system.

We see that when N_{MC} is small relative to N_T , control will be concentrated in the hands of relatively few decision-makers and PC will be large. (PC=1 only when $N_{MC}=0$, which is the many-controlling-the-few case we have restricted from the present analysis.) On the other hand, when N_{MC} is large relative to N_T (it will never equal N_T), control will be concentrated in the hands of a relatively large number of decision-makers and PC will be small.

Do values of PC for the hierarchical, mutual adjustment, and mixed systems conform to our previous commonsense notions of the concen-

¹³ Presumably, this condition will hold in most political systems of interest.

tration of power in each of these systems? The answer seems to be no: PC = .85 for the mutual adjustment system, .75 for the hierarchical system, and .44 for the mixed system. While we would have expected power to be least, not most, concentrated in the mutual adjustment system, inspection of Diagram 3b reveals what intuition does not-that just two decision-makers (a and m) have direct or indirect influence over all other decision-makers in the rest of the system (except j).14 Nevertheless, though this would explain the mutual adjustment system's higher concentration of power vis-avis the mixed system-in which a total of five decision-makers, a, m, g, k, and l, exercise influence over the rest of the system (and themselves)—does the mutual adjustment system really outrank the hierarchical system in its concentration of power?

IV. HIERARCHICAL LEVELS OF INFLUENCE; THE INDEX REFINED

It does only if we do not take account of the fact that in the hierarchical system there are two different *levels* of minority control sets. In this system, unlike the other systems, one

¹⁴ Decision-maker j's exclusion suggests that we should not count j in N_T , the denominator of the PC index, because he is not directly or indirectly influenced by the minority control set, $\{a, m\}$. Accordingly, we define a revised power concentration index,

$$\mathrm{PC'} = 1 - \frac{N_{MC}}{N_T - N_U} \qquad 0 < \mathrm{PC'} < 1,$$

where

N_U = the number of decision-makers (not in minority control sets) uninfluenced by any minority control set.

PC' is the same as PC for the hierarchical and mixed systems (because $N_U=0$ for these systems), but PC' (=.83) is slightly less than PC(=.85) for the mutual adjustment system.

minority control set $\{T\}$ influences all the other minority control sets, $\{L\}$, $\{m\}$, and $\{n\}$. As only intermediaries between $\{T\}$ and the mutual influence sets, the sets $\{L\}$, $\{m\}$, and $\{n\}$ hardly qualify as minority control sets in the same way that $\{T\}$ does. Since decision-maker T influences directly or indirectly all other decision-makers in the hierarchical system, $\{T\}$ in an important sense can be considered to be the only minority control set. Provisionally accepting this interpretation of a minority control set, the value of the PC index for the hierarchical system would be .94, which would make it the highest of the three systems and more consonant with our intuitive ranking of power concentration in the systems. Diagrammatically, this interpretation would mean that the hierarchical system would be equivalent to a system in which $\{T\}$ influenced $\{a\}$, $\{b\}$, ..., $\{n\}$ directly. 15

In the mixed system there is a related problem in determining which mutual influence sets should be considered minority control sets. As can be seen from Figure 3c, two of the three initially-postulated minority control sets, $\{a,m\}$ and $\{g\}$, influence both a mutual influence set and another minority control set which together have a total of more constituent decision-makers. Thus, in this system there are not even clear-cut hierarchical levels of minority control: two minority control sets exercise influence at both lower and higher levels, and the argument given above for excluding lower-level minority control sets in the calculation of the PC index is not applicable to these mixed-level sets.

Consistent with our previous interpretation, however, we shall adopt the provisional rule that minority control sets which are influenced exclusively by other minority control sets, regardless of the hierarchical level (or levels) of the sets which they in turn influence, will not be counted in the calculation of the index. Thus, because $\{L, k\}$ is influenced exclusively by $\{a, m\}$ and $\{g\}$ in the mixed system, we count only the three members of the latter two

¹⁵ A system in which all influence relationships are asymmetrical and never flow "upward" can also be described as one in which (1) a decision-maker cannot be both the superior and subordinate of another, and (2) a subordinate of a subordinate is a subordinate. A necessary and sufficient condition for these requirements to hold is that the digraph of the system be free of cycles. See John G. Kemeny and J. Laurie Snell, Mathematical Models in the Social Sciences (New York: Blaisdell Publishing Company, 1962), pp. 103–104.

(mixed-level) minority control sets in the N_{MC} term of the index. The value of the PC index then becomes .67 for the mixed system, which still leaves it lowest in power concentration behind the hierarchical system (.94) and the mutual adjustment system (.85), though not by such a wide margin as before (when its value was .44).


Even interpreting the index according to the above rules, the PC index as it stands is not entirely satisfactory as a descriptive statistic. In a decision-making system with more than two hierarchical levels, the index may mask important information about influence relations among lower-level minority control sets which are influenced exclusively by higher-level minority control sets and thus are not counted in the numerator of the index. To arrive at a more refined index that illuminates the configuration of influence relations at all levels, it is first necessary to show how different hierarchical levels can be distinguished.

To do this, consider the condensations of the digraphs of the three decision-making systems in which the mutual influence sets (and minority control sets) are points and only the directed lines between the mutual influence sets (and minority control sets) are preserved.16 As we previously noted, all influence relations between mutual influence and minority control sets are asymmetrical and acyclic (free of cycles of influence), so the reduced diagraphs with these sets as points are themselves acyclic. If p is the length of a longest path of such a digraph—that is, the maximal number of directed lines along which influence may be transmitted from one point to another-each mutual influence or minority control set (point of the reduced digraph) can be assigned to one of (p+1) hierarchical levels in such a way that it receives influence only from higher levels and transmits it only to lower levels.17 The procedures set forth below make the level assignments for each point unique.

For the three decision-making systems, hierarchical levels are numbered in descending order from the highest (#1) to the lowest in Figures 4a, 4b, and 4c, with the solid and dashed rectangles (points of the reduced di-

¹⁶ If there is more than one directed line between two mutual influence or minority control sets, which is not the case in any of the Lindblom systems, only one is preserved. Some of the consequences of this simplification for the PC index are discussed in Footnote 23, where a refinement in the index is suggested.

¹⁷ Harary, Norman, and Cartwright, op. cit., p. 270, Theorem 10.2.



Hierarchical System


Fig. 4a

graph) circumscribing the members of the mutual influence sets and minority control sets, respectively, of Figures 3a, 3b, and 3c. In Diagram 4c, for example, a longest path in the digraph includes a path of length 1 from $\{a,m\}$ to $\{L,k\}$, a path of length 2 from $\{a,m\}$ to $\{b,h\}$, and a path of length 3 from $\{a,m\}$ to $\{c\}$; there is also another longest path of length 3 from $\{g\}$ to $\{L,k\}$ to $\{b,h\}$ to $\{c\}$. Since the two paths of length 3 are the longest paths in the digraph, there are four hierarchical levels in this system (#1, #2, #3, and #4), with each point in a longest path assigned to a different level as shown.

Each point not in a longest path of the reduced digraph, but influenced by a point in a longest path, is given level assignment #(q+1), where q is the length of a maximal path of the digraph terminating at the point in question. Thus, $\{L,k\}$ of level assignment #2 in Figure 4c, which is in a longest path, influences $\{d\}$, which is the terminal point of two maximal paths of length 2, so the level assignment of $\{d\}$ is #(2+1), or #3.

On the other hand, each point not in a longest path of the reduced digraph, but which influences a point in a longest path, is given level assignment #(p-r+1), where p, as above, is the length of a longest path in the digraph and r is the length of a maximal path in the digraph originating with the point in question. Thus, $\{k\}$ of level assignment #3 in Figure 4b, which is in a longest path, is influenced by $\{j\}$, which is the originator of a maximal path of length 1; since a longest path in the digraph is of length 2, the level assignment of $\{j\}$ is #(2-1+1), or #2.

For more complicated digraphs, similar procedures can be followed for ordering more "remotely" connected points at unique hierar-



chical levels. These ordering procedures, which have been incorporated into a computer program called DECOMP, ¹⁸ allow us to define an index of power concentration between any two hierarchical levels, m and n (m < n), of a political system:

$$PC(m, n) = 1 - \frac{N_{MC(m)}}{N_{T(m,n)} - N_{U(m,n)}}$$
 if $N_{MC(m)} > 0$
 $PC(m, n) = 0$ if $N_{MC(m)} = 0$
where $0 \le PC(m, n) < 1$ and

 $N_{C(m)}$ = the number of decision-makers in minority control sets at level m.

 $N_{T(m,n)}$ the total number of decision-makers in the political system at levels m through n,

 $N_{U(m,n)}$ = the number of decision-makers (not in minority control sets at level m) at levels m through n uninfluenced by any minority control sets at level m.

 $N_{U(m,n)}$ will not be equal to zero whenever there is a mutual influence set at level m, or a mutual influence or minority control set at levels (m+1) through n which is only a "transmitter"—that is, which exerts influence but is not influenced from above. 19 Only in the mutual

¹⁸ Steven J. Brams, "DECOMP: A Computer Program for the Condensation of a Directed Graph and the Hierarchical Ordering of Its Strong Components," Behavioral Science, forthcoming. A write-up and source deck of this program are available from the Syracuse University Computing Center, Syracuse, N. Y.

19 In digraph theory, the set of points with outgoing but no incoming directed lines at all levels (but the lowest) of the reduced digraph—the

adjustment system (Figure 4b), where $N_{U(1,2)} = N_{U(1,3)} = 1$ because of $\{j\}$, is this term not equal to zero.

It is apparent that a single index like PC which summarizes a complex system from the top to the bottom levels may cover up where and to what extent power is concentrated in the system. Therefore, there is an obvious advantage in a "movable" index which allows one to describe the concentration of power between any two levels of a political system.

In Table 1 the values of this index for all onestep levels, and for the highest and lowest levels (i.e., the entire system), are given for the hierarchical, mutual adjustment, and mixed systems. When there are no minority control sets exerting influence from a higher to a lower level, the index assumes the arbitrary value 0, which is indicative of the "many" influencing the "few" and thus the low concentration of power between two levels.

The higher the value of PC(m,n), the more concentrated power is between levels m and n. In the hierarchical system, for example, power is more concentrated between levels #2 and #3 (PC(2,3) = .80) than between levels #1 and #2 (PC(1,2) = .75); for the system as a whole PC(1,3) = .94, since $\{T\}$ at level #3 is the only decision-maker counted in the $N_{MC(m)}$ term of the index.

In the mixed system PC(1,2) = .40, suggesting that, contrary to our definition of minority control sets, the "many" may exert influence on the "few" and drop the value of the index below .50. Examination of Figure 4c explains this phenomenon: minority control indeed exists, but it exists because of influence directly exerted by $\{a,m\}$ and $\{g\}$ at level #3 as well as level #2. When we look at the concentration of power between levels #1 and #3 (PC(1,3) = .63), the index assumes a value > .50.

In general, $PC(m,n) \leq .50$ (but not equal to the arbitrary value 0) if and only if the minority control sets at level m, considered together, have more constituent members than the sets at lower levels, down to n, which they influence. This circumstance cannot occur in a system unless multiple influence from two or more sources, at or above level n, impinges on

TABLE 1. VALUES OF $\mathrm{PC}(m,n)$ FOR THREE DECISION-MAKING SYSTEMS

PC(m,n)	Hierarchical System	Mutual Adjustment System	Mixed System
One-Step Levels			
PC(1,2)	.75	.78	.40
PC(2,3)	.80	0	.60
PC(3,4)	_		0
Entire System			
PC(1,3)	.94	.83	_
PC(1,4)	_		.67


at least one mutual influence or minority control set, perhaps below level n, in the system.

Because the mixed system contains an influence relationship that traverses more than one level ($\{g\} \rightarrow \{b,h\}$ goes from level #1 to level #3 in Figure 4c), its reduced digraph is not "gradable." In a gradable reduced digraph all the directed lines fall between adjacent levels, so the length of every path connecting two points in such a digraph is equal in all cases to the absolute difference in the levels of the points. As a consequence, influence exerted by mutual influence or minority control sets at one level in both the hierarchical and mutual adjustment systems, each of which is respresentable by a gradable reduced digraph, will reach all mutual influence and minority control sets (connected by a path) at any given lower level in the same amount of time.20 It is also worth noting that, in every system representable by a nongradable reduced digraph, there will be influence from two or more sources at different levels impinging on at least one mutual influence or minority control set, suggesting the possibility of conflicting orders from different levels that create cross-pressures on the actors in such systems.

So far we have shown how actors in a political system can be grouped into mutual influence and minority control sets and assigned unique hierarchical levels according to the structure of their pairwise influence relations. Having formulated an index to measure the concentration of power between any two levels of a political system, we shall now discuss what this index does not measure and some possible variations that might be made in it to suit the particular needs of a study. For convenience we shall assume in the next section that levels m and n have been chosen and shall refer only to the PC index instead of the PC (m,n) index.

originators of influence in the system—is the unique point basis of the reduced digraph. In the original digraph (containing cycles), a point basis is not unique and will consist of one member from each of the originator mutual influence and/or minority control sets. See Harary, Norman, and Cartwright, op. cit., pp. 85-89.

²⁰ Ibid., p. 276.



V. WHAT THE INDEX DOES NOT MEASURE

One kind of decision-maker occupies a special position in a power structure. This is the linkage decision-maker, of which we may distinguish two types. One type is the upward linkage decision-maker, as represented by decision-maker b in Figure 5, who links decisionmakers from higher levels to the members of his mutual influence set. The other type is the downward linkage decision-maker, as represented by decision-maker c in Figure 5, who links decision-makers at lower levels to the members of his mutual influence set. In both cases the influence of these linkage decisionmakers "overlaps" their mutual influence sets and joins decision-makers at different levels in the system.21 As we shall see below, the type of linkage of a linkage decision-maker may be different with respect to the different decisionmakers that he joins above and below him.

When a linkage decision-maker is both upward- and downward-linked, as is decision-maker c in Figure 6, the flow of influence in the system from higher to lower levels will be most direct. However, this fact will not be reflected in the value of the PC index, which is the same (.75) between the top and bottom levels for both of the systems in Figures 5 and 6, because the index treats mutual influence sets as inde-

²¹ Such "linking pins," when operating at different hierarchical levels, have been found to perform a valuable integrative function in an organization. See Rensis Likert, New Patterns of Management (New York: McGraw-Hill Book Company, Inc., 1961), ch. 8. In digraph theory, linkage decision-makers b and c in Figure 5 are cut points whose removal would reduce the strength of connectedness of the digraph. See Harary, Norman, and Cartwright, op. cit., ch. 8. For a method to identify "liaison persons" in symmetric graphs, see Ian C. Ross and Frank Harary, "Identification of the Liaison Persons of an Organization Using the Structure Matrix," Management Science, 1 (April-July 1955), 251–258.

composable units of analysis and gives no special recognition to the types of linkage decision-makers within these units.

While information on linkage decisionmakers, or the "tightness" of influence relations within mutual influence sets, is not taken into account in the formulation of the PC index. it is certainly recoverable at a later stage in the analysis. Having observed from Figure 4c, for instance, that the mixed system can be represented by a nongradable reduced digraph of four levels, with different PC values for each pair of levels, we can then go back to Figure 3c for more detailed information and ascertain that: (1) with respect to minority control set $\{L,k\}$ at level #2, decision-maker b in mutual influence set $\{b,h\}$ is both an upward and downward linkage decision-maker; (2) with respect to minority control sets $\{a, m\}$ and $\{g\}$ at level #1, however, decision-maker b is only a downward linkage decision-maker (decisionmaker h in $\{b,h\}$ is the upward linkage decisionmaker); (3) thus, we may conclude that the flow of influence to mutual influence set $\{c\}$ at the bottom level takes a more direct route from $\{L,k\}$ through $\{b,h\}$ than from $\{a,m\}$ or $\{g\}$ through $\{b,h\}$.

One form of indirect influence which we have not allowed for in our definition of a minority control set is that occurring when a mutual influence set directly and indirectly, but not directly alone, influences one or more other mutual influence sets containing a total of more constituent decision-makers. If we restrict minority control only to instances where the "few" directly exert influence on the "many," then we can reserve the term minority influence (and minority influence sets) for those other cases where the "few," both directly and indirectly, exert influence on the "many." If $\{c\}$ influenced $\{j\}$, for example, in Diagram 3b, it would be considered a minority influence set because $\{j\}$ influences $\{k\}$ —and thus $\{c\}$ directly or indirectly would influence two decision-makers. Minority influence is a remote form of minority control.

Obviously, the appropriateness of either the inclusion or exclusion of indirect influence in the PC index will depend on whether or not direct and indirect forms of influence can be considered equivalent to each other. This judgment in turn will depend on the nature of the political system under investigation—in particular, the speed with which influence flows from one actor to another—and in what time perspective (short-run, long-run) one seeks to describe behavior within the system. The distribution of influence among the mem-


bers of a system in the short run may look quite different than in the long run, after indirect influence has had time to "spread."²²

Given the availability of additional information, the PC index could be modified in another way. If numerical weights could be assigned to decision-makers, minority control (and minority influence) sets could be defined on the basis of the combined weights of the decision-makers in one mutual influence set being less than the combined weights (rather than the combined numbers) of those in other sets which they influence.

It seems evident that what the best index is for any particular study will depend on the nature and purposes of the study. The point I wish to emphasize is that all variations in the power concentration index ultimately depend on variations in the definition of mutual influence sets, minority control (and minority influence) sets, and hierarchical levels of control, the building-block concepts in this analysis.²³ I have attempted to show how these con-

²² See John R. P. French, Jr., "A Formal Theory of Social Power," in Dorwin Cartwright and Alvin Zander (eds.), *Group Dynamics: Research and Theory* (2nd ed.; New York: Harper and Row, 1960), pp. 727-744; and Frank Harary, "A Criterion for Unanimity in French's Theory of Social Power," in Dorwin Cartwright (ed.), *Studies in Social Power* (Ann Arbor, Michigan: Research Center for Group Dynamics, University of Michigan, 1959), pp. 168-182.

²³ Another elementary concept, influence relationship sets, might be usefully employed to build greater precision into the power concentration index. These sets would consist of all asymmetrical influence relationships occurring between each minority control set and the set or sets which it influences. For example, the values of the PC index for the three-actor systems pictured below are the same (.67), but the influence



relationship set for the system on the left has one member (one directed line from the minority control set to the mutual influence set) while the influence relationships set for the system on the cepts can help us to simplify visually and summarize quantitatively complex power configurations in a political system.

VI. AN ILLUSTRATIVE APPLICATION TO EMPIRICAL DATA

Unfortunately, few attempts have been made to represent power relations in a political system schematically. The paucity of work in this area undoubtedly stems in part from the lack of analytic tools that enable one to simplify, and extract meaning from, complex power structures. No less an obstacle, however, has been the obdurate problem of identifying a relational concept of power that can be defined operationally and used to measure the exercise of power between actors in a political system.

As a very rudimentary approach to this problem, we shall consider two actors to be in a power relationship when they appear to be responsive to each other's behavior. When one actor responds more frequently than the other, we shall assume that the actor responding less frequently exercises asymmetrical influence over the actor responding more frequently; when the actors respond to each other with equal frequency, we shall assume that they are involved in a symmetrical influence relationship.²⁴ As Thibaut and Kelley explain, the possession of superior (or asymmetrical) power tends to relieve an actor in a dyadic relationship of the necessity of paying close at-

right has two members (two directed lines from the minority control set to the mutual influence set). Because minority control set $\{a\}$ can exert direct influence on actor c in the right-hand system, a reasonable argument could be made to weight the influence of $\{a\}$, and the concentration of power in the system, by the number of members of the influence relationship sets. The more influence relationships which these sets contain, the more direct will be minority control—and, in one sense, the more concentrated power will be in the system.

²⁴ For experimental evidence on this point, see Jacob I. Hurwitz, Alvin Zander, and Bernard Hymovitch, "Some Effects of Power on the Relations Among Group Members," in Cartwright and Zander, op. cit., pp. 800–809; Arthur R. Cohen, "Upward Communication in Experimentally Created Hierarchies," Human Relations, 11 (Feb. 1958), 41–53; and David L. Watson, "Effects of Certain Social Power Structures on Communication in Task-Oriented Groups," Sociometry, 28 (Sept. 1965), 322–336.

tention to his partner's actions.²⁵ In this sense, power is "the ability to afford not to learn."²⁶

In order to apply these simplifying assumptions to the identification of symmetrical and asymmetrical forms of power in dyadic relationships, it is first necessary to try to infer the "responses" of actors to each other's behavior. For this purpose, we shall use data collected by Zbigniew K. Brzezinski on the number and location of all Politburo-level bilateral and multilateral meetings of delegations from eight Communist countries in the two periods November 1956-November 1957 (the "stabilization" period) and 1958-1959.27 Two countries will be considered to be in an influence relationship if their meetings with each other exceed a specified number. If an equal number occurs in each country, their influence relationship will be considered symmetrical; otherwise, the country receiving the most visits (responses) will be considered the country exercising asymmetrical influence over the other.

Influence is thus conceived not as a substance or possession (e.g., GNP) but as a relational property that appears in the transactions of nations.²⁸ In particular, we have conceptualized it as a property associated with the recurring movements of government officials. From the symmetrical cr asymmetrical pattern of such movements, we seek to infer the responses of these officials and their governments to each other's actions.²⁹

²⁵ John W. Thibaut and Harold H. Kelley, *The Social Psychology of Groups* (New York: John Wiley & Sons, Inc., 1959), p. 125.

²⁶ Karl W. Deutsch, The Nerves of Government: Models of Political Communication and Control (New York: Free Press of Glencoe, 1963), p. 111.

²⁷ Zbigniew K. Brzezinski, "The Organization of the Communist Camp," in his *The Soviet Bloc: Unity and Conflict* (rev. ed.; New York: Frederick A. Praeger, 1961), pp. 445-479.

²⁸ For an actor-oriented measure of influence in dominance situations (system representable by a complete asymmetric digraph where each actor either dominates or is dominated by—but not both—every other actor), see John G. Kemeny, J. Laurie Snell, and Gerald Thompson, *Introduction to Finite Mathematics* (2nd ed.; Englewood Cliffs, N. J.: Prentice-Hall, Inc., 1966), pp. 390-391.

²⁹ For an extended treatment of this idea, see Charles A. McClelland, *Theory and the International System* (New York: Macmillan Company, 1966), Ch. 3. In a resent paper, McClelland has used digraph theory to study international crises.

In the November 1956-November 1957 period, the bilateral and multilateral meetings represented occasions for the eight countries to meet with each other 60 times in pairs. 30 Since there are 28 possible combinations in which eight countries can meet in pairs, one would expect that the average pair of countries would meet 60/28 = 2.14 times in this period. If we assume that two countries are in an influence relationship if their Politburo-level delegations met a greater-than-expected number of times. then any pair of countries that met three or more times (i.e., at least 40 percent above the expected number of meetings in this case) would qualify as being in an influence relationship.


In the 1958–1959 period, there were 109 occasions for the 28 pairs of countries to meet with each other in bilateral or multilateral meetings, or an expected number of 3.90 meetings per pair of countries. Instead of assuming that two countries were in an influence relationship if they met four or more times during this period (i.e., at least 3 percent above the expected number of meetings), we shall assume five meetings as the minimum number necessary for an influence relationship to exist (i.e., at least 28 percent above the expected number) in order to make the cutoff point for this period more comparable with the cutoff point for the earlier period.³¹

Based on the above criteria, the symmetrical influence relations among the eight Communist countries for the two periods are shown in

See his "The Beginning, Duration, and Abatement of International Crises: Comparisons in Two Conflict Areas," in Charles F. Hermann (ed.) International Crises, forthcoming.

³⁰ A bilateral meeting represents an occasion for the meeting of one pair of countries whereas a multilateral meeting represents an occasion for several pairs of countries to meet with each other. Brzezinski did not distinguish between the meetings of pairs of delegations in bilateral and multilateral meetings.

off point in the second period (i.e., 54 percent above the expected number), then only 5 of the 28 pairs of countries would be in influence relationships and at least two of the eight countries would therefore not be in influence relationships with any others. At the five-meeting-per-pair cutoff point, on the other hand, 9 of the 28 pairs of countries are in influence relationships, and each of the eight countries is in an influence relationship with at least one other. In the first period, one country (Rumania) is not in an influence rela-



Nov. 1956-Nov. 1957

Fig. 7a

Figures 7a and 7b.³² The grouping of these countries into mutual influence and minority control sets reveals that there are three hierarchical levels of influence in the earlier period (longest path: {USR,GME} \rightarrow {CHN}), but only two in the later period, so PC(m,n) for the entire system in the earlier period is PC(1,3), in the later period, PC(1,2).

The value of PC(1,3) in the earlier period is .71 (with Rumania not in an influence relationship, the system comprises seven countries), and the value of PC(1,2) in the later period (with the system comprising all eight countries) is .63, suggesting that power became less concentrated in the Communist political system in the late 1950's. This finding seems to be in agreement with the observations of many experts that the bloc had begun to assume a more polycentric character at this time.³³

As host to frequent delegations from abroad the Soviet Union stands as the dominant influence on other bloc members in both periods. Its association with neo-Stalinist East Germany in the early period, and more revisionist Hungary and Poland in the later

tionship with any other, but the three-meetingsper-pair cutoff point for this period cannot be lowered without violating the criterion that the cutoff point be greater than the expected number of visits per pair for the system.

F1g. 7b

period, are particularly worthy of note.³⁴ Rumania's disattachment from the bloc in the early period—perhaps indicative of its neglect by the rest of the bloc—might in part explain recent signs it has given of disaffection with Soviet policies and the Warsaw Treaty Organization.

VII. SOME BROADER IMPLICATIONS OF THE ANALYSIS

Needless to say, the diagrams of influence relations of the eight Communist countries are vastly oversimplified representations of very complex phenomena and processes. Although my measure of influence is based upon the movement of high-level officials in policymaking positions—and thus, presumably, indicative of more than just a lack of indifference between two countries-it ignores the substance of their meetings, the power resources available to the participants, their goals, motives, and opportunity costs, the scope of issues over which influence was exercised, the forms which it took, and the effects of the exercise of influence on the subsequent behavior of the officials and the countries they represented.

Unfortunately, these are matters on which reliable information is generally lacking, even if means could be devised for distilling it and combining it in a way which would make meaningful comparisons possible. For now we must settle for more available and manageable types of data, but there is no impenetrable upper limit on the types of manipulations that we can perform on these data to elicit patterns of influence relations among actors in political systems—a heretofore neglected area of politi-

²² The eight countries, and their code abbreviations, are: Bulgaria—BUL; China—CHN; Czechoslovakia—CZE; East Germany—GME; Hungary—HUN; Poland—POL; Rumania—RUM; and Soviet Union—USR.

³⁵ See, for example, Robert H. McNeal (ed.), *International Relations Among Communists* (Englewood Cliffs, N. J.: Prentice-Hall, Inc., 1967), pp. 76-78.

³⁴ For a discussion of these points, see Brzezinski, op. cit., pp. 482-483.

cal inquiry.³⁵ Indeed, these manipulations as much as the data themselves will determine how rapidly our knowledge advances.

Why has the search for patterns been neglected? At least in part because

... statistical techniques are not appropriate to realms of organized complexity where some statements can be made only of the two or more things considered in their interrelationship, where the pertinent fact is not the presence or absence of something in such and such quantity but rather the nature of the arrangement of the observable entities.²⁶

Toward dealing with the arrangement of such entities, I have defined a political system as something set-theoretic in nature consisting of a set of actors and certain kinds of relations between pairs of actors. Then, by relating the actors and their relations to the points and directed lines of a digraph, which were primitive (undefined) terms in the analysis, I was able to utilize the findings of digraph theory to highlight some structural properties of the systems under consideration.

In this way, modern mathematics provides a powerful means to simplify and bring order out of complex systems of actors and their relations where either the empirical structure of a system cannot adequately be interpreted numerically or where the assumptions and concepts of a non-numerical model better describe relevant aspects of the structure. There is necessarily arbitrariness in the choice of a particular model-numerical or non-numerical-and the concomitant simplifications it imposes on the reality one is trying to describe, but a fruitful model can rearrange and discipline the way in which personal bias is introduced so as to evoke new and interesting patterns that intuitive methods cannot reveal.37

While different systemic models may produce different patterns that "fit the data,"

- ²⁵ Cf. Riker's argument for *n*-adic, rather than dyadic, definitions of power. William H. Riker, "Some Ambiguities in the Notion of Power," this Review, 58 (June, 1964), 341-349.
- ³⁵ Clyde Kluckhohn, "Cultural Anthropology," in Lynn White, Jr. (ed.), Frontiers of Knowledge in the Study of Man (New York: Harper and Brothers, 1956), p. 39.
- ³⁷ See Christopher Alexander, Notes on the Synthesis of Form (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1964), p. 194, Footnote 12. It should be noted that the non-numerical digraph model was used to formulate the numerical PC(m,n) index.

explanation of the data requires that a model's mathematical assumptions (e.g., a digraph is an irreflexive relation), primitives (e.g., point), and derived concepts (e.g., strong component of a digraph) underlying the way in which the parts of a system are pieced together be explicitly related to behavioral assumptions (e.g., no actor can influence himself), primitives (e.g., actor), and derived concepts (e.g., mutual influence set) in the model. Having established such a correspondence, the mathematical theory can then be used to draw out nonobvious theoretical implications linking the mathematical primitives and derived concepts (e.g., every point is contained in exactly one strong component), which may then be replaced by their behavioral counterparts (e.g., every actor is a member of exactly one mutual influence set).

At a mathematical level, we end up with not only a set of theorems but an understanding of how they were arrived at, step by deducible step; at a behavioral level, we end up with a set of hypotheses, some of which (those whose constituent terms can be interpreted empirically) are capable of test by reference to observable phenomena. Thus, the statement "every actor is a member of exactly one mutual influence set" is a logically necessary consequence of the assumptions of the digraph model; its formal correctness has nothing to do with how we choose to interpret its behavioral terms empirically.38 As applied to an empirical situation, however, it is a hypothesis whose corroboration by empirical data would require operationally defining its terms independently of each other and testing the truth of the empirical relationship. For example, we might define an actor to be a member of a legislative body and a mutual influence set to be a party caucusing group in the legislature; in testing the hypothesis, we would not only be confirming or disconfirming its empirical validity but mediately strengthening or weakening the primitive hypotheses—of which there may be more than one set-from which it was derived

³⁸ See Rudolph Carnap, "Elementary and Abstract Terms," in Arthur Danto and Sidney Morgenbesser (eds.), *Philosophy of Science* (Cleveland: World Publishing Company, 1960), p. 155. The above analytic (nonfactual) statement illustrates the great advantage of translating an already developed mathematical theory into a mathematical model of a political system: the model inherits from the theory a stock of proven theorems with a logically unassailable theoretical structure.

in the model (e.g., all influence relationships are either symmetrical or asymmetrical), which may not be directly testable because their constituent terms (i.e., symmetrical and asymmetrical influence relationships) do not refer to observable phenomena,³⁹

Finally, some concepts of the model, when combined with our knowledge of the empirical world, may suggest how characteristics of a system (e.g., "gradability" of its reduced digraph) may be related to characteristics of its members (e.g., extent of cross-pressures on them) and thus lead to new insights into the possible effect of a system on the behavior of its members and vice versa. Other insights might be generated "retroductively" from the data when diverse phenomena are observed (e.g., Rumania's early neglect by Communist bloc members and its independence today) which may be made explicable by supposing a hypothesis to obtain (e.g., neglect of a member of a system will loosen his attachment to the norms of the system).40 In the conclusion of this article I shall suggest some individual and systemic characteristics associated with the degree of power concentration in a system.

The approach outlined above, heterodox by traditional standards, seems more relevant to the construction of fruitful models and testable theories than simply positing physical analogues of political systems (e.g., an airport traffic control center), whose structural correspondence to real political systems is impossible to validate. Such an approach also seems useful in the face of the welter of uncoordinated findings that new methods of quantitative analysis, particularly with the aid of the computer, have made possible. To give theoretical coherence to our knowledge of the political world, it is essential that we begin to investigate structural properties associated with complex and observable patterns of relations instead of focusing attention exclusively on the quantifiable prop-

³⁹ Carl G. Hempel, "Operationism, Observaion, and Theoretical Terms," *ibid.*, pp. 117-120. erties of the constituent units of systems. 41 In their allusions to the "exact sciences," social and behavioral scientists generally have not recognized that some of the greatest advances in modern physics, particularly in mathematical theories of symmetry and invariance, have been characterized by a concern with relational patterns and spatial order of geometrical configurations of elementary particles-what might be called the architecture of matterrather than with properties of the featureless constituent units or the forces that produced them.42 Indeed, Marshall McLuhan asserts that "it has been the consensus of modern science and philosophy that we have now shifted from 'cause' to 'configuration' in all fields of study and analysis."43

My operationalization of the direction of influence flows in terms of the symmetrical and asymmetrical movement of government officials, though supported by experimental studies, should be recognized as a high-order abstraction of the generally unobservable succession of demands and responses of governments in influence relationships to which we are not privy. Different measures of and assumptions about influence may produce different findings, but these will be a matter of concern only if one insists that power is a unidimensional concept whose essence can be revealed by some single best method of analysis.44 Hopefully, my illustrative application of the power concentration index to empirical data will stimulate the search for reliable and valid indicators of relational power as well as the application of the index—or the kinds of methods which underlie its formulation—to more complex systems which reveal more fully its utility

⁴¹ This is not to say that study of the isolated parts of systems is not useful but rather that we must also direct our attention to ways of putting the parts together into a palpable whole. This point is developed more fully in my "Transaction Flows in the International System," this Review, 60 (Dec. 1966), 880–881. For a discussion of these contemporary approaches in biology, see C. H. Waddington, The Nature of Life (London: George Allen & Unwin Ltd., 1961), esp. pp. 21–24.

⁴² Jacob Bronowski, "The Discovery of Form," in Kepes, *op. cit.*, esp. pp. 56, 59-60.

⁴³ Marshall McLuhan, *The Gutenberg Galaxy:* The Making of Typographic Man (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1962), p. 252.

⁴⁴ On this point, see James D. Barber, *Power in Committees: An Experiment in the Government Process* (Chicago: Rand McNally & Company, 1966), p. 129.

⁴⁰ Retroduction, which involves reasoning back from diverse phenomena to a pattern within which they appear intelligible, should be distinguished from induction, which involves the discovery of regularities (empirical correlations) in repetitive observations of details in phenomena. See Norwood R. Hanson, Patterns of Discovery: An Inquiry into the Conceptual Foundations of Science (Cambridge, Eng.: Cambridge University Press, 1958), pp. 85ff. I am indebted to Wayne A. Kimmel for this reference.

as a comparative measure.⁴⁵ In different behavioral contexts, particularly sociometry, the index would seem useful as a measure of the concentration of communications, friendship choices, and other interaction phenomena and processes.⁴⁶

The digraph model on which the index is based might also be used to construct a logical hierarchy of if-then propositions. Such a hierarchical ordering of causal relations could be obtained by letting the points of a digraph symbolize a set of characteristics $\{c_1, c_2, \cdots, c_n\}$ (e.g., bicameral legislature), a single directed line from characteristic c_i to c_j symbolize the implication relation for conditional statements (if c_i then c_i) that are true (for a particular universe), and two directed lines going in opposite directions between characteristics c_i and c_i symbolize the equivalence relation for biconditional statements (c, if and only if c_i) that are true. Since the characteristics in every "mutual influence set" form an equivalence class, the presence of only one in a set could be used to establish the presence of all in the set; and the presence of characteristics forming a point basis (see footnote 19) could be used to establish the presence of all characteristics in the heirarchy.

VIII. CONCLUSION

I shall conclude by suggesting some possible correlates and consequences of the concentration (or dispersion) of power in political sys-

⁴⁵ For an analysis of changes in the structure of influence relationships over time based on visits between heads-of-state and other high-level officials for all nations in the world in 1964-65, see Steven J. Brams, "The Structure of Influence Relationships in the International System," in James N. Rosenau (ed.), International Politics and Foreign Policy: A Reader in Research and Theory (rev. ed.; New York: Free Press, forthcoming 1969). In ibid., it is suggested that the kind of influence tapped by data on international visits tends to reflect the visited nation's control over broad policy areas, but not specific actions related to the vital national interests, of the visiting nation.

⁴⁶ One concept making use of interaction data that has been of particular interest in the structural analysis of organizations is status. See Leo Katz, "A New Status Index Derived from Sociometric Analysis," in J. L. Moreno (ed.), The Sociometry Reader (Glencoe, Ill.: Free Press of Glencoe, 1960), pp. 266-271; and Frank Harary, "Status and Contra-status," Sociometry, 22 (March 1959), 23-43.

tems. First and most obviously, the concentration of power might be correlated with itself—that is to say, its concentration in one issue-area might tend to be associated with its concentration in other issue-areas, as Robert A. Dahl found in New Haven.⁴⁷ On the other hand, the dispersion of powerful forces on one decision might be associated with their dispersion, through different alignment, on others, as apparently was the case in Chicago in the late 1950's.⁴⁸ Further, the concentration of power in one functional area may breed its concentration in others, as the rapid centralization of supranational authority in Western Europe a decade ago demonstrated.⁴⁹

Second, the high concentration of power in a decision-making system may increase its vulnerability, especially if the structure of the system is a tree in which the disruption of one channel of influence would affect all decisionmakers below the decision-maker directly serviced by this channel. In such a system there would be few opportunities for coalitions with overlapping members to form, which would increase the probability of disruptive conflict in the system and decrease its chances of long-run survival and growth. Growth, Deutsch has argued. 50 is fostered by an increase in the levels of autonomy of a system, which might in graph-theoretic terms be reflected in the development of systems whose power structures are nongradable graphs with centers (or subsystems) of influence connected by linkages spanning several different hierarchical levels.⁵¹

Finally, at least in small groups, the distribution of power is related to the communications network through which power is exerted. The greater a person's "relative centrality" in a communications network, for example, the higher his morale and the more likely he is to emerge as leader of his group.⁵² Analogously in

⁴⁷ Dahl, op. cit.

⁴⁸ Banfield, op. cit.

⁴⁹ Ernst B. Haas, The Uniting of Europe: Political, Social, and Economical Forces, 1950–1957. (London: Stevens & Sons, 1958).

⁵⁰ Deutsch, op. cit., p. 253.

⁵¹ One kind of algebraic ordering which has been proposed as a model for the structure of cities and organizations is the semilattice. See Christopher Alexander, "A City is Not a Tree," Architectural Forum, 122 (2 parts; April, May 1965), pp. 58-62, 58-61; and Morris R. Friedell, "Organizations as Semilattices," American Sociological Review, 32 (Feb. 1967), 46-54.

⁵² Alex Bavelas, "Communication Patterns in Task-oriented Groups," in Cartwright and Zan-

political systems, high concentration of power is probably correlated with the emergence of single rather than collective leaders within elite structures. Furthermore, satisfaction probably accrues to people in these positions, and those who find such positions attractive at the recruitment stage probably possess a distinctive set of psychological predispositions.

Considerably more research is needed, however, to test and confirm how and under whatcircumstances the concentration of power affects political behavior. Being better able to measure and compare how and to what extent power is relationally distributed among the members of political systems should better enable us to understand and predict its effects.

From a broader perspective, I believe the usefulness of the kind of configurative analysis outlined here—or synthesis, from the viewpoint of combining constituent units—is not limited to the study of power. Other manifold phenomena and processes are amenable to systemic types of analysis, and other models or

der, op. cit., pp. 669-682. At a more theoretical level, see Terence K. Hopkins, The Exercise of Influence in Small Groups (Totowa, N. J.: Bedminister Press, 1964).

indices, such as the influence concentration index suggested by Bruce M. Russett in this issue of the REVIEW, will illuminate this kind of pursuit.53 By taking the trouble to explain the substantive meaning and behavioral significance of the abstract assumptions and concepts of a mathematical theory, we can translate the theory into a model, and the model with operational concepts and data into a testable empirical theory, and thus raise the concept of a political system from the level of vocabulary to the level of analysis. Otherwise, the way in which we try to fit the erratic properties of the parts of a system into a less erratic and more coherent whole will remain in the hocus-pocus world of magic, leaving us with either no visible trace of how a result was obtained or no clue as to its theoretical significance.

⁵³ For various measures of the "concentration of authority" based on asymmetric dominance relationships between all pairs of actors in a system, see Otomar J. Bartos, Simple Models of Group Behavior (New York: Columbia University Press, 1967), pp. 56-61. These measures, like Russett's, are algebraic in nature and do not presuppose a decomposition that depicts the geometric order in a system.

PROBABILISM AND THE NUMBER OF UNITS AFFECTED: MEASURING INFLUENCE CONCENTRATION¹

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In suggesting a basis for operational indices of the concentration of power Steven Brams' creative article "Measuring the Concentration of Power in Political Systems" (see pp. 461-475) has performed an important service to the discipline in opening up a neglected area. It is very surprising that despite all the past efforts to devise summary measures of power bases (e.g., income or military strength) so little effort has gone into summary indices for rigorously gauging their dispersion or the absence of dispersion. Having acknowledged Brams' piece as an extremely valuable stimulus for further thought, I would like now to exercise a scientific prerogative to propose a variation in the approach that should, for some theoretical purposes, prove even more useful. As Brams notes appropriately, it is indeed true that the best index "for any particular study will depend on the nature and purposes of the study."

All the versions of Brams' PC index are directed toward measuring the collective exercise of influence between different levels of decision-makers. This approach reflects an essentially deterministic point of view: the influence from any level on a mutual influence set or sets is determined by the exercise of influence on only one of its members. For example, if a has power over b, and b is in a mutual influence set with c, then c's actions vis-à-vis b are completely determined by a. As far as the PC index is concerned, this is no different from the case of a's directly influencing b and directly influencing c when b and c are not in an influence relationship. But if one takes a probabilistic viewpoint of indeterminacy, of a's predominance but less than complete control over b and c when they are in a mutual influence relationship, the relations among units at a subordinate level become interesting. Then the PC index will sometimes prove unsatisfactory because it does not measure the individual exercise of influence between each decision-maker and all others at a

¹ I am grateful to the National Science Foundation and the Yale Political Data Program for general support, to Charles L. Taylor and Michael J. Taylor for our conversations on these points, and also to Steven J. Brams for a most productive further exchange.

particular level. The problem can be illustrated with Figures 1s and 1b.2


By any of the versions of the PC index both graphs would produce the same measure, $1-\frac{3}{7}=.57$. There are two levels, and a single minority control set of three decision-makers in each. The distinction that in Figure 1a those at the lower level are isolated from one another. whereas in Figure 1b they exert a good deal of influence on one another, is not recognized. Yet intuitively it would seem that power is more heavily concentrated in the first system than in the second. The first illustrates a successful divide-and-rule policy, while the second suggests both a diffusion of total influence and perhaps some possibilities for a future change in the system if the lower group can realize the potential of its greater size and the influence its members exert on one another.

To help avoid such results I propose an alternative measure, based not on the size of various sets but on the size of the domain, the number of other decision-makers influenced by a given decision-maker. This shift to the number of decision-makers influenced, furthermore, makes it possible to avoid the concept of minority control sets, a concept which leads to certain additional difficulties with the PC index. The proposed alternative still makes use of the system of directed graphs employed by the previous article, but does not incorporate the set-theoretic aspects. In line with this probabilistic emphasis on influence but incomplete control of one unit by another, we may identify this index by the letters IC (Influence Concentration) and define it as:

$$IC = 1 - \frac{D_a + D_b + \cdots + D_n}{N(N-1)}$$

where N is the number of decision-makers in the system, and D_a is the number of decisionmakers, other than a itself, who are influenced,

² The expression $a \rightarrow b$ means that a often influences b's actions, but with no implication that b always responds; $a \leftrightarrow b$ would indicate mutual influence. The empirical meaning of "often" would of course have to be specified in the situation.



 $\begin{pmatrix}
d & \longrightarrow e \\
\dagger & \downarrow \\
f & \longrightarrow g
\end{pmatrix}$

Fig. 1b

Fig. 1a

directly or indirectly, by a, etc. For Figure 1a that would be

$$IC = 1 - \frac{6+6+6+0+0+0+0}{7(6)} = .57$$

but for Figure 1b the figure is much lower, as seems intuitively reasonable:

$$IC = 1 - \frac{6+6+6+3+3+3+3}{7(6)} = .29$$

Using the expression N(N-1) in the denominator enables us to produce an index that can vary from zero to nearly unity. Like PC normally, it will always fall short of unity. The maximum concentration of power would of course be a situation where a single decisionmaker directly influenced all the others but was not influenced by them in return. Expressed generally, the maximum possible value both for IC and for PC is 1-(1/N). This limits the utility of both indices for comparing systems comprising unequal numbers of decisionmakers, since the maximum value approaches nearer to unity, without ever reaching it, as the number of decision-makers increases. But again, IC discriminates between systems where the subordinate units are isolated and where they form one or more mutual influence sets among themselves.

There are, however, two kinds of anomalies which form exceptions to the above statement about the maximum value of PC, and where PC may reach a value of 1.0. First, PC will equal unity whenever the controlling set is not in a minority but is as large as or larger than the total number of units in the controlled set or sets (e.g., if a, b, c, and d were in a mutual influence relationship, and influenced e, f, and g acyclically). Though perfect mutual influence may seldom be observed in empirical political systems, this latter situation may not be so rare as to be absent from "most political systems of interest." Any measure employing the concept

3 "Measuring the Concentration," footnote 13.

of minority control set is unable to acknowledge this situation at all, let alone distinguish conditions where the controlled minority is isolated from where it forms its own mutual influence set. Both of the latter illustrate variants of a "permanent" winning coalition, and either may for instance approximately represent relations between the white majority and Negroes in a few Southern states. Second, in an acyclic chain (or path) where a influences b and b influences c, PC (excluding the variant which allows for minority control sets) is at 1.0 since there are no minority influence sets. This anomaly is less peculiar than those above, but surely the concentration here is no greater than in the system where one unit directly controls each of the others and which has the lower index of 1-(1/N). Because PC=1.0 can be reached by so many different systems it is impossible to evaluate such an empirical value without other information on the system in question. Indeed, Brams does suggest other information, such as the identification of "linkage" decision-makers, but one must return to the diagrams to obtain it.

While both IC and PC in its non-anomalous forms must fall short of unity, at the lower end PC is often restricted above zero. For IC, however, zero is the true value for "pure democracy," i.e., where everyone has direct or indirect influence on everyone else. And for the situation of four units in a mutual influence set controlling three isolates,

$$IC = 1 - \frac{6+6+6+6+0+0+0}{7(6)} = .43.$$

Compared with this, the minimum value of PC in all gradable graphs is

$$PC = 1 - \frac{\frac{N-1}{2}}{N} = 1 - \frac{N-1}{2N}$$

except, as Brams notes, where several minority control sets impinge on one mutual influence or minority control set, and the membership of the




Fig. 2a





Fig. 2b

minority control sets is larger than that of the set they influence. Aside from this exception, the minimum true value of PC, as well as its maximum value, varies with the total number of decision-makers, approaching nearer to .50 as N increases.

Note that the rank-order of relative concentration shown by IC for each of the three situations illustrated in Figures 1a, 1b, and 1c of the

preceding paper is nevertheless the same as produced by PC; i.e., we obtain an IC of .89 for the hierarchical system, .66 for the mutual adjustment, and .53 for the mixed (compared with .94, .83, and .67 respectively for PC). This confirms Brams' assertion that intuitive descriptions which identified Lindblom's "mixed" system as more concentrated than the mutual adjustment one were unsatisfactory. In any



case, the choice of index depends upon one's theoretical purposes, and neither is manifestly superior for all situations.

There are some interesting similarities between IC and indices of inequality based on the Lorenz curve. The latter, a standard measure of inequality or concentration, is useful whereever we can identify an individual unit as possessing a given proportion of the total value (power, wealth, representation, etc.) in the system.4 While the Lorenz curve and its derivatives are not strictly applicable here, we can proceed on much the same principle. We can, for instance, order the decision-makers, putting those who influence (directly or indirectly) the smallest number of other decision-makers on the left and those who influence (directly or indirectly) the most on the right. Then, plotting the number of other decision-makers influenced by each on the vertical axis, we obtain graphs like those in Figures 2a and 2b for the hierarchical and mutual adjustment systems respectively. The area of the box above and to the left of the jagged line (which we may call the "concentration line") represents the difference between the actual concentration of power and a hypothetical perfect equality. If every unit influenced every unit the line would connect points running up the left-hand edge of the box and across the top. Because of the restriction on the upper limit, however, the line representing complete concentration would never be quite a perfect reverse L along the bottom and up the right side. (It must register the N-1decision-maker as influencing 0 other decisionmakers, and then angle up to the top right corner for the Nth decision-maker who influences all others.)

Some other useful aspects may be noted. Taking a deterministic point of view that an asymmetrical power relationship is complete, in a path PC is at the anomalous value of 1.0

⁴ See Hayward R. Alker, Jr., and Bruce M. Russett; "Measures for Comparing Inequality," in Richard L. Merritt and Stein Rokkan (eds.), Comparing Nations: The Use of Quantitative Data in Cross-National Research (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1966).

(see above). But if b's actions are influenced but not determined by a, then b may be considered also to have independent influence over its subordinates in the chain. Under these circumstances a has some direct or indirect power over N-1 units, b over N-2, c over N-3, etc. The IC index is then exactly .50, compounded of

$$1 - \frac{\sum\limits_{k=1}^{N} (k-1)}{N(N-1)} \cdot$$


In a graphical presentation this gives a diagonal line bisecting the square from the lower left corner to the upper right.


Note, however, that the same index may sometimes be obtained from different patterns of influence. Suppose, for example, that we had three systems as illustrated in Figure 3. Each has precisely the same IC index, .25, yet it seems intuitively that influence is not equally concentrated in each. Most observers would regard the system of Figure 3a as in some way more "egalitarian" than either of the others, and the political implications are surely different.⁵

The first two systems can nevertheless, despite identical IC indices, be distinguished by differences in the graphical illustration of their concentration lines, as in Figure 4.

Here the system where only a minority has no influence over others is marked by an initial steep slope rapidly levelling off, whereas the system in which a minority has acyclic influence over the majority is illustrated by a steep slope in the upper right-hand corner. Thus, like the Lorenz curve or every other measure of concentration ever devised, IC cannot be used slavishly or without reference to the details of the distribution. It will often be helpful to plot graphs like those illustrated in Figures 2 and 4, and perhaps to use special-purpose indices to

⁶ This is a case where Brams' PC index would differentiate the two, but by showing PC for 3b to be .75 and PC for 3a at the arbitrary value of zero (no minority control sets). Zero is of course an unsatisfactory value since there is in fact some concentration.





gauge the slope along different segments of the concentration line. For instance, a figure for the average slope of the second half of the line would effectively distinguish systems 4a and 4b, and, on the analogy of the Lorenz curve, the steeper slope would in a sense indicate greater concentration.⁶

Finally, it must be noted that neither IC nor PC takes full account of indirection and the diminution of influence implied by mediation through several actors. That is, recalling our original comment about probabilities, b's control over d in Figure 3c is undoubtedly greater than in Figure 3b. In 3c, b is also linked directly to d without having its influence weakened by being dependent solely on intermediary c, with its consequent weakening of influence by the uncontrolled element in b's relationship with c. Nor does the graphic type of presentation in Figure 4 distinguish between them, since the concentration line would be just the same as that given for 3b.

It may be said that both IC and PC are directed toward measuring the power dispersion of the system rather than toward an adequate measure of the power of an individual unit; even so, further refinements ought to incorporate a weighting scheme whereby indirect influence is counted for less than is a direct link. Ideally each relationship would be weighted by the probability of success of an influence attempt. Hence the power of b in $b\rightarrow c$ would be

⁶ Formally, of course, the slope measures the rate of change in concentration, but similar measures with the Lorenz curve (e.g., the Schutz coefficient) are often used to suggest an aspect of concentration or inequality. See Alker and Russett, op. cit., p. 364. See also Lee Goodman, "On Urbanization Indices," Social Forces, 31 (May, 1953), 360–362. Brams' incorporation of hierarchical levels of control into his PC index is of course another way of dealing with this problem, but it requires several distinct indices (one for each two levels) for each system, thus complicating the comparison of two different systems.

the probability that in the event of an influence attempt c would obey b's wishes, minus the probability c would follow the same course of action even in the absence of any influence attempt $(P_{ble} = P_{e,b} - P_{e,\bar{b}})$.

And the index of b's power over d in

$$c \to d$$

would be b's indirect influence $(P_{b/c} \times P_{c/d})$ minus d's influence over $b \cdot P_{d/b}$). In

$$\stackrel{b}{\swarrow} \stackrel{\searrow}{\searrow} ,$$

however, the index would be the sum of b's direct power $(P_{d/b})$ and the probability of indirect influence if direct influence failed $(1-P_{b/d})(P_{b/c}\times P_{c/d})$, minus $P_{d/b}$. The index would vary between +1.0 and -1.0 depending on whether b had net influence over d, or vice versa. B's total power in the system would thus equal the sum of its power index over each member. Furthermore, various measures of power concentration in the system could be compiled from the relationship of the individual power indices. A very simple measure, for example, would be the total power index of the most powerful member civided by N-1: a more complex measure could use the variance of the distribution.

It is of course extremely difficult to measure empirically the component probabilities for the exercise discussed in the last paragraph. Their mere introduction raises a variety of familiar problems in the theory of power.⁷

⁷ See, inter alia, Robert A. Dahl, "The Concept of Power," Behavioral Science, 2 (July 1957), 201–215; John C. Harsanyi, "Measurement of Social Power, Opportunity Costs, and the Theory of Two-Person Bargaining Games," Behavioral Science, 7 (January 1962), 67–80; Peter Bachrach and Morton Baratz, "Two Faces of Power," this Review, 56 (December 1962), 947–952; and William Riker, "Some Ambiguities in the Notion of Power," this Review, 58 (June 1964), 341–349.

THE MINORITY PARTY AND POLICY-MAKING IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES*

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Considerable attention has recently been focused on political oppositions in democracies. A recent book examines oppositions in various western countries and a journal called Government and Opposition was founded in 1965. The significance of the role of an opposition in democracies does not have to be stressed. It is generally accepted.

What of the role of the opposition in the United States? Robert A. Dahl notes that one must use the plural when speaking of opposition in this country since, "a distinctive, persistent, unified structural opposition scarcely exists in the United States... it is nearly always impossible to refer precisely to "the" opposition, for the coalition that opposes the government on one matter may fall apart, or even govern, on another." 3

While it is true that "the" opposition is not institutionalized as a definite cohesive, persistent, distinctive group in American politics, it is also true that there has usually been an identifiable minority party in Congress. Though it does not always oppose the majority, and cannot be expected to be synonymous with "the" opposition very often, it does persist. Despite handsome invitations to disband—in the form of successive defeats at the polls—a sizeable number of congressmen, senators, and congressional candidates continue to call themselves Republicans and to organize as such in Congress.

* This is a much-revised version of a paper presented at the Annual Meeting of the American Political Science Association, Statler-Hilton Hotel, New York City, September 6-10, 1966. Financial support for this study was provided by the Carnegie Corporation in a grant to the American Political Science Association's Study of Congress, Professor Ralph K. Huitt, Director, and the Institute of Government Research, University of Arizona. I wish to acknowledge the comments and criticisms of Samuel C. Patterson, Randall B. Ripley, John Manley, Conrad Joyner, Jorgen Rasmussen, and Phillip Chapman.

¹ Robert A. Dahl (ed.), *Political Oppositions in Western Democracies* (New Haven, Conn.: Yale University Press, 1966).

² The first issue of Government and Opposition was published in November, 1965.

³ In Dahl, op. cit., p. 34.

This study focuses on the range of strategies. including various forms of opposition, available to the minority party in congressional policymaking. Specific attention will be paid to the Republican party as a minority party in the House of Representatives for two reasons: 1) to limit the scope of the article and 2) because the Republican party is the contemporary minority party. The major questions to receive attention are: What are the principal policymaking strategies of the minority party? What political conditions determine the range of strategies available to it in any one Congress? The major thesis is that there are various types of minority parties when classified by the range of strategies available to them for participating in policy-making. Some minority parties are extremely weak and ineffectual, others have significant sources of power available to them. The role of the minority party in Congress is not a single, consistent role over time. It varies considerably depending on a number of external and internal conditions.

I. POLITICAL SETTING FOR THE MINORITY PARTY IN CONGRESS

There are certain relatively stable factors in the American political setting which are of importance in determining the role of the minority party. Notable among these are, of course, federalism, representation, and the separation of powers—all three of which tend to decentralize the political party structure. While distributing power between a central unit and sub-units, federalism also distributes elective offices throughout the land. Parties exist to fill these offices and therefore organize where elections take place. The representation system is based on the land mass of states for the Senate, population for the House, and a combination of the two for the Electoral College. Separation of powers in and of itself allows for only a minimum of coordination at the national level for the majority party and almost none at all for the minority party. Thus, decentralization and lack of cohesion may be taken as "givens" when analyzing American political parties.

The role of the minority party is also determined by the role of Congress in national policy-making. In general, Congress has the primary function of legitimating one course of action, designed to solve a public problem,

over another. The legitimation process is ultimately one of some type of majority rule and therefore policy to be legitimate must be traced to a numerical majority. Thus, if a course of action is to be legitimated in Congress, it is necessary for political leaders to consider the majority-building prerequisite. The output of the legitimation process may be called policy and normally it is the result of compromise. Note that reference is made to a legitimation "process." There is considerably more involved in this process than voting on legislation. The final vote is merely the manifestation of success, or lack of it, in building a majority. By legitimation process is meant all those activities to collect a majority which go on in Congress (and specifically in the House for this study).

This process of legitimation is not simply one of ratification of what the executive proposes. The executive is, indeed, a major source of proposed courses of action but there are many other sources too—interest groups, constituents, state and local public officials, members themselves. The process of building a majority involves considerable bargaining. The results of this process may bear only slight resemblance to any one of the courses of action originally proposed—whether from the executive or elsewhere.

There are a number of strategies which may be employed by the minority party in the majority coalition-building process in Congressdepending on the political conditions at the time. A minority party which is severely restricted by political conditions may only be able to support the majority party or offer inconsequential opposition to the majoritybuilding efforts of the party in power. A minority party which has a President in the White House will have the opportunity of participating in majority coalition-building efforts. A minority party which is favored by political conditions may have a range of strategies available-e.g., consequential partisan opposition, employed to defeat majority party efforts; consequential constructive opposition, where the minority party counters with its own proposals; innovation, where the minority party initiates its own proposals and attempts to build a majority in favor; cooperation, where the minority works with the majority on a particular problem; support, as mentioned above; or withdrawal, where the minority party is divided on an issue and can find no basis for agreement.

What are the political conditions which may determine the range of strategies for the minority party? Conditions both inside and outside Congress may be significant. I have identified

four "external conditions" and four "internal conditions" which seem to have important effects.

The general temper of the times is the first external condition to consider. Is there a domestic or international crisis which dominates policy-making? Or is there relative calm? To what extent has there been expressed a national mood for action in Congress and the executive? Since there are no simple, scientific measures of this condition, I will have to rely on fairly crude estimates of the temper of the times. The second external condition is the relative political strength of the minority party outside Congress (see Table 1). Is the party strong or weak nationally among the voters? in the states? in the White House? The third external condition is national party unity. Obviously a disunified party will be preoccupied with party matters to the exclusion normally of an active role in congressional policy-making as a party.

A fourth external condition is presidential power. A President with a variety of sources of power would normally limit the range of strategies of the minority party whereas a President with only limited sources of power would normally allow more flexibility.⁴

The first of the internal conditions is procedure in the House. Generally speaking procedure is relatively stable but minor changes occur frequently and major changes have occurred in the House in 1910-1911, 1946-1947, and 1961-1965. Such changes may have an important effect on the minority party. A second internal condition is the size of the margin enjoyed by the majority party over the minority party. A third condition is that of majority leadership and organization, and a fourth is minority party leadership and organization. Of particular interest is the ability, style, and sources of strength of both sets of leaders and the nature of the organization relied on.

II. THE MINORITY PARTY IN FOUR CONGRESSES

I have selected four congresses to illustrate the various political conditions which can set the range of strategies for the minority party. These four—the 63rd (1913–1914), 73rd (1933–1934), 85th (1957–1958), and 87th (1961–1962)—represent widely differing situations for the Republicans as a minority party

⁴ I rely to a great extent on Richard E. Neustadt's analysis of presidential power contained in *Presidential Power: The Politics of Leadership* (New York: John Wiley, 1960).

TABLE 1. VARIOUS COMBINATIONS FOR THE TWO PARTIES SHARING DOMINANCE OF THE HOUSE, SENATE, PRESIDENCY, AND NATIONAL VOTER PREFERENCE, 1900—PRESENT

Combination	Democrats Control	Republicans Control	Occurring In
1	NPI, PR, HO, SE		1933-47, 1949-53, 1961-67 (24 yrs)
2	NPI, PR, SE	HO	, , ,
3	NPI, PR, HO	SE	
4	NPI, PR	HO, SE	1947-49 (2 yrs)
5	NPI	PR, SE, HO	1953-55 (2 yrs)
6	NPI, SE, HO	PR	1955-61 (6 yrs)
7	NPI, HO	PR, SE	
8	NPI, SE	PR, HO	
9	PR, HO	NPI, SE	
10	PR, SE	NPI, HO	
11	PR	NPI, HO, SE	1919-21 (2 yrs)
12	PR, SE, HO	NPI	1913-19 (6 yrs)
13	SE, HO	NPI, PR	
14	SE	NPI, PR, HO	
15	HO	NPI, PR, SE	1911-13, 1931-33 (4 yrs)
16		NPI, PR, SE, HO	1909–11, 1921–31 (20 yrs)

Key: NPI-National Party Identification of Voters (Survey Research Center Concept)

in Congress. The first two (63rd and 73rd) illustrate the minority party in its most restricted role, the third (85th) illustrates one of those ambiguous policy-making situations where the minority party has a President in the White House, and the fourth (87th) is an example of greater flexibility for the minority party.

Restricted Minorities-63rd and 73rd Congresses. As noted in Table 2, the differing political conditions in 1913 and 1933 placed serious limitations on the alternative strategies which could be practically employed by the minority party. Of major importance in 1913 was the disunity of the Republican Party. Though the Republican Party was presumably the majority party in terms of voter preference in the nation, the Democrats won control of both houses of Congress and the White House (combination 12, Table 1). The result was that Woodrow Wilson had sources of power not ordinarily available to a minority party President. He could capitalize on the disunity of Republicans and the fact that, though there was not a specific domestic or international

⁶ Of course, there were no voting behavior surveys for this period. Based on election returns, I am assuming that the Republican Party was the majority party in terms of voter party identification.

crisis which dominated politics, there was a mood of dissatisfaction.⁶ Arthur S. Link described it as follows:

The election of 1912 marked the culmination of more than twenty years of popular revolt against a state of affairs that seemed to guarantee perpetual political and economic control to the privileged few in city, state, and nation. The uprising that came so spectacularly to a head in the first years of the twentieth century—the progressive movement—was the natural consummation of historical processes long in the making.

Such sources of strength are formidable but they could be reduced somewhat by internal political conditions favorable to the minority party. This was not the case in 1913, however. As noted in Table 2, the internal conditions also favored Wilson and the Democrats. There had been major procedural changes in the House of Representatives in the two preceding congresses which could also be traced to the

- ⁶ Woodrow Wilson was not the kind of man to ignore the opportunity. He had expressed himself on the need for a stronger executive in his book, *Congressional Government* (New York: Meridian Books, 1956, first published in 1885). To him, the president had merely been a branch of the legislature (see p. 173).
- ⁷ Arthur S. Link, Woodrow Wilson and the Progressive Era (New York: Harper, 1954), p. 1.

PR -Presidency

HO -House of Representatives

SE -Senate

TABLE 2. POLITICAL CONDITIONS AND RANGE OF MINORITY PARTY STRATEGIES IN FOUR SELECTED CONGRESSES

		The second secon	,						
	Locates and a second se	External Conditions	ons				Internal Conditions	ditions	
Congress	Temper	Maj-Min Combination	Min. Party Unity	President	Procedure	Margin	Majority Party Minority Party Leadership Leadership	Minority Party Leadership	Type of Minority Party by Range of Strategies
63rd (1913–1914)	No Dominant Crisis Mood for Action	t 12 (Ambiguous)	Weak	Strong (Wilson)	Major Changes	Large	Strong	Weak	Restricted
73rd (1933–1934)	Dominant Crisis Mood for Action	1 (Unambiguous)	Moderate	Strong (Roosevelt)	No changes	Large	Weak	Weak	Restricted
85th (1957–1958)	No Dominant Crisis Mood Unclear	t 6 (Ambiguous) r	Moderately Strong	Weak (Eisenhower)	No Changes	Small	Strong	Weak	Participating
87th (1961–1962)	No Dominant Crisis Mood Unclear	t (Unambiguous) r	Strong	Moderate Strength (Kennedy)	Minor Changes	Medium	Weak	Strong	Flexible

See Table 1 for explanation of combinations.

divisions in the Republican party. As will be noted below, the reduction of the power of the Speaker had the effect of forcing the Democratic party leadership to develop new techniques for building majorities. They proved themselves adept at doing so—without having to rely on minority party support. Further the Democrats were blessed with a wide margin in the House in 1913—290 to 127. To that date, no party had ever had such a comfortable House margin.

Majority party leadership and organization in the House in the 63rd Congress were both strong and effective. With the diminution of the Speaker's power, and the rejection of collegialism and personalism as leadership styles,8 it was natural that the House would have to go through a period of democratization. Certainly Speaker Champ Clark could not expect to wield power equal to that of his immediate predecessor, Joseph G. Cannon. At the same time, there were 290 Democrats in the House—a great many of them freshmen—who had to be led, and there was a President in the White House who wanted action. The pattern of leadership and organization that the Democrats developed in the House as a response to this situation is one of the most fascinating in the history of the modern Congress.

Speaker Clark was almost perfectly suited to the conditions of the moment. An affable, personable, and beloved member, Clark is quoted as saying in the 61st Congress, "Although I am going to be Speaker next time, I am going to sacrifice the Speaker's power to change the rules." He referred to himself as "Dean of the Faculty." Randall B. Ripley classifies him as a "figurehead" Speaker.10 Clark's majority leader, however, was Oscar W. Underwood—the brilliant Congressman, later Senator, from Alabama. Underwood also served as Chairman of the powerful Committee on Ways and Means and therefore of the Democratic Committee on Committees. He became the principal Democratic leader in the House.

Underwood capitalized on the inevitable period of democratization following Cannon's

- ⁸ These are terms used by Randall B. Ripley in *Party Leaders in the House of Representatives* (Washington, D. C.: The Brookings Institution, 1967).
- Quoted in Chang-wei Chiu, The Speaker of the House of Representatives Since 1896 (New York: Columbia University Press, 1928), p. 303.
- ¹⁰ Ripley, op. cit., Ch. 2. The other categories of leadership style relied on by Ripley are "collegial" and "personal."

demise by relying on the caucus as a policysetting group. Though the evidence on Underwood's techniques is still scanty, it is possible to describe the procedure which developed. Following the introduction of major bills, and their assignment to committees, the Democratic caucus would meet to debate the legislation—sometimes for two weeks. A vote would be taken, making the bill a party measure. Unless they recused themselves, Democrats were bound to vote for the bill and to vote against all amendments except those supported by the party leaders. The bill would then be brought before the appropriate committee, hearings held if the Democratic leadership so desired, and sent to the House floor for debate.11 The Republicans played a very minor role in these proceedings, and they often expressed their frustrations. For example, Sereno E. Payne (New York), ranking Republican on the Committee on Ways and Means and former majority leader under Speaker Cannon, made the following statement in the minority report on the Underwood Tariff: "In this statement we shall not attempt to analyze this bill or to criticize it in detail. Our acquaintance with it is too brief to permit this."12 The minority report on the Federal Reserve Act expressed the same frustrations.

The undersigned regret that when the Committee on Banking and Currency met finally to consider H. R. 7837 they found the majority members of the committee so bound by their caucus action that they could not consider amendments to the bill which, if adopted, would have eliminated its unsound and questionable provisions.

Such changes... are fundamental and vital. The majority members of the committee refused to favorably consider them on the ground that they involved matters of Democratic party policy settled by the caucus.¹³

- 11 Various sources may be relied on for a more complete description of this procedure. See Chiu op. cit.; George R. Brown, The Leadership of Congress (Indianapolis: Bobbs Merrill, 1922); Paul D. Hasbrouck, Party Government in the House of Representatives (New York: Macmillan, 1927); Arthur S. Link, Wilson: The New Freedom (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1956); Wilder H. Haines, "The Congressional Caucus of Today." this Review, 9 (November, 1915), 696-706.
- ¹² U. S. Congress, House, Committee on Ways and Means, House Report No. 5, 63rd Cong., 1st sess., 1913, p. lv (emphasis added).
- ¹³ U. S. Congress, House, Committee on Banking and Currency, House Report No. 69, 63rd

Even with all of these disadvantages, it is conceivable that the minority party's options could be increased simply due to the strength, imagination, and style of its leaders. Unfortunately for the House Republicans in 1913, they could not expect to rely on this source of power either. They were led principally by old-guard leaders—all of whom had supported Cannon in 1910 during the speakership fight. The minority leader was James R. Mann of Illinois—an interesting, rather enigmatic figure in House politics. He was closely identified with Cannon and won the minority floor leadership post in 1911 because the old-line Republicans still maintained a majority in the House Republican Party. Mann was apparently precise, humorless, and brilliant in his own way—a sort of "thinking man's H. R. Gross." He seemed to be a transitional figure for the House Republicans—not very well liked among his colleagues and charged with the responsibility of holding the party together until they recaptured control of Congress. It is noteworthy that when the party did gain a majority in the House in 1919 Mann was defeated for the Speakership by Frederick H. Gillett of Massachusetts.

This combination of external and internal political conditions effectively neutralized the House Republican Party. Republicans were limited to inconsequential opposition. That is, they opposed the principal aspects of Wilson's program but could do little more than try to have amendments accepted, attempt to have the legislation recommitted, and then oppose final passage. Only if the Democrats were seriously split on some issue could the Republicans expect to play a significant role. These instances were extremely rare.¹⁴

Cong., 1st sess., 1913, p. 133 (emphasis added). It is not suggested that all legislation passed without incident in the House. For example, the Tariff bill and Federal Reserve bill both were controversial within the Democratic Party. Once the principal issues were resolved in the party, and between Democratic congressional leaders and President Wilson, however, major bills passed the House by large margins.

One such instance was the legislation to repeal the exemption to American coastwide shipping under the Panama Canal Act of 1912. Speaker Clark and Majority Leader Underwood opposed President Wilson on repeal but, with some Republican support, Wilson was able to build a majority without their endorsement. See Link, Wilson: The New Freedom; and James M. Leake, "Four Years of Congress," this Review, 11 (May 1917), 252-283.

House Republicans were equally impotent during the 73rd Congress but for different reasons (see Table 2). The economic collapse of the nation was the dominant condition and it worked to the advantage of the Democrats. In 1928, the Republican Party had firm control of Congress, the White House, and the nation. In 1932, the Democratic Party was unquestionably the majority party (combination 1 in Table 1). The 1932 presidential election is classified as a "realigning election" by the Survey Research Center, 15 since major shifts were occurring in voter preference between the two parties. Indeed, even some congressional Republicans failed to support Hoover in 1932. The resulting effect of these external conditions was to provide President Roosevelt with a virtual "blank check" by the public in the 1932 election. He had more impressive sources of power than almost any President in history.

What of the internal political conditions? Did they act to blunt the thrust of presidential leadership sustained by crisis? Several did in later Roosevelt congresses, but in the 73rd Congress there were few roadblocks. There were no major rules changes, but the existing rules were made to serve the President. Major legislation was sometimes processed in a matter of days. The Democratic margin over Republicans was 198 seats—313 to 117. This was the largest margin for either party in history, though new records would be set in the 74th (219 seats) and the 75th (244 seats) Congresses.

For the most part, of course, majority party leadership in the 73rd Congress was in the White House. It was probably fortunate for the Democrats that there was strong presidential leadership, the margins were large, and the mood was for action. Neither the Speaker, Henry T. Rainey of Illinois, nor the Majority Leader, Joseph W. Byrns of Tennessee, were strong leaders. Randall B. Ripley classifies Rainey as a figurehead who was conservative in his use of power. He classifies Byrns in the same way when Byrns became Speaker in the 74th Congress. The Democratic Whip for the

¹⁵ Angus Campbell, et al., The American Voter (New York: John Wiley, 1960), Ch. 19; and Philip Converse, et al., "Stability and Change in 1960: A Reinstating Election," this Review, 55 (June, 1961), 269-280. See also, V. O. Key, Jr., "A Theory of Critical Elections," Journal of Politics, 17 (February, 1955), 3-18.

¹⁶ Ripley, op. cit., Ch. 2.

73rd Congress was Arthur H. Greenwood of Indiana.¹⁷

If Democratic party leadership in the House was weak, Republican party leadership was weaker. Gone was the strength of Nicholas Longworth of Ohio and John Q. Tilson of Connecticut, who led the House during the Coolidge and Hoover Administrations. The minority floor leader in the 73rd Congress was Bertrand H. Snell. Snell, a staunchly conservative businessman from upstate New York, was never very effective as leader in his eight years as minority leader (though it must be said that he led under extremely difficult circumstances). The Whip was Harry L. Englebright of California.

Given these circumstances, it is not surprising that the minority party in the 73rd Congress varied between the weak strategies of support of the majority coalition-building efforts of the President and inconsequential opposition. The emergency was there, the President had won an overwhelming mandate to proceed with whatever proposals he thought necessary, and the Republican party had little if any claim to public support. House Republicans could only add a voice to the consensus which served to legitimize unprecedented legislative actions.

The classic instance of Republican support came very early in the first session. The Emergency Banking bill was introduced, debated, and passed in both houses on March 9, the opening day of the 73rd Congress. Majority Leader Byrns asked for and got a unanimous consent agreement to limit debate to 40 minutes even though members had not seen the bill. Minority Leader Snell expressed the hope that Republicans would not object to this procedure.

The house is burning down, and the President of the United States says this is the way to put out the fire. And to me at this time there is only one answer to this question, and that is to give the President what he demands and says is necessary to meet the situation.¹⁸

The bill passed by a voice vote.

No other legislation in the first session would

¹⁷ The caucus apparently proved useful in canvassing opinion and organizing the great numbers of new Democrats. See E. Pendleton Herring, "First Session of the 73rd Congress," this Review, 28 (February, 1934), 65-83. The Democratic caucus minutes for this period are available in the Library of Congress.

¹⁸ Congressional Record, 73rd Cong., 1st sess., March 9, 1933, p. 76.

go through the House with such ease. But the process by no means returned to normal. House Democrats pushed through legislation at a record pace by relying on closed rules which restricted amendments. A total of ten closed rules were employed during the first session, compared to an average of two such rules a session for other Roosevelt Congresses. As Lewis J. Lapham, in his detailed study of the House Committee on Rules, has noted: "Hardly a single important bill having to do with the economic recovery program of the president was considered by the House except under the restrictions imposed by a so-called gag rule."19 Despite these tactics—so dreaded and heavily criticized by the minority—sizeable numbers of Republicans supported the legisla-

During the second session of the 73rd Congress, House Republicans were considerably less supportive of Roosevelt's efforts. They assumed the slightly more aggressive strategy of inconsequential opposition. For example, with the reciprocal trade bill, they issued a minority report which listed 24 separate reasons why Republicans could not support the bill. House Republicans rarely issued minority reports in the first session. When the bill reached the floor Allen T. Treadway (Massachusetts), ranking Republican on the Committee on Ways and Means, served mild notice that Republicans would offer less support in the future.

... in making critical remarks I wish to say that they are in no way reflections on the personality of the President of the United States. I hold the President in the very highest esteem. I have voted with him as far as I could, consistently with my conscience, in his program of recovery; but I claim that when our stern convictions differ from those of the President of the United States, there is but one course for us to pursue... ²⁰

Treadway's remarks were very circumspect, however, and, it might be added, of no great concern to the President. Roosevelt had a sizeable and dependable majority without Republican support.

The 63rd and 73rd Congresses represent very unusual minority party situations. In both instances, political conditions were such that the minority party could rely on only a very narrow range of strategies in congressional policymaking. House Republicans in both congresses

19 Lewis J. Lapham, Party Leadership and the House Committee on Rules (unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, Harvard University, 1954), p. 52.

²⁰ Congressional Record, 73rd Cong., 2nd sess., March 23, 1934, p. 5262.

had an immediate, internal party problem—that of survival as a political party.

Yet there are important differences between these two situations for the minority party. As noted in Table 2, the Republicans in 1913 had one potential source of power which was not available in 1933—they were presumably still the majority party nationally. In 1913, the salient condition determining the restriction on the minority party was disunity. Therefore, it was within the power of the minority party to make the adjustments necessary to correct this condition. If successful, the restrictions on the minority party in Congress could well be temporary. If unsuccessful, the party could well disappear as a major party. Thus, there were important stakes in seeking a rapprochement. Given the characteristics of the American party system this reunion might best be accomplished by less aggressive behavior on both sides. That is, the party might accomplish a partial healing by just "holding on"-insuring that the divisiveness not go further and that those disagreements which did exist not be advertised so broadly. For the most part, this is precisely what happened.

In 1933, however, the Republicans did not have it within their power to produce remedies. Events were out of control, as far as the minority party was concerned. The party had to stand aside and hope that, by some miracle, the situation would change. It did not. Of the two situations, that during the 73rd Congress is clearly the most undesirable from the point of view of the minority party since it signals a long period when the minority party can expect to play only the most limited role in policymaking.

A Participating Minority—85th Congress. As is noted in Table 1, the American electoral system makes possible very ambiguous political situations. One such is illustrated by the 85th Congress. President Dwight D. Eisenhower was reelected by a very large margin in 1956 but the Republican Party was unable to capture control of either house of Congress. Thus, the minority party in Congress was faced with conflicting demands and expectations—enacting the President's program while opposing congressional Democratic leadership.

Since the margins in both the House and Senate were narrow (33 seats in the House, 2 in the Senate), there were three conditions—one external, two internal—which could have resulted in a strong role for the minority party in Congress (see Table 2 for a summary of conditions). The first of these, the external condition, would be a President with a number of sources

of power other than a majority in Congress. President Eisenhower did have one such source of power-his phenomenal popularity among the public. There were several factors which prevented Eisenhower from turning this advantage into success in policy-making, however. First, there was no all-engaging crisis or general mood for action which would rally all legislators to support the President. Second, it was unlikely that a man of Eisenhower's background would have the necessary skills for majority coalition-building in these circumstances (an asset for him at the polls but not in negotiating for majorities in Congress).21 Third. it seems that the President did not see the need for legislation in many areas and therefore did not press hard for its enactment. Thus, for the very reasons that he did have personal popularity, it was unlikely that he would try to capitalize on this advantage.

The internal conditions which might have strengthened the minority party would be weak majority party leadership combined with strong minority party leadership. If House Democratic leaders had been inept—unable to control their majority—and House Republican leaders had been exceptional negotiators, it is conceivable that the minority party would have been highly successful in building majorities for a Republican program. Unfortunately for the minority, the reverse was the case during the 85th Congress.

In the House, the Democrats were able to rely on Sam Rayburn as Speaker and John W. McCormack as Majority Leader. Rayburn was serving his 22nd term as a member of the House and his seventh full term as Speaker. Though Rayburn apparently lost some of his characteristic alertness in later Congresses, he led his party with strength in the 85th Congress. Rayburn approached the perfect model of the effective Speaker of the House of Representatives. He knew the rules and how to use them, he maintained contact with all of the various wings of the House Democratic party, and he was very protective of his procedural majority-sensing when he may have gone too far with any member. He also retained a fine sense of compromise, and relied on techniques of leadership which emphasized party unity.

McCormack was serving his 15th full term in the House and his ninth term as the secondranking leader in his party—seven as Majority Leader, two as Minority Whip. Though generally considered to be more partisan than Rayburn, McCormack had proved himself to be a very durable, and generally well-liked, leader.

²¹ See Neustadt, op. cit., pp. 163-164.

Rayburn and McCormack did not rely on either the caucus or a steering committee. They maintained a relatively efficient whip system as a formal system of communication (led by Carl Albert, Oklahoma, in the 85th Congress) but both relied more heavily on informal methods of contact than on the formal whip system. Both leaders avoided calling caucuses to set party policy, fearing the effects of such meetings on party unity.

House Republicans were not so fortunate in getting strong leadership. They were led by Joseph W. Martin, Jr., of Massachusetts. Martin certainly was experienced in leading House Republicans—he had done so since the 76th Congress. As contrasted with his long-time friend, Sam Rayburn, however, Martin was losing control over his party. He had lost contact with many of the younger members and his health was failing. Evidence for this appeared in convincing form in the 86th Congress when Martin was defeated for the minority leadership post by Charles A. Halleck of Indiana.

Like Rayburn, Martin relied on "personalism" as a leadership technique. But he was never as successful as Rayburn. It seemed as though conditions in the Republican Party (e.g., less sectional diversity) favored greater use of party caucus and committee action than for the Democrats. Republicans were generally more unified and could gain publicity from such meetings. Martin, however, continued to rely on a coterie of advisers. Halleck was one of these in earlier times but Martin had grown to distrust him. Leslie C. Arends, Illinois, served as his Whip and while performing adequately, Arends took a narrow view of his function as Whip.

Thus, House Republicans had rather uninspired leadership in the 85th Congress. Martin's greatest source of strength was his friendship with Rayburn. But many young members considered this friendship more harmful to the party than helpful. They wanted to establish a more positive image for the party and were frustrated with the leadership of Martin, Arends, and ranking committee members like Clarence Brown (Ohio). These dissatisfied members were to make many changes in the House Republican Party in ensuing years.²²

The range of strategies for the House Repub-

²² For a discussion of the frustrations of House Republicans under Martin's leadership, see Charles O. Jones, *Party and Policy-Making; The House Republican Policy Committee* (New Brunswick, N. J.: Rutgers University Press, 1964), Ch. 2.

lican Party in the 85th Congress was almost as restricted as that during the 63rd and 73rd Congresses. House Republicans participated in majority coalition-building. The President would be expected to count his own party first in building majorities and rely on House Republican leaders to assist him in getting the necessary Democratic votes to enact his policies. Given the weakness both of the President and the House Republican leaders, however, it is reasonable to distinguish between weak and strong participation. The former, of course, characterized the House Republican Party in the 85th Congress.

The range of strategies for the minority party could be expected to be somewhat broader if a particular proposal became more identified with the House Democrats. Thus, if the Democrats were successful in altering the president's legislation to a considerable extent. then House Republicans would be free to adopt a number of strategies—oppose the legislation, substitute their own proposal, support the Democratic version, etc. Further, if the President compromised with the Democrats without House Republican concurrence, or despite their objections, the range of strategies would be increased. It is obvious that majority coalition building under these conditions requires considerable finesse—particularly if the issue is significant and controversial. The policymaking result in the 85th Congress was often confusion, ambiguity, and stalemate.

There were instances during the 85th Congress when the two parties worked together to pass legislation—with the Republicans forming the principal basis of support. For example, the Civil Rights Act of 1957 was characterized by bipartisanship at every stage of the process. On the other hand, there were cases when a presidential proposal divided House Republicans. Efforts to unify Republicans risked the loss of needed Democratic support. Efforts to gain Democratic support further divided Republicans. The President had a mixed record on such issues. On reciprocal trade and national defense education, he and his party leaders were able to build a coalition sufficiently large for passage. On federal aid to education, he was not only unsuccessful in doing so, but apparently had some doubts about the bill himself.23 And who can know how many proposals were never even made due to the ambiguity of the congressional situation? The president himself was discouraged following the first session: "I am tremendously disappointed that so many of these bills have not been acted on, and in some

²³ See Neustadt, op. cit., p. 75.

cases, not even have held hearings."²⁴ The editors of the *Congressional Quarterly* summarized the second session: "Adjournment of the 85th Congress... brought to a close a second session as remarkable for what it didn't do as for what it did do."²⁵

Quite clearly, the external and internal conditions which existed in the 85th Congress resulted in a most confusing policy-making situation. For the most part the House Republican party was limited to a participating strategy in majority coalition-building. Thus, as with the 63rd and 73rd Congresses, the minority party had a restricted range of strategies available. As distinct from those two Congresses, however, the minority party was considerably more involved in congressional policy-making during the 85th Congress.

A Flexible Minority—37th Congress. The combination of conditions which characterized the 87th Congress provided a greater range of strategies for the minority party than the other three congresses examined here. President Kennedy's view of the presidency was in the tradition of Wilson and Roosevelt, but he did not have their sources of strength. There was no all-pervasive crisis to dominate national politics in 1960, Kennedy's margin over Nixon was extremely narrow, congressional Republicans had increased their numbers in both houses over 1958, Republicans were generally unified, and Democrats were plagued with a measure of disunity (see Table 2 for summary of all conditions). Kennedy's greatest sources of power seemed to be his energy in producing new ideas, and renovating old ideas, for solving public problems, and the fact that so little had been accomplished in the 86th Congress. In Neustadt's terms, he was able most to rely on "the expectations of those other men regarding his ability and will to use the various advantages that they think he has."26 President Kennedy took a very broad view of the presidency:

Whatever the political affiliation of our next President, whatever his views may be on all the issues and problems that rush in upon us, he must above all be the Chief Executive in every sense of the word. He must be prepared to exercise the fullest powers of his office—all that are specified and some that are not.27

With the exception of a procedural change in the House, internal conditions also tended to favor the minority party. As noted above, for the first time since 1952, Republicans increased their numbers in the House of Representatives. The Democrats still had a commanding majority-263 to 174-but with probable Democratic disunity on some measures, the Republicans could expect some success in building negative majorities so as to defeat the President's proposals. The President was successful in effecting a procedural change of some significance. The House Committee on Rules had become an anti-administration device and could be expected to cause considerable procedural difficulty for the President's program. In a major power struggle between Chairman Howard W. Smith and Speaker Rayburn, Rayburn won (with the critical support of 22 Republicans) and the Committee on Rules was enlarged by three members. Though enlargement did not result in the Committee's loss of power and independence, it did represent a major defeat for those who had relied on it to curb the majority and merely opened the door to other, more drastic reforms.28

The House party leadership situation in the 87th Congress was almost the reverse of that during the 85th Congress. The Republicans were much stronger, the Democrats much weaker. Rayburn, McCormack and Albert continued to lead the Democrats but the long-time Speaker was apparently losing his touch. As one senior Democrat put it:

Rayburn died at a propitious time. During the last three to five years, things were getting out

²⁴ Quoted in Congressional Quarterly Almanac, Vol. 13, 1957, p. 87.

²⁵ Congressional Quarterly Almanac, Vol. 14, 1958, p. 57.

²⁶ Neustadt, op. cit., p. 179.

²⁷ Quoted in the *New York Times*, January 15, 1960, p. 16 (emphasis added).

²⁸ There are a number of excellent studies of this struggle. See Robert L. Peabody and Nelson W. Polsby (eds.), New Perspectives on the House of Representatives (Chicago: Rand-McNally, 1963), Chs. VI and VII; William R. MacKaye, A New Coalition Takes Control: The House Rules Committee Fight of 1961 (New York: McGraw-Hill, 1963); Neil MacNeil, Forge of Democracy: The House of Representatives (New York: McKay, 1963); James A. Robinson, The House Rules Committee (Indianapolis: Bobbs-Merrill, 1963). See also my "Joseph G. Cannon and Howard W. Smith-An Essay on the Limits of Leadership in the House of Representatives," Journal of Politics, 30 (August, 1968). It should be noted that further changes were made in 1965 to reduce the power of the Committee.

from under his control. And during the last two years people really had no idea, but it was distressing to sit there with his group of about 15, and see him trying to grapple with bills like the foreign aid bill when he had lost his touch.²⁹

McCormack was elected Speaker after Rayburn died in November, 1961.

The Republicans changed leadership in 1959. Joe Martin was in poor health and had grown away from many of the party's younger members. The 1958 election, in which House Republicans lost 47 seats, served as a catalyst for change. The new minority leader, Charles A. Halleck of Indiana, was less a friend of Rayburn and was considered more partisan than Martin had been. Though he was not the first choice of many House Republicans who had pressured for a change in leadership, they generally considered him superior to Martin.30 As it turned out, he was to serve as interim leader only-until the insurgents could muster enough support to get a more preferred candidate elected.31 At the time that Halleck was elected. House Republicans also reorganized their party. The most significant change was to separate the floor leadership and Policy Committee chairmanship posts. This change was made at the insistence of the insurgents. Though the reorganized Policy Committee by no means satisfied those House Republicans who desired more vigorous and imaginative policy leadership, it did give them somewhat more access to leadership decision-making and served to unify the party.

The first point to establish in analyzing policy-making in the 87th Congress is that a minority party with several sources of power is "consequential" in policy-making. Thus, what the House Republicans did during the 87th Congress, the strategy they adopted on a particular piece of legislation, was often important to the outcome. Further, the very fact that they could mount consequential opposition became important in majority coalition building. Put another way, to the extent that the minority party has flexibility in choosing strategies, the majority party's role in policy-making is limited.

In the 87th Congress, House Republicans had a number of options at different stages of

the legislative process. They could simply oppose that which was offered by the majority party (partisan opposition), they could counter with their own proposals (constructive opposition), they could support proposals (support), they could cooperate in developing policy (cooperation), they could initiate proposals of their own (innovation),32 or they could simply not take a party position (withdrawal). As would be expected, a consequential minority potentially can be involved in policy-making during all stages of the legislative process-and various options may be available at each stage. It must be recognized, however, that there are separate minority party leadersusually the ranking minority members of the committee or subcommittee-during the early stages of legislation. They may or may not consult the House minority leadership in developing strategies. Thus, it is conceivable that the minority party, through its various leaders, may actually employ different strategies at different stages.33 By their very nature, one would expect that the cooperative and innovative strategies would be employed during the early stages of the legislative process (notably subcommittee and early committee action); partisan and constructive opposition, withdrawal, and support, during the later stages (final committee action and floor action).

It is not possible in this article to provide illustrations of all of the various combinations mentioned above. Only a few examples of the range of possibilities can be offered. There were many bills in the 87th Congress which illustrated partisan opposition by the minority party. In some cases, unified partisan opposition found enough support among Democrats to defeat the legislation. Thus, the federal aid to education bill in 1961, the attempt to establish a Department of Housing and Urban Affairs in 1962, and the first farm bill in 1962, all were defeated by the combination of a cohesive minority and defecting Democrats.

²⁹ Personal interview with a senior House Democrat, June, 1963.

³⁰ For details, see Jones, op. cit., pp. 27-42.

³¹ See Robert L. Peabody, *The Ford-Halleck Minority Leadership Contest*, 1965 (New York: McGraw-Hill, 1966).

Theodore Lowi argues that innovation is a principal function of the minority party in Congress. See "Toward Functionalism in Political Science: The Case of Innovation in Party Systems," this Review, 57 (September, 1963), 570–583.

³³ This is always true of the minority party; but in more restricted situations, the party's options are limited throughout the legislative process. It also should be pointed out that there is considerable legislative and representative behavior by minority party congressmen which is simply not attributable to party membership.

The total House Republican vote on these three bills was 20 in favor and 480 against (an overall index of cohesion of 92).³⁴

In other cases, House Republicans offered constructive opposition on the House floor following unsuccessful efforts in committee to have their proposals adopted. That is, efforts were made on the floor to amend the legislation and/or recommit it with instructions to accept Republican changes. One such efforton the Area Redevelopment Act of 1961—was inconsequential. Many House Republicans defected to vote against recommital and for the bill. Other efforts came close to victory. The recommital motion on the Omnibus Housing Act was defeated 215 to 197 and on the Tax Reform Act the recommital motion was defeated 225 to 190. House Republicans were actually successful in substituting their pareddown version of a minimum wage bill on the House floor in 1961—an important defeat for the Kennedy Administration. The President recovered, however, by a victory in the Senate for his bill. The Conference Committee adopted the Senate bill and their report was approved by the House only because 33 Republicans supported the President.

There were many other patterns of strategy during the 87th Congress. On the important Trade Expansion Act of 1962, there was considerable Republican cooperation and support during the formative stages of the legislation in the Committee on Ways and Means. The legislation split the House Republican Party, however, and many conservative Republicans opposed the bill. Due to this civision, no Republican position was adopted. The minority party "withdrew" on this legislation. The House Republican Policy Committee took no position—allowing members to vote as they wished. The results showed 80 House Republicans in favor, 90 opposed. 36

The Communications Satellite Act of 1962 is an example of cooperation in the formative stages followed by support on the House floor. The Manpower Development and Training Act of 1962 is an example of innovation followed by support on the House floor. The Subcommittee on Special Projects of the House

- ³⁴ Relying on Stuart Rice's index of cohesion: *Quantitative Methods in Politics* (New York: Knopf, 1928).
- ³⁵ It should be noted that "constructive" means that the Republicans were offering an alternative. That alternative may well have been "destructive" from the point of view of the President.
- ³⁶ For details on the Republican dilemma on this legislation, see Jones, op. cit., pp. 126-134.

Republican Policy Committee had conducted a general study of employment in the United States. One section of the study dealt with manpower retraining. Many of the recommendations contained in this study eventually found their way into the Manpower Development and Training Act.³⁷

There are many other examples which could be given—in this Congress and in the first session of the 88th Congress (where, prior to the assassination, the minority party also had a rather wide range of strategies). 38 The point has been established, however. Conditions were such that the minority party had a range of strategies available in the process of majority coalition building in the House.

III. SUMMARY AND QUESTIONS

The principal thesis of this article has been that the minority party's role in the process of majority coalition-building in the House of Representatives is by no means a consistent role over time. External conditions (temper of the times, minority party strength, minority party unity, and presidential power) and internal conditions (procedure, the margin, majority party leadership and organization, and minority party leadership and organization) determine the range of strategies available to the minority in congressional policymaking. As illustrated by four congresses, the range of strategies varies from the limited number available in the most restrictive minority party situations to the large number available in the flexible minority party situations. A number of these strategies are identified and discussed.

There are several important questions raised by this research which require separate analysis. For example, what are the functional consequences for policy formulation and policy administration of these various types of minority parties? It can be hypothesized that if the minority party has available a wide range of strategies, then both policy formulators and policy administrators will take into account minority party interests and views when performing their respective tasks. A consequential minority party may have a definite effect on the policy-making process. If an issue divides

³⁷ *Ibid.*, pp. 65-66.

³⁸ For evidence on the 89th Congress, see Robert L. Peabody, "House Republican Leadership: Change and Consolidation in a Minority Party," unpublished paper delivered at the 1966 Annual Meeting of the American Political Science Association, Statler-Hilton Hotel, New York City, September 6-10.

the majority, policy formulators may have to court minority party votes; the minority may be developing alternative proposals which become attractive to those affected by a policy problem and thus these proposals may be taken over by the majority party; minority victories in defeating the President may force executive policy formulators to rethink a proposal; minority party research into administration of policy may result in new legislation: and the general expectation that the minority party will oppose with strength and has certain rights, which are protected, to criticize presidential proposals, may induce caution, precision, and careful consideration in policy formulation and administration.

A second major question relates to minority party goal achievement. Do individual strategies in congressional policy-making contribute to the realization of the principal minority party goal of majority party status? If the minority party has a wide range of strategies available, does that result in victory at the polls? On the surface, it appears that the data confirm what every student of Congress knows -electoral success is related to a wide variety of factors, of which the range of policy-making strategies available is relatively minor.39 In this century the Republicans as a flexible minority have scored impressive gains in the next election (1942, 1946, 1952), scored only slight gains (1962), and lost ground (1944). The greatest victories for Republicans in this century, in terms of net gain of seats, have followed congresses in which the minority party was severely restricted (1914, 1938, and, to a lesser extent, 1966). Republicans as a participating minority in the House have never gained in the next election (1912, 1956, 1958).

If electoral success does not follow from a more active role for the minority party in majority coalition building, a rather anomalous

³⁹ For a general discussion of the opposition party in governmental decision-making, see Anthony Downs, *An Economic Theory of Democracy* (New York: Harper and Row, 1957), especially Chapter 4.

situation results. Minority party leaders are generally expected to rely on strategies which presumably will be rational in terms of the overall party goal of majority party status. Yet the impact of their actions on whether the minority party in fact becomes the majority party may be of very little consequence.

A third major question asks: What of the other combinations of variables not discussed here? Are there other types of minority parties when classified by the strategies available? A cursory examination of the congresses in this century suggests that the categories identified here are generally serviceable. But, as was indicated in the discussion of the differences between the 63rd and 73rd Congresses, a great many refinements can and should be made. Thus, for example, some restricted minorities have little immediate prospect of a greater range of strategies. Clearly, there are degrees of restrictedness and flexibility. Further, it is perfectly conceivable that a participating minority may have a strong, rather than a weak, President in the White House. And what of those rare instances when both parties are in the minority in Congress—one in each house? The two congresses of this type in this century, the 62nd and 72nd, represented highly abnormal policy-making situations wherein the majority party nationally was in the process of being deposed.

This research suggests many other questions as well. Are there differences between the minority parties of the House and Senate in any one Congress? Preliminary analysis indicates that there are. Does the analysis provided here apply to the Democratic party as a minority party? Does it apply to a large number of congresses? What happens to a minority party which fails over a long period of time to achieve majority party status? To what extent are goals of individual members functional or dysfunctional for achieving the party's goal? To what extent is "party" important at all in the formative stages of legislation? These and other important questions must be answered if we are to understand the role of political parties in Congress.

THE HOUSE AND THE FEDERAL ROLE: A COMPUTER SIMULATION OF ROLL-CALL VOTING*

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Much of the business of the U.S. Congress in the post war period has involved issues concerning the size and scope of activities of the federal government. The legislation in this area can be traced, for the most part, to measures which originated curing the period of the New Deal in response to the Great Depression and to measures enacted during World War II to meet the short-run exigencies attendant to rapid economic and social mobilization. From the point of view of the expansion of the federal role, the Eisenhower years are of some moment. While they marked a lull in the expansionist trend witnessed under the Democratic presidencies of Roosevelt and Truman, their significance lies in the fact that despite the change in adminsitrations, there was no reversal of the policies begun during the Roosevelt years. While most of the Republican legislators were on record in opposition to the expansion of the federal role, the failure of the Republican Party to introduce and enact legislation to reverse the trend of federal expansion resulted in a new plateau of federal activity from which the congressional dialogue was to proceed during the Kennedy and Johnson Administrations.

While the 87th Congress, meeting during Kennedy's first two years in the White House, did not enact the quantity of legislation expanding the federal role that Kennedy had called for in his inaugural, In the 88th Congress both parties supported a larger federal role to a greater extent than they had previously. In fact the first sessions of the 88th Congress as it bears on the federal role has been summed up as follows: "At no time did the majority of both parties reject a larger federal role." (Congressional Quarterly Almanac, 1963, p. 724) With two exceptions, the statement holds true for

* The author is indebted to Dr. Cleo Cherryholmes of the Department of Political Science at Michigan State University who shared in the design of the simulation model and rendered valuable advice and assistance in its application reported here. The author wishes, in addition, to thank Dr. Harold Guetzkow and Dr. Kenneth Janda of the Department of Political Science at Northwestern University who aided immeasureably in the conception and execution of the research upon which this article is based.

the second session in 1964.

The research reported in this article is based upon a computer simulation study of roll-call voting on twenty-one bills in the 88th session of the U.S. House of Representatives dealing with the expansion of the Federal role. Its purpose is twofold: first, to elucidate and explicate the determinants of the success of legislation resulting in the expansion of the federal role; and second, to develop and test a model that represents a theoretical overview of the roll-call voting process in the House.

I. THE MODEL

This simulation model of roll-call voting in the U.S. House of Representatives focuses on two basic processes. The first is a cognitive process involving the predisposition toward voting on a kill that a representative develops when he assesses his past voting behavior on that type of bill, the individuals and groups in the House with positive and negative positions on the bill, and the substance of the bill in terms of its benefits and disadvantages for his constituency and region of the country. The second is a communication process in which representatives who do not develop strong predispositions on a bill in the first phase of the model confront the President and their colleagues and receive influence.

The Predisposition Phase. The predisposition phase of the model is depicted in the flow chart of Figure 1. In this phase a predisposition score is calculated for each representative, one at a time, as the attributes of the bill in question are compared with those of the representatives.

The first determination made when a bill is

¹ The attributes of the bills were determined from their descriptions in the Congressional Quarterly Almanac for 1963 and 1964. The bills chosen for the simulation study are essentially the same as those identified by the Congressional Quarterly Service as pertaining to the federal-role issue area. A few recommital motions on these bills have been added to provide a larger number of bills for purposes of analysis in general and to allow, in particular, for comparisons between bills introduced by the Demogratic Administration and those introduced by Republicans (the latter having been reflected, for the most part, in recommital motions).




Fig. 1. The predisposition phase of the model.

entered into the model and confronts the first representative is whether or not the representative's past voting on that type of bill suggests a bias or predisposition for or against the bill. This aspect of the model is based upon the notion that representatives have ideological postures that provide cues for their roll-call voting behavior.² The use of past votes on federal role

² For a number of different perspectives on the effects of personal ideology on legislative roll-call voting, see D. R. Brimhall and A. S. Otis, "Con-

bills to determine a representative's ideological position with respect to present federal role bills is based upon the discovery of what constitutes, in effect, a federal role dimension in a in a number of roll-call analyses of legislative voting.³ Thus weights of two or one are added

sistency of Voting in Our Congresses," Journal of Applied Psychology, 32 (1948), 1-14; Charles Farris "A Method for Determining Ideological Groupings in the Congress," Journal of Politics, 20 (1958), 308-338; Duncan MacRae Dimensions of Congressional Voting: A Statistical Study of the House of Representatives in the Eighty-First Congress (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1958); and Lewis A. Froman, Jr. Congressmen and Their Constituencies (Chicago: Rand McNally, 1963).

³ From the standpoint of face validity, the case for the unidimensionality of congressional attitudes on the federal role is a good one. In recent years it has been one of the few issue areas that has consistently distinguished the platforms of the two parties. This consistency has been reflected by the increasing tendency for both casual observers and systematic investigators of politics to employ this issue dimension as a liberal-conservative index. In one case, the use of representatives' past votes on the federal role as a liberalconservative index has provided an instance of empirical validation of the issue area's unidimensionality (Froman, op cit.). It was found that congressmen from constituencies associated with conservative voting are low on the index (at the conservative end), while those from constituencies associated with liberal voting are high on the index (at the liberal end). This type of validation is not completely satisfying in as much as Froman's criteria for liberal and conservative voting with which the constituencies were purported to be associated are not entirely independent of the factors or bills that make up the liberal-conservative index employed. A better case for the unidimensionality of representatives' attitudes (inferred from voting behavior) towards the federal role is based upon inferences from the results of Guttman scaling techniques applied to congressional roll-call votes. This scaling technique, based upon rank-ordering procedures, was designed to tap the unidimensionality of attitude clusters. See Louis Guttman "The Basis for Scalogram Analysis," In S. A. Stouffer (ed.), Measurement and Prediction (Princeton, N. J.: Princeton University Press, 1950). MacRae, in his Guttman scale analysis of roll-call votes in the 81st Congress, found what he termed "Fair Deal" and "Welfare State" scales for Democrats and Republicans respectively (op. cit.). Within both of these scales were most of the roll-call votes

to or subtracted from the predisposition scores of each representative if he has voted consistently for or against bills dealing with the expansion of the federal role.⁴

The remaining variables in the predisposition phase of the model relate, first of all, to the individuals and groups that support or oppose the bill in question, the parties, state delegations, individual sponsors, committees that have reported the bill out and the elected leadership,⁵ and secondly to the substance of

concerned with the federal role. Anderson obtained similar scales in his analyses of four succeeding congresses. See Lee Anderson "Variability in the Unidimensionality of Legislative Voting," Journal of Politics, 26 (1964), 568-585. Finally, a Guttman scaling analysis was conducted on the 21 bills included in my simulation study. When two bills were eliminated from this analysis, a reproducibility coefficient of .90 was obtained. The two bills that did not scale were not coded for a memory effect in the simulation.

4 After some testing of the model, predisposition weights of plus or minus two were assigned to representatives who had voted for the expansion of the federal role either eighty-five percent of the time or more or fifteen percent of the time or less. Predisposition scores of plus or minus one were assigned for percentages between sixty-five and eighty-five percent and between fifteen and thirty-five percent. Predisposition scores based upon past voting were calculated only for those representatives who had voted on at least ten bills in this issue area. In general, our measure of past voting behavior on the federal role issue dimension was based on the previous two House sessions. All other weights for variables in the predisposition phase of the model are plus or minus one. It can be observed, then, that the predisposition phase of the model provides a theoretical framework for combining propositions about legislative voting behavior that have emerged from more inductive legislative studies. This theoretical framework is based upon the assumptions that predispositions are additive and that all the predisposing variables have approximately equal weight. It is important to note that this last assumption relates to initial predispositions and not to voting behavior. As will be noted below, these variables appear in the communication phase of the model where their effects are not equal.

⁵ Two of these types of predisposition calculations require some clarification. On the basis of our knowledge of the pervasiveness of party conflict in legislatures I have constructed the model such that a coding of a bill for party sponsorship which predisposes all the members on one party

the bill. Thus each bill is coded in terms of the region or regions of the country and types of constituencies it might aid or hinder.⁶

The representative in this conceptualization is thought of as developing a predisposition on the basis of his ideological posture, and the audiences he may be expected to perceive as relevant to a bill. This predisposition phase, however, represents only part of this theoretical conception of the roll-call voting process in the House. After predispositions have been calculated for all the representatives for a given bill, the communication phase of the model is activated.

The Predisposition-Communication Linkage. Not all the representatives are influenced in the communication phase of the model on each bill, but all representatives are potential influences in the communication process. Each representative's potential influence over his colleagues on a given bill is a function of the predisposition that he develops during his confrontation with it in the predisposition phase of the model. Only those representatives whose predispositions fall within the range between plus two and minus two enter the communication process to be influenced. The final votes of all others are

to vote for the bill (adding one to all their predisposition scores) has the effect of predisposing all the members of the other party in the opposite direction (subtracting one from all their predisposition scores). In the case of a bill coded from committees, all members of a committee through which the bill has passed are predisposed for the bill except those representatives who signed the minority report. These are predisposed against the bill.

6 It should be noted that when bills are coded such that some representatives acquire a predisposition as a result of an attribute of their constituency, it is then determined whether or not their constituency is competitive. If the representative comes from a competitive constituency, he acquires an additional unit of predisposition in the same direction. Competitive constituencies were designated as those that had not returned a representative from the same party in the last four consecutive congressional elections. The constituency attributes included in this study were percent urban, percent rural farm, percent rural non-farm, percent negro, percent foreign stock, percent owner occupied dwellings, percent white collar, and degree of competitiveness. With the exception of the competitiveness variable, the raw data on these variables was obtained from the Congressional District Data Book, Districts of the 88th Congress, 1963.

determined in the predisposition phase of the model.

The decisions on who enters the communication phase of the model are based upon propositions from both social-psychological findings of influence and conformity in groups in general and findings related specifically to the influence on representatives' voting behavior. From the former we get the proposition that individuals with more extreme attitude positions are less susceptible to influence than individuals with less extreme attitude positions, and from the latter the proposition that a legislator with two or more pressures such as party and constituency influencing his vote in the same direction is unlikely to be susceptible to further influence concerning his vote.

The decisions involved when a representative approaches the communication phase of the model are depicted in the flow chart in Figure 2. It can be noted that we have employed the simplyfying assumption that the communication process for all legislators is based upon the predispositions derived before the process is begun. No cycling of the process is carried out to take account of the possibility of a diffusion of influence in which predispositions generated as a result of communications among representatives become the basis for further influence in later communicative interactions.

The Communication Phase. Bauer, Dexter, and Pool have asserted that "the U.S. House of Representatives is above all a communication node which serves to unify a large and heterogeneous land by bringing into confrontation a group of men representing its various parts." It has been observed, on the other hand, that the patterns of interaction in legislative bodies tend to reinforce rather than moderate basic cleavages. In constructing this communica-

- ⁷ For evidence with respect to the attitude extremity proposition see Carl Hoyland, O. J. Harvey, and Muzafer Sherif, "Assimilative and Contrast Effects in Reactions to Communication and Attitude Change," Journal of Abnormal and Social Psychology, 55 (1957), 244–252. The proposition on immunity to influence of representatives with two influences predisposing them in the same direction is suggested by Julius Turner Party and Constituency: Pressures on Congress (Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins Press, 1951) p. 125.
- ⁸ Raymond Bauer, Lewis Dexter, and Ithiel de Sola Pool American Business and Public Policy (New York: Atherton Press, 1964).
- ⁹ John Wahlke, Heinz Eulau, William Buchanan and Leroy Ferguson, *The Legislative Sys*-




Fig. 2. The communication entry criteria.

tion process I have attempted, based upon investigations of interactions in legislative bodies, to simulate the types of confrontations that a legislator is likely to engage in when, because of either a lack of significant cues or a conflict among them, he has not evinced a strong predisposition to yote for or against a given bill.

The method employed to simulate these confrontations is an adaptation of the method of "pseudo partners" used by Abelson and Bernstein in their fluoridation referendum simulation. With this technique they matched con-

tem: Explorations in Legislative Behavior (New York: Wiley, 1962).

¹⁰ Robert Abelson and A. Bernstein, "A Computer Simulation Model of Community Referendum Controversies," *Public Opinion Quarterly*, 27 (1963), 93-122.

versation partners on the basis of potentiality for conversation, which was calculated as a function of social network information, a meshing of demographic characteristics and shared habitual loci of discussions about community issues. They based their conversation rates upon the levels of interest in the issue under discussion. I have adapted this procedure to the social network in the House by basing my conversation partner matching decisions on knowledge of the structure and processes of legislative systems in general and the House in particular.

The variables chosen to represent the structure of the communication network in the House are based upon observations of the frequency of interactions between representatives with attributes of their conversation partners, and the general observations that representa-




Fig. 3. Communication with the President.

tives seek information from certain types of colleagues and that some representatives, particularly those in positions of leadership, seek to give information or exert influence on certain types of bills. For the purposes of communication, then, each representative is described in terms of his party, state, region, constituency characteristics, leadership positions, committee membership, rank on each committee, and seniority.

The first determination made when a representative enters the communication process is whether or not he has a conversation with the President. Such a conversation symbolizes, for the sake of simplicity, a conversation with either the President or one of his legislative liaisons. The inclusion of the President in the communication process is predicated on the observation that presidential-legislative relations of this type have been institutionalized in

the post war period.¹¹ As is indicated in the flow chart of Figure 3, I have confined the President's communications with representatives to cases in which legislation that is a part of his program is concerned.

The probabilities of conversation generated when the President confronts a representative are depicted in Figure 3. To arrive at these probabilities we begin by setting a limit on the average number of representatives that the President might be expected to confront on bills that are a part of his program. Here we assume that his number of contacts would approximate those of the formal leaders of the majority party in the House (the Speaker, Majority Leader, and Whip). After setting such a limit (approximately 45 contacts) we can then apportion this contacts among the types of legislators he confronts in such a manner that his total number of contacts on a given bill will approximate our limit. For these approximations we assume that his frequencies of interaction with the various types of representatives is similar to those of a representative. He is thus given more contacts with the members of his party, representatives from his home state, and representatives from his region of the country.

When the probability of conversation between the representative and the President is calculated, a random number is called, if the random number is less than or equal to that probability, it is assumed that a conversation took place and the President's predisposition on the bill (plus two if he favors the bill and minus two if he opposes it) is added to the influence total for that representative.

The representative then enters that part of the communication process within which a determination is made as to the members of the House with whom he will converse. In this part of the communication process he confronts all 434 of his colleagues. For each confrontation a probability of conversation is calculated, based on a matching of attributes of the representative and his potential influencers. As in the case of confrontations with the President, a random number is called after each of these confrontations, compared with the probability of conversation generated, and, when it is less than or equal to that probability, results in the addition of the predisposition that the conversation partner developed in the predisposition phase of the model to the representative's influence total.

¹¹ See for example Richard Neustadt "Presidency and Legislation," this Review, 49 (1955), 980-1021.

The formal leadership of the House is prominent in the communication process because, as Truman has observed, "The House has four and one half times as many members as the Senate. From this schoolboy fact comes the tendency for the formal leadership in the House to correspond closely to the actual. . . . "12 Thus in the first part of the matching process (shown in the flow chart in Figure 4) it is determined whether the representative entering the communication process is an elected leader. If he is, it is then determined whether or not his potential conversation partner is an elected leader. The flow chart in Figure 4 indicates the probabilities of conversation generated when the various types of leadership confrontations take place. These probabilities are derived from the general observation that the leadership in the House interacts frequently, and from the findings of investigations of state legislative bodies which indicate that the presiding officer (speaker) and majority leader have a close relationship and that the interactions between these and the minority leaders are somewhat less frequent.13 They are based, in addition, on the finding that frequent interactions occur between the whips and whip organizations, and between these and the other elected leaders.14

The probabilities of conversation among the legislative leaders are based, in part, on the average total number of communications in which a non-leader becomes involved in legislative bodies. To distinguish formal elected leaders, I made use of the finding that the leaders become involved in twice as many communicative interactions on the whole as do the rank and file members of legislative bodies.15 The probabilities appearing in Figure 4 are thus based upon an extrapolation from the total number of communications in which leaders become involved. The relative apportioning of probabilities for inter-party as opposed to intra-party confrontations is explicated in our discussion of non-leadership interactions below.

The flow chart in Figure 5 depicts the beginning of that part of the communication phase of the model in which a representative who holds no positions of elected leadership becomes involved after having confronted the President.

¹² David Truman, The Congressional Party (New York: Wiley, 1959).

¹³ Wahlke et al., op. cit., p. 225.

¹⁴ Randall Ripley, "The Party Whip Organizations in the United States House of Representatives," this Review, 58 (1964), 561-576.

¹⁵ Wahlke et al., op. cit., p. 226.




Fig. 4. Leadership interactions.

The first determination made in this section is whether the potential conversation partner is a regional whip assigned to the region of the representative. The high probability of conversation generated when the representative confronts his regional whip is based upon the finding that such a conversation actually does take place on most bills.¹⁶

The next set of determinations depicted in Figure 5 constitutes the matching of attributes

16 Ripley, op. cit.




Fig. 4. (cont.) Leadership interactions.

between the representative and his potential conversation partner. As in the case of the other types of confrontations discussed thus far, the probabilities of conversation generated are based on the limit set for the average total number of communications in which a representative tends to become involved. That average falls between twenty-five and thirty and

is derived from investigations of communicative interactions in legislative bodies. It has been found that in general legislators in state legislative bodies exert personal influence over approximately a dozen colleagues. We have added another half dozen to take account of the larger size of the House which increases the possibility of a wider acquaintanceship,




Fig. 5. Rank and file interactions.

and the remainder has been added to represent the communications that a representative has with both elected and seniority leaders in the process of carrying out the task of legislating.¹⁷

The apportioning of the probabilities for confrontations between representatives involves a matching procedure. This procedure begins with a determination of whether the representative and his potential conversation partner

¹⁷ See Wahlke et. al., op. cit., p. 222 for data on the dozen basic interactions. The additional interactions are based upon the findings of Truman, op. cit., pp. 145-275.

are members of the same party. The relative size of the probabilities for inter- and intraparty interactions is based on the finding that a representative tends to have four times as many communicative interactions with members of his own party than with members of the opposition.¹⁸

The matching procedure then continues with a determination of whether the representative

¹⁸ See Garland Routt "Interpersonal Relationships and the Legislative Process," Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Sciience, 19 (1938), 129-136, and Wahlke et. al.. op. cit., p. 224.

and his potential conversation partner are from the same state delegation. The additional probability of conversation added for intrastate confrontations is based upon the observation that state delegations in Congress are somewhat cohesive in their voting behavior and upon congressmen's reports that their state delegations are important sources of their communications about legislation.19 The size of the probability relates, again, to the limit set for the total number of communications a legislator can be expected to have and is weighted on the basis of inferences drawn from the above sources as to the importance of the state delegation as opposed to other factors in the communication process.

The next determination in the matching procedure is whether the representative and his potential conversation partner come from the same region of the country. The probability of conversation added for intra-regional confrontations is based upon both observations of interactions in legislative bodies and reports of conversation frequencies by members of the house.²⁰ The probability is based, in addition, on the limit set for total communications as in the case of the other probability increments.

The next matching determination depicted in the flow chart of Figure 5 is whether the representative and his potential conversation partner represent similar constituencies in terms of their urban-rural attributes. The probability of conversation added for a confrontation between representatives with like constituencies is based upon the finding that those with similar constituencies engage in a greater-than-average number of communications in a state legislature, and upon the finding that there is a slight tendency for those

19 See Truman, op. cit., p. 253; Donald Matthews U. S. Senators and Their World (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1960); John Kessel, "The Washington Congressional Delegation," Mid-West Journal of Political Science, 8 (1964), 1-21; Lewis Froman, Jr. and Randall Ripley, "Conditions for Party Leadership: The Case of the House Democrats," this Review, 59 (1965), 52-63; and Marc Ross," Some Correlates of Voting Support for the Leadership in the House of Representatives" (Mimeo, Department of Political Science, Northwestern University, 1965).

²⁰ Routt, op. cit., p. 135; Samuel Patterson, "Patterns of Interpersonal Relations in a State Legislative Group: The Wisconsin Assembly," Public Opinion Quarterly, 23 (1959), 101-109; Ross, op. cit.

with similar constituencies to demonstrate cohesion on roll-call votes in the House.²¹

The next matching determination for confrontations among representatives relates to committee membership. The probability of conversation added when the confrontation is between representatives who share a committee assignment is based, first of all, on the common sense supposition that those who share committee assignments will have some communications in the course of carrying out those assignments, and secondly on the finding that those sharing committee assignments in the House demonstrate a slightly greater than average cohesiveness on rell-call votes.²²

The last matching determination in this phase of the communication process relates to the effect of shared seniority status on communicative interactions of representatives. The probability of conversation added for shared seniority status is based upon the finding that interaction in legislatures occurs disproportionately within seniority groupings.²³

In addition to the criteria for the matching decisions enunciated above, the probabilities of conversation for these and other types of confrontations are based upon the finding that representatives in the majority party are more cohesive on roll-call votes than those in the minority party and on the finding that more interactions take place between members of the majority party. The use of this criterion can be noted in the apportioning of probabilities of conversation for interactions between leaders and rank and file representatives to be described below.

The flow chart in Figure 6 depicts the determinants of communication that are included to account for interactions between rank-and-file representatives and the seniority leaders and technical experts in the House, the chairmen and members of the committees through which the bill that is the subject of communications passes. The probabilities of conversation added for these confrontations are apportioned on the basis of a matching of party between the representative and his potential conversation partner, the assumption being that the representative seeking technical

²¹ Allan Fiellin "The Functions of Informal Groups: A State Delegation," in R. L. Peabody and N. W. Polsby (eds.), New Perspectives on the House of Representatives (Chicago: Rand McNally, 1963), p. 66; and Triman, op. cit., p. 210.

²² Truman, op. cit., p. 277.

²³ See Wahlke *et al.*, op. ci., p. 224; and Routt, op. cit., p. 135.

²⁴ Truman, op. cit., p. 286; Routt, op. cit., p. 135.




Fig. 6. Interactions with the seniority leaders.

advice on bills will display biases similar to those displayed in his choices of other conversation partners. In addition, in keeping with the finding that the seniority leaders (committee chairmen) are expecially cohesive with their party on bills that have gone through their committees, the chairmen are weighted more heavily in the communication process.²⁵ The higher ranking members of the committees relevant to the bill in question are given more weight in the communication process also, based upon the finding that technical experts receive more communications than rank and file legislators.²⁶

The final determinations in the communication phase of the model relate to the probabilities of conversation added when a representative confronts an elected leader. The flow chart in Figure 7 depicts the matching procedure involved. The probabilities of conversation added are based, in part, on the finding discussed above that leaders are involved in twice as many communications as non-leaders and, again, on the limit set for total communications for each representative. The apportion-

ing of probabilities for the various types of leaders is based on the reports of communicative interactions by congressional representatives.²⁷ As in the case of the seniority leaders, representative-leadership interactions are incremented only for intra-party confrontations.

An overview of the communication phase of the model is depicted in the flow chart of Figure 8. It can be noted that when the random number falls within the probability of conversation calculated for a given confrontation, the predisposition of the conversation partner is added to the influenced representative's influence total. When a representative has confronted all 434 of his colleagues, his new predisposition is calculated on the basis of the influence he has received in the communications in which he has become involved. This calculation is carried out by dividing the sum of the predispositions with which the representative is confronted by the number of conversations in which he has been involved to obtain the average predisposition or attitude toward the bill with which he has been confronted. The representative's new predisposition then becomes one that is halfway between his old one and the

²⁵ Ibid., p. 240.

²⁶ Matthews, op. cit., p. 252.

²⁷ Ross, op. cit.




Fig. 7. Representative-leadership interactions.




Fig. 8. An overview of the communication phase.

average one that he has confronted. This influence calculation is based upon research findings of attitude change and conformity in situations of communicated influence in small groups.²⁸

²⁸ See S. C. Goldberg, "Three Situational Determinants of Conformity to Social Norms," *Journal of Abnormal and Social Psychology*, 59 (1954), 325-329; C. I. Hovland and H. A. Pritzker, "Extent of Opinion Change as a Function of Amount of Change Advocated," *Journal*

The outputs of the communication process are thus the new predispositions of those

of Abnormal and Social Psychology, 54 (1957), 257-261; C. I. Hovland, O. J. Harvey, and M. Sherif, op. cit.; S. Fisher and A. Lubin, "Distance as a Determinant of Influence in a Two-Person Serial Interaction Situation," Journal of Abnormal and Social Psychology, 56 (1958), 230-238; P. G. Zimbardo, "Involvement, Communication Discrepancy, and Conformity," Journal of Abnormal and Social Psychology, 60 (1960), 86-94.

TABLE 1. ACTUAL AND SIMULATED VOTING OUTCOMES

Bill	Simulated Voting	% Correct	Actual Voting
HR 12	171-239	84	171-239
(recommittal)			
HR 12	280 - 128	77	288-122
HR 4955	153 - 244	92	181-217
(recommittal)			
HR 4955	382-13	92	378-27
HR 6143	294 - 104	70	287 - 113
S 1576	353-3	94	335 - 18
HR 6196	167-237	81	179 - 224
(recommittal)			
HR 6196	232-168	78	216-182
HR 6518	262-119	82	273 - 109
HR 4955	159-214	90	180-193
(recommittal)			
S 2265	153-209	86	174–188
(recommittal)			
S 2265	241 - 121	76	254-107
m HR~7152	323-100	84	290-130
HR 8316	362-0	87	317 - 43
${ m HR}$ 10222	245-173	90	229-189
HR 6196	238-175	89	211-203
HR 3881	230-172	82	212-189
HR 11377	247 - 172	85	226-185
HR 12175	371-3	82	308-68
HR 11926	221-170	78	218-175
S 3060	148-197	76	107 - 237
(recommittal)			

representatives who receive influence in that phase of the model. It is these new predispositions that determine their votes on the bill in question.

II. THE PERFORMANCE OF THE MODEL

Because this simulation model aggregates the voting choices of each individual representative to obtain roll-call results, the basic evaluation of its performance has been carried out at both the macro and micro levels. The former involves the extent to which the voting outcomes in the simulation approximate the actual voting outcomes in the Eighty-Eighth Congress, and the latter considers the extent to which each individual representative's voting behavior in the Congress is approximated by his voting behavior in the simulation.

Considering, first of all, the macro level or voting outcomes as a whole we present the simulated and actual voting outcomes in Table 1. It can be noted that, in the simulation, the splits in the votes tend to be larger than were the splits in the actual votes. The average

split in the simulated votes is 141 while the actual average split was 109. This difference is explicable in terms of the types of representatives for which the model's performance is below its overall average for individual voting performances. The sources of error will receive more attention in our discussion of the micro level performance of the model. Despite this tendency for the simulation to over-emphasize the splits in the votes, it can be noted that the correct outcomes are obtained by the simulation for all the bills. Using the splits in the simulated and actual votes as raw scores, moreover, we obtain a product-moment coefficient of correlation between the simulated and actual voting outcomes of .97.29 While this suggests a very positive evaluation of the simulation model, the assessment of its performance must be made in the context of a consideration of what kinds of performances are obtained with variations or alternative formulations of the model.

Before turning to this type of assessment, however, the micro level performance of the original model remains to be considered. The percentages of individuals voting the same way in the simulation as they actually voted are presented for each bill in Table 1. The average percentage of individuals correctly simulated across the twenty-one bills is 84. Breaking that figure down for the three different categories of party sponsorship we find that for the four bipartisan bills the average percentage of individual representatives correctly simulated is 89. The percentages obtained for the eleven Democratic Administration bills and the six Republican sponsored recommittal motions are 82 and 85 respectively. The assessment of these differences and all others reported must be made in the context of the amount of variation in results that can be obtained because of the stochastic variation of the communication phase of the model.30

²⁹ If the sum of the yes and no votes are used as raw scores instead of the splits between the yes's and no's on each vote, correlation coefficients become .95 and .96 respectively. It should be noted, however, that because the product-moment correlation coefficient adjusts for the situation in which the range of the values for one variable is higher than that for the other, the coefficient we have obtained slightly overstates the degree of fit between the simulated and actual roll-call voting outcomes.

30 To determine this variation two bills were run ten times each, one being a bill with a large number of representatives entering the communication phase and the other with relatively

These percentages obtained for the three party-sponsorship categories are explicable in terms of the types of individuals for which the simulation performs best. The most significant difference is between Democrats and Republicans. Averaging the percentages across all the bills yields scores of 86 and 79 correctly simulated Democratic and Republican representatives respectively. All of this difference is accounted for by the Democratic Administration-sponsored bills, for representatives in both parties voted correctly in the simulation: an average of 83 percent on the Republicansponsored recommittal motions and an average 85 percent on the four bills with bipartisan support. The simulation thus tends to over-emphasize the cohesiveness of the Republicans on Democratic-sponsored bills despite the attempt to build greater cohesiveness for Democrats than Republicans into the communication phase of the simulation model described above.31 It may be that it is this poorer micro level performance of the simulation for Republican repsentatives that accounts for part of the lower percentage of correctly simulated representatives on Democratic-sponsored bills.

Turning to the regional breakdown of the extent to which individual representatives are correctly simulated, we find that the poorest performance for regions obtained is for the southern representatives, with an average percentage correct across the twenty-one bills of 78. The next lowest percentage correct is for the eastern representatives at 83. The midwestern, mountain and far western representatives are simulated correctly with percentages of 88, 86, and 86 respectively.

It would appear that the simulation model confronts the same difficulty as the Democratic Whip organization, predicting the voting behavior of the Southern Delegation.³² Because of the difficulty of discerning those bills on which the conservative coalition of Republicans and southern Democrats takes shape, we must code the southerners as regular Democrats and thus predispose them in the same manner as the other Democratic representatives, with respect

few. In each case, the amount of variation in the percentage of representatives correctly simulated did not exceed one percent. Thus any difference in percentages that is two percent or greater can be treated as an actual difference.

31 In keeping with previous findings cited in a number of the works noted above, the structure of the communication process provides for more communicative interactions within the majority party

32 See Froman and Ripley, op. cit.

to party affiliation. By do doing, we miss a sizable percentage of them on occasions when they side with Republicans against "liberal legislation" such as bills proposing the expansion of the federal role. It should be noted in addition that it is undoubtedly the incorrect simulating of the voting of some southern representatives that accounts, in part, for the greater average split in the simulated votes as opposed to the actual votes, for the switching over of southerners has the effect of moderating the heavily party-oriented cleavages that account for the larger splits in the simulation.

The slightly lower average percentage correctly obtained for eastern representatives is probably explicable in terms of the traditional liberalism of eastern representatives. Several eastern Republican representatives usually side with Democrats on liberal legislation, and in general, eastern representatives from both parties tend to have more liberal voting records than their colleagues from other parts of the country. Our simulated voting results on the communications regulation bill, HR 8316, illustrate this phenomenon quite clearly. Coding the bill as a bipartisan measure resulted in an average percentage of representatives correctly simulated of 87. Because this bill results in the diminution of the federal role, however, a number of liberal easterners who had voted against the bill ended up for it in the simulation as a result of the bipartisan effect. Thus a below-average percentage of eastern representatives of 84 was obtained. Again, this slightly lower performance for eastern representatives would have the effect of over-emphasizing the voting splits as is the case with the performance on southern representatives.

Looking at the performance of the simulation model for the different representatives in terms of the types of constituencies they represent reveals a range of correctly simulated individual representatives from 86 per cent for representatives with predominantly urban constituencies to 81 per cent for representatives with predominantly rural non-farm constituencies. The representatives with predominantly rural farm constituencies were correctly simulated on an average of 82. These differences are probably a result of the distribution of Republicans and southern Democrats in terms of constituency types. A disproportionate share of non-southern Democrats represent constituencies with a high proportion of urban residence while Republicans and southern Democrats disproportionately represent rural farm and non-farm constituencies.

One interesting constituency-type variation in per cent correctly simulated is for competi-

tive versus non-competitive districts. Representatives from the former were simulated correctly on an average of 33 per cent.³³ While this can be interpreted as evidence of the relatively stronger hold that the parties (the strongest determinant in our model) have over representatives who are less firmly established, the fact that competitive districts are not equally allocated on a regional or party basis confounds the clear interpretation of this result.

Moving to the consideration of a representative categorization that is closely related to the competitiveness of constituencies we can look at the extent to which the voting behavior of representatives with different seniority positions are correctly simulated. The findings from legislative research suggest that representatives with high seniority rankings are less likely to be loyal to their party and are thus far less predictable in terms of their roll-call voting.34 The results of the simulation tend to support this proposition: it yields an average per cent correct figure of 87 for the low-seniority members of the House while the average per cent correct figure obtained for representatives with high seniority standing is 82. Again. this finding must be assessed in the context of possible confounding factors, not the least of which is the fact that southern representatives possess a disproportionate share of the highseniority positions in the House.35

We have seen thus far that the model as originally constituted simulates the voting on federal role issues in the 88th Congress with results that match the outcomes of the actual voting quite closely at both the macro and micro levels. We have, in addition, gained some insights into the extent to which the voting behaviors of different types of representatives are explicable in terms of our theoretical formulation of the voting process. In the final section I turn to a consideration of the validity of my theoretical formulation by examining the extent to which alternative formulations of the simulation model can replicate the results obtained with the original formulation.

- ³³ These percentages are computed for only those twelve bills on which constituency effects are coded.
- ³⁴ See Oliver Garceau and Corrine Silverman, "A Pressure Group and the Pressured: A Case Report," this Review, 48 (1954), 672-691; Truman, op. cit.; Froman, op. cit.
- 25 If this inquiry were directed toward a rigorous examination of such effects as seniority, we could control for confounding effects and operate the model with these controls to obtain these more specific insights into the effects of individual mechanisms.

III. THE VALIDITY OF THE SIMULATION MODEL:
ALTERNATIVE FORMULATIONS

Pool, Abelson, and Popkin have addressed themselves to the problems of evaluating a complex simulation model:

A complex model can predict real-world outcomes and yet be wrong in many details. It may predict accurately because the main effects are correctly represented and yet the model may contain many irrelevances. So one must always question the details of a complex model, even if it passes the test of good prediction.²⁶

Simulation is a modeling strategy that is perhaps ideally suited for the questioning of the details of a model. Assumptions can be changed, and in a matter of minutes the data can be processed on the reformulated model. In this section we turn to a consideration of the details of our simulation model of roll-call voting in the U. S. House of Representatives in order both to examine the validity of the model as it was originally formulated and to test the sensitivity of the determinants or effects pogrammed into the model to represent those processes and propositions that we had deemed to be significant factors in the roll-call behavior of the members of the House.

The Party Effect. There is little doubt that on the American legislative scene, party is the most significant factor in roll-call voting cleavages. Recent quantitive analyses of roll-call voting in the Congress have explored this phenomenon systematically. The Because party is a prominent determinant in our simulation model, appearing as both a predisposing factor and a communications parameter, a systematic assessment of the performance of the model requires the consideration of the extent to which the party effect contributes to that performance

We thus examine, first of all, the performance of a simulation model in which party is the only effect. Maintaining the same coding rules for party sponsorship and omitting all other determinants we obtain the voting results shown in Table 2. The actual results and the results obtained with the original model are also shown for purposes of comparison. Again using the voting splits as raw scores, we obtain a product-

³⁶ Ithiel de Sola Pool, Robert Abelson, and Samuel Popkin, Candidates, Strategies, and Issues: A Computer Simulation of the 1960 and 1964 Presidential Elections (Cambridge: MIT Press, 1964), p. 64.

37 See Turner, op. cit.; MacRae, op. cit.; Truman, op. cit.; and Froman, op. cit.

TABLE 2. THE RESULTS OF THE "JUST PARTY" MODEL

Bill	Original Model	% Correct	Party Model	% Correct	Actual Voting
HR 12 (recommittal)	171–339	84	171–239	84	171–239
HR 2	280-128	77	240 - 170	77	288-122
HR 4955 (recommittal)	153-244	92	163-235	93	181-217
HR 4955	382 - 13	92	399-0	95	378-27
HR 6143	294 - 104	70	237-163	60	287-113
S 1576	353-3	94	357-0	95	335-18
HR 6196 (recommittal)	167 - 237	81	169-235	81	179 - 224
HR 6196	232 - 168	78	232-168	78	216-182
HR 6518	262-119	82	220-163	78	273 - 109
HR 4955 (recommittal)	159-214	90	160-213	90	180-193
S 2265 (recommittal)	153 - 209	86	153-209	86	174-188
S 2265	241 - 121	76	210-152	74	254-107
HR 7152	323-100	84	423-0	69	290-130
HR 8316	362-0	87	362-0	87	317 - 43
HR 10222	245 - 173	90	242 - 176	90	229 - 189
HR 6196	238 - 175	89	237-177	89	211 - 203
HR 3881	230-172	82	235-167	75	212-189
HR 11377	247 - 172	85	245-167	84	226-185
HR 12175	371 - 3	82	374-0	81	308-68
HR 11926	221 - 170	78	0-0	00	218 - 175
S 3060 (recommittal)	148-197	76	148-197	76	107-237

moment coefficient of correlation between the actual voting splits and the "just party" simulated voting splits of .80 as compared with the .97 coefficient obtained with the original model. The micro level performance or average percentage of representatives correctly simulated by the "just party" model is 78 as compared with the 84 per cent obtained with the original model. It is thus clear, on the one hand, that party plays an important role in the performance of the simulation model, but on the other, it is also clear that the remaining effects built into our model are not irrelevant, for the results obtained with only the party effect are not as good as those obtained with the original model at either level.

Another way to assess both the model as a whole and the effect of the party variable is to run the model in its original form without including the party effect. When this is done the performance criteria are markedly similar to those obtained when just party is used to simulate the voting. The voting results obtained with this variation of the model are presented in Table 3 along with the results obtained with the "just party" model and the actual votes for purposes of comparison. The product-moment coefficient of correlation between the actual voting splits and those obtained with party removed from the model is .68, somewhat lower than that obtained with just party as the model. But the average percentage of

representatives correctly simulated is 78, the same figure obtained for the "just party" simulation.

Two types of interpretations suggest themselves from the sensitivity testing of the model with the party effect the subject of our manipulations. The relatively similar performance of the model with just party and without party suggests that the original model is somewhat overdetermined in terms of party. The absence of party in the second reformulation of the model is partly compensated because of the extent to which the communications process is structured by a party effect, but the communications is also structured by the preceding predisposition phase of the model. This suggests that there may be a party surrogate in this prior phase that accounts for the similar performances. We examine this possibility below.

The other type of interpretation afforded by manipulation of the party effect relates to the types of issues processed in the model. Included in Table 3 along with the juxtaposed voting results of the "just party" and "without party" simulations are the percentages of representatives correctly simulated on each bill. If we examine the three different categories of party sponsorship, bipartisan, Democratic, and Republican, separately, we can determine the extent to which the party effect is significant in each. These are broken down into the party sponsorship categories in Table 4.

TABLE 3. THE RESULTS OF THE "JUST PARTY" AND "WITHOUT PARTY" MODELS

Bill	"Just Party" Model	% Correct	Actual Voting	"Without Party" Model	% Correct
HR 12 (recommittal)	171-239	84	171-239	158-250	84
HR 12	240-170	77	288-122	353-55	78
HR 4955 (recommittal)	163-235	93	181-217	120-175	83
HR 4955	399-0	95	378-27	285-113	70
HR 6143	237-163	€0	287-113	301-96	82
S 1576	357-0	95	335-18	272 - 83	75
HR 6196 (recommittal)	169-235	81	179-224	127-272	75
HR 6196	232-168	78	216-182	257 - 137	76
HR 6518	220-163	78	273 - 109	315-66	80
HR 4955 (recommittal)	160-213	90	180-193	121-243	84
S 2265 (recommittal)	153-209	86	174-188	171-188	88
S 2265	210-152	74	254-107	288-72	75
HR 7152	423-0	69	290-130	165-243	64
HR 8316	362-0	87	317-43	265-97	75
HR 10222	242 - 176	90	229-189	265-149	87
HR 6196	237-177	8 9	211-203	247-164	86
HR 3881	235-167	75	212-189	209-190	85
HR 11377	245-167	84	226-185	255-156	86
HR 12175	374-0	81.	308-68	297-75	79
HR 11926	0-0	00	218-175	224-170	79
S 3060 (recommittal)	148-197	76	107-237	130-213	79

Considering, first of all, the bills coded as bipartisan we obtain an average percentage of correctly simulated representatives of 90 with the "just party" model, slightly better than the 89 per cent obtained over the same bills with the original model. The percentage obtained with the "without party" model is only 75, considerably lower. Similarly, we obtain an average percentage of correctly simulated representatives on the Republican-sponsored recommittal motions of 85 with the "just party" model, the same figure obtained with the original model. The percentage obtained with the "without party" model is 71, again considerably lower.

When we examine the eleven remaining Democratic Administration bills, however, we find that the percentage of correctly simulated representatives is only 70 for the "just party" model as compared with the 82 per cent figure obtained with the original model. The "without party" model, on the other hand, correctly simulates an average of 79 per cent of the representatives on these bills. This reversal in performances between the "party only" and "without party" models suggests some validity for our presupposition about treating recommittal motions as incidents of party conflict rather than mediating the party effect with substantive coding for region and constituency variables as in the case of the Demo-

cratic Administration bills. At a general level, this result tends to validate the inclusion of constituency and regional effects in the model, for these enhance its performance. To assess the inclusions of regional and constituency effects more critically, however we must directly manipulate them with further sensitivity testing of the model.

The Constituency Effect. Investigations of the relationship between the demographic and political characteristics of constituencies and the roll-call behavior of their representatives have been extensive. The findings from these studies all point in the direction of such a

TABLE 4. COMPARISON OF THE ORIGINAL "JUST PARTY," AND "WITHOUT PARTY" MODELS ON THREE PARTY SPONSORSHIP CATEGORIES

	Criginal Model % Correct	"Just Party" Model % Correct	"Without Party" Model % Correct
Bipartisan Bills	89	90	75
Republican Sponsorship	85	85	71
Democratic Sponsorship	82	70	79

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Bill	Original Model	% Correct	Without Constituency	% Correct	Actual Voting
HR 12 (recommittal)	171–239	84	170-239	84	171-239
HR 12	280-128	77	242-168	77	288-122
HR 4955 (recommittal)	153 - 244	92	149-249	91	181-217
HR 4955	382-13	92	380-17	91	378-27
HR 6143	294-104	70	169-230	66	287-113
S 1576	353 - 3	94	352-4	94	33518
HR 6196 (recommittal)	167 - 237	81	168 - 236	81	179 - 224
HR 6196	232 - 168	78	233-166	78	216-182
HR 6518	262-119	82	224 - 159	79	273-109
HR 4955 (recommittal)	159-214	90	158-215	90	180-193
S 2265 (recommittal)	153 - 209	86	150-212	86	174-188
S 2265	241-121	76	213-149	74	254-107
HR 7152	323-100	84	297-126	88	290-130
HR 8316	362-0	87	362-0	87	317-43
HR 10222	245 - 173	90	243-175	90	229 - 189
HR 6196	238 - 175	89	238-176	88	211-203
HR 11377	230-172	82	236-166	76	212-189
HR 12175	247 - 172	85	245-167	84	226-185
HR 12175	371-3	82	351-20	83	308-68
HR 11926	221 - 170	78	317-0	42	218-175
S 3060 (recommittal)	148–197	76	147-198	76	107-237

relationship.38 While these investigations have not systematically explored the constituency effect from issue to issue in terms of the extent to which different types of issues result in different degrees of constituency loyalty on the part of representatives, Miller and Stokes' recent investigation explored the effect in this manner.39 They found, among other things, that representatives tend to heed the desires they perceive their constituents to have as well as the ones they actually do have, particularly on domestic welfare legislation. The close similarity between the welfare legislation included in the Stokes and Miller study and our bills dealing with the federal role is the basis upon which the decision to code constituency effects was made.

In order to examine the validity of constituency coding in general and the specific coding

²⁸ Turner, op. cit.; Duncan MacRae "The Relation Between Roll-Call Votes and Constituencies in the Massachusetts House of Representatives," this Review, 46 (1952), 1046-1055; MacRae, op. cit., 1958; J. Roland Pennock "Party and Constituency in Postwar Agricultural Price Support Legislation," Journal of Politics, 18 (1956), 167-210; Froman, op. cit.

³⁹ Warren Miller and Donald Stokes "Constituency Influence in Congress," this Review, 57 (1963), 45-56.

decisions made in particular, I have run the model on the twenty-one bills without the constituency coding that had been included in the original run. The voting results obtained with this alternative formulation of the model are presented in Table 5 along with the actual voting results and the voting results obtained with the original model for purposes of comparison. The coefficient of correlation between the actual splits and those resulting from the "without constituency" simulation is .80 as compared with the .97 coefficient obtained between the original model and the actual votes.40 It would appear that the constituency effect is not an irrelevant part of the simulation model.

To examine the extent to which the specific constituency coding decisions were well advised, we consider the micro level performance of the model without the constituency coding. The average percentage of representatives correctly simulated on the twelve bills for which constituency was coded is 78 for the run with the "without constituency" model. This

⁴⁰ When we compute the correlation between the actual splits and the "without constituency" splits across only the twelve bills on which constituency was originally coded we obtain a coefficient of .78 as compared with a .95 obtained with the original model for the same bills.

TABLE 6. THE RESULTS OF THE "WITHOUT REGION" MODEL

Bill	Original Model	% Correct	Without Region	% Correct	Actual Voting
HR 12 (recommittal)	171-239	84	171–139	84	171-239
HR 12	280-128	77	287-123	75	288-122
HR 4955 (recommittal)	153 - 244	92	165-233	92	181-217
HR 4955	382-13	92	385-13	92	378-27
HR 6143	294-104.	80	338-61	70	287-113
S 1576	353-3	94	354-3	94	335-18
HR 6196 (recommittal)	167-237	81	168-236	81	179 - 224
HR 6196	232-168	78	232 - 167	78	216-182
HR 6518	262-119	82	252 - 129	81	273-109
HR 4955 (recommittal)	159-214;	90	159 - 213	90	180-193
S 2265 (recommittal)	153-209	86	154-208	86	174-188
S 2265	241-121	76	239-121	77	254-107´
HR 7152	323-100	84	423-0	70	290-130
HR 8316	362-0	87	265 - 97	75	317 - 43
HR 10222	245-173	90	244-174	90	229-189
HR 6196	238-175	89	238-176	89	211-203
HR 3881	230-172	82	244-158	78	212 - 189
HR 11377	247-172	85	246-166	85	226-185
HR 12175	371-3	82	371-3	82	308-68
HR 11926	221-170	78	225-169	78	218-175
S 3060 (recommittal)	148-197	76	147–198	76	107-237

compares with an average of 85 per cent obtained for those twelve bills with the original model. While this is not conclusive evidence of the validity of the specific coding decisions made for the constituency effects, it argues strongly for that validity. It tends to validate the model as a whole and to support previous findings on the effect of constituency factors on legislative roll-call voting behavior.

The Region Effect. Sectionalism or regional cleavages in congressional voting behavior have been found in many investigations. In our simulation of bills dealing with the federal role, only four were coded as having regional effects. All of these were coded to suggest a negative predisposition on the part of southern representatives.

To test the extent to which my regional coding aided in the performance of the simulation model we processed the twenty-one bills without the regional coding. The voting results obtained with this "without region" model are presented in Table 6 along with the actual results and those obtained with the original

⁴¹ See for example H. G. Roach "Sectionalism in Congress (1870-1890)," this Review, 19 (1925), 500-526; G. Grassmuck, Sectional Biases in Congress on Foreign Policy (Baltimore: John Hopkins Press, 1951); V. O. Key, Southern Politics (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1949).

model for purposes of comparison. The productmoment coefficient of correlation between the splits on the actual bills and those resulted from the "without region" simulation is .89 as compared with the .97 coefficient obtained between the actual voting splits and those resulting from the original simulation model.⁴² The regional coding thus substantially improves the performance of the simulation model even though only four bills are coded as subject to a regional effect.

To test the extent to which my specific regional coding was well informed, we examine the micro level performance of the "without region" model. The average percentage of representatives correctly simulated with this variation of our original model is 77 as compared with an average of 83 correctly simulated with the original model for the four bills on which region effects were coded. We thus have partial validation of the regional coding decisions. It would appear that the substantive provisions of the simulation model (including both constituency and regional effects) is an important part of the legislative process involved

⁴² When we compute the correlation between the actual splits and the "without region" splits for only the four bills on which region was originally coded we obtain a coefficient of .62 as compared with a .99 obtained with the original model for the same bills.

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TABLE 7. THE RESULTS OF THE "WITHOUT MEMORY" MODEL

Bill	Original Model	% Correct	Without Memory	% Correct	Actual Voting
HR 12 (recommittal)	171-239	84	171-239	84	171-239
HR 12	280-128	77	336 - 72	71	288-122
HR 4955 (recommittal)	153 - 244	92	153 - 249	93	181-217
HR 4955	382-13	92	399-0	95	378-27
HR 6143	294-104	70	314-80	73	287-113
S 1576	353-3	94	357-0	95	335-18
HR 6196 (recommittal)	167-237	81	169 - 235	81	179-224
HR 6196	232-168	78	232-168	78	216-182
HR 6518	262 - 119	82	280-102	81	273-109
HR 4955 (recommittal)	159 - 214	90	160-213	90	180-193
S 2265 (recommittal)	153-209	86	166 - 196	83	174-188
S 2265	241-121	76	271 - 89	71	254-107
HR 7152	323-100	84	322-100	84	290-130
HR 8316	362-0	87	362-0	87	317-43
${ m HR} 10222$	245 - 173	90	246-171	90	229 - 189
HR 6196	238 - 175	89	237 - 177	89	211-203
HR 3881	230 - 172	82	172 - 229	7 8	212-189
HR 11377	247 - 172	85	245 - 167	84	226 - 185
HR 12175	371-3	. 82	374-0	81	308-68
HR 11926	221-170	78	226-168	78	218-175
S 3060 (recommittal)	148-197	76	148-197	76	107-237

in roll-call voting. The inclusion of these effects has aided the overall performance of the model at the macro level and provided better individual performance of the model on the bills for which coding makes the substantive provisions relevant.

The Memory Effect. On all but two of the bills, memory is coded in terms of whether the bill proposes an expansion or diminution of the federal role. Each representative thus has his predisposition affected if his past votes on the federal role issue dimension suggest a positive or negative attitude toward the expansion of the federal role. To examine the extent to which memory is an important effect in our model I have run the bills through the model without including the memory effect. The results of the "without memory" simulation are presented in Table 7 along with the actual and original simulation results for purposes of comparison.

Looking at the macro level performance of the "without memory" model, we obtain a product-moment coefficient of correlation of .97, the same coefficient obtained with the original model. The lack of contribution of memory can be further highlighted by viewing the results obtained when just memory is used to simulate the votes. The product-moment coefficient of correlation obtained between the actual voting splits and those resulting from the "just memory" simulation is only .21. These findings suggest that the memory effect does not aid in the macro level performance of the simulation model. The presence of the memory effect may, however, account for the findings obtained when the party effect was manipulated. When we correlate the splits resulting from the "just party" simulation with those resulting from the "just memory" simulation we obtain a coefficient of .62. This suggests that memory tends to coincide to some extent with party membership and is thus somewhat of a party surrogate which may explain part of the similarity of the results obtained with the "just party" and "without party" simulations.

Despite the small role that memory has been shown to have in the macro level performance of the simulation model, the micro level performance of the "without memory" simulation model indicates that the memory effect is not entirely superfluous. The average percentage of representatives correctly simulated by the "without memory" model is 82 as compared with the 84 per cent figure obtained when memory is included. The memory effect is thus a slight aid in the micro level performance of the model.

Of some interest is the performance of the memory effect on the different types of bills. Comparing the average percentage of correctly simulated representatives obtained with the "without memory" model and the original

TABLE 8. THE RESULTS OF THE "WITHOUT COMMUNICATIONS" MODEL

Bill	Original Model	% Correct	Without Communication	% Correct	Actual Voting
HR 12 (recommittal)	171-239	84	173-222	84	171–239
HR 12	280-128	77	254-119	72	288-122
HR 4955 (recommittal)	153-244	92	155-233	90	181-217
HR 4955	382 - 13	92	303-34	74	378-27
HR 6143	294-104	70	188-133	62	287-113
S 1576	353-3	94	278-13	77	335-18
HR 6196 (recommittal)	167 - 237	81	170 - 221	79	179 - 224
HR 6196	232-168	78	220 - 168	78	216-182
HR 6518	262-119	82	219-120	76	273-109
HR 4955 (recommittal)	159-214	90	158-200	88	180-193
S 2265 (recommittal)	153-209	86	164-169	84	174-188
S 2265	241-121	76	207-121	72	254-107
HR 7152	323-100	84	298-100	83	290-130
HR 8316	36 2- 0	87	265-96	68	317-43
HR 10222	245 - 173	90	237-170	89	229-189
HR 6196	238-175	89	226 - 176	87	211-203
HR 3881	230-172	82	169-177	77	212-189
HR 11377	247 - 172	85	228 - 168	85	226 - 185
HR 12175	371-3	82	285-25	74	308-68
HR 11926	221-170	78	214-167	77	218-175
S 3060 (recommittal)	148-197	76	147–183	76	107-237

model for the four bipartisan bills yields the same figure of 89. Similarly, the "without memory" model results in the same average percentage of representatives correctly simulated across the six Republican sponsored recommittal motions as in the original model, 85. It is on the Democratic Administration bills that memory appears to aid the micro level performance of the model.

While the original model correctly simulated the voting behavior of 82 per cent of the representatives on the Democratic Administration bills, the "without memory" model correctly simulated only 79 per cent of the representatives on these bills. Because it is these bills that deal with the substantive issues involved in legislation, the memory effect probably conveys the impact of ideological postures that have been found to have some effect on legislative roll-call behavior. In the case of recommittal motions and bipartisan bills, the content of the bill that tends to evoke ideological effects is obfuscated by procedural concerns and the bipartisan effect respectively.

The Communication Effect. We turn finally to a consideration of the contribution made by the communications phase of the model. Again this assessment is made by testing the sensitivity of the effect by removing it. The voting

results obtained when the model is run without the communications process are presented in Table 8 along with the actual and original simulation model voting results for purposes of comparison. Examining, first of all, the macro level performance of this alternative formulation of the model we obtain a product-moment coefficient of correlation between the actual voting splits and those resulting from the "without communications" simulations of .88 as compared with the .97 coefficient obtained between the actual and original model voting splits.

The micro level performance of the model is also enhanced by the communication process. The average percentage of representatives correctly simulated by the "without communications" simulation model is 78 as compared with the 84 per cent correctly simulated by the original model. We thus have a basis for believing that the communications process is not an irrelevant part of our overall model.

Several important questions can be raised with respect to internal aspects of the communications phase of the model. In constructing the process I found that changes in key mechanisms such as the salience of the party effect resulted in a dimunition of the performance of the model as a whole. Changes in the average number of communications of representatives had similar effects on the performance of the model as a whole. A thorough

⁴⁸ See footnote 2 above.

examination of the sensitivity of all the important effects in the communication process has not been conducted as yet, but the indications derived from the examinations thus far suggest that the communications phase of this model is quite sensitive to changes in parameters and mechanisms.

IV. CONCLUSION

The fact that every alternative formulation of the model undertaken thus far has decreased some aspect of the model's performance lends evidence in support of the contention that the relatively good match obtained between the actual roll-call voting in the House on federal role issues and in our simulation is not a result of a number of errors or ill-advised hypotheses that cancel each other out to make the model right for the wrong reasons. What is especially significant is the fact that the theoretical model based upon propositions from legislative and face-to-face group research can be used to simulate the roll-call voting on an issue area in two sessions of the House with good performances at the macro and micro levels.

The results of the research just reported can be assessed from various perspectives. From the point of view of legislative behavior research, the performance of the model lends support to the propositions from legislative research upon which it is based. In addition, the model represents, in itself, a theoretical formalization of legislative voting behavior. To the extent that it was validated with the sensitivity testing reported in this chapter, that formalization has been shown to perform in a manner that suggests acceptance of the conceptualizations which comprise it.

In terms of the manner in which theories can be evaluated, this theoretical model has performed well on the basis of a prediction criterion. In addition, the ability of the model to simulate legislative voting effectively with few mechanisms grouped into its predisposition and communication phases suggests a positive evaluation in terms of a theoretical organizing criterion discussed in a recent article. To the extent to which the model performs similarly on other types of issues and for other sessions of the House, its organizing power will be further enhanced. The manipul-

⁴⁴ K. W. Deutsch, J. D. Singer, and K. Smith. "The Organizing Efficiency of Theories," *American Behavioral Scientist*, 9 (1965), 30-33.

⁴⁵ For a more extensive treatment of the model which includes an assessment of its performance on foreign affairs legislation, see Cleo H. Cherryholmes and Michael J. Shapiro Representatives and

ability of the model has been demonstrated, in part, by the sensitivity testing reported in this paper. While it cannot be increased without sacrificing organizing power, its potential has not been exhausted here.

The performance of the model can also be assessed in terms of its successful simulation of a large decision-making body. It can be noted that the evaluation of the performance of processes in large groups depends upon the ability to discern outputs from the group processes in order to compare the functional equivalence of outputs in the simulation and thereby obtain evaluation criteria. The public character of roll-call voting provides an easily obtained quantifiable output and thus renders legislatures susceptible to the simulation mode of investigation. The success of this simulation is encouraging from the point of view of its implications for the application of the simulation technique to the study of social and political processes in large groups as well as its illumination of the determinants of the legislative process involved in the roll-call voting decisions of representatives.

Finally, a number of directions in which investigation of the model might proceed suggest themselves. In terms of the predisposition phase of the model, we could investigate the extent to which the inclusion of personal characteristics of representatives as predisposing effects would affect the simulation of roll-call votes. The communications phase of the model could be reformulated in two ways. First, a number of parameters could be added to affect conversation probabilities, and second, the communication process could be cycled to allow for a diffusion of influence whereby those whose predispositions have been changed as a result of interactions with colleagues could interact with other colleagues as influencers on the basis of their newly acquired predispositions.

What is perhaps most significant from the point of view of future research possibilities with the model is the relative similarity of state legislatures of the Congress. In order to develop our model to the point where it simulates legislative voting in a broader sense, we hope to employ it in simulations of roll-call voting in state legislatures as well as in several other sessions of the U.S. House of Representatives. In this way we hope to enhance the organizing power of a theoretical formulation, the potential of which we have begun to explore in the research reported here.

Roll-Calls: A Computer Simulation of Voting in the Eighty-Eighth Congress (Indianapolis, Indiana: Bobbs-Merrill, 1968), forthcoming.

ORGANIZATION THEORY AND THE EXPLANATION OF IMPORTANT CHARACTERISTICS OF CONGRESS*

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By and large the Congress of the United States has been studied on its own terms, as a somewhat unique political institution. Studies of Congress are usually considered to be important simply because they shed light on an important institution in the American political system. It is true, of course, that Congress is an important policy-making body and does deserve study for that reason. But there is no reason why substantive importance cannot be combined with "importance" in another sense. It is also important, for example, to develop theory within any discipline which will help explain the phenomena under study. Trivial substantive problems can be made interesting because of the theory which they suggest. And because a problem may already be substantively important does not mean that it cannot be made even more significant by theoretical development.

As a result of this substantive focus, research on Congress has produced a very rich body of descriptive data on various components of the institution, including its members and leadership, group structure, committees, party systems, organization, and rules and procedures. Studies have also provided generalizations concerning such things as the decentralized decision-making of Congress and the effects of the seniority rule on the distribution of power within the House and Senate. These descriptive data and generalizations may serve as the content to be explained within the context of a theory. As yet there has been very little effort at theory construction concerning Congress. The data are there—their organization and explication remain.

I. CHARACTERISTICS OF CONGRESS

Although it is difficult to abstract the most important characteristics of Congress which have emerged from these studies, most close observers would agree that the following thirteen accurately reflect some of the more

* I wish to thank James G. March and Deane E. Neubauer for helpful comments on earlier versions of this paper.

interesting and useful things which may be said about Congress.¹

I. Impact on Public Policy

1. Congress is an important political decision-making body which, unlike legislatures in many other countries, makes a significant, independent contribution to public policy.

II. Organization

- 2. Decision-making in Congress is highly decentralized, with power widely dispersed among committees, subcomittees, and the formal and party leadership.
- 3. Each body has a well-developed system of formal and impersonal rules and procedures, with the rules of the House of Representatives more formal and impersonal than those of the Senate.

III. Members

- 4. Members in each body may make large individual contributions to public policy, although some members are more salient than others.
- 5. Members of each house have a high commitment and loyalty to the Congress.

IV. Group Structure

- 6. There are many subgroups within each body, with the House having a larger number than the Senate.
- 7. There is a highly developed specialization of labor and specificity of roles, and more so in the House than the Senate.
- 8. Group cohesion in each body is relatively low.
- 9. The existence of an active group structure has important consequences for decision-making and public policy.
- ¹ Since the literature is so voluminous, and since most of the findings have been replicated and are not controversial, I will not attempt to cite specific references in each instance. For a general bibliography see the latest texts on Congress, William J. Keefe and Morris S. Ogul, The American Legislative Process: Congress and the States (Englewood Cliffs: Frentice-Hall, 1964), and Malcolm E. Jewell and Samuel C. Patterson, The Legislative Process in the United States (New York: Random House, 1966).

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V. Leadership

10. Each house has a relatively elaborate and complex leadership structure.

11. Authority of leadership is relatively low.

VI. Processes

12. Internal communication within each body is relatively elaborate and complex.

13. A prevalent form of decision-making within each body is bargaining.

These thirteen generalizations about Congress are obviously not meant to be exhaustive of those which could be made in each category (as well as in additional categories). They are, however, among the more important propositions which aid in the understanding of the congressional process. As far as I know none are contradicted by any study, and most are supported extensively in the literature. These thirteen propositions, then, will be taken as "given," as true of Congress, and as important enough to be "explained."

II. POSSIBLE EXPLANATORY THEORIES

There are, essentially, two ways in which one may attempt to link up emprireal findings with observations about their significance. One may discuss the consequences of the findings, what happens because the findings are true; or one may attempt to show why the findings are true, what explains the findings. The first is called functional analysis, the latter causal analysis.

Occasionally, but unfortunately only occasionally, the rich descriptive data on specific aspects of Congress and the generalizations relating one aspect to another are related further to possible consequences which the data being explored may have on public policy, careers of members, relations with the executive branch, or the American political system in general. Although most researchers on Congress are aware of the importance of demonstrating the effects which the institutional characteristics or processes which they describe have on important outcomes, the difficulty in collecting reliable data on such consequences often prohibits more than speculation.

More rare still are studies which explain why the descriptions or patterns which are observed are what they are. With relative infrequency historical references are made as to the genesis of certain features of Congress, but little or no causal analysis is attempted. At best one finds ad hoc explanations of special features of Congress, but such explanations are normally intrinsic to the organization itself

and therefore difficult to validate in terms of general laws. Comparative data are necessary for this purpose. For example, to explain why power in Congress is decentralized it is not sufficient to point to the existence of the committee system. Multiple units are undoubtedly necessary to a dispersal of power, but not a sufficient condition for it. Are, for example, all organizations with committees decentralized? Undoubtedly not. But raising the general question forces one to think in a context larger than Congress itself, that is, on a comparative basis.

It is commonly accepted in philosophy of science that one achieves explanation of a phenomenon when that phenomenon can be subsumed under a general law. Thus, that Congress has a seniority system might be deduced from the following argument: All organizations with extensive divisions of labor have seniority systems; Congress is an organization with an extensive division of labor; therefore... (The soundness of this particular argument is not at issue here, it is the form of explanatory propositions with which this paragraph is concerned.)

What is necessary, then, in order to "explain" certain salient features of Congress is to subsume the specific findings under a set of more general hypotheses or laws (whether the former or the latter will affect the credibility of the explanation). But to do so requires moving away from the view that Congress is a unique institution and treating it, instead, as an instance of a more general category. What the more general category is will affect the terms of the theory as well as other matters. For example, Congress may be considered as an example of a legislature. If we had a theory of legislatures, then many of the propositions about Congress could be tested within that theory and many of the characteristics of Congress could be explained by the laws or hypotheses of that theory. We do not, however, have such a theory, although the development of one would certainly be useful. We do have the beginnings of general theory in the literature on organizations and it is not unrealistic, in order to use that theory, to label Congress an instance or an example of a formal organization.

If we view Congress as a formal organization, and use the general propositions which have been stated, with more or less validity, about formal organizations, we will be able to avoid strictly ad hoc interpretations of Congressional phenomena and, in their place, substitute a somewhat organized and consistent set of empirical generalizations which have

been found to be true of other formal organizations. Such propositions, used in explanation, may be quite powerful and parsimonious and aid immeasurably in our understanding of why Congress is as it is. Dealing with Congress at this theoretical level may also have a number of other payoffs. If we are able to subsume important findings about a political institution under some general laws such an effort would provide significant clues as to what might be involved in attempts to change or reform various features of that organization. When one attempts to make changes in the absence of knowledge about causes, he is often "whistling in the wind," a constant source of irritation by the way to those who, at an intuitive level, are knowledgeable about Congress and who must deal with reform proposals by those who are

What follows, then, is an effort to explain the thirteen general characteristics of Congress concerning public policy, organization, members, group structure, leadership and processes, by subsuming these characteristics under general statements which have been drawn from organizations other than Congress. It is in this sense that Congress will be treated as a formal organization, subject to the same "laws" as other organizations, and unique only in the sense that there is only one Congress of the United States although there are many formal organizations.

The major source of these propositions is an article by Stanley Udy, Jr., which is an effort to subsume the extant literature on comparative organizations by the formulation of somewhat abstract generalizations.2 Udy's definitions will be found in his article, along with the bibliographic references supporting the propositions. In several cases the propositions have been rephrased for clarity, consistency, and relevance. It is to be emphasized, however, that these propositions are designed to encompass organizations in general and that data from legislative bodies had no part in their formulation. The process in which we are engaged in this paper, then, may be described in two ways: (1) an exploration of "goodness of fit" of propositions in one literature to the findings in another literature, and (2) an attempt to

² Stanley H. Udy, Jr., "The Comparative Analysis of Organizations," in James G. March (ed.), *Handbook of Organizations* (Chicago: Rand McNally, 1965), pp. 678-709. Proposition seven comes from James G. March and Herbert A. Simon, *Organizations* (New York: Wiley, 1958), p. 130.

organize a number of descriptive statements about Congress around a set of explanatory propositions.

III. EXPLANATION OF MAJOR FINDINGS ON CONGRESS

The propositions about organizations from Udy and March and Simon may be placed in one of two categories, depending upon the reference of the independent variable: (a) propositions in which the environment of the organization is the independent variable, and (b) propositions in which either the organization itself or its membership is the independent variable. We will first consider three propositions which specify the environment or social setting as the independent variable. These three propositions help to explain seven of the descriptive statements about Congress enumerated at the beginning of this paper. The numbers in parentheses following each proposition refer to the descriptive statements (see above) being subsumed. We will then proceed to discuss four propositions in which organizational factors are the independent variables.

Environmental Determinants

1a. The more highly differentiated the social setting, the more salient the organization itself.³
(1)

Since outcomes of legislatures are public policies, this proposition asserts that although any setting undoubtedly affects an organization's output, the more differentiated and less unitary the setting the greater will be the effects of the organization itself in determining the organization's outcomes.

Applying this general proposition to Congress, it has often been suggested that Congress does not simply ratify the requests from its environment (including requests from the executive, interest groups, public opinion, political parties, etc.), but that the organization itself has a major impact on matters of public policy. It is even suggested that the American Congress is probably more powerful vis-à-vis the executive than are most other national legislatures. One explanation of this

³ This part of proposition one is actually a deduction from two others: The more highly differentiated . . . the social setting, the less salient it will be; The less salient the social setting . . . , the more salient the organization itself; therefore By "differentiated" is meant dispersed, heterogeneous, plural, non-unitary. By "salient" is meant important as an influence on the output of the organization.

independence, as this first proposition suggests, is that the United States Congress may be classed with those formal organizations which face a relatively more differentiated environment. The social setting of the British Parliament, for example, is a good deal less highly differentiated given the fact that the diversity of interests which exist are already aggregated in a strong, cohesive, majority party which presents the bulk of requests. In Britain, of course, Parliament is not a highly salient political institution in terms of its independent impact on public policy. This observation may lead to a general hypothesis about legislatures: the independent influence which a legislature exerts will vary inversely with the centralization of other pressures. The French Assembly under the Fourth Republic could have a greater impact on public policy than the French Assembly in the Fifth Republic. In the former centralization of pressure was rather weak; in the latter it is relatively strong.

1b. The more highly differentiated the social setting, the more decentralized the decisional apparatus, the greater the amount of internal communication and group interaction, and the greater the expectation of high commitment of members.⁴ (2, 12, and 5)

Part b of this proposition asserts that not only will a diffuse and non-unitary environment make the organization more important as a determiner of its own decisions, but such an environment will also affect how the body is organized and how its members behave. An organization which faces a more unitary environment will be less likely to have an elaborate decentralized decision-making structure. It will also have less internal communication and less commitment of its members to the organization (which may, incidentally, also help to explain why a more centralized decision-structure is necessary).

The fact that Congress is subjected to a wide breadth and diffuseness of external pressures is documented without contradiction in the literature on Congress as well as in the relevant literatures on interest groups, political parties, public opinion, and public administration. The literature, of course, also supports the findings that Congress is highly decentralized, has a large amount of internal communication and

⁴ These three dependent variables are positively associated with what Udy calls "breadth and diffuseness of external pressure." I take "differentiated social setting" and "breadth and diffuseness of external pressure" to be synonymous.

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interaction, and a high commitment of members to the organization.⁵

It is also interesting to observe that propositions 1a. and 1b. are probably mutually reinforcing. That is, an organization which has an important independent influence on its own decisions is also an organization where one would expect the commitment of members to be high. Similarly, an organization where commitment of its members is low is much more likely to be hierarchically organized (in order to force compliance) than an organization where commitment is high.

The amount of differentiation in the social setting, then, affects four important variables, some of which also influence (or at least are consistent with) the others.

2. The . . . greater the amount of pressure exerted on the organization from the social setting, the greater the emphasis on administration. (10)

In this proposition "administration" may mean at least three things: (1) routine tasks, (2) elaborate rules and procedures, and (3) complexity of leadership structure. Although we are primarily interested in the latter, all three meanings of the term are consistent with congressional findings. Proposition 2, then, asserts that organizations will vary in amount of routine tasks, the elaboration of rules and procedures, and leadership complexity and that one of the factors affecting the extent of "administration" is the amount of pressure exerted on the organization from the environment.

Studies of Congress attest to the large amount of outside pressure which is exerted on its members (from interest groups, constituents, executive agencies, party leaders, etc.) and also to the large amount of time which is spent by Congressmen and Senators on routine tasks (answering the mail, going to meetings, "making a record," etc.), the rather elaborate rules and procedures in both bodies, and the relatively complicated leadership structure. As is suggested by the general proposition, the two sets of factors, amount of pressure and amount of administration, are related in organizations other than Congress as well.

- ⁵ For discussions and bibliography see Keefe and Ogul, op. cit.; and Jewell and Patterson, op. cit.
- ⁶ For example, see Robert L. Peabody, "Party Leadership Change in the United States House of Representatives," this Review, 61 (September, 1967), Randall B. Ripley, "The Party Whip Organizations in the United States House of Repre-

Another way to state this proposition is in terms of work overload. Congressmen and Senators are literally deluged with requests, information, and "pressure." The three administrative responses of routine, rules, and role structure are efforts to cope with this overload.

3. The greater the degree of conflict with the social setting, the greater the amount of authority exercised at all levels, and the more cohesive the group structure. (11, 8)

Authority exercised by leaders in Congress is relatively small. Committee chairmen, the Speaker, the Majority and Minority Leaders, etc., are not able to command support although they do bargain for it. The literature suggests that leaders do have rewards and punishments to dispense, but all agree that the size of these resources is relatively small. Similarly, although the group structure in Congress is important and extensive it is not cohesive.⁷

These features follow from the independent variable in the above proposition, that is, Congress as an organization is not in conflict with the social setting. Rather, one would more accurately describe the relationship as being in league with the social setting. This comes about in two ways. First, Congressmen and Senators have constituents to court and care for, and they in fact spend an enormous amount of time doing just that. Estimates of time spent on constituency affairs range as high as ninety percent. Congressmen and Senators may, in fact, be in conflict with certain segments of the population, but not a majority of their own constituents (at least not publicly).

Second, it has been pointed out numerous times that although in some senses the executive branch and Congress are in conflict, in most matters legislators work hand in glove

sentatives," this Review, 58 (September, 1964), 561-576; Lewis A. Froman, Jr. and Randall B. Ripley, "Conditions for Party Leadership: The Case of the House Democrats," this Review, 59 (March, 1965), 52-63, and Lewis A. Froman, Jr., The Congressional Process: Strategies, Rules, and Procedures (Boston: Little, Brown, 1967).

⁷ Lewis A. Froman, Jr., Congressmen and Their Constituencies (Chicago: Rand McNally, 1963); David B. Truman, The Congressional Party (New York: Wiley, 1959); Alan Fiellin, "The Functions of Informal Groups: A State Delegation," in Robert L. Peabody and Nelson W. Polsby (eds.), New Perspectives on the House of Representatives (Chicago: Rand McNally, 1963), pp. 59-78; and John H. Kessel, "The Washington Congressional Delegation," Midwest Journal of Political Science, 8 (Feb., 1964), 1-21.

with the administrative departments which they oversee. Of course, the amount of cooperation undoubtedly varies in the House and Senate from committee to committee, but by and large relations with executive agencies are cordial and friendly, not hostile.

Another aspect of these same phenomena of lack of strong authority and low cohesion is the fact that Congress exhibits a good deal of intraorganizational conflict, not only between the parties but within parties as well. It would also be expected that this would be true of other organizations which have non-conflictual environmental relations, a fact which might suggest that relationships between organizational variables in Congress might also be generalizable to other organizations.⁸

These three environmental factors, extent of differentiation, amount of pressure, and degree of conflict help to explain a wide range of congressional phenomena in particular (statements 1, 2, 5, 8, 10, 11, and 12 in the list at the beginning of this paper), and organizational phenomena in general.

Organizational Determinants

In the previous three propositions the environment or social setting has been the major independent variable. In this section we well consider propositions in which the independent variable is intra-organizational.

4. The more permanent the organization, the lower its turnover rate, and the less mechanized the technology, the higher the salience of its group structure. (9)

One of the features of Congress which has intrigued several recent writers on Congress is the important role which informal groups and group norms have in affecting the way in which Congressmen do their work. It has long been

- ⁸ See, for example, Samuel P. Huntington, *The Common Defense* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1961), which draws explicit parallels between Congressional processes and decision-making in the Pentagon.
- ° See Richard F. Fenno, Jr., "The House Appropriations Committee as a Political System: The Problem of Integration," this Review, 56 (June, 1962), 310-324; Donald R. Matthews, U. S. Senators and Their World (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1960), especially Chapters 1 through 5; Alan Fiellin, "The Functions of Informal Groups: A State Delegation," in Peabody and Polsby (eds.), op. cit., pp. 59-78, and John F. Manley, "The House Committee on Ways and Means: Conflict Management in a Congressional Committee," this Review, 59 (December, 1965), 927-939.

known, since Woodrow Wilson's Congressional Government,10 that committees and subcommittees play an all but overwhelming role in Congressional deliberations. But not only are these more formal groups now recognized as important cogs in the decision-making apparatus, but informal groups such as state delegations, voluntary clubs such as the Democratic Study Group in the House, informal groups of individuals within committees and subcommittees, and even larger groups such as the "conservative coalition," are being given increasingly more attention. Both the House and the Senate have a large number of informal groups as well as formal ones.

Causal proposition 4 asserts that the permanence of an organization, its relatively low turnover, and an unmechanized technology help to produce in organizations generally a highly salient group structure. Congress is certainly a permanent organization. Less well known, however, is the fact that turnover from Congress to Congress is relatively low, averaging about fifteen percent in the House of Representatives every two years.11 That is, approximately eighty-five percent of all Congressmen remain in Congress from one election to the next. The turnover in leadership positions. of course, is even smaller. In addition Congress is noted for its resistance to mechanization. Even such simple things as the installation of electric voting devices have failed to attract much enthusiasm among Congressmen and Senators. Most members of Congress pick up their information about what is going on as a result of talking with others. Televising the proceedings in each chamber, with closed-circuit outlets in each office would certainly be an aid to the members in determining when their presence on the floor might be desired. Rather than this, however, reliance is placed on word of mouth, and such low mechanization items as the telephone.

In addition to the high salience of the group structure, or more likely as a consequence of it, a number of informal norms have developed

¹⁰ (New York, Meridian Books, 1956.) This book was first published in 1885.

¹¹ See Samuel P. Huntington, "Congressional Responses to the Twentieth Century," in David B. Truman (ed.), The Congress and America's Future (Englewood Cliffs: Prentice-Hall, 1965); Nelson W. Polsby, "The Institutionalization of the House of Representatives," paper delivered at the 1966 Annual Meeting of the American Political Science Association, and Lewis A. Froman, Jr., The Congressional Process, op. cit., Chapter 1.

which help to protect the members and preserve stability. In a body in which members will be in contact with one another over long periods of time, and in which the technology of the organization is almost entirely social, it is not surprising to find that informal ways of doing things grow up which help to avoid serious threats to the stability and functioning of the organization. The seniority rule, senatorial courtesy, restrained debate, and even the socalled "Senate type," are undoubtedly a product of this. No issue is worth the destruction of the institution-members will have to deal with other members over a wide range of issues and over long periods of time. Legislators are, in effect, socialized into rules which specify that one must not jeopardize his ability to play future games by seriously discombobulating other members.

5. The greater the need for technical expertise, the more salient the membership. (4)

Not only is Congress as an organization highly salient (essentially because of its highly differentiated environment), and groups within Congress important (causal proposition 4), but its members may also become significant figures in the development of public policy. Undoubtedly, as this proposition suggests, part of the reason why this is true is the importance attached to technical knowledge about very complicated matters of public policy. Such expertise may lie in a substantive field like housing or tax matters, or in parliamentary skills. In any event members may become influential by the amount of information about a topic which they have at their command.¹²

This factor of technical expertise also helps to explain why some Congressmen are more important than others and why periods of apprenticeship are developed within the institution. A number of norms of behavior, in fact, revolve around the learning of technical expertise. Freshman members are expected not to participate extensively in debate, to speak only about what they know, and generally to watch and listen rather than participate. 13 One source of power in the House and Senate is information and, like other technical skills, it must be learned. Additional support is given to this hypothesis by the deference which is paid to those who have information and skills. Wilbur Mills, Chairman of the House Ways and Means Committee, for example, is an enormously respected member of the House, not only because of his formal position but for his

¹² See, for example, Richard F. Fenno, Jr., *The Power of the Purse* (Boston: Little, Brown, 1966).

¹³ See Matthews, op. cit., Chapter 5.

technical competence and parliamentary skill as well.

6. The larger the size of the organization, the greater the number of subgroups in it; hence the greater the overall emphasis on formal and impersonal rules and specificity of roles. (3, 6, 7)

This proposition helps us in two ways. First, both the House and Senate are relatively large organizations. For example, in 1960 more than ninety-five percent of the 4.7 million business organizations in the United States had less than one hundred employees. ¹⁴ Even without counting the large supporting staffs in the House and Senate, each is larger than this figure. We would expect, then, that both houses of Congress would have a relatively large number of subgroups, formal and impersonal rules, and high specificity of roles.

But the fact that membership in the House is over four times that of the Senate would also suggest that the House, as compared with the Senate, would have a larger number of subgroups, a more complex and impersonal set of rules, and greater role specificity. The data indicate that each of these is true. Although the data on social groups is incomplete, in formal group structures the House in the Eighty-ninth Congress (1965-66) had 20 committees and 125 subcommittees, whereas the comparable figures for the Senate were 16 and 99. On the question of role specificity. Representatives are usually members of only one committee whereas Senators normally have three or more committee assignments. In addition fifty-one percent of Senate Democrats have two or more committee or subcommittee chairmanships whereas only twelve percent of House Democrats play such multiple roles.15 The data on rules and procedures is somewhat more difficult to summarize. but existing evidence supports the contention that House rules are more elaborate, formal, and impersonal than are Senate rules.16

7. The extent of use of analytic processes to resolve conflict is a function of the type of organizational conflict involved. The more organizational conflict represents individual rather than intergroup conflict, the greater the use of analytic procedures. The more organizational conflict represents intergroup differences, the greater the use of bargaining. 17 (13)

This proposition simply asserts that bargaining as a method of reaching agreement will be prevalent in organizations which have group conflict as opposed to analytic problem-solving devices in individual conflict.18 The processes of log-rolling, compromise, and side-payments are widely used to reach majority agreement in committees, subcommittees, and on the floor of both the House and Senate.19 The reasons for intergroup conflict in Corgress are, of course, obvious. Disagreements in Congress reflect, generally, the cleavages within society. Such cleavages include ideological differences (e.g., over the role of the federal government), religion, race, region, social class, and many others. Small groups of Congressmen and Senators may think somewhat alike on such matters, but putting together a majority coalition with respect to any single policy which touches on one or more cleavages usually results in extensive bargaining.

These last four intraorganizational propositions, then, account for the remaining six descriptive statements about Congress (3, 4, 6, 7, 9, and 13).

IV. SUMMARY AND IMPLICATIONS

We began this paper with thirteen major propositions about Congress. Each was subsumed under a more general empirical proposition about formal organizations derived independently of any data on Congress but which fit other formal organizations. We can now briefly summarize, diagrammatically, the major relationships.

In each of the thirteen explanations there is no recourse to factors peculiar to Congress (and hence no problem in proving the validity of unique explanations). In addition several additional findings about Congress were cast in a more general language to suggest that they too may not be peculiar to only one formal organization.

A number of implications for further research are suggested by this tentative beginning in wedding organization theory to the study of Congress.

1. Propositions in organization theory may be very helpful in causal analysis of political institutions other than those usually included in public administration. The executive branch is by no means the only location of formal or-

¹⁸ A similar proposition is found in Udy, op. cit.: "The greater the difficulty of group as opposed to individual problems, the greater the pressures toward social interaction" (p. 701).

¹⁹ See Froman, The Congressional Process, op. cit., Chapter 2.

¹⁴ William R. Dill, "Business Organizations," in James G. March, op. cit., p. 1072.

¹⁵ Lewis A. Froman, Jr., The Congressional Process, op. cit.

¹⁶ Ibid., passim.

¹⁷ This proposition is taken from James G. March and Herbert A. Simon, *Organizations* (New York: Wiley, 1958), p. 130.

Fig. 1. Summary relationships.

Independen	t Variables		Congressional Dependent Variables						
Setting	Organizational	Policy	Organization	Members	Group Structure	Leadership	Process		
. highly differ- entiated		1. high salience of Congress	2. high decen- tralization	5. high commit- ment			12. high internal communication		
2. amount of pressure					arren como de apro de aproxece.	10. high complexity of leadership	y		
3. low conflict					8. low cohesion	11. low authority			
	4. high perman low turnover low mechanic	•			9. high salience of group structure				
	5. high technic expertise	al —		4. high salience of members					
	6. size→	3. high formal an impersonal rul		6. large number of subgroups 7. high specificity of roles					
	7. intergroup conflict		***************************************			-	13. bargaining		

ganizations which may have common features. In addition, the general propositions used here by no means exhaust the list of possible factors which may be included in the study of comparative organizations.²⁰

- 2. There is, of course, no reason why such comparative study should be restricted to the search for causes only. It may also be true that certain organizational characteristics may produce similar consequences in terms of the organization's output. None of the possibilities which readily suggest themselves concerning functional analysis have been included here.
- 3. As suggested at the beginning of this paper, proposals for change in such highly visible organizations as the United States Congress must take into account the "realities" of the organization. Included in a list of such realities would have to be some notion of why the organization operates the way it does now in order to make realistic estimates of the likely acceptance and feasibility of changes. To pro-
- ²⁰ Udy's article, op. cit., lists many more general propositions, most of which have to do with technological and psychological relationships.

pose changes without taking into account the causal roots of what is being proposed to be changed is to run the risk of being labeled naive, being ignored, or botching the job. Among other things which the 1946 Legislative Reorganization Act purported to do, for example, was to reduce the number of committees in Congress. In fact, counting subcommittees which have vastly increased in number, the number of subgroups in the organization has increased. The analysis in this paper perhaps sheds some light on why this has been the case.

4. The interplay between organization theory and the study of specific formal organizations like Congress need not be all in the direction of organization theory suggesting the more general propositions which will then be applied to a specific governmental institution. In several places in this paper propositions which developed from the study of Congress were thought to have more general application. For example, a greater degree of technical expertise in any organization might produce a more highly extended apprenticeship system, similar to the one developed in Congress. Or organizations which have low conflict relations

with the environment might be hypothesized to have a higher degree of intra-organizational conflict. Both of these general propositions were suggested as a result of the study of Congress, and the question being asked is whether these propositions might not be true of other organizations.

5. One of the advantages of relying on comparative data as a source of general propositions is that factors which may be peculiar to only a small subset of institutions may turnout, on reflection, to be special cases of more general rules. For example, although a large number of important propositions about Congress were discussed, in no case was it even necessary to refer to the fact that Congressmen

are elected rather than recruited in some other way. Certainly the fact that they are elected has something to do with the low degree of conflict with the social setting which, it is suggested, is characteristic of Congress. But organizations may, for many different and specific reasons arrive at the same or similar degree of low conflict. Election is one way, recruitment through professional schools may be another. Regardless of the specific nature of recruitment, however, the result may be the same, that is, low conflict with the social setting.

Given these advantages of comparative organizational study, it is hoped that this paper will encourage further efforts in the same direction.

IF, AS VERBA SAYS, THE STATE FUNCTIONS AS A RELIGION, WHAT ARE WE TO DO THEN TO SAVE OUR SOULS?*

LEWIS LIPSITZ
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Sidney Verba has argued that the state in modern societies may function as a religion. He is certainly not the only one to adopt such a point of view. But his work is especially notable in that he has strengthened the argument by welding together a theoretical perspective that seems to be derived from structural-functional analysis and a good deal of varied and interesting, though not crystal-clear data. Verba's discussion of the functions of the state is most explicit in his article on the Kennedy assassination—in which he seeks to interpret the many studies of public reaction to the President's death. In this article, appropriately titled "The Kennedy Assassination and the Nature of Political Commitment," Verba attempts to go to essentials. He speaks of the deeper levels of political involvement made evident by the psychological crisis of the assassination. Repeatedly he employs the term "primordial" to describe the character of the underlying political commitment to the nation-state and its symbols in modern societies—the foremost of these symbols in America being the President. But let Verba speak for himself since he is explicit about these matters: first, on the nature of public reactions and the larger meaning of those reactions:

The Kennedy assassination...illustrates the close meshing of the sacred and the secular in the top institutions of a political system. In a society in which the formal ideology is officially secular...the close linkage of religious institutions to the events of the crisis weekend is particularly striking...a larger proportion of the American population responded to the assassination with prayer or attendance at special church services and religious ceremony and imagery abounded in the events of the weekend.²

* So many people have criticized this article that I can only mention a few who have made life particularly hard: Herbert Reid, Donald Searing, Robert Alford and Kenneth Ring. Without their comradely impatience I would have made even more mistakes.

¹ In Bradley S. Greenberg & Edwin B. Parker (eds.), *The Kennedy Assassination and the American Public* (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1965), pp. 348–360.

² Ibid., p. 352.

On the basis of what seems to him the extraordinary depth and the special one of public reaction to the assassination, Verba goes on to offer the following interpretation:

What this suggests is that complete separation of church and state may be possible only in a formal sense. In a secular society where formal religious commitment is weak, the activities of the state may be the nearest one comes to activities of ultimate importance, activities that fundamentally determine matters of death and life and the quality of life. In short, governmental institutions may have significance of a religious kind. The awe inspired by the ultimate power of the church in more pious times may be akin to the awe inspired in modern secular societies by the ultimate power of the state.³

Second, there is Verba's notion of the President's central symbolic role. Drawing on recent studies of political socialization, he argues:

He [the President] is the symbolic referent for the learning of political commitment; children first become aware of political matters through an awareness of and diffuse attachment to the President. As Durkheim pointed out, complex social collectivities... are not easily the direct objects of emotional attachment or commitment. Rather some common symbol... is required... this central symbolic role in a modern secular society is preempted by the political symbols that stand on the highest level for the society—in the American case by the presidency above all.

Verba goes on to say:

The presidential role is thus endowed with a religious quality... Religion and politics in the United States are closely related to each other, and many of the functions religion and religious symbolism perform elsewhere in holding society together are performed in the United States by the central political symbols. If in the new states a passionate political religion replaces an intense traditional religious commitment, in a modern society such as the United States a somewhat less intense political religion assumes some of the functions of a less intense religious system.... 4

3 Thid

⁴ Ibid., p. 353. Robert Bellah has recently put forward an argument for the existence of what he calls a "civil religion" in the United States.

All of this is profoundly interesting and provocative, but immediately questions come up: for example—what is a "religious quality?", how do we know that politics has moved in to fill the psychological gap left by the loss of religion?; does religion and/or its symbolism really hold society together, and if so, what exactly does that mean? In short, has Verba himself taken a great leap of faith in reaching his conclusions? For the moment, let us swallow our skeptical tendencies and accept at least that there is a grain or more of truth in his linking up the sacred and the political in modern societies. But accepting the potential insightfulness of Verba's analysis, where does it lead us? The political leader as monarch-priest: the citizen as worshiper; the political group as sacred object—these are strange, but nonetheless familiar themes. They are familiar because social scientists often use ideas of the sacred. and religious metaphors, in interpreting politics outside western, industrial societies. They are strange because Verba has taken these ideas. previously manufactured chiefly for export, and put them to work at home. The result, you would think, would be thoroughly disturbing to men who care about the quality of our political life. Yet, remarkably enough, Verba seems entirely at ease, and never appears to raise as much as a normative eyebrow at the possible implications of his own imaginative analysis. But then, what are these implications?

I. POLITICS AS SECULAR RELIGION

In the representative system, the reason for everything must publicly appear. Every man is a proprietor in government and considers it a necessary part of his business to understand.... He examines the cost, and compares it with the advantages and above all, he does not adopt the slavish custom of following what in other governments are called LEADERS.

Thomas Paine

Secularization is a dominant trend of modern times. In fact, it is precisely the questioning of received truths, of once sacred notions, that is

He sees the notion of an "American Israel" playing a "constitutive role" in the thought of early American leaders, and he perceives considerable continuity in the civil religion, employing as a clear contemporary example of its appearance, President Kennedy's inaugural address, Bellah states: "...this religion—or perhaps better, this religious dimension—has its own seriousness and integrity and requires the same care in understanding that any other religion does." Robert N. Bellah, "Civil Religion in America," Daedalus (Winter, 1967).

identified with the nature of modernity. Science, technology, industralism, the modern nation-state, all are associated with the growth of the secular style and the decline of traditional faiths

But at the same time we are supposedly becoming secular, life has grown increasingly politicized. The modern era is the time of that "fundamental democratization" of which Mannheim spoke—the involvement of the masses of people in political life. Revolutions, civil wars, international conflicts, general social upheaval, ideological ferocity—these are the characteristic features of our epoch. What Thomas Mann wrote half a century ago seems to sum up the extraordinary quality of modernity: "In our time the destiny of man presents its meaning in political terms."

As students of this upheavel, some social scientists have perceived the continued importance of religious impulses in social life despite their seeming decline. This is not so much the religion of established churches and beliefs in supernatural beings; rather, it is a concept of religion fundamentally involving ideas of the "sacred." It is the "religious" impulse inter-

⁵ There is a good deal of controvery over the problem of defining religion. Some writers regard the crucial distinction to be that between the "sacred" and the "secular." Roger Caillois, for example, in Man and the Sacred (Glencoe: The Free Press, 1959), identifies religion with the realm of the sacred, arguing that in this realm men feel a deep-seated dependence and show a lack of critical inquiry. His argument here follows Durkheim's position that sacredness is a matter of social definition and can be applied to a good many things. Melford Spiro, on the other hand sees religion as inextricably connected with supernatural beings, though he notes that the worship of other "sacreds" may serve many of the same functions as religious beliefs. Melford E. Spiro, "Religion: Problems of Definition and Explanation," in Michael Banton (ed), Anthropological Approaches to the Study of Religion (New York: F. A. Praeger, 1966), pp. 85-126. Clifford Geertz and Phillip Rieff provide discussions of religion in terms of its psychological functions and this focus provides a bridge between the alternative definitions noted above. Geertz defines religion as a system of symbols that establish powerful, pervasive and long-lasting moods and motivations in men by formulating conceptions of a general order of existence and clothing these conceptions with such an aura of factuality that the moods and motivations seem uniquely realistic: Clifford Geertz, "Religion as a Cultural System," in Banton, op. cit., pp. 1-46. For Rieff, religion performs two functions: the therapeutic control of

preted in this sense that social investigators have though they found in various aspects of modern political life. Interpretations of Communism, both as an ideology, and a set of institutions, often rely heavily on analogies borrowed from religion. Alfred Meyer, for example, develops the analogy very extensively and suggestively between communism and puritanism.⁵

Then too there are the "new states" and the phenomenon Apter has called "political religions" in those changing societies. There is no need here to engage in a discussion of these "political religions." It is enough just to note the consensus that such a phenomenon exists. Political religions attempt to define a new reality, to mobilize people's deepest sentiments, and generally to compensate for the loss of older, now shattered, beliefs. Fascism might perhaps qualify under this heading. Coming closer to home in recent years, various analysts have argued, although some only implicitly, that the religious impulse was still to be found, even in the most apparently modern and developed societies.

In an article analyzing the supposed "functions" of the Coronation of a British Queen, Shils and Young draw on the identity Durkheim suggested between religious and political rededication ceremonies: "What essential difference is there between an assembly of Christians celebrating the principle dates of the life of Christ, or of Jews remembering the exodus from Egypt or the promulgation of the decalogue, and a reunion of citizens commemorating the promulgation of a new moral or legal system or some great event in the national life?"

everyday life, and relief from that control by covertly providing opportunities for instincts to express themselves. Phillip Rieff, The Triumph of the Therapeutic (New York Harper & Row, 1966). Thomas Luckmann and Peter Berger have discussed religious roots in the formation of the self and the construction of symbolic universe. They see religion referring to a realm that transcends everyday life, giving it ultimate meaning. Their analysis of the process of legitimation is particularly suggestive: Peter L. Berger and Thomas Luckmann, The Social Construction of Reality (Garden City, N. Y.: Doubleday 1966). Thomas Luckmann, The Invisible Religion (N. Y.: The Macmillan Co., 1967).

⁶ Alfred G. Meyer, *Communism* (New York: Random House, 1963), pp. 4-8. And Meyer says that he is certainly not the first to note the similarities.

⁷ Edward Shils and Michael Young, "The Meaning of the Coronation," Sociological Review, 1. (December, 1953). The quote is from Emile

For Durkheim, as for Shils and Young, the religious impulse, the creation of a realm of the sacred, is a social cement, binding together members of a collectivity.

This argument leads to the conclusion that there are strong similarities between the religious and the political, and for that matter, between traditional and modern social systems. Apter argues, for example, that "politics in its moral sense can be described as approaching religion, just as churches in their organizational sense can be said to approach politics:"8 Almond has pointed out that traditional patterns of socialization continue in modern political systems, but are supplemented by other, more differentiated socialization mechanisms. Verba, discussing comparative political culture, argues that a "residue of non-rationality" a political commitment that is "implicit" and "primitive," exists in all stable political cultures.9 Primary among these "implicit" beliefs he places the feeling of national identity.

Perhaps the fundamental social-psychological underpinning to this point of view has been added by Robert Lane, Murray Edelman, David Easton, and Robert Hess. Easton and Hess tell us that "not only do many children associate the sanctity and awe of religion with the political community, but to ages 9 or 10 they sometimes have considerable difficulty in disentangling God and country." Their discussion of the psychological consequences of the flag salute is particularly interesting. They see the ritual as displacing religious affect onto a political object. They conclude: "The fact that as the child grows older he may be able to sort out the religious from the political setting much more clearly and restrict the pledge to a political meaning, need not thereby weaken this bond. The initial and early intermingling of potent religious sentiment with political community has by that time probably created a tie difficult to dissolve."10 Edelman asserts that politics can never deal strictly with who gets what in the sense of tangible benefits and punishments. Rather he maintains that "symbolic" rewards and punishments also play a

Durkheim, The Elementary Forms of the Religious Life. Norman Birnbaum has a thoughtful critique of Shils and Young, "Monarchs and Sociologists," Sociological Review, V. 3 (July, 1955) pp. 5–23.

⁸ Apter, op. cit., p. 272.

⁹ Sidney Verba, "Comparative Political Culture," in Verba (ed.), *Political Culture and Political Development* (Princeton: Princeton, University Press, 1965).

¹⁰ David Easton and Robert D. Hess, "The Child's Political World," "Midwest Journal of Political Science, V. 6 (August, 1962), pp. 238-39.

significant role in political conflict. This would be true in all political systems—and Edelman applies his ideas to the contemporary United States in particular. The "symbolic" side of politics, according to Edelman, involves two things: the creation of a sense of belonging, and attempts to allay the feelings of anxiety widespread in mass publics.11 Lane, on the basis of intensive interviews with Eastport "common men" looks at the question of religion and politics from the perspective of the urban citizen in an industrial society in mid-twentieth century.12 He finds that "in many ways belief in a powerful state is a psychological substitute for belief in a powerful God." And this belief, according to Lane, serves an essential psychological function. He says: "A positive faith in one's political system, like a positive faith in religion, reassures a person that he is properly connected to the powers that be... He has been 'good' and, like a good child, deserves well of the authorities."13

Still, the argument remains vague. What exactly are the consequences of the religious impulse in politics—particularly American politics. First, we are led back immediately in the direction of the President and Verba's analysis of reactions to the assassination. Greenstein has recently summed up behavioral research on the American President in seven points. 14 One—the President is by far the best known political figure in this country, and often the only political figure known. Two-there is great respect for the status of the President, although often combined with cynicism toward politicians. Third and Fourth—the President is the first public official to come to the attention of young children and children see the President as very important and benign. Fifth-in spite of much variation, adults generally have favorable views of the President's performance. Sixththere is a tendency to rally to the support of the President particularly when he acts at a time of international crisis. And seventh-scattered clinical evidence indicates that for an undetermined portion of the population the President is an unconscious surrogate of childhood authority figures. In addition Greenstein notes that although responses to the Kennedy assassination were profound, they were not uniquely so. From the evidence available he argues that similar reactions occurred at the deaths of other Presidents such as Lincoln, Roosevelt, McKinley, Garfield and even Harding. These reactions often take a somatic form involving headache, tenseness, insomnia and rapid heart beat.

But the religious impulse in politics leads us in another, though related, direction—the direction of American nationalism. Writing in the mid-1950's S. M. Lipset noted that Americans were not a tolerant people and pointed out that "each war and most postwar situations have been characterized by the denial of civil liberties to minorities. . . . "15 He went on to relate this lack of tolerance, especially in crisis situations, to the quality of national allegiance in this country. "... Americanism is a political creed.... Our national rituals are largely identified with reiterating the accepted values of a political system, not solely or even primarily of national patriotism. For example, Washington's Birthday, Lincoln's Birthday, and the Fourth of July are ideological celebrations comparable to May Day or Lenin's Birthday in the Communist World," Rather than a notion of simple citizenship, the concept of Americanism, Lipset concluded, had become a "compulsive ideology." If, then, there are specific large-scale evidences for the infusion of religious tendencies into American politics they would probably be most apparent along these two dimensions: Intense and often intolerant patriotism, and implicit reverence for the President, particularly in times of crisis.

II. THOREAU'S POSITION

We have now taken one of the necessary two steps backward to gain perspective on Verba's findings. These findings, as it turns out, are not unique, but dovetail with the interpretations of a good many other social scientists. Of all the writers mentioned, only Lipset and Edelman are at all disturbed at what they see. The others either simply report findings, or, more important for purposes of this paper, they see the

¹⁵ S. M. Lipset, "The Sources of the Radical Right—1955," in Daniel Bell (ed.), The Radical Right, (Garden City, N. Y.: Doubleday & Co., 1963), p. 264. See also Robert Dahl's characterization of America as a "... somewhat deviant case: most other stable democracies have not imposed as severe a set of legal and social obstacles to political dissent as exist in the United States." R. A. Dahl, "Epilogue," in R. A. Dahl (ed.), Political Oppositions in Western Democracies, (New Haven: Yale Univ. Press, 1966), p. 391.

¹¹ Murray Edelman, *The Symbolic Uses of Politics* (Urbana: University of Illinois Press, 1964).

¹² Robert E. Lane, *Political Ideology* (New York: Free Press of Glencoe, 1962).

¹⁸ Ibid., pp. 198-199.

¹⁴ Fred I. Greenstein, "Popular Images of the President," American Journal of Psychiatry, 122 (November, 1965), 523-529.

religious impulse in politics performing useful and perhaps essential functions. Verba, as well as Shils and Young in their piece on the British coronation, take the position that some kind of religious or quasi-religious political commitment must be widespread if a social system is to be stable. As Verba points out, there is no such deep, consensual commitment to "democratic" ideas and so a latent, but unquestionable basic lovalty to the going political order must be what maintains the "stability" of the system. Of course, this emphasis on stability and on latent emotional ties is nothing new, not only structural-functional theorists, but Marxists as well have acknowledged the potency of the religious impulse in social and political life. What is worth noting, however, is the ease with which these writers assume that such impulses are entirely harmonious with democratic expectations. Speaking of national identity, for example, Verba says: "It is perhaps only when some basic beliefs remain implicit and 'primitive' and when the commitment to them is heavily expressive that one can have the underlying stability that allows a more pragmatic approach in relation to other beliefs." Or, to take another example: "... stability in 'modernized' systems may depend upon the maintenance of a residue of non-rationality-of traditional, implicit and unquestioned values . . . that keeps certain aspects of the political system out of the realm of rational meansends calculations." What a happy balance Verba hopes to strike! The emphasis on combining sacred and pragmatic beliefs in politics, and maintaining each in proper amount is reminiscent of Berelson's praise of political apathy, and Almond and Verba's conclusion that it takes some "subject" and "parochial" types in order to achieve the proper mix for the stable, yet not stagnant, civic culture. But can it really be that there are no dangers to democratic politics flowing from those "primitive" beliefs. Clearly, Lipset's discussion of Americanism is not comforting. But Edelman too expounds a darker side in his interpretation: "Alienation, anomie, despair of being able to chart one's own course in a complex, cold and bewildering world have become characteristic of a large part of the population of advanced countries. As the world can be neither understood nor influenced, attachment to reassuring abstract symbols rather than to one's own efforts becomes chronic."

The question of who is right in this matter— Verba or Edelman—is partly empirical but not wholly so. In order to evaluate the consequences of the infusion of the religious into politics, we have also to employ normative tools. This is the second step backward we have to take to gain perspective on Verba's analysis. It is my contention that Thoreau, that solitary but significant figure in the liberal tradition, can help us in this, perhaps more than anyone else.

Thoreau is not an easy man to deal with, especially if you come to him with the problem of social stability foremost in your mind. His most important political writings all involve attacks on the going political order, and attacks of a very radical sort. He tells men to obey their consciences not the law. He refers to higher laws that ought to have precedence over legislation. In the famous essay on civil disobedience written after his refusal to pay certain Massachusetts state taxes as a protest against the Mexican War and the extradition of fugitive slaves, he declared his intention of unilaterally severing his ties to the on-going political system. He wants to opt out-return to his state of nature, to his berry field, leaving the state and its noise far behind. But sadly, Thoreau finds that the state does not merely get in the way of the good, but itself is a vast machine of evil. It is not enough therefore for a man to opt out: nothing less than a decisive alteration of the state is needed. Thoreau actually accepts both of these points of view in different places—they might be represented by the contrast between Thoreau himself at Walden Pond, and Captain John Brownwhom Thoreau championed-taking up arms against the slave system. Thoreau has been attacked for inconsistency and moral confusion because of these varied strands in his writings.

Yet it has been overlooked that Thoreau perceived and was attempting to come to grips with a very complex and modern phenomenonexactly that phenomenon Verba has described for us: the growth of a religious attitude toward the nation-state; the phenomenon of "primordial" allegiance, of "primitive" and unquestioned beliefs. In the essay on Civil Disobedience, Thoreau, like Verba, sees that in his time the political realm is dealing with ultimate questions, with matters of conscience-matters, as Verba puts it, "of death and life and the quality of life." Of course, Thoreau had in mind those unquestionably ultimate issues of slavery and war. But unlike Verba, Thoreau saw disastrous consequences for liberal democracy in the growth of the sacred form of political allegiance. Actually he saw twin disasters: first, the loss of moral autonomy for the mass of men who abandoned their consciences to state direction: and second, ostracism or worse for the few who would not abandon their convictions and as a result became enemies of the state. Calling attention to this dilemma, Thoreau says: "Can there not be a government in which majorities do not virtually decide right and wrong, but conscience?-in which majorities decide only those questions to which the rule of expediency is applicable? Must the citizen even for a moment, or in the least degree, resign his conscience to the legislator?"16 But most men do resign their consciences to the legislators, and Thoreau chooses a military image—not by accident I think—to make this clear: "A common and natural result of an undue respect for law is, that you may see a file of soldiers, colonel, captain, corporal, privates, powder-monkeys, and all, marching in admirable order over hill and dale to the wars, against their wills, against their common sense and consciences, which makes it very steep marching indeed . . . they are all peaceably inclined. Now what are they? Men at all? or small moveable forts. . . . "17 Those who, as Thoreau puts it, "serve" the state with their consciences also, and not just with their bodies—the heroes, patriots, and reformers—these men often resist state authority. And Thoreau's argument is that the state inevitably treats them as criminals because it has been persuaded of its own sanctity.

In his own time, Thoreau regarded Captain John Brown as one of these conscientious patriots. For Thoreau, Brown's distinguishing characteristic involved his refusal to place his faith in leaders, in intermediaries—it was, in short, his political protestantism. Thoreau's own language in "A Plea for Captain John Brown," makes the religious analogy clear: "The curse is the worship of idols, which at length changes the worshiper into a stone image himself. . . . This man [John Brown] was an exception, for he did not set up even a political graven image between him and his God." 18

Whatever we want to call him—anarchist, romantic, enemy of the people—Thoreau did perceive that the intertwining of the religious and the political ought to be regarded as a problem. And indeed it must be regarded as a problem from the standpoint of the liberal tradition. Thoreau, as an inheritor of the Lockean view with its emphasis on the strict separation of church and state, could hardly avoid this problem. His originality and importance lies in the fact that he, like Verba, did not think of church and state in formal institutional terms,

but in psychological terms—in terms of conflicting impulses within human beings. In this, he carried the Lockean argument for separation one step further. Locke's distinction between church and state is based upon the matters each must deal with. The state is justified as a matter of convenience—its purposes are pragmatic and commonsensical. Men gave their consent to government because it provides certain definable benefits. The relationship between man and the state is a contractual onewith the state providing certain day-to-day services in exchange for the giving up of the right to judge one's own case. The state, as one interpreter of Locke has characterized it, is a limited corporation. The culmination of this rather expedient attitude toward the state shows up in Jefferson's notion that a political revolution per generation would be needed to adapt the governmental framework to the people's needs, and in Tom Paine's proclamation that each generation was a new Adam, for whom inherited political forms were irrelevant.

The church, for Locke, dealt with the sacred, with ultimate questions of individual salvation. It was absolutely essential then that religion not corrupt itself through association with the state, and also that the state not coerce men into accepting a particular religious position. In sacred matters, for Locke, voluntarism was fundamental. Salvation could not be established by government edict.

But if voluntarism is essential in matters of the sacred, and if we discover that the state deals not in matters of convenience, but of conscience, matters of death and life and the quality of life, then the same voluntarism Locke thought essential for church-religion. must be applied to political-religion as well. As I understand it, this is the essence of Thoreau's argument. He sees that the state is not merely a matter of convenience and that allegience to it is psychologically similar to religious allegiance. Law and morality became intertwined and the basis of the Lockean dichotomy between church and state evaporates. Given this reality, Thoreau speaks for the rights of conscience. He argues by analogy with the Lockean position on religion that political salvation should not be coerced and that the right to opt out of the contract should be recognized as it would be in the case of a church. If politics is our religion, each man must nonetheless save his own soul, but this time on the terrain of the authoritative allocation of values.

Thoreau means to make clear that it is blasphemy for liberals to regard the state with reverence, since such attitudes are a retreat from the hard-headedness of liberal thought.

¹⁶ "Civil Disobedience," Thoreau's Writings, Vol. IV, (Boston: Houghton Mifflin & Co., 1906), p. 358.

¹⁷ Ibid., pp. 358-359.

¹⁸ "A Plea . . . ", *ibid.*, P. 419.

He is pointing in his own way toward the idea of that escape from freedom Erich Fromm has described this way: "After the great European Revolutions of the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries failed to transform 'freedom from' into 'freedom to,' nationalism and state worship became the symptoms of a regression to incestuous fixation."19 He is pointing in his own way to the phenomenon of mass acquiescense that Edelman has connected with symbolic reassurances, particularly strong in the foreign policy area. Finally, Thoreau is pointing to a resolution of the liberal dilemma—the dilemma posed by the nationalization of the sacred. This solution, impassioned and extreme as it may seem in Thoreau, basically calls for enlarged rights for dissenters, and a more critical attitude generally toward the political system. It is perhaps the normative reverse of Verba's idea that some basic beliefs should remain unquestioned if there is to be the stability which allows a pragmatic approach to other beliefs. The Thoreauian tendency would be to argue that modern politics inevitably confronts precisely those issues which touch the core of political religion: the issues of war, dissent, and enlightened popular sovereignty. Though he would admit that liberal thought provides no clear solution, a contemporary Thoreau would suggest that we will find a way out of these problems by revitalizing the meaning of resistence, probably in the direction of civil disobedience and a heightened consciousness of the meaning of consent.

I am not attempting here to make a case for Thoreau's brilliance as a political philosopher, nor to deny that his position has many probably insoluble problems.²⁰ I am arguing that he graspee a central development of our era and perceived its normative significance.

19 Erich Fromm, The Sane Society (New York: Holt, Rinehart & Winston).

²⁰ The critique of Thoreau's politics by Heinz Eulau—"Wayside Challenger," Antioch Review (Dec., 1949), 509-522, argues that to follow Thoreau's injunctions and make the individual conscience the ultimate political decision-maker would bring on anarchy, and make democracy impossible. Eulau's position, though it has some important sense to it, fails to penetrate to the real problem Thoreau sought to deal with. Eulau's argument is equally absolutist, ignoring the problems that would flow from too great a reverence for existing laws. Generally, Eulau forgets that at any one moment, democratic values, and other important values as well, may conflict with legalities.

III. NORMATIVE CONSEQUENCES OF EMPIRICAL SCIENCE

What need have we of the socialization of banks and factories? We socialize men.

Remark attributed to Hitler

We cannot accept Verba's assurance that the sort of religious attachment to political symbols he describes holds no dangers for democratic life. We have many normative specifics to attend to.21 First, we need to look again at the problem of the democratic personality. If we regard achieving democracy as, in part, a problem of developing the self, then a passive, reverent citizenry is undesirable regardless of how much stability it may generate. We need to think of measuring democracy not by defining it blithely as whatever exists in so-called democracies, but in terms of the creation of citizens-men and women aware of the problems of freedom in their own and other societies; men and women relatively free from irrational obsessions. We need to scrutinize the undemocratic aspects of our societies, at the workplace, also in the home and school, and develop plans for reform, or conservation. We are still awaiting that general democratization of social life which Dewey spoke of, and which depends upon a more equal distribution of economic and cultural resources.

A second concern grows directly out of this perspective on democracy. There is a suggestion in much recent literature that "democracy" is saved only by the "apathy" of large numbers of people who have undemocratic attitudes.22 To activate these anathetics then appears to risk undermining what democratic processes we have. For example, in relation to the Vietnam War, a national survey early in 1966 showed that individuals with income below \$5,000 a year were three times as likely to oppose the right to demonstrate against the war as individuals with incomes of \$10,000 a year or more.23 Would it contribute to democratization to activate those who oppose dissent? Aren't we here dependent on mass acquiescence and elite support for libertarian norms, with a little help from our friends, the upper middle class. Such has been the common

²¹ There are a great many empirical specifics as well.

²² As one example, see Herbert McClosky, "Consensus and Ideology in American Politics," this Review, 58 (June, 1964), 361-382.

²³ Louis Harris survey reported in the Washington *Post*, April 18, 1966. Under \$5,000, 60% oppose the right to demonstrate; over \$10,000, 19% oppose it.

argument. But this argument is strangely myopic in several respects. For present purposes, its major failing is a refusal to press the question hard enough.24 Why should individuals with low incomes or little education oppose dissent when they are not more likely to support the war itself, and perhaps even less likely to support the war?25 This is not a simple ambiguity, but perhaps here we are encountering precisely that primordial attachment to national symbols that makes for "stability." If less educated people are less likely to favor libertarian norms this may occur because of the kind of early socialization they participate in. We cannot with one hand endorse primordial allegiance to the nation and with the other hand condemn anti-libertarian nationalism. It seems likely that these matters are linked. Here we return to concerns that Marx and Freud dealt with long ago, when they sought the roots of the "religious" in the fundamental structure of human development. Perhaps in discussing political religions we need to rethink Marx's argument: "The abolition of religion as the illusory happiness of the people is required for their real happiness. The demand to give up illusions about its condition is the demand to give up a condition which needs illusions."26 Instead of assuming then the "naturalness" of a religious attachment to politics, we should seek the empirical origins of this process.

All of this should make us increasingly aware of the ideological implications of our work. Despite our proclamations of value "neutrality" it is increasingly clear that many of the analytical frameworks and conclusions of behavioral political scientists have normative roots and branches.²⁷ This is also clearly true

²⁴ There are a good many other serious failings in this point of view. On this matter, see my letter criticizing McClosky's argument in this Review (December, 1966), 1000-1001. A thorough treatment is Peter Bachrach, *The Theory of Democratic Elitism*. (Boston: Little, Brown & Co., 1967).

²⁵ Sidney Verba, et al., "Public Opinion and the War in Vietnam" this Review, (June, 1967) 317-333. A curious Gallup poll of February, 1967, shows that 40% of those with incomes under \$3,000 a year favored a bombing halt, while only 14% of those with incomes over \$10,000 a year did so.

²⁶ From "Toward a Critique of Hegel's Philosophy of Right."

²⁷ There are many recent discussions of this matter: Christian Bay, "Politics and Pseudopolitics," this REVIEW, 59 (March, 1965), 39—

in the discussion of political religions. Our increasing sophistication about "methods" of research has not been matched by an equal sophistication about the normative side of that research. But that sort of sophistication is not easy to come by. To begin, we might take greater care in discussing both "democracy" and "stability"—both of which are in deep need of quantification and clearer definition. Failing to deal with these matters, we will find ourselves, as sometimes in the past, offering bland endorsement of the status quo in western societies, while turning away from the deepest normative and empirical questions.

In the end, of course, it may not matter what social scientists think. That is an empirical question. If not, these issues are important only for the profession and for the sake of personal clarity. On the other hand, the social role of social scientists might just be of some consequence and we may, ourselves, help to determine by our action or inaction what our social role will be. In that case, the stakes are considerable and the costs of confusion high.

Finally, we need to pay careful attention to the problem of dissent in modern societies. The civil rights movement made this problem real again, and a good many social scientists have tried to come to grips with questions of civil disobedience. More recently, the issue of conscientious objection to a particular war has also burst upon us. One would think that, given the liberal heritage, given the extraordinary dimensions of war in modern times, given the Nuremberg trial experience—we would have paid more attention to this problem. Unfortunately, the Vietnam war has had to recall us to it. Modern war is, after all, precisely the experience that invalidates the old liberal dichotomy between church and state. Wars deal in ultimate matters, and generate passionate affiliations rare in peacetime. And here Thoreau's plea for the rights of conscience is most immediately relevant. The right conscientiously to object to a particular war follows from the principle of voluntarism in sacred matters. Legal protection for such a right would clarify for each individual the fact that obedience as well as opposition was a

52; Charles Taylor, "Neutrality in Political Science," in Peter Laslett and W. G. Runciman, Philosophy, Politics and Society. Third Series, (Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1967), pp. 25-57. Charles C. Moskos, Jr. and Wendell Bell, "Emerging Nations and Ideologies of American Social Scientists," The American Sociologist, (May, 1967), 67-72, for three particularly relevant pieces.

moral choice. This, in itself, would be a gain in democratic education.

IV. CONCLUSION

It may be that men ought not to live, and perhaps cannot live, without a religion or its functional equivalent—some set of beliefs related to "ultimate" matters. And of course it is clear that even the man who attacks dogmatism has his own dogma, which includes, at least, the freedom to criticize. This is not as much of a dilemma as it appears. There are, after all, dogmas and dogmas. It makes sense to distinguish between a group attachment based on enlightenment and personal experience, and an attachment developed largely unconsciously, which resists examination.²⁸

Robert Bellah has something of this sort in mind when he argues that America's civil religion has had a "best" and a "worst", a depth and a distortion. He chooses to believe that "it is difficult to use the words of Jefferson and Lincoln to support special interests and undermine personal freedom."²⁹ And he also chooses to identify the words of Jefferson and Lincoln with America's "civil religion." On the

²⁸ On this point, Michael Walzer has put the matter eloquently: "The increasing size of the state, the growing power of administration, the decline of political life: all these turn politics from a concrete activity into what Marx once called the fantasy of everyday life. The state becomes an arena in which men do not act, but watch the actions, and, like other audiences, are acted upon. Patriotic communion is always a fraud when it is nothing more than the communion of an audience with its favorite actors, of passive subjects and heroes of the state. Our emotions are merely tricked by parades and pageants, the rise and fall of political gladiators, the deaths of beloved chiefs, the somber or startling rites of a debased religion. It could be done to anyone, whereas patriotism ought to be the pride of a particular man, the enjoyment of particular activities": "Politics in the Welfare State," Dissent (January-February, 1968) p. 36. ²⁹ Bellah, op. cit., p. 14.

other hand, he calls to mind the use of nationalistic sentiment "as a justification for the shameful treatment of the Indians . . ." and its use "to legitimate several adventures in imperialism. . . ." Right now, he argues, there is "the tendency to assimilate all governments or parties in the world which support our immediate policies or call upon help by invoking the notion of free institutions and democratic values. Those nations that are for the moment 'on our side' became 'the free world.' A respressive and unstable military dictatorship in South Viet-Nam becomes 'the free people of South Viet-Nam and their government.'"30 Faced with what he considers a degeneration of the civil religion, Bellah counts on the "prophetic voices" to call us back to sanity. He recalls Lincoln's opposition to the Mexican War. He quotes Thoreau: "'I would remind my countrymen that they are men first, and Americans at a late and convenient hour....'" For Bellah these words provide the appropriate standard for contemporary thought and action. Yet here, I think, Bellah stretches his conception of civil religion to include even its staunchest opponents. Thoreau is reacting against precisely that reverence for established authority which civil religion creates. To ask for civil religion without reverence is to abandon the core of the concept. Moreover, the implications of civil religion in the United States are far more serious now than a hundred years ago. The United States is not just another country, but a primary world power. The ways in which Americans regard their government may have consequences which touch men everywhere. This is not true of many other societies. What is required, as Bellah states, is the articulation of standards that transcend immediate interests and subject the nation itself to judgment. But to work out and internalize such standards would require a far more critical attitude toward political authority.

(Editor's Note: For comments by Professor Verba, see Communications, pp. 576-577.)

30 Ibid.

SOME THOUGHTS ON THE RELATION OF POLITICAL THEORY TO ANTHROPOLOGY*

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The study of developing areas has, in recent years, caused political science and theory to be increasingly aware of realities of non-Western government and politics. Comparative politics and its theory no longer, therefore, can avoid utilizing the results of the research of anthropologists and ethnologists in a way comparable to the use of historical data if they wish to be comprehensively empirical. Since the political theorist will not, as a rule, be able to become a practising anthropologist, the basic problem of such cooperation turns upon whether the investigating anthropologist asks the crucial, the basic questions in the first place. A broad survey of their reports and writings, such as the Human Relations Area Files afford, shows that this is by no means generally the case. Nor is this easy to achieve, for political scientists and anthropologists differ in their objectives. It has been suggested that the anthropologist is primarily interested in diversity, in how many ways something could be done, whereas for the political scientist and theorist such divergencies are important mainly as they lead to political insight and verifiable generalization.

The utility of the writings of anthropologists for the political scientist is seriously impeded by the over-simplified and misleading understanding of the nature of power and authority held by many of them.¹

* What follows is a revision of a working paper prepared for a conference held at Yale University on May 7–8, 1965, which has been reported elsewhere. Its purpose was to consider the problems raised in adapting the Human Relations Area Files to the use of political scientists (and by implications to that of jurists, economists, and other social scientists). There can be little doubt that although "the HRAF constitute a major potential resource for research and teaching in political science," they have not been used to any great extent by political scientists. (The authors wish to acknowledge the research assistance of Mr. Michael Rothschild.)

¹ These writings are digested in the *Human Relations Area Files*, produced at New Haven, in cooperation with Yale and a number of other universities. In the footnotes which follow, there is a certain time lag due to delays in incorporating material in the HRAF. See, for a recent con-

One of the most pervasive difficulties which arises among those who would use the work of anthropologists is the one-dimensional understanding of what the concept "power" entails. Because of the liberal and egalitarian assumptions of many anthropologists, a tendency to ignore the element of power is characteristic of much of the literature. Only where they are confronted by a clearly hierarchical society in which elements of coercive power can hardly be overlooked do they set about to analyze the power relations in primitive cultures. Many primitive societies, however, are not particularly hierarchical so that the dominant sources of power in these societies, deriving either from social coercion or from consent, are more difficult to detect. Often, in the absence of clear and determinate incividuals who exercise power in a particular society, students of primitive cultures have come to conclude that in fact there is no power in the society.2

Leaving aside for the moment the obvious confusion of power and authority which is quite common in anthropological writings, there are other grave difficulties with their work as far as power relations are concerned. One often finds in reading such material that there is undue preoccupation with the formalistic aspects of power, to the exclusion of analyses of many other relevant power situations. There is, in addition, insufficient appreciation of the informal aspects of social coercion which are among the dominant means of social control in primitive societies. The situation which some anthropologists find "perennially astonishing" is undoubtedly the result of a highly complex system of informal social controls, not the least important of which is

tribution which is informed by a much greater awareness of the problems here discussed, Max Schwartz, *Political Anthropology* (New York 1966), though even here the references are spotty and the views often rather one-sided.

² The interesting study by John Middleton and David Tait (eds.), *Tribes Without Rulers* (1958), while more sophisticated, suffers from this difficulty too. Max Schwa-tz has, in *Political Anthropology*, offered a good review of the literature of political anthropology, including the studies of Goodenough and Leach which focus attention upon conflict and process.

the "personal influence" of the headmen. E. Adamson Hoebel remarked upon this tendency to ignore social coercion in his critique of Malinowski's studies of the Trobriand Islanders' systems of law. In all of his studies of law, Hoebel noted, "Malinowski exhibited a definite distaste for the forces of social coercion and he exerted himself to the utmost to minimize—even banish—them as operative elements in the regulation of human relations."²

Some anthropologists, however, have given careful attention to the informal processes of social control in primitive cultures. Leighton and Kluckhohn, for example, quite a few years ago described in great detail the social controls which they found among the Navaho on the basis of their "shame culture." And in his study of Yahgan society, Gusinde points out that among the Yahgan "one could speak of public opinion as the guardian of laws and as the avenger of serious transgressions. It acts no less successfully than a police force or a court of justice." Indeed, he gives great weight to this crucial dimension of primitive life.

The pressure it puts upon a person can be clearly seen from the fear which everyone, not only the average Indian, has for a bad reputation and even more of public ostracism. If he sees himself ensnared by it, he promptly hastens back to the path of virtue and constantly tries with exaggerated zeal to change the bad opinion about him into a good one.⁶

Yet, in spite of his clear insight into informal aspects of social control, Gusinde appears to exhibit another tendency prominent among students of society imbued with liberal and egalitarian ideals. While he is willing to see an amorphous "public" as the guarantor of social order, he is unwilling to see that specific individuals very often do exercise disproportionate amounts of power in a given society. In fact, one often finds among anthropologists that only the most well-structured and formal power relationships are given attention. Thus, Gusinde emphasizes that "there is no authoritative judge over all the people; everyone must seek his own justice." Furthermore, he stresses

- ³ E. Adamson Hoebel, *The Law of Primitive Man* (Cambridge, Mass.), 1961, p. 181.
- ⁴ Dorothea Leighton and Clyde Kluckhohn, *Children of the People* (Cambridge, Mass.), 1947, pp. 105-106.
- ⁵ Martin Gusinde, The Yahgan: the Life and Thought of the Water Nomads of Cape Horn (trans. Frieda Shutze, for Human Relations Area Files), p. 1025.

that "there is no superior authority appointed for either tribal community or for smaller groups." Yet, he mentions, but does not elaborate upon a phenomenon which is often of crucial significance in primitive cultures:

There are always certain...men, who as a result of their advanced age and blameless character, their long experience and mental superiority, have a moral influence of such importance that it amounts to positive control.

Just what the precise nature of this "positive control" is, we are not told. We know that in primitive cultures the power exercised by political leaders will more often than not be consensual power deriving from authority, where the members of the community cooperate with the leadership in securing obedience to the community's values and beliefs. But a preoccupation, on one hand, with the formal and coercive aspects of power or, on the other hand, with the informal sanctions of an amorphous public opinion, has obscured the consensual aspect of power and leadership possessing less formal characteristics.

The failure to appreciate the consensual component of power can be traced to a still more fundamental misunderstanding of political phenomena which constantly reappears in anthropological writings: the confusion of power with authority. Since many of the studies identify authority with power, or see it as some kind of power, usually legitimate power or formal power or rightful power (which again is some sort of legitimate power), an inquiry into the basis of authority often becomes merely an investigation into the basis of power.8 As we have argued, however, "there are power situations which are differentiated from others by the fact that the wielder of power has the capacity to elaborate what he prefers by reasoning which would make sense to those who follow him, if time and other circumstances permitted. Such reasoning usually involves the values and beliefs, as well as interests, of the group within which the power is exercised. The power-handler shares with his followers all or part of such values and beliefs, and therefore could, and at times will, explain to his following the reasons he acted in a certain way and more especially why he preferred them to act likewise. What we are proposing is that his capacity for reasoned elaboration when it exists should be called

⁸ Ibid.

⁷ Op. cit., p. 802.

⁸ For a more detailed theoretical discussion, see Carl J. Friedrich, *Man and His Government* (New York, 1963), pp. 213ff.

political authority." Because "power can be implemented and enlarged by the capacity for reasoned elaboration" and because the particular component of power which is usually affected by political authority is consensual power, there is a clear relationship between the failure of anthropological studies to give appropriate attention to consensual power and their misunderstanding of the nature of authority.

If we understand authority as involving the capacity for reasoned elaboration then the anthropologists have all but ignored this significant dimension of political behavior. Even so, although rarely understood, the nature of political authority is often alluded to in anthropological discussions of the leader's role. There are many cases where this capacity is clearly an essential concomitant of such leadership. Thus it has been shown that among the Nambicuara (Brazil) the very existence of the band is dependent upon the chief's ability to inspire confidence in his followers. 10 It is true in other cases as well. Of the Comanche (North America) it has been written: "A peace chief rose to his position of leadership by combining generosity, kindness, evenness of temper, wisdom in council and knowledge of his territory with good sense and the ability to speak persuasively on matters at issue. The man whose advice was most persistently followed served as a peace chief for his group. He emerged gradually as a leader, and when his ability to influence his group was surpassed by that of another man, he ceased to be its (chief)."11 An almost identical situation is described by Honigmann in his study of the Nahane.

A leader held authority as long as he lived. . . . Leaders who lost competence found themselves ignored, the people adhering to a more intelligent man. The headman's functions transcended mere food getting. His wisdom derived from experience, and the ability to speak convincingly reinforced his authority in moral matters. 12

- 9 Ibid., p. 233, for this and the preceding quotation.
- ¹⁰ Claude Levi-Strauss, "The Social and Psychological Aspects of Chieftanship in a Primitive Tribe: the Nambicuara of Northeastern Mato Grosso," Transactions of the New York Academy of Sciences, Series II, vol. 7 (1945), 16-32
- ¹¹ Ernest Wallace and E. A. Hoebel, *The Comanches* (1952), p. 211.
- ¹² John J. Honigmann, *The Kaska Indians: An Ethnographic Reconstruction* (New Haven, 1954), p. 84.

Needless to say, the source of authority need not be verbal facility, but may well be the power of example. Karsten notes that "the Jibaros have absolute faith in the heritability of prominent qualities, and ascribe extraordinary importance to education and the power of example. The son of a great chief. they say, must necessarily also become an able warrior because he is, as it were, a direct continuation of his father, has received a careful education for the deeds of war, and has always had the good example of his great father before his eyes."13 In a large number of cases, however, the capacity for verbal elaboration is an essential element in authority. Among the Navaho, Kluckhohn and Leighton observe, "age and experience, ceremonial knowledge and oratorical skill, wealth and any combination of these facts can bring prestige and influence..."14 And among the Kapauku, as Pospisil has shown, wealth and generosity as well as eloquence and verbal courage are considered basic attributes of authority. Despite his wealth and generosity, a man who is afraid to argue publicly and pass judgments has hardly a chance of becoming a headman."15

There are many cases where an important element which enhances authority is some form of secrecy or esoteric ritual. Particularly a characteristic of aristocratic or hierarchical cultures, secrecy extends authority by convincing the common people that, while the capacity for reasoned elaboration is in no way impaired, they are for one reason or another better off not knowing. "Among the Bemba," Richards writes,

much of the tribal ritual is secret.. and the advisory council is composed of what might be called an aristocratic caste. If the bakabilo meet in sitting on the open ground of the capital... they use archaic language on purpose, so that the common people cannot understand... the Bemba chiefs were formerly considered very nearly divine, and the belief in their supernatural powers is still strong enough to integrate the

- ¹³ Rafael Karsten, "The Head-Hunters of Western Amazonas: The Life and Culture of the Jibaro Indians of Eastern Ecuador and Peru," Societas Scientiarum Fennica: Commentationes Humanarum Litterarum, Vol VII, No. 1 (1935), p. 267.
- ¹⁴ Clyde Kluckhohn and Dorothea Leighton, *The Navaho*, Cambridge, Mass., 1946. p. 71.
- ¹⁶ Leopold J. Pospisil, "Kapauku Papuan Political Structure," in Verne F. Ray (ed.), Systems of Political Control and Bureaucracy in Human Societies (Seattle, 1958), p. 18.

tribe. The sacredness of the royal ceremonial largely depends on its secrecy and the fact that only persons of the right descent can take part in the ritual. The ordinary people do not attend the ceremonies except in the case of some inhabitants of the capital, but they value their secret nature and speak contemptuously of the Bisa and the neighboring tribes with less complex rites." ¹²⁶

Similarly, Firth has observed that among the Tikopia, where ritual knowledge is the basis of authority, the chief is reluctant to communicate all he knows to his son.

A younger man of rank will not normally know as much as his father because in native belief if a chief or elder imparts the last vestiges of his ritual knowledge to his son, then the gods regard that as a sign he is finished with the affairs of this world and will soon make him die. Only when he is very old or ill does he divulge the information.¹⁷

Another good illustration of this phenomenon can be seen in ancient Thailand, where, as Thompson reported, the secrecy of the law was the basis of its authority. "The concept that law was a secret science known only to judges and not open to discussion by the people still survived in 1850, when a law code in process of compilation was seized by the king and destroyed lest it should become known to the public." 18

The tendency to confuse power and authority leads to considerable difficulty in making effective use of anthropological studies in political theory. For example, of the Kavirondo Bantu we learn:

Political authority... remained inarticulate. It was not linked upon the clearly defined rights and privileges, such as are usually associated with institutionalized chieftainship. The leading elders of a clan or sub-clan were merely those persons whose opinion carried most weight when public matters were discussed... and who were called to perform sacrifices. They had no rights that were inherent in their office.... There is no generally accepted term for a clan or tribal head, but a leading elder is referred to by a variety of terms which can also be used with regard to any re-

¹⁶ Audrey I. Richards, "The Political System of the Bemba Tribe—North-Eastern Rhodesia," in M. Fortes and E. E. Evans-Pritchard (eds.), African Political Systems (London, 1940), p. 111.

¹⁷ Raymond Firth, *Primitive Polynesian Economy* (London, 1939), pp. 103-104.

¹⁸ Virginia Thompson, *Thailand: The New Siam* (New York, 1941), p. 269.

spected and honoured person. Finally, there was no formal appointment and installation of the head of a clan or sub-clan.¹⁹

What makes this report especially interesting is its old-fashioned, or shall we say unsophisticated, use of the term "authority." It seems to stand for "power" as well as "rulership" and "office." Had the author had a different conception, he would have recognized the conduct he observed as indicative of the primordial and characteristic syndrome of authority, and thus would have been able to contrast it with other types of political situations. Moreover, the informal and unstructured attribute of authority in this situation led him to treat lightly one of the most important sources of power in primitive cultures.

Situations such as the one just related have in recent years aroused the interest of anthropologists as they have debated "stateless" societies, "tribes without rulers,"20 in short. societies or cultures without any centralized pattern of government. Characteristically, these sorts of political systems are operated with the help of authority and the influence which springs from it, in a loose and segmented way.21 It is wholly inadmissible, in fact, to argue that these societies lack "authority," as we have seen is done in a good deal of the literature. An attempt to restrict the political to that which is coercive (even though recognizing the role of consent in human society) is certainly unacceptable from the viewpoint of political theory. We have heard it argued that "in the modern nation state, the ancient empire, the African kingdom, etc., the limits of the political field are coincident in the end with the limits of authority," meaning by authority the right to rule coercively. Yet, as we have seen, this formulation excludes the significant political dimension of leadership deriving from authority, understood as involving the capacity for reasoned elaboration.

There are, as we have already mentioned, many societies in which the characteristic situation of power based on authority can be

¹⁹ Gunther Wagner, "The Political Organization of the Bantu of Kavirondo," in Fortes and Evans-Pritchard, op. cit., pp. 235-236.

²⁰ Middleton and Tait, op. cit., 1958. Unfortunately, it, too, is entangled in difficulties resulting from the failure to distinguish power and authority. A similar attempt at classifying "stateless societies" is offered by Fortes and Evans-Pritchard in their Introduction to African Political Systems, op. cit., pp. 11–16.

²¹ M. G. Smith, Government in Zazzau: 1800-1950 (1960).

surmised to exist, particularly in all those in which the ruler acts as judge; for judicial decisions are typically affected by authority (though by no means always, as so-called cadijudgments show). Thus we hear about the Zulu (South Africa) that the king demonstrates authoritative qualities in promulgating law and judging cases. As the supreme court of the nation "the king was supposed to maintain the customary law . . . he could not decide against the law, for his favourite. Nevertheless, the king could in deciding the case create a new law for what he and his council considered good reason."22 Among the Hausa it is pointed out. there is a clear distinction between Law (shari'a) and acts of legislation (doka, pl. dokoki). "The chief had neither the function nor the power of making or altering the shari'a, which it was formerly his duty to apply and execute within the scope of powers alloted to him. Since the shari'a is regarded in Zaria as a divinely santioned code of law, it may not be altered except under force majeure by acts of legislation (dokoki), although of course its application provides considerable scope for differences of interpretation. Hence community chiefs lacked the function and power of enacting dokoki which modified the shari'a."23 Both of the situations here described are surely reminiscent of the medieval king, or at least of the image of the king as judge, believed-in during the European middle-ages. It is found in many other cultural settings, notably among the Tallensi, the Ankole and the Marquesas.24 And there are many other comparable situations, as, for example, that among the Ganda (East Africa) where the king was reported in an

²² Max Glueckman, "The Kingdom of the Zulu of South Africa," in Fortes and Evans-Pritchard, op cit., p. 33.

²³ M. G. Smith, The Economy of Hausa Communities of Zaria, London, 1955, p. 10.

24 The Tallensi and the Ankole are discussed by Fortes and Orberg, respectively, in Fortes and Evans-Pritchard, op. cit., pp. 266 and 121ff. The Marquesas are described in Ralph Linton, "The Material Culture of the Marquesas Islands," Memoirs Bernice P. Bishop Museum, vol. 5, p. 268 (1925). Rothschild added the following comment here. Only in the colonial period when Tallensi chiefs were agents of the British Administration can it be said that they had judicial power based on authority. The Tallensi are one of the famous tribes of the anthropological state and their fame rests on Fortes' description of their social structure before the British came to the Gold Coast and before chiefs had pronounced judicial functions.

early study as absolute in power and yet as "expected to respect established right, to uphold justice, and to behave with 'kindness' or generosity in rewarding the deserving." In fact, "in relations between the chiefs and people we see again a conflict between a theoretical absolutism and an equally conceived theoretical standard of air dealing. . . . "25 In a similar manner, Firth went to great lengths to illustrate the fact that among the Tikopia "the power of the chief, absolute though it is in theory, is continually held in check in the interests of his people."26 Not only do both of these situations illustrate customary restraints upon a formally absolute ruler, they also imply that power is primarily consensual. The required standard of justice by which such a chief is measured seems to be the analogue to that required by the classic Greek, and more especially by the Platonic, conception of monarchy which dominated much later thought; here the link with traditional political theory is evident.

There are numerous cases where the element of authority is the distinguishing feature of the "legal process" in primitive societies. Among the Kikuyu, for example, the capacity of reasoned elaboration is the central characteristic of the judge's authority. "A muthamaki or mugambi depends for his judicial reputation very largely on his knowledge of the principles on which judgments in previous cases have been based...."27 A very interesting example of authority as "reasoned elaboration" also occurs in the following case, where it is explained why the crime of murder (awudie) came to be punished among the Ashanti by centralized authority. One of the Ashanti legal maxims says: "It is taboo for any person killed to have to inquire after death 'What was it I did?"" Murder without due process of law "struck at the root of all centralized authority," for the authority of the council of Elders in punishing cases of murder was based on its ability satisfactorily to supply to the murderer the answer to the question, "What was it I did?" Only where the murderer could be shown through a trial authorized by custom that he had committed murder was execution lawful. To go outside of the law—to take the law into one's own hands by punishing a murderer-

²⁵ Lucy P. Mair, An African People in the Twentieth Century (London, 1934), pp. 268, 183.

²⁶ Raymond Firth, We, the Tikopoa: A Sociological Study of Kinship in Primitive Polynesia (London, 1936), p. 284.

²⁷ H. E. Lambert, Kikuyu Social and Political Institutions (London 1956), p. 120.

was rightly considered a challenge to all authority.28

The absence of a clear understanding of authority as well as a tendency to ignore the consensual element of power in primitive cultures has led to a debate among anthropologists on the nature of "law" as encompassing "all processes of social control, and . . . any of the obligations, customary actions, and conventions inherent in the social system " Such a characterization is both too all-inclusive and "confusing." The particular author from whom this statement is taken limits his definition "to social control which is maintained by organized legal sanctions and applied by some form of organized political mechanism."29 Yet, once we understand the consensual component in power and realize that the primitive legal process depends far more on the strength of custom than on coercion, we see that it is precisely within the realm of "customary actions and conventions inherent in the social system" that we are likely to find the legal process at work. Moreover, to limit "law" to "organized legal sanctions" overlooks the importance of the informal and amorphous processes of social coercion prevalent in primitive society. Even so, he points out that among the Nuer "there were recognized standards for the control of human relationships even though these were maintained by sanctions too indeterminate to be called legal."30 Yet, as we shall see, there are good reasons both for distinguishing between law and custom and for devaluating the importance of sanctions in connection with defining law.

Where law is employed as a term "designating the enforceable rule, enforced by a legitimate ruler possessing authority," it appears that many difficulties in understanding the primitive legal process are avoided. "For evidently such rules will be expressing the values, interests and beliefs of the community, and hence will be rooted in custom and habit exhibited in the behavior of the members of such a community." Three difficulties are eliminated by this formulation. First, it avoids the formalistic insistence upon "centralized" authority or sanctions. The inquiry is shifted to whether, in fact, a rule is enforced by any

legitimate ruler possessing authority. This formulation also escapes the difficulty inherent in the realist position, which, simply put, asserts that law is a generalization based upon what is the prevalent behavior of various persons, especially of judges. This difficulty results from the fact that if law is prevalent custom, it is not easy to comprehend the imperative "ought" aspect which a command involves, for if people do something anyhow, why tell them that they ought to? Thus, the distinction between law and custom emphasizes the ideal obligatory "ought" element in law which custom often lacks. To underline this point, Hoebel discussed Malinowski's distinction between the customary and legal handling of the incest taboo among the Trobriand Islanders, where mild moral disapproval turned into harsh legal punishment once the incest was called to public notice.32 On the other hand, a strictly normative interpretation of "law" is likewise misleading. This is so because law can be nullified: if few or none obey it, it ceases to exist. Indeed, as Pospisil points out, the result would be "that so-called dead rules which are not enforced and are often unknown to the public, being contrary to the behavior of the majority of the people, are considered together with the rest of the rules as the law of the country."33

By understanding law as an "enforceable rule, enforced by a legitimate ruler possessing authority," we are able to encompass both the empirical and normative aspects of law. The first question one asks is whether, in fact, a rule is enforced. Usually the proper place to look for this phenomenon is among the decisions of the native headmen or councils.34 Yet, the normative and obligatory aspect of law is derived from the authority of the headmen's or councils' decisions, which relate legal commands to the interests, values and beliefs of the community. It is in terms of the rulemakers' capacity for reasoned elaboration, which relates decisions to a community's interests, values and beliefs, that a law becomes authoritative. Conversely, the obligatory aspect of law declines when it becomes less authoritative.

The concept of authority is crucial to the understanding of primitive law; for it relates to the tricky question of whether there must be sanctions for there to be law. It is surely extreme to say that physical force is the only

²⁸ R. S. Rattray, Law and the Ashanti Constitution (London, 1929) pp. 295-296.

²⁹ P. P. Howell, A Manual of Nuer Law (London, 1954), p. 225.

³⁰ Ibid., p. 22.

³¹ Friedrich, op. cit., p. 270. See also The Philosophy of Law in Historical Perspective, 2. ed. (1954), passim.

³² Hoebel, The Law of Primitive Man, pp. 185ff.

³³ Leopold Pospisil, Kapauku Papuans and Their Law, New Haven, 1958, p. 248.

³⁴ Ibid., p. 255.

kind of sanction standing behind law.35 Indeed, if we accept this formulation "law would not be a universal phenomenon, for cultures exist where physical sanction is practically lacking."36 Among the Kikuyu, it has been shown, "if a judgment debtor failed to pay and persisted in his recalcitrance he would be ostracized, excommunicated from society. He was 'shut out'.... His relatives and neighbors would show their disapproval by declining to talk or eat with him." And among the Kapauku, "being shamed by a public reprimand, which sometimes lasts for several days. is much worse than anything except capital punishment."38 Among the Yahgan as well, it is reported, "punishment of being ignored and ostracized is more effective than scoldings and whippings."39 Yet, it appears that if law is to be distinguished from custom, some form of sanctions-however informal and unorganized-must accompany a legal rule, even if these sanctions are rarely invoked to enforce a decision. The Guajiros, for example, emphasize the differences between moral obligations. which derive from custom, and legal obligations, which are backed up by public sanctions.40 Yet, it is perhaps more important to insist that the authoritative nature of law in most primitive cultures, on most occasions, eliminates the necessity for sanctions. Because law is generally an expression of the interests. values and beliefs of a people, a legal offender often will habitually bow to the weight of the law without ever considering the sanctions which disobedience entails.

If a "legal process" is to be identified among primitive peoples, it appears that greater understanding of customary processes of settling disputes is necessary. To some extent, the HRAF material, with its emphasis upon formal "structural" categories, makes this attempt at understanding more difficult, especially where, for example, it stresses "office" rather than "process." It is important to bear in mind, therefore, as the legal realists insist, that one must look to the informal processes of dispute-settling in primitive cultures, for there is a greater tendency to define law too narrowly. Essentially, there are three modes of

35 Hoebel, op. cit., p. 28.

settling disputes in all societies, not all of which, however, need be part of the legal process. If there are no rules at all, we may speak of expedient settling of disputes, if only broad general rules, of discretionary settling, if detailed rules, of judicial settling.⁴¹

The case of the leopard-skin chief among the Nuer might well be an example of the expediential mode of settling disputes (though there are also to be found the other two types of dispute-settling). "Only if both sides are willing to submit to arbitration can a dispute be settled. Also, although the chief, after consultation with the leaders, can give a verdict, this verdict is reached after general agreement and in large measure, therefore, arises from an acknowledgement by the defendant's or plaintiff's party that the other party has justice on its side."42 Most Nuer disputes, in fact, are settled privately and between the parties concerned without the intervention of the leopard-skin chief. Indemnities "will not be paid if there is no pressure on the part of the community in which they live, and there will be pressure in proportion to the extent to which men's mutual animosity disturbs the tranquility of the community, generally speaking, the greater the structural distance between them, the less likelihood of composition."43 Indeed, this seems to be the characteristic mode of dispute settling among atomistic or uncohesive primitive societies, where neither powerful public opinion nor centralized power exists. Just as with the Nuer, compensation is determined by so-called "arbitors" or "palabras," who are nothing more than "intermediaries named by the family groups affected to settle the affair peacefully."44 Although there are fairly welldefined ideas of customary liability and compensation, the family of the injured person must seek a settlement which will provide a settlement in accordance with their power. Where the expedient mode of dispute settling predominates, neither equity nor justice are as important as the maintenance of equilibrium within the body politic, and hence this becomes the central object of any settlement of a dispute.

³⁶ Pospisil, op. cit., p. 267.

³⁷ Lambert, op. cit., p. 128.

³⁸ Pospisil, op. cit., pp. 267-268.

³⁹ Gusinde, op.cit., p. 984.

⁴⁰ Vincenzo Petrullo, "Composition of Torts' in Guajiro Society," Publications of The Philadelphia Anthropological Society, Vol I. (1937), 156-158.

⁴¹ Friedrich, op. cit., p. 426.

⁴² E. E. Evans-Pritchard, "The Nuer of the Southern Sudan," in Fortes and Evans-Pritchard op. cit., p. 293.

⁴³ Howell, op. cit., p. 24.

⁴⁴ Roberto Pineda Giraldo, Aspectos de la Magia en la Guajiro (translated from the Spanish for the Human Relations Area Files by Sydney Muirden), pp. 77.

Discretionary settlement of disputes comes into play whenever no specific rules or principles have been formulated, while at the same time mere whim, that is the failure to recognize broad rules of conduct, cannot be allowed. Among the Azande, for example, "custom determines in most cases what penalty to inflict," but the chief has great discretion in applying the rule. In the case of witchcraft. discretion is particularly pronounced for guilt is determined not on the basis of precedent but by recourse to an oracle. The importance of precedent is here transferred to the correct operation of the oracle so that "true" judgments will be given. 45 Among the Kikuvu, we also find a clear case of discretionary settling of disputes. "Every tribe has a code, but it is a code of general principles, not of detail. Every judgment must conform to it, though the principles are applied with a latitude unknown in European law."46 Where the discretionary mode predominates, the emphasis in dispute settling appears to be on equity, rather than on strict obedience to rules which are held to embody substantive justice. The attitude appears to be similar to Plato's classic argument against written law on the grounds that laws prevent the realization of justice in particular cases. Plato argued for the discretionary approach to justice as long as the ruler was bound by moral conviction. To be sure. his last word on the subject in the Laws marked a change in his position, because by then he despaired of finding rulers who would be certain to be just.47

Finally, the mode of judicial settling of disputes is often the most difficult to identify among primitive peoples. Researchers have tended to ignore this phenomenon in primitive cultures, perhaps for the reason that they have been prepared by their own experiences to look for a determinate legal sovereign or for a formal judicial authority that has explicit powers to enforce its decisions. On the other hand, the legal realists have rightly insisted that the proper test is whether a judge's legal decisions are in fact obeyed, even when he lacks the formal characteristics of a judge. There exists a great variety of "courts" which may appear in primitive societies. 48 To illustrate, a typical

⁴⁵ C. R. Lague, Les Azande du Miam-Niam (trans. from Human Relations Area Files), pp. 20-21. Cf. also Evans-Pritchard, op. cit.

46 Lambert, op. cit., p. 118.

⁴⁷ Grene, Man and His Pride: A study of the Political Philosophy of Thucydides and Plato. See Ch. 12, especially at the end.

48 Hoebel, op. cit., pp. 24-26.

example of the legal process among a primitive people is given by Koppers in his study of the Bhil. The panch, or judicial council consists of an assemblage of "the most established and most influential members of the village." Of them he reports;

The panch treats clan and caste questions above all, property disputes and disagreements of every sort, in which the most numerous are probably those concerned with marriage and women. . . . If one of the two parties is found guilty, then the guilty party must provide the daru. However, it happens rarely that the guilt is ascribed exclusively to one party; generally both sides are more or less guilty and a corresponding decision of the panch is rather rare. 49

If one were to search for "organized legal sanctions" he undoubtedly would find none, for all that exists in the way of sanctions is the informal disapproval of public opinion. Here as in other cases, the sanction of public opinion underlines the authoritative nature of the legal process: to disobey the legal authority is to strike at the heart of the communal values and beliefs, which brings public ostracism. Physical force plays little if any role in upholding the legal process.

The same kind of situation occurs among the Baluhya: intra-clan disputes are usually settled privately by negotiation and mediation. When they become serious and the public takes notice, then the elders of the different clans meet together and pronounce judgment. "The only sanction which supported legal decisions given by the leaders of the sub-clan or by the larger ad hoc assembly of all clan elders was the solidarity of the members of the respective groups in backing these decisions. Native statements assert that whenever the verdict was supported by all or the great majority of the clan elders, the defendant would not have tried to oppose." 50

In the above instances it was fairly clear, although implicit, that decisions were determined on the basis of specific and well-defined customary rules. This judicial mode of settling

⁴⁹ Wilhelm Koppers, *Die Bhil in Zentralindien*, (translated for the Human Relations Area Files by Theodore J. Ziolkowski), p. 165.

⁵⁰ Wagner, op. cit., p. 221. Rothschild added the following comment: "It should be noted that the council's decision was accepted only if elders from all sections of the clan or sub-clan accepted it. If there were disagreement which followed lineage lines and neither side gave in the clan would split which was, one gathers from Wagner, not an infrequent occurrence."

disputes is made even clearer by Pospisil's description of the Kapauku "process of law."

After he secures all the evidence and makes up his mind as to the factual background of the dispute, the authority starts the activity called by the natives boko duwai, which means the process of making a decision and inducing the parties to the dispute to follow it. This process could hardly be compared in its form to the adjudicating activity of our judges. The native authority makes a long speech in which he sums up the evidence, appeals to a rule, and then tells the parties what should be done in order to terminate the dispute. If the disputants are not willing to comply, the authority becomes emotional and starts to shout reproaches, and makes long speeches in which evidence, rules, decisions, and threats form inducements. Indeed, the authority may go as far as to start "wanai, the mad dance," or to change his tactics suddenly and weep bitterly about the misconduct of the defendant and the fact that the latter refuses to obey him. Some native authorities are so skilled in the art of persuasion as to produce genuine tears which almost always break the resistance of the unwilling party. A superficial Western observer confronted with such a situation may very likely regard the weeping headman as the culprit on trial. Thus, from the formalistic point of view, there is little resemblance between the Western court sentence and the boko duwai activity of the headman. However, the effect of the headman's persuasion is the same as that of a verdict passed in our court. As we have seen, there were only five cases in our material (176 cases) where the parties openly resisted and disobeyed the authority. . . . 51

This description of the Kapauku "process of law" again raises the question of whether students of primitive cultures are defining "law" with sufficient flexibility to enable them to understand what appear to be legal phenomena. The reason for informality in the primitive legal process need not be the "underdeveloped" nature of their legal institutions. In fact, informality may be the expression of a profound cultural objection to the formalistic adversary nature of advanced legal institutions. Mediation and negotiation become the mechanism by which this idea is approached, although, of course, these processes do not square with the Bodinian-Austinian doctrine of law as the act of a sovereignty. Because of the traditional mode of settling legal disputes, the observer may fail to note the specific and detailed customary rules for settling disputes, because they often, although known, remain

unarticulated. This is not to say that the abstract rules which natives may identify are necessarily "good law." Only through empirical study of actual "decisions" can the observer learn the actual rules governing settlement of disputes.

The study of law in primitive cultures is intimately related to the basic political structure of those cultures. One of the most important distinctions in this connection, already mentioned, concerns the question whether a particular society possesses some form of centralized governmental institutions. Where a centralized governmental system exists, one can expect a fairly well defined system of law. In these states, rules and decisions are generally made by headmen or councils possessing powers of enforcement by appropriate sanctions. It should be pointed out in this connection that virtually all of the tribes contained in the studies digested in the HRAF display the attitude towards law characteristic of traditional societies: They conceive of law as "discovered" and not "made." Many, as we have seen, have some conception of a "higher law," which they invariably identify with customary practices.

As the centralized governmental institutions. become more powerful, there is some tendency for a society to regard a greater number of misdeeds offenses against the body politic as distinguished from mere private offenses against persons or things. Yet, this is not always so. Among the Zande, for instance, punishment is essential "for the satisfaction of the individual," not of the community. Although there are clear powers of enforcement in the hands of the chief, all crimes except witchcraft appear to be regarded as private matters to be settled by indemnity.52 Among the Baluhya there is no clear distinction between crimes against society and those which affect individuals, because the extent of social involvement depends on the actual social disruption which a particular offense causes and not on its inclusion in a category of crimes against society. The Baluhya, in addition, limit social punishment to repeated offenders who can not be disciplined privately.53 On the other hand, the distinction among the Ashanti between "things hateful to the tribe" and those deeds which were punished privately has been described in elaborate detail. Private offenses were treated as "household matters" and "were settled by the persons directly

⁵¹ Pospisil, op. cit., p. 255.

⁵² P. M. Larken, "Impressions of the Azande,"
Sudan Notes and Records, vol. XIII, p. 99 (1930).
⁵³ Wagner, op. cit., p. 219n.

concerned or were decided by argument before an Elder. . . . " Public offenses, by contrast, "raised a much wider issue to the African and were thought to result in more serious and widely felt consequences."54 Of course. this distinction resembles in some respects the Western classification of offenses as "civil" and "criminal" but the use of these familiar categories can be rather misleading. In many tribes, assault, adultery or even murder are treated as if they were "civil" matters, where some indemnity or refund of the "bride-price" is the only penalty. There does seem to be considerable utility, however, in analyzing primitive legal systems in terms of the distinction between "public" and "private" offenses even though this dichotomy may not apply in all situations. Nevertheless, in those instances where it does apply, the investigator will have an opportunity to learn the reasons for the treatment of particular crimes; he may, at the same time, learn that many laws are not enforced by centralized authority. Finally, an investigation of the degree to which there is a relationship between the scope of centralized power and the extent to which offenses are treated as public might also prove valuable. In any case, the extent of such treatment provides an important clue to the extent of social cohesiveness in any society.

The extent to which offenses are considered public also provides an important measure of the complexity of a society. Hoebel points out that simple societies have relatively little need for law. "If the more primitive societies are more lawless than the more civilized," he writes, "it is not in the sense that they are

ipso facto more disorderly; quite the contrary. It is because they are more homogeneous; relations are more direct and intimate; interests are shared by all in a solid commonality; and there are fewer things to quarrel about."55 Conversely, when a society becomes more interdependent and heterogeneous it inclines to treat an ever greater number of offenses as affecting the body politic. Where anti-social behavior affects only the household or a limited circle of people, social control tends to be confined to this basic sphere; but where the consequences of a misdeed have impact over a wider circle, the range of public offenses is expanded.

Any broadly comparative theory of politics needs to make all possible use of the kind of data concerning primitive societies which anthropology is able to furnish. But there is still a great task ahead in developing more effective cooperation between the two disciplines. If the problems we have discussed and many others like them can be overcome it would surely be a major stimulus to the study of comparative politics. And, perhaps more important, it would provide a readily accessible source of empirical material with which to validate those generalizations which form the core of political theory and science.⁵⁶

⁵⁴ Rattray, op. cit., p. 287.

⁵⁵ Hoebel, op. cit., p. 293.

⁵⁶ The recent work of Gabriel A. Almond and G. Bingham Powell Jr., Comparative Politics: A Developmental Approach (Boston, 1967) utilizes some of this material, as did my Man and His Government (New York, 1963), and Karl W. Deutsch's The Nerves of Government (New York, 1964).

A NONLINEAR MODEL FOR THE ANALYSIS OF JUDICIAL DECISIONS*

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Various attempts have been made in recent years to analyze judicial decisions in selected areas of law as functions of controlling facts. At least two of these attempts have relied on systems of simultaneous equations.1 In both endeavors the assumption was made that the combination of facts on which the decisions depend is linear. In the absence of any clear indication of a nonlinear combination, as well as in view of the significant results that were obtained on the basis of a linear model, the initial approach was justified. The use of high speed digital computers has made it possible, however, to explore the existence of nonlinear relationships where the original assumption of linear relationships was made. The important feature in detecting nonlinear relationships is not primarily the greater accuracy of the results—the linear model has provided acceptable approximations—but the acquisition of new insights into how different facts combine in influencing judicial decisions.

It is the purpose of this paper first to review the linear model, and then to show how it can be extended to a nonlinear model—in general terms as well as in the form of an actual application. Finally, limitations and implications of the nonlinear model will be indicated.

I. THE LINEAR MODEL

In many areas of law, comprehensive sets of

facts have been specified by courts as relevant and controlling for reaching decisions, with the understanding that some combinations of these facts would lead to decisions in favor of one party, whereas other combinations would lead to decisions in favor of the opposing party. For example, in the involuntary confession cases under the due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, the Supreme Court has clearly stated that each decision depends on the particular circumstances surrounding the interrogation of each petitioner-a rule which has been substantially modified but not fundamentally changed by the decision in the Miranda case. Workmen's compensation cases provide another example; reviewing courts have indicated that an award or denial of compensation must be decided on the basis of such facts as the nature of the injury, the circumstances under which the accident occurred and became known, the conditions of employment, etc. Beyond the association of some combinations of facts with decisions which already have been reached, it is not known, however, what decisions can be expected on the basis of other combinations of facts. This problem can be attacked by representing each case which already has been decided by an equation. The resulting system of simultaneous equations can be stated as follows:

$$a + b_{1}X_{11} + b_{2}X_{12} + \cdots + b_{j}X_{1j} + \cdots + b_{n}X_{1n} = Y_{1}$$

$$c + b_{1}X_{21} + b_{2}X_{22} + \cdots + b_{j}X_{2j} + \cdots + b_{n}X_{2n} = Y_{2}$$

$$\vdots \qquad \vdots \qquad \vdots \qquad \vdots \qquad \vdots$$

$$c + b_{1}X_{k1} + b_{2}X_{k2} + \cdots + b_{j}X_{kj} + \cdots + b_{n}X_{kn} = Y_{k}$$

$$\vdots \qquad \vdots \qquad \vdots \qquad \vdots$$

$$a + b_{1}X_{N1} + b_{2}X_{N2} + \cdots + b_{j}X_{Nj} + \cdots + b_{n}X_{Nn} = Y_{N}.$$

$$(1)$$

* Support for this research was provided by a grant awarded by the Committee on Governmental and Legal Processes of the Social Science Research Council. The IBM 7040, which was supported in part by Grant GF-1819 of the National Science Foundation, and the IBM 360 at the Computer Center of the University of Connecticut have been used extensively throughout the entire research. The assistance which has been received from the research foundations and from the University is gratefully acknowledged.

¹ Fred Kort, "Simultaneous Equations and Boolean Algebra in the Analysis of Judicial Decisions," Law and Contemporary Problems, 28 (Winter, 1963), 143-163; and "Content Analysis of Judicial Opinions and Rules of Law," in Glendon Schubert (ed.), Judicial Decision-Making (New York: Free Press of Glencoe, 1963), pp. 133-197; S. Sidney Ulmer, "Quantitative Analysis of Judicial Processes: Some Practical and Theoretical Applications," Law and Contemporary Problems, 28 (Winter, 1963), 164-184; and "Mathematical Models for Predicting Judicial Behavior," in Joe Bernd (ed.), Mathematical Applications in Political Science, III (Charlottesville, Va.: University of Virginia Press, 1967). A different approach, employing Boolean algebra, has been used by Reed C. Lawlor; see his "Foundations of Logical Legal Decision Making," Modern Uses of Logic in Law (June, 1963), pp. 98-114, and Kort, supra.

² Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U. S. 436 (1966).

These simultaneous equations apply to any number of facts and their weights $(j=1, 2, \dots, n)$ in any number of cases $(k=1, 2, \dots, n)$. The only unknowns are the weights of the facts, b_j , and the constant a. Each numerical value of X_{kj} (0, 1, or an integer larger than 1), which indicates the absence, presence, or several manifestations of fact j in case k, is known. If multiple regression is used, the number of votes of the justices favorable to the party seeking redress (which is known in the decided cases) can be used as a numerical value for Y_k . The normal equations which then are obtained by employing the method of least squares are:

where

$$x_{kj} = X_{kj} - \overline{X}_j$$
 $(j = 1, 2, \dots, n),$

$$\overline{X}_j = \sum_{k=1}^N \frac{X_{kj}}{N}, \qquad d_j = \overline{X}_j^{**} - \overline{X}_j^*,$$

$$\overline{X}^* = \sum_{k=1}^{N_1} \frac{X_{kj}}{N_1}, \qquad \overline{X}_j^{**}_{a} = \sum_{k=1}^{N_2} \frac{X_{kj}}{N_2},$$

and where N is the total number of cases, N_1 the number of cases in the con group (decisions against the aggrieved party), and N_2 the number of cases in the pro group (decisions in favor of the aggrieved party).

By substituting the values for b_i which are

As the normal equations are solved, the weights of the facts are obtained. By substituting these weights for b_j in a case not previously encountered, a numerical value for Y_k —which indicates in terms of the votes of the justices a decision in favor or against the party seeking redress—is obtained.

If discriminant analysis is used, a numerical value is not assigned to Y_k . The system of simultaneous equations which corresponds to the normal equations in multiple regression analysis is the following:

obtained from the solution of these equations in the "discriminant function"

$$Z_k = b_1 X_{k1} + b_2 X_{k2} + \cdots + b_n X_{kn} \tag{4}$$

for any case k, a numerical value which places the case in a pro or con category can be computed.

Whether discriminant analysis or multiple regression should be used depends on the assumption which is made about the nature of the decision. If it is assumed that the decisions

$$b_{1} \sum x_{k_{1}^{2}} + b_{2} \sum x_{k_{1}} x_{k_{2}} + \cdots + b_{n} \sum x_{k_{1}} x_{k_{n}} = d_{1}$$

$$b_{1} \sum x_{k_{2}} x_{k_{1}} + b_{2} \sum x_{k_{2}^{2}} + \cdots + b_{n} \sum x_{k_{2}} x_{k_{n}} = d_{2}$$

$$\vdots \qquad \vdots \qquad \vdots \qquad \vdots \qquad \vdots$$

$$b_{1} \sum x_{k_{1}} x_{k_{1}} + b_{2} \sum x_{k_{1}} x_{k_{2}} + \cdots + b_{n} \sum x_{k_{n}^{2}} = d_{n},$$
(3)

³ This is the method which was used in my studies cited in note 1. For a somewhat different application of multiple regression to the analysis of judicial decisions, see Werner F. Gruenbaum and Albert Newhouse, "Quantitative Analysis of Judicial Decisions: Some Problems of Prediction," Houston Law Review, 3 (1965) 201-220.

⁴ This is the method which was used in the studies by Ulmer, see *supra*, note 1. For a somewhat different application of discriminant analysis to judicial decisions, see S. Sidney Ulmer, "The Discriminant Function and a Theoretical Context for Its Use in Estimating the Votes of Judges," to be published in a forthcoming volume by John Wiley and Sons, edited by Joseph Tanenhaus and Joel Grossman.

represent two separate categories (pro and con), discriminant analysis is appropriate. If, on the other hand, it is assumed that the decisions represent various degrees of support of parties in terms of the votes of the justiceswhich reveal, of course, whether each decision is pro or con-multiple regression has to be employed. In exploring nonlinear relationships between the controlling facts, there is another consideration which is decisive in the choice of discriminant analysis or multiple regression. Two-group discriminant analysis, which would distinguish a pro category from a con category, assumes linearity. Multiple regression can be linear or nonlinear. It also is true that multiple discriminant analysis encompasses nonlinearity. However, it would be possible to attribute meaning to the results of multiple discriminant analysis in this instance only if the analysis would discriminate groups of decisions representing different combinations of votes. The result then would be virtually the same as the one obtained by multiple regression. For these reasons, multiple regression will be used in the exposition of the nonlinear model.

Before turning attention to the nonlinear model, the use of factor analysis in connection with the linear model should be noted. In employing the linear model, it is advisable to restate the facts in terms of factors for the purpose of multiple regression or discriminant analysis for two reasons: (1) the equations stated in terms of the facts may not contain sufficient information for a unique solution; (2) it is desirable to explore the mutual dependence or independence of the facts. This restatement of the facts in terms of factors can be accomplished by the use of factor analysis. The original equations representing the observations (cases) then can be written as follows:

(the facts), an assumption regarding linearity or nonlinearity in the correlations between facts has to be made. This, of course, is an assumption which one does not wish to make in exploring a nonlinear model. For this reason, the exposition of the nonlinear model will use the facts as variables without reducing them first to factors. In view of the purposes of factor analysis, which have been indicated, it must be understood that the exploration of a nonlinear model can be pursued only if the equations stated in terms of facts provide sufficient information for a unique solution (in the least squares sense).

II. THE NONLINEAR MODEL

In considering a nonlinear model for the analysis of judicial decisions, it must be noted that there are infinite possibilities. This can be seen from the fact alone that the linear model which has been discussed can be readily extended to a nonlinear model by raising any X_j to a power ranging from 2 to infinity. Obviously, then, even at the initial stage of ex-

$$A + B_{1}\overline{F}_{11} + B_{2}\overline{F}_{12} + \cdots + B_{j}\overline{F}_{1j} + \cdots + B_{m}\overline{F}_{1m} = Y_{1}$$

$$A + B_{1}\overline{F}_{21} + B_{2}\overline{F}_{22} + \cdots + B_{j}\overline{F}_{2j} + \cdots + B_{m}\overline{F}_{2m} = Y_{2}$$

$$\vdots$$

$$A + B_{1}\overline{F}_{k1} + B_{2}\overline{F}_{k2} + \cdots + B_{j}\overline{F}_{kj} + \cdots + B_{m}\overline{F}_{km} = Y_{k}$$

$$\vdots$$

$$A + B_{1}\overline{F}_{N1} + B_{2}\overline{F}_{N2} + \cdots + B_{j}\overline{F}_{Nj} + \cdots + B_{m}\overline{F}_{Nm} = Y_{N}.$$

$$(5)$$

These equations apply to any number of factors and their weights $(j=1, 2, \ldots, m)$ in any number of cases $(k=1, 2, \ldots, N)$. Since the object of the factor analysis is to restate the facts in the original equations in terms of fewer variables, it is expected that the number of factors m is smaller than the number of facts n. Each numerical value of \overline{F}_{ki} , which is the factor estimate of factor j in case k is known; it has been obtained as a result of the factor analysis. The only unknowns in the new equations are the weights of the factors, B_i . As new cases arise, the applicable facts can be reduced to the factors which have been identified, and by substituting the weights of the factors obtained from the solution of the equations the decisions can be determined. However, since factor analysis is based on the correlations between the original variables

- ⁵ See David V. Tiedeman, "The Utility of the Discriminant Function in Psychological and Guidance Investigations," Harvard Educational Review, 21 (Spring, 1951), 71-80, at 79.
- ⁶ This method has been used in my earlier studies and in the more recent study by Ulmer, see *supra*, note 1.

ploration, only a nonlinear relationship between facts which has a meaningful interpretation can be considered.

For the purpose of exposition, it will be helpful to examine a hypothetical example. Assume that—contrary to reality—the justices of the Supreme Court of the United States consider only two facts in deciding an involuntary confession case: X_1 —the defendant was subjected to protracted interrogation; X_2 —the defendant did not even complete an elementary education. If the linear model which has been discussed is used, the decision in this instance would be stated as a function of facts as follows:

$$a + b_1 X_1 + b_2 X_2 = Y. (6)$$

Since the function represents the regression equation, it takes into account not merely the simple correlations between the decision and each fact, but the multiple correlation between the decision and the facts in combination. It is linear, for in three-dimensional space it can be represented by a plane. (If only one fact were involved it would be represented by a line, and if more than two facts were involved it would be represented by a hyperplane.) The

interpretation of the function would be as follows: The influence which the fact that the defendant has not even completed an elementary education has on the decision adds to the influence which the fact that he was subjected to a protracted interrogation has. It is quite possible, however, that the subnormal education of the defendant does not add to his protracted interrogation as a fact in favor of a reversal of his conviction, but that it increases the impact of that fact on the decision. This possibility can be represented by a multiplicative rather than additive relationship between the facts in the following form:

$$a + (b_1 X_1)(b_2 X_2) = Y.$$
 (7)

This function is nonlinear, for in threedimensional space it is not represented by a plane, but by a hull. In order to maintain a meaningful interpretation of this function, a modification has to be introduced. According to the form in which the function has been crease the impact of his protracted interrogation on the decision, but—in the absence of subnormal education—the protracted interrogation still would influence the decision.

In reality, judicial decisions depend. of course, on more complex and more extensive combinations of facts than are indicated in the foregoing illustration. For example, in the involuntary confession cases decided by the Supreme Court of the United States, 29 controlling facts can be identified. In the workmen's compensation cases reviewed by the Supreme Court of Connecticut, 22 controlling facts appear in the opinions of the Court. Multiplicative relationships therefore are possible not only between pairs of facts, but between sets of 3, 4, \cdots , n facts. Moreover, the relationships between some facts may be additive and between others multiplicative. For n facts, in any case k, the decision as a function of facts then would have to be stated in the following form:

$$a + (1 + b_{1}X_{k1})(1 + b_{2}X_{k2}) \cdot \cdot \cdot (1 + b_{m_{1}}X_{km_{1}})$$

$$+ (1 + b_{m_{1}+1}X_{k(m_{1}+1)})(1 + b_{m_{1}+2}X_{k(m_{1}+2)}) \cdot \cdot \cdot (1 + b_{m_{1}+m_{2}}X_{k(m_{1}+m_{2})}) + \cdot \cdot \cdot$$

$$+ (1 + b_{m_{1}+m_{2}+\cdots+m_{l-1}+1}X_{k(m_{1}+m_{2}+\cdots+m_{l-1}+1)})(1 + b_{m_{1}+m_{2}+\cdots+m_{l-1}+2}X_{k(m_{1}+m_{2}+\cdots+m_{l-1}+2)})$$

$$\cdot \cdot \cdot (1 + b_{m_{1}+m_{2}+\cdots+m_{l}}X_{k(m_{1}+m_{2}+\cdots+m_{l})})$$

$$+ b_{m_{1}+m_{2}+\cdots+m_{l}+1}X_{k(m_{1}+m_{2}+\cdots+m_{l}+1)}$$

$$+ b_{m_{1}+m_{2}+\cdots+m_{l}+2}X_{k(m_{1}+m_{2}+\cdots+m_{l}+2)} + \cdot \cdot \cdot + b_{n}X_{n} = Y_{k}, \text{ where } (m_{1} + m_{2} + \cdots + m_{l}) \leq n.$$

$$(9)$$

stated, the fact that the defendant was subjected to protracted interrogation would have no effect on the decision if his education were not subnormal. For X_2 then would be 0, and the entire term, including X_1 would vanish. Such a result would not be plausible. One would expect X_1 to have some impact on the decision, even if X_2 were absent. For this reason, it would be more meaningful to modify the preceding function as follows:

$$a + (1 + b_1 X_1)(1 + b_2 X_2) = Y.$$
 (8)

According to this expression, the subnormal education of the defendant certainly could in-

7 It should be noted, however, that precisely this type of function is very meaningful in the analysis of some judicial decisions in Roman law systems. In the latter, the presence of specified facts frequently is designated by legislatures or courts as a set of indispensable conditions for a decision in favor of the aggrieved party. A forthcoming study by the author, to be presented at the APSA Annual Meeting in 1968, will exemplify this point with regard to Swiss cases.

In determining which particular form of this function applies to a specified set of judicial decisions, a nonlinear multiple regression analysis has to be performed several hundred to several thousand times-depending on the number of facts and the number of multiplicative relationships between facts which are identified as significant in the course of the analysis. It can be readily seen that such an investigation would be prohibitive without the use of a high speed computer. With the use of a computer, the following procedure can be employed: Linear regression is performed first. Then a multiplicative relationship between the first pair of facts is introduced into the regression equation, and nonlinear regression is performed. If the results of this regression are significant in relation to the preceding one,8 the multiplicative relationship between

. 8 The significance test which can be employed here is the F test for determining significance of nonlinear regression over linear regression or higher order nonlinear regression over lower order nonlinear regression:

$$F = \frac{\left[\sum (Y_{\text{from higher order regression}} - \overline{Y})^2 - \sum (Y_{\text{from lower order regression}} - \overline{Y})^2\right]/1}{\left[\sum (Y - \overline{Y})^2 - \sum (Y_{\text{from higher order regression}} - \overline{Y})^2\right]/(N - n - 1)}.$$

the first two facts is accepted; if not, the additive relationship is restored. In any case, a multiplicative relationship between the next pair of facts is introduced into the regression equation, and a new nonlinear regression is performed. This procedure is employed for every pair of facts, and in each instance the acceptance or rejection of the multiplicative relationship under investigation depends on the significance test of the higher order nonlinear regression in relation to the lower order nonlinear regression. This procedure then is extended to multiplicative relationships between 3, 4, \cdots , n facts. It is possible, of course, that every multiplicative relationship is rejected because of insufficient significance. In that case, the original linear model is retained. It can be seen, therefore, that no assumption regarding linearity or nonlinearity is made in this procedure. The linear model is transformed into a nonlinear model only if the significance tests so indicate.

Of crucial importance in the foregoing procedure is the solution of nonlinear simultaneous equations. The normal equations which are encountered in the iterative regression analysis are nonlinear. This can be seen if one considers merely a few terms in the preceding, generally stated function (9):

$$a + (1 + b_1 X_{k1})(1 + b_2 X_{k2}) + \cdots + b_n X_{kn} = Y_k. \quad (10)$$

In accordance with the method of least squares, on which regression analysis is based, the function

$$g = \sum_{k=1}^{N} \left[a + (1 + b_1 X_{k1})(1 + \dot{\beta}_2 X_{k2}) + \cdots + b_n X_{kn} - Y_k \right]^2 \quad (11)$$

has to be minimized. The normal equations, which are obtained by taking the partial derivatives of this expression with respect to every unknown and setting them equal to 0, can be written in the following form (the subscript k is omitted):

$$f_{0} = \frac{\partial g}{\partial a} = Na + N + b_{1} \sum X_{1} + b_{2} \sum X_{2} + b_{1}b_{2} \sum X_{1}X_{2} + \cdots + b_{n} \sum X_{n} - \sum Y = 0$$

$$f_{1} = \frac{\partial g}{\partial b_{1}} = b_{1} \sum X_{1}^{2} + b_{1}b_{2}^{2} \sum X_{1}^{2}X_{2}^{2} + \cdots + a \sum X_{1} + ab_{2} \sum X_{1}X_{2} + \cdots + \sum X_{1} + b_{2} \sum X_{1}X_{2} + \cdots + b_{n} \sum X_{1}X_{n} - \sum X_{1}Y + b_{2}^{2} \sum X_{1}X_{2}^{2} + \cdots + b_{2} \sum X_{1}X_{2} + 2b_{1}b_{2} \sum X_{1}^{2}X_{2} + \cdots + b_{n} \sum X_{1}X_{n} - \sum X_{1}Y + b_{2}^{2} \sum X_{1}X_{2}^{2} + \cdots + b_{2}b_{n} \sum X_{1}X_{2}X_{n} - b_{2} \sum X_{1}X_{2}Y = 0$$

$$f_{2} = \frac{\partial g}{\partial b_{2}} = b_{2} \sum X_{2}^{2} + b_{1}^{2}b_{2} \sum X_{1}^{2}X_{2}^{2} + \cdots + a \sum X_{2} + ab_{1} \sum X_{1}X_{2} + \cdots + \sum X_{2} + b_{1} \sum X_{1}X_{2} + \cdots + b_{1} \sum X_$$

Since only a few terms were taken from the generally stated function, it should be noted that the normal equations are in reality much more complicated than the equations in the preceding exposition. A solution of the normal equations by graphic methods is not possible.

See F. E. Croxton and D. J. Cowden, Applied General Statistics, 2nd. Ed. (Englewood Cliffs, N. J.: Prentice-Hall, Inc., 1955), pp. 726-732, including the exposition of the t-test on p. 727.

However, with the assistance of a high speed computer, a method of iterative approximation—based on Taylor's theorem⁹—can be

⁹ See, e.g., R. E. Johnson and F. L. Kiokemeister, Calculus, 3rd. Ed. (Boston: Allyn and Bacon, Inc., 1964), pp. 397-401, and M. H. Protter and C. B. Morrey, Jr., College Calculus (Reading, Mass.: Addison-Wesley Publ. Co., Inc., 1964), pp. 695-699. This method was brought to the attention of the author by Pro-

used for the solution of these equations.

According to Taylor's theorem, a function of several variables $f(x_1, x_2, \dots, x_n)$, which is continuous in the neighborhood of a point (c_1, c_2, \cdots, c_n) , and all the partial derivatives of which up to p+1 are continuous in the neighborhood of that point, can be expanded as follows:

$$f_{j}(a, b_{1}, b_{2}, \cdots, b_{n})$$

$$= f_{j}(c_{0}, c_{1}, c_{2}, \cdots, c_{n})$$

$$+ \frac{\partial f_{j}(c_{0}, c_{1}, c_{2}, \cdots, c_{n})}{\partial a} (a - c_{0})$$

$$+ \frac{\partial f_{j}(c_{0}, c_{1}, c_{2}, \cdots, c_{n})}{\partial b_{j}} (b_{1} - c_{1})$$
(15)

$$f(x_{1}, x_{2}, \dots, x_{n}) = f(c_{1}, c_{2}, \dots, c_{n})$$

$$+ \sum_{1 \leq r_{1} + r_{2} + \dots + r_{n} \leq p} \frac{\partial^{r_{1} + r_{2} + \dots + r_{n}} f(c_{1}, c_{2}, \dots, c_{n})}{\partial x_{1}^{r_{1}} \partial x_{2}^{r_{2}} \dots \partial x_{n}^{r_{n}}} \frac{(x_{1} - c_{1})^{r_{1}}}{r_{1}!} \dots \frac{(x_{n} - c_{n})^{r_{n}}}{r_{n}!}$$

$$+ \sum_{r_{1} + r_{2} + \dots + r_{n} - p + 1} \frac{\partial^{p+1} f(z_{1}, z_{2}, \dots, z_{n})}{\partial x_{1}^{r_{1}} \partial x_{2}^{r_{2}} \dots \partial x_{n}^{r_{n}}} \frac{(x_{1} - c_{1})^{r_{1}}}{r_{1}!} \dots \frac{(x_{n} - c_{n})^{r_{n}}}{r_{n}!},$$

$$(13)$$

where (z_1, z_2, \dots, z_n) is a point between $(x_1,$

 x_2, \dots, x_n) and (c_1, c_2, \dots, c_n) . If (c_1, c_2, \dots, c_n) is so chosen that it is close to (x_1, x_2, \dots, x_n) , approximate equality can be attained in (13) even if the right side of the equation is limited to the first derivatives. (13) then becomes

$$f(x_{1}, x_{2}, \cdots, x_{n})$$

$$\stackrel{=}{=} f(c_{1}, c_{2}, \cdots, c_{n})$$

$$+ \frac{\partial f(c_{1}, c_{2}, \cdots, c_{n})}{\partial x_{1}} (x_{1} - c_{1})$$

$$+ \frac{\partial f(c_{1}, c_{2}, \cdots, c_{n})}{\partial x_{2}} (x_{2} - c_{2}) + \cdots$$

$$+ \frac{\partial f(c_{1}, c_{2}, \cdots, c_{n})}{\partial x_{n}} (x_{n} - c_{n}).$$
(14)

Each of the normal equations in (12), f_0 , f_1 , f_2, \dots, f_n , is a function of several variables, namely, of a, b_1, b_2, \dots, b_n . Any of these normal equations f_j $(j=0, 1, 2, \dots, n)$ therefore may be expanded in accordance with (14):

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$$+\frac{\partial f_j(c_0, c_1, c_2, \cdots, c_n)}{\partial b_2} (b_2 - c_2) + \cdots$$

$$+\frac{\partial f_j(c_0, c_1, c_2, \cdots, c_n)}{\partial b_n} (b_n - c_n).$$

For the purpose of initial approximation, the values obtained for a, b_1, b_2, \cdots, b_n from linear regression can be used as values for c_0 , c_1, c_2, \cdots, c_n . Of course, the values of a, b_1, b_2, \cdots, b_n as nonlinear regression coefficients in (12) are not known. Furthermore, the values of $(a-c_0)$, (b_1-c_1) , (b_2-c_2) , \cdots , (b_n-c_n) are not known. However, by solving a system of equations with $(a-c_0)$, (b_1-c_1) , (b_2-c_2) , \cdots , (b_n-c_n) — designated in briefer notation as Δa , Δb_1 , $\Delta b_2, \cdots, \Delta b_n$, respectively—as unknowns, a first approximation to a, b_1, b_2, \dots, b_n as nonlinear regression coefficients can be found. This system of equations can be obtained by applying (15) to each of the normal equations in (12); i.e., the partial derivatives of each normal equation with respect to a, b_1, b_2, \cdots , b_n are taken, the values of $c_0, c_1, c_2, \cdots, c_n$ are substituted for a, b_1, b_2, \cdots, b_n respectively, and the following system of equations is formed:

As the values of Δc , Δb_1 , Δb_2 , \cdots , Δb_n that are obtained from the solution of these equations are added to the initial values of c_0 , c_1 , c_2 , \cdots , c_n , the first approximation to a, b_1 , b_2 , \cdots , b_n as nonlinear regression coefficients is found. The values of a, b_1 , b_2 , \cdots , b_n in this first approximation then are used as c_0 , c_1 , c_2 , \cdots , c_n , and the entire procedure is repeated as many times as is necessary for reaching a point at which the residuals between the right and the left sides of the normal equations (12) vanish or become negligible.

III. APPLICATION OF THE NONLINEAR MODEL

For the purpose of testing and demonstration, the proposed nonlinear model was applied to an analysis of the Connecticut workmen's compensation cases. Included in the analysis were all 128 cases which the Supreme Court of Connecticut had decided since the adoption of the State Workmen's Compensation Law of 1913 with regard to the following question: Does the combination of relevant facts justify an award or denial of compensation? Of course, there are several thousand workmen's compensation cases which were never submitted to the Connecticut Supreme Court for review, and there are many cases which the Court reviewed on other grounds. But the analysis under consideration is concerned only with those cases in which the decisions of the Court may be regarded as a function of identified relevant facts. These facts are listed in Table 1.

In accordance with the procedure described in the preceding section, linear regression analysis was performed first. The observation equations, which are stated in general terms in (1), were formed pursuant to the basic regression equation

$$a + b_1 X_{k1} + b_2 X_{k2} + \dots + b_j X_{kj} + \dots + b_{22} X_{k22} = Y_k,$$
 (17)

with $k=1, 2, \cdots, 128$ (128 cases). Note again that the value of each X_{kj} is 0, 1, or an integer larger than 1, depending on whether fact j is absent, present, or has several manifestations in case k. The normal equations—stated in general terms in (2)—were obtained by taking the partial derivatives of the sum of the squares of the observation equations with respect to every unknown and setting them equal to 0. As these normal equations were solved, the values of the linear regression coefficients $a, b_1, b_2, \cdots, b_{22}$, which are listed in Table 2, were found. The substitution of these values

10 Copies of the complete set of data and results may be obtained from the author.

in the observation equations (1) yielded the estimated values for Y_k .

The significance test for the linear multiple regression gave a value of F = 7.962, with a chance probability for such a value of P <0.001. Consequently, the results of the linear regression could be accepted as significant. Nevertheless, the possibility had to be considered that the linear model was merely a good approximation to a nonlinear model, which would show even higher significance. The exploration of this possibility was particularly indicated by the fact that some regression coefficients were negative (see Table 2) and made an intuitive interpretation difficult. For example, one would expect that fact 4—an accident occurred in the course of an activity known to and permitted by the employer-should have a positive rather than negative weight in contributing to a decision in favor of the claimant. It will be seen that even the nonlinear model in its application to this set of data did not eliminate entirely such inadequacies, but it will be apparent that the latter model achieved substantial improvement in this and other respects.

After the completion of the linear regression. a multiplicative relationship between the first two facts was introduced into the regression equation, and nonlinear regression in accordance with the exposition of systems of equation (10) to (16) was performed. Since the results were not significant in relation to the preceding linear regression, a multiplicative relationship between the first two facts was rejected. Likewise, the introduction of every subsequent multiplicative relationship into the regression equation and the corresponding nonlinear regression analysis did not yield significance over the linear model until the pair of fact 4 and fact 18 (see Table 1) were reached. At that point, the significance test for nonlinear regression gave a value of F = 8.024, with a chance probability of P < 0.001, and the significance test for the nonlinear regression over the preceding linear regression yielded a value of F = 5.997 (see note 8), with a chance probability P < 0.05. Consequently, a multiplicative relationship between fact 4 and fact 18 was accepted, and the further exploration of the nonlinear model continued on the basis of the following regression equation:

$$a + b_1 X_{k1} + b_2 X_{k2} + \cdots + (1 + b_4 X_{k4})(1 + b_{18} X_{k18}) + b_6 X_{k5} + \cdots + b_{17} X_{k17} + b_{19} X_{k19} + \cdots + b_{22} X_{k22} = Y_k,$$
(18)
$${}^{11} F = \frac{\sum (Y_{\text{from regression}} - \overline{Y})^2 / n}{\sum (Y - Y_{\text{from regression}})^2 / (N - n - 1)}.$$

TABLE 1: FACTS IN THE CONNECTICUT WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION CASES

Injury Claimed Is an Occupational Disease or the Result of Repetitive Trauma or Repetitive Acts:

- 1. Injury consists of a disease or a physical disability which is frequently encountered in the occupation of the employee.
- 2. Injury consists of a disease or a physical disability which reasonably can be connected with the occupation of the employee.

Circumstances under Which an Accident or an Act Alleged to Have Caused the Injury Occurred:

- 3. Accident or act occurred during working hours.
- 4. Accident or act occurred in the course of an activity known to and permitted by the employer, or customary and not forbidden by the employer.
- 5. Accident or act occurred in the course of an activity conducive to efficient work.
- Accident or act occurred in the course of an activity indispensable to the performance of the work.
- 7. Accident or act occurred on the premises of employment, in an area annexed to the place of employment, in an area where the work normally is performed, in the direct course of transportation furnished by the employer, or in living accommodations furnished by the employer.
- 8. Accident occurred as the result of an act or activity which did not involve unnecessary, self-imposed, knowlingly hazardous conduct, such as taking a "joy-ride" on a conveyor belt for unloading coal.
- 9. Accident occurred as the result of an act by the injured employee, the occurrence of which was known to the employer and not effectively forbidden.

Circumstances under Which the Injury Became Known:

- 10. Injury became immediately apparent to the employee as a result of an accident or act.
- 11. Accident or act as described by the claimant was observed by other persons.
- 12. Injury became immediately apparent to other observers as a result of an accident or act.
- 13. Injury was reported to the employer as soon as it became apparent to the employee.
- 14. Accident or act alleged to have caused the injury was promptly reported to the employer.
- 15. Accident or act alleged to have caused the injury was brought to the attention of a physician when medical treatment for the injury was first sought.
- 16. Claim for compensation filed as soon as the injury became apparent to the employee.

Conditions of the Employment Which Affect the Probability of an Injury Subject to Compensation

17. Conditions of employment exposed employee to an uncommon risk or to a common risk to an unusual degree, or to an exertion or risk beyond usual workaday labor (including railroad crossings en route to work and adjacent to the place of employment when employer knows of and permits use of crossing path).

Causal Aspects of the Injury

- 18. The cause alleged by the claimant is the probable cause of the injury, as supported by expert testimony.
- 19. The injury is causally traceable to the employment other than through weakened resistance or lowered vitality, as supported by expert testimony.
- The accident or act is the cause of the injury, and no expert testimony is necessary to establish this fact.

Evidence Not Derived from Expert Testimony

- 21. No contradictions in the evidence given by the claimant.
- 22. All evidence not derived from expert testimony in favor of the validity of the allegation made by the claimant.

with values for a, b_1 , b_2 , \cdots , b_{22} as listed in the applicable column in Table 2. It should be noted that this equation is a particular form of the generally stated equation (9).

The further introduction of multiplicative

relationships between pairs of facts did not yield significance over the regression in terms of (18) until the pair of fact 7 and fact 20 (see Table 1) was reached. At that point, the significance test gave a value of F = 9.179,

TABLE 2. REGRESSION COEFFICIENTS

Applicable to facts (X_1) as listed in Table 1	Linear	Nonlinear, after inclusion of multiplicative relationship between facts 4 and 18	Nonlinear, after further inclusion of multiplicative relationship between facts 7 and 20	
a	-1.709	-2.860	-4.836	
bı	-0.330	-0.288	-1.539	
b_2	3.388	3.027	3.265	
b_2	-0.101	-0.082	-0.540	
b4	-0.529	-0.119	-0.276	
bs	2.443	2.088	3.339	
b_6	-0.704	-0.542	-1.154	
b7	1.317	1.263	1.238	
bs	0.484	0.348	0.395	
ba	0.929	0.929	0.530	
b_{10}	0.325	0.743	0.727	
b_{11}	.0.088	0.033	1.114	
b12	-1.280	-1.197	-2.986	
b_{13}	0.031	-0.100	0.648	
b14	-0.178	-0.111	-0.400	
b_{15}	0.566	0.479	0.823	
b_{16}	-2.235	-2.117	-1.575	
b ₁₇	1.103	0.982	1.395	
b_{18}	2.062	2.989	0.992	
b_{19}	0.700	0.237	2.854	
b_{20}	2.561	2.773	2.184	
b21	0.443	0.449	0.864	
b_{22}	0.225	0.085	0.368	

with a chance probability P < 0.001, and the significance test for the higher order nonlinear regression over the lower order nonlinear regression yielded a value of F = 99.997, with a chance probability P < 0.001. On that basis, a multiplicative relationship between fact 7 and fact 20 was accepted as part of the nonlinear regression equation, which now could be stated as follows:

$$a + b_1 X_{k1} + b_2 X_{k2} + \cdots + (1 + b_4 X_{k4})(1 + b_{18} X_{k18}) + b_5 X_{k5} + \cdots + (1 + b_7 X_{k7})(1 + b_{20} X_{k20}) + b_8 X_{k8} + \cdots + b_{17} X_{k17} + b_{19} X_{k19} + b_{21} X_{k21} + b_{22} X_{k22} = Y_k;$$

with values for a, b_1 , b_2 , \cdots , b_{22} as listed in the applicable column in Table 2.

An exploration of further multiplicative relationships between pairs of facts and multiplicative relationships between more than two facts did not yield any significance over nonlinear regression in terms of (19). To be sure, the proposed procedure is designed to examine multiplicative relationships between 2, 3, \cdots , n facts. On empirical grounds, it is not likely, however, that significant multiplicative relationships in all these combinations will be found.

A comparison of equations (17) and (19) shows that the nonlinear model which has been accepted for this set of data is superior to the linear model not only on the basis of statistical

significance tests, but also on intuitive grounds. If the applicable values of the regression coefficients $a, b_1, b_2, \cdots, b_{22}$ from columns 1 and 3 of Table 2 are substituted in equations (17) and (19), respectively, the following observations can be made: In the linear model, fact 18 counteracts with a positive weight of approximately 2 the negative weight of approximately 1/2 of fact 4 (which can not be easily interpreted), if both facts are present in the case. In the nonlinear model, the impact of fact 4, with a positive weight of approximately 3/4, is increased twice if fact 18 also is present in the case. [Note $(1+b_4X_{k4})$ $(1+b_{18}X_{k18})$ with the applicable values for b_4 and b_{18} and 1 (presence) for X_{k4} and X_{k18} in equation (19)]. The latter relationship is more meaningful, for one would expect that verification by expert testimony substantially increases the influence of an accident in the course of an activity permitted by the employer on the decision. Similar observations can be made with respect to facts 7 and 20. In the linear model, fact 20 adds a positive weight of approximately 2 1/2 to a positive weight of approximately 1 1/4 of fact 7, if both facts are present in the case. In the nonlinear model, the impact of fact 7, with a positive weight of approximately 2 1/2 is increased three times if fact 20 also is present in the case. The latter relationship is more plausible than the former, for one would expect that an undisputed injury does not merely add to the influence of the fact that the accident occurred at a place connected with the employment, but that it decisively increases the impact of the latter on the decision in a workmen's compensation case.

IV. LIMITATIONS AND IMPLICATIONS

In general, the application of the nonlinear model provides insights into the relationships between facts in judicial decisions which otherwise would be merely speculative. Limitations in the application of the model must be recognized, however. In the discussion of factor analysis in connection with the linear model, it was noted that—without reducing the facts to factors-not enough information may be obtained from the observations (cases) for a unique solution of the simultaneous equations. Another possibility is that enough information for a unique solution of the equations is obtained, but there are too few observations for an indication of significance in the results of multiple regression. This is the problem which was encountered in the analysis of the involuntary confession cases decided by the Supreme Court of the United States. With 29 facts and 33 cases (only 4 degrees of freedom), the F test did not even show significance at the 0.05 level, either for the initial linear regression or for any subsequent nonlinear regression. Clearly, this is a situation to which the nonlinear model can not be applied. On the other hand, by reducing the facts to factors and employing the linear model as an approximation, i.e., system of equations (5), significant results can be obtained.

As far as the implications of the use of the nonlinear model are concerned, three comments—quite different from each other—seem to be in order: (1) The exploration of nonlinear relationships between facts that determine judicial decisions can be combined with an analysis of the acceptance or rejection of facts by appellate courts.¹² In this fashion, it first

¹² See Fred Kort, "Models for the Analysis of Fact-Acceptance by Appellate Courts," The American Behavioral Scientist, 9 (April, 1966), 8-10; and "Quantitative Analysis of Fact-Patterns in Cases and Their Impact on Judicial Decisions," Harvard Law Review, 79 (June, 1966), 1595-1603.

can be ascertained under what circumstances facts are accepted by appellate courts from lower court records and appellate briefs as relevant for decisions, and then it can be determined whether linear or nonlinear relationships exist between the accepted facts in influencing the decisions. (2) It can be shown that nonlinear relations between controlling facts are even more dominant in Roman law systems than in common law systems. The Swiss workmen's compensation cases provide a significant example in that respect. 13 On that basis, linear and nonlinear models furnish a criterion for distinctions in judicial decisions between major legal systems. (3) The dependence of decisions on controlling facts is not unique to judicial decisions, although it has special importance in adjudication. Consequently, the proposed nonlinear model can be employed in the analysis of decision-making processes beyond the framework of judicial action.

13 See supra, note 7.

DECISION COSTS IN COALITION FORMATION*

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Choices made in coalition formation are costly to participants, complex, and difficult to measure with precision because observable coalitions are multi-person, non-zero-sum games. At least eight decision costs are included in the process. The purpose of this paper is to identify them and to examine their usefulness in explaining coalition formation. Decisions include: (1) information costs, (2) responsibility costs, (3) intergame costs, (4) costs of division of payoffs, (5) dissonance costs (6) inertia costs, (7) time costs, and (8) persuasion costs.

Coalition building is an essential aspect of decision making within any political system. Whether one is studying the behavior of a municipal planning commission, a committee or sub-committee of a legislative body, the United Nations Security Council, or any other decision-making institution in which more than one person is involved in reaching a decision, the essential problem is often one of establishing a winning coalition within the entire group membership. A winning coalition is any portion of the group that can decide to do or not to do something that is on the agenda of the group and over which it has competent authority. The requirements of what constitutes a winning coalition are determined by the formal and informal rules of the game. Most commonly, one of the rules is that a winning coalition must consist of onehalf the members of the group plus one and this assumption is made for purposes of this paper. The size of the coalition needed is important for individual and coalition strategies, but it is not important conceptually. That is, the problems involved in securing a winning coalition on the United States Supreme Court when only four votes are needed in order to agree to hear a case affects the strategy of the members of the court, but is of no theoretical importance to coalition formation. Once the formal rules indicate the size of coalition minimally necessary, the size and makeup of the

* We wish to thank Paul Dawson, Susan B. Hannah, and James Ozinga, all former students in our "choice theory" seminar at Michigan State University, for their critical comments on this article.

coalition is theoretically determined by an algebraic summation of the decision costs involved for participants. These costs incorporate a variety of economic and psychological factors and in particular are influenced by three "principles." These are the unanimity principle, the size principle, and the indispensable membership principle.

The unanimity principle is derived from the small-group theories of social psychology. It can be stated as follows:

Among members of a group capable of direct communication with one another, the dynamics of intra-group interaction produces pressures for decisions of the group to be formally unanimous.

There are two corollaries:

- (1) Pressures for unanimity vary directly with the cultural salience of the issue.
- (2) Pressures for unanimity vary inversely with the size of the group.¹

Some studies seem to indicate that the pressure for unanimity is strong only in groups of six or less,² and one report on a five-member village council found patient efforts to secure a coalition of the whole group to be the rule,³ but a preliminary study of a 42-member county governing board in a county where potential rural-urban and urban-sub-urban conflicts were present, still found the pressure to exist and unanimous votes to be the rule.⁴ The few non-

- ¹ For empirical studies tending to support this principle, see Barry E. Collins and Harold Guetzkow, A Social Psychology of Group Processes for Decision-Making (New York: John Wiley & Sons, Inc., 1964), esp. chap. 9; and Robert T. Golembiewski, The Smail Group (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1962), esp. pp. 144–170.
- ² For a supporting study, see Philip E. Slater, "Contrasting Correlates of Group Size," Sociometry, 21 (1958), 129-139.
- ³ A. J. Vidich and Joseph Bensman, Small Town in Mass Society (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1958), p. 110.
- ⁴ Jean McDonald, "The Theory of Political Coalitions as Applied to the Ingham County Board of Supervisors," a seminar paper submitted to the authors, Michigan State University, March, 1966.

unanimous votes strongly tended to be on non-salient issues.

The size principle was developed by William Riker.⁵ In its briefest form, it is this:

In n-person, zero-sum games, where sidepayments are permitted, where players are rational, and where they have perfect information, only winning minimal coalitions occur. A winning minimal coalition contains the minimum number of votes practicable that is still a majority.

As we will indicate below, Riker has developed an elegant size principle, but it has very restricted explanatory power so far as the observable behavior of coalition formation is concerned. Even so, the size principle is of value, for it can be generalized to apply to far more situations than it does as stated by Riker. We would state the size principle as follows:

In n-person, non-zero-sum games, where side-payments are permitted, and where information costs are greater than zero (persons have imperfect information), the desire to maximize individual power and individual shares of the payoffs of victory will cause players to seek to approximate a minimal winning coalition.

The unanimity principle and the size principle, obviously, work against one another, but there is no theoretical reason why these opposed tendencies could not exist simultaneously in the same group behavior. Interest-group theory, motivational theory in psychology, and the laws of physics are replete with similar examples of countervailing forces.

The indispensable membership principle is this:

Sometimes, for a coalition to be winning, certain powerful members of the group must be included. They cannot be substituted for by any aggregation of other group members.

The United States Constitution, as originally submitted to the states, could formally be made effective through its ratification by nine of the

- ⁵ William H. Riker, *The Theory of Political Coalitions* (New Haven: Yale University Press 1962).
- ⁶ In a zero-sum game, what one player or coalition of players gains, the others lose. The formula is: $1-(a+b+\cdots x)=0$.
- ⁷ Side payments are payments made by players as inducements for other players to join with them in coalition.

thirteen states, but it was generally believed by informed persons then (and still is) that the government it would establish could not be effective or even survive unless the two most populous states, New York and Virginia, were among those ratifying. Some decisions of the United Nations General Assembly will not be effective unless both the United States and the Soviet Union support them. Majority leaders in either house of Congress seldom are excluded from a winning coalition on any issue in their house. Their support is ordinarily necessary in order to secure a numerical majority. Leaders always have a number of votes, "in the pocket;" these include those of persons with little seniority and no independent power base, and those who are indebted to the party leader for past favors. A coalition may be able to win almost automatically if just one indispensable person joins—the majority leader in a legislative body, the president of the university student body, or the most prestigeful member of a departmental faculty. His action converts what might otherwise be a risky position for some members of a group into one involving minimal decision (responsibility) costs.

In some cases, the indispensable membership for a winning coalition is the entire membership. Economic sanctions applied by an international agency such as the United Nations are an example. With even a few small nations refusing to cooperate, efforts to apply sanctions to an offending nation may not be effective.

I. DECISION COSTS

Decision costs in coalition formation include the following:

(1) Information costs. These are divided into two sub-categories. They involve the costs of collecting information concerning the value ordering and strategies of other members of the group as well as the costs of communicating one's own value ordering and bargaining positions.

The communication of information is complicated by the blurring effect resulting from each individual's imperfect perception of reality and by the screening of all communications through one's personal value system. Furthermore, in evaluating information, people may confuse what they believe to be rational information (subjective rationality, in Herbert Simon's terms) with what is rational, that is, what is believed to and in fact does lead to chosen goals.

Because information costs are often high, what is sometimes taken for apathy may represent rational calculation, as Anthony Downs has pointed out, and as many a member of a legislative body has concluded. The amount of power for influencing an outcome or the payoff for being a member of a winning coalition may be so small as to make it uneconomic to be informed.

Information costs may tend to counter the potential application of either the size principle or the unanimity principle. The effort (cost) necessary in order to determine whether it would be desirable and feasible to include all members of the group in the coalition may be too high to be worthwhile. A leader may assume, for example, that one or two persons who have been consistently deviant members of the group cannot be brought along into agreement on a particular decision while, if he had the actual information, he might have found the situation to be one in which these persons could be convinced to join the coalition with minimal, acceptable cost. On the other hand, where the coalition seeks to apply the size principle in the absence of complete knowledge, as Anthony Downs has observed, the coalition might rationally include, say, fiftyfive per cent of the total membership of the group in order to overcome the informational aspects of decision-making costs-it is not worth the effort needed to determine the actual minimal coalition.8

(2). Responsibility costs. These are costs resulting from having a decision attributed in whole or in part to a given person. Responsibility costs are related to the size of the group. The relative size of a minimal winning coalition varies according to the size of the group—the smaller the group, the larger the percentage of the total that is required for a minimal winning coalition. In the case of a two-person committee, one hundred per cent of the group is the necessary figure; for three persons, sixtysix and two-thirds per cent. In the United States House of Representatives, with 435 members, 50.1 per cent (218 Congressmen) is needed if all are present. In cases of very small groups, individual power is relatively high,9 information costs relatively low, and responsibility costs relatively high. In a fairly large group, on the other hand, the inverse is the case.

Responsibility costs increase inversely with

the size of the group. These may vary enormously, of course. They may be negative costs (profits)—that is, the individual may gain social capital, status, or opportunities to participate in other games, but they may also be very expensive, resulting in losses in relation to all of these.

Responsibility costs vary by role and position, particularly as to whether an individual is the coalition builder, the marginal member, or some other member. For the coalition builder, these costs are especially likely to be high, for he cannot usually hide a failure. He also assumes some of the responsibility costs of other members, for in seeking to get them to join, he has to estimate their various costs and will be blamed by his colleagues if his estimates prove to be seriously in error. The costs to the coalition builder are reduced somewhat by the institutionalization of the process. Legislative party leaders and whips build coalitions routinely as part of their role. Their risk is much less than that of, say, George Norris who succeeded in trimming the powers of the Speaker of the House of Representatives in 1910. He carried his proposal around in his pocket for years waiting for the "right" moment to make his challenge. The risk of failure was great and the personal costs would have been enormous. The same kind of risk was taken by A. P. Herbert in the British House of Commons in 1936-1937, when he sought to build a cross-party coalition to change the divorce laws.

The marginal member also bears extra responsibility costs, because his act of joining permits the coalition to win. If the action of the coalition is later seen by relevant persons as having been undesirable, he will be disproportionately blamed. The risk to the marginal member may be reduced, however, by the fact that his identity may not be evident and members of the group, in private session, may agree to hide it, although exposure always remains a threat.

The size principle does not apply whenever the overwhelmingly important objective of the group is to dilute responsibility for a decision; the unanimity principle does. As a corollary, we could say that responsibility costs increase disproportionately as the irrevocability of decisions increases. Where responsibility costs rise, the pressure to minimize error by careful calculation mounts. The more irrevoachle the decision, the more important it becomes to minimize the cost of error.

One way, and very possibly the most effective way, to minimize responsibility costs is to spread them over the largest possible per-

⁸ Anthony Downs, An Economic Theory of Democracy (New York: Harper and Row, Publishers, 1953).

⁹ L. S. Shapley and Martin Shubik, "A Method for Evaluating the Distribution of Power in a Committee System," this Review, 48 (1954), 787-792.

centage of the total group. The coalition in a legislative body that seeks to lead a nation into war—one of the most irrevocable of decisions that can be made in modern times—would never be expected to apply the size principle. A strong effort at unanimity would be made, as in fact was the case in the United States Congress when war was decleared in 1917 and again in 1941.

Many political situations are such that the payoff involves sharing responsibility or maximizing social impact rather than dividing up the payoffs among the members of a winning coalition. Institutions wary of criticism of a particular action commonly seek unanimity. The procedure of "massing the court" has been followed many times by chief justices when the United States Supreme Court has prepared to announce an especially controversial decision. The school integration decision of 1954 was unanimous and the justices worked hard to make it so. The justices and supporters of their decisions are keenly aware of the marginal legitimacy of such decisions and of the political controversy that follows each of them.

Legislators follow the same kind of procedure when raising their own salaries, passing a concurrent resolution, or even in adopting a highly controversial bill, such as Medicare legislation. They seek maximum coalitions to avoid raising questions about the legitimacy or wisdom of such decisions, to help unite the nation in time of crisis, and to lessen the effectiveness of attacks on the decision-making institution.

(3) Intergame costs. These are costs in other games for participation in one game, in other words, they are one type of opportunity costs. All games in which an individual participates during his lifetime and all political decision-making are interrelated, although the costs of participating in one game are discounted in relation to other games at different rates. Only if we assume that each game is totally independent of others are intergame costs zero. In empirically observable situations, this is never the case, or at least cannot be observed to be such.¹⁰

If an individual is left out of a coalition, but believes he should have been included, leaders of that coalition may overcompensate in the

¹⁰. The theoretical statement is found in Norton E. Long, "The Local Community as an Ecology of Games," American Journal of Sociology, 64 (1958), 251-261; some empirical testing is reported in Paul A. Smith, "The Games of Community Politics," Midwest Journal of Political Science, 9 (1965), 37-60.

next decision as a result of guilt feelings, a desire to be fair, or a need to keep the individual predisposed to give his help on some future issue when his support may be needed. As Morton Kaplan has pointed out, one nation does not rationally destroy another nation, because it may need that nation in a later coalition. Cato's proposal for the destruction of Carthage or a Morgenthau plan for Germany may offer emotional satisfactions to the authors, but they are poor politics.

Even an election is never zero-sum, since losers still commonly participate to some extent in decision making. George Romney, in 1964, paid some costs in relation to his standing with Goldwater supporters and a possible Goldwater victory in order to gain hoped-for payoffs in the 1968 game. Goldwater, likewise, paid some costs for the 1968 game by his 1964 convention attitude toward Republican moderates. Intergame costs must often be estimated and discounted before the game begins (and in anticipation that it will begin). These costs may be discounted to near the zero point, as in 1960 with some John F. Kennedy supporters in consideration of the possibility that Lyndon B. Johnson might, in the near future, become President. A more common example of intergame costs are those involved in vote trading in Congress, where a member surrenders his right to discretion on bill B in order to secure the support of a colleague for bill A.

The serial or processional characteristics of decision making also add to intergame costs. Commonly, they produce pressures for the application of the rule of unanimity, or a close approximation of it. Congressional sub-committees seek as large a vote in favor of reporting out an item as possible in order to strengthen the hand of the winning coalition at the next decision locus, that of the parent committee, which then will tend to follow the same procedure in order to influence the whole house. Congressional leaders, in turn, will sometimes seek as large a majority as possible on a controversial measure in order to reduce the chances of a presidential veto if such a possibility seems to exist. Political party leaders try to maximize the party vote in presidential elections, for the presidential and congressional election games are interrelated and the larger the margin of victory in the former, the larger the size of the party's representation in Congress tends to be.

(4) Division-of-payoffs costs. These are in-

¹¹ Morton Kaplan, System and Process in International Politics (New York: John Wiley and Sons, Inc., 1957).

volved in distributing payoffs among members of a winning coalition. The cost is measured by the loss of payoff to each member by the addition of members to the winning coalition. If, for example, the total payoff for members of a seven-member group is fixed, the highest possible payoff to a member of a winning coalition is twenty-five per cent of the total. If a fifth member is added to the winning coalition, the payoff to each individual drops to twenty per cent. Other things being equal, and with a fixed payoff, a minimal coalition is the rational strategy for the participants. In zero-sum games, the size principle applies for this part of the total decision formula. However, even in zero-sum games, the size principle accounts for only a small portion of the total decision concerning coalition size. (We cannot, however, measure the proportions because we do not have the necessary data or know the weightings of the various costs involved.)

In the empirically more meaningful nonzero-sum situation, however, the amount of individual payoff may increase as the size of the group increases. The opposite of the size principle applies. Mancur Olson, an economist, has argued, for example, that "any group seeking an inclusive collective good is not in a zero-sum situation since the benefit payoff by definition increases in amount as more join the group, and as more of the collective good is provided."12 His point is probably applicable in forming coalitions among nuclear powers to agree upon prohibiting nuclear-bomb testing. He believes it applies for many other types of decision making, too. Such groups as the American Medical Association and labor organizations, within the limits of candidates they consider eligible, seek to maximize rather than minimize their membership in order to increase payoffs. The larger and stronger labor associations become, the larger the payoff for each member. The same is true of any international diplomatic agreement or any agreement among members of a confederation.

(5) Dissonance costs. These are the costs of conflict and disagreement within the winning coalition that result from the fact that no two persons are ever in perfect agreement with one another and, therefore, the larger the group, the more internal discord that group will experience. Any faction wishing to form a coalition with others in order to control a group will experience greater internal conflicts as the size of the proposed coalition increases. Whenever

TABLE 1. COALITIONAL DISSONANCE COSTS

Proposition

A controlling non-minimal coalition has a goal consonance less than that of a controlling minimal coalition.

Let

m = a minimal coalition

C = goal consonance (level of interpersonal agreement)

n=a potential member of a coalition, that is, a member of a committee or other small group

$$C_m(n_x n_y) < C_m$$

Proof:

Assuming (1) goal consonance (C) among any two persons in a coalition is imperfect, e.g., $Cna \times Cnb < 1$; and assuming (2) the following interpersonal goal consonance relationships:

n	1	2	3	4	5
1	_	.98	.70	.97	.50
2	.98		.89	.99	.60
3	.70	.89		.98	.30
4	.97	.99	.91	•	.20
5	.50	.60	.30	.20	

The index of $C = (n_a n_b) \times (n_a n_c) \times (n_b n_c) \cdot \cdot \cdot$.

A winning coalition in a five-man committee must have at least three members (a majority).

Coalition	Index of C
1 (1, 2, 3)	.611
2(1,2,3,4)	.534
3(2,3,4)	.802
4(2,3,4,5)	.289
5(1,3,4)	.618
*6 (1, 2, 4)	.941
7(1, 2, 5)	.294
8 (1, 3, 4, 5)	.019
9(2,3,4,5)	.289
10 (1, 2, 3, 5)	.055
11 (1, 2, 3, 4, 5)	.008

NOTE: Not all 3-person coalitions involving n_5 are calculated. He is the most atypical member of the committee. No non-unanimous winning coalition would include him.

controlling coalitions seek to minimize their size, their behavior may be motivated not necessarily so much by a concern for maximizing individual payoffs from the coalition as by a desire to minimize decision costs of dissonance within the controlling group. Thus, in Table 1, ns might be a member of the Communist Party of the United States or of the John Birch Society. He would not be included

¹² Mancur Olson, Jr., The Logic of Collective Action (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1965).

^{*} Optimal coalition.

in any winning coalition, except possibly only after all other possibilities have been exhausted In 1966, the German Christian Democrats accepted the Socialists as members of the government coalition despite high dissonance costs, apparently as the only way to remain in the winning coalition themselves. Maverick members of Congress are commonly excluded from many winning coalitions because of dissonance costs. (In fact, they usually exclude themselves, to avoid overt rejection.)

(6) Inertia costs. These are the costs involved in changing existing coalition patterns. William Gamson, a sociologist, in his study of coalition formation at national nominating conventions, notes that once a coalition is formed, it tends to persist.13 Inertia costs may outweigh others in determining the size of a winning coalition or they may be the marginal costs that matter. Dissolving a coalition may involve more costs than maintaining an existing coalition that may not be minimal in size or in internal dissonance. (In Table 1, Coalition Three, if already in existence, may be preferred over the more harmonious Coalition Six because of the costs involved in ousting member n3 in order to add member n1.) In other words, where inertia is a factor, a coalition that would be inefficiently large or small if inertia equaled zero, may become the actual winning coalition.

(7) Pressure-of-time costs. These are the costs involved because longitudinal factors are involved in coalition building. Time costs are often related to other costs, but are not identical with them. In some cases, the convenience of taking the most available person rather than waiting for the otherwise most appropriate person may also help reduce, say, information and inertia costs, although it may increase other costs, say, dissonance costs.

The pressures of time may introduce costs that are more important than other costs. A factional leader may be faced with having to build a winning coalition by a certain hour on a certain day. Simply getting such a group together, no matter what intergame or other costs must be paid may be the overwhelming consideration. Time costs, furthermore, increase as the decision process proceeds. The nearer to a resolution of a problem a group has progressed, the harder it is to effect a change in its direction.¹⁴

¹³ William A. Gamson, "Coalition Formation at Presidential Nominating Conventions," *American* Journal of Sociology, 68 (1962), 157-171.

¹⁴ James D. Barber, *Power in Committees* (Chicago: Rand McNally & Company, 1966), pp. 62-66.

Opportunity costs are also a type of time cost, for an individual has only a certain amount of time available to him. His decision to participate in building a coalition relative to subject A may prevent him from participating relative to subject B, in which he is also interested.

Time costs are also involved in the fact that all past and future games involve intergame costs that must be discounted for present value in the current game. The more recent the past game and its claims or the closer the future game, the more important are these costs.

(8) Persuasion costs. These are the costs of bringing a reluctant member of a group into a winning coalition. Persuasion may be difficult because the individual to be persuaded lacks information that would help convince him of the advantage of joining a coalition, or psychological factors may make him reluctant to accept responsibility costs, or he may see intergame costs as being too high (perhaps because he sees the potential payoff in some other game as being much more valuable than do other members of the coalition), or he may psychologically be unwilling to pay the dissonance costs of being a member of the winning coalition. Persuasion costs certainly vary according to the point at which a member is called upon to make a decision or voluntarily decides to do so. If he is called upon to make the marginal choice that will create a majority, his power is relatively great, but persuasion costs may be high. Once a majority is reached, persuasion costs of other members of the group decline sharply, however. In many cases, it may be that persuasion costs are problems of overcoming ideological commitment. Glendon Schubert, in examining Supreme Court decisions, has noted the difficulty involved in seeking to bring members at the ideological extremes together in the same coalition.15 Persuasion costs in convincing ideological extremists to enter into a coalition led by nonextremists are always higher than are those for capturing individuals near the ideological center. It is probable that persuasion costs increase disproportionately as ideology becomes increasingly deviant.

II. SUMMARY AND CONCLUSION

We have argued that decision costs are the major factors to be observed in the empirical study of coalition formation. We conclude that the size principle as developed by Riker is of

¹⁵ Glendon A. Schubert, Quantitative Analysis of Judicial Behavior (New York: The Free Press of Glencoe, 1959).

rather limited explanatory power for such purposes. His argument is that if all other items are assumed to be constant, the size principle will prevail in zero-sum situations. We believe this does not always hold even when Riker's conditions are met, for they assume that the purpose for which a coalition is to be built is to divide resources, to win the spoils. But we have indicated that in many cases involving coalition building, no direct psychological or economic payoffs may exist and even when they do, other decision costs may outweigh the desire to win them.

The zero-sum assumption seems especially inappropriate. There is probably never a simple winner or loser in any political game. A contestant who fails to win a presidential nomination may be named Secretary of State after the election. A consolation prize is not equal to the first prize, but having played the game and "lost" may also have been the marginal factor that gave the player the stillimportant win in the second game. A Congressman who fails to muster a necessary majority vote from a committee in order to have reported out a bill he introduced and considers important, knows that he may well have gained support or good will that may help him succeed at a later time. Furthermore, his having made the effort will have communicated information to the committee members and will have introduced a certain amount of tension and pressure upon members which will have a cumulative effect the next time the matter is raised. And every baseball player knows that no decision by the umpire is completely zero-sum: he may lose one close call, but the umpire will probably tend to give him the benefit of the doubt the next time.

Riker's formulation also assumes a static game and a static payoff. He attempts to avoid the resulting problem by considering all payoffs in future games or in games involving utilities other than the winning of political power as side payments. But this is defining the zero-sum condition out of existence. In considering utilities, all utilities in past, present, and future games must be considered (discounted for present value and future probability) as part of the game. Otherwise to speak of zero-sum conditions is meaningless.

In cases of empirical observation, it is rarely true that members of a coalition are interchangeable—that is, that all count as of equal value because each has a vote. As Thomas Schelling has pointed out, the participants in bargaining do make a difference in the result.¹⁶

16 Thomas C. Schelling, The Strategy of Con-

Pavoffs to a coalition will depend upon who is in it. The winning coalition in the United States Senate in 1919 to defeat the Treaty of Versailles might have made much less impact on history if it had not included a man of the political skill and personal prestige of Henry Cabot Lodge; a coalition to seize control of a political-party organization may depend for its success more upon the resources brought to the coalition by its members than the number of persons involved. The critical question in coalition formation may, in any given case, be on the willingness of the participants to commit resources and on the skills of the participants in reaching their goals. Five skillful men may well out maneuver eight clumsy or naive men. In a formal vote, a numerical majority is needed, of course, but the effective coalition may actually consist of less than a majority. A few members may count upon their ability to secure the needed additional votes through log-rolling (side payments), by status gained from seniority, intimidation, or through some other attribute, and thus may gain the necessary support at low cost from those who have less interest, incentive, information, or ability. Alternatively, the leaders may assume that a sufficient number of persons to create a formal majority will go along with aggressive, confident leaders who seem to have a plausible plan because no other reasonable alternative appears to exist.

The problem of coalition payoff determination is complex: Being in a winning coalition is not necessarily in itself an indication of winning. Interpersonal valuation of utilities varies. A naive person or one simply lacking in sufficient information may cast a vote along with that of the dominant coalition, but may receive no payoff because no commitment, direct or implied, had ever been made to him. Or an individual may be drawn into a coalition that wins a particular office or other payoff, but the payoff may not be the one the individual wants. When conservative Republicans selected Theodore Roosevelt for the Vice-Presidency in 1900, they did so in the belief that they had forestalled his presidential ambitions, and Roosevelt himself moaned his fears of having "shot my bolt."

In conclusion, we have argued that the precise membership in the winning coalition in any group must be determined by an algebraic summation of at least eight decision costs and that these costs are determined by various economic and psychological factors existing in the

flict (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1960).

political setting. In this first approximation, we have not isolated the various factors. They overlap to some extent and present knowledge has not enabled us to make even rough estimates of the weight to be assigned to each of the factors, but like all algebraic equations, each of the components may potentially have either a positive or a negative sign. Because many variables are involved, no one will necessarily be dominant. A winning coalition of minimal size is not necessarily the one that costs participants the least and winning marginally is not always to be preferred to winning by a unanimous or other supra-minimal vote.

In the absence of necessary empirical data, it is not possible to answer such questions as to whether a particular sub-committee will seek to apply the unanimity principle or the size principle in its deliberations, or which members of a group (if any) are indispensable for a winning coalition. The answers will depend in part upon the given case or issue before the sub-committee, but even information concerning the instance would be only a beginning in an attempt to answer the questions. We believe, however, that the concept of decision-making costs is useful in our efforts to explain the process of coalition formation.

THE MALEVOLENT LEADER: POLITICAL SOCIALIZATION IN AN AMERICAN SUB-CULTURE*

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Perhaps the most dramatic finding of recent research on the political socialization of children is that youngsters appear to be overwhelmingly favorably disposed toward political objects which cross their vision. Officers and institutions of government are regarded as benevolent, worthy, competent, serving and powerful. The implications of such findings are striking indeed. Childhood political dispositions may represent the roots of later patriotism; we may be observing the building of basic regime-level supportive values at a very young age.²

These findings are by no means new; in fact, they might be classified as part of the conventional wisdom of the discipline. Moreover, they are extremely well documented, and the study of childhood political socialization has advanced to consider far more than basic regime-level norms. Despite all this, however, there are still many empirical questions to be asked about such norms. Perhaps the recent assertion that the political scientist's model of socialization is "static and homogeneous" is

- * The data on which this paper is based were collected under Contract #693 between the University of Kentucky Research Foundation and the Office of Economic Opportunity.
- 1 Robert D. Hess and David Easton, "The Child's Changing Image of the President," Public Opinion Quarterly, 14 (Winter, 1960), 632-642; Fred I. Greenstein, Children and Politics (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1965), pp. 27-54; Robert D. Hess and Judith V. Tourney, "The Development of Basic Attitudes Toward Government and Citizenship During the Elementary School Years: Part I," (Cooperative Research Project No. 1078; University of Chicago, 1965), pp. 102-105; Dean Jaros, "Children's Orientations Toward the President: Some Additional Theoretical Considerations and Data," Journal of Politics, 29 (May, 1967), 368-387.
- ² David Easton and Robert D. Hess, "The Child's Political World," *Midwest Journal of Political Science*, 6 (August, 1962), 243; Greenstein, op. cit., 53.
- ³ Roberta S. Sigel, "Political Socialization: Some Reactions on Current Approaches and Conceptualizations," (Paper presented at the 1966 Annual Meeting of the American Political

particularly apropos here. Consider two closely related characteristics of the appropriate literature: 1) the "positive image" which children have about politics and political figures has been synthesized from data gathered largely in the United States and to some extent in urban, industrialized communities within the United States; and 2) empirical explanation of the favorable disposition which children manifest has not progressed very far. Though there may be hypotheses about how children get this way, there has been little systematic testing of the relationships between variables.

There is some danger that the major findings may be essentially "culture bound." There are few data on the political values of children in other countries or even in rural, racial, or ethnic subcultures within the United States. Moreover, what evidence there is hints at important cross-cultural variations in political learning, less positive images may characterize other cultures. Political socialization is the process by which the child learns about the political culture in which he lives. The content of what is socialized may well differ from culture to culture or from sub-culture to subculture.

The failure to explain children's positive orientations toward politics may be a function of the cultural problem. If the great majority of children in one culture manifest a glowing image, variance in disposition is not prominent, and empirical explanation in terms of accounting for variance may not suggest itself as a crucial task; also it may be quite difficult. In order to explain children's political images, one has to have a distribution of affect; there have to be some relatively negative images to come

Science Association, New York, Sept. 6-10, 1966), p. 14.

- ⁴ The Chicago area, New Haven, and Detroit provided the research environments for some of the studies cited in Note 1.
- ⁵ Robert D. Hess, "The Socialization of Attitudes Toward Political Authority: Some Cross-National Comparisons," *International Social Science Journal*, 14 (No. 4, 1963), 542–559.
- ⁶ Gabriel A. Almond and G. Bingham Powell, Jr., Comparative Politics: A Developmental Approach (Boston: Little, Erown, and Co., 1966), pp. 23-24.

by. Research into children's political views in other cultures or sub-cultures may provide us with such negative images. But even if it does not generate the necessary data to conduct explanatory analysis, it would lessen the culture bound nature of findings in political socialization.

This paper attempts to realize these desiderata through a study of childhood socialization in the Appalachian region of eastern Kentucky. Appalachia may be classified as a subculture within the United States for at least two reasons. First, the poverty and isolation of the region impose characteristics that differentiate it from most other areas in the country. Secondly and relatedly, many cultural norms of Appalachia differ radically from those considered to be standard middle-class imperatives.⁸

I. TWO EXPLANATIONS OF CHILDREN'S POLITICAL AUTHORITY ORIENTATIONS

There are several relatively untested hypotheses about the sources of the positive notions children are observed to hold toward the political. Many of them prominently involve the family as a socializing agent. Because of the intriguing nature of family-related variables in Appalachia, the region provides an excellent context in which to investigate these assertions.

Among these explanations is the view that the family directly transmits positive values about government and politics to the child while shielding him from stimuli which have negative connotations, such as stories of political corruption, expedient bargaining, etc. In short, the family directly indoctrinates the child as to the benevolent nature of political authority, to view the political world in essentially the same terms as characterize the parents' generally supportive outlook on the political regime. In Appalachia, in contrast to

- ⁷ Michael Argyle and Peter Delin, "Non-Universal Laws of Socialization," *Human Rela*tions, 18 (February, 1965), 77–86.
- ⁸ Several analyses contributory to this assertion are: Virgil C. Jones, *The Hatfields and the McCoys* (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1948); Jack E. Weller, *Yesterday's People* (Lexington: University of Kentucky Press, 1965); Harry M. Caudill, *Night Comes to the Cumberlands* (Boston: Little, Bowrn and Co., 1963).
- ⁹ Greenstein, op. cit., pp. 45-46; Easton and Hess, Midwest Journal of Political Science, 6 (November, 1962), 229-235.
 - 10 Herbert Hyman, Political Socialization (Glen-

most of the rest of the United States, there is a great deal of overt, anti-government sentiment in the adult population. Rejection of and hostility toward political authority, especially federal authority, has long characterized the region. It is very difficult to believe that here parents could transmit positive images of regime symbols to their children. In fact, "... the civic instruction which goes on incidental to normal activities in the family," suggested as a likely cause of children's favorable affect, would in Appalachia be a source of political cynicism.

Secondly, we might take the thesis that the family is an important socializing agent because the child's experiences with his immediate authority figures (parents) are somehow projected to include more remote agencies, including the political. The father, perceived as providing and benevolent, supposedly becomes the prototypical authority figure. 13 For the child, the regime becomes "the family writ large,"14 especially sacred as its image benefits from the emotional kind of bond that exists between parent and child. In Appalachia, there is a high degree of family disruption. The father may well not live at home. Far from providing a glowing prototype of authority, he may be a pitifully inadequate figure, unemployed or absent, not providing for his family, deserving of (and receiving) scorn.15 If the

coe, Ill.: Free Press, 1959), Chapter 4; Leonard W. Doob, *Patriotism and Nationalism* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1964), pp. 119-126.

11 Weller, pp. 33-56, 163; Also Thomas R. Ford (ed). The Southern Appalachian Region: A Survey (Lexington: University of Kentucky Press, 1960), pp. 12-15. These may characterize the entire American South. Indeed, some basic socialization data from the South could be most interestingly compared with that gathered elsewhere. But apart from South-wide considerations, there are historical reasons why one would expect such values to be especially strong in Appalachia.

- 12 Greenstein, op. cit., p. 44.
- ¹³ Harold D. Lasswell, *Power and Personality* (New York: Viking Press, 1962), pp. 156-159; Sebastian DeGrazia, *The Political Community* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1948), pp. 11-21; James C. Davies, "The Family's Role in Political Socialization," *Annals*, 361 (September, 1965), 10-19.
- ¹⁴ Easton and Hess, Midwest Journal of Political Science, 6 (November, 1962), 242-243.
- ¹⁵ The effects of widespread unemployment in the coal industry and other economic malaises

Appalachian child generalizes the father figure or the family authority structure to the political, he is not very likely to be generalizing a positive configuration.¹⁶

II. METHOD

Data were gathered from a nearly complete enumeration (N=2,432) of rural public school children in grades 5-12 in Knox County, Kentucky during March, 1967. Paper-and-pencil questionnaires were administered in classrooms in connection with an evaluation of a Community Action Program of the Office of Economic Opportunity. This paper is based on the responses of a random sample of 305 of these subjects.¹⁷

are well known. Because they are unable to provide, men reportedly invent physical disabilities or contrive "abandonments" of their dependents in order to qualify their families for public assistance. Such men become ciphers: Weller, op. cit., pp. 76-78; Ford, op. cit., pp. 245-256. In addition to anecdotal accounts of such situations, there are some hard data which are consistent with these assertions. The great proportion of Appalachian men who are not in the labor force (23% in Knox County, site of the present study, as opposed to 11% in the U.S. as a whole) plus a high unemployment rate (11% in Knox County) suggests a large number of non-providing fathers (Source: U.S. Census of Population, 1960). A high incidence of incomplete families can also be confirmed. Fully 22% of the Appalachian children sampled for the present study reported father-absence, while only 12% of the Survey Research Center's national sample of high-school seniors are from fatherless homes. The authors wish to thank Richard Niemi for the last datum.

16 At this point, it should be noted that these two general hypotheses do not exhaust the list of suggested socialization processes. In fact, some observers stress the efficacy of altogether different agencies, for example the public school: Hess and Tourney, op. cit., pp. 193-200. But even with this emphasis, such observers believe that some political values are implanted in youth by their parents, namely, those which "insure the stability of basic institutions" (p. 191). This is a reference to what we have called "regime level" values, which are the sole topic of this paper. At least for socialization to this kind of political affect, testing of family-related hypotheses is of undoubted importance. See M. Kent Jennings and Richard Niemi, "Family Structure and the Transmission of Political Values," (Paper presented at the 1966 annual meeting of the American Political Science Association, New York, Sept. 6-10, 1966).

¹⁷ A few schools, not accessible by road, did

Affect toward political authority was measured in two ways: through reports of images of the President, 18 and through "political cynicism" scale scores. 19 Images of the President were used because this figure apparently occupies a key position in the development of both cognitions of and affect toward the regime. 20 The Presidency provides an introduction; notions first held toward this role are probably subsequently generalized to other political institutions and to the entity of government itself. 21 The specific instrumentation is that developed by Hess and Easton. 22

By contrast, political cynicism, "rather than referring to specific political issues and actors ... is a basic orientation toward political actors and activity. It presumably pervades all

not participate in the study. The cost of including them would have been very high and the returns realized very small. These schools had a total enrollment of less than fifty and a somewhat smaller number than this in grades five through eight. The questionnaire was administered by regular classroom teachers who had been instructed in its use. Every attempt was made, however, to convince the subjects that despite the context, they were not being tested. Teachers were asked explicitly to communicate this notion. This mode of administration probably produced fewer invalid responses than exposing the subjects to a non-indigenous investigator who would have aroused suspicion.

Knox County was chosen as the site for this study because it to some extent typifies Appalachia. That is, it is isolated, rural, and poor. No air or rail passenger transportation is available and only one U.S. highway crosses the county. Knox county has an annual per capita income of \$501 as compared with \$2223 for the U.S. as a whole. It is 84% rural while the nation is only 30%. (Source: U.S. Census of Population, 1960).

18 For commentary on images of the President, see Fred I. Greenstein, "More on Children's Images of the President," Public Opinion Quarterly, 25 (Winter, 1961), 648-654.

¹⁹ For remarks on political cynicism, see Robert E. Agger, Marshall N. Goldstein, and Stanley A. Pearl, "Political Cynicism: Measurements and Meaning," Journal of Politics, 23 (August, 1961), 477–506.

²⁰ Fred I. Greenstein, "The Benevolent Leader: Children's Images of Political Authority," this Review, 54 (December, 1960), 936; Easton and Hess, Midwest Journal of Political Science, 6, 241.

21 Greenstein, Children and Politics, p. 54.

²² Hess and Easton, Public Opinion Quarterly, 14, 639.

encounters with political objects."²³ In short, political cynicism relates to a basic, general evaluative posture toward politics. Though perhaps a developmental descendant of images of the President, this variable represents far less specifically focussed regime-level affect. The specific instrumentation is the political cynicism scale developed by Jennings and Niemi.²⁴

In addition to desiring variables important in the introduction of children to politics and ones which seem to encapsulate a more generalized and developed kind of regime-level affect, we chose these measures because of the fact that they have generated reliable data. We wished to take advantage of direct replicative possibilities.

Unfortunately, no direct information about the political values of the parents of our sample is presently available.25 Though the aggregate view of political institutions and personalities held by Appalachian adults is reportedly less positive than those of other Americans, the only personal level data available are childreported. Our indicators of parental affect toward political authority consist of two familyrelated items from Easton and Dennis' scale of political efficacy.26 Two problems arise in using these items as indicators of parental values. First, the index in question was designed to measure a variable in children, not adults. However, the items "inquire about the relationship between government and the child's family. . . . " The index is not regarded as a direct reflector of children's efficacy per se. In fact, it shows how a child has come to "view expected relationships between adult members of the system and the authorities" as well as tapping a "nascent attitude" of the child himself.27 Youngsters tend to evaluate political objects in child-related terms.28 Clearly this index does not measure that kind of dynamic. The items can be interpreted as a report on family (adult) orientations to political authorities, Indeed, such a report, involving the perception of children, may be a more significant independent variable than the actual values of the parents. A person's values, of course, can have no direct impact on the behavior of another individual. Any effect must be mediated through the influencee's cognitive and evaluative processes.

Secondly, given this, can items which tap efficacy be said to reveal anything about "positive" or supportive regime-level attitudes among adults? Though it is easy to imagine people highly enthusiastic about their political authority without possessing "citizen competence," it is probable that in democratic societies sense of efficacy is in fact related to general affect toward political authority. Inefficacious feelings are related to alienation and what has been called "political negativism." These are the very antithesis of supportive dispositions. Moreover, recent scholarship has specifically considered efficacy to be a crucial variable in regime-level supports.

The nature of the family authority structure is measured by 1) "father image" items analogous to Hess and Easton's Presidential image items²² and 2) noting whether the father in fact lives at home.³³

III. THE APPALACHIAN CHILD'S AFFECT TOWARD THE POLITICAL

Our subjects' evaluations of political authority have a very prominent feature: they are dramatically less positive than those rendered by children in previously reported research.

Table 1 describes the affective responses of the Appalachian children to the President and directly compares them to Hess and Easton's findings on Chicago-area children. Though our sample includes children from fifth through twelfth grades and Hess and Easton's from second through eighth, it is possible to make comparisons using only the fifth through eighth

- ²⁹ Gabriel A. Almond and Sidney Verba, *The Civic Culture* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1963), Chapter 6.
- ³⁰ John E. Horton and Wayne Thompson, "Powerlessness and Political Negativism," American Journal of Sociology, 67 (March, 1962), 435-493.
 - 21 Easton and Dennis, op.cit.
- ⁸² Hess and Easton, Public Opinion Quarterly, 14, 635-642.
- ³⁸ On father-absence see: David B. Lynn and William L. Sawrey, "The Effects of Father-Absence on Norwegian Boys and Girls," Journal of Abnormal and Social Psychology, 59 (September, 1959), 258-262; George R. Bach, "Father-Fantasises and Father-Typing in Father-Separated Children," Child Development, 17 (March, 1946), 63-80.

²³ Jennings and Niemi, op. cit., p. 13.

²⁴ Ibid., footnote 30.

²⁵ The evaluation of the Community Action Program in Knox County involved the solicitation of data from a sample of adults. These data can be arranged with those on youngsters to form parent-child pairs. These data are being exploited by Herbert Hirsch.

²⁶ David Easton and Jack Dennis, "The Child's Acquisition of Regime Norms: Political Efficacy," this Review, 61 (March, 1967), 25–38.

²⁷ Ibid., p. 32.

²⁸ Greenstein, this Review, 54, 938-939.

TABLE 1. FIFTH-EIGHTH GRADE CHILDREN'S EVALUATIONS OF THE PRESIDENT

	Response	Knox County data*	Chicago area data†	Smirnov two-sample test
1) View of how hard the	harder	35%	77%	
President works compared with most men.	as hard	24	21	
	less hard	41	3	D = .42, p < .001
	Total	100 % (N = 128)	101% (N = 214)	
2) View of the honesty of	more honest	23 %	57%	
the President compared with most men.	as honest	50	42	
	less honest	27	1	D = .34, p < .001
	Total	100% (N = 133)	100% $(\bar{N} = 214)$	
3) View of the President's liking for people as com-	like most everybody	50%	61%	
pared with most men.	likes as many as most	28	37	D = .20, p < .01
	doesn't like as many	22	2	
	Total	100% (N = 125)	100% ($\tilde{N} = 214$)	
4) View of the President's	knows more	45%	82%	
knowledge compared with most men.	knows about the same	33	16	D = .37, p < .001
	knows less	22	. 2	
	Total	100% (N = 124)	100% $(N = 212)$	
5) View of the President	best in world	6%	11%	·····
as a person.	a good person	68	82	
	not a good person	26	8	D = .19, p < .01
	Total	100% (N = 139)	101% (N = 211)	

^{*} The Knox County subjects were provided with a "don't know" option apparently not available to their Chicago-area counterparts. This was done to avoid forcing the subjects, who are relatively undeveloped intellectually, to choose among possibly meaningless options. As expected, choice of the don't know alternative was very frequent. For each of the five items above, approximately 30% responded that they did not know. In the interest of comparability, the data do not include these responses. Reported non-responses (about 1%) to items 4 and 5 are likewise excluded from the Chicago-area data.

[†] These data are compiled from those reported in Hess and Easton, op. cit., pp. 636-637.

grade portions of both. It is clear that for all five President-evaluation items, the distribution of responses of the Knox County youngsters is significantly less favorable than that of the Hess and Easton sample. In fact, when compared against "most men," the President does not do particularly well. In aggregate, he is not a paramount figure, and there are a fair number of youngsters (about a fourth) that express overtly unfavorable reactions to him.

Hess and Easton, it will be recalled, note that age greatly affects the nature of their sample's responses. Generally, they showed that the very favorable view that the very young have of the President's personal qualities (Items 2, 3, and 5) declines with increasing age, while high regard for his performance capabilities is maintained or even increased as the child grows older.34 The diminution of "personal" portions of the image is not interpreted as a disillusionment with authority, but as in-, creasing realism. The maintenance of the rolefilling portions is regarded as most relevant to future adult behavior, translating into respect for political institutions. 35 In short, the changes of children's images of the President with age present a very fortunate configuration considered from the standpoint of loyalty and support for the regime. The Knox County data, bleak to begin with, show few such encouraging tendencies when controls are imposed for age. Even extending the analysis to the older portions of the sample does little to effect change. To be sure, the personal portions of the image appear slightly less positive than those of younger children. Only 31% of the high-school seniors think the President likes almost everybody, while 31% think he likes fewer people than most men; no twelfth graders think the President is the best person in the world, while 31% think he is not a good person. But overall, the picture is static. Tau correlations between age and positive responses to the three personal image items range between .02 and .04 and are not significant.

In those portions of the image supposedly more crucial to adult regime-level behavior, there is no increase in favorable response to the President. However, a decline in the proportion of overtly unfavorable reactions does produce a significant relationship between age and positiveness on the item dealing with how hard the President works ($\tau_c = .14$, p < .05) and a perceptible though not significant relationship between age and positiveness on the item deal-

ing with the President's knowledge ($\tau_c = .09$, p > .05). At best, these are modest trends. There is relatively little ground for saying, "The President is increasingly seen as a person whose abilities are appropriate to the demands of his office. . . . "36"

Furthermore, the very high incidence of "don't knows" does not decline significantly with age (see note to Table 1). Such a high rate was to be expected of a deprived, unsophisticated population. But the fact that it remains high even among high-school seniors (mean non-response rate is 27%) provides further evidence that, politically speaking, nothing is happening to these Appalachian youth as they mature, They certainly do not appear to be developing into adults devoted to symbols of extant political authority.

Finally, the stark contrast of these data to those on other American children is heightened when the consideration of social class is introduced. It has often been observed that lower class children have a greater propensity to idealize political figures.37 This may well be due to the fact that such children are less politicized than their middle-class counterparts. Being less developed and less knowledgeable, they have developed fewer critical faculties and continue to exhibit the "immature" response of excessive deference. It is impossible to determine whether the same class phenomenon operates within Appalachia, for the sample as a whole is overwhelmingly lower class.38 But because of their lower class position relative to the rest of the country, Knox County youngsters generally should be highly idealizing. The data, of course, reveal the diametric opposite. It is clear that Appalachia constitutes a distinct sub-culture, one in which there are operative variables sufficiently powerful to prevent the occurrence of what is by now expected as a matter of course.

²⁴ Hess and Easton, Public Opinion Quarterly, 14, 635-642.

³⁵ Ibid.

³⁶ Ibid., p. 639.

³⁷ See for example, Greenstein, *Children and Politics*, Chapter 5.

³⁸ No reliable information on social class could be secured from the children themselves. Information on occupation or estimated family income simply was not given by these youngsters. Assigning class on the basis of the neighborhood in which individuals live, as Greenstein did, requires that virtually every subject be placed in the lowest social stratum. These rural residents are universally poor. Only 9% of the county's families have incomes over \$6,000, and these are almost entirely to be found in the "urban" county seat, which was not sampled. (Source: U.S. Census of Population 1960).

TABLE 2. POLITICAL CYNICISM SCORES*

		Knox County data (whole sample)	Knox County data (high school only)	SRC national sample	Smirnov two sample test
most cynical	6	8%	26%	5%	Knox County data (whole sample)
	5	11	22	3	and SRC national sample, $D = .16$,
	4	19	11	13	p < .001
	3	19	20	37	Knox County data (High school
	2	23	15	25	only) and SRC national sample,
least cynical	1	21	6	17	D = .40, p < .001
Total		101% N=305	100% N=54	100% N=1869	

^{*} It has been assumed that the Political Cyricism Scale generated Guttman scalar patterns in the Knox County Data as it did in the SRC National Sample. To compensate for the possible invalidity of this assumption, the items were conservatively dichotomized and conservatively scored. Only choice of the most cynical available alternative was considered a cynical response. Failure of a respondent to choose the most cynical alternative for whatever reason, including non-response, resulted in the recording of a non-cynical item score.

Table 2 describes the more generalized affect manifested in political cynicism. The scores of the Knox County youngsters are compared to those of the Survey Research Center's nation-wide sample of high school seniors.³⁹

The greater cynicism of the sub-culture sample is evident. Since the Survey Research Center deals only with high school students, perhaps comparisons should be made only with the high school portion (grades 10-12) of the Knox County sample. Though this portion is significantly more cynical, the small number of subjects in it perhaps recommends use of the entire sample. One might think that the introduction of younger respondents would depress cynicism scores (age and cynicism are reportedly positively related in children),40 but this does not happen to any great degree. In any event, even the entire 5-12 grade Knox County sample is significantly more cynical than the SRC twelfth graders. The implication of this, of course, is that in Appalachia, unlike the rest of the United States, there is relatively little change in cynicism with maturation. That this is the case is revealed by the nonsignificant $\tau_c = -.02$ between school grade and political cynicism score. Early in life these children appear to become relatively cynical and they stay that way.

Thus, though at this point it remains unexplained, there is no doubt that Appalachian children manifest far less favorable political affect than do their counterparts elsewhere in the United States. Regardless of the index in question, the responses of our sample stand in sharp contrast to other research. Just as supportive dispositions in citizens have been asserted to have early roots, so may the Appalachians' often-noted rejection of political authority germinate during early years. Moreover, also in some contrast to findings of other research, the affective orientations of these subjects does not change greatly with increasing age. These negative images are relatively static. This nonvariant affect suggests the operation of a pervasive socialization agent early in the lives of these children.41 This in turn suggests the desirability of examining the causal efficacy of variables related to an early

41 This non-variance, a preliminary look at our data suggests, may be due to the homogeneity and isolation of the area. Family, peer groups, schools and other possible agents of socialization indigenous to the region probably manifest substantially the same configuration of values. Thus if families transmit an initial set of political notions to children, subsequent exposure to school, peers, etc., is likely to reinforce rather than change values. The remote location of the county probably insulates it from electronic or printed media and other external stimuli. Any value implications at variance with indigenous norms which such sources might transmit are thus prevented from having a widespread effect on maturing children.

³⁹ Jennings and Niemi, op. cit., p. 15.

⁴⁰ Greenstein, Children and Politics, pp. 39-40.

TABLE 3. RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN FAMILY POLITICAL ORIENTATION AND CHILD'S POLITICAL AFFECT

Family political orientation item	Child's political affect measure	те	Significance
"I don't think people in the government care much what people like my family think"*	view of how hard President works	.23	p < .001
people like my lamily onlik	view of the honesty of the President	.06	p > .05
	view of the President's liking for people	.18	p < .001
	view of the President's knowledge	.01	p > .05
e.	view of the President as a person	.05	p > .05
	political cynicism scale	20	p < .001
"My family doesn't have any say about what the govern- ment does."*	view of how hard President works	.10	p>.05
mont does.	view of the honesty of the President	.06	p>.05
	view of the President's liking for people	.07	p>.05
	view of the President's knowledge	.13	p < .01
	view of the President as a person	.06	p > .05
	political cynicism scale	13	p < .01

^{*} Disagreement scored as positive value.

agent frequently assumed to be an important socializer: the family. It is to this task that we now turn.

IV. THE FAMILY AS TRANSMITTER OF SPECIFIC POLITICAL VALUES

What kinds of general explanatory propositions about the socialization process are consistent with these data? If parents typically transmit the substantive content of their values about government to their children, then the very negative political affect observed among Appalachian youngsters should be related to similar assessments on the part of their mothers and fathers.⁴² Evidence on this

⁴² In the absence of additional data, it is difficult to show empirically that the parents of this sample have negative dispositions toward politican be gained by examining the nature of the relationship between our family political orientation items and childrens' political affect (Table 3).

cal authority. However, responses to the family political value items, when the distribution is dichotomized, reveal about equal number of agreements (negative dispositions) and disagreements (positive dispositions). Following each item is the percentage of respondents expressing agreement:

"I don't think people in the government care much about what people like my family think," 58%;

"My family doesn't have any say about what the government does," 43%.

The authors are fully aware of the precarious nature of the family value measures. Their

Since responses to family political orientation items were recorded in terms of degree of agreement (from disagree very much to agree very much), they constitute ordinal variables as do the presidential image and cynicism measures. The evidence on the amount of impact they have on these child political affect variables, however, is mixed. Some fairly substantial taus are accompanied by others approaching zero. But it is interesting to note where the significant relationships occur. Primarily, they involve Presidential competence items and the cynicism scale. These may be the most important dependent variables. Several scholars have observed that childhood evaluations of the personal qualities of the President, which here do not relate to family political orientation, are "less functionally relevant" to future adult behavior than are assessments of role-filling capabilities. As stated above, these observers express no alarm at the decline with age of evaluations of Presidential benevolence. Similarly, the fact that parental values do not seem to influence them may not be great evidence about the inefficacy of familial values in conditioning important childhood orientations.

If political cynicism represents a more developed kind of evaluation, it is significant that it appears to depend upon these parental variables. Regarded as an important encapsulator of youthful political affect, this construct may be a crucial indicator whose antecedents should be known.

Family political values, then, appear to have some effect on children's political affect. Especially given the fact that the affective variables in question appear to be among the most significant, the direct transmission hypothesis takes on some credibility. This suggests the desirability of more detailed investigations of the content of intra-familial political communication.

V. THE FAMILY AS PROTOTYPICAL AUTHORITY STRUCTURE

A totally different kind of dynamic is implied in the notion of relations with the family as a model for political affect. It is not, how-

proxy nature makes them somewhat suspect. The data they generate are displayed, however, because they are suggestive and because they indicate the kind of research which, in the authors' opinions, should be performed more often. In subsequent publications based on the Appalachian data, direct information on parental values and children's perceptions thereof will be available (See note 25).

ever, incompatible with the notion that the family transmits specific value content to the young. It is entirely possible that both processes operate simultaneously. Moreover, since the relationships are relatively small, our data on value transmission fair y demand that additional explanatory tacks be taken. Table 4 demonstrates the effects of father-image and integrity of the family on Appalachian children's political orientations. Again, evidence is somewhat mixed. Three father image items⁴³ are placed against their Presidential-image parallels and against cynicism. There is almost a complete lack of relationship. Not only does the "great overlap of the images of father and President"44 fail to appear among these children, but the more generalized political affect measured by cynicism does not depend on how they see their fathers. In short, there is no evidence at all to support the hypothesis that evaluations of family authority figures are directly projected to remote, political ones.

If the father image hypothesis thus suffers, another dynamic by which the family might serve as a model for regime affect fares even worse. The presence or absence of the father might be thought to have political consequences for children. A fatherless home is disrupted and generally thought to have negative implications. Children might project their negative evaluations of such homes onto the political authority.45 If this were the case, children from fatherless homes should have less positive views. Table 4 revels exactly the opposite. There are generally low to moderate, but significant, negative relationships between having a father at home and evaluating the President in a favorable light. Fatherless children are more positive toward the political. How can this remarkable result be interpreted? One could argue that there is a cathartic process at work; that there is some sort of psychic necessity (possibly anxiety-related) to regard authority as benign. Perhaps unfortunate home life heightens this need which is then manifested in positive evaluations of the political.46

⁴³ The father image items are analogous to the Presidential image items used by Hess and Easton. Though there are five Presidential image items, only three father image analogues are used because of objection to asking respondents to evaluate their fathers' honesty or diligence at work.

44 Hess and Easton, Public Opinion Quarterly, 14, 640.

45 Davies, op. cit., 13-15.

⁴⁸ Judith V. Tourney, The Child's Idealization of Authority (unpublished M.A. thesis, University of Chicago, 1962).

•	TABLE 4.	RELATIONSHIP	BETWEEN	FAMILY	AUTHORITY	CHARACTERISTICS		
AND CHILD'S POLITICAL AFFECT								
	· .	·ANI	CHILD'S I	POLITICA	L AFFECT			

Family authority characteristics	Child's political affect	$ au_c$	Significance
View of father's liking for people	view of President's liking for people	.05 .	p>.05
	political cynicism	07	p > .05
View of father's knowledge	view of President's knowledge	.02	p > .05
;	political cynicism	.02	p > .05
View of father as a person	view of President as a person	.05	p > .05
	political cynicism	03	p > .05
	view of how hard President works	08	p < .05
	view of President's honesty	09	p < .05
Father living with family*	view of President's liking of people	12	p < .05
	view of President's knowledge	23	p < .001
•	view of President as a person	.00	p > .05
	political cynicism	.05	p > .05

^{*} This is a dichotomous variable—either the father lives at home or he does not. However, since father's living at home constitutes a less disrupted family authority structure, we continue to apply ordinal statistics.

This does not seem likely, for as we have just seen, specific negative evaluations of their fathers are not related to childrens' positive political orientations.

Rather than resulting in negative authority orientations, father-absence could interfere with the transfer of specific political value content from family to child. A major agent in the transfer process may be absent. Though mixed, there is some evidence in previous research of "male political dominance" in the family. Fathers may be particularly important communicators of political values.⁴⁷ Children

⁴⁷ Greenstein, Children and Politics, p. 119; Kenneth P. Langton, The Political Socialization Process: The Case of Secondary School Students in Jamaica, (Unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, University of Oregon, 1965), p. 119. On the other hand, male dominance in the political learning of the young fails to appear in some research: Hyman, Political Socialization, pp. 83-89; Eleanor from fatherless homes become more dependent upon their mothers. But mothers are not typically strong political cue-givers. Hence, the typical adult political values of Appalachia will not be so effectively transmitted in the fatherless home. These adult values supposedly involve relatively unfavorable assessments of political authority. The fatherless child escapes close contacts with these values and emerges more positively disposed toward political authority. When this agent is absent, perhaps the media, or other agents bearing more favorable cues, assume a more prominent role in the socialization process.

This interpretation, which of course returns us to the transmission-of-specific-values hypothesis, is strongly supported by additional

E. Maccoby, Richard E. Matthews, and Anton S. Morton, "Youth and Political Change," Public Opinion Quarterly, 18 (Spring, 1954), 23-39

TABLE 5. RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN FAMILY POLITICAL ORIENTATION AND CHILD'S POLITICAL AFFICT, WITH FATHEL-PRESENCE CONTROLLED

Family political orientation item	Child's political affect measure	Father-present children $ au_c$	Father-absent children $ au_{m{o}}$	Significance of the difference	
I don't think people in the government care much what	view of how hard the President works	.25	.12	p < .001	
people like my family think*	view of honesty of the President	.12	10	p < .001	
	view of President's liking for people	.23	.04	p < .001	
	view of President's knowledge	.00	.06	p < .01†	
	view of President as a person	.10	11	p < .001	
	political cynicism scale	18	26	p < .01†	
My family doesn't have any say about what the govern-	view of how hard the President works	.17	15	p < .001	
ment does*	view of honesty of the President	.10	06	p < .001	
	view of President's liking for people	.17	23	p < .001	
	view of President's knowledge	.17	.03	p < .001	
	view of President as a person	06	.08	p < .001†	
	political cynicism	13	16	$p < .05\dagger$	

^{*} Disagreement scored as positive value.

analysis of the data. First, it is clear that there is no unknown process operating to produce more positive adult political values in fatherless families. Fatherless and two-parent families are identical in this regard (tau's between father at home and family political value items are -.03 and .00). Though the starting point is the same, it is also clear that the transmission process is greatly attenuated in fatherless homes. This can be seen by imposing a control for father-presence on the relationship between family political orientation and child's political affect (Table 5). The data for fatherpresent children are very similar to the collapsed data shown in Table 3, except that the relationship between family value and child affect is generally somewhat stronger. But for

father-absent children, the relationship generally declines and in several cases is actually reversed. Not only can the fatherless family not promulgate its political values, but it seems to leave its children very vulnerable to the socialization of other agents, agents with rather different (more positive) values. To be sure, child political cynicism, which is related to family political values, does not appear to be governed by these considerations. Other family-related roots may affect this variable—perhaps those which relate to generalized cynicism.

VI. CONCLUSION

Children in the relatively poor, rural Appalachian region of the United States are dramatically less favorably inclined toward

[†] Relationship not in predicted direction.

political objects than are their counterparts in other portions of the nation. Moreover, the image which these children have does not appear to develop with age in the fashion observed for others; there is no indication that a process conducive to the development of political support is operative in Appalachia. Here, children's views appear to be relatively static. These findings have two implications. First, they point to the possibility that the oftenemphasized highly positive character of children's views of politics may be a culturally bound phenomenon. One should exercise much caution in accepting such views as a universal norm. Secondly, the occurrence of such divergent findings underscores the desirability of explaining children's political orientations.

Since, at the sub-cultural level, these atypical findings are paralleled by 1) atypical adult (parent) political values, and 2) atypical family structure, two broad hypotheses involving the effect of family-related variables on children's political affect were tested. Examination of the hypothesis that parents directly transmit the content of their political values to their children produced some confirming evidence. Reported parental values showed moderate relationship to certain aspects of children's political affect. This was especially true of the competence items in Presidential images (supposedly the most important for subsequent behavior) and of political cynicism, a more generalized kind of system affect.

The thesis which posits the family as prototypical authority structure fares less well, however. There is no support at all for the notion that affect toward the father is extended to remote, political authority. Relationships between specific aspects of children's father images and parallel components of Presidential images are not significant. Nor is there evidence that disrupted family structure, measured by father-absence, contributes to negative politi-

cal evaluations. In fact, father-absence is associated with more favorable political valuations in Appalachian children! This remarkable result is interpreted as supporting the first hypothesis regarding the direct transfer of value-content from family to child. Where the father is absent, an agent communicating the predominantly negative adult political values to youngsters is lost. This notion seems the more plausible when it is observed that there is a marked relationship between family political values and child political affect among father-present families, but no such relationship—if anything a slight negative gradient—among father-absent families.

Thus, of the two broad hypotheses posited at the outset, our data support the notion of direct value transfer, while leading us to doubt that the family is an effective authority prototype. Though these findings are offered as significant in and of themselves—they certainly suggest the importance of closer examination of parent-child political communication processes in the understanding of regime-level values—there are other implications. The explanatory relationships presented here are of relatively modest magnitudes. The small amount of variance in children's political affect which is explained here by the family suggests that we should search for other agents of socialization, or for other dynamics which may operate within the family. A preliminary view of other of the Knox County data suggests that there may be conditions under which other, less personal agents assume a great role. Fortunately, the move toward cross-cultural and explanatory analysis of childhood socialization will proceed and these and related questions will be joined.48

⁴⁸ The forthcoming doctoral dissertation by Herbert Hirsch explores other socialization agents at greater length.

COMMUNICATIONS

If, As Lipsitz Thinks, Political Science Is To Save Our Souls, God Help Us!

TO THE EDITOR:

Professor Lipsitz raises a number of questions. I suppose the main ones are: "Did I say it?", "If so, is it true?", and "If true, is it a good thing or a bad thing or a mixed thing or what?"

I did say it, and I think I meant it. But I do not think I was suggesting anything as extreme as Professor Lipsitz finds. I was suggesting that what has been said about many of the new nations might apply to a society as "secular" as the United States—i.e., that politics might function as religion. The parallels between the kind of ceremony Shils and Young observed at the British coronation and the ceremony associated with the assassination crisis were quite striking, and triggered off a comparison between the functions of such ceremonies and the functions of religious ceremonies that Durkheim noted—the reinforcement of collective identity and the re-dedication to continuity. The parallel can be drawn without assuming identity with political religions in the new states or with political religions like Naziism. A similarity of pattern does not imply a similarity in intensity.

The purpose of the essay was not to argue that such commitments are good or bad. Its purpose was to use the information available on the reaction to the assassination to suggest that such a religious-type commitment existed in the United States and to relate it to political stability.

Is the argument true? I agree with Lipsitz that a lot of evidence supports the general point of view, but that we need more precise definitions and better data.

But what really concerns Lipsitz is the normative question of whether this is a good or bad thing. This represents a different realm of discourse. The argument about the overlap between political and religious beliefs does imply that religious-type beliefs in the political sphere foster acquiescence to political authority and, in turn, stability. That's good if you like stability; bad if you don't. Whether you do or not depends upon your evaluation of the present state of society, and your estimate as to the type of change that would be instituted if there were less acquiescence and more questioning.

On such a question different people will have different views. If my essay implied to Lipsitz that I believe that unquestioning acquiescence because of belief in the sanctity of state authority is a good thing, I am sorry. I am not sure it was appropriate or necessary in that earlier essay to "raise a normative eyebrow," but in reply to Lipsitz it seems proper to raise two. There are times when political authority

becomes unworthy of support and should be challenged, and in the spring of 1968 many serious men in the United States are considering such a challenge. But though such challenges may be appropriate now, I would part company with Lipsitz in that I both welcome them and fear them. And here the argument about political acquiescence is relevant. The great tragedy of American politics in 1968—a tragedy centered around Vietnam-is that it has led to a fundamental loss of respect for and confidence in the government among significant groups. One can understand why this has happened and may, indeed, welcome it. But if this implies a long-run decline in fundamental loyalty, the future of the American political community becomes problematic and we may be in for a great time of troubles.

And it is in relation to this normative question that Lipsitz and Thoreau are inadequate guides. To stress acquiescence and stability as the only normative goals is, I believe, a mistake, but it is equally mistaken to stress only the opposite. Thoreau makes an eloquent case for civil disobedience but he ignores the complexity of the problem and one cannot take him fully seriously. He argues for a fully rational and voluntaristic obedience to law. "The only obligation which I have a right to assume." he wrote in "Civil Disobedience," "is to do at any time what I think right." And he says he has no obligation to "the societies which I have never signed in to." But surely Lipsitz knows —though he hardly mentions—the arguments as to why this just will not work. In part it cannot work because citizens are not able and would be foolish to try constantly to "examine the costs, and compare it with the advantages" of their relationships with the government (as Lipsitz quotes Thomas Paine as telling us to do). And a stable system of rule cannot be built on such voluntaristic and easily changeable commitments.

And because Thoreau and Lipsitz look at one side of the argument, they ignore the tough normative question of when civil disobedience is justified: in what kind of society and in response to what kind of governmental action? Does one refuse cooperation with any governmental act of which one disapproves or only with certain severely important acts? Perhaps one can hope for the following from religious type commitments to political authorities: that they will prevent civil disobedience from being triggered off by trivial governmental acts (as can happen when people have no "primitive" respect for authorities whatsoever) but they will not be so intensely held that they prevent protest in cases where governmental activities are felt to be major evils. This would all call for some "balance." This I admit is a vague notion and Lipsitz does not like it, but I am not sure how one can avoid considering it.

All this goes beyond social science, but Lipsitz is writing normative theory (which I do not think I was, though he clearly thinks so). Social science can, however, be useful in dealing with normative questions of this sort. This requires, however, that one deal with more complex relationships than Lipsitz considers. Political quiescence—to use Edelman's term—has different consequences depending upon who is quiescent. And we have some data that would help predict the consequences of greater political activity and involvement of different groups. One is not sure whether Lipsitz wants everyone involved; or just intellectuals, or liberals, or who. One gets the impression that Lipsitz is looking for people committed to peace and to a reduction of abuse of freedom by the state. But he cannot dismiss as easily as he does the information from recent polls which suggest that many quiescent Americans (that is, people who are politically inactive and relatively passive before government authority and who only speak up when questioned by a pollster) are committed to more bombing in Vietnam and believe by two to one that people should not have the right to demonstrate against the Vietnam war.1 Would heightened political consciousness among such a group maximize the values Lipsitz wants? He answers that it is just "state worship" that leads to such attitudes; but the quiescence that goes with deference to political authority keeps such attitudes from being converted into actual pressures for repression of others.

In any case, these are speculations to place against Lipsitz's speculations. He clearly does not like the normative implications of my article. If the implications are the ones he draws from it, neither do I. But I think things are more complicated than he does. I find unquestioned commitment normatively inadequate but pure voluntarism inadequate as well. And whether he likes some implications of my essay or not, the question remains as to whether what I wrote is true. I believe that the kind of commitment I described exists and has a relationship to stability—whether we like it or not. But I am not sure-my original essay was speculative also. Indeed, the essay he cites was written in reply to a request to speculate on the political implications of the more precise studies

¹ See S. M. Lipset, "The President, the Polls and Vietnam," Transaction (September/October 1966), p. 24; and the Harris Poll of December 1967 (New York Times, December 19, 1967).

of reaction to the Kennedy Assassination—which may be the reason (though hardly the excuse) for some of its vagueness. Like Lipsitz, I would welcome some hard and careful research on the subject.

SIDNEY VERBA

Stanford University

TO THE EDITOR:

Sidney Verba seems to maintain that the "not-too-intense" political religion we have is somehow what we need. He doesn't seem to take seriously the question of how such a "religion" affects democratic life. Why? The issue is not whether Sidney Verba was personally endorsing unthinking obedience to political authority. The issue is whether we want to ignore the implications of our work. In Verba's case, that work has implications which can only make one complacent about the quality of our political life.

What we need, as Almond and Verba once told us, is "a more sober and informed appreciation of the nature and complexity of the problems of democratization." As a first step toward such soberness, we must stop talking about contemporary America (or England) as if it were the very model of democratic life, or, worse yet, of the good life. We need standards which transcend existing systems unless we are prepared to defend the idea that what already exists exhausts all possibilities of democratization or happiness. Sidney Verba suggests in his reply that activating the undemocratic in America might be disastrous, yet only a few years ago he argued that this same America (with these same "dangerous" people) could serve as something of a model for democracy. Wasn't it short-sighted not to have taken up these undemocratic attitudes as a deep and unfinished problem of our politics? It is exactly this sort of short-sightedness that grows out of theories that build only on what "is" right at the moment, ignoring both history and the tasks of the future. It is here (among other places) that normative and empirical matters get confused. A theory of under-development that included exacting norms of democratization and paid careful attention to human needs, would help us maintain a perspective on these questions. I tried to move into the thinly populated neighborhood of such a theory in the conclusion of my article where I suggested a few steps that might enhance democracy in the United States.

Still, the question of who is activated is a real one. The possibility that dissent may be suppressed or become self-destructive is real. Yet here the possibilities are more complicated than Verba suggests. There is no one-to-one correspondence between attitudes and be-

havior. Involving more Americans in discussion or action concerning the war in Vietnam does not necessarily mean suppression of civil liberties. Also, without mass involvement, suppression can still occur. Why doesn't Verba mention the kind of public atmosphere created by HUAC, General Hershey and those leading public figures who find dissent close to treason? Is that also mass behavior? You would think that in this generation the civil rights movement would have demonstrated that mass movements are not necessarily threats to such democracy as we have.

Verba says he welcomes as well as fears challenges to authority. That might be sensible, depending on the kind of challenge and the nature of the authority. Yet his emphasis is on the fear, not the welcome. He looks with dread toward the possibility of a decline in fundamental loyalty, yet he makes no mention of how present challenges may make new policies possible, and may in fact alter the nature of national loyalty for the better. Why? Beyond this, isn't it reasonable to fear also the acquiesence that allows authority to go unchallenged when challenge is needed? The issues involved are not only democracy and stability, but survival and human decency itself. Why, ten years ago, were so few political scientists telling us that what we needed was a dose of humane and democratic instability?

Lewis Lipsitz
University of North Carolina, Chapel Hill

TO THE EDITOR:

The authors of "Socio-economic Variables and Voting for the Radical Left: Chile, 1952" (December, 1967) stated their study concerned alienation. Yet, it is difficult to understand how the vote for Socialist candidate Salvador Allende can be interpreted as an expression of alienation, no matter how sophisticated the indices. Since their formation in the early 20th century the Socialist and Communist parties of Chile have performed demand aggregation and recruitment functions and have otherwise abided by the norms and laws of a constitutional democracy. Certainly they have not attempted to organize the masses for revolution and the destruction of the "Old Regime."

The vote for Allende well may have reflected dissatisfaction with the policies of the preceding Radical governments, but not alienation. Voting for an "out-party" in U.S. politics usually is interpreted as dissatisfaction with the "in-party," not rejection of the system. Why should that differ in Chile? If there was an alienated vote in 1952, that more probably was the vote for the winner, Carlos Ibanez del Campo who, during his campaign, stated that

the traditional parties of Chile were responsible for the existing social-economic problems. He presented himself as a charismatic leader who would rule for the "good of the country" as he perceived that good unrestricted by political parties. Indeed, many people believed, and perhaps even hoped, that Ibanez, if elected, would establish his second dictatorship of the century.

SANDRA POWELL

The American University

TO THE EDITOR:

Deane E. Neubauer's "Some Conditions of Democracy," this Review, (1967), pp. 1002–1009, claims to demonstrate that after a certain level of socio-economic development has been achieved, continued development is irrelevant to democratic institutions.

Neubauer erroneously ascribes to me the view that political development (which he interprets as meaning democratization) will increase indefinitely with further gains in social and economic development. It is obvious from the context of the 1963 article² cited by Neubauer that I was not speaking of democratization, but of "the degree of complexity and specialization of its [a nation's] national political institutions." The Political Development Index (PDI) used in that article was not intended as a measure of democracy.

A Political Representativeness Index (PRI) appeared in 1965.³ In 1967 I added electoral participation to the index, an addition which slightly increases the correlations between the various political indices and socio-economic indicators.⁴

So, even with the post-1963 measurement changes, the general results of the 1963 analysis remain. For the sake of argument, let us assume that I was talking about democratization, rather than political development, in the

- ¹ My thanks to Benjamin Walter for his comments on this rejoinder, and for bringing Neubauer's article to my attention.
- ² Phillips Cutright, "National Political Development: Its Measurement and Social Correlates," in Nelson W. Polsby, Robert A. Dentler and Paul A. Smith (eds.), *Politics and Social Life* (Boston: Houghton Mifflin Co., 1963), pp. 569–582.
- ³ Phillips Cutright, "Political Structure, Economic Development and National Social Security Programs," American Journal of Sociology, 70 (1965), 537-543.
- ⁴ Phillips Cutright and James A. Wiley, "Modernization and Political Representation: 1927-1966," mimeo, Nashville, Tennessee, Department of Sociology, Vanderbilt University, 1967.

1963 article. Is Neubauer's interpretation of my position correct? My major prediction about change in the level of democratization and changes on modernization applied to one type of nation: a nation at a low level of modernization and a low level of democratization was expected to increase its level of democratization, if its modernization program was successful.

Neubauer seems shocked to find that "very many" (actually 9 of 76) nations received maximum "democratization" scores, but varied in their level of modernization. Yet, I am sure that he would not be surprised to learn that in spite of the correlation between height (independent variable) and weight (dependent variable), men with identical weights will vary in height. Dissatisfaction with the measurement "ceiling" stimulated Professor Neubauer to develop an index of Democratic Performance.

Neubauer wants to test two hypotheses. The first is that nations with maximum PDI scores and varying socio-economic development will fail to show a positive correlation between socio-economic development and his Democratic Performance measure. This hypothesis is not tested since his sample (sic) contains countries with widely different PDI scores.

The second hypothesis is that beyond a certain threshold of socio-economic development, variation in socio-economic development will be unrelated to PDI or to his Democratic Performance measure. He does not test this hypothesis either, since his "sample" of nations contains only democratic countries, rather than all nations which exceed a certain (unspecified) threshold.

It is important to inspect Neubauer's measure of Democratic Performance in some detail, since he believes it measures degrees of democratization that are not discriminated by my PDI or PRI measures. The Democratic Performance index is composed of four equally weighted (summed T-scored) indicators. The first, "the percent of the adult population eligible to vote," starts off well, but ends up ignoring: (1) whether an election actually occurred; (2) whether the representatives thus elected were seated; and (3) whether the parliament continued over its full term. Obviously the indicator has no general value, except when it is applied to completely stable democraciesnearly all of which have universal suffrage.

The second indicator, "equality of representation," is insufficiently explained. One cannot perform the operations necessary to reproduce it. It appears that a pure proportional representation system would get the highest number of points on this indicator. I wonder whether Neubauer really believes that proportional

representation is superior to single-member, winner-take-all methods of electing party candidates to legislative assemblies.

The third indicator, "information equality," purports to measure the extent to which "all individuals (in the nation) possess identical information about the alternatives." Lacking adequate data, Neubauer takes per capita newspaper circulation in the capital city and multiplies this figure by the number of "independently" owned newspapers. One can calculate that the same score can be achieved in spite of huge differences in newspaper circulation, so long as the number of newspapers varies. As a yardstick for what is going on in the nation, the measure is inadequate; only one of every 250 Americans lives in Washington. D.C. Finally, giving this indicator 25 percent of the weight in the composite index contaminates the dependent variable, since all of the measures of socio-economic development are related to newspaper circulation.

The fourth component is "competition." This indicator awards points to nations that have frequent changes in party leadership, and also rewards nations in which the vote was close. But a population satisfied with its leadership may overwhelmingly return a party to power in free and competitive elections for many years. Or a population may reject the leadership of a party in power and replace it with a competitive party by an overwhelming margin. In either case the nation loses points—it is lower on "competition" (hence, Democratic Performance) than a nation repeatedly voting parties in and out of office by narrow margins.

The sources of information for all indicators are unlisted, the procedures are unspecified, and even the time period used is not mentioned. This makes replication impossible.

Neubauer's "sample" of 23 "democratic" nations omits Australia, Iceland, Panama, Costa Rica, and Uruguay, but includes Mexico, Venezuela and India. Clearly some criterion other than my PDI index was used in selecting "democratic" nations, but Neubauer never gets around to saying exactly what that criterion contained.

Neubauer states that "Once above this (socio-economic) threshold, however, the degree to which a country will 'maximize' certain forms of democratic practice is no longer a function of continued socio-economic development." (p. 1007) Since he included India in his sample, one would expect that to test this hypothesis he would have taken all nations at and above India's development level, and seen whether a correlation exists between political and socio-economic scores.

His test is laid out in his Table 1. The test is

labeled a "multiple regression analysis." It is the only multiple regression analysis I have ever seen that consists entirely of zero order correlation coefficients. With the exception of the modest correlation between the communications index and Democratic Performance (a a result of index contamination), all correlations with the dependent variable are near zero. The author then concludes that there is no relation between socio-economic development and Democratic Performance. But, given our examination of his measure, one may wonder whether Professor Neubauer has simply created a very difficult technique to apply random numbers to nations.

Although different Democratic Performance scores are assigned to nations, the lack of correlation with socio-economic indicators is meaningless (setting aside the sample design problem) unless the validity of the indicator is proven. Neubauer simply assumes that differences in his measure really mean what he wants them to mean. Since Professor Neubauer failed to deal with this problem, I have correlated the Democratic Performance measure against five measures to which a reasonable man might think it should be related. For example, we might expect that nation high on Democratic Performance would also be relatively high on redistribution of income through social security programs, but the rank correlation (N=22) of Democratic Performance with the percent of GNP allocated to social security programs is only .15, controlling years of program experience, voting participation, and percent of labor force in industry.5 Nor is the measure related to income inequality; the rank correlation (N=20) is positive .19, controlling economic development, PRI, and percent of labor force in agriculture.6 Perhaps governments high on Democratic Performance will be relatively more active in securing opportunities for occupational mobility; the rank correlation, (N=11) with the degree to which sons have inherited their fathers' occupation is positive .11. Are govern-

⁵ See Phillips Cutright, "Income Redistribution: A Cross National Analysis," Social Forces, 46 (1967), 180-190 for data and analysis. The number of cases used in this and the following correlations vary according to the availability of data, unless other reasons for omitting cases are given.

⁶ See Phillips Cutright, "Inequality: A Cross National Analysis," American Sociological Review, 32 (1967), 562-578 for data and analysis.

⁷ See Phillips Cutright, "Occupational Inheritance: A Cross National Analysis," *American Journal of Sociology*, 73 (1968), for data and analysis.

ments high on Democratic Performance more attentive than low performance governments in fulfilling the educational needs of their populations? The rank correlation with the percent of children 5-19 enrolled in school⁸ (N=17) is only .11. Finally, the rank correlation with a measure of "freedom of the press" (N=18) is .13. One concludes that the measure's pragmatic validity has yet to be established.

Failure to establish the validity of the Democratic Performance measure leads one to the reasonable conclusion that assigning more than one nation to the same PRI score may not be such a sin after all. For if we cannot explain differences in important nation-wide consequences presumably related to democratization (with Neubauer's measure), this may simply mean that the causes of variation in these consequences do not result from minor variations in electoral participation, party competition, etc., but are a function of other social and economic characteristics that are independent of the political system, as Neu-

* Data from Bruce M. Russett, et al., World Handbook of Political and Social Indicators, New Haven: Yale University Press, 1964, pp. 218-219. Nations below \$400 per capita GNP (data from Russett, et al., op. cit. pp. 155-156) are omitted to put a rough control on economic development; Switzerland and Norway are also dropped since only public school enrollments in these nations were available to Russett.

⁹ Data from Ralph L. Lowenstein, "World Press Freedom, 1966", Columbia, Missouri: School of Journalism, University of Missouri at Columbia, May. 1967, Table III. In this report nations are grouped into eight levels on a measure of "Press Freedom." Removal of the four nations in Neubauer's list with less than \$400 per capita GNP (plus Luxemburg, for which no Press Freedom rating was listed) leaves 18 cases. Ten of the 18 nations are in the upper level and the remaining eight are in the second level on Press Freedom. Within the upper level a rank order is available for the top six nations. (See "A Charter Subscription Offering for Interplay: A Review of European/American Affairs," New York: Interplay, 200 West 57th Street (January, 1968), p. 1. A common rank was assigned to the remaining four nations in the upper level and a common rank assigned to the eight nations in the second level. For example, Great Britain and France were ranked first and second on Democratic Performance by Neubauer, but were both in the second level (assigned a rank of 14.5) on Press Freedom: Switzerland is ranked in 18th position on Democratic Performance, but is second on Press Freedom.

bauer defines it.

PHILLIPS CUTRIGHT

Vanderbilt University

TO THE EDITOR:

Almost ten years ago in what is now a wellknown article, S. M. Lipset presented some not very firm evidence illustrating the already familiar proposition that democratic government is more likely to occur in plentiful than wanting environments. More recently Phillips Cutright has attempted to validate the proposition that political development, per se, comes about as a result of nations achieving specified levels of social and economic development. In short, Lipset asserts that democracy, as a discrete variable, requires some social and economic requisites, while Cutright suggests that political development is a continuous variable and is related linearly with social and economic development.

The argument and evidence provided by Cutright to support this assertion have confused the whole question of democratic requisites. The empirical support for Cutright's assertion rests upon the relatively high correlations which he obtains between selected socio-economic indices and an index of "national political development" using aggregate statistical data for 76 countries. It is this result which leads him to conclude that there is a strong, linear relationship between social-economic development and "national political development." This index, however, is constructed such that scores are assigned to countries on the basis of whether they sustain institutional patterns which are explicitly democratic in nature, and thus his index is in fact not about political development at all, but simply a more "sophisticated" version of Lipset's explicitly "democratic" measure. Inspection of Cutright's data indicates that all democratic countries cluster toward the high end. One may conclude, then, from his own evidence, that Cutright is asserting a direct and positive relationship between socio-economic development and democratic development, not political development, and that, unfortunately, he is misinterpreting the meaning of his own "findings."

The purpose of my article, "Some Conditions of Democracy," this Review, 1967, pp. 1002–1009, is to demonstrate this. Since the primary question now involves the relation, if any, between social-economic factors and democracy, it will be useful to examine the variation in these variables for those countries for which an index of democraticness is sensible. The following procedures were therefore employed: (a) I select 23 democratic countries from among those for which Cutright reported data. (b) I

obtain the same social-economic data for these countries used by Cutright. (c) I create an index of democracy with which to measure the relative degree of democracy of the 23 countries. This last step is necessary because Cutright's index does not permit one to differentiate degrees of democratic behavior among manifestly democratic countries (he insists he is measuring all political development, not merely democrationess). The results indicate an almost zero order correlation between Cutright's and Lipset's social-economic indices and my index of democratic performance. I therefore conclude that the model proposed by Cutright is overly simple as a political development model (since such a model "should" include things besides democratic institutional features) and incorrect as a democratic development model.

I fail to find these issues addressed in his above remarks. Let me, however, offer two comments. He attempts to make much of the fact that I have not in this one article tied my index of democratic development to some set of output variables which he thinks should be related to it. He asserts that the low rank-order correlations between my index and his selected variables impeach the validity of my argument. On its face this line of reasoning can only lead to nonsense. Besides the obvious fact that I am under no obligation to provide evidence supporting his hypothetical assertations, his argument, were it to be believed, would strip all researchers of the right and obligation to report evidence disconfirming hypotheses no matter how important such disconfirmations. Indeed, the logic of his argument precludes the rationale of establishing null hypotheses for testing. To the specific point raised, however, Cutright unfortunately is not aware of the fact that I have long been interested in the relationship between democratic performance and system output characteristics and have discovered some interesting relationships of my own which will be contained in a forthcoming report.

Finally, it is understandable that Cutright should be defensive about his index of political development—he has a great deal invested in it. It has appeared in one guise or another in at least four publications (conveniently cited in his above comment), sporting minor modifications to suit the immediate purpose of the day. My remarks concerning its utility as a measuring device stand. It measures the institutionalization of liberal democracy, not "the degree of complexity and specialization of its (a nation's) national political institutions." In short, it does not suit the purpose to which it has been put.

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BOOK REVIEWS AND NOTES

BOOK REVIEWS	
Holt and Turner, The Political Basis of Economic Development: An Exploration In Comparative Political Analysis. Gerald A. Weiner	583
Weiner, Party Building in a New Nation: The Indian National Congress. AVERY LEISERSON	584
Wainhouse and Associates, International Feace Observation: A History and Forecast. Ross, The United Nations: Peace and Progress. Lincoln P. Bloomfield	586
Ashford, Perspectives of a Moroccan Nationalist. Ashford, Morocco-Tunisia: Politics and Planning. Ashford, National Development and Local Reform: Political Participation in Morocco, Tunisia, and Pakistan. George Lenczowski	587
Barnett, China After Mao. Geoffroy-Dechcume, China Looks at the World. Goldman, Literary Dissent in Communist China. Granqvist, The Red Guard. Roger W. Benjamin.	588
Friedlander, Prelude to Downfall: Hitler and the United States, 1939–1941. O'Neill, The German Army and the Nazi Party, 1933–39. Nyomarkay, Charisma and Factionalism in the Nazi Party. H. P. Sechen	590
Spinelli, The Eurocrats. Ronald Inglehart	593
Young, The Democratic Republicans of New York: The Origins, 1763–1797. Prince, New Jersey's Jeffersonian Republicans: The Genesis of an Early Party Machine. Manning J. Dauer.	594
Blau and Duncan, The American Occupational Structure. M. Kent Jennings	596
Howe, The Garden and the Wilderness: Religion and Government in American Constitutional History. Thomas S. Schrock	597
BOOK NOTES	
POLITICAL THEORY, HISTORY OF POLITICAL THOUGHT, AND METHODOLOGY	599
American Government and Politics	619
Foreign Governments and Comparative Politics.	643
International Politics, Law, and Organization	671

BOOK REVIEWS

The Political Basis of Economic Development:

An Exploration In Comparative Political
Analysis. By Robert T. Holt and John E.
Turner. (Princeton, New Jersey: D. Van
Nostrand & Company, 1966. Pp. iii, 410.
\$4.50, paper.)

Robert T. Holt and John E. Turner have written an imaginative book that is a welcome addition to the growing literature on modernization and political development. They reveal a lack of timidity in their usage of comparative analysis, as they rise above the usual procrustean attempts in Political Science at comparative methodology. The main purpose of their exploratory study is to develop hypotheses which can be tested in future studies. As they admit, they want to generate hypotheses and not to test them. Basically, they are presenting a conceptual framework for the analysis of political factors in economic growth, and they develop hypotheses on the role of these at certain stages of economic development. In order to do this, they utilize an adapted structuralfunctional perspective based upon pattern variables developed by Talcott Parsons and his associates. These are: (1) adaptation, (2) goal attainment, (3) pattern maintenance and tension management, and (4) integration. They also borrow some of W. W. Rostow's terminology and use his concept of the stages of economic growth, but they do not employ a Rostowian scheme because of their differences on crucial definitions.

The data in their book is taken from four selected societies, France (1600-1789), Manchu China (1644-1911), Tokugawa Japan (1603-1868), and England (1588-1780). According to Holt and Turner, "shortly after the final dates listed, Japan and England entered upon a period of rapid industrialization, whereas France and China lagged behind in varying degrees. If there are significant political requirements for economic growth, and if there was no obvious technological factor at work, we should expect to find certain political similarities between France and China, on the one hand, that distinguish them from Japan and England on the other." It was the patterns of similarity and difference that supposedly provided them with the basis for developing hypotheses concerning the political requirements for economic growth at the stage of early industrialization. Even though the empirical analysis of their four cases was not presented to provide an explanation of why England and

Japan managed to achieve take-off quickly after the techniques of industrial production became known, while France and China lagged behind, they did this to a great extent by their excellent handling of the historical data.

A minor flaw that mars Holt and Turner's book is their concern only with domestic political factors that had an influence upon economic growth. They are aware of this problem and dismiss it in their prologue. They realize that there were other factors that were important, such as foreign wars and international involvements, but these lie outside the boundaries of their present interest. I am afraid that in their search for analytical rigor, they sacrifice empirical proof for logical consistency, perhaps, fully knowing that it may well not be epistemologically possible to have both. In two of their cases, Japan and China, domestic political factors that had an influence upon economic growth may be considered secondary compared to the importance of external threats and intervention. In the 19th century, China may have slowly modernized and overcome her national inadequacies had it not been for the depressive and exploitative influences of foreign imperialism. Granted, that the major determinants of China's response lay within Chinese society and not outside it, but if China had not been beaten to her feet by foreign powers, there may have been a greater chance for her to change and modernize. Western imperialism stimulated Japan and the fear of the "White Peril" was a major factor in motivating the samurai elite to bring about many reforms that were responsible for Japan's leap into the industrial age. I think Holt and Turner should have paid more attention to the problem of exogenous forces influencing economic growth even though they do not entirely ignore them. Either way, this is not a major defect and their arguments stand well enough on their

In Chapter 1, Holt and Turner give a critique of what they claim to be the most significant methodological works that are related to their research. According to them, "this critique is focused upon the writings of scholars who have made the most significant contributions to the solution of crucial methodological problems." Though they warn the readers who are not especially interested in methodological issues to begin their reading in Chapter 2, there is still a doubt in my mind as to the value of the first chapter. It would appear to be incidental to the main thrust of the book even

though it is a lucid attempt to explicate and criticize some of the major approaches to the study of the process of political development. The short treatment of the Soviet Union from 1930 to 1965 in the Appendix also seems apart from the main thrust of the book even though Holt and Turner include it in order to demonstrate how their conceptual framework might be applied at other stages of economic development. They really do not need the section on the Soviet Union since they accomplish the same purpose in Chapter 6—"The Take-off Stage: Japan and England."

Holt and Turner give a series of controversial and challenging hypotheses in Chapter 7. They not only posit a series of stimulating hypotheses on the impact of the functions of government and the procedures of governing upon economic development, but also make an important methodological contribution in their approach to empirically generated hypotheses. They point out that they consider empirically generated hypotheses that are derived from a very small number of cases to possess three marked weaknesses. (1) There is always a probability that the patterns of similarity and difference which emerge from the analysis are idiosyncratic. (2) The scholar has little notion of the level of generality of the hypotheses. (3) It is difficult to develop a research design which can test such hypotheses and at the same time be useful in the testing of a significant theory. In order to avoid these problems as much as possible they attempt to introduce a special step in the development of their hypotheses. First, they examine the patterns of similarity and difference which emerge from their data and formulate hypotheses that appear to be most consistent with these patterns. Second, they examine these empirically generated hypotheses in relationship to a number of social science theories from which the hypotheses could conceivably have been deduced. Third, they modify the hypotheses so that they are consistent both with the empirical data of the exploratory study and with the theories they have examined. Where they have problems with the complexity of the theoretical argument, the two forms of a given hypothesis are kept distinct by labeling the empirically generated form as the preliminary hypothesis. The hypothesis that has been modified in light of what they consider to be relevant theories in the social sciences and is supposed to be ready for "testing" is designated as the final hypothesis.

In summary, the substance of this book is superb. The authors have done an excellent job, although they could have shortened their book by excluding what I consider to be an overabundance of theorization. They also provide a very comprehensive bibliography that shows the extensiveness of their research. All in all, Holt and Turner have written a book that is certainly a major contribution to the study of the problems of development.

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Party Building in a New Nation: The Indian National Congress. By Myron Weiner. (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1967. Pp. viii, 509, \$12.50.)

This is Myron Weiner's third volume on Indian politics, rounding out his two earlier studies of the leadership, history and ideological range of all national parties, and how the national regime "manages" the emerging interest-group "infrastructure." The field work for the volume under review was done during 1961-62. The author has steadfastly maintained two only-partly reconcilable objectives (p. 3). He has sought, first, through five intensive case studies at the local-state level in three rural-urban and two primarily urban districts.* to explain "why the Congress party has been relatively successful in winning elections and providing the country with stable government." Second, he has tried to place his work in the context of contemporary development theory in comparative politics "by exploring the conditions under which a modern political organization develops." The latter objective evidently requires a different analytical apparatus than the case studies; at any rate, it turned out to involve no less than an overall appraisal of the impact of the Congress party upon the policy output and structural evolution of the Indian political system. This final report amply confirms Weiner's high status among the well-informed observers and interpreters of Indian society and politics. In overall perspective, however, a fascinating puzzle remains: Why has Weiner apparently been unwilling to join such men as Rajni Kothari, Gopal Krishna, W. H. Morris-Jones and George Rosen, who have ventured to conceptualize "the Congress system," distinct from the party organization of the I.N.C., as the principal agent and vehicle of Indian political development?

* In India the district is the basic common unit of local government and party organization above the village and taluka. It usually contains a dozen or more state assembly districts, two or more parliamentary constituencies, and from one to three million population.

The main body of the book, comprising eighteen chapters, presents case analyses of five differing, local political situations (Calcutta, West Bengal; Madurai, Madras; Belgaum, Mysore; Kaira, Gujarat; Guntur, Andhra Pradesh). Three introductory chapters deal with the methodological and historical aspects of the project; two summarize the author's conclusions concerning Congress' contribution to India's national economic and political development.

In analyzing organization performance at the district level, the author employs an implicit functional approach. He marshalls an impressive array of evidence relating Congress' success to its leaders' unflagging attention, commitment and capacity for: (1) steadily-increasing voter participation, (2) organizational maintenance, (3) open recruitment of "primary" and "active" members, (4) helping individuals from all social strata to satisfy their material needs, mobility aspirations, group (caste, language, religious) identities, and cultural ideals, (5) sharing power with, and accommodating the conflicting demands of traditional and modernizing elites, (6) conciliating and adjusting disputes both within its own ranks and in the community's status and power structure. The materials are relevant, penetrating, always fascinating; but of course case study methods do not produce statistical measures of the relation between party electoral success or failure and variations in voter and elite attitudes with respect to the six variables (see the forthcoming Eldersveld-Marvick study of the Fourth General Elections).

Weiner brings out quite clearly the structural features of Congress party organization that were associated with its success in winning elections and providing stable governments from 1947-57. These were extreme factionalism, reliance upon personal and historical charisma, parochial and particularistic bases of support, constantly shifting coalitions of power, frequent defections from and re-absorptions into the party. But he does not squarely face the problem posed by the question: Were not these institutional characteristics of the party simultaneously both functional and dysfunctional to the successful operation of the political system (let alone nation-building)? In this and in his previous books he has shown how many intellectuals and spiritual leaders (the saintly tradition) have been alienated from Congress. He might have gone much further in demonstrating how these and other features of Congress party politics have produced decisions and policy-making practices that retard modernization and economic development; how they foster and sometimes reward groupism and defection from the party; and above all, how they help to undermine attitudes of willing respect, voluntary collaboration and presumptive legitimacy toward the centralizing, nationalizing institutions of both party and the regime with which Congress is identified.

In the final chapter, obviously written after the 1967 General Elections which (aside from Kerala) first produced widespread evidence of the Congress' declining power to govern at the state level, the author contemplates the inevitability of the party's defeat nationally, but in the same breath he rejects the inevitability of its disintegration. In line with the professed purposes of the study, it would have been enlightening if the author's field studies had enabled him to construct more systematically the shape of the more likely alternatives to Congress party dominance at state and local levels, and if he could have specified the organizational conditions necessary for a developing nation "to establish a balanced relationship between the interests and ambitions of individuals and the goals of the institutions to which they belong" (p. 495). His final theoretical position is scarcely distinguishable from that of those formalists and dialecticians who edify us with the truism that if a political system fails to satisfy its structural-functional requisites it will be replaced by another.

Perhaps because of his and LaPalombara's preoccupation with parties instead of party sustems. Weiner evidently has little use for the "developing" typology of political systems (Shils, Almond-Coleman, Apter, Riggs). We can only infer that he would classify India somewhere between (1) the "participantlibertarian, alternating-majority" system-type of political recruitment and policy formation, and (2) the "reconciliatory-adaptive, coalitional-consensus" type, closer to the latter than the former. He would probably agree that continued postponement of economic performance, plus other internal and external pressures, might result in transforming the Indian polity into a (3) "hegemonic-mobilization, pyramidal, mass-indoctrination" system, and he would presumably join most Indian specialists in doubting that she will swing as far as the (4) "sacred-collectivity, hierarchical, modernizing autocracy."

Party Building In A New Nation greatly advances our understanding of the conditions under which one dominant-party system guided the transition during the first twenty years of post-colonial, independent nation-building. Much remains to be done, however,

in clarifying and elaborating our empirical theories of how the dominant-party, reconciliation-coalition system increases or decreases legitimacy and consensus, and, further, in improving our analytical instruments for comparing nations as their politico-economic systems converge or diverge under the pressures of time, international conflict, technological change and unsatisfied human demands.

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International Peace Observation: A History and Forecast. By DAVID W. WAINHOUSE AND ASSOCIATES. (Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins Press, 1966. Pp. xvii, 663. \$10.00.)

The United Nations: Peace and Progress. By ALF Ross. (Totowa, New Jersey: The Bedminster Press, 1966. Pp. xi, 443. \$8.00.)

International Peace Observation is a solid and uniquely comprehensive examination of a political art invented and put into practice in this epoch. As a source book it fills a gap in the literature and will be a mine of reference for scholars and others for years to come. Its value lies both in its generalities, and in the 70 cases drawn from the experience since 1920 in the League of Nations, the United Nations, and the Organization of American States, as well as several multinational cases outside these formal organizations.

If I may pick one major nit at the outset, by opting for the label "Peace Observation," the authors have, I fear, not necessarily clarified the semantics of what is an already confused lexicon. They define "Peace Observation" as a method "whereby the organized international community initiates a third party intervention as soon as possible in a threatening situation with a view to permitting calmer judgments to allay the potential or actual conflict." This covers far more than observing, patrolling, and reporting. It subsumes much that has in the past been called "Peacekeeping" (which they unaccountably limit to collective acts by "considerable" military forces to bring about a cessation of hostilites). Their definition of "peace observation" also includes other kinds of activities that have in the past paraded under the label of "Pacific Settlement of Disputes." The functions of ascertaining facts and calling for as well as supervising a ceasefire in fact lend themselves to all three rubrics. But it is certainly far too late to quarrel with the authors about this, and we should gracefully accept their idiom while making the best use possible of their splendid research efforts.

Their treatment of cases usefully describes and evaluates international action for each.

They remind us that under the League of Nations, when Great Britain and France were in accord, the League succeeded (for example between 1920 and 1930, except for the Vilna dispute), but after 1930 the presence of other great powers fouled up this harmonious situation. It is helpful to be reminded of some of the useful modalities of pacific settlement under the League of Nations such as the Commissions of Enquiry, and of fact-finding efforts which were able to suggest solutions as well (there were some who would call this "Peacemaking"!). Their findings for the League of Nations successes, while not surprising, are useful: speed in taking up the case was most important, as was the cooperation of the parties, the agreement of great powers, and the quality of observers. My only quarrel with this section is with such extraordinarily guarded statements as: "Whether Facist or Communist governments after 1931 would have permitted their nationals such freedom from government control, or whether such freedom is enjoyed by Soviet officials operating under the United Nations today, is a question of some significance" (p. 11).

Useful data, gathered here on OAS actions, are not usually presented in conjunction with United Nations material. The Inter-American Peace Committee has exercised peace observation functions, the authors tell us, bringing the parties together and suggesting procedures to them (didn't we used to call that "Pacific Settlement of Dispute"?). Written in June 1965, the authors assert "there has never been a peace-keeping operation in Latin America"; it is too bad they did not wait a month or so. Also, it is not clear why the Guatemalan case study is included, since no peace observation was carried out by any international organization. The conclusion is that OAS peace observation machinery is ample, "effective, and useful." But I cannot help feeling that the authors dismiss OAS-type peace observation operations elsewhere—for example Africa—a bit too cavalierly, considering for example the OAU peace observation operation actually conducted in 1964 in the Algerian-Moroccan border dispute. As for the UN, their discussion of cases is comprehensive and generally excellent.

In the last hundred pages the authors look at the future character and role of peace observation arrangements under the UN, including an examination of possible conditions in a disarming or disarmed world. They consider the establishment of a UN peace observation corps and the earmarking of observation units by member states. They examine such practical problems as the selection, training, size, and composition of standing or ad hoc peace obser-

vation groups; terms of reference; procedures and methods of activating such an operation under the UN; reports and reporting procedures; and the relation of a peace observation corps to international military peacekeeping operations. An annex contains a detailed plan for organizing and equiping such a corps.

In terms of thoroughness, exhaustive coverage, and sound scholarship, the work in question is of high value. Despite my quarrels with its semantics, I do not choose to be anti-semantic, and salute the authors for a splendid piece of work.

Professor Ross teaches law at the University of Copenhagen. The purpose of his book is the always commendable one of seeking to understand the United Nations as a political phenomenon, and the author succeeds in wisely conjoining realism with idealism. He correctly presupposes that only a Soviet-American rapprochement can save the world. He not so correctly is critical of the United States but not its potential partner, for lack of foresight in this regard.

The book is less a text than a series of essays. It covers the history, functions, membership, and what Mr. Ross calls the "apparatus" of the UN. Unlike some other professors of law, Mr. Ross seems to see clearly the relationship between the development of community and consensus, and the growth of law. In his eagerness to criticize McCarthyism in the United States I found him a little naive concerning the use of the United Nations by the Soviets as an espionage base—a fact that is well established and available on inquiry even in Copenhagen.

The principal problem with this book is that, although it was published in 1966 and was written in early 1965, many of his references are considerably out of date. I could find only one reference in the entire book later than 1962, nothing later than 1961 in most sections, and most of the references date back to the 1950's. Surely American and Western European literature is not that slow in penetrating to Denmark.

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Perspectives of a Moroccan Nationalist. By Douglas E. Ashford. (Totowa, New Jersey: The Bedminister Press, 1964. Pp. xiii, 171. \$6.00.)

Morocco-Tunisia: Politics and Planning. By Douglas E. Ashford. (Syracuse, New York: Syracuse University Press, 1965. Pp. xx, 65. \$2.75 paper.)

National Development and Local Reform: Political Participation in Morocco, Tunisia, and Pakistan. By Douglas E. Ashford. (Princeton, New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 1967. Pp. xi, 439. \$10.00.)

Professor Ashford's three studies have a common theme in that they all explore problems of nation-building and modernization in recently emancipated ex-colonial Islamic societies. Each, however, deals with a different aspect of development and their geographic coverage is not identical.

In his Perspectives of a Moroccan Nationalist, the earliest of the three studies, the author describes and analyzes the Moroccan Istiglal Party on the basis of an extensive questionnaire circulated among the party members in 1958. The implied assumption of this procedure has been that the Istiglal, as the main political instrument of the Moroccan struggle for independence, should be considered as representative of Moroccan nationalism. The questionnaire was addressed to over 1,200 party secretaries, of whom 337 responded. Of the latter number the replies of those who had more than five omissions and/or partial responses were rejected. As a result, 93 dulyfilled questionnaires served as a basis for this study. The detailed character and careful organization of the questionnaire provided the author with ample material for analysis, thus offsetting the disadvantage of having to deal with a sample representing only one-sixteenth of the party secretaries. No important facet of the secretaries' personal background and service as functionaries of a major organization was neglected. A number of questions addressed themselves to the respondents' attitudes on questions of national and local interest. What emerged was a detailed profile of an important segment of society throwing light on the problems and challenges of the Moroccan polity in transition.

In his brief, comparative monograph on planning in Morocco and Tunisia, the author deals with the often neglected (by economic planners) political aspects of planning. As Bertram M. Gross justly observes in his preface to the study, plan implementation "requires, in addition to economic plans that are technically implementable, institutional change, managerial capacity, and political action." Professor Ashford employs in his discussion of planning two notions borrowed from cultural anthropology, those of "symbolic change" and "ritual change." The first of these represents a change in attitudes, the second a change in behavior. One without another cannot assure success of the planning process. What is needed is the interaction of the two. In the two central chapters the author discusses, first, the political forces in the commitment to planning, and, secondly, participation and the planning effort. His conclusions regarding Morocco tend toward pessimism largely on account of "the capricious political system" which may "prevent adaptation to the needs of planning... and growing political awareness." By contrast, according to the author, Tunisia's "single-party system has shown itself well suited to mobilizing popular opinion and influential groups on behalf of planning." The author warns, however, that "the single party may operate with effectiveness at Tunisia's present stage of development, but it may also be contributing to the social transformation that will make its hegemony more difficult to sustain."

Compared with the two preceding studies, National Development and Local Reform: Political Participation in Morocco, Tunisia, and Pakistan is a major work of comparative politics in which the author focuses on political participation, especially on the local level, as a key to the process of development affecting the totality of an emerging new nation. His inquiry embraces three systems: "the traditional approach of the Moroccan monarchy, the activist solution advocated by the Tunisian singleparty system, and the highly professional view of politics represented by Pakistan." "The burden of inquiry," states the author, "is to elaborate and describe how each government does indeed respond to the developmental challenge." The book is divided into four major sections of varying length. The first contains a thought-provoking discussion of broader issues arising from the quality and intensity of the government's purposeful intervention in the process of modernization. The second, entitled "National Politics and Localized Authority" offers a detailed historical and contemporary review of the Moroccan commune, the Tunisian municipal council, and the Pakistani system of Basic Democracies. The third, devoted to planning and rural development, deals with problems of land reform, public works, education, and administrative reform. The fourth aims at an analysis of the national development and "attitudinal change." In this last section the author further develops some of the themes initially introduced in his monograph on planning in Morocco and Tunisia; namely the conceptual articulation and ideological manifestation with regard to perceptions of national development in the three countries under review. He also distinguishes three periods in the shaping of attitudes: the pre-national, the national, and the postnational. He claims that "in the national phase it is difficult to use institutions to build participation and involvement" inasmuch as, as Tunisia's case illustrates, the main motive force for development is to be found in "a high degree of ideological manifestation." Throughout his study Dr. Ashford lays emphasis on the primacy of politics in the developmental process, a view which today will find considerable consensus as against the earlier oversimplified technoeconomic approaches.

Well organized, combining a wealth of empirical data with the depth of analysis, Dr. Ashford's volume constitutes a significant contribution to the understanding of the problems of modernization in the three selected Islamic countries.

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China After Mao. By A. DOAK BARNETT. (Princeton, New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 1967. Pp. 287. \$6.00.)

China Looks at the World. By Francois Geoffroy-Dechaume. (New York: Random House, 1967. Pp. 237. \$4.95.)

Literary Dissent in Communist China. By MERLE GOLDMAN. (Cambridge, Massachusetts: Harvard University Press, 1967. Pp. xvii, 343. \$7.95.)

The Red Guard. By Hans Granqvist. (New York: Frederick A. Praeger, 1967. Pp. ix, 159. \$5.95.)

The Geoffroy-Dechaume and Granqvist volumes are relevant for the non-specialist. Barnett's work is also primarily for the non-specialist and teachers of Chinese politics. Merle Goldman has published a serious piece of scholarship. All four books are concerned about various aspects of the Communist Chinese revolution.

Hans Granovist is a Swedish journalist who has twice in the past four years taken trips of two months duration to mainland China. He has woven an account of events leading to the "cultural revolution." The author sets the stage for the "cultural revolution" by discussing the economic and political environment prior to 1966. Though the author's observations add little of substance to our small store of knowledge about Communist China, the reader might profit by reflecting on this latest set of journalistic images brought from the mainland. The author feels, for example, that confidence in the regime had returned by 1964 and that Mao "... had clearly arrived at the point where he was able to launch a new revolutionary tidal wave." Perhaps more startling is the statement, apropos of 1964, that the Chinese in Peking seemed better off materially than the Russians in Moscow. No evidence is offered for these statements. The author is content to put the rise of the Red Guard down to Mao's continuing attempt to legislate equality and achieve a Utopia where no groups are superior to the masses. To reach this conclusion it is assumed that Mao is a "revolutionary romantic," one who is "happier" in times of revolution than periods of peaceful change.

The central theme of Geoffroy-Dechaume's China Looks at the World is Chinese culture or civilization and inter-societal images about China and the West. The author is a French diplomat with extensive training and experience in Sinological affairs. His personal effort toward greater understanding between the Chinese and Western world results in a curious Spenglarian-like historical synthesis. An erudition of a very personal and metaphysical quality characterizes this work which ranges from writing systems to political conflict to the broadest eclectic intellectual history imaginable. The author states that he is aware of the pitfalls of this effort, but feels that scholars too often remain on the "platonic" level.

Doak Barnett's latest effort, China After Mao, falls also in the food for non-specialists' category with one qualification. Political scientists not primarily concerned with China may ignore the first two works, but would profit from the summary essay provided by Barnett. Barnett, one of the most sensitive and prolific China watchers, presents no new material, but focuses on the social, political, and economic background factors which provide the environment for current events on the mainland. The author reviews the considerable achievements of the Communist Chinese elite, creation of a disciplined and successful revolutionary movement, a mass political party without parallel, and the initiation of "... a significant program of industrialization." The major section of the introductory essay deals with the basic economic and social challenges facing the regime, the imminence of a very critical change in political leadership in the Party, and the basic prescriptions in Mao's ideological dream for the future. The rest of the volume reprints selected key documents emanating from the Chinese Communist Central Committee on the "cultural revolution," Lin Piao's "Long Live the Victory of People's War," and other documents reflecting Mao's thought.

Merle Goldman offers an original piece of scholarship on the problem of conflict between the Chinese Communist party and leading leftwing Chinese writers in the 1940's and 1950's. The conflict between the Party and the literary intellectuals, one of conflicting values—ideological conformity versus the need

for free inquiry—has left many scars. The author presents impressive evidence that the Party leaders have not entirely succeeded in purifying their writers of unorthodox tendencies.

The basic problem is that imperatives guiding writers of any, and including Maoist, ideological inclination demand a degree of independence of thought often found unacceptable to political elites attempting to industrialize. The author does not speculate on the reasons for the tension, but rather unrayels the Kafka-like environment in which, in historical order, writers of the ilk of Hu Feng, Hsiao Chun, and Ting Ling were "constructively criticized" through Cheng Feng campaigns. Cheng Feng movements, originating in the early 1940's, were designed to create a disciplined devoted cadre and intellectual core. The movement was developed in order to alter basic behavior patterns of intellectuals to conform with the Party line. We are taken through a series of Cheng Feng campaigns and thus see the development of the most extreme psychological techniques, such as public criticism, self-criticism, and re-criticism, which are used against the writers. Yet the author concludes that after two decades of denunciation and self-depreciation, the writers remain alienated, often counter-productive, and independent. The one sanction the writers apparently unconsciously exploit, namely the political elite's dependence on their productivity as a group, may partially explain the series of relaxation periods throughout the 1950's culminating in the Hundred Flowers Movement.

Literary Dissent in Communist China joins the painfully small group of volumes which provide valuable information about contemporary China. An excellent bibliography and glossary citing major Chinese language source material adds to the usefulness of the work.

It would be unfair to criticize the historian Goldman for not writing a sociological analysis of the problem investigated. Likewise, Barnett's work is introductory and historical. Yet the two works reflect a general malaise in works on China of potential relevance for political scientists. Perhaps the most crucial difficulty is that of concept formation and evidence. Nowhere does Goldman define the concept intellectual; rather, and improperly, common intersubjective understanding of the term is assumed. Neither author attempts to explain events under analysis. Without dwelling on the problem of "facts speaking for themselves," frameworks of considerable power are available for application. If, for example, central political organizations such as the Chinese Communist party are viewed as reference groups and ideologies as guides for societa-communication networks which are very difficult to maintain in the absence of a set of relatively stable social values and norms, the political elite's constant attempts to exorcise ideological deviation may be more understandable. Imaginative comparative analysis of other regime's efforts at controlling their intellectual class might yield generalizations of improved value.

Major difficulties paralyze our attempts to create a genuinely profitable academic political science dialogue about Communist China. First, there is the absence of scholars who have the sufficient language and area training plus enough political science discipline concentration. Second, analysis of political problems in a closed society poses critical data problems. Granting these difficulties, more careful explication of the unit of analysis and the elements of the research design apparatus, and the enployment of strategies such as content analysis on substantive questions and comparative aralysis of social background characteristics of inter-societal political elites may facilitate the dialogue thus far conspicuous by its absence.

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Prelude to Downfall: Hitler and the United States, 1939-1941. By Saul Friedlander. (New York: Alfred E. Knopf, 1967. Pp. xi, 328. \$6.95.)

The German Army and the Nazi Party, 1933-39.

By Robert O'Neill. (New York: J. E. Heinemann, 1966. Pp. xiii, 286. \$8.50.)

Charisma and Factionalism in the Nazi Party.

By Joseph Nyomarkay. (Minneapolis:
University of Minnesota Press, 1967. Pp.
161. \$5.00.)

Three separate but very intriguing facets of the rise and fall of the Nazi regime are highlighted by these penetrating scholarly studies: the internal convulsions of the movement on its way to power (Nyomarkay), the crucial rivalry between the party hierarchy and the officer corps (O'Neill), and the policies of moderation vis-à-vis the U.S. pursued by the Third Reich to keep the U.S. from abandoning its isolationist stance which abetted Hitler's control over the Continent (Friedlander). An unexpected but distinctly discernible theme underlying all three works would seem to be the obstacles that lay in the way of Hitler's ascendancy to power. That he could mold the rabble of his early followers into a compact political force. that he could prevail over prestigious and established representatives of the military and, at a later date, through skillful diplomatic maneuvering keep the U.S. at least at arms length, would seem to be less the result of well thought out and prepared plans than of Hitler's almost uncanny ability to take advantage of the weaknesses and unimaginativeness of his adversaries. The ideologically unsophisticated, even primitive character of his early following was no match for Hitler's unscrupulous techniques of persuasion, the officer corps was blinded by its own arrogance, and the Western powers' hesitancy always left most foreign policy options at the discretion of Hitler.

It is especially Friedlander's competent and profuse documentation that conveys a sense of the opportunistic rather than carefully planned nature of Hitler's foreign policy. From Friedlander's meticulous perusal of diplomatic correspondence and other foreign policy documents Hitler emerges as a much less arrogant or politically naive dictator than later assessments have portraved him. Surprisingly it is FDR who, in his determination to foil Nazi policies in Europe even at the risk of war, barely escapes being cast in the role of sinister Machiavellian. If evidence as presented by a scholar of Friedlander's acknowledged sympathetic objectivity to the Allied cause can give this impression, there is reason to be apprehensive about the interpretations of future generations of scholars who may have less cause to skew their impartiality in the direction of the democracies! Between 1939 and 1941 Hitler was extremely careful to keep the U.S. out of the war, to the point even of wanting to avoid a confrontation at all costs. Despite the urgings of his admirality to the contrary, he gave strict orders not to provoke any naval incidents with the U.S. FDR, on the other hand, wanted to assist England in every possible way without necessarily foregoing the risk of involvement. To be sure, much of Hitler's diplomatic moves vis-à-vis the U.S. derived from his continued probing of the strategic potential of the U.S.; he did not want the U.S. to mobilize its full military strength prior to the successful completion of the campaign against Russia. Certainly the influence of neutralists and isolationists in the U.S. was sufficiently strong to lend a great deal of plausibility to Hitler's political calculations. Foremost among those was his speculation that Japan's entrance in the war against England and the Soviet Union would keep the U.S. neutral because of her fear of becoming involved in a two-front war. But somehow FDR had long since decided that a risk of a twofront war could be borne and that Japan's expansionist policies would not act as a deterrent

to legitimate American goals in the Pacific: thus American diplomatic maneuvers were deliberately designed to give Japan only the option between war or a total reversal of her foreign policy. Toward Germany, American policy was quite openly one of entrapping her into a crass act of aggression against American shipping on the high seas. But Hitler simply would not oblige—and then obliged only too well by issuing his declaration of war subsequent to Japan's attack on Pearl Harbor. It will probably always remain one of the more fascinating exercises to speculate on whether in the absence of such a declaration the U.S. and the Third Reich would have gone to war against each other. Friedlander does not make a wholly convincing case for the inevitability of Hitler's action. He suggests Hitler's loyalty to his Asian allies and his conviction that a quick victory over Russia would confront the U.S. with a nearly invincible Germany dominating a vast, monolithic continental bloc. Friedlander's own exposition of the logic of Hitler's action up to that point weaken this explanation. Undoubtedly Hitler did believe that he could yet destroy Russia militarily according to the timetable he had set for himself—but might not such a quick defeat of Bolshevism have created entirely new opportunities for the relationship between the Reich and a still non-belligerent U.S.?

The second work before us is yet another attempt to penetrate the real attitudes of the German Generals toward Nazism and to provide evidence that even if the Generals cannot be relieved of the parts played by them in putting Hitler into power they can at least be shown as having fought his aggressive and criminal designs for world conquest every step of the way. The author has engaged in very serious and careful scholarship designed to overcome the picture of the German General Staff as willing and pliable tools for the execution of the Führer's will. Based on the minute investigation of official documents, as well as unofficial records and conversations with surviving German Generals, Dr. O'Neill has tried to arrive at an explanation as to why the conservative, exceedingly professional and Christian German High Command could allow itself to be used as it was by Hitler and his cynical political supporters. Briefly his argument is that this highly patriotic, professional officercorps fought Hitler's unprincipled machinations every step along the way toward rearmament and aggression; that certainly prior to Hitler's personal assumption of the office of Minister of War in 1938, the army never harbored any independent aggressive design.

Though many officers certainly had clear ideas with respect to the restoration of German military strength and appreciated the favorable climate for such policy offered by the Nazi government, they were also equally repelled by the intrusion of Nazism in the form of political indoctrination and made a determined effort to keep the army free of such contamination. O'Neill is especially concerned to cast the person and role of General v. Fritsch in a new and more favorable light by showing that he was among those who manfully tried to stem the tide of Nazification of the military. But the author's labors cannot be said to introduce any new evidence that would justify a reversal of the impression that Fritsch and most of his peers left to the world: of a military leadership that was undoubtedly disdainful of Hitler's methods, and some of whom even despised him personally, but who supported his policies willingly enough as long as they could be expected to lead to a militarily powerful, internationally respected and economically autonomous Germany. Even O'Neill has to admit disconsolatedly in the end that "there was much about the Third Reich in its prewar vears which seemed to the German Army at large wholly right and proper."

What the work does provide is less an explanation of the ambiguous role of the Generals than a series of rather sketchy portraits of the personal views of a selected number of Generals. The overall impression is that of the self-serving and sycophantic nature of Generals Blomberg, Reichenau and Keitel whose personal ambitions and weak character alone contributed to making Hitler's policy of breaking the will of the army a success. This is a decided oversimplification of the known circumstances that surrounded the subjugation of the army to the party. Much more than personal predilections, there was a distinct orientation away from real political involvement bred into the army under the leadership of von Seeckt who correctly, if arrogantly, assumed that the state owed its existence to the army. The estrangement of the army from the republic played directly into the hands of the Nazis who could play upon the hostility of the officer corps to the republic. That officercorps became the prisoner of its own ideology when it equated Hitler's vulgar nationalism with its own and permitted, especially its younger officers, to embrace Nazism with enthusiasm because of its promises of new opportunities, adventure and prestige. But even those who supported the republic feared the power of the one group, the military, with whose aid that republic would have to be defended against its enemies. A

fearful liberalism either ignored or retreated before the Reichswehr and it became the tragedy of the Weimar republic that the initial attempt to build a republican army following the armistice had to give way so quickly to the forces of tradition and restoration that succeeded in the establishment of the Versailles decreed 100,000 man army. Thus it was the spirit of the arrogant General von Seeckt which imbued the Reichswehr and led to its near alienation from political leadership. That the counter revolution from which Hitler drew his strength could succeed, was made possible by the fact that the state in which an alienated army merely "camped" felt indebted to that army for having redressed the balance between civilian and military authorities in favor of the former. No one ever addressed himself directly to the basic problem of how to integrate a professional army, and especially an officercorps shaped along specific, i.e., monarchic, concepts of duty, honor and loyalty, within a democratic state that did not accord with its own conception of nation or state! The Reichswehr, as Benoist-Mechin has pointed out so perceptively was an army without a nation. It was not merely Hitler's promises of rearmament and universal military training that intrigued the army but his ability to recapture the "nation" again for its soldiers that made him so invincible in the eyes of the Generals. Also, Hitler was very careful during the early years of power to recognize and respect the insistence of the military on autonomy vis-à-vis the political organs of the state—and he could do this the better because of the reliability of the two key-figures among the Generals: Blomberg and Reichenau. Blomberg was only following von Seeckt's guidelines when he saw in Hitler's policies the opportunity for the Reichswehr to be relieved of political problems and intrigues so that it could dedicate itself wholeheartedly to its original task of the creation of a military expertise. It was this withdrawal of the officercorps into "purely" expert problems of military strategy and rearmament that made possible its ignoring of the brutal realities that led to the bloodbath of June 30, 1934. It was none other than v. Fritsch, Commander-in-Chief of the Army at the time, who noted the murder of two of his fellow officers, with the recorded remark: "We cannot change Politics, but we must do our duty." Because the Reichswehr ideal was that of autonomous power within the state, it could no more oppose the trauma of dictatorial government than it could fulfill its correct role within a democratic framework.

Professor Nyomarkay's extremely provocative study centers on the role of Hitler's charis-

ma as a factor which elevated him above the factional strife of his movement making him thereby the object rather than the subject of rivalries among his followers. In discussing the differences between Nazi factionalism and that of other totalitarian movements, the author hopes to generate fresh thinking on the relationship of factional behavior to the legitimacy of power leading toward a new typology for factional behavior based on the nature and degree of group cohesion. Nyomarkay's theory hinges on two considerations: his distinction between ideology and Weltanschauung and his use of charisma as a means for the integration of widely diverging factional behavior. Weltanschauung, according to Nyomarkay, unlike ideology, projects the metaphysically unlimited world of thought, denoting its necessarily esoteric and vague content, unconcerned with any immediacy of action. Consequently it lends itself admirably to personification by an imaginative leader who bends its essentially unshaped form to suit his highly personal goals. Thus general feelings of racial superiority, veneration of tradition, and suspicion of the outside world could be exploited to accept antisemitism, authoritarianism, and militarism as means to control a hostile environment. Because the success of such sentiments depended primarily on their effective articulation by a personal leader, it was less important to test their validity than believe in the integrity of the leader. Thus factions caused by disagreements on certain programmatic points could be permitted to exist as long as their members did not waver in their loyalty to the leader. By contrast, the highly complex philosophical and scientific apparatus of an ideology such as Marxism, with its process of constant refinement and reinterpretation fosters exactly the kind of splinter groups, sects and deviations that resist the integrative effect of a powerful personality unless they are subjected to outright, violent, repression. This distinction between ideology and Weltanschauung is indeed useful since it restores to ideology its role as the creator of authoritative concepts that make politics more meaningful by infusing it with a systematic and central organizing principle. Also, Hitler emerges as an essentially antipolitical personality whose goal was not the reconciliation of divergent facets of his program but the undving loyalty of his lieutenants to his person.

While the proposition concerning factional behavior in the early Nazi movement merits serious attention and contributes to our understanding of its powers of attraction for those who needed a mythos to overcome their insecurities, the use of the charismatic category would appear to suffer from a lack of theoretical precision. Certainly Hitler's personality acted as an important crystallizing force and his singular dedication provided the kind of psychological comfort that permitted the concentration on his person of many of the aspirations that agitated his contemporaries caught in the throes of a disintegrating political system. But can irresponsible, ruthless, albeit skillful manipulation be equated with the power radiating from charisma? Must the ability to deal successfully with variously aligned factions be necessarily attributable to the kind of power that precludes rational explanation? Even the author appears to hesitate over his use of this category since he supports his argument with examples of leaders who were patently not charismatic types yet successfully dealt with factions among their supporters. Besides, such attribution courts the danger of circular reasoning since the very recognition of Hitler's charisma presupposes solidarity among his followers without providing any cogent explanation for its existence. Would not the really charismatic leader ignore factions altogether, refusing to deal with them either positively or negatively? Factionalism implies sectarianism and such a process has been known to accompany the demise of charisma rather than its ascendancy. As used in this work the principle of charisma could easily be applied to nearly every powerful American president thereby leading unavoidably to its dilution. If charisma is to retain operational significance it should be reserved for those whose inspirational, prophetary, ethical, and aesthetic qualities enable them to lead by the power of their example rather than by manipulation of those whose weaknesses seduce them into attaching themselves to an irrational personality.

All three volumes provide worthwhile new and stimulating insights into the nature of Hitler's National Socialist regime. Their shortcomings also would seem to indicate that a great deal of painstaking scholarship remains to be done before we can arrive at operationally useful and objective criteria for the evaluation of totalitarian movements.

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The Eurocrats. By Altiero Spinelli. (Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins Press, 1966. Pp. xi, 229, \$5.95.)

Written for a broader audience than the academic community, *The Eurocrats* nevertheless provides a valuable complement to the leading scholarly accounts of the process of European integration. Its author furnishes a concise

and thoroughly readable introduction to the background and institutions of the European Communities—but his emphasis is on the problems of unification, told in terms of contending concepts and their partisans. Spinelli is one of the partisans. For him, the central issue has been a struggle between federalists, functionalists and confederalists. A dedicated federalist, his targets include not only the Gaullists, but also the "Eurocrats"—top-level administrators of the European Communities.

Chief among the pro-European forces today, this last group's functionalist techniques have failed to adequately exploit Europe's opportunities. Spinelli charges, and this failure reflects their bureaucratic mentality: cautious, orderly and suspicious of parliaments and publics, those creators of disorder. More specifically, Spinelli criticizes the European Commission for its failure to treat the European Parliament as a real decision center: it could have been developed as a basis for democratic legitimation of the European institutions. Unduly influenced by Monnet's success with the French Plan, the Eurocrats fell into the trap of placing excessive confidence in technocratic methods of gaining acceptance for potentially controversial policies. Their source of legitimacy was based on the myths of economic rationality rather than the myths of popular representation. Their concept of European unity became one of a community founded on economic interests, regulated by professional administrators, rather than one based on a popular consensus, and hence governed by political insti-

Spinelli rejects this "Europe of Offices"—not only because he finds it undemocratic, but because it can furnish no basis for ultimate political choices—choices which had to be made. His goal would be a federal "Europe of Peoples," drawing authority directly from the electorate.

Given the existing decision-making structure, however, the functionalist alternative was probably necessary. Despite the fact that by the 1950's, a pro-European popular majority already existed, decisions in the Communities could be blocked by any one government; virtually since the Common Market came into being, one government has been in the hands of confederalists, dedicated to a "Europe of Nations." It would not tolerate any change which gave European institutions direct contact with the electorate. Faced with this situation, the Eurocrats made shift to justify decisions having strong political implications on technical grounds. As Spinelli concedes, they were quite skillful at expanding the role of the Brussels institutions in this way. In his book he seems torn between a painful awareness that power based on a direct popular mandate was not immediately possible, and a conviction that it should have remained foremost among the goals, with a tendency to blame the administrators for the current European stalemate.

The lag in European unification does not seem due to the functionalists' failure to choose sufficiently ambitious goals; we must recall that they were attempting to depart from existing patterns. Spinelli may be right in saying that the easiest time to do this would have been in the immediate post-war period, if we corsider solely the problems of institutional resistance: it was a time of relative flux. But it was also a time of relative weakness and pessimism in Europe. The self-confidence necessary for great innovating ventures was not yet present; time was needed to develop the new institutions which were to replace the familiar nation-state; and time was also needed to heal the animosities engendered by the war. By the early 50's, with a considerable measure of recovery—and with the stimulating example of the European Coal and Steel Community in view-bold ventures were proposed. France's rejection of the European Defense Community and the stillbirth of the European Political Community were a defeat for the federalist cause. Though the defeat was narrow, it indicated that, for the time being, traditional fears and passions were still strong enough to block a federal solution. The European strategists shifted back to functionalism—a policy designed to gradually work around traditional opposition, rather than attempt another frontal assault. It seems clear that they retained federalist goals, even if in the background. A decade later, with a series of incremental successes behind them, the Eurocrats attempted another major move toward supranationalism; the European Commission's ambitious package of proposals was countered by France's boycott of the Community institutions in 1965-66. This time, unlike in 1954, action was not met with widespread indications of nationalistic feeling in France (quite the contrary happened); nor was it rejected by broad-based groups in Parliament: it was blocked by the will of one man. For de Gaulle has at least one thing in common with Monnet: he, too, sees the European Commission's version of functionalism as all too likely to lead toward federalism. Given the policy preferences of his five partners (and their frequent reluctance to submit to leadership from the Elysée), this would bring with it an intolerable limitation of France's freedom of action.

In short, Spinelli's basic charge against the

Eurocrats is not necessarily convincing. Nevertheless, his book performs an important service. Arguing with eloquence and grace, he calls attention to an area which tends to be underemphasized in much of the leading empirical work on European integration—the realm of ideas and values. It is underemphasized, perhaps, because these things do not fit readily into the leading analytic schemes (which tend to be written from a functionalist point of view and to share its emphasis on socioeconomic determinants). Yet, clearly, they can carry great importance. To cite a prominent example, the policies of de Gaulle, which often dominate the European scene, can not readily be derived from the imperatives of economic, technological or strategic reality, but reflect a bold and dramatic assertion of traditional values. In a protest against the greyness which threatens to overtake the "Europe of Offices." Spinelli seems to be calling for an equally bold assertion of new ideas and policy initiatives.

Spinelli never quite spells out how this is to be done, but the success of Servan-Schreiber's recent book Le Dést Américain,* illustrates the impact which a new statement of the European idea can have. Like the Eurocrats, Servan-Schreiber draws on the symbols of modernism, rather than the mythology of a glorious past. He takes a new course, however, as he rechannels existing anti-Americanism into a new but more restrained form (one which takes as its first premise the overwhelming success of American society). Playing on fears of American domination, he appeals to European desires to play a significant role on the world stage and to maintain an "advanced civilization." based on advanced technology and computerized management. In his estimation of both the success of American society, and the degree to which it constitutes a threat to Europe, he may be overstating his case. He has, however, assembled a set of arguments for a united Europe (including Britain) which has generated widespread interest and even excitement among elite groups within the Europe of the Six. It is a Europe which would, almost necessarily, be federalist enough for Spinelli.

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The Democratic Republicans of New York: The Origins, 1763-1797. By Alfred F. Young. (Chapel Hill: Institute of Early American History and Culture at Williamsburg, Virginia, by The University of North Carolina Press, 1967. Pp. xv, 636. \$12.25.)

* Jean-Jacques Servan-Schreiber, Le Défi Américain (Paris: Denoël, 1967).

New Jersey's Jeffersonian Republicans: The Genesis of an Early Party Machine. By Carl F. Prince. (Chapel Hill: Institute of Early American History and Culture at Williamsburg, Virginia, by The University of North Carolina Press, 1967. Pp. xvi, 266. \$7.50.)

These two studies of the beginning of political parties and party machinery in the United States are of excellent quality. Furthermore they add to our understanding of a number of problems pertaining to the role of parties in the democratic process, problems which continue to the present day. There are also other problems treated in these books that are common to the process of development, and that still appear in some countries which today are in a comparatively early stage of development.

To come to specifics. Both works are the product of diligent examination of much new material. Each author has examined all the newspapers that are available for the years covered in the respective states-New York and New Jersey. Furthermore the surviving manuscripts of national, state and local political leaders have been systematically culled. The result is a wealth of new information. The work by Young on the Democratic Republicans of New York is the broader of the two. It covers political coalitions, the class conflicts of the period, the development of party organization, the decision process, and the relationship to national politics. While long and detailed, it is very rewarding. So, too, is Prince's book on New Jersey's Jeffersonian Republicans but in a more restricted scope, that of party organization, machinery, and leadership.

What is new that emerges from these studies and what confirms earlier findings? Both writers agree with the recent figures of Chilton Williamson in his book American Suffrage . . . 1760-1869, that after the American Revolution the suffrage in the states extended to 65 percent of the white male population. Earlier estimates had been for a numerically much smaller electorate. Furthermore this electorate divided according to socio-economic groups. In this respect Young and Prince confirm, although with many changes and refinements, the basic concepts of the economic and social basis of parties. The studies of Charles A. Beard on the Economic Origins of Jeffersonian Democracy and on the movement for the Constitution are basically confirmed with changes as to detail by Young. There is an excellent bibliographic essay at the end of Young's book, covering the Beard literature and other writings relevant to the period. At the same time the writers confirm the earlier findings of Wilfred Binkley,

Peter Charles, Noble Cunninghain, and myself on the economic and social forces behind the Federalists and Republicans. There is also confirmation of the thesis of such writers as Robert Dahl in *Who Governs*, on the transition from aristocracy to democracy.

On the other hand there are many refinements in comparison with the above works and such refinements are developed by Young. In the Colonial period of New York much of the legislative struggle had been between two proprietor factions, the Delanceys and the Livingstons. The Delancey's became Tories. After that the conflict developed between the Federalists and Anti-Federalists over the movement for the Constitution. Politics developed on a broader scale. The larger families and commercial interests supported the Constitution. The Clintons and a few other large proprietors, led the opposition. The Federalists led by the Schuyler, Hamilton, and Jay families broadened the basis of their support by adopting popular slogans and bringing in broader participation. But most of the small landholders followed the Clinton faction. An exception should be made of the squatters, who organized movements for acquisition of land without compensation. In contrast, the Federalists and Republicans, with an overwhelming majority, supported the system of property and there was no serious threat to the basic system. Mechanics (laborers) in the cities at first supported the Federalist commercial leadership. But after 1793, with the development of a state-federal political party around Jefferson, the mechanics changed to the Democratic Republicans. Some commercial interests, such as those around Aaron Burr, supported the rising Democratic Republicans and Clintonians. This was because the Federalists had access to the Bank of the United States. Therefore others accepted in the commercial groups, but excluded by the Federalists, desired access to banking resources through the channels of a state charter. Also they desired access to state government for land sales, for political positions, for access to power. The outcome was two parties, each providing for vertical mobility within. This likewise provided multiple access to political and social leadership.

It is also true that the frontier threat from the British (until Jay's treaty of 1795), and from the Indians, produced Federalist strength in the frontier area. There was demand from the frontiersmen for the stronger policies of the national government.

The politics of the New Jersey picture is treated in less detail, but the role of party organization is clearly developed in Prince's book.

Party organization played a dominant role as New Jersey was transformed from a Federalist to a Democratic Republic state. The term caucus was used by the early New Jersey Democratic Republicans for the state party legislative caucus during the period of sympathy for the French Revolution, in the early 1790's. Link and others have previously shown the importance of the Democratic Republican societies in increasing the extent of political participation and in broadening the basis of political authority. But the development of party organization also shows what may well be a heritage from the committees of correspondence of the pre-Revolutionary War period. These were revived as campaign committees at the township and county level. Then by 1800 there was the convention that was added at the county and then at the state level. Also in each county there was the party weekly or daily newspaper. Finally the party activists were at the head of this apparatus. These individuals were well rewarded. Over a sixteen-year period from 1801 to 1816, 64 percent of 256 identified party activists received political jobs or other rewards. Citizen participation was broadened but the new leadership received specific rewards. This may raise a question for other developing countries if in modern times complete stress is placed on professionalization of the civil service. Such may well be necessary in complex organizations but the problems of reward for political activism still remain.

In summary, what is presented in these works is the picture of a pluralist society, and a society offering considerable social mobility. Definite rewards for political activity emerged. These included bank charters, land leases, job preferment, social advance, and the use of power. But there also was a spirit of accommodation to new policies, to social change, to emerging new groups of the population, and to new leadership. Fortunately many of the leaders supported policies which were broadly based and, in the end, political opponents were not proscribed. Some of these changes were embraced by the Federalists. But the Democratic Republican Party was the more popular vehicle. Hence except for a revival by the Federalists during the War of 1812, the Democratic Republicans ultimately overwhelmed the opposition. But no single party could encompass all the rival demands. After the demise of the Federalists, new policy differences developed to prevent one-party rule. Even as the Democratic Republicans emerged victorious there developed the seeds of later divisions, and the party struggle continued.

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The American Occupational Structure. By Peter Blau and Otis Dudley Duncan. (New York: John Wiley & Sons, 1967. Pp.xi, 520. \$14.95.)

Ever so often a work appears which is not about political phenomena in a strict sense, but which many political scientists find valuable. Such a work is represented by this inquiry, in which two of the foremost students of occupational sociology combine their talents. Observers of political life have long been intrigued by the interrelationships between a man's work orientations and his political values, between the allocation of occupational status and political power, and between the occupational structure and political development. I doubt that political scientists concerned with the interlacing of political life and such matters as social stratification, occupational mobility, socialization, achievement orientations, and minority group behavior (to name a few) can ignore this work.

It is well-nigh impossible to summarize the undertaking. Perhaps the best way to begin is to describe the study design. Through cooperation with the Bureau of the Census the authors were able to utilize the interviews obtained with 20 to 64-year-old males as part of the Current Population Survey in March 1962. This was supplemented by questionnaires left with the eligible males; approximately five-sixths of the latter filled out this instrument. The questionnaire and interview data were then collated. In all an unadjusted N of 20,700 resulted, easily the largest and best sample ever obtained for a study of this type.

One of the acknowledged limitations of the study is that no attitudinal, motivational, or perceptual information was gathered. That is, the survey data are almost exclusively "hard" rather than "soft." While this is a handicap in developing a comprehensive model of occupational achievement, it at least has the virtue of highly valid and reliable measurement. Another constraint is that the authors were allowed very little interaction with their data. Due to the special circumstances of the project, all tabulations had to be specified in advance. It is a tribute to their knowledge and perspicacity that the analysis suffers only occasionally from this handicap. In the eyes of some readers a final limitation will be the lack of an explicit theory to guide the research and analysis. The authors are quite clear about why they have not pursued this course, and in any event various theoretical perspectives are found throughout.

In examining the dynamics of the American occupational structure Blau and Duncan employ five keystone variables: the respondent's

1962 occupational status, his first-job status, his education level, father's occupational status, and father's education. With these five variables alone an impressive story can be unfolded about inter- and intra-generational mobility, the relative determinants of status beginnings and destinations, and secular trends.

The initial task was to make a broad sweep of movements among occupational groups (not individuals). Of the many conclusions two seem especially salient for political scientists. First, the white-collar, blue-collar, farm occupational classes serve as more than convenient handles for typing occupations. They also form distinct psychological and skill boundaries severely limiting the flow of downward mobility while permitting upward mobility of greater than chance proportions. The archetype here is the lackluster son of a white-collar father who elects a low-level white-collar position rather than a more remunerative job across the blue-collar boundary. A second salient conclusion deals with structural rigidities. Some observers have claimed that the traditional opportunity structure associated with an egalitarian and open society shows signs of hardening. Using varied data, including four age cohorts from their sample, Blau and Duncan argue that the impact of social origins on occupational destinations has changed hardly at all in the last few decades. Despite changes in immigration flows and fertility rates there seem to be inherent factors facilitating continued mobility.

Having charted the broad movements, the authors then turn to the major task of unravelling the determinants of occupational status and mobility. Among the four major predictors—father's occupation and education, and respondent's education and first job—it is respondent's education which exerts the most powerful effect and first job second most, even though social origins do have an enduring effect. These variables are most assuredly interrelated, but it is one of the great virtues of the book that a basic model employing path coefficients has been utilized to tackle such knotty problems.

A number of additional factors help determine a man's eventual status, although a convincing case is made that such factors are primarily important because they affect educational attainments. Political scientists may be most interested in the several chapters dealing with these other matters. For example, there is a timely chapter on "Inequality of Opportunity" which portrays the fashion in which region, race, and immigration affect occupational chances. While the authors demolish the popular conception of self-perpetuated status, they

do demonstrate how the American Negro becomes the victim of an accumulation of disadvantages, resulting in a vicious circle. It appears, incidentally, that it is the better educated Negro who suffers the most from racial discrimination per se.

The bearing of kinship and marriage patterns on careers is taken up in some detail and carried off with consummate skill. Classic and tantalizing questions are considered: the importance of birth order, family size, broken families, social origins of spouse, assortative mating, and so forth. Students of political socialization will find these chapters particularly engaging. By the same token those concerned with the effects of spatial mobility and urbanization on the political process will find the extended material on these topics enlightening.

Most political scientists who use this book will probably be selective since not all of the subject matter is of equal pertinence. At least one set of readers, however, might value the entire effort because it is a virtual primer on data manipulation. There is a dazzling array of analytic and presentation techniques, including transition matrices, smallest space analysis, multiple classification analysis, regression, covariance, path coefficients, and cohort analysis. Furthermore, the authors provide clear and contextually related descriptions of their techniques. They also pinpoint the crucial linkage of methodology to questions of theory and substance.

For the political scientist there is a sobering afterthought. Occupational status is of singular importance in the real world, and it is susceptible to powerful analytic techniques and theoretical treatment. Starting from the single construct of occupational status the sociologist can generate an immense amount of vital information about society, across generations and throughout the life cycle. The question arises as to whether there are any such constructs in the political world, constructs which are of analogous importance, which are amenable to rigorous and quantitative treatment, and which can be extended over time.

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The Garden and the Wilderness: Religion and Government in American Constitutional History. By Mark DeWolfe Howe. (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1965. Pp. 180. \$4.50.)

This book is written with grace and good nature. It leaves the reader feeling he has been instructed by a master teacher who must also

have been a "genuine, solid, humble, thoughtful man."

Howe's concern in these Weil Lectures was the theory and therefore the history of church-state law in this country. He accepted the Supreme Court's working maxim that theory and decision must be supported by history in all cases where professions of wisdom can be mistaken for mere assertions of preference. He went on to argue, however, that the theory of much recent church-state law has been infirm because it was based on bad history.

The Court's historical premise has been that the First Amendment was the work of men who wanted their government neutral between religion and irreligion. Howe's research led him to assert a different proposition: that, ignorant of this kind of neutrality and remote from Jeffersonian anticlericalism, the enactors of the Amendment were moved by benevolence for the cause of religion. Adoption of the First Amendment was a political decision in favor of religion, reflecting the framers' assumption "That the realm of religious interests and religious convictions occupied a special constitutional status" (p. 160). Evangelical separatists, who gave the religion clauses their purport, wanted the State voluntarily to build a wall between its Wilderness and the Church's Garden, for the sake of the Garden.

Howe believed, in other words, that one of the "most important purposes of the First Amendment was the advancement of the interests of religion" (p. 31). And he was willing to face a possible implication of this finding: that government aid to religion might be called for by the deeper intention of the Amendment. For would not a successful disputation of the minor premise that total separation is in fact beneficial to religion transform the evangelical argument against establishment into an argument for a mild form of church-state cooperation? On Howe's hypothesis, would not every argument that government can help the Garden grow without corrupting it (see p. 152) tend to the conclusion that government ought to help it grow (cf. p. 15)?

To say the least, this is a startling conclusion. Howe removed some of the paradox simply by noting that neither the original Constitution nor the First Amentment granted the national government power to sponsor religion. But, of course, the original Constitution left this power to the states, and from 1789 until long after passage of the Fourteenth Amendment few thought the First Amendment took it away

from them. In that interval state courts developed their own constitutional law of church and state. And Howe insisted that the development of state-court doctrine in those years is a relevant chapter of our legal history: it too must be allowed to inform our present theory. According to Howe, Judge Alphonoso Taft of Ohio represented the nineteenth-century statecourt view tolerably well when, in 1870, he said that "'the government is neutral, and while protecting all, it prefers none, and it disparages none" (p. 150). Although this passage has been quoted recently by the Supreme Court as if it were a true anticipation of present doctrine, Howe tells us that the neutrality Taft had in mind was not the neutrality between religion and irreligion that our Court champions. Taft meant only "the government's neutrality between its associates in a common enterprise" (p. 151).

After passage of the Fourteenth Amendment the Supreme Court had the option of (1) not applying the First Amendment to the states, (2) applying it with its evangelical presuppositions, thus sanctioning the kind of non-discriminatory cooperation with churches that state courts had consistently approved, or (3) reading back into the First what Howe regarded as the a-religious presuppositions of the Fourteenth. The Court has done the latter, by "the familiar process of incorporation carried out, as it were, in reverse" (p. 31; and see, p. 157). Howe deplored this result. In particular, he insisted that the nonestablishment clause ought not have been forced to support "that broadened rule of neutrality [between religious and non-religious interests] that our times require" (p. 161). While Howe knew very well that disestablishment enhances the liberty of non-believers and heterodox believers (pp. 96-102, 106, 117), he contended nevertheless that the disestablishment clause ought to be kept true to its origin. The way to do that is to restrict it to the function, within Fourteenth Amendment jurisprudence, of assuring equal treatment of the friends of religion.

Howe thought it possible for government to help religion without hindering non-religion. This belief may be hard to reconcile with his affirmation that separation of church and state enhances the liberties of the non-religious. Here I can say only that Howe typically preferred to see more evidence before choosing between apparent contraries. Disharmony didn't bother him as much as forced harmony. So, he took a bold stand on the issue of aid to religion: government can help religion without hindering irreligion and states make out a prima facie constitutional case when they argue that their acts

¹ Griswold, "Professor Mark Howe," 80 Harv. L. Rev. 1631 (1967).

will benefit religion. Of course, Howe promptly entered the necessary qualification, i.e., that any particular act of cooperation may impair the liberties of the non-religious. That question, however, must be resolved under the clauses designed to protect non-religious liberties, and not under the religion clauses. For, properly understood, the non-establishment clause merely assures equal governmental treatment of religious interests, while the free exercise clause itself amounts to a constitutional establishment of religion (see pp. 90, 100, 110, 154). Neither clause is the appropriate protector of the free exercise of irreligion. The office of protecting non-believers belongs to the speech and press provisions of the First Amendment and to the equal protection and due process clauses of the Fourteenth, clauses fully adequate to their office (pp. 153-54, 156-57, 160-61, 165).

Howe contrasted his own understanding of the First Amendment with the present Court's in chapters on the cases from *Cantwell* to the present. In that development he saw two antagonistic efforts to the same end—constitutional parity of religion and irreligion. The first was Mr. Justice Jackson's endeavor in *Barnette* to assimilate religious freedom to secular freedom. It was still-born. Howe's reading of the opinions in *Barnette* led him to think that, Jackson's dismissal of the case's religious elements to the contrary, the Court in fact exempted the Witnesses from West Virginia's patriotic ritual because their objections were religious: he doubted that secular objections to the flag

salute would have moved the Court to the same result. In other words, as late as 1943 religious freedom possessed de facto "a special constitutional status" (p. 114; see also pp. 165-66; but see pp. 109-10, 135, 148). The second effort was successful because its chief strategist, Mr. Justice Frankfurter, realized the unbelieving conscience would gain parity only when it was sheltered by the religion clauses. He overcame constitutional and judicial favoritism for religion by employing the establishment clause, neutralized to the difference between religion and irreligion, to protect the free exercise of irreligion. He accomplished parity by bringing irreligion within the sheltering confines of the religion clauses, and not by removing religion to the more exposed reaches assigned to the protection of the secular clauses. Howe quoted Justice Frankfurter from the Sunday law cases: "'The Establishment Clause withdrew from the sphere of legitimate legislative concern and competence a specific, but comprehensive, area of human conduct: man's belief or disbelief in the verity of some transcendental idea and man's expression in action of that belief or disbelief" (p. 156; and see pp. 116-18). To this simple, symmetrical, and false proposition, the closing sentence of Professor Howe's book is an adequate response: "The complexities of history deserve our respect" (p. 176).

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NOTES

POLITICAL THEORY, HISTORY OF POLITICAL THOUGHT, AND METHODOLOGY

Political Science and Ideology. By WILLIAM E. CONNOLLY. (New York: Atherton Press, 1967. Pp. viii, 179. \$5.95.)

It is not unusual in the history of political thought that an idea or concept, developed and honed as a weapon against the opposition, has been captured by the latter and, with minor alternations, effectively turned against its former proponents. The concept of ideology is such a case. While radical writers, following Marx, developed it as an instrument to unmask the hypocrisies of the ruling class it has now as is commonly known, been captured and effectively employed by spokesmen of the status quo. The confusion of the concept today largely stems from the attempt of

both camps to apply it in a pejorative sense to the political interpretation of their opponents and to deny its relevance to their own position. In the tradition of Karl Mannheim, William Connolly argues that it is time that ideology be neutrally defined and its applicability generalized to encompass all political interpretations, from radical polemics to orthodox and scientific treatises in political science. He further argues that political scientists are not only obliged as scientists to become aware of the ideological dimensions of their own work, but that they also have a social obligation to construct interpretations of politics sufficiently broad to meet important problems of the day. In a word, political scientists must responsibly face

up to the problem of ideology rather than attempting, under the guise of science, to expunge it.

Ideology is not conceived by Connolly as moral commitment nor as basic political values that serve as criteria for judging whether a given event or position is good or bad. Rather, he defines ideology as "a set of empirical claims not fully tested, and for practical purposes not fully testable, which functions both to orient political activity and to preserve from destruction values and higher level beliefs cherished by its authors and supporters" (p. 49). Conceived in this way, ideology serves as the essential link between an individual's values and his view of reality.

In a perceptive and in a closely analytical manner. Connolly applies his concept of ideology to the conflicting "pluralist" and "power elite" interpretations of the American system by Robert Dahl and C. Wright Mills. However, in the course of showing that their ideologies pre-determine their findings, he tends to overplay his hand. Mills did not focus, to the extent that Connolly claims, on the nondecision-making process-if he had done so, his case, in my view, would have been stronger; and Connolly's effort to show that Dahl, independent of his ideology, "conveys a mood of complacency" (p. 46) toward reform of the system, is pretty thin. The significant point is not that Dahl's "cherished beliefs" are reflected and protected by his ideology, but that the implications of his ideology are profoundly conservative.

Until "empirical claims not fully tested" (ideology) are subject to empirical validation, the question of whether a given ideology is distorted (a departure from reality) cannot be completely determined. The temptation, which Connolly strenuously rejects, to solve the problem by restricting political inquiry to subjects susceptible to hypotheses that can be narrowly constructed and rigorously tested, is in reality no solution. In the first place, as Connolly points out, there is no assurance that a precisely formulated hypothesis. subject to empirical validation, will encompass every significant aspect of the problem under investigation. More importantly, for the political scientist to restrict his analysis and inquiry to that which is countable and measurable is, according to Connolly's argument, to fail to meet his intellectual and social responsibility to society. Connolly engages in a provocative and rewarding discussion on the nature and need of ideological detachment and involvement. If he had, however, applied his thesis to his own ideology, which is implicitly reflected throughout the book, and how it protects values which he strongly embraces, his case would have been even stronger.

Professor Connolly by no means lays to rest the opposition or the issues; nevertheless he offers a

strong, and often penetrating, argument that should be taken into account.—Peter Bachrach, Bryn Mawr College.

The Concept of Ideology and Other Essays. By George Lichtheim. (New York: Random House, 1967. Pp. xviii, 327. \$5.95.)

This book is a collection of twenty-two essays, review articles, and shorter reviews all written and published in the years 1962-66. Some of the pieces first appeared in learned journals of history and sociology; others in such literary periodicals as Commentary, Encounter, and The New York Review of Books. Lichtheim's tone, that of the politically conscious intellectual addressing other intellectuals, is uniform throughout. Lichtheim is a scholar, as his two books on Marxist thought make clear; but it is also clear that his natural mode of address to the world-a mode he doubtless prizes above the cautious neutrality most other scholars impose on themselves-is engaged, passionate, and verbally proud and virtuose. To be sure, Lichtheim pays a price: in his strain to be both readable and au courant, he is occasionally either hasty or entirely too artful. But the price is small. His best traits are abundantly displayed in The Concept of Ideology, which will appeal to all those who love politics as a complex moral phenomenon, and who sympathize with the view that the best understanding of politics comes from a humanistically trained intelligence struggling to make sense of politics in order to make sense of life.

There is no use in pretending that these pieces are held together by anything but Lichtheim's preoccupations. But certainly no apology is called for, when a miscellany is as consistently interesting as this one is. The only point is that often one wishes that an argument Lichtheim could only sketch because he had to be brief had been carried further. Even the longer articles in the book are tantalizingly inconclusive. In any case we should be satisfied with what we are given.

Lichtheim's preoccupations are with Marxist thought, its Hegelian antecedents, its influence on movements in Germany and practice in the Soviet Union, and its influence on recent radical speculation. While not the sustained theme of the book. the continuous and variegated betraval of Marx by most who claimed to act or to philosophize in his name does dominate Lichtheim's general approach. Only five of his pieces do not touch directly on Marxism and its career: an omnibus review of Toynbee (towards whom Lichtheim is unfailingly and unjustly unkind). Louis Halle, and Louis L. Snyder; a review of Hannah Arendt's On Revolution (which he spiritedly finds reactionary); a review of Guéhenno's life of Rousseau and Jack Lively's edition of de Maistre (an effort not up to Lichtheim's usual standard and that lacks the elegant subtlety of John Plamenatz's review of Guéhenno in The New York Review of Books); a review article on Hans J. Morgenthau's three-volume work, Politics in the Twentieth Century (in which Lichtheim struggles with some success to establish the difference between Morgenthau's realism and that of Hobbes); and an article on Leo Strauss's commentary of Xenophon's Hiero, and Strauss's controversy with Alexandre Kojève on the nature of tyranny (in which Lichtheim is on Kojève's side, mocking Strauss for his horror of atheism). Though the subjects of these pieces are not central to Lichtheim's concerns, and do not add to his study of Marxism, they are inherently valuable, if only for the brilliance of particular sentences and passages.

As for the remainder of the book, the student of Marxism will find much to admire. The title-essay, the longest piece in the book, usefully traces the development of the concept of ideology, from the time of the rationalists of the French Revolution, to Hegel and Marx, and beyond to Weber, Mannheim, and the positivists. Lichtheim stresses the twofold sense of the term present in Marx: ideology as faithful but unselfconscious reflection of social conditions, and ideology as narrow, selfinterested rationalization. Lichtheim finds that later so-called Marxists, as well as positivists, err in not retaining that distinction, and in abandoning altogether Marx's belief in the possibility of an intellectual transcendence of social conditions. These latter thinkers have been too eager to unmask: in the process they have carried relativism to the point of irrationality and despair. The second piece, a review article on the writing of the Polish Marxist, Ossowski, tries to point out those elements in Marx's thought which would allow an elaborated Marxism to be not only a critique of capitalist society, but also of advanced industrial society whatever its system of political economy. The third piece, "Society and Hierarchy," deals brilliantly with Marx's ambivalence towards "backward countries." Though concluding that Marx never shed his ambivalence, he shows how the younger Marx applauded Western incursions into Asiatic countries as intimations of progress, but how the mature Marx grew appalled at the human cost of such progress and wondered whether ancient communal economic forms could not, when suitably modified, remain as the basis for communism. Lichtheim's best writing, is in these three essays: they are remarkably stimulating and wide-ranging.

Mention must also be made of the review article on J. P. Nettl's life of Rosa Luxemburg, and the essay on Trotsky. Generous as he is to both revolutionary figures, Lichtheim succeeds in deflating the romanticism that has come to surround

them. He gives no consolation to contemporary disillusioned radicals who go back to an earlier generation to find their heroes. Lichtheim's closing essay, "Sartre, Marxism, and History," centers on that dreadful perplexity: the link, if link there is, between the unrelenting individualism of existential morality and the collective activism of Marxist-inspired political tendencies. The perplexity is still with us after we finish Lichtheim, but at least its nature is specified more exactly. To deal thus with perplexity is, all in all, Lichtheim's great gift. He was right to collect his pieces.—George Kater. Amherst College.

The Study of Total Societies. Ed. By Samuel Z. Klausner. (New York: Frederick A. Praeger, 1967, Pp. xx, 220. \$6.00.)

A decade has elapsed since Karl Wittfogel heralded the "macroanalytic revolution" to come. Since that time the "revolution in the behavioral sciences"-so far as it touched political sciencehas largely been in the opposite direction, i.e., "behavioralism." In the present volume concern with significant "larger issues" of theory and practice has finally surfaced into full view, a welcome arrival since, as William Mitchell supposes, it is a level of analysis "potentially more rewarding to political science." Political modernization, for example, can be celebrated for only so long without taking recourse to the "comprehensive analytic tools" and "big-structured concepts" advertised by Wittfogel-whatever one's views on Cold War ideological competition with Marxism as a "universal idea system" (although Ellsworth Bunker's analysis of the "political solution" in South Vietnam as an exercise in "nation-building," e.g., the conferral of political legitimacy through "democratic elections," puts the question squarely in the arena of world politics).

As a societal phenomenon, the study of political modernization necessarily evokes a general interest among social scientists and enlists a wide range of their talents. The multidisciplinary nature of societal analysis is clearly reflected in the catholicity of the contributors to this symposium and in the ecumenism of their own careers. The fields broadly represented are sociology (Klausner, Coleman, Etzioni, Levy, Tiryakian), economics (Boulding), political science (Pool), psychiatry (Kardiner), and Anatol Rapoport, who defies classification. Collectively they construe "total society" as a unit, not only of intradisciplinary analysis, but also of interdisciplinary synthesis, and for this reason the "total study" of total societies is defined as involving the formulation of cross-disciplinary, cross-level propositions. This is not a book about political modernization, but that topic may again serve as illustrative; its total study would readily engage questions of political socialization in a family setting (Levy), and through mass media exposure (Pool), to the subjectively meaningful symbols of political legitimacy (Tiryakian) as institutionalized aspects of political culture (Kardiner) the "macrolearning" (Boulding) of, or psychotic fixation (Rapoport) on, would crucially influence political articulation of institutional sectors intrasocietally (Coleman) and political unification, e.g., of "mini-states" intersocietally (Etzioni), among other things.

No apologies are necessary for the involuted last sentence: total societal analysis is that complex. The trick is being "just complicated enough" to avoid wrong simplification on the one hand and overdetermination on the other. Ways of coping with "organized complexity" in the analysis of total societies are discussed under three main headings: "methodology" (Klausner, Coleman, Pool), "conceptual issues" (Tiryakian, Boulding, Rapoport), and "opening research strategies" (Etzioni, Levy, Kardiner). Klausner's epilogue provides a skillful résumé of the conference proceedings. Inventorying the resources for rational control over the unruly topic of total societies, we may likewise identify three major areas: societal descriptions, societal indicators and societal models. As to the first, the conferees agreed that exhaustive, general purpose descriptions are impractical, and moreover, irrelevant; Pool announced "there is no consensus on any such grand schemes for the description of a total society . . . there will be none" (p. 47). Nonetheless, both he and Boulding take the creation of a representative sample of the population as a first step, while Levy would contend for basic demographic data on family size and age structure as strategic in the analysis of any society. Apart from which data are to be collected, Boulding further emphasizes methods of data collection and especially its cross-national character. "because the collection of knowledge, like any other social process, has to be legitimated if it is to be continuous" (p. 113). Reposing societal facts in a United Nations data bank would obviate compromising national interests, witness Project Camelot. At the same time, Kardiner considers United States society unique in its possession of sufficient knowledge for self-correction (p. 188).

More than descriptions of total societies, what is being requested is a basic set of societal indicators which tap its major dimensions, particularly those of a changeful nature. Along these lines Tiryakian proposes three "lead indicators": (1) rates of urbanization as measures of institutional capacity, (2) rates in the distribution and public acceptance of sexual promiscuities as measures of egoistic anomie, and (3) rates in the outbreak of non-institutional religious phenomena as measures of the extent of sharing of and commitment to societal values (pp. 92-94). These may provide upwards of

30 years "early warning" of discontinuous societal changes impending—of "revolutionary potential." Again, Boulding speculates about "key roles" in a society, a point underscored in Kardiner's discussion of occupational and other institutional factors in individuals' life organization.

The selection of societal indicators raises inescapably the question of what is being indicated. and the position of such in a total societal model, Most comprehensive in this respect is Tirvakian's explicit societalization of Parsons' "systems problems" (AGIL) schema, an exchange model relating for any social system the functional problems of Adaptation (economy), Goal attainment (polity), Integration (family) and Latent-patternmaintenance-and-tension-management (religion). Tiryakian's focus on non-institutional religion as the source, symptom and symbol of societal change is novel and valuable. What seems missing from Parsons' model is an empirical input-output analysis, a system of "societal accounts" expanding on Leontief's economic activity analysis. Also conspicuous by its absence is further development of "structural-functional requisite analysis" as originally formulated by Levy himself and strongly seconded in Almond's "Introduction" to The Politics of Developing Areas. The recession from requisite analysis impairs what is perhaps the most systematically powerful and theoretically promising method of societal analysis available (Levy here devotes himself to an illuminating discussion of family structures as the strategic factor in total societal analysis; his collaboration with Coale, Westoff and others is the most fruitful to date between sociological theory and formal demography). On the other hand, Coleman's game approach and Pool's on simulation secure new ground for future exploitation, not only as techniques for data gathering and processing but also for model and theory construction.

In closing and I cannot fail to mention that the conference was held under the auspices of the Special Operations Research Office "as a part of SORO's long-term research interests in the problems of analyzing societies" (p. xv). The image of society entertained in government circles for purposes of policy formation and programming is of urgent concern in regard to both international relations (e.g., China) and national politics (e.g., President Johnson's "macropower" model of United States society and his style of private politics adapted to it, as recently commented on by Max Frankel). It would be interesting to learn what impact, if any, this conference has made in decision-making circles. For their part, academic specialists may conclude that societal analysis has considerable distance to go, even to reach "the actual design for the study of a concrete total society" which Klausner prophesies (p. 193). The general reader may conclude that the \$1.25 Doubleday paperback edition (A 574) is a better investment. In any case, it cannot be said, as G. K. Chesterton said of Christianity, "the trouble is not that it was tried and found difficult, but that it was found difficult and not tried." The difficulties of societal analysis are apparent; however gropingly, the contributors at least tried.—C. P. Wolf, Brown University.

The Technological Society. By JACQUES ELLUL. (New York: Random House, 1967. Pp. xxxvi, 449. \$2.45.)

This is a recently issued paperback edition of a work by a French sociologist that was first published in France in 1954. The translation by John Wilkinson is excellent.

Once the reader has adjusted his orientation away from the concept of "technique" as being synonymous with technology and "the technological society" as being about the same thing as the industrial state, it becomes apparent that Jacques Ellul has provided a commentary on the present state, of society and the direction in which it is heading that will stand as an important contribution to the sociological explanation of the deterministic influences that shape human actions and associations.

Ellul defines "technique" as the totality of methods rationally arrived at and having absolute efficiency in every field of human endeavor. With such a definition, it is no wonder that at times his use of the term is less than precise. In fact, the term is used so ubiquitously throughout the book it acquires an almost metaphysical connotation.

Technique changes not only the structure of states, but also political doctrines. The doctrines of traditional democracy—liberty, equality, personal rights—are not adaptable, Ellul believes, to the technological society, and they must give way to the great god efficiency, which is typified in practice by the dogma of the people's democracies. Doctrine, instead of providing goals and values, has come to serve the purpose of justification for the methods of the state and reinforcement of its role as the symbol and coordinator of technical progress. The technique causes the state to become all-encompassing and totalitarian.

There is no counterbalance to technique that Ellul can visualize. Every new cultural tendency that threatens to disturb the march toward progress is restrained by the forces of morality, public opinion, the social structure, and, above all, the state. These restraining forces are all instruments in the service of technique. Performance and efficiency, whether in an athletic contest or in economic planning, have become ends in and of themselves.

The role of the state in the development of technique, as Ellul sees it, is both indispensable and inevitable. It is the state with its vast resources and control mechanisms that coordinates the integration of technique with the traditional culture, and in the process the traditional culture is bent and twisted and carried along with the tide of progress. The traditional culture is of course, dehumanized in the process and relegated to a role as part of the supporting superstructure of the technological society.

It seems appropriate that this moving and sometimes emotional critique of the technological society should have been written by a citizen of France, one of the last great bastions of the traditional culture. De Gaulle, however, since 1958 has emphasized technical progress, and the momentum of technique has wrought a gradual but profound change on French society. This serves to reinforce the validity of Ellul's predictions.

Political socialization has come to mean a process of integration and adaptation to technical methodology in all aspects of societal activity, an adaptation that leaves the actor less of an individual. As Ellul describes it, the sacrifice of personal identity is accomplished unwittingly and as an almost natural transformation, with conformity to the standards of performance and productivity accepted as the price of socialization. Although these new standards appeal to technological man with promises of happiness and material comforts, they bring tensions, insecurity, and, in many ways, more serious problems than the ones they replace.

The author presents an eloquent and persuasive plea for man to retain control over his values and goals and to resist becoming the captive of a methodology that subverts humanism for the sake of efficiency. He foretells a grim future where the scientists offer happiness, but it is a happiness purchased at a tragic price to the individual, and a happiness that may even be a fraud induced by the use of sophisticated tranquilizing drugs. This is a pessimistic outlook, but Ellul holds out some hope that man may be able to anticipate his fate and take positive measures to alter it.

He strikes a responsive chord with many political scientists when he deplores the fact that even with all of the enormous power wielded by the scientists and technologists, they are incapable of anything but the emptiest platitudes when they stray from their specialities and enter the political dialogue. Unfortunately, unless the trend is changed these are the very men who will exert the greatest influence upon governmental planning in the future.—William R. Nelson, United States Air Force Academy.

The Elite in the Welfare State. By PIET THOENES. Ed. by J. A. Banks. Translated from the Dutch by J. E. Bingham. (New York: The Free Press, 1966. Pp. 236. \$6.95.)

This work is a twofold enterprise. First comes a discursive treatment of historical efforts to syste-

matize elite theory—including concise commentaries on Mannheim and Geiger as well as Mosca and Pareto. What follows is a stimulating but inconclusive analysis of the distinctive problems created by the emergence of the kind of politically-nurtured society we call the Welfare State and by the unavoidable presence of a functionary elite, convinced of their superiority as scientifically-trained specialists. Neither part is carried out systematically, nor is much empirical evidence marshalled by Thoenes. But his work is full of distinctive formulations and suggestions.

In contrast to the Lasswellian formula that elites are those who get the most of what there is to get, Thoenes holds that an elite emerges because its members view themselves as an elite They are a chosen people: they view themselves as superior. An elite is a group that has a special quality or a special mission to perform: the instrument of God, the vanguard of ineluctable historical forces, or the custodians of as much warranted knowledge of the universe and of humanity as has yet been achieved. Thoenes does not hold that every group saddled with the job of preserving the existing order is by definition an elite, but only that the sense of spiritual superiority and the sense of a socio-political mission to perform—the hallmarks of a self-conscious elite-are likely to be engendered, among other reasons, by a fear that letting go will lead to retrogression. Quite simply, lesser breeds cannot do the job.

Historically, when men came to feel their present situation was not the end-product of a divine plan, humanistic interpretations of history were put forward. Progressives and conservatives alike came to view the existing order as a phase, either the fruition or the germination phase of man's effort to create a reasoned social order. Historical elites set themselves specific tasks—to declare a message, to carry out a plan, to conserve an order. Yet it is sometimes easy for them to regard themselves as natural elites—whose superiority is timeless and whose mission is indispensable to the maintenance of a system.

The scientific elite in the twentieth century—including the social scientists—claims a key mission, sees itself as possessing a crucial intellectual superiority, and seeks power in order to introduce or preserve the spiritual values that ought to characterize the socio-political order. We do not yet have a clear understanding of what constraints shape man's efforts or what aspirations give them direction. But at least there is a method—the scientific method—for improving our understanding and clarifying our aims.

In the twentieth century, the Welfare State came into being in the West after crises, war and depression, when people knew "what they did not want: danger, hunger, thirst or cold, unemploy-

ment, dictatorships or squandering of either food or talents" (p. 133). Without abandoning the economic hallmarks of capitalism—private property and profits—and without forsaking democratic processes—free elections and party rule—a complex system of governmental controls and services was created and staffed. Through the Welfare State, the economy could be controlled and a guarantee of collective social care could be made to all citizens.

To do the job, a new elite emerged—"an elite of scientifically-trained officials, in government departments, in semi-official departments, serving with big firms, with trade unions, and with professional organizations" (p. 129). So long as the Welfare State functioned in a context of scarcity and under-employment, and so long as basic health, education, retirement and social welfare programs needed to be set up, the scientific "functionary elite" posed no basic threat to democracy. As a plan-fulfilling elite, needed in particular historical circumstances, the functionaries helped to articulate a distinctive political program. But now, as an order-maintaining elite, the functionaries are inclined to justify their prerogatives as due to natural superiority. Politically, nobody propagates the Welfare State very enthusiastically; to each it seems like a makeshift haliway house. Nevertheless, it does perpetuate itself, as a system based on the avoidance of fatal social and economic tensions. And the experts who man the system are reasonably confident that it can continue to be a workable system. "Hence, in this system they are a natural elite. Their special task is to preserve the new order" (p. 188). And control over their actions rests with people who only occasionally and by chance are competent to judge them.

With this diagnosis, it is not surprising that Thoenes calls the functionary elite illegal, a blindfold to science and a halter to democracy. The scientific community must also be blamed, so long as it holds to its pretensions to objectivity, turns away from controversial social problems, and relies uncritically on a static picture. He calls for more deeply-probing social science inquiries, which frankly aim to stimulate political awareness. He calls for a politicized sociology, whose practitioners must be a new elite—an intelligentsia that dares to take responsibility and that formulates a free range of choices about the shape of a new society.—Dwaine Marvick, University of California, Los Angeles.

The Revolutionary Personclity: Lenin, Trotsky, Gandhi. By E. Victor Wolfenstein. (Princeton, New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 1967. Pp. x, 330. \$7.50.)

Freud might have been referring to the difficulties of political psychobiography when he ob-

served, in an essay on Dostovevsky in 1928, that "Before the problem of the creative artist analysis must, alas, lay down its arms." The problem of the politician and statesman is hardly less complicated, which may be why Freud himself did not attempt such analyses (excluding the highly controversial book, with Bullitt, on Woodrow Wilson to which he may or may not have contributed), although there is a sense in which his Moses and Monotheism can be regarded as a political psychobiography. The complications include the reluctance of political figures to expose themselves to public view during or after their lifetimes; they are notoriously a secretive lot, and any inkblots they have inadvertantly left behind are usually wiped clean by their loyal posterity. Crucial childhood experiences may not be remembered or recorded, and those that have not been lost may be reworked into memories of a childhood-that-never-was. And even if the past can be traced, at least in part, there is no certainty that Early Events A, B, and C were responsible for Later Events X, Y, and Z. For these reasons no completely satisfactory political psychobiography has yet been written, and it is not likely that any will be written until better techniques are developed for recapturing life histories and forging links between the experiences of childhood and adolescence and the later political behavior.

Almost all efforts to write political psychobiography, nevertheless, are to be welcomed, because without such explorations we are not likely to know or even be able to guess much that is important about certain key figures. While most political leaders neither require nor merit a psychobiography, the form is particularly appropriate when we are dealing with odd or deviant political careers. Thus right and left extremists—that is, leaders who depart sharply from the conventional political beliefs and behaviors of their eras-are especially suitable subjects for psychobiography. Those who suffer from psychosomatic illness, or whose afflictions are known to affect decision-making processes, are also eligible, as are alcoholics and those whose careers end in suicide. Another category includes political actors who compulsively (it appears) and therefore more or less consistently snatch defeat from the jaws of victory-the phenomenon of the "born loser" in politics has never been explored-and those who invariably transmute defeats into victories. Finally, there are the politicians who careen back and forth on the spectrum of ideologies and parties, or whose political belief systems seem totally divorced from the values operating in their private worlds. Anyone will think of names to fit these categories, and it may be hoped that the half dozen or so political psychobiographies so far written will not long be stranded on the bookshelf.

Professor Wolfenstein's study of Lenin, Trotsky, and Gandhi is a worthy addition to that small number although, like the others, it is not and could not be wholly successful, given his approach and the inevitable complications referred to above. The "common characteristic" of the three revolutionaries, according to Wolfenstein, was that each "carried with him into his adult life unfinished business with his parental generation. Each carried a burden of guilt he had been unable to relieve in the context of the family or, in Gandhi's case, in the context of the family extended to include his wife. Each had to come to grips with a primitive image of parental authority." But such conditions are not enough to cause revolutionary involvement. The necessary catalyst in all three cases was the harshness of treatment accorded them by the established political order, a harshness that included imprisonment, discrimination on account of color or religion, the execution of a close relative (Lenin's brother), and other repressive acts. Wolfenstein appears to be saying, in short, that guilt and unresolved internal psychological conflicts, especially unresolved Oedipal situations, plus aggressive treatment by established authority set the stage for the revolutionary personality.

The application of this equation to the lives of Lenin, Trotsky, and Gandhi illustrates the promise and the limitations of psychoanalysis as a tool for exploring political behavior. On the one hand, psychoanalysis can provide us with a psychodynamic explanation of how it is that the early life experiences of some individuals cause them to reject ordinary career choices in favor of major roles as political or religious leaders, and surely such explanations are essential to an understanding of the great traumatic events of history. But on the other hand, psychoanalysis in its present state is a rather crude device for exploring the behavior of leaders long since dead. Because it is one of the younger behavioral sciences-it is, after all, less than thirty years since the death of Freud-it is racked by disputes over theory and technique, and if there is some doubt both inside and outside the profession that it has much to offer the living patient on the couch, there is even more doubt that it can be effectively applied to the deceased statseman in his tomb who literally has taken his dreams and fantasies, his Oedipus complex and identity crisis, with him.

Hence Wolfenstein is not altogether convincing when he suggests that Lenin's "basically mistrustful nature"—a characterization that would be questioned by some authorities—may have dated back to the birth of his sister Olga when he was two years old, and that Lenin's failure to walk until he was three possibly derived from his having been "uncertain about how his environment

would react." Trotsky's indecision and hesitation at certain crucial moments, on the other hand, are traced to internal conflicts in childhood and adolescence that were more complex than those of Lenin, conflicts that included contradictory feelings about his father (Trotsky allegedly was torn between being his father's favorite son and hating his father). Gandhi, who loved his mother and both respected and feared his father, suffered all of his life from guilt and anxiety partly because the "aim to be like the father implies overturning the father, which in turn leads to anxiety and guilt." Because Gandhi was having sexual intercourse with his pregnant wife when his father died, Wolfenstein hypothesizes that in Gandhi's mind the intercourse was held responsible for his father's death and the death four days after birth of the infant. Gandhi himself, in his Autobiography, confesses to his "great shame" aroused by these incidents, but is Wolfenstein justified in suggesting that Gandhi unconsciously regarded the sexual activity and the deaths as connected? Gandhi's own reference to the baby's death is almost an afterthought, and while he eventually did renounce sex in favor of abstinence, it was not until twenty years after his father's death when he was thirty-six years old. And it was then, he writes, not because of shame and guilt, but because he was opposed to contraception and wanted no more children (he and his wife had had four).

Much of this may appear to be "nit-picking," but it is well to keep in mind that it is the nits in psychoanalysis, the seemingly trivial episodes to which, at the time, little importance may be attached, that often supply the principal clues to personality development. Indeed, it is in these and other guilt-generating events that Wolfenstein finds the sources of Gandhi's later commitment to passive resistance or non-violent action, viewed by Wolfenstein as "the indirect expression of almost overwhelming guilt—and vigorous self-assertion."

Of course, he may be right in this interpretation; the point is, given the present state of psychoanalysis and the paucity of information, there is no way of ascertaining whether Wolfenstein has brilliantly illuminated the whole personality landscape of his three revolutionaries. It is a fair comment, however, that many psychoanalysts whose own work is no less enterprising would regard his use of psychoanalytic theory as rather pedantic, mechanical, and old-fashioned; a prime example is his contention that Gandhi's campaign against the salt tax may have had something to do with the fact that, according to Ernest Jones, salt is symbolically significant as semen, hence Gandhi's personal renunciation of salt (sex) in his diet and desire to claim for the Indians tax-free salt manufacturing rights (potency, virility, self-respect, etc.).

Wolfenstein may also be unduly simplifying in casting Lenin as the most effective administrator,

Trotsky as the most impressive agitator, and Gandhi as surpassing the others in charismatic appeal. Lenin, according to contemporary accounts, possessed considerable charisma, and Trotsky was an extremely skilled military administrator and litterateur. It is arguable that Wolfenstein does not attach enough importance to the so-called catalytic or precipitating agents—the fact, for example, that when Trotsky was a boy Jews in Russia were restricted to a certain territory (the Pale), forbidden to take up certain professions, prohibited from owning land, and limited to quotas (the numerus clausus) of from three to ten per cent at schools and universities. The coincidence that all three revolutionaries suffered from stomach trouble (Trotsky attributed his own "chronic catarrh"-could it have been an incipient ulcer?-to "nervous shocks") is not explored.

These reservations, however, do not fundamentally detract from Wolfenstein's daring and impressive achievement in elucidating, at long range and under considerable difficulties, the personality patterns of three of the most significant figures in the twentieth century. Perhaps what is needed most now in the developing field of political psychobiography are psychoanalytic case histories of political men to clarify relationships between the early experiences and later careers. It is no secret that a number of men in public life have been psychoanalyzed or have visited psychiatrists; is it too much to hope that some of them, in the interests of behavioral science research, will authorize their doctors to make their case histories available after their deaths? Much could be learned from such histories that would lend depth and precision to studies of the type Wolfenstein has attempted. In the meantime, Wolfenstein may be congratulated for succeeding in his effort to frame tentative hypotheses about revolutionary personalities, and by so doing to remind us that the study of politics can not and will not be complete without psychological analysis.—Arnold A: Rogow, City University of New York.

The Political Consequences of Electoral Laws. By Douglas W. Rae. (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1967. Pp. xii, 173. \$5.00.)

Douglas Rae has produced a succinct comparative study of a classic question: How much difference do the rules make? The rules of concern are those which regulate the translation of voters' choices at the polls into partisan shares of seats in a legislative chamber. The objective of the analysis is to assess the consequences for the party system, specifically the competition among parties, of the structural variables we know as electoral laws. Rae's study is distinguished by its careful empiricism, its comparative focus, and its lack of theoretical pretension.

Roughly a third of the text is devoted to devel-

oping the variables and classification scheme used in the subsequent analyses. Rae gives a careful qualitative treatment of the major properties of electoral laws in the twenty Western democracies covered by his study. The result is a classification of the laws by the rules for assigning seats to districts (district magnitude), the rules governing the form of choice available to voters (ordinal or categorical ballots depending on the non-exclusive or exclusive choice required of the voter), and the rules specifying the translation of votes to seats (electoral formulae). The discussion of electoral formulae is extraordinarily compressed and will require close reading by one unfamiliar with different voting systems. The major distinction in formulae is, of course, that obtaining between plurality decision rules and the variety of proportional representation schemes. The principal distinction developed within the class of P. R. formulae is between "highest average" and "largest remainder" seat allocation rules. Electoral formulae are designed to deal with an inherently quantitative problem and Rae introduces a convenient notation to facilitate his comparative discussion.

The second half of Rae's methodological problem is developing descriptive measures for party systems. The choice of variables is dictated by a concern with party competition and by the data on which analyses are based. The data are aggregate election returns and the resulting distributions of partisan legislative seats for 121 lower house elections occurring between January 1, 1945 and January 1, 1965, Rae's strategy is to develop a set of parallel variables which can be used to measure a property of the party in the electorate, and simultaneously, an analogous property of the party in parliament. This strategy results in five dual variables: number of parties, competitive share of the strongest party, competitive share of the strongest two parties, fractionalization of the party system, and average change of shares between two elections. To these is added the variable of minimal number of parties required for a parliamentary majority. The most interesting of these variables is the measure of party fractionalization. It reflects both the number of parties and the distribution of seat or vote shares among the parties in one well-behaved quantity.

The simplicity of the variables is deceptive. The tools Rae fashions are designed for a particular comparative task and when applied do their work well. The basic analytic device is to compare party electoral vote outcomes with the resulting party share of parliamentary seats. This is done initially with no variation in electoral law categories to demonstrate the common effects of electoral systems. Next, plurality and P.R. formulae are compared to demonstrate differences in effect, not of kind but of degree, and a brief treatment of some special cases is given. Finally, the conse-

quences for parties of district magnitude and ballot structure are examined. The results of analysis are set off in the text as propositions and these are brought together in an appendix.

Rae demonstrates that the consequences of electoral laws conform to the rule "them that has, gets," although the advantages to large parties are not of startling magnitude. On the other hand, the fundamental role assigned to majority rule in parliaments magnifies these mild effects into consequences of considerable significance for parties. For example, of 42 one-party parliamentary majorities, 27 were the result of electoral laws translating electoral minorities into parliamentary majorities. The British case is relatively well known but it is surprising to note the frequency of the phenomenon and also that it is widespread, not being restricted to systems operating under plurality electoral formulae.

There are many other generalizations in this monograph, not all surprising, but invariably analyzed and evaluated with great care. Perhaps of greatest general interest is the evaluation of Duverger's "sociological law" connecting multi-partism with electoral formulae. Duverger comes off well. Those who are interested in political engineering may find some results uncomfortable for they imply the impossibility of simultaneously realizing certain goals. Three classes of scholars, however, must own this book—those who concern themselves with politics in Western liberal democracies, those who specialize in political parties, and those who focus on elections and electoral politics.

Some political scientists will be disappointed in the author's decision to avoid extensive treatment of particular cases or discussion of system properties he did not measure. Rae casts this as a choice between literature and science and opts for the latter thus restricting himself to only those statements his analysis will support. The resulting product is a tightly reasoned and sharply focused empirical treatment of a classic political problem.

—John Sprague, Washington University, St. Louis.

Politics and Communication. By RICHARD R. FAGEN. (Boston: Little, Brown & Company, 1966. Pp. x, 156.)

Content Analysis of Communications. By RICHARD W. Budd, Robert K. Thorp, and Lewis Dono-Hew. (New York: The Macmillan Company, 1967. Pp. x. 142. \$5.95.)

In current political analysis, the researcher is faced with the problem of dwindling field resources. Political officials are confronted with an increasing volume of interviewers, foreign governments are looking askance at foreigners asking prying questions of their citizens and officials. In this growing desert, there is one area of growth

and increasing attention—Communications. Each nation, government official, department, governing unit, etc., pours out a greater mass of written, spoken and visual communications every year. As media technology improves, access to these materials also increases. The problem becomes one of developing analysis techniques and methods to process this data as well as evolving necessary propositions, hypotheses and definitions in this area. These two books offer different introductions into this field.

Richard Fagen considers communications as one theoretical tool to facilitate insight into the political process. His view of communications is the familiar model of Wilbur Schramm which is based on information processing. Relating this model to the Lasswellian paradigm, "Who Gets What, etc.," Fagen examines political information. He discusses the various channels through which information moves and the association of these channels in a communications network, relating the structure of this network to the functional approach to politics. Various recent surveys including the work done on the Kennedy assassination and the Almond-Verba work, help illustrate and categorize the content of information. Probably the most interesting chapter in the book is devoted to communications and change. Here Fagen presents and discusses two models, the Deutsch exogenous change model and the endogenous model arrived at during some of Fagen's own work on Cuba. Finally, Fagen poses some of the political problems in media growth, increased technology and massive communications volume. Here he tends to consider communications as those things connected with mass media or socialization.

Fagen's work is not a comprehensive treatment of politics and the communications field. Rather, it represents a survey of some of the more interesting instances of recent note where the fields have overlapped. Much current work is being done, for instance, with the problem of international images which he treats in his discussion of information content. As an introduction to current theory and research, the book provides a variety of information and some synthesis. It is unfortunate that Fagen's survey has an absence of references to other communications work. Much of interest for politics is being done today by sociologists on the problem of meaning, by psychologists and anthropologists on language, and by engineers and mechanics on the communications process. In spite of its limitations, this remains a valuable introduction to the complex field and a good look at some recent research.

Both books under consideration here begin with Schramm's model. From that point on they are completely different. Budd, Thorp and Donohew have written that rare tool for analysts, a cookbook with valuable recipes for content analysis. To them communications is a process which must be dissected and explained. To do this one particularly valuable tool is content analysis and the authors propose to instruct the uninitiated in a step-by-step way to use this method. They begin with hypothesis formulation where they reveal their preoccupation with mass media and journalism (they are all in schools of journalism or communications). Then they discuss sampling, measurement, and categories, in minute detail including most of the problems a student faces doing research. They consider sample size, show how to use a random number table, define stratification, explain coding, illustrate category development, etc. In short, they consider most of the problems encountered by a researcher in his initial attempt at work of this kind. An especially good section deals with reliability and validity, problems which plague any communications research. The authors review some of the major solutions to these problems offered by Osgood, Holsti and others while discussing alternatives of research. In their section on analysis, the authors simply offer a few of the many varieties of statistical techniques applicable to studies they propose. Obviously where so many techniques apply and there are ample illustrative possibilities some selection had to be made. But instead of presenting a few techniques, omitting such major areas as analysis of variance, and a few examples, the authors might better have discussed the process by which a researcher in this area chooses among statistical techniques and analytic methods. It is only in the last chapter of the book, a brief five pages that the authors consider content analysis by computer. With today's access to machinery and the tendency for large amounts of data, the majority of content analytic studies are going to be computer processed. Although most of the topics apply to any research of this sort, it is apparent that actual research will be computer directed. This leaves the user with the question, if the computer is used how do the authors' considerations have to be modified. In spite of these problems, the book is a valuable tool which is much needed for current work. As political analysis becomes more productive in the communications area, these books should provide a stimulus for research work and further, theoretical offerings.—Ellen B. Pirro, University of Minne-

Political Representation in England and the Origins of the American Republic. By J. R. Pole. (London: The Macmillan Company, 1966. Pp. xvii, 606. \$16.50.)

This is a very scholarly analysis of the theory of suffrage, majority rule and representative government in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries in England, the American colonies of Massachusetts, Pennsylvania, and Virginia, and in the United States during its formative period by a reader in American history and government at the University of Cambridge who has spent considerable time teaching and studying in the United States. Dr. Pole begins by analyzing the political theories of James Harrington, Algernon Sydney, and John Locke. He next discusses the impact of the ideas of these theorists on the development of political institutions of the three colonies and later the three states that he selected for intensive analysis. He traces the influence of Harrington on the thinking of John Adams and William Penn and the influence of John Locke on Thomas Jefferson. In a final chapter he compares the evolution of ideas and institutions in the eight jurisdictions which he has selected. He relates the theories of suffrage, majority rule and representation to the rights and functions of local governments, landed and property rights, and individual rights. He describes how "interest representation" displaced the old notion of representation of estates.

In a brief review it is impossible to do justice to the wide range of learning and the penetrating insights contained in this lively-written volume. Dr. Pole has done his research well in the archives of New England, Pennsylvania, Virginia, and other parts of the United States. He has also done a fine job on the English archives. An Appendix furnishes election statistics on Massachusetts, Connecticut, New Hampshire, Pennsylvania, Maryland, Virginia, and North Carolina from eighteenth and nineteenth centuries. In a felicitous manner, Dr. Pole has combined political philosophy and detailed description of political and electoral behavior on the basis of widely scattered historical materials available.—HAROLD F. GOSNELL, Howard University.

The Moral and Political Tradition of Rome. By Donald Earl. (Ithaca, New York: Cornell University Press, 1967. Pp. 1,167. \$4.95.)

Professor Earl has written a book about the "moral and political tradition of Rome." On the basis of what he has written, it is interesting to examine what he conceives to be the essence of that tradition, that is, the moral and political components of that tradition. At the outset, Earl makes three assumptions which dictate his eventual conclusions and totally constrain his scope of investigation. One, a moral and political tradition exists only with respect to the nobility and/or those portions of other classes which from time to time intrude into the ruling oligarchy. Two, one assesses a moral and political tradition on the basis of belief rather than behavior. And, three, the essence of that tradition is contained in a few summary concepts, the meaning of which one can examine overtime to determine the continuity and variation which occurs in the tradition.

Depending on what one wants from the book, these assumptions may or may not be detrimental. If one wants only a description of some basic Roman beliefs over time (e.g., virtus, gloria, nobilitas, and respublica) expressed through the extant writings of the major Roman writers and historians (e.g., Sallust, Cicero, Polyibus, Cato, Virgil, Horace, Livy, Marcellus, and Augustine) then the book is perfectly adequate. If, however, one wishes to investigate the manner in which certain beliefs and values affect the political world in which they exist, then the above assumptions are quite inhibiting and the book somewhat of a major disappointment. One should hasten to acknowledge that Earl is a Classicist, not a political scientist, and that he is obviously writing for different purposes than that for which he is being read. Still, the question here is to what degree such a book is useful to political scientists; consequently such questions, though hard on the author, are still appropriate.

Let us therefore examine the affect of the above assumptions on this particular exercise. First, it is not unusual to find scholars (especially historians) who treat the literary remains of a given aristocracy as evidence of the motivating values of a particular political system in a given period of time. In this respect then, Earl's description of the presumed dominant values of the ruling oligarchy as indicative of the "moral and political tradition" stands in good company. But if one is writing for any other purpose than the purely descriptive (and such is rarely the case), to make this assumption is to implicitly adopt a very simple, naive theory of politics, one which would, if made explicit, rarely if ever be defended by the same authors. Such a theory would assume, of course, that other groups outside of the political and/or social and cultural oligarchy are unimportant to the study of a "moral and political tradition." From other kinds of evidence, we know that this is obviously not the case. The urban mass of Rome was always an important factor of Roman politics. As the Republic gave way to the Empire, it became increasingly clear that the values and attitudes of a variety of groups outside the oligarchy, administrators, the army, allied citizenries, were as important to the continuance of Roman power as were those of the oligarchy. The consummate skill of the Roman Empire was organization, perfected to a degree unmatched in the Western world prior to the industrial revolution. This organizational skill, a central part of the political, if not the moral, tradition of Rome, was to a significant degree held and transmitted by groups other than the dominant oligarchy. In sum, by studying only the values and beliefs of the dominant oligarchies, Earl is forced to ignore other kinds of values and beliefs (such as the beliefs of the urban mass as to what constituted a legitimate government) which are useful for explaining the course of Roman History.

Second, one must ask of this, as of all intellectual histories, what does one know of a political tradition if one knows only the values upon which it is ostensibly predicated? As we are only too aware, professions of value, especially when stated in the abstract, frequently differ from practices. One wonders especially about the relevance of the views of a Virgil or a Horace in the assessment of a moral and political tradition. That powerful figures in art are frequent contributors and critics of the moral language of an age is acknowledged; that they are representative of the motivating intellectual tradition of an age is a subject for considerable empirical research.

And, finally, given the above two caveats, what is the significance of tracing this intellectual development over eight centuries through the medium of a few basic summary concepts? At the least we are forced to accept the word of the expert, in this case Professor Earl, that these are the ideas central to Roman thought. But, again, one is sceptical about the relevance of these particular ideas with respect to others which might be equally interesting for suggesting how the Roman Republic and Empire sustained themselves over such an extended period of time.

In sum, Professor Earl has presented us with a pleasant, descriptive statement of what he calls the Roman idea, a set of beliefs characteristic of Roman civilization, beliefs presumably of high relevance for understanding the moral and political tradition of Rome. Political scientists, I fear, will find the definition of what constitutes the political a bit thin.—Deane E. Neubauer, University of California, Irvine.

Peter and Caesar: The Catholic Church and Political Authority. By E. A. Georner. (New York: Herder and Herder, 1965. Pp. 282. \$5.95.)

Professor Goerner has written a good preparatory discussion of the relations of church and state. It is good in that it expresses learning and distinction of mind. It is merely preparatory, however, in that it provides little more than an introduction to the problems with which it is concerned. It concentrates on the Catholic Church. And, contrary perhaps to the aims of the author, it does not arrive at the kind of broad, ultimate principles that constitute political theory.

The contents of the book are easily described. They consist in descriptive and critical comments concerning several theories of church-state relations, these covering an historical and philosophical range as wide as that bounded by Giles of Rome and John Courtney Murray. The final three chap-

ters of the book are the author's own reflections. These in general are on the side of a Church which uncompromisingly stands by the faith in its own infallibility in matters of doctrine and teaching but gives up the lingering notion that the "special graces" of its clergy fit them for political sovereignty.

Professor Goerner skillfully summarizes and criticizes the thinkers whom he considers. He is graceful and judicious. And he is concerned with a great problem: not simply the relations of the Catholic Church and the state, but also the spiritual quality of earthly society. He powerfully expresses his apprehension of this problem, and suggests a noble conception of the political role of the Catholic clergy, when he asks of the Church, "Is it too much to hope that it discover a mode whereby it might give new birth and sustenance to statesmen who could speak with such a voice as spoke in Lincoln's Second Inaugural? Is it too much to hope that it discover a mode whereby it might give new birth and sustenance to a people that could hearken to such a voice?"

Professor Goerner's central problem, however, is that of obviating the hierocratic principles which seem to follow from the infallibility claimed by the Church. He emphatically resists such principles, but it does not seem to this reviewer that he found any solid philosophical ground on which to do so. His main contention seems to be that the sanctity of the Church does not imply any special political competence. But does it not? Can political matters be cleanly severed from the moral and theological matters on which the Church is, according to Catholic faith, infallible? Can an institution with unconditional authority in morals and faith be denied such authority in politics? At several points in the book Professor Goerner seems to rely simply on the practical impossibility of instituting hierocratic regimes in the twentieth century. Yet he is clearly aware that this is a consideration without weight as political theory.

The traditional claims of the Catholic Church can be reconciled with the idea of freedom, if at all, only through the idea of a community embracing Catholics and all others. Why should Catholics speak and listen to obdurate non-Catholics? In the absence of a philosophical answer to this question it seems that proposals for institutional reorganization, such as Professor Goerner discusses at length, cannot be of much avail. Peter and Caesar explores the borders of this realm of speculation but hardly enters it.

Among the chief problems in this realm are the nature of truth and the manner in which it is known. In one of his few reckless statements Professor Goerner asserts, in an attack on "Victorian superficialities," that "after Auschwitz, Mill is irrelevant." But one of the reasons for thinking Mill is not irrelevant—especially after Auschwitz—is

that he wrote a humane and moving essay on liberty, part of which was a meditation on the relationship of men to the truth. Can an organization claim to be infallible and still engage in genuine communication? This is the sort of question Mill reflected on in his essay On Liberty and Professor Goerner will surely have to join in such reflection if he continues to work upon these problems.

And if men who care for freedom must consider the nature of truth, Christians who care for freedom must devote particular attention to the nature of Christian truth. In what way is it different from scientific truth? Can it be fully and accurately embodied in words? Christianity is a religion of love and thus of community; yet Christians have not been very good at entering into community with, as distinguished from imposing their faith upon, non-Christians. Tolerance has flourished only as faith has waned. In an effort to moderate the monarchical structure of the Catholic Church Professor Goerner suggests, on the grounds that grace is not restricted to the clergy, the idea of the priesthood of all members of the Church. But the problem he is concerned with points to the idea of a priesthood reaching beyond Catholic laymen and even beyond all believers. If a Christian is fully in earnest about entering into community with all men must he not go so far as to entertain the notion that there is in some sense a priesthood of non-believers?

Professor Goerner suggests that excommunication should not be commanded without lay assent. But—to take the concept of excommunication in its literal sense—can a Christian ever have adequate grounds for so drastic an act as severing communication with another human being?

Such questions of course open heretical doors. But does the concept of heresy have any place in a religion of love (and thus of openness to all men), in a religion of humility (thus alive to the imperfection of all human doctrines), in a religion of faith in the sovereignty and indefeasibility of God's address to men?

Liberal Christians must open these heretical doors, even if only to allow them to be closed again in the assurance that their use will not contribute to freedom and unrestricted community. And it will be well if this is done by scholars with the learning, the seriousness, and the analytical skill which are manifest, despite its failure to dwell upon the most radical questions, in Peter and Caesar.—Glenn Tinder, University of Massachusetts, Boston.

History of Indian Social and Political Ideas—From Rammohun to Dayananda. By BIMANBEHARI MAJUMDAR. (Calcutta: Bookland Private Ltd., 1967. Pp. xi, 332. Thirty rupees.)

For some thirty years now, an item entitled, History of Political Thought from Rammohun to Dayananda, 1821-84, Volume I: Bengal (Calcutta, 1934) by Bimanbehari Majumdar has been staring at me from my library shelves. I have often wondered what Professor Majumdar did with his projected second volume. Comes now this new title with the author's prefatory explanation that "The present volume completes the work undertaken in 1931, possibly establishing a record in perseverance or procrastination as may diversely be interpreted by friendly or hostile critics." Two questions present themselves immediately: How does the new work relate to the earlier study? What effect has the thirty-three year delay had on the quality of the final product?

The present work is not entirely new. Eight of its fourteen chapters are a revised version of the original Volume I, with identical chapter titles. Of these, seven are substantially unchanged, while the chapter on "The Muslim School of Political Thought" is thoroughly recast and extended, to give a greatly improved picture of muslim ideas. The new compilation adds an introductory chapter on "The State and Society-the Problem of Social Reform," and another on "Social Thinkers and Reformers of the pre-Congress Era." The author thus justifies his use of the new title. History of Indian Social and Political Ideas, which, he states in his Preface, was advisable because "the condition prevailing in the last century in this country made it impossible to separate these two aspects." Finally, in response to the implied promise of the 1934 volume, he has added four chapters, covering Western India, South India, and Davananda and Harischandra in the North. The author's new Introduction puts the whole in much better perspective than did the prefatory material of Volume I.

As to the effect of a third of a century delay in bringing out the final version of this study of the 1821-84 period: The later chapters appear to be in the same style and consistent with the earlier sections. From the perspective of the present, however, there is a distinct aura about these discussions which savors of earlier times. Bacon, Bentham, Blackstone, Calvin, Hobbes, John Stuart Mill, Proudhon, Rousseau and Spencer are the principal Western theorists cited. This is all in the spirit of the nineteenth century British India of which Majumdar writes. Marx is mentioned only once: to point out that Das Kapital had not been translated into English and was therefore not mentioned by Bankimchandra when he wrote his Samya. It is instructive of the profound change in the premises and issues and personages of political thought during the last century to read through the dialogues of the Victorian era in India which this volume presents.

The author has provided a wealth of historical insights. In a passage on the nineteenth century he comments that "the proper climate necessary for propounding political philosophy was totally

absent in India . . . Intellectual leaders . . . took recourse to journalism, therefore, as the vehicle of expression. A major portion of the social and political ideas of India . . . is to be found in the . . . journals owned and edited by Indians" Davananda, is, of course, an exception and the author gives an excellent analysis of the Swami's contributions and his relationship to Rammohun Rov. Despite a style which may strike the reader as a bit flowery at times (Roy: "the great Vedantist... one of the earliest champions of the noble ideal of international co-operation"; Dayananda: "the Rishi or Divine Seer of modern India,") he is capable of sharp critical evaluation of leading writers—a quality sometimes lacking in other Indian historians of the period. He quotes, for instance, the now discredited theories of Indian political thought held by K. P. Jayaswal and says that he seems to support Dayananda's views on kingship and dictatorship. But he is very careful not to assume that such views are valid and, in fact, refers to Dayananda's claims of "Republicanism in the Vedas" as the product of "distorted vision." In summary, the book is well written, informed, scholarly. It presents a most useful analysis of the period, richly larded with citations from contemporary sources.

Professor Majumdar is well known to South Asian scholars, having served as President of the Indian Political Science Association and written or edited various works, including Public Administration in India, The Gandhian Concept of the State, and Militant Nationalism in India. It is to be hoped that the projected two volume History of Social and Political Ideas from Ranade to Nehru, completing the series of studies from 1821-1964 (which Majumdar advises us is to be brought out by the same publisher) will now be promptly available.—D. Mackenzie Brown, Prescott College.

Russian Political Thought: An Introduction. By THORNTON ANDERSON. (Ithaca, New York: Cornell University Press, 1967. Pp. xiii, 444. \$9.75.)

"Political thought" can mean two things—what politicians think, or what thinkers say about politics. Professor Anderson's history of political thought in Russia is devoted almost exclusively to the first kind, but of necessity: the history of Russia is singularly deficient among great nations in the production of original and significant treatises on the nature of government. From Kievan to Soviet times, public political discussions in Russia have been almost exclusively confined to sloganeering and propagandizing, whether by the government or the opposition. It is as though the history of American political thought had to be written from provincial editorials and Washington news releases.

Professor of Government at the University of Maryland, Thornton Anderson has shifted, after some eminent work in the history of American political theory, to the field of Russian intellectual history. He recently edited a useful anthology, Masters of Russian Marxism (New York, 1963). In the work under review, he has produced a most readable and well-organized introduction to the history of political ideology and controversy in Russia. With its copious Western-language bibliography, Russian Political Thought will be an excellent text for courses in general political theory or Soviet government where an account of the opinions of Russia's leaders, pre- and post-revolutionary, is desired with a good deal of historical context. Of systematic philosophical depth, on the other hand, there is very little, particularly in Anderson's section on the Soviet period. Even where Lenin's State and Revolution invites some exposition and critique, the author slows down for no more than a couple of paragraphs of summary.

The thesis emerging from Professor Anderson's pages and re-affirmed in his conclusion is the inseparable link of Russian political thought, as ideology, with the concerns of governmental power. Such were the political formulations of the Orthodox Church, the messianic pretensions of the Muscovite Tsars, and the ethereal reform notions of the eighteenth century, which Anderson pursues chronologically for the first third of his book. The same was true for the nineteenth century, with the difference that various schools of opposition-Anderson has chapters on Westerners, Slavophils, Anarchists, Populists, Liberals, and Marxists-declaimed their views along with the Official Ideology of Orthodoxy-Autocracy-Nationality. And the Soviet period (comprising the last quarter or so of the book) saw a return to the one official belief, enforced with all the authority of the state.

Marxism, Anderson feels, fitted in psychologically with the Russian bent for messianic commitment despite its logical incompatibility with the revolutionary movement of a backward country where the bourgeoisie had been too weak to accomplish its own revolution. The Russian Marxists (even Plekhanov, Anderson points out) had to contrive a rationale for the party of the proletariat to accomplish the bourgeois revolution, a prospect that did considerable violence to the prescriptions of historical materialism. They were Anderson observes, "under pressure from the urgencies of the revolutionary movement to deny strict economic determinism and to act through politics without being unduly restrained by the backwardness of the national economy. The habits acquired and the theories that justified them led ultimately to Lenin's explicit assertion of the priority of politics over economics and to Stalin's idea of revolution from above."

On the Bolsheviks and the Soviet period Anderson is on firm ground in stressing the subordination of theory to practice and the subjection of political doctrine to constant manipulation. There are some unfortunate omissions of independent and interesting people-Bogdanov and the prerevolutionary Left Bolsheviks, and the legal theorists of the 1920's and '30's. But the principal controversies of the 1920's are well described, and the maneuvers of Stalin and Khrushchev are recognized for what they are, even to the extent of Khrushchev's amendment of the theoretical triumph of Communism to exclude any Soviet obligation to give aid to China. Anderson wisely cautions against the notion that the Soviets have cynically abandoned theory: "It is important to remember that, at each step along the way, the new departures were integrated into the remaining fabric of Marxist theory. This was accomplished through a polemical process of exceptional vigor, which set a pattern that continues to prevail in international Communism. A new orthodoxy was established, again connected with the government but standing above it and not below it as the Orthodox Church had stood."—R. V. DANIELS, University of Vermont.

VMarx in the Mid-Twentieth Century: A Yugoslav Philosopher Reconsiders Karl Marx's Writings. By Gajo Petrovic. (New York: Doubleday & Company, 1967, Pp. 237. \$1.25.)

The task that Petrovic sets for himself in this collection of essays is "to penetrate to the essence of Marx's original thought and to think further in its spirit about the momentous philosophical questions of the contemporary world and man."

In Part I. Petrovic deals both directly and indirectly with the first half of this task; the penetration of the rigid dogmatism of Stalinism that has surrounded some Marxist philosophy, to the essence of Marx's original thought. The "original" Marx is not to be confused with the "young" Marx, however, since Petrovic rejects any analysis that does not acknowledge the essential unity of Marx's thought. Capital and Economic and Philosophical Manuscripts possess "an essential identity" in that they represent a philosophical critique that is based on a concept of man as a "free creative being of praxis." The deficiency of Stalinism, therefore, lies not only in its rejection of Marx's early writings but also in its distortion of his later works.

According to Petrovic, the return from Stalin to Marx is a return from a system of philosophical dogma to a "creative Marxism" that questions old solutions and new problems. The duty of a renewed Marxist philosophy, then, is to critically expand Marx's thought to include new realities and to examine new philosophical trends "in the

spirit of Marx." This is the second half of the task Petrovic has set for himself, and the rest of his book is devoted to essays which attempt to explore the possibilities of applying a renewed, critical, creative Marxism to various questions about man and the contemporary world.

Thus in Part II, in what is probably the most interesting section of the book, Petrovic deals with the topics of "Marx's Concept of Man," "Man as Economic Animal and Man as Praxis," "What is Freedom," "Alienation and De-alienation," and "Philosophy and Politics in Socialism." A review of this length cannot do justice to the wealth of detail and interesting comment in these essays, but a brief summary of some of Petrovic's conclusions will indicate the direction of his argument.

Among other things, Petrovic rejects the idea that man, according to Marx, is an "economic animal" whose "entire activity is determined by the economic sphere of his existence." He sees Marx instead as emphasizing man as a "universal, creative and self-creative social being." In his essay on "What is Freedom" the author commits himself to a view of freedom as self-determination in repudiation of those who consider freedom to be either the knowledge of necessity or the absence of external restraints on activity. In line with this argument, Petrovic also claims that the problem of "de-alienation" cannot be reduced to the problem of social transformation or the abolition of private property as some "Marxists" have claimed. He does not think it possible that a social system could be created that would automatically produce non-alienated individuals. De-alienation results from an individual's own activity and not from some external source.

Finally, in Part III, Petrovic examines certain apparently epistemological and ontological topics; "What is Meaning," "Truth and Reflection," "Praxis and Being," "Logic and Mathematics." He reviews the writings of Kant, Hegel, Heidegger, Feuerbach and others on these questions and critically analyzes them "in the spirit of Marx." As Petrovic points out, however, his essays in Part III are no less "anthropological" than those in Part II, and the essays in Part II also deal with ontological problems. Traditional terminology, therefore, cannot adequately characterize all the elements of their essays.

Petrovic realizes that the type of critical discussion he is advocating will be questioned by some "Marxist critics" who might feel that such discussion can only lead to a weakening of Marxist philosophy. To this charge he answers "why should a living Marxism be weaker than a dead one?" and he expresses a hope that the time will soon come when it can no longer be said that "Jesuits have written more studies about Marx and Marxism

than Marxists themselves." This collection of essays is welcome evidence of the potentialities of a living Marxism that rejects both a blind acceptance of Stalinist orthodoxy and a mere compilation of Stalinist "errors," and attempts to creatively interpret new realities.—Edward D. Wilde, Moravian College.

Two Tracts on Government. By JOHN LOCKE. Edited, with an introduction, notes, and translation by Philip Abrams. (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1967, Pp. x, 264. \$7.50.)

This book contains the first English publication of Locke's earliest writings on politics (an Italian edition appeared in 1961). These are two short untitled works that have been culled from the Lovelace Collection of Locke manuscripts in the Bodleian Library. The first is an English tract written in 1660, the second a Latin essay composed a year or two later. Both works represent defenses of the affirmative position on the question (to quote the heading of the English tract): "Whether the Civil Magistrate may lawfully impose and determine the use of indifferent things in reference to Religious Worship." This was, of course, an emotion-charged political issue in the England of 1660, but it is difficult to get very excited about or even vicariously involved in it today. Furthermore, for the most part Locke's handling of the argument strikes me as heavyhanded, tedious, and pedestrian. On the surface, these tracts seem to possess only a tenuous antiquarian or biographical interest for the contemporary reader and thus to be scarcely worth the trouble of publishing them.

I do not, however, believe that this is so. The real value of these early works is lucidly explained in a lengthy introduction written by the editor, a Fellow of Peterhouse College and Lecturer in Economics in the University of Cambridge, Students of political thought-especially those who are interested in the origins of modern, secularized political theorizing—can acquire from this volume considerable insight into the assumptions and problems of the intellectually pivotal seventeenth century. And the mind of John Locke-one of the most deceptively complex writers in the history of political philosophy-is much clarified as well. Pre-eminently, this book helps us to begin to understand precisely how and to some degree why Locke's thought served as a bridge between the antecedent classical-Christian tradition and the predominant science-minded, secularized framework of modern political thought.

It is certainly true that Locke's two early tracts support a conservative viewpoint, upholding the right of authoritarian government, rather than the individual conscience, to set standards of religious behavior. Yet, as Dr. Abrams points out, Locke defended his position in such a way as to call into question the fundamental assumptions of the scholastic tradition. Divine and natural law are merely asserted as true, but no effort is made to buttress their authority by demonstration. In large measure, Locke's attempt to justify authoritarian government is utilitarian, premised upon the threats to social order posed by human ignorance, passion and partiality.

Furthermore, even at this early stage of his development Locke presents a contractual justification of governmental authority. At this juncture he claimed not necessarily to believe in this theory, but in fact he attempted to present at least a minimal defense of it and none at all of the divine right doctrine. The latter is only mentioned as another possible theoretical support for government. In sum, the philosophical assumptions—and dilemmas—which undergirded Locke's mature "liberal" political thought are presented embryonically or at least hinted at in these expressions of a youthful conservatism.

Dr. Abrams is to be commended for his excellent editorial work and even more for his successful and illuminating effort to place these early works in the context of Locke's intellectual development. I have only two minor criticisms of points in his introduction. He maintains that Locke's tracts represent a late statement of an "old ideology" but set the terms for a career culminating in the formulation, by the 1690's, of a "new ideology." I assume that the editor does not use the term "ideology" in Marx's sense but rather as short-hand for philosophical system. But his meaning would have been clearer on this point if he had avoided the equivocal and, in this context, tendentious-sounding term, ideology. Finally, Dr. Abrams contends that Locke's argument ended in an epistemological crisis (concerning the status of traditional claims to moral knowledge) which no one prior to Locke was willing to face. Surely Hobbes, at least, had previously confronted this problem in an even more head-on and unequivocal fashion than Locke ever did. None of this critical commentary should be taken, however, as minimizing in any sense the value of this excellent work of editorial and interpretative scholarship.-FRED H. WILLHOITE, Louisiana State University.

The Phenomenology of the Social World. By ALFRED SCHUTZ. Translated By George Walsh and Frederick Lehnert. (Evanston, Illinois: Northwestern University Press, 1967. Pp. xxxvi 255. \$9.00.)

Within the past decade or so, English translations of European phenomenological literature have been appearing at a rapid pace. The "Northwestern University Studies in Phenomenology and Existential Philosophy" has added the welcomed,

invaluable translation of Alfred Schutz's (1899-1959) pioneering work, Der sinnhafte Aufbau der sozialen Welt: Eine Einleitung in die verstehende Soziologie (1932; 2d ed., 1960) which was highly praised by the founder of phenomenology, Edmund Husserl (1859-1938). The translated version includes George Walsh's "Introduction" (pp. xv-xxix), a short German-English "Glossary" (pp. xv-xxxvi), a "Selected Bibliography" (pp. 251-52) and an expanded "Index" (pp. 253-55).

Schutz's Phenomenology is an analysis of the meaning-structure of the social world and suggests a new way of investigating the social sciences. In describing the invariant and typical structure of the social world, Schutz utilizes the central categories of Husserl's early phenomenology such as intentionality, internal time-consciousness and intersubjectivity. Schutz attempts to describe social "phenomena" and to establish the meaning of "objectivity" in the social sciences from the perspective of the lived experience of man in the "natural attitude" (natürliche Einstellung). He accepts the fact with justification that what is essentially human is qualitatively different from what is natural and, accordingly, adopts radically different procedures in the social sciences from those of the natural sciences.

Schutz's Phenomenology is divided into five sections (a total of 50 sub-sections). In Section I, he formulates the basic methodological problems of "interpretive sociology," clarifies the basic ambiguities in a series of tacit presuppositions of Max Weber's sociological concepts such as the "intended meaning" and "motive" of action, and attempts to go beyond Weber. Section II shows the meaningstructure of action as a lived experience (Erlebnis) from the standpoint of the solitary ego by means of Bergson's notion of lived time as "duration" (durée) and above all of Husserl's analysis of internal time-consciousness. Section III deals with the problem of intersubjective understanding (Fremdverstehen) or our knowledge of the alter ego. In Section IV, Schutz describes the structure of the social world and formulates a typology of social relationship. In Section V, he reformulates some basic questions concerning "interpretive sociology" in view of the four preceding sections and hints at a direction in which sociological problems may be more fully analyzed. In the remainder of this review, I shall attempt to state the focal insights of Schutz in Sections II, III and IV of his Phenomenology.

1. By action Schutz means something more than a mere physical event; it is the unity of an actor's lived experience. Action has its temporal, meaningful and motivational dimensions. It is a uni-directional and irreversible on-going process. It acquires meaning when it is grasped by the Act of attention (i.e., reflectively). This reflective glance

is called "Act" (Akt) which has a reference to "having behaved," never "behaving." Thus a distinction is made between "action in process" (Hendeln) and "the completed act" (Handlung). Moreover, the distinct element of an action is its "project" (Entwurf) which is a preconceived plan by the actor in advance before the execution of his action. It is thought of in the future perfect tense (modo futuri exacti), i.e., "I shall have done." As "a phantasying of action," project is in principle independent of the actual performance of action. Now, motive is the meaningful ground for action. There are two kinds of motive: (1) the "'in-order-to' motive" (Um-zu-Motiv) and (2) the "because-motive" (Weil-Motiv). The first refers to the orientation of action to a future event and the second to a past lived experience. Hence they have the temporal character of futurity and of pastness respectively.

2. The realm of intersubjectivity begins as soon as we assume the existence of others. Since all the social sciences take intersubjectivity for granted, the philosopher of social science must clarify the structure of intersubjectivity. In a genuine intersubjective understanding, it is not sufficient to know the external "indications" (Anzeichen) of other's behavior. In direct social experience, the body is a field of expression. In case of a "sign" (Zeichen) intended for communication, it is always the "sign for" (1) what it signifies and (2) what is expressive of the lived experience of its user. In "a sign system," the user and the interpreter place a sign or a group of signs in a configurative context of meaning expressive of their lived experiences. Intersubjective understanding thus takes into account the lived experience of the other self. This is possible because (1) I know that the structure of other's lived experience is analogous to mine or has the same form as mine, (2) the idea "I and you co-exist" suggest that the stream of your intentional acts is "simultaneous" or "contemporaneous" with my own, and (3) I can observe the course of your action as it actually takes place in a direct social encounter, whereas I must attend to my lived experience reflectively in order to observe it. Schutz, however, is advancing neither a "projective theory of empathy" nor a solipsism. In Schutz's theory, I recognize another self other than mine and I comprehend this lived experience as other than mine (i.e., the distinction between the "intended meaning" of my lived experience and my interpretation of his).

3. Section IV is by far the most important and original contribution of Schutz's *Phenomenology* to the theory of social science. By the social world, he means a complex network of relationships. The starting point of all social science is found in our ordinary social life, and other people are both our "objects of experience" and "objects

of thought" as well. Four regions of social relationship are (1) the Umwelt (the world of consociates), (2) the Mitwelt (the world of contemporaries), (3) the Vorwelt (the world of predecessors or "history") and (4) the Folgewelt (the world successors). The Vorwelt and the Folgewelt have the temporal character of the past and the future respectively. The Umwelt is the social world in which we directly experience others as "consociates" (Mitmenschen) here and now. In "We-relationship" I encounter the bodily presence of the other in the face-to-face situation. Only in the Umwelt and the Mitwelt, can I be both actor and observer. The distance of social relationship ranges from "We-relationship" to collective entities such as "state," "government," "law," etc., with of course the varying degrees of anonymity. The Mitwelt which has a reference to "They-orientation" is of immediate significance to the political world. In it we do not directly experience our "contemporaries" (Nebenmenschen) but only infer their typical characteristics on the basis of our immediate social relationships, namely, we understand the "contemporary" as "an ideal type." Thus he is always experienced predicatively (Erfahrung). Moreover, there are two ideal types of knowing (by inference) the behavior of others as "contemporaries": (1) "personal ideal type" and (2) "course-of-action type." Both types are used together because to know another person as a "diplomat" or "politician" we must know the job or functions he performs. The anonymous collective entities such as "state" can also be reduced to these ideal types: "every 'action' of the state can. be reduced to the actions of its functionaries" and "the term 'state' is merely an abbreviation for a highly complex network of interdependent personal ideal types" (p. 199).

In conclusion, Schutz's Phenomenology contributes to a philosophical clarification of the very roots of human social existence. It is (or was) the significant beginning of a new way of theorizing about social science. To evaluate and appreciate his thought fully, one has to read his available and posthumously forthcoming writings. The phenomenological movement today is far broader and richer than when Husserl initiated it. Moreover, phenomenology as a philosophy also seeks the value of science for human existence. Now political theorists of all persuasions can and should no longer ignore the wealth of phenomenological insights, although they have often been misunderstood by political theorists.—HWA YOL JUNG, Moravian College.

Mathematical Applications in Political Science, II. Ed. By Joseph L. Bernd. (Dallas: Southern Methodist University Press, 1966. Pp. 208. \$4.95.) This is the second volume to emerge from Southern Methodist's 1964 and 1965 summer conferences on "Mathematical Applications in Political Science." It appears to differ from the first by virtue of having been devoted to advanced topics, the first having been devoted to fundamentals.

This volume contains seven papers, the first two addressed, ostensibly, to "Solutions to Methodological Problems," the third to "Statistical Techniques," the fourth and fifth to "Applications to Practical Politics," and the last two to "Models of the Political System." I shall summarize them briefly in that order.

Hayward R. Alker, Jr. has written an instructive discussion and application of causal modeling techniques, both recursive and circular. If read carefully, one can even find occasional warnings concerning the limits of such modeling. One such obvious warning, though remaining unmentioned, concerns a direct linkage found to exist between urbanization and literacy in the recursive model which is perforce eliminated from the circular model to satisfy the conditions of identifiability in the set of equations.

The use of the term reciprocal where circular should have been used and an enigmatic discussion of free choice and causality, in which it appears that free choice must appear as random behavior in a casual model, mar an otherwise good review of causal modeling.

Richard L. Merritt's paper on cross-national content analysis gets no closer to mathematics than a mention of sampling, counting and coder reliability but it is a better than adequate review of some of the recent work in content analysis.

Carl F. Kossack's paper must rate as the most frustrating reading experience of recent history. A discussion of factor analysis, power spectrum analysis, cluster analysis, general linear hypotheses, simultaneous regression, response surface analysis and classification techniques in 25 pages must set a new record for confidence in the efficiency of language. The task was too much, however, for only those who can make the necessary leaps and generalizations can view this as, at best, a listing of some available techniques while for those others among us it becomes simply impenetrable. This is unfortunately compounded by a badly constructed type set making certain of the equations quite difficult to read and other typographical sins of both omission and commission.

Frank S. Scalora's article on stochastic models is a nice review of McPhee's 1960 Wisconsin primary study and Buzzell's research on company recruiting. Mr. Scalora is a good reviewer.

Gerald H. Kramer's article, "A Decision-Theoretic Analysis of a Problem in Political Campaigning," presents an imaginative model of the relationship between canvassing and the maximization

of vote plurality where there are constraints on resources available. He develops a simple algorithm for ordering precincts in terms of their probable contribution to such maximization. Assumptions concerning the precincts and, in particular, the assumption that there is no opposition candidate substantially limit the generalizability of the model but its treatment of decision rules in campaign behavior is step No. 1 of any more general effort.

William H. Riker's article is a detached appendix to his *The Theory of Political Coalitions* intended to replace its Appendix I, or parts of it. He merely simplifies his proof of the size principle.

Otto O. Davis and Melvin Hinich conclude the book with a nicely developed model of "policy formation in a democratic society." Their announced intention is the determination of the relationship of voter preferences and governmental policy. Proceeding from some basic, and fairly well known, assumptions concerning decision rules and the nature and distribution of preferences they find that a "beneficent" dictator would provide the same policy outcomes as the winner of an election campaign, that minority parties can win if the parties differ in cohesion, that a party may improve its chance of winning by nominating a candidate whose position is somewhere between its internal mean preference and that of the other party, and that a candidate can maximize his chances by catering to specialized "mutually exclusive" sets of interests in the electorate.

Such then are my assessments of the contents of the book. It remains to be suggested that this is the type of book which will be purchased for only a small part of its contents. I doubt that there are many who would be able to find those contents, in their entirely, uniformly informative.—Alden E. Lind, University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill

Theory and Methods of Social Research. By JOHAN GALTUNG. (New York: Columbia University Press, 1967, Pp. 534, \$10.00.)

Books, like people, are often divided into those that do, and those that reflect on doing; and if this dichotomy fits abrasively, blame the reflective people (who thought it up). Theory and Methods of Social Research by Johan Galtung is exactly what its title suggests—a book which reflects on doing. It is an excellent work.

The reflection is, however, of a particular sort. The author states on page 1 that neither philosophical foundations nor nuts-and-bolts techniques will be disucssed in depth. Instead, a middle road of analysis is chosen which ties together a variety of approaches to data collection, data processing, data analysis, and theory formation.

It is part of the book's merit that the author

does not always succeed in staying on this elusive middle ground. The text runs all the way from discussions of statistical tests to the epistemological status of theories. Even Quine's views on truth and falsity are invoked. At the end of the book one is not even sure if there is a middle road.

The organization of the book is superb. Beginning with the observation that he is interested in correct methodology, or what researchers should do rather than what they actually do, Galtung moves comprehensively over almost every phase of research design. Indeed, the book itself is arranged like a gigantic research design, containing reflections on the range of moves open at each stage of the analysis.

The main divisions of the book are two: data collection and data analysis. In the first section are found discussions of the data matrix, units of analysis, variables, values, collection of data, and surveys. The second section of the book contains data processing, distributions, patterns, hypotheses, analysis of data, and theories.

The subject of a data matrix contains a series of initial distinctions which recur throughout the book: synchronic (spatial) vs. diachronic (temporal) variables; manifest vs. latent data; and the basic sequence of background—personality—behavior variables. Some confusion results from distinguishing latent and manifest data on the basis of inference (i.e., all data involve some form of inference—a philosophical point, sad to say), but this is minor.

In discussing units of analysis the author separates analytic levels, warns the researcher of the ecological fallacy (and others), and provides the reader with a good summary of the Lazarsfeld-Menzel system of separating variables. A very clear and brief point is made of the sometimes overlooked difference between substantive (sample) and generalization (sample to universe), hypotheses; and generally the discussion of sampling is quite good, especially the business of linking sampling techniques to research purposes—a nuts-and-bolts point, I believe.

Some generally good distinctions are made between levels of variables, but the reader will look in vain for values other than those which are strictly empirical. Galtung is concerned with actor evaluations, not justification beyond this. Even so, the author is clear-headed enough to separate norms and evaluations (the former as action-oriented), and generally handle the subject well. The same is true of the subjects of data collection and surveys, although applying the Parsonian phase system to questionnaires (p. 133) is a bit too much

Data processing, statistical distributions, patterns and indices are all discussed with aplomb and wit (if that is possible). There are some especially interesting discussions of the mathematical relations between Lazarsfeld's manifest and latenvariables (p. 274 ff.), but only a brief allusion is made to factor analysis. (Enough, however, is perhaps enough—no matter what the size of the book.) Hypotheses are given a different twist being defined in terms of form and not the meanings of the words contained. Hence, "God is infinitely good" is an hypothesis, and then is treated in terms of the conditions under which it is tenable (instead of the reverse). The final section or theories is especially good.

In a brief review, any thorough criticism of such a book is impossible, and in this case hardly needed. I will take up only a few brief points (it just to avoid a vacuous summary). The choice of examples does not always come off. Some used to demonstrate the ecological fallacy (p. 47) demonstrate only that they ought not to have been included. It would also be helpful to have more examples from the social sciences in the discussion of hypotheses (p. 337 ff.).

There is also some confusion over the meaning of a tautology, which (contrary to the author's belief) is not defined in terms of probability (p. 338) but rather in terms of the linguistic or quantitative terms used; hence, the question of probability is irrelevant, for a tautology is not a factual claim. Further, the sociology of knowledge is related to epistemology (p. 336), leading to a position of epistemological uncertainty. And so on.

But, as can be seen, none of these criticisms is anything to get excited about. The book is good enough to escape its minor flaws easily. It is sprinkled liberally with charts (the author obviously finds the spatial dimension a fertile area for his ideas) which clearly present the main distinctions made in the work. The book as a whole is probably too much for any but the most advanced undergraduates and graduate students, but anyone with some background in methodology will immediately appreciate the competence and élan with which Galtung has handled his much-discussed subject.—Fred M. Frohock, Syracuse University.

Divisiveness and Social Conflict. By ALAN R. Beals and Bernard J. Siegel. (Stanford, California: Stanford University Press, 1966. Pp. xi, 185. \$6.00.)

At first sight, this book by two well-known anthropologists seems to have considerable promise. A new theory of conflict, based on the comparison of divisiveness and factionalism in two widely different agrarian communities (Taos pueblo in New Mexico, and a village in southern India called "Namhalli"), should be welcome and useful to political scientists. Unfortunately, the promise is deceptive; although others may disagree, I have the

feeling that an interesting opportunity to contribute to an interdisciplinary theory of social and political processes has been missed.

Some of the problems may arise from the book's organization, which seems—peculiarly enough—to be backwards. Is it not confusing to read the theoretical conclusions (chapters 4, 5) before the data from which they are drawn (chapters 6, 7)? Should the reader be given a survey of the existing literature—and the only clear statement of the authors' central thesis—in the last chapter? If we are to be told, in chapter 2, that size is an important variable in determining the cohesiveness of a rural village (p. 41), should the actual populations of Taos and Namhalli only be mentioned, as if in passing, far later in the exposition (pp. 98, n. 2; 100; 138)?

The central hypothesis of Beals and Siegel is not without interest: "a stress which is low in visibility, high in randomness, high in complexity, high in selectivity, and long in duration is most likely to produce factionalist dispute" (p. 115). But the political scientist will be struck by their failure to develop clear and objective measures to test the proposition. Equally disappointing is the failure to cite relevant work in other social sciences: theories of political conflict, studies of community power in the U.S., and analyses of the impact of modernization on agrarian societies are conspicuously absent from the bibliography.

Indeed, Divisiveness and Social Conflict is, to a considerable extent, a tract directed to other anthropologists, condemning the excesses of the socalled "functionalist" interpretation of conflict. Beals and Siegel repeatedly criticize the concept that social conflict serves positive functions; asserting that functionalism necessarily treats society as a static and "closed" organization, they insist instead on a distinction between "normal conflict," which is defined as "nondisruptive" and "nonviolent," and "disruptive" or "unregulated" conflict, of which the "pervasive factionalism" in Taos and Namhalli are prime examples (chapter 1).

This perspective raises more problems than it solves. It results in the assumption that "fighting" and "warfare" apply only to situations "where opponents do each other physical injury outside of any system of rules and meanings," thereby cutting off possible comparisons between international conflicts and feud or violence in primitive stateless societies (pp. 18, 170). The distinction between an organization's internal "strains" and the environmental "stresses" to which it is subject is useful, but it is approached with an evident bias in favor of cooperative responses to problem-solving (esp. pp. 20, 166).

Conflict and violence may well be deplorable, but this perspective does not increase our understanding of the role of headhunting, feud, and group fission in many primitive systems. Nor does it illuminate the consequences of violence in the process of economic and political modernization (so brilliantly analyzed by Barrington Moore in Social Origins of Dictatorship and Democracy). Whether or not looting and rioting in American ghettoes may actually contribute to an improvement of the negro's status is an open question, but Beals and Siegel do not help us to pose it more clearly.

Both in its empirical analysis and its theoretical conceptualization, the book has an opaque character that will frustrate political scientists. The authors' conclusion is representative: "let there be proposed a range of theories of conflict and let there be collected much information relevant to the causes, the course, and the concluding stages of divisiveness" (p. 170). In such a quest, it is to be feared that this slim volume will contribute less than it might have.—Roger D. Masters, Dartmouth College.

AMERICAN GOVERNMENT AND POLITICS

Prestige and Association in an Urban Community: An Analysis of an Urban Stratification System. By Edward O. Laumann. (Indianapolis, Indiana: The Bobbs-Merrill Company, 1966. Pp. vii, 218. \$2.95.)

Cities in a Race With Time: Progress and Poverty in America's Renewing Cities. By Jeanne R. Lowe. (New York: Random House, 1967. Pp. x, 601. \$10.00.)

The Regional City: An Anglo-American Discussion of Metropolitan Planning. Ed. By Derek Senior. (Chicago: Aldine Publishing Company, Pp. viii, 192.)

Professor Laumann in Prestige and Association in an Urban Community assesses the social stratification system in an urban area by directing his investigation at three main questions. First, do we have separate indentifiable social classes in urban areas or does a social continuum exist with no distinct boundaries between the classes? Secondly, what types of social interaction patterns exist among friends, neighbors, and relatives given the observed stratification system? Thirdly, what relationships exist between the observed social structure and certain political and economic attitudes?

Laumann used relatively sophisticated statistical techniques to analyze the occupational ranks, social interactions and attitudes of a sample of 422 white male residents in Cambridge and Belmont, Massachusetts. Occupation was the primary variable used to assess the stratification system. For each occupational category a subjective measure (preferred social-interaction) and an objective measure (observed social-interaction) was used to determine the dimensions of the stratification system.

An individual's subjective description of the social system differs from his objective social interaction patterns. The respondents describe the system as open and state social preferences for individuals with higher social status than themselves. However, their objective social interaction is con-

fined primarily to individuals of equal occupational status. The American ideology of an open class system with a great deal of social mobility most reflects subjective descriptions of the system not actual social interaction behavior.

The research indicates that neither a status continuum nor a social class system is descriptive of the urban stratification system. Rather, a stratification system exists with both the top and bottom exhibiting crystallized boundaries and the large middle group socially undifferentiated. The middle occupational groups show considerable differentiation in subjective social preferences along prestige lines and less tendency to confine social-interaction with status equals than do the top and bottom occupational groups. This conclusion makes suspect findings of past studies that state a social continuum or identifiable social classes characterize the urban stratification system. The stratification system is mixed, combining certain features of social-class and status continuum.

Given the above description of an urban stratification system Laumann finds that social-interaction, particularly friendship, was primarily confined to individuals of similar occupational groupings. Social-interaction among relatives and neighbors was less confined to equal status individuals. The top and bottom occupational categories exhibited the greatest degree of equal status contact and the middle category the least.

Individuals with high status sensitivity, strong class identification and consciousness and desiring social interactions with status-equals exhibited more extreme economic and political beliefs of either a liberal or conservative persuasion. This finding indicates relating status characteristics to political and economic attitudes is no longer a sufficient enterprise. Greater emphasis should be placed upon intervening variables, such as, social mobility and social-interaction networks of individuals which may play an important role in the formation and support of economic and political beliefs.

It is unfortunate that Negroes were not included in the sample for they are an important segment in most of our urban areas. Occupation may not be a reliable indicator of prestige and social interaction for Negroes. It is understandable that their inclusion in the sample may have jeopardized the validity of the findings. However, valuable insights about the Negroes' position in the stratification system could have been obtained from the responses of the white respondents.

Professor Laumann makes a major contribution with his penetrating analysis describing and explaining an urban stratification system. His study will not only be of interest to persons concerned with social stratification, but it should prove useful to researcher's utilizing social class as a major variable.

Miss Lowe in Cities in a Race with Time focuses upon the development of urban renewal and public housing over the past twenty years in five major cities. (New York, Pittsburgh, Washington, Philadelphia, and New Haven). In a descriptive fashion she outlines the experiences of each of these cities by vividly portraying the individuals and groups involved in urban renewal. Miss Lowe has exhibited astute political awareness and understanding of the forces and values involved in renewal in each of the five cities.

Miss Lowe superbly describes the roles of Robert Moses and Richard Lee in their respective cities. By focusing on these two men the author illustrates the complexity of problems inherent in initiating and carrying through urban renewal in New York and New Haven. But, by concentrating on urban renewal, many related problems and priorities of the cities were overlooked. Urban renewal and public housing were not examined as part of the total political process in the cities examined. Urban renewal issues were examined as if they were top priority issues in the cities. Local political leaders may not think that urban renewal is the major problem facing their city and this affects the politics of renewal.

Cities in a Race with Time is a case study of five cities. The urban renewal experiences of the cities were not adequately compared with one another. No theoretical framework was incorporated to illustrate similarities or differences which might lead to greater understanding of the politics of urban renewal. Would Mayor Lee be as successful in New York as he was in New Haven? Would the Mellon fortune accomplish similar success in Philadelphia as it did in Pittsburgh?

Miss Lowe describes the emerging problems of cities and relates the effects of urban renewal upon them. In general, urban renewal and public housing barely scratch the surface of the social, economic and racial problems of cities. Nevertheless, the book concludes that the very process of trying to solve urban problems may constitute the

good life. With urban problems so great and solutions so difficult to reach, what else can be said?

The Regional City consists of papers and discussion of American and British planners during a conference on regional planning held in England in 1964. The book represents the opinions and observations of the 32 conferees toward differences and similarities of planning in the United States and Britain. Because of the large number of participants and varying shades of differences in their points of view the book makes difficult reading.

The major difference between planning in the United States and Britain stems from the historical role of local government in both countries. In the United States great emphasis upon local determinism, Jacksonian Democracy and private economy shapes and limits what planners can accomplish. In the United States planners follow market forces closely when constructing their plans. Whereas in Britain, regional planning follows closely national priorities. Local government in Britain has never enjoyed the autonomy of local government in the United States and as a result is more receptive to regional plans.

The surprising conclusion is reached that "given the general will to use them, taken in all, American social control over land use are inherently no less powerful than those in Britain, and the compensation price to be paid need be no higher." Then why hasn't the United States used their social controls over land? Again, the conclusion is the historical role of local government. The conference also suggests that the pressure to plan is not as great in the United States because of its vast open spaces and great wealth.

Given the limitations on American Planners they appear to employ more sophisticated techniques such as urban simulation models and general systems theory which take into account the urban area as a totality. The British focus primarily upon physical planning stressing to a lesser extent social and economic factors. The planning techniques available in the United States will not be really useful until values concerning planning and governmental organization change. The book concludes that a major change in important public objectives is needed if comprehensive planning is to be effective in American urban regions.—Vincent L. Marando, University of Arizona.

Urban Research and Policy Planning. Ed. By Leo F. Schnore and Henry Fagin. (Beverly Hills, California: Sage Publications, 1967. Pp. 638. \$20.00.)

Urban Research and Policy Planning is an ambitious book. As the initial volume in a planned series of annual reviews sponsored by Sage Publications, it attempts to survey major urban research and policy planning developments which

have occurred in the twenty-year period since World War II. In the first half of the book, thirteen authors utilize a disciplinary format to discuss urban research developments in the fields of psychology, social welfare, economics, regional science, history, geography, political science and political sociology. In the second half of the book, eleven authors cut across disciplinary lines to analyze urban policy planning developments in terms of concepts, technology and organization. Thus, the book's organization begs the question of the potential relevance which the more academic-oriented research discussed in Part I has to the policy planning developments described in Part II.

Despite the fact that the book's title implies the existence of a meaningful interaction between academic research and policy planning, the introductory chapter by Leo Schnore and Eric Lampard tends to minimize the extent of this potential interrelationship by arguing that "serious scientific research must continue to be concerned with fundamental questions of understanding the whole urban phenomenon and not just those aspects that currently appear to be problems to the social engineers." In line with this philosophy, Part I authors such as Anselm Strauss advise that urban sociology is weak "not in how to verify theory, but in how to discover theory." As a result, Strauss suggests a series of research strategies that focus on such issues as "the unstudied" (e.g., urban icons, the symbolism of time and space) and "the unusual" (e.g., the trivial, the odd).

While the unstudied and the unusual undoubtedly represent intriguing areas of investigation, it is difficult to reconcile such Part I research "emphases" with the agonizing dilemmas which policy planners, such as Lyle Fitch, describe in the second half of the book. As Fitch warns, "social planning in the United States in the mid-1960's represents many influences, strains of thought, and conflicting sentiments. . . One may ask if social planning is in danger of overreaching itself. . . Such are the uncertainties that social planning must be in the main based on probabilities . . . rather than with neatly constructed models based on known facts."

Besides such differences in intellectual outlook between many of the book's Part I academic researchers and Part II policy planners, there are a number of disparities among the academicians, themselves. John Kain, in an extremely stimulating discussion of "Urban Transportation Behavior," emphasizes that the real problem confronting the transportation researcher is to impose some order on "the truly phenomenal outpouring of data" that has occurred in the post-war period. Conversely, Harold Mayer, in discussing problems relative to research in transportation flows in urban geography, argues that "unfortunately, much potentially useful research on flows is inhib-

ited or prevented by lack of adequate data."

These, and the other, divergencies of viewpoint that are apparent in this book suggest that it is difficult to reconcile much of our present Urban Research and Policy Planning efforts under the covers of one neatly organized volume. Indeed, at various points in the book, hints are droppped that the quality of our present-day academic research may be unduly complicating the already complex task facing the policy planners. Norton Long, for example, questions whether some of our current research in urban politics may not fall into this category by suggesting that "an ironic effect of the 'community power structure' literature has been to teach civil rights leaders to seek a confrontation with a putative white power structure" that may well be non-existent, or at least incapable of responding effectively to the kinds of demands which are placed upon it.

Despite the book's numerous inconsistencies, the quality of many of the individual articles is certainly high enough to warrant the careful attention of serious observers of the urban scene. In addition, the book does make it obvious that, in at least one crucial respect, the modern city is very decidedly being influenced by the products of modern research. Britton Harris emphasizes this fact in his discussion of "New Technology and Urban Planning." As Harris points out, such technological breakthroughs as the development of new power resources, more sophisticated techniques of microprocessing, new innovations in communications and computational capabilities, and recent advances in the biological sciences are all having a very decided impact on the modern metropolis. Thus, while many of us in the social sciences may be fascinated with the odd and the trivial, the scientific technicians are grinding ahead relentlessly, reshaping our cities for better or for worse. Perhaps in the future the social sciences will develop a more sophisticated capability to apply their own new technology to urban planning processes in a manner which Harris discusses. Books such as Urban Research and Public Policy make it clear, however, that we still have a long road to travel before we can expect any such development to take place.-Frank Smallwood, Dartmouth College.

Metropolitan America: Fiscal Patterns and Governmental Systems. By Alan K. Campbell and Seymour Sacks. (New York: The Free Press, 1967. Pp. xvi, 239. \$7.95.)

Political scientists in recent years have increasingly turned their attention to systematic (i.e., comparative and quantitative) analysis of the fiscal patterns of political systems. Perhaps this is a function of their new theoretical focus on system outputs, or, equally plausibly, it may be because state and local budgets (and national ones)

provide a gold mine of quantitative data, hitherto explored only by the economists. In this book, two distinguished students of metropolitanism, a political scientist and an economist, have brought together an enormous amount of data and a sophisticated methodology to explain variations in metropolitan fiscal behavior.

There are inevitably two vexing problems which confront anyone who hopes to explain municipal spending and taxing as dependent variables. First. problems arise out of the division of governmental labor between the state and local units. In 1962. for example, cities in New York made 77.8 per cent of the total state and local expenditures in that state, while the comparable figure for Vermont was 39.4 per cent. Because of these differing functional responsibilities, one would expect a city in New York to spend more than an exactly comparable city in neighboring Vermont. Campbell and Sacks deal with this difficulty by introducing as an independent variable an expenditure (and tax) assignment variable, i.e., the amount of state and local spending made by local governments Even reckoning with the state-local question, however, will not solve a second complexity, for even within the metropolitan area the incredible mosaic of municipal corporations and special districts leads to a varying pattern of expenditures and taxation. The latter problem can be reasonably well handled, as the authors do, by aggregating expenditures into larger units, for metropolitar areas as a whole, for central cities and for outside central city areas. Unfortunately, in doing so, one must make some inevitable compromises with the empirical world, for policy decisions are not made by these analytically useful aggregates, but by decision-makers in fragmented governmental units

The independent variables used in the analysis are for the most part the traditional ones used by economists in explaining variations in state and local spending—per capita income, density, percent urban, state aid, federal aid, and the authors' tax and expenditure assignment variable. If the goal in the expanding research on policy outputs is to maximize one's multiple correlations, then Campbell and Sacks have done better than anyone else. The coefficient of multiple determination (R^2) between these six independent variables and per capita expenditures of metropolitan areas is 914. Statistically speaking, this must stand as a high-water mark in the search for the determinants of fiscal variations.

While one should hesitate to quibble with such a disarmingly high multiple R, I nonetheless detect a troubling conceptual difficulty with these independent variables, one suggested by Ellio: Morss (in "Some Thoughts on the Determinants of State and Local Spending," National Tax Journal, March, 1966). Morss suggests that three kinds of theoretical concerns might justify efforts to

study the determinants of state and local spending levels: normative views about the value of spending patterns; efforts to predict outputs; or efforts to understand or explain fiscal levels. He argues, I think rightly, that variables like state and federal aid payments are handy predictor variables, but next to meaningless for purposes of explanation. Presumably, both Parkinson and the average taxpayer, sans data, might guess that the more money governments obtained, the more they spent. Campbell and Sacks' assignment variables seem more useful for prediction than for explanation. Political scientists who read Metropolitan America might wish that the authors had pushed their search for independent variables further back in the funnel of causality, to borrow a metaphor from the voting studies. The assignment variables might then have been used as control variables in partial correlation analysis.

Partly for this reason. I suspect that the book will find a wider audience among economists than among political scientists. It is clearly more in the tradition of economists like Brazer and Fabricant than in the newer political science literature stemming from the work of Dawson and Robinson and Dye, among others. It is similar to the latter research, however, in suggesting the overwhelming importance of economic (as opposed to political) variables in determining variations in municipal outputs. As the authors would readily concede, this might reflect the paucity of data on relevant political variables of cities. But what data on political variables they could utilize (e.g., measures of governmental fragmentation and of state interparty competition) were rejected in preliminary analysis as insignificant.

My conceptual quibble notwithstanding, this book reflects both excellent research and reasoned analysis-the methodological rigor one expects from an economist and the policy concerns of a political scientist. The implications for policy issues like metropolitan reorganization are spelled out in the final chapter. Interestingly, two measures of governmental fragmentation (area per government and population per government) showed no relation to fiscal variations. Income, however, emerged as second in importance only to the assignment variables in predicting spending and taxing. Since income plays such a dominant role in determining municipal spending, the immediate response might be to suggest that effective metropolitan reorganization would provide a broader resource base for the central city. Sober second thoughts, however, would note that fiscal levels are considerably lower in outside central city areas. Thus the latter areas might indeed exert a conservative drag on metropolitan spending if real metropolitan integration were to (magically) come about. A second public policy implication is no less important. Despite the concern (or

rhetoric) of some, federal and state aids are clearly not substitutive of local effort; if anything, they are stimulative. Increasing roles in tackling metro-problems by higher levels might be reasonably expected to produce spillover effects in the form of greater local initiative.—ROBERT L. LINEBERRY, University of Texas.

Metropolitan America: Challenge To Federalism.
By Bernard J. Frieden. (Washington: Advisory
Commission On Intergovernmental Relations,
1966. Pp. x, 176.)

This confused volume unwittingly offers a powerful insight into the character of our urban problems, for it reveals how badly understood those problems are at the highest levels of our governmental system. Based on proposals published by the Advisory Commission on Intergovernmental Relations during the period 1961-65, and pulled together by Professor Bernard J. Frieden, the report argues that inadequate public services, racial and economic segregation, fiscal imbalance, and other urban problems cannot be dealt with effectively because of the fragmented structure of government in our metropolitan areas. This fragmentation is caused not only by the multitude of local governments, but also by the many special district governments, state agencies and federal agencies that are now active in each of our metropolitan

To eliminate this near-chaos the Commission proposes a series of measures: the powers of local governments should be reduced; counties, metropolitan planning commissions and state governments should become more active; and the federal government should encourage co-operation and planning, as well as discourage the further growth of special district governments. Worked out in laborious detail, these notions produce some 53 recommendations, including a series on water supply and sewage problems, and a series proposing improvements in relocation procedures.

There is no denying that government in metropolitan areas is fragmented, of course, but that such fragmentation constitutes a "problem" for anyone but the people who write these kinds of reports is less self-evident. As the Commission recognizes, few residents of metropolitan areas pay much attention to reorganization proposals and, whatever inefficiencies there may or may not be, "Local governments . . . keep the metropolis running. They operate the schools, maintain the streets, take care of police and fire protection" (pp. 7-8). What, then, is the difficulty? In truth, it is impossible to tell, for this report rarely moves beyond the level of slogans in developing the criteria by which it determines that a "problem" exists. Inadequate services, particularly in the newly-developing suburbs, is said to be a major difficulty, but in the absence of any Commission criteria of "adequacy" in service levels, the charge has little meaning. "Poor co-ordination and conflicts of interest among governments often block effective action to deal with metropolitan problems," says the Commission (pp. 10-11), but again, we are not told what "effective" action would be, for what range of problems. Special districts are said to be both confusing and expensive, but the Commission presents neither evidence of confusion nor standards of "efficiency" in expenditure.

Absence of criteria which define adequacy and efficiency of governmental performance is crucial, for it marks the failure of the Commission to enunciate a philosophy of purpose from which performance standards might be derived. This failure is partly conscious, for the Commission adopts a "realistic" stance (pp. 33, 117) which prohibits proposals for radical change. A more important source of the failure, however, is the remarkable confusion which characterizes the Commission's perception of how the present system works. On the one hand, the Commission sees no sharp separation between levels of government in the metropolitan area. Indeed, the simultaneous operation of local, county, state and federal agencies in metropolitan areas is regarded as a source of confusion and thus a target for remedial action. Alongside this view, on the other hand, the Commission presents another, which stresses the independence of each level of government. The Commission's attack on the powers of local governments is in fact rationalized as an attempt to modify the "Home Rule" principle, which the Commission seems to think is equivalent to a grant of absolute independence from external control. Local officials will surely be surprised to learn of their excessive independence, and the nation's governors and state legislators will be equally surprised to learn that the influence of local officials stops at municipal boundaries.

This uneasy juxtaposition of two contrasting views of metroplitan reality undermines the Commission's recommendations, not only because it suggests a lack of comprehension, but also because it allows the Commission to evade the problem of devising a realistic strategy of reform. Availability of two images of reality enables the Commission to use first one image, then the other, as rationalization, without regard for the frequent contradictions thus created. The powers of local government should be reduced because municipalities are too independent, but strong local government should be preserved; state agencies are a source of confusion in metropolitan areas, but states should expand their activities; the federal government should retain an essentially advisory role, but it should use its grants-in-aid to force acceptance of metropolitan planning, whether or not local governments see any point to such planning. In the midst of such a grab-bag of ideas, undisciplined by consistency of viewpoint, the Commission's repeated claim to have developed a "philosophy" of Federalism must be regarded as pompous nonsense.

A few years ago, a report proposing the sort of organizational tinkering suggested by this Commission might have been dismissed as a harmless entertainment. After Watts, Harlem, Newark and Detroit, such a judgment seems entirely too charitable. Confused in its analysis, undisciplined in its proposals for change, and pompous in presentation, this report is itself a sign of how deep are the roots of our present urban crisis.—Thomas J. Anton, University of Stockholm.

American Federalism in Perspective. Ed. By Aaron Wildaysky. (Boston: Little, Brown & Company, 1967. Pp. ix, 277.)

When invited to write this review I accepted with alacrity, for a book under the above title by Aaron Wildavsky promised to be exciting. The volume in fact turned out to be in the best tradition of modern American publishing: that is, it is (1) a reader, (2) a paperback, and (3) comparatively cheap (as to the last I can only conjecture, for no price is given; but the publisher's intent to reach a wide audience seems clear). Wildavsky on American federalism as author and Wildavsky on the same subject as editor are of course two quite different things. It is the latter we have here; let us see what he has brought forth.

It is perhaps appropriate to begin with the editor's declaration of purpose, which is presented in his brief Introduction. Asserting that the literature of federalism is often polemical and the "debate" on the subject shopworn, he concludes (at p. ix): It seemed desirable, therefore, to concentrate on analysis, instructive both in its own right and as a better preparation for those interested in political dispute. Hence, the emphasis here is on conceptual clarity, empirical theory, and comparative analysis.

Presumably all readers, and especially those which are in any wise selective (as this one is), reflect the editor's point of view. It is well to have a statement of that view in the beginning.

In the pursuit of his goal Wildavsky has assembled 13 essays. They cover the period 1945 (two brief pieces) to 1966 (one), a long enough time span surely to provide at least reasonable longitudinal perspective. Seven of the essays were written in 1960 or later. One is an original contribution, the remainder are reprints. The comparative analysis sought by the editor is served by papers on aspects of federalism in Australia, Canada, Germany, and the United States, and by collateral cr incidental attention to practice around the world in other essays. Further, several of the papers whose titles promise no great breadth actually

achieve an ecumenism which raises them above provincial concerns. In sweep, then, the volume is wide indeed.

In coverage otherwise the book merits high rating—as far as it goes. Every essay is a worthy piece of scholarship in its own right, a judgment certified by the fact that all save one have been published previously. The authors, too, deserve the confidence of the reader, for among them are several of the scholars most active in the field of federalism in recent years. All this is to say that the editor has chosen well both contributors and contributions. If he has selected five essays from two sources (two from Arthur Macmahon's Federalism Mature and Emergent, three from the late Morton Grodzins' federalism workshop), his choices indicate only where and by whom much of the productive work has been done.

Yet there is to one reader an inexplicable omission from this otherwise wholly worthy anthology. A perspective, I had thought, is meant to provide a comprehensive view of the scene beheld, from near foreground to distant horizon. The far sight is here, but an essential element is-or seems to me to be-missing from the front yard. I refer to what has come to be called creative federalism, or by some (with a different emphasis) intergovernmental relations. Call it what you will, it is here, and it has drastically modified the practice of American federalism. Some observers maintain that it provides linkages necessary to the operation, and even the survival, of the federal system in the onrushing world of tomorrow; other damn it as the perversion of true federalism. But few indeed command the Olympian view which permits them to ignore it altogether. The addition of a single essay, whether critical or approving does not matter, on contemporary trends would, in one man's judgment, have converted a very good collection into an outstanding one.

A word now (but not a lugubrious word) on the seamy side. Those who write or arrange books must be forever mindful of the ancient truism that typesetters are the sworn enemies of authors. The only known sure way to escape destruction at their hands is to eschew publication. An alternative is to allow approximately as much time for proofreading as was devoted to writing. This must be done by the author (or editor), he being the only one who has the slightest interest in the internals of the book in the end. Another alternative-and of course the one most often adoptedis to let proofing slide—that is, to leave it to the reader to figure out what the writer meant. Normally this is not hard, but sometimes it places the consumer in double jeopardy. In the argot of the day, the proofreading here was not that bad; but it was not that good either.—Roscoe C. Martin, Syracuse University.

Behind the Shield: The Police in Urban Society. By Arthur Niederhoffer. (New York: Doubleday & Company, 1967. Pp. vi, 242. \$5.95.)

Quite simply, this book is worth reading because it offers interesting insights about a vital subject, police responses to social change. In their emphasis on education, these responses are similar to the predominant reactions of many others in a society characterized by rapid change. Because of this similarity Niederhoffer is correct in his contention that social scientists have for too long ignored the study of law enforcement. With a Ph.D. in sociology and twenty years as a New York police officer, Niederhoffer offers a unique perspective on the relationship between the police and their social milieu. In his opinion, "Police systems can be understood only as institutions in interaction with the rest of the social structure" (p. 12). Though other departments are mentioned, he focuses on the New York City department.

Using primarily the concepts of professionalism and cynicism, his analysis of this interaction is the book's most valuable contribution. Professionalism develops as a manifestation of law enforcement officials' attempts to adjust to social change. Cynicism is a characteristic almost inherent in police work. The author states that the cynicism developed in the young police officer is more permanent than the type characteristic of those trained in other professions.

The goals of professionalism include more education, greater specialization, a rigid code of ethics, and, more implicitly, a certain amount of secretiveness and cliquishness. He offers some interesting evidence to show that the achievement of some goals of professionalism may be declining. For example the number of college-graduate New York police recruits has greatly declined since 1940. Also, professionalized officers have often opposed the very changes professionalism is supposed to help them accept. In an analysis of the battle over the continuation of the New York City civilian review board, Niederhoffer demonstrates the effects of these less desirable ramifications of professionalism. Despite, and sometimes because of, the adoption of the standards of professionalism, the ethos of the police professionals is still often contrary to the goals of those advocating social change.

He defines cynicism as "diffuse feelings of hate and envy, impotent hostility, and the sour grapes pattern [which resembles Merton's concept of ressentiment] . . . in which the anomie of the police organization is reflected in the individual policeman" (pp. 93-94). Such anomie develops particularly when old values of a social system are supplanted by new ones. Consequently, professionalism may increase cynicism for at least two reasons. First, the ideals of professionalism are often

preached in an organization where the criteria for "good" police work are still based on the older values. Secondly, officers who best achieve some of professionalism's goals become impatient and thus more cynical about the lack of promotional opportunities than do other officers.

The book also offers a wealth of other information, from a discussion of the plight of the Jewish policeman to a much needed new look at the question of police authoritarianism. Unfortunately the author is not clear in his discussion of the relationship between police systems and the social structure. He does consider the public's perceptions of the status of police occupations as well as police perceptions of some of their social milieu. These considerations, however, are organized in a manner making it virtually impossible to discover what effect these factors have on police activities. He never systematically considers what constraints the public places on police behavior. A concluding chapter which more specifically considered these "outside" factors and their effect on police behavior would have improved his analysis.

He fails to use adequately his experience as a participant observer in an analysis of police behavior. The bulk of his empirical evidence about cynicism comes from a questionnaire administered to 220 New York City policemen. This sample includes men at virtually all stages of the police career. They really form the core of his study, but he chooses to use these men only to test the intensity of their cynicism and to some extent to test the relationship between cynicism and professionalism. No attempt is made to analyze the actual behavior of any of these men. His discussions of police activities (as opposed to police attitudes) are based on data not directly related to observations made of this 220-man sample. With his sample data he clearly establishes that cynicism exists, that it develops rapidly and permanently only after one joins the department, and that professionalism may increase cynicism. But he never explains the effects of cynical attitudes on this sample of police. One can only try to infer these effects from his other data, much of which is not taken from the New York department. As a result, he cannot show, for example, how this increase in cynicism affects actual behavior toward minority groups. An investigation of this question, as well as other questions involving police behavior, is certainly most vital to an understanding of police-social structural interactions.-NEAL MIL-NER, Grinnell College.

Corporate Management in a World of Politics; The Public, Political and Governmental Problems of Business. By Harold Brayman. (New York: McGraw-Hill Book Company, 1967. Pp. xii, 272, \$7.95.) Addressing himself to the management of large corporations, the author will bore the academic reader with his shorthand rationalizations of the business position, his recitation of current business tribulations, his easy optimism that ills can be cured by sound public relations. His grammar is popularized; his analysis is often superficial special pleading: his sycophancy can try the patient reader. But his prejudices are frank; his understanding of political forces and the meaning of political debate is often shrewder than that of many businessmen.

The central theme is that public opinion has become the great new force in politics, that public opinion is made by events and by the "communicators." These include, among others, journalists, commentators, script writers and academics, a rather mixed bag. The scheme gives relatively little credit to the substance of the public affairs dialogue and much to access, which may not endear the author to political scientists. Yet precisely the latter is one of his objectives. Unlike many politicians and most businessmen, he understands the influential role of the intellectual in our present-day politics. He admonishes businessmen to give highest priority to finding ways to communicate with the academic community. He has shown skill in organizing the interchange of ideas between business and professors at du Pont. where he served for many years as director of public relations. He is quite right that a scholar. or most any "communicator," seeking an audience in a business corporation will usually be turned over to a public relations man. Often this is a youngish man, product of a major in English, cross-pressured by a fancied role as office intellectual, well dressed and well paid; often big with the unborn American novel, and clearly not on the main career line to the top. For many of these reasons, the public relations man cannot serve the corporation well except in the routine dissemination of news releases. Nor does top management itself deal easily with intellectuals. Whether management can, by an effort of will, do better is not so easily argued. The differences in mode of discourse and style of thinking are hard to bridge. Such gaps are bridged by sensible people who want to do business together. But the intellectual does not necessarily want to do business with businessmen. The intellectual, on the whole, is bent not on understanding business but on competing with it as an influential élite in the political system,

So the author is correct to sound the alarum. His prescription, energetic top management leadership of the corporation's outside relationships, sounds reasonable. He lists the current attacks on business and provides tidy policy answers. But it rather seems as though he had the argument up-

side down. The attack is really on the autonomy of corporate management itself, more especially on the status and power corporate management enjoys in the political system. He is correct in saving that the academic knows little at firsthand about the large corporation. Academic faith in the wickedness of business does not need the inspiration of contact with reality. So one must discount the author's prescription of intelligent and diligent communication to reach the "communicators." Perhaps business will have to borrow from the experience of politics. The emerging élite may best be dealt with by making room at the top. Politicians are learning to do this with intellectuals. But in business only a few economists have reached top management in large banks. A few students of administration have consulting relationships with large industrial corporations. Occasional physical scientists and engineers turn up running their own corporations. Lawyers easily move over to senior management. Corporations often send executives back to the campus for "liberal" orientation. But making room for academic élites in management has not been thought of by the troubled writers of the business creed. Indeed, it still sounds like a silly idea and reminds one of Roosevelt's "Brain Trust."

Short of partial incorporation of the rival élite, business must assuredly learn to listen better than does this author. He would meet the challenge of "consumerism" by taking the lead in pollution abatement, drug policing, control of egregious advertising and so forth. But city air is probably cleaner than in a 19th century coal burning factory town. Drugs are safer than the conventional medicine of the 18th century or the wonderful nostrums of the 19th. Consumerism has blossomed in American politics, after innumerable false starts, only after the consumer was lavishly and durably served. Consumerism reflects not an increase in consumer hazards, but the failure of affluence to meet the aspirations of the liberal man. Having won the struggle for enough goods, enough choices, enough diversion, enough leisure, the consumer is frustrated precisely by his passive and essentially irresponsible role as consumer. The businessman, high priest of production, is therefore confronted with a more elusive and complicated dialogue than this book prepares him for. The book serves as an admirable example of the difficulty business discourse has in dealing with ideas in the political process.—Oliver Garceau, East Boothbay, Maine.

The American Chief Executive: The Presidency and the Governorship. By Joseph E. Kallen-Bach. (New York: Harper & Row, 1966. Pp. xii, 622.)

In writing this book, Professor Kallenbach had

an interesting and novel idea. He has provided a comparative treatment of the fifty-one chief executives who reign in the federal and state governments. The effort has been well worth it, since, to the full extent that his subject permits, the author has used the governorship to throw light on the presidency, and vice versa.

The net result, however, does not equate the two offices. Similar in form, they are so dissimilar in the range of their functions that the difference of degree virtually becomes a difference in kind. This can readily be seen by contrasting Parts 1 and 2 of this book with Part 3. In the two former, where the author discusses the "constitutional foundations" and then the "structure of the office," the governorships are amply analyzed and as much space appears to be devoted to them as to the presidency. But the subject-matter in places becomes tedious, as usually happens when one attempts to summarize all the systems prevailing in the various states and to detail the various exceptions to the various generalizations.

When Professor Kallenbach reaches Part 3, which is concerned with "Executive Power and Functions," he comes alive—as does his reader. At the same time, almost inevitably, the presidency takes over, and the governors for the most part receive short shrift. And, how could it be otherwise? The office which is invested with national political power, which is the object of the most intense inter-party rivalries, and which is at the same time the leader of the country—for good or ill—in its external relations, cannot fail to have deeper significance than any governorships. Only three or four of the latter truly encompass a range of problems whose depth and import admit meaningful comparison with those of the president.

In the course of this general analysis, the author offers some interesting judgments. He reminds his reader that the earliest governorships paved the way for the presidency as that office emerged in the Constitution, and that the latter has since presented a norm to which the state offices have tended more and more to approximate. Although, in theory, the states are sometimes considered as laboratories for experimentation, in practice the experimenting has been conducted within a much narrower scale than the opportunities permitted. Indeed, as Mr. Kallenbach notes, "fundamental variations in the organizational pattern and role of the chief executive were wider and more significant among the original 13 state governments than they are now..." (p. 242).

Professor Kallenbach considers the arguments which have been advanced in favor of altering the structure of the presidency and assimilating it to a cabinet-parliamentary system. He rejects this possibility, rightly and realistically, because he thinks that the American type of chief executive has be-

come such a part of our accepted tradition, and works on the whole so effectively, that drastic change in its character is out of the question. To this office, particularly at the federal level, he pays the deserved tribute that it has provided a focus for effective national leadership in public affairs.

Leadership, however, can have its dark or dangerous side. In the closing section of the book, the author peers into the future and observes the perils which arise increasingly from the aggrandizement of the military powers of the President and from the response to conditions of international crisis. Could even a form of Caesarism result from present tendencies, if extrapolated? These are not idle questions, especially since they are raised at a time when presidential action has led the country into a full-scale war which the Congress has never been asked to declare, and by gradual escalation has contrived to make support for executive actions politically synonymous with upholding the nation's honor.

Perhaps, these contemporary facts suggest an epilogue to this study of our chief executives. It is the salutary reminder that executive power exists in authoritarian regimes as well as in democracies. The key institution of government, however, which distinguishes democracy from dictatorship is the legislature, since there, and there alone, is the public forum for the continuous confrontation of the power to govern and the power to criticize.—Leslie Lipson, University of California, Berkeley.

Reorganizing Roosevelt's Government: The Controversy Over Executive Reorganization 1936-1939. By Richard Polenberg. (Cambridge, Massachusetts: Harvard University Press, 1966. Pp. viii, 275. \$5.95.)

The thesis of this book is that Franklin D. Roosevelt sought to order the structure of the welfare state he had fathered when he appointed the Brownlow Committee in 1936, and that the defeat of the Executive Reorganization Bill by the House of Representatives in 1938 after months of bitter controversy and with the crucial defection of more than one hundred of the two hundred and twenty-five who were members of the President's party, was a major setback and therefore a turning point in the history of the New Deal as a reform movement. On this defeat Polenberg approvingly quotes a New York World Telegram editorial to the effect that history would probably mark it as the crisis of FDR's political career, and Frank Gannett's comment that "It may be the turning point in our history" (pp. 175-176). According to Polenberg, "it was a shattering blow to Roosevelt's prestige. The vote indicated that the President had lost control of Congress" (p. 176). Again, "Nothing better illustrates the erosion of the New Deal than the contrast between Roosevelt's bold proposals of 1937 and the bland Reorganization Bill offered in 1939" (p. 185).

The thesis is advanced with fetching style but is unconvincing. First, historians are fond of spotting "turning points" and it is not clear why this defeat should be so regarded rather than FDR's 1937 defeat on Supreme Court reorganization, or, for that matter, the 1938 defeat in his effort to purge the Democratic party. Second, there is an implication that FDR's first term, through the 1936 elections, is the norm against which the President's relations with Congress and his party should be judged. But historians as well as political scientists regard the 1933-36 period as atypical, Third, FDR's ability to get significant legislation from Congress did not end with any of these three "turning points." For example, a few weeks before the April defeat of the Executive Reorganization Bill, the same Congress had enacted the second AAA; and a few weeks afterwards in June it enacted the Fair Labor Standards Act. Finally, the "bland Reorganization Bill" that became law in 1939, while different in major respects from the measure that failed, assured the development of the "institutionalized presidency." And, while it is customary to distinguish it from New Deal measures, repeal of the Arms Embargo in late 1939 points to the dominance that marked FDR's leadership of Congress and his party throughout the years of the

There is an elaborate apparatus of historical documentation. Forty-nine pages are filled with more than eight hundred references to items in fifteen pages of bibliography covering published documents, newspapers, biographies, books, articles, and unpublished manuscript papers of Congressmen. Senators, advocates and opponents, and various Government papers. Noticeably absent, but apparently unavoidably so, are any papers of two key Democaratic opponents of the Brownlow Report-Senator Harry F. Byrd of Virginia and Representative James Buchanan of Texas. An interview with Louis Brownlow in 1962 and one with Henry A. Wallace in 1963 are referred to briefly, and there is also some indication that James A. Farley was interviewed. The book is carefully indexed.

The chapters on the sources of opposition and the legislative conflict are impressive in the detail of the findings. But Polenberg's interpretation, especially of autonomous agency-legislator-interest group subsystems that successfully opposed the president, is weak. This was heady stuff for political scientists when the first Inter-University Case Program studies began to circulate nearly twenty years ago in mimeographed form, and when they were first compiled and published, Harold Stein.

ed., Public Administration and Policy Development (1952). The relating of these kinds of data to a theory of the political process dates at least from David B. Truman, The Governmental Process (1951), and J. Leiper-Freeman, The Political Process: Executive Bureau-Legislative Committee Relations (1955). Further, Polenberg's interpretation is cut to a pattern that sees white-hat liberals and black-hat reactionaries joined in battle; this was a battle that the guys in the white-hats lost. Such an interpretation, while perhaps engaging. overrides known complexities. That there were many stakes in the various proposals and counter-proposals for reorganization was clearly expounded bv Schuvler Wallace. FederalDepartmentalization: A Critique of Theories of Organization (1941).

Polenberg's volume may be regarded as a sequel to one published in 1963 by the same university press, Executive Reorganization and Reform in the New Deal: The Genesis of Administrative Management, 1900-1939, by Barry Dean Karl. Together they document an important controversy during Franklin D. Roosevelt's second term. Karl looks at the Brownlow Committee in relation to antecedents in the administrative management movement that emerged at the beginning of the twentieth century. Polenberg looks at the defeat of the Committee's proposals in 1938 and subsequent passage of the Reorganization Act of 1939. Karl's treatment is more compatible than Polenberg's with that of Schuyler Wallace. Karl's volume is based on his 1961 doctoral dissertation in history at Harvard ("Twentieth Century Concepts in Public Administration: Merriam, Brownlow, and Gulick") and was awarded the 1963 Faculty Prize of Harvard University Press. Polenberg's is based on his 1964 doctoral dissertation in history at Columbia ("Franklin D. Roosevelt and the Reorganization Controversy: 1936-1939").-MALCOLM B. Parsons, The Florida State University.

Presidential Vetoes: 1792-1945. By Carlton Jackson. (Athens, Georgia: University of Georgia Press, 1967. Pp. x, 254. \$8.00.)

During the period 1792-1945, 1,762 vetoes were handed down by twenty-five different Presidents. Of these vetoes, only fifty-eight were over-ridden by Congress. During this same period, seven Presidents, John Adams, Thomas Jefferson, John Quincy Adams, Martin Van Buren, William Harrison, Zachary Taylor, and Millard Fillmore chose not to exercise their veto power.

Prior to 1870, the Presidential veto power was exercised only eighty-five times; thus Professor Jackson is able to give each of these vetoes individual attention. With few exceptions, he approaches each veto in the same way. He presents the necessary background information followed by

the President's stated reasons for vetoing the measure, the Congressional reaction to the veto, and the popular reaction as recorded in major national newspapers. Finally, after indicating whether or not the veto was sustained, he compares this veto with those previously considered. One gets the distinct impression that nearly every President expanded or redefined the use of the veto power in some way. For example, Andrew Jackson was the first President to use the veto power as an instrument to mold public opinion. Use of the veto enabled Jackson to play the intermediary between the people and the Congress. In fact, Jackson's veto of the Bank Rechartering Bill of 1832 was a major factor in his re-election. On the negative side, Jackson was the only President to use the veto "as an instrument of personal malice" (p. vii); his Maysville veto of an internal improvement proposal, ostensibly based on grounds of Constitutionality and national expediency, really was motivated by bitter feelings toward Henry Clay.

After the Civil War, the great number of pensions and private relief bills which inundated Congress forced both the President and Congress to alter their procedures for handling vetoed bills. When the President could no longer give personal attention to each bill, cabinet members and other subordinates made the final decisions on whether or not bills should be vetoed. Congress, finding it could no longer take a formal vote, simply referred many vetoed bills to committees where they were permitted to die.

From 1870 on, Professor Jackson groups the Presidents in an attempt to discover major themes within their administrations. The vetoes of Grant, Hayes, and Arthur fall into four distinct groups: (1) vetoes of private bills relating to the Civil War, (2) vetoes in defense of the gold standard, (3) vetoes to protect the executive authority from Congress, and (4) vetoes to prevent strict immigration laws. The Presidents from 1885 to 1909 cast most of their important vetoes with regard to the protection of the Treasury against unwarranted intrusions and the maintenance of personal principles. Then Taft and Wilson manifested such an unyielding posture on matters of principle that their vetoes evoked bitter reactions in Congress. The vetoes of Harding, Coolidge, and Hoover, like those of Pierce and Buchanan, were out of touch with the times. They dealt primarily with pensions, farm relief, Government competition with private industry, general relief, and Philippine independence.

The last chapter of this book is devoted to the vetoes of Franklin Roosevelt. Roosevelt handed down a record 631 vetoes. He also began the practice of returning vetoes to Congress en masse, and on one occasion he personally delivered his veto

message to a joint session of Congress. FDR was similar to Jackson in his pragmatic and occasionally inconsistent use of the veto. In addition, both Roosevelt and Jackson used the veto as an instrument to stir up popular support.

For the sake of continuity, it would have been helpful if Professor Jackson had prefaced his book with a survey of the thoughts of the men who inserted the veto provision into the Constitution. This might have demonstrated, as Edward Corwin pointed out, that the veto was seldom used as the framers had anticipated. In addition, more discussion might have been devoted to the reasons why seven Presidents chose not to use the veto, and some attention could have been given to the vetoes which were written since 1945. Finally, from the standpoint of the political scientist, it would seem that the major theme of this book would have been clarified if the book had been organized in a functional rather than chronological order. By the same token, it would have been of immense value if Professor Jackson had provided a concluding chapter uniting the minor themes. As it is, the book stops abruptly at 1945, and the reader is left to draw his own conclusions. In sum, although the major theme is almost lost in the over-abundance of minor details. Presidential Vetoes contains many interesting and informative episodes concerning Presidential vetoes.—Robert J. Kulisheck, University of Iowa.

The Truman-MacArthur Controversy and the Korean War. By John W. Spanier. (New York: W. W. Norton & Company. 1965. Pp. viii, 311. \$1.85.)

This is a second edition, although not labeled as such, of the same work published under the same title by the Harvard University Press (see this Review, March 1960).

In this edition, Professor Spanier's dual objectives remain the same as in the original: first, to analyze "the basic decisions which American policy-makers had to make during the Korean War" in order to set the stage for his more fundamental and second purpose, an analysis of "the problems of civil-military relations during a limited war." Mr. Spanier identifies these decisions as follows: the initial one, "to repel the North Korean invasion by force; . . . the neutralization of Formosa; the Inchon landing; the crossing of the 38th Parallel; the 'home by Christmas' offensive; the decision not to extend the war to China after Communist China's intervention; to condemn Peking as an aggressor; and MacArthur's dismissal."

Each of these decisions is thoroughly and reasonably considered. The objectives and the objections, the frustrations and the fears, Korean strategy and global implications, international relations and domestic politics, the roles of the military

field commander and his superiors at home—all is woven into a single fabric. Washington started out with the limited objective of pushing the North Koreans back across the 38th Parallel. However, after MacArthur's success at Inchon, Washington was perfectly willing to buy his views and attempt to unite Korea by military force. Then it returned to its original position after MacArthur reached the Yalu River and Communist China intervened. Vacillation with respect to basic policy hardly makes the task of the field commander easy. In spite of this, it is supposed to be a cardinal sin in the military not to follow the lawful orders of one's superiors. In instance after instance, Spanier indicates that MacArthur was either incapable of or unwilling to follow the policies of his Commander-in-Chief. In fact, he even issued public statements which contradicted Presidential policy. In this context, the question of who was right and who was wrong is irrelevant. The only question that is relevant is who was President-Truman or MacArthur. No one could possibly picture President Truman as a vassal; it is not surprising that he exercised his constitutional prerogative and relieved the General. What is surprising, and perhaps indicative of MacArthur's psyche, is that the General could have expected any other outcome.

The main issues raised by the Truman-MacArthur controversy are the recognition that "nuclear bombs have outmoded total war as suicidal and made the world safe only for limited wars," and the maintenance of civilian supremacy over the military during a limited war crisis. Although these problems are discussed throughout the book, they are central to the first and last chapters; they are the chapters that have been revised in this edition and they are also the best and most significant.

Mr. Spanier is convincing in his argument that military considerations for a total victory must not be permitted to dominate political considerations for limited victory. He observes that the enemy would not accept total defeat and thus would escalate what was originally a limited war into a total war. But he is less convincing in depicting MacArthur's dismissal as the "first real test" of the doctrine of civil supremacy over the military authority. Spanier himself notes that the State Department and the Defense Department were in agreement on the relationship between military strategy and political objectives. He also notes that President Truman relied more on Generals Bradley, Vandenberg, and Collins, and Admiral Sherman (the Joint Chiefs), rather than on Secretary of State Acheson, when presenting the Administration's case at the Senate hearings. While the State Department and the Joint Chiefs were in agreement, Spanier doesn't present evidence as to who influenced whom; it is possible,

then, in this context also to conclude that the civil authority emerged as merely the arbiter between two military authorities, rather than the master of both. Would the President have been able to prevail if the Joint Chiefs and the field commander had been in agreement and both in opposition to the State Department? What may be concluded is that even a politically strong and popular field commander as MacArthur cannot withstand the combined will of a determined President supported by the Defense Establishment and the State Department. But this is not the "first real test" even in this limited view: President Lincoln had trouble with his generals, too, and dismissed a number of field commanders until he found one to his liking.—Felix Rackow, Case Western Reserve University.

Charles Evans Hughes: Politics and Reform in New York, 1905-1910. By ROBERT F. WESSER. (Ithaca, New York: Cornell University Press, 1967. Pp. ix, 366. \$8.50.)

The name of Charles Evans Hughes is forever linked to the odious appelation of "the nine old men." This study, focusing only upon the gubernatorial years, explains clearly why this man never attained the stature of a great political figure. Hughes trained for the ministry, took up law, and then made a reluctant entry into politics. As a public investigator, in 1906, he gained widespread attention by uncovering misdeeds of insurance companies in the State of New York. Because of this prominence as a reformer, and the party's need for a new face, Hughes received the nomination as the Republican choice for governor. He was a hesitant candidate, having once declined to run for mayor of New York City: but with the able assistance of Theodore Roosevelt, Hughes defeated the Democratic "prophet of unrest," William Randolph Hearst.

During the tenure as Governor of New York, Hughes tried to implement reforms, secure regulatory legislation, and further the cause of clean government. Hughes' "independence of character" and dedication to the general welfare were noteworthy, but the Governor's lack of political acumen was a distinct liability. He failed to gain control of his party and, in fact, seemed to disdain working with key political leaders in the state legislature. Instead of using the political machinery at his disposal, Governor Hughes relied far too much upon public opinion. The results of this approach proved disappointing as far as legislative achievements were concerned. Hughes did not supplement his moral fervor with the political maneuvering needed to assure success. He failed to provide party leadership and, because of his aloofness, the Governor did not impress Theordore Roosevelt as potential material for the presidency.

Charles Evans Hughes was not temperamentally suited to the hurly-burly of politics. Despite his good intentions and stoic-like exterior, he, as the author substantiates, "never quite emerged as an assertive force." Theodore Roosevelt was distinctly disappointed in his amateurishness, calling it "mugwumpism." The President placed the mantle of succession upon William Howard Taft in 1908 instead of selecting the New York Governor. Hughes ran for a second term, winning by a plurality of 69,000, while Taft won New York's presidential electors by a margin of 203,000. Hughes seemed to have learned little from his first term. He continued to alienate party leaders, refused to use patronage to his advantage, and continued the practice of uttering moral preachments without commensurate political activity to attain legislative objectives. In 1910, Hughes admitted privately that he was "tired" of politics. He notified President Taft, "I do not dare to run the chance of breaking down mentally. I must get out." His escape from politics came that same year when a vacancy on the Supreme Court allowed Taft to nominate him for the position. With the Republican party in disarray, the stage was set for the defeat of Henry L. Stimson in 1910.

Charles Evans Hughes preferred the quiet atmosphere of the high court. He had one more political date with destiny in 1916; but after narrowly missing the presidency, Hughes served as Secretary of State and then received another appointment to the Supreme Court—this time as the Chief Justice. In that capacity he asserted his leadership only once, and that was after Franklin D. Roosevelt threatened to strip the Court of its power of judicial review.

This monograph, although narrow in scope, is an extremely valuable study. It reveals concisely why high-minded men sometimes fail in the realm of politics. By making judicious use of the papers of Hughes, and those associated with him politically, as well as utilizing the Roosevelt correspondence, the author presents a factual record of the period in question. The picture of Hughes that emerges is that of a legal-minded moralist who never completely understood the mechanics of professional politics. It was obvious from this fine work that Charles Evans Hughes was a good man who lacked the necessary requirements for statesmanship.—Frederick H. Schapsmeier, Wisconsin State University, Oshkosh.

Back to Back: The Duel between FDR and the Supreme Court. By Leonard Baker. (New York: The Macmillan Company, 1967. Pp. 311. \$6.95.)

This is the first book on the Roosevelt Court-packing fight since Alsop and Catledge's *The 168 Days*, published in 1938. Like them, the present

author is also a journalist, and the book has the virtues and defects of a journalistic account. Baker has the advantage of almost thirty years of perspective and accumulated historical data, and he has utilized the papers, among others, of Borah, Hughes, Morgenthau, Norris, and of course Roosevelt. The surprising thing is how comparatively little new light has thereby been thrown on this historic controversy.

The principal new material has to do with Herbert Hoover's ill-fated effort to use the affair for refurbishing his image. According to an unnamed Republican "prominent in the Court dispute" whose papers Baker saw but whose name he agreed not to mention, Hoover was unwilling to accept the Republican strategy of allowing dissident Democrats to kill the plan. Hoover was the first front-line Republican to deliver a public speech attacking the proposal. At the same time he commissioned an agent to go to Washington and urge Brandeis to retire and then make a speech against the Court plan. If this scheme worked, Hoover proposed to take credit for masterminding it. Actually other people had already made this suggestion to Brandeis. In any case, Hoover's emissary, who did not know Brandeis personally, made the hilarious faux pas of going to see Justice McReynolds, who had not spoken civilly to Brandeis for years, and asking him to suggest to Brandeis that he resign, McReynolds sent the hapless agent on to see the Chief Justice, who declined to get involved. He then wound up his mission with Senator Borah and offered Hoover's help in lining up the country, but Borah replied that he hoped Hoover would stay out of the fight entirely. Baker concludes that Hoover was "the first political casualty of the Court fight.'

For general readers Baker has told one of America's great political stories interestingly and well. Only the captious will be bothered by reference to the income tax decision as occurring in 1885 or to Adkins v. Children's Hospital as involving a state minimum wage law.—C. HERMAN PRITCHETT, University of Chicago.

Earl Warren: A Political Biography. By Leo Katcher. (New York: McGraw-Hill Book Company, 1967. Pp. 502. \$8.50.)

At first I was not sure that Leo Katcher's biography of Earl Warren merited review in the A.P.S.R., but since the book has received a good deal of acclaim, much of which may not be warranted, a few comments should be raised.

Katcher has put an amazing amount of energy into researching the life of Warren and presents the reader with some good insights, especially during the earlier period of Warren's life when he manifested a strong conservative philosophy cut from the mold of Herbert Hoover. One would

have hoped that the overall endeavor could have resulted in a product not unlike Alpheus Mason's books Brandeis: A Free Man's Life and Harlan Fiske Stone, Pillar of the Law. The Katcher book, however, falls far short of this mark. This is not attributable to the energy which went into the research and the writing of the book; rather, it is because of the imprecision and sloppy manner in which some of the data are handled. The book simply is filled with a number of factual mistakes and erroneous interpretations of judicial decisions. Admittedly, a reviewer can become intoxicated with "nit-picking" thereby destroying the purpose of the review, but in the case of this political biography the mistakes are of sufficient magnitude to significantly detract from the book as a whole.

What the Katcher book needed was a legal editor who could bring some precision and interpretation to those aspects of the book requiring more than a journalist's understanding of the law. Indeed the blame for this spoilization of what could have been a fine piece of work may not rest with Katcher at all. It more appropriately may be attributed to McGraw-Hill for not giving Katcher more assistance in this area. Katcher cannot, however, escape the responsibility of certain journalistic writing habits that have an annoying impact upon the reader. For instance, upon Warren's ascendency to the Supreme Court, Katcher notes that within a year "Warren was a peacock among sparrows." If a reviewer were to take the same liberties in comparing Katcher's book with that of other political biographies of Supreme Court justices. Katcher could be characterized as an Edgar Guest in a room full of Longfellows. Obviously neither of these analogies is well-founded. In sum, Earl Warren, A Political Biography makes for enjoyable reading, but it must be read with a very careful eye.—CLIFFORD M. LYTLE, University of Arizona.

The Roots of Isolationism: Congressional Voting and Presidential Leadership in Foreign Policy. By Leroy N. Rieselbach. (Indianapolis: The Bobbs-Merrill Company, 1966. Pp. xvi, 240, \$2.95.)

This fine study is an analysis of roll-call votes, principally concerning foreign aid and foreign trade, in the House of Representatives. The data come from four Congresses, the 76th, 80th, 83rd, and 85th; a research design which yields a twenty-year time base and four different combinations of partisan control of the White House and Capitol Hill. Professor Rieselbach has organized the roll-call data into Guttman scales to determine the extent of "isolationism," "moderation," and "internationalism" in these Congresses. Social, political, and constituency characteristics are related to these three forms of roll-call behavior by means of

correlation and time series analyses.

Professor Rieselbach finds that isolationism is a multidimensional phenomenon. "On the whole the data of this study show that isolationism cannot be explained in terms of any one factor, that its correlates are not fixed but rather change in response to alterations in the political and legislative situations, and that at any given time the shape of isolationism may differ with respect to different issues. There are different 'isolationisms' at different times and on different subjects." In the 76th Congress, isolationism was associated with the Republican party and internationalism with the Democratic party. Beginning with the 80th Congress for foreign aid, and with the 83rd Congress for foreign trade, there was a damping of the sharp inter-party division on foreign policy with coastal Republicans shifting toward internationalism and southern Democrats shifting toward isolationism. In a postscript, Professor Rieselbach notes a re-emergence of Republican isolationism and Democratic internationalism in the 88th Congress.

Few personal attributes were found to be consistently related to foreign policy voting behavior, but Catholicism, a business background, election from a competitive district, and service on the Foreign Affairs Committee were frequently associated with internationalism. These personal factors were better predictors if they tended in the same direction as the broad political forces operating at the time in question. Constituency characteristics, on the other hand, were consistently related to roll-call votes. After the end of the straight inter-party contests on foreign aid and foreign trade, eastern, high ethnic (over 1% born in Germany or Ireland), high education, urban, and high socio-economic districts were significantly more likely to send internationalists to the House of Representatives.

Professor Rieselbach has made a thorough canvass of the literature on isolationism and has related his own findings to it. This feature makes his book a particularly useful contribution to a cumulatively developing body of knowledge. Throughout one finds such helpful footnotes as: "This finding is in direct contrast to that of Smuckler ("The Region of Isolationism," pp. 399-400) who found a negative relationship between high education and internationalist voting. Our data tend to support the findings of much survey research that internationalism and high education are positively correlated. Again, we should note the possibility that the difference in the findings results from different procedures in measuring educational levels."

Whether one finds inconsistencies in the analysis of this complex subject matter depends on how one reads the author's many propositions. For example, Proposition 2-1 states "There exist in Con-

gress clusters of issues, foreign and domestic, which are sufficiently distinguishable to be considered as distinct segments of congressional activity." Proposition 2-2 says "Beyond foreign aid and foreign trade, there can be no constant definition of the content of congressional isolationism." This seems illogical if foreign issues constitute a "distinct segment of congressional activity." However, the first proposition rests upon a table giving correlations between scales representing four different policy domains in four different Congresses, correlations reflecting relationships between some 47,000 individual votes. If these data are taken as evidence which simply confirms the proposition, then there is inconsistency. But if the correlations are recognized as subtle and complex statements in a probabilistic argument and the proposition is regarded as a less refined summary statement, the only inconsistency is that caused by the inability of a single sentence to capture all the rich detail of a correlation matrix.

The limitations to this study result from the use of bivariate technique to study a multivariate phenomenon. The two-by-two relationships identify the variables associated with isolationism, but the analysis does not go very far beyond that point. It is hard to understand why Professor Rieselbach did not take the natural step into multivariate analysis, especially since he presents bivariate correlations and percentage distributions (but not correlations) with one or more controls applied. If he had told us what happened to the correlations when controlled with appropriate test factors, his statements about the relative influence of independent variables ("Political variables seem to be stronger than social forces when they push in opposite directions.") could have been strengthened.

Both the weaknesses and the strengths of this study as a contribution to political science are derivative from its focus on foreign policy voting behavior. Because of the weak negative association in this policy domain between constituency attitudes and congressional voting pointed out by Miller and Stokes, and because of the well-known presidential preeminence on foreign policy, such data are not very good general evidence about congressional voting or presidential-congressional relations. However, there is also a fast-developing professional interest in the domestic sources of foreign policy. And on this, his chosen topic, Professor Rieselbach has much to say and says it very well.—John H. Kessel, Allegheny College.

Sectional Stress and Party Strength: A Study of Roll-Call Voting Patterns in the U.S. House of Representatives, 1836-1860. By Thomas B. ALEXANDER. (Nashville: Vanderbilt University Press, 1967. Pp. xvii, 284. \$10.00.) At a time when the ICPR is training historians in empirical techniques and amassing historical data for analysis, Thomas B. Alexander's book should be a welcome addition to the work done by Joel Silbey and William O. Aydelotte. Unfortunately it is not. Seemingly enchanted with the ability to analyze pre-Civil War roll call votes in the United States House on the University of Alabama's computer he neglects to tie his findings into any sort of meaningful interpretation of the politics of the period. Indeed, the bulk of the book—220 out of 280 pages—is devoted to presentation of scalograms, graphs, computer printout, and computer programs rather than text.

Alexander's primary goal is to examine sectional and party splits in Congress in the twenty-four years preceding the Civil War. To do this roll calls from only the first session or from special sessions preceding the first regular session were used as the basic data; roll calls for the second session were omitted because the sessions were "lame duck" and "since a substantial proportion of the House membership failed to return to the subsequent Congress, the element of personal attitude or even frustration might enter more freely into decision-making in the 'lame-duck' sessions" (pp. 3-4). The Representatives were divided by section-New England, Middle Atlantic, South Atlantic, South Central, Northern Northwest and Southern Northwest (composed of the southern sections of Illinois, Indiana and Ohio)—and by party. The 268,000 individual roll call votes were Guttman-scaled into scalable sets and analyzed in terms of section and party.

In examining each of the twelve sessions of Congress from 1836-60 Alexander finds that only two scalable sets of roll call votes appear with any continuity, economic considerations and slavery involvements. The extent to which the issues formed unidimensional scales purposively rather than through random chance is an issue to be raised since the economic issues facing the 24th Congress involved such unrelated topics as the location of a national military foundry. Bank of the United States, Cumberland Road construction, tariff reduction, and Michigan and Arkansas statehood. Alexander's treatment of the Cumberland Road votes is curious since they are included as economic issues in the 24th Congress, dropped in the 25th "because local interest dominated the positions more than party or sectional interest" (p. 26), and re-included in the 26th Congress.

After examining economic and slavery issues for each session Alexander concludes that prior to 1850 party was the far more salient factor in voting in the House although sectional differences were beginning to arise. After 1850, however, the Democratic party position on economic and slavery matters began to conform to southern sectional

attitudes. "By the mid-1850's the consequence of this fusion of southern and Democratic position on economic matters, reinforcing a comparable blending on slavery concerns, had cost the northern Democrats so dearly in political appeal that the demise of the party in New England and its virtual elimination throughout the upper north was immediately to follow" (p. 110). While the data support this conclusion it is unfortunate that Alexander did not attempt to relate shifts in party positions with party activities outside of Congress for that same period. Or failing this, far more could have been done in analyzing the more than a quarter-million roll call votes. Alexander must have realized this; in a footnote in his concluding chapter he states:

It is not the purpose of this appraisal to pursue all relevant conclusions that might be indicated by the roll-call analyses offered. One of the reasons for making available these data and the patterns exposed by certain research designs is to furnish conveniently prepared information for use by students of the period. This appraisal seeks only to explore some of the promising avenues for question framing and further investigation (footnote 1, p. 110).

Under these circumstances Sectional Stress and Party Strength may have its greatest value as a kind of pre-Civil War version of America Votes for the House of Representatives.—James J. Best, University of Washington.

Water Research. Ed. By Allen V. Kneese and Stephen C. Smith. (Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins Press, 1966. Pp. 508. \$12.50.)

Northern California's Water Industry. By Joe S. Bain, Richard E. Caves and Julius Margolis. (Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins Press, 1966. Pp. xvii, 729. \$15.00.)

For political scientists, public investment theory focuses on a central concern of the discipline—power in the service of purpose. Normative in its basic premises, this body of theory draws attention to the need for designing decisional frameworks which optimally promote the public interest. The challenge posed by such theory to fruitful collaboration between "neutral" empiricists and normative institutionalists is a formidable one. Sadly, the tension between these, for all its potential benefits, has often yielded little in the way of viable results.

Both volumes suggest new areas in which political scientists of varying persuasions may labor with profit. The collection edited by Kneese and Smith consists of 26 papers originally presented at the seventh Western Resources Conference by scholars working in the physical and social sciences. It includes Bains' condensed summary of the larger, separately published, opus.

Attempting to cope meaningfully with issues raised by the presence of "public goods" and eco-

nomic externalities (an index of current preoccupation with environmental quality), several participants call for a restructuring of traditional interest-group politics. Their essays describe a continuum of estrangement from the pluralist model. The range embraces Irving Fox's plea for a more public-oriented alignment of forces representing mixtures of centralized and decentralized perspectives to Hubert Marshall's, and Bain, Caves and Margolis' (BC&M) a-political recipe for rational resources policy. Fox endeavors to confer greater leverage on politically disadvantaged groupings by changes in organizational and intergovernmental relationships.

Infatuated by claims for disinterested professionalism, Marshall and the California study group opt out of politics and advocate a transfer of decision-making responsibility almost exclusively to impartial panels of experts. While "nonpolitical solutions" may be highly politic in some situations, the proposed schemes are neither feasible nor sufficiently sensitive responses to the complexities and subtleties (note Gilbert White's remarks) of resources problems to warrant serious consideration. Marshall's reliance on economists to rectify distorted agency benefit-cost ratios reflects a misreading of the professional pulse. Increasingly, economists are becoming critical of the undue concentration on economic efficiency as the summum bonum. Striving to incorporate more elusive psychological dimensions in their analysis, they have fashioned the concept of option demand as a substitute for demand expressed through the market-place. But this tool, admittedly vague and imprecise, has hardly won widespread acceptance. Professional debate will doubtless increase in intensity on the suitability of measures of willingness to pay (or their surrogates), and the parameters of option demand (conflicting treatments of this problem appear in papers by Knetsch and Davis, and Davidson, Adams and Seneca). Further disagreement among economists will probably emerge from a heightened awareness of the salience of "intrasystem and intersystem trade-offs" (Smith). Krutilla's piece, for example, on the Columbia River Treaty alludes to external political factors which may have influenced the negotiations, even though these elements remain outside his analytical structure.

BC&M need not have skewered themselves on the rusty "Board of Review" idea if they had studied the prospective impact of legislative reapportionment, desalination for the urban coastal region and consequent shifts in water-related values. To be sure, BC&M observe that "various fragments of evidence, not previously discussed, suggest the forthcoming possibilities of rivalry and effective alternatives. One such element is the rapid increase in the number of retailing agencies

with economical access to alternative sources of water" (p. 497). Surprisingly, this insight is never really cranked into their prescriptive analysis. Inasmuch as technological advance (note impact of improvements in pumping technology on political behavior in 1890's, p. 431) may work its greatest influence on growing urban areas which traditionally have displayed most anxiety over anticipated shortages, misallocations of scarce resources may not be as troublesome a problem in the future. Under these conditions, a polycentric political system, as described earlier by Vincent Ostrom in this Review, may function quite rationally in the public interest. The authors, however, are too fixated on the idea of scarcity to allow for sufficient degrees of freedom in their theoretical formulation. Indeed, the evidence which they themselves adduce to demonstrate this overriding fear of water famine is not entirely consistent. BC&M point out that many water districts have failed aggressively to pursue new sources of supply (see especially material on Santa Clara and Sonoma counties). Several have willingly traded water for cash. Some "potential customers wishing to defer a decision" have been threatened by the State development authority. Most disappointing in this regard is the absence of discussion on patterns of conduct and performance in the amply-endowed North Coastal Region. BC&M deserve praise for eschewing the simplistic Milliman-Hirshleifer approach, recognizing the externalties problem, and for proceeding along "behavioral" lines when economic data were unavailable. But it is unfortunate that their rich lode of political observations was not sifted and ordered by a political scientist.

Normative perspectives may open new paths for empirical research. In turn, empirical analysis can test the viability of proposals drafted to realize more transcendent interests. Arthur Maass couples these differing orientations in assailing welfare economics for its almost exclusive preoccupation with the objective of economic efficiency. He insightfully suggests that the secondary benefit methodology issue may be more effectively handled by explicitly confronting the existence of multiple objectives. In a daring paper which probes the capacity of the legislative process to furnish systems analysts with a specific set of objectives against which to evaluate alternative projects, he has accumulated evidence of trade-offs among various goals in the urban renewal and interstate highway fields. Maass would be the first to acknowledge the relative crudity of his technique and the difficulty of deriving acceptable inputs from the political sector (Fox and Robert Davis are far more sceptical). Hopefully, this pioneering attempt to associate empirical analysis and normative theory will inspire still more sophisticated efforts by other scholars. Ultimately, it may prove possible to understand the nature of the rigidities in the social environment and to find the means to surmount them.—Ashley L. Schiff, State University of New York at Stony Brook.

The Politics of Federal Aid to Education in 1965: A Study in Political Innovation. By Philip Meranto. (Syracuse, New York: Syracuse University Press, 1967. Pp. xiii, 144. \$3.25.)

Professor Meranto's argument is that changes in several interrelated factors converged in 1965 to enable Congress to enact a general aid to education bill. He concludes that it is not possible to rank these factors "systematically in order of importance."

Passage of the 1965 Act is regarded as political innovation that was induced in part by such "environmental changes" as the rediscovery of poverty, a metropolitan trend and the civil rights movement. Such "demand articulators" as the President, political parties, organized interests and constituents underwent changes sufficient to contribute also to the momentum for the bill's success. Finally, changes within the House of Representatives, namely a larger Democratic majority on the Education and Labor Committee, Graham Barden's replacement by Adam Clayton Powell as committee chairman, and enlargement of the Rules Committee, facilitated the task of enacting aid-to-education legislation.

The strength of Professor Meranto's book lies in the clear exposition of the necessary conditions for a legislative breakthrough. There is a convincing grasp of how those non-congruent sub-issue conflicts that for years had paralyzed Congress in this policy area finally and one-by-one were surmounted. Quite importantly (and somewhat rare for a legislative case study) there is a demonstration of detailed understanding of the end product as substantive policy and of its relationship to the activity that produced it. For these virtues the book is a scholarly contribution.

Aside from a few minor embarrassments that should have been corrected in proof—incorrect references to the "House Subcommittee on Education" (p. 36) and the "House Committee on Education and Welfare" (p. 53), and repeated allusion to voting "blocks" (p. 86 et seq.)—there appear to be two weaknesses. These are a misapplication of systems analysis, and a disturbing reluctance to even try to determine the relative importance of the independent variables.

Systems analysis as I understand it enables one to abstract sets of behavior (along with their antecedents and consequences) that are interrelated and have meaning analytically, but whose boundaries as a system do not necessarily correspond to the boundaries of concrete entities, such as institutions. When the boundaries of the analytical sys-

tem are simply those of an institution which is the real object of analysis, then the language of the systems approach may degenerate into blague, and otherwise lucid arguments may become unnecessarily obfuscated. Although Professor Meranto intends to employ the concept of legislative system in the manner of Wahlke and his associates, it becomes apparent early in the book that what he means by "legislative system" is simply "legislature."

Professor Meranto's reluctance to make statements regarding the relative importance of a group of presumably causal factors that are not amenable to symbolic treatment is understandable. I should have hoped, however, that his obvious mastery of the subject matter would have provided the necessary encouragement for a qualitative judgment. Surely the metropolitan trend was not of so great importance as the other "environmental changes"-the rediscovery of poverty and the civil rights movement. The impact of metropolitanization had not vet struck Congress in 1965. Between Wesberry and the November 1964 election only four states had redistricted. There is no evidence that non-metropolitan Congressmen would have been receptive to an urban oriented bill in the absence of provisions that would aid the deprived pupils wherever they lived.

I would guess, moreover, that Presidential commitment and large Democratic majorities in Congress were of greater importance than changes in either interest group positions or constituency attitudes. As the author makes clear, "The Democratic vote alone . . . was sufficient to gain passage of the bill in the House and in the Senate as well . . ." (p. 93). The book itself demonstrates that the data on constituency attitudes are inconclusive, and are of dubious comparability from one survey to the next. The ability of the National Education Association and the National Catholic Welfare Conference (now the U.S. Catholic Conference) to coalesce was a result of administration strategy and the wording of the bill.

The three internal changes mentioned by the author certainly contributed to a more favorable milieu for education legislation. It is about time, however, for political scientists to take a new look at the Education and Labor Committee. The old cliches about this committee, generated in the late fifties and repeated in part by Professor Meranto and others, still contain a germ of truth. To be sure, there is much partisan bickering. But this results from the committee's jurisdiction over high conflict issues and not over the nature of committee members. At least since 1959, the committee has included moderates from competitive districts, and on those occasions when it has confronted negotiable issues the committee has been able to achieve bipartisan consensus. The Brademas ad hoc subcommittee on higher education emerged in 1961 with a unanimous report, and the success of the college aid bill in 1963 was due in part to extensive bipartisan agreement on Edith Green's special subcommittee on education. My point here is merely that any assessment of changes in the Education and Labor Committee ought to account for these factors as well as the changed party ratio that resulted from the 1964 election. Success in the Education and Labor Committee is not always a product of raw power.

On balance, Professor Meranto's discussion of each contributing factor is knowledgeable and convincing. His reluctance to distinguish their relative importance to the passage of the bill is a type of intellectual caution that is laudable in some contexts. Perhaps a reviewer ought to respect the author's intellectual tastes in such matters and let it go at that. I feel denied something, however, and I believe that what is a good book could have been even better.—LAWRENCE K. PETTIT, The American Council on Education.

The Politics of Poverty. By John C. Donovan. (New York: Pegasus Press, 1967. Pp. 157. \$5.75.)

Professor Donovan, former assistant to Willard Wirtz, has given us a sketchy, highly superficial but readable review of the formation of the Economic Opportunity Act of 1964 and of the political issues involved in its first two years of operation. He makes several arguments worth noting here.

- (1) The Office of Economic Opportunity had a multitude of goals and aspirations, many of which were unachievable in the short run, others of which were highly contradictory. This led to grave administrative problems within OEO, and to difficult relationships with other agencies.
- (2) Neither the authors of the EOA, the President, the Congress, Sargent Shriver, the Bureau of the Budget, the press nor the public realized the meaning or import of the Act's politically potent requirement that community action programs be "developed, conducted and administered with the maximum feasible participation of residents of the areas and members of the groups served."
- (3) Although the EOA is an almost classic example of what has been called "the professionalization of reform" and of an executive-originated proposal, the day has not yet arrived when Congress will give up to the executive ultimate control over program development and operation.
- (4) The war in Vietnam killed any possible chance for real commitment of the nation's resources to the search for solutions of the country's domestic problems.
- (5) Fundamental reform, and for that matter, abolition of poverty, were, with a few exceptions, mere flights of rhetoric rather than real objectives of the President, the Congress, and the Office of Economic Opportunity.

Professor Donovan's book is a frightening one for several reasons. First, it clearly demonstrates how irrational our decision-making system can be. Assisted by the emotional shock which followed the Kennedy assassination, and eager for success in domestic matters where he was mistrusted, President Johnson called for and claimed to establish a war on poverty which apparently neither he nor any of his advisors understood. Even Congress overlooked the fact that the legislation contained within it a mechanism which could fundamentally alter the allocation and exercise of political power-and of the rewards and benefits which the political system distributes. It is not at all disturbing that such an alteration should be made: to the contrary, it is essential that we do so. It is, however, unsettling that our political leaders often do not comprehend the implications of their words and deeds.

In the face of such circumstances, it becomes essential that we, as political scientists, recognize the role played by ignorance, chance, and lack of information. We need not and should not start with the assumption that decision-making, or for that matter, the political system is a rational process.

Second, the impact of the book is distressing because it clearly demonstrates that the administration, either wittingly or unwittingly, created hopes for winning the war on poverty without developing and supporting a program for that purpose. The Johnson administration has refused to commit to the war on poverty the necessary resources to begin to make a change in the way the poor exist. Professor Donovan at one point characterizes this as a "cruel hoax." It is more than that. If social science has produced any finding related to the war on poverty, it is that when a people's expectations far exceed achievements, unrest and revolutionary activities are to be expected.

Third, the book implies, convincingly, that Johnson failed completely in his attempt to fight the war in Vietnam and the war on poverty. After identifying the war on poverty as his personal crusade, the President virtually abandoned it. The decision to pursue the former at the expense of the latter, whether rationally decided upon or not, may have serious implications for the continued survival of the country's basic political values.

Finally, I am troubled by Professor Donovan's overly optimistic view as to how a solution of this country's racial problems can be achieved. He argues that "the Negro has real and substantial political power in his hands now," and that change can and will come through the use of this present political power. The situation is actually far more complicated and much less hopeful as is easily seen by a careful review of the literature on Negro politics. Negro political power is highly restricted by whites, largely undeveloped and

greatly lacking in experience. Moreover, there remains a great deal of white political power-not just in Mississippi but in Newark and Boston and Washington—that is potentially more effective than black power. This white power is also determined not to give up either the power or the benefits which accrue therefrom. Moreover, as Professor Donovan's chronicle of the experiences with community action shows, the system can win even when it mistakenly gives to those who would bring about reform the very powerful weapons of office, money and legitimacy. The 1967 Green Amendment easily removed these legitimate political weapons from the hands of the poor. With such demonstrations that the system is closed to normal political demands, is it any wonder that it is being threatened by force?

In the December 1967 issue of this review one reviewer suggested the withholding of the publication of a book until the author could answer this question: "How can sufficient change be brought about through the political process so that the 'have-nots' will not feel compelled to resort to violence and destruction in order to gain 'equality." I advocate no such reticence (the publishing houses would have to close up!). I do suggest, however, that Professor Donovan's hope in the present political power of Negroes is naive. Militant community action, within the system as it operated those few brief days between 1964 and 1967, is more likely to be the answer than Professor Donovan's faith in Negro political power. Perhaps President Kennedy put it most succinctly: "Those who make peaceful revolutions impossible make violent revolutions inevitable."-John H. STRANGE, Duke University.

The Negro in Federal Employment. By Samuel Krislov. (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1967. Pp. 157. \$5.00.)

Professor Krislov's work in the field of public law and the judicial process is well known and is rightly admired. It may come as a surprise to some that his most recent book mentions not at all, the federal courts. This is altogether appropriate for one who sustains an abiding interest in the civil rights movement, for the cutting edge of that movement has shifted from legal to political and economic concerns. In considering Negro jobs, constitutional questions reflecting the aspirations of the group are not so much raised as they were when voting and educational policy set the priorities of civil rights leaders. The national debate now focuses on a new set of planning and economic priorities, and Professor Krislov's slim volume makes an outsized contribution to that debate.

The author has set himself the task of describing and evaluating the major elements of the equal employment program within the federal service. The assumption which gives broad gauge relevance to this exercise in reviewing minority group employment in the federal government is that "if elimination of prejudice cannot be achieved in the public bureaucracy, it is unlikely that it will be achieved anywhere."

The issues raised by this new quest for economic equity are described in the opening three chapters principally in an historical and administrative context. In these chapters, a certain amount of Leonard White-style historicism and Max Weber-style reification blur the statement of the issues as they are uniquely relevant to the 1960's. The balance of the book more successfully supplies an analysis and evaluation of today's problems of civil rights and civil service. The last four chapters give the book its very considerable strength, and here the discussion is shaped by contemporary behavioral and personnel theory perspectives, Professor Krislov's own analytical skills, and the results of interviews which he conducted between 1963 and 1965 in every department and agency supervised by the President's Committee on Equal Employment Opportunity.

Krislov elaborates a view of "representative bureaucracy" (the extent to which administrative personnel do and should reflect the class, ethnic and group bases of society). Where Negroes are concerned, their position as one-tenth of the American population suggests something of their fair share in federal employment. Taken as a rough norm, what kinds of problems does this standard raise for the merit system?

The challenge of the civil rights movement to past practice in the federal service has two facets in relation to the merit system. Insofar as it stresses elimination of artificial barriers, the movement enforces the principles of the merit system and reduces dissonance between articulated values and actual practice for the bureaucracy. . . But insofar as the movement seeks to apply new standards to alter past patterns, it arouses fears in many defenders of the merit system. When leaders of civil rights groups speak of "compensatory employment" or "benign quotas" they evoke absolute hostility.

But as things stand, the relationship between the supply of qualified Negro applicants and the demand for added federal employees yields "an uneasy, unstable equilibrium" between the urgings of civil rights leaders and the merit system advocates. It is "uneasy" because political, economic and population changes may generate more insistant demands. It is "unstable" because it is neither legitimized nor internalized in the minds of either participating group. "Both see problems that they think could easily be solved," but their solutions differ. "So far the current situation is accepted because there is pragmatic movement in the direction desired by both; only time can tell whether that fortunate conjunction of interests will perdure."

While acknowledging the catalytic influence of the Equal Opportunities Commission and the potential of the Civil Rights Commission in exercising newly acquired watchdog functions, Krislov looks chiefly to the departmental or agency level for progress. The zeal of top administrators who are in control of their agencies makes critical differences where jobs for Negroes are concerned. This is borne out by the 15 percent Negro-of-total-employees figure attributable in 1966 to the Department of Housing and Urban Development under Secretary Weaver. The comparable figure for the Justice Department was 5.9 percent in 1966 (the Department employs nearly as many attorneys as there are Negro lawyers in the whole of the United States). Krislov describes the Department of State as "the most receptive to the incorporation of Negroes into its service." At least this is so in theory because the concept of representativeness is said to underlie the requirement of geographical distribution in the Rogers Act which governs personnel selection for the Foreign

Providing for equality of opportunity, even within the ranks of federal government employees, involves complex institutional and programmatic problems which demand detailed consideration. Professor Krislov has treated these problems with the sophistication and realism which they deserve. The book should be recommended to students and required of administrators.—RICHARD CLAUDE, University of Maryland.

The Negro in Virginia Politics, 1902-1965. By An-DREW BUNI. (Charlottesville, Virginia: The University Press of Virginia, 1967. Pp. 285. \$6.00.)

This book is a detailed chronological description of the role of the Negro in the politics of the Commonwealth of Virginia in the twenteith century. The author uses the first eleven chapters of the book to describe the long era of Negro noninvolvement in the State's politics. During that era, from disfranchisement in 1902 to the end of the 1950's, Virginia's Negroes were objects and subjects of politics, but, except for isolated cases and moments, seldom were they political participants. During this era, of course, the Negroes made determined efforts to involve themselves in politics. However, the poll tax, literary tests, the White Democratic primary, Republican lily-whitism, and the stultifying effects of habitual nonparticipation were difficult to overcome.

In the last three chapters—two substantive chapters and one very brief concluding chapter—Buni describes the recent era of increasingly meaningful Negro political participation in Virginia's politics. He concentrates on the attraction of the 1960 and 1964 Presidential campaigns for Negroes in Virginia. For a change, candidates of

both major parties appealed for the Negro vote. This, coupled with the greatly increased tempo of the civil rights movement nationally, and the reaction of varied factions in the State to the "massive resistance" stand of the Byrd organization on school desegregation, produced a milieu in which the Negro became a meaningful political participant.

Clearly the book deals with an era of political history of real interest to historians and political scientists. Unfortunately, the author follows methodological routes which will satisfy few social scientists. The author's willingness to use one interview as an adequate sample for generalizing about the attitudes of all Negroes in Virginia during an election, his willingness to depend on the personal reminiscences of four informants for basic interpretations and generalizations, the author's willingness to depend on newspapers' analyses of electoral data for his basic interpretations, and his unwillingness to develop any tables of data indicate an approach to political analysis which few social scientists currently accept as adequate. No effort is made to document the switches in the Negro vote from period-to-period within the era covered. Raw data from secondary sources are spewed out page after page without any effort to treat the data systematically. Even such elementary techniques as percentages and percentagepoint gain and loss are ignored. Much ado is made of the rise in the number of Negro candidates for public office during the 1940's and 1950's, but no data is presented to support this. The social backgrounds of these candidates are discussed, but the author presents no data to show that he has systematically studied this phenomenon.

In short, this is a disappointing book. The greatest disappointment is that the author seems to know enough about Negro politics in Virginia to make a real contribution, but his unwillingness to present what he knows in a systematic fashion casts doubt upon his entire effort. Also, he often fails to raise or to pursue the important questions. What part did Negro leadership play in the politics of the era? What ties existed between Negro and white political leaders? What alliances were possible? What were the nature of the Negro organizational efforts over the years? Why were Negroes in various sections of the State unable to cooperate? Why were the Negro leaders in various sections of the State unable or unwilling to cooperate? How has Negro politics in Virginia compared to that of other Southern States? Even though the author has footnotes which direct the reader to the recent books and articles of Everett Ladd, James Prothro, Donald Matthews, and Ralph Eisenberg, he does not incorporate their findings about Negro political leadership and voting patterns in other Southern States-and in Virginia in

the case of Eisenberg's work—into his textual treatment, except in the most superficial manner.

The author deals not at all with the key questions which the book raises: (1) Why did the Negroes' votes become so important in Virginia's politics in the 1960's? and, (2) When is it feasible for the major aggregates in a society to seek the support of the society's marginal aggregates? In other words, when can Negroes or other minority aggregates expect to be involved as participants in Virginia's politics, and when can they expect to be excluded? The author raises this question in writing the book, but he does not answer it. If he had used data at hand to speak for that question as well as he did that from the Luther Porter Jackson papers at Virginia State College to document and describe the Negroe's disfranchisement in the 1930's and 1940's, he would have made an important contribution to our understanding of the Negro in Virginia politics.—Lewis Bowman. University of Virginia.

Race and the News Media. Ed. By Paul L. Fisher and Ralph L. Lowenstein. (New York: Frederick A. Praeger, 1967. Pp. x, 158. \$4.95.)

Electronic Journalism. By William A. Wood. (New York: Columbia University Press, 1967. Pp. xi, 175. \$5.00.)

Race and the News Media is a report of the eighth annual conference held during November 1965 at the Freedom of Information Center of the University of Missouri. Conducted after the Watts riot but before Newark and Detroit, it consists of a series of brief speeches by the participants, most of whom are active in the fields of press or television. The editors contribute a short introduction. Topics canvassed during the conference include: reporting the racial crisis in the North and South; the changing content of racial news; an evaluation of broadcasting's role; and the role of the Negro press in the civil rights struggle.

Clearly the conference, in bringing together a wide assortment of individuals active in press and television to discuss the presentation of race in the news media, served a worthwhile purpose. Since oral eloquence diminishes in print, it is less certain that the proceedings deserved to be published. And cramming over twenty contributions, which range from prescient and concerned to platitudinous and preachy, in 160 pages results in skimpy treatment of significant issues.

From a political science prespective the discussions are instructive to the extent they illuminate the dilemmas of responsibility and integrity faced by workaday editors and reporters who must decide how to present news bearing on race relations. The best articles have a blunt honesty. Martin S. Hayden, editor in chief of the *Detroit News* explains that his paper does not publicize in

advance events calculated to disturb the public order, such as planned picket lines or economic boycotts, and it ignores them after they have begun. He bemoans the lack of Negro reporters, raising the thorny question of what beats to assign them. And he admits that only during the last five years has the *Detroit News* covered Negro engagements and weddings in its society columns.

Hodding Carter, III, managing editor of the Greenville (Miss.) Delta Democrat-Times, provides a sensitive and extemporaneous delineation of the personal problems facing a conscientious journalist in a small southern town. As he puts it: It is one thing to live in a community and be detached from it, as in fact one can be in a metropolitan area. It is another thing to live in a town of several thousand people and have a close relationship with the news makers themselves on a day-to-day basis.

The symposium raises many questions. What is news? What is the power possessed by the media and is it exercised responsibly? Aren't the media excessively concerned with conflict and controversy to the detriment of analysis? What changes in group actions are wrought by the knowledge that, as one participant observes: "quieter tactics starve for lack of attention?" In other words, to what extent are the media participants in the activities they are attempting to report? These questions blend with complaints: the civil rights movement is not fully and fairly reported; violence and conflict are given space to the detriment of analysis and interpretation; the white press creates Negro leaders in large northern cities: and the press sides with the police in police-Negro disputes. All these issues are raised but scarcely explored.

The results of the conference are a series of recommendations by the editors. These include: assigning the best reporters to the police beat; increasing the number of Negroes in all departments of the news media; providing additional training for reporters responsible for coverage of racial news; and, in general, the admonition to emphasize analysis and interpretation. What is missing, however, is any consideration of the implementability of these proposals. For they are directly related to the way the media are organized and the temporal, financial, and community constraints under which the press and television function.

Professor Wood, in *Electronic Journalism*, attempts a balanced assessment of the accomplishments, problems, and prospects of television news and public affairs programs. Instead, employing a prose style riven by stock phrases, he produces a panegyric.

The difficulty in discussing the mass media, especially television and its informational role, relates to the demands or expectations one places on it. Is it sufficient, for example, for television to depict combat and thus claim to cover the war in

Vietnam, or should we demand that it examine and evaluate the strategy and policy of all protagonists in depth? Certainly such an approach would be controversial, but the problem of responsibility is not resolved by eschewing controversy. For Professor Wood such a dilemma scarcely exists.

The worst lacuna in Electronic Journalism is the author's reluctance to place the programs in context. News on television is surrounded. The dramatic half hour of news expires and is followed by the imaginary drama of a western or a World War II adventure. Within the news period the program flits from death in Vietnam to French truffle tribulations. A program on the Vietcong is interrupted by commercials for Buick. Surely this jumble of reality and invention, annihilation and salesmanship has an impact on viewers that is different from other media? Moreover, television is foremost a means of selling products; yet it is difficult to recall, while reading Professor Wood's frequent ingenuous citations of television executives' rhetoric, that he is describing what the institution's former CBS news director Fred Friendly called "the profit machine."

In both books a major impact on our social and political life is claimed for television. Television. bringing the outside world to southern Negroes and whites, penetrated the closed society and accelerated the Negro revolution. Furthermore, it showed conditions in the South to the North, thus facilitating passage of civil rights legislation. Television, in its entertainment and commercials, provides an image of affluence alien to the urban black masses and, indirectly at least, is a stimulus to discontent and therefore riots. And Professor Wood, citing a Roper poll finding that "people give television the highest rating for credibility of all the mass media" proceeds to claim for it "a peculiarly personal and graphic impact on its viewers which the printed word cannot match."

In recent years the complex interrelationships between politics and the mass media of communication received insufficient attention from political scientists. The insights of, among others, Lasswell, Lerner, and Lazarsfeld, have not been developed. It is time, I would suggest, for us to return to the medium's messages.—David L. Paletz, Duke University.

A Body Incorporate: City-County Separation in Virginia. By Chester W. Bain. (Charlottesville: The University Press of Virginia, 1967. Pp. x, 142. \$4.50.)

Professor Chester Bain has written a short study of local government in Virginia which deals with that state's interesting practice of city-county separation. Much of A Body Incorporate is taken up with the historical development and legal description of this practice, in which cities of ten thou-

sand population or more may completely separate from the county and perform within its jurisdiction all the functions normally assigned to the county (cities of five to ten thousand, or "second-class" cities may also separate save for the judicial function). Not only are cities of ten thousand population or more responsible for carrying out all municipal functions, but they are also responsible for performing all functions normally required by the state of its counties when the city separates from the county. They are financially and electorally independent.

The final and longest chapter is titled, "Separation: Boon or Cross?" and takes up the important evaluation of separation. Bain lists as major reasons for desiring independence these factors: dual taxation, threat of annexation of a town by an independent city, civic prestige, property assessment, disaffection with county officials by city folks and their ensuing desire for concentration of political power, and wishes for separate (and usually more expensive) schools. Dual taxation, school standards and the annexation threat seem to be the most important issues, and all appear to stem from basic rural-urban conflicts.

Separation as practiced in Virginia has certain advantages: reduction of functional overlap, economy, no buck-passing of responsibility between city and county officials on crucial local problems, and acceptance by the Virginia public of the practice. There are problems, though, especially relative to the low population figure at which cities can separate from counties, a level which tends to encourage too-small governments with inadequate financial resources. Another hardship is the time-honored distinction between first- and second-class cities.

Finally, Bain evaluates the practice of citycounty separation as one which has served Virginia well in the past, but one which must be immediately adjusted to operate well in the future. However effective at local self-determination these independent local units may be, "local selfgovernment is a myth without the financial resources to make it operational."

Bain has traced the historical development of separation clearly and his style is quite readable. The reader does get the impression that a few examples have perhaps been leaned on too heavily and that some key sources on current issues are not as recent as would be expected. The closing chapter, however, is an excellent weighing of the pros and cons of city-county separation, and his analysis of the Virginia experience with this approach deserves careful attention.—Wendell Bedicher, Lamar State College.

Politics in New Mexico. By Jack E. Holmes. (Albuquerque: University of New Mexico Press, 1967. Pp. 335. \$10.00.)

Historically students of American state politics have been frustrated by the paucity of comparable studies on political behavior and institutions of the various states. But in recent years this problem has become less acute. This volume by Jack E. Holmes can be added to a growing list of studies which should lead to a comparative analysis of state politics. Although this book is limited to a single state, its focus and approach should be of general interest. Holmes' general approach and analysis are similar to those employed by V. O. Key, Jr. in Southern Politics and American State Politics.

The prime focus of the book is on the changing nature of the party system in New Mexico as reflected in voting behavior, the legislature and the governorship. Holmes makes judicious use of election results, legislative roll calls, interviews and historical records. In addition he enriches his material with personal experiences. Holmes was a resident of New Mexico for sixteen years and during that time he taught at the University of New Mexico, was director of the Legislative Council Service and served as the state's chief tax commissioner. Because of this varied background, Holmes brings to his work the skills and perspective of a political scientist as well as the sensitivity of a political practitioner. The result of this combination of talents is a solid piece of research which should appeal to political scientists and lay readers alike.

New Mexico provides an opulent cultural setting for a political system. It is a curious blend of "old-settler" Spanish Americans who initially cultivated the fertile Rio Grande Valley, transplanted Texans who located in the state's eastern tier of counties, the native American Indians of the northern counties, cosmopolites who migrated to Albuquerque from all over the United States and a band of scientists who have migrated to the state's research installations. When one adds to this cultural and sociological potpourri the elements of rapid population growth, urbanization and industrialization, the result is an excellent social laboratory of which Holmes makes good use.

Through the use of an historical comparison of election results Holmes demonstrates the political significance of ethnic and economic groups in the state. Some of his findings are surprising. For example, one might assume that the Spanish Americans traditionally have supported the Democratic party, but Holmes shows this not to be the case. Today the Hispanic counties vote Democratic but from statehood (1912) to the middle 1930's these counties provided the basis of the Republican party. One might also assume that liberal Democratic support and a high voter turnout would characterize the scientific communities like Los Alamos, but Holmes shows that this is not always the case.

As is true in other states of rapid growth, the

political complexion of New Mexico has changed considerably in the last few decades. In statewide elections the party balance in the Hispanic counties has shifted from Republican to Democratic, but the eastern counties of "Little Texas" have moved from a once extreme Democratic attachment to a two-party balance. Like other states in the South and Southwest (especially neighboring Arizona) urban growth in New Mexico is augmenting Republican strength.

In his brief discussion of the legislature Holmes uses roll call analysis to show the declining significance of the party label among the legislators. Holmes also maintains that the legislature has become increasingly independent from the governor; however, his coverage of legislative-gubernatorial relations could have been improved with an analysis of the governor's success with his legislative programs, appointments and vetoes.

In this book one can find readable prose, careful and convincing scholarship, and a fascinating account of the politics of a colorful state.—Roy D. Morey, Denison University.

A Stripe of Tammany's Tiger. By Louis Eisenstein and Elliot Rosenberg. (New York: Robert Speller & Sons, 1966. Pp. xii, 300. \$5.95.)

Keynes' Law of Ideology holds that all self-professed practical men are at bottom slaves to some defunct social theory. Until the publication of Mr. Eisenstein's book I had believed Keynes' Law to be an inviolable axiom. The author-I use the singular since the entire book is written in the first person-opens his book with the claim that "This book is about politics, not political science." He then further boasts that the reader would find no generalizations, abstractions, formulas or laws. That being the case I had planned, following Keynes' Law, to review the book by picking out a long list of generalizations the author made despite himself. But much to my astonishment he accomplished his purpose. He wrote a book completely without relevance to anyone not a present or past member or enemy of the author's own extended family. And that is a pity. The situation about which he writes was ripe for a good book.

The author, one of a dying breed of lower politics who lived off politics as well as for politics, has tried to write his autobiography as a tribute and an epitaph to machine politics in New York. He is not the hero. He is the Jewish Boswell to a Lower Eastside Irish family dynasty, the Ahearns. The Ahearns can justly be said (although the author does not say it) to have epitomized everything that made machine politics succeed and ultimately fail. The Ahearns are literally the poorman's Buddenbrooks-on-the-East-River. Patriarch of the dynasty was John F., founder of the Fourth Assembly District club that bore his name from

the late 1880s until the early 1950s. As A. D. Leader he successfully spanned the transformation of the Lower Eastside from an Irish to an almost totally Jewish quarter. He was dynamic and beloved, but he was also the regular's regular who accepted from Tammany Leader Murphy the treacherous task of engineering the impeachment of Governor Sulzer. John F.'s son Eddy, at the age of 30, inherited the Leadership. The author describes as a "meteoric" career the fact that the post fell into the young man's lap. Upon Eddy's death in 1934 the Leadership in this now even more concentratedly Jewish district fell to William, the younger brother. Willie was a pitiable figure who, due to a childhood head injury, was rendered virtually moronic by adulthood. Yet he held the leadership for 16 years. Toward the end real power in the District devolved upon Bert Stand, an extraordinary opportunist who during much of the same period was also behind-thescenes co-leader of Tammany Hall itself. The author was for forty years the Captain of the Banner Election District (precinct) of the Banner Democratic District of the city and state.

The situation has all the makings of a classic, but alas the author has preferred sentimentality and petty preachment. Political scientists do lack the author's extensive experience. Almost no such machine exists any more, and there are probably no districts or wards anywhere equal to the old Fourth in special, savorable political characteristics. The author was as wasteful with all this as Mayor Wagner was wasteful, in the author's judgment, with City Hall's patronage. Shed of all sentimentalities there is little history in the book worth recording. But in better hands those few items could have been made into good historyuseful even to political scientists. The author's brief account of John F.'s removal from the Presidency of the Borough of Manhattan proves that this was not a case of corruption. But his account never turns to the positive question, that of whether party professionals were uniquely incapable of operating as amateurs in the modern administrative apparatus of city government. The author also bemoans the rise of issue- and candidate-oriented politics as that which undermined good old party loyalty in the Banner District. But his blindness to what was significant in his own experience deprives us of possibly valuable insights into (1) how it came to pass in the first place that the most advanced of all immigrant groups in the past century and a half, the Jews, so peacefully accepted half a century of Irish hegemony, and (2) how an Ahearn club that could capture the primordial loyalties of Jews could not survive against the presumably more superficial identification of the new educated masses with programs or ticket leaders. His sentimental attachment to the local particularities also prevented him from reporting sufficiently upon the most fascinating account in the entire book—how Eddy Ahearn worked out the settlement whereby Mayor Walker agreed to resign his mayoralty in time to save presidential candidate Roosevelt from what could have been a tragic decision. Local parties decentralized power in the United States to an incredible degree apparently; and with the decline of machines so there might be also an increase in national centralization. But for an appreciation of the decentralization effected by local political organization one must return to the writings of political scientists like Schattschneider and Grodzins.

The author's sentimental hearkening to the po-

litical pattern of Boss Croker is equivalent in quaintness to the neanderthal Republicans' hearkening to the economic pattern of McKinley. Mr. Eisenstein would be amazed to learn how many political scientists share his appreciation of the machine's importance in American urban history. Pity he does not on the other hand share the political scientist's "framework of possibilities" within which he might have been guided to what was really significant in his experience. Since he did not his book was doomed from the start. The book was doomed because it was not the result of forty years' experience but rather the result of one year's experience lived forty times.—Theodore J. Lowi, University of Chicago.

FOREIGN GOVERNMENTS AND COMPARATIVE POLITICS

Urban Political Systems: A Functional Analysis of Metro Toronto. By HAROLD KAPLAN. (New York: Columbia University Press, 1967. Pp. 320. \$8.50.)

Harold Kaplan's book, the seventh in the Metropolitan Politics Series edited by Wallace S. Sayre, is an attempt to apply the theory of "structural-functionalism" to an analysis of the municipality of Metropolitan Toronto. Drawing primarily upon the work of Talcott Parsons, the author, in his first chapter, reviews the major concepts involved in functionalism, particularly as they relate to the study of urban political systems. The essence of Parsons' functional approach, according to Kaplan, is ". . . the attempt to define certain basic requisites for the survival and success of social systems and to see the structure of a system as a set of mechanisms that attempt to fulfill these requisites" (p. 10). The Parsonian model, particularly its focus on normative order, is held to have severe limitations when applied to the analysis of urban political systems. Metro was found to have no normative order of its own, but rather shared the normative standards of the nation; a normative order was necessary to the Metro system's functioning, but was not the responsibility of the Metro system itself. After making several modifications of the Parsonian model, Kaplan completes his functional framework by formulating an analytical construct comparing the Metro Toronto system with two other types of systems —the business elite and the broker leadership.

The remainder of the book is concerned with a functional assessment of the Metro system. After a brief discussion of the origins and initial developments of Metro Toronto, the performance of the system and its subsystems and the social context of Metro politics are analyzed. Kaplan defines success of the system as "... the ability to perform its integrative and adaptive functions to the satisfaction of relevant actors within and with-

out the system" (p. 246). Relevant actors are those whose behavior and attitudes have direct implications for the system. A rudimentary level of non-normative or calculative integration was found to have emerged, but normative integration, central to the Parsonian model, did not develop. Performance of the adaptive function was assessed on the basis of "objective indicators" (p. 249). Metro achieved a role differentiation or an institutionalization of the problem-solving (adaptive) activity, but Kaplan's indicators show net satisfaction scores of discontent upon the part of the adaptive-oriented actors.

Although the book is focused upon the Metro Toronto system, the author repeatedly refers to other systems in a manner that encourages comparative analysis. Particularly striking are numerous observations about Metro Toronto that are in sharp contrast to those that have been made about urban systems in the United States. For example, Kaplan analyzes group involvement in fifty-five major issues that came before the Metro Council between 1953 and 1965, and found that the political parties and the Real Estate Board did not voice an opinion on any of the issues. One would be surprised if comparable groups in American urban areas remained silent for such a long period of time. A comparison is made of the administrative politics in the "executive-directed" Metro system and the "broker-leadership" system in New York City. In New York, the pattern is one of department heads becoming the spokesmen for the institutional interests of the departments and often striving to frustrate the mayor's interest in coordinating departments. In contrast, Chairman Frederick Gardiner was successful in mediating between Metro's departments. Kaplan found it paradoxical that ". . . the New York mayor, officially the head of the administration, in fact presides over a feudal system, while the Metro chairman, lacking the formal powers of a chief administrator, in fact plays a dominant role in & united cabinet" (p. 76).

Metro's first chairman pursued a "gradualist" strategy in bringing issues before the Council. Only those issues upon which there would be a high level of consensus were initiated. The effect of this policy was greater emphasis on public works projects rather than on programs in the nonconstruction field. The Chairman believed that by pursuing noncontroversial issues first, unity would eventually develop on the Council and permit the consideration of "soft" programs. According to Kaplan, ". . . Gardiner's gradualist strategy was a failure" (p. 121). As far as the application of this strategy to the United States is concerned. it is doubtful that American urban areas can afford the luxury of a "gradualist" approach. Gardiner's legislative strategy was also governed by the norm of regional parity—that each municipality receive benefits roughly in line with its tax contribution to Metro. Although this norm may contribute to integration, it would not facilitate the resolution of many urban problems in the United States that require some degree of redistribution: of resources. And, it is this type of problem that is the most critical in many urban areas.

Kaplan found the level of group influence in Metro to be very low, and he delineates ten factors that seek to explain the "low pressure environment." The author's conclusions about group influence are quite similar to V. O. Key's "opinion dikes." Group influence was found to be more the ability to help structure Council's general attitudes than the ability to affect the course of decision-making in specific instances.

The book is well-written and exceptionally well documented. The extensive footnotes provide an excellent bibliography of both functional theory and urban politics. The emphasis is theoretical exposition, and the author comments that students more interested in Metro than in theory may be disappointed. The book's orientation requires no apology. The literature on urban politics is abundant with purely descriptive studies, but few exist that soundly combine a conceptual framework with a specific research problem. Professor Kaplan's book is a valuable contribution toward achieving this combination that is so badly needed if an understanding of urban politics is to develop.—James L. Cox, University of Delaware.

Political Leadership in Industrialized Societies: Studies in Comparative Analysis. Ed. By Lewis J. Edinger. (New York: John Wiley & Sone, 1967. Pp. vii, 376.)

"Statecraft," writes Stanley Hoffmann in this group of essays, "is of the essence of all politics"; yet its study has been the "orphan of contemporary political science." That seems both curious

and ironic, for the tradition of writing on political leadership includes some of the most imaginative and perceptive works of this discipline's inheritance; yet lions and foxes, philosopher-kings, heroes and leviathans have led a rather quiet existence in the deep methodological shadows of systems analysis and the behavioral persuasion. Leadership studies have continued, of course, and have recently begun to approach the level of a flood tide. This book may be viewed as an effort to channel, or perhaps only to label, the flood; to define, that is, the subject matter of "political leadership" as a subfield of modern political science. What emerges is a very broad definition, one Machiavelli would be unlikely to recognize.

The book opens with an essay by Edinger, who seeks to give some conceptual order to the variety of concerns of students of leadership, and is followed by nine separate studies, a concluding article by Harold Lasswell, and an excellent annotated bibliography prepared by Edinger and Donald Searing. It is the great disparateness—in subject-matter, method, and quality—of the nine studies that gives the book its value as a reflection of the state of the study of leadership. As individual essays, three of the nine seem to me particularly well-wrought and worthy of special comment: those by Alfred G. Meyer, Samuel H. Barnes, and Hoffmann.

Meyer puts forward a perceptive analysis of authority in Communist systems. The draconian authority style of Stalinism, he argues, is characteristic only of the period of Communist "systembuilding," a phase of transition between the initial authority crisis of the revolution and a crisis of system maturity centering in the challenge of new elites to the party bureaucracy. The West has defined Communism by the attributes of the system-building stage; the authority relationships now emerging, Meyer suggests, will not only undermine that definition, but may put an end to the very distinctivenss of Communist rule. There lurks here, then, an implicit theory of convergence, but a subtle and persuasive one which does not require that Western and Soviet systems become identical.

It might be useful to apply to this perspective Barnes' thesis that leadership systems must be congruent with the degree of participatory competence of the led, defined as political skills plus a sense of efficacy. Any increasing pluralism in Soviet decision-making would then have to be matched by enhanced mass participation in politics—a development for which there is in fact some evidence. Barnes' general hypothesis is plausible, and his discussion of the relevant literature (e.g., the Kurt Lewin experiments with groups of children) fills it out and lends it appropriate qualification. Unfortunately the empirical portion of

the essay rests on too slender a reed—a single survey question asked of Italian socialists—to provide much additional confirmation.

Whatever uniformities of leadership style the Soviet bloc and the West may be developing, the French, if we are to believe Hoffmann, remain determinedly sui generis. The dominant authority style of French society (here Hoffmann leans heavily on Michel Crozier) produces an almost cyclical alternation between routine and crisis. Since the routine in the political sphere comprises a "multiplicity of brakes and the absence of a motor," crisis is necessary to bring forth the heroic leader who, operating under a partial suspension of the rules of the road, is permitted to save the nation so that it may once again wallow gratefully in the routine. Hoffmann's argument, which examines the cases of De Gaulle, Pétain, and Mendès-France, is brilliantly put; yet one wonders examples whether non-French (Roosevelt? Churchill? Hitler?) might not reveal similarities as great as those between his diverse Frenchmen.

Additionally, there are psychoanalytic studies by Alexander Mitscherlich and Victor Wolfenstein; useful comparisons between the political cultural "resources" available to leaders in the United States, Canada, and Great Britain, by Erwin Hargrove, and between supreme court justices in four countries, by Glendon Schubert; and studies of recruitment and career patterns in relation to party structure by Joseph Schlesinger and Lester Seligman, the second somewhat less ambitious and considerably more successful than the first.

It will be noticed that there is no study here dealing primarily with Hoffmann's "statecraft"—i.e., the techniques of leading, "leadership" in its most narrow and traditional sense. Political culture, leadership styles, and the problems of congruence between them are the recurrent themes. With their importance to the understanding of statecraft there can be no quarrel. I wonder, however, whether there is not a useful distinction to be made between the study of leadership per se and that of elites and political recruitment. The Schlesinger and Seligman essays, which belong to the latter category, do not really seem at home with the other studies of this volume.—Thomas A. Baylis, Duke University.

The Communist Movement in Iran. By Sepretre Zabih. (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1966. Pp. xiii, 277. \$6.00.)

Planning and Development in Iran. By George B. Baldwin. (Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins Press, 1967. Pp. xv, 212. \$6.95.)

Politics in Iran continue to confound the initiated and novitiate alike. These two works dealing with central problems of Iranian politics are no

exception. Both raise fundamental issues which remain unsolved and perhaps, by the nature of the subject matter itself, insoluble. Both treat notable failures: in the former case, the failure of the Iranian Communist Party or Tudeh to seize power and in the latter, the failure of a planning effort to take hold in an essentially hostile political culture. But both conclude with an unmistakable sense of success-success for which the record of unmitigated failure have ill-prepared the reader. In the former work, the ability of Mohammad Reza Shah Pahlavi to defeat his internal opponents and develop rewardingly close ties to the present Soviet leadership are as unexpected as are. in the latter work, a burgeoning Iranian economy and entrepreneurial elite which befuddle economic planners.

Zabih's work is a painstakingly researched examination of materials in Persian, Russian, and Western languages whose bibliographical discoveries and thorough treatment will serve as a guide and reference source for future investigators. Woven throughout his presentation, and often unstated, are strands which highlight several central facets of Iranian politics. Of major importance is the issue of continuity: continuity in Iran's relations with the U.S.S.R., in her political leaders, and in the dilemmas of her political opposition.

Zabih illustrates the startling consistency of the Soviet Union in its willingness to sacrifice indigenous communist movements on behalf of Soviet relations with Iran and the West. The abrupt withdrawal of Soviet support for Kuchek Khan and the Gilan separatists in 1919-20; the pull-back of Soviet troops from Northern Iran and the signing of a draft agreement with Prime Minister Ghavam in 1946; the conclusion of technical, economic, and even military-arms agreements in the 1960's highlight Soviet pragmatism, flexibility, and caution—all, of course, at the expense of Iranian communists.

The author understates the present disarray of the Tudeh as a result of these developments. He mentions, but fails to attribute sufficient importance, to the little-noted event in 1964 where the U.S.S.R. returned to the Iranian Government one of its subjects. This hapless pawn of international politics had been a prison guard responsible for perpetrating a jailbreak in the 1950's whereby a significant portion of the Tudeh leadership was able to escape confinement and flee to the Soviet Union. His subsequent execution at the hands of the Iranian Government and the nearly simultaneous conclusion of the steel mill agreement between Iran and the U.S.S.R. had an impact on the Tudeh similar to that of the 1939 Soviet-Nazi pact on European and American communists and fellow travelers. Of perhaps even greater importance was the impact of these events on the noncommunist opposition. The Shah, whom they considered their domestic enemy, had apparently "won over" the Soviet Union, whom they had viewed as their only foreign friend.

A second major strand in Zabih's work is the continuity of Iranian élites—among both the opposition and the shahparastis. Individuals playing a central role in early political events persistently reappear, a decade, two, or even five decades later. Mohammed Saed, for example, was the Iranian Consul General at Baku who fled from the attack on his consulate by the precursor of the Persian Communist Party, the Adalat (Justice) group in 1918. Saed went on to serve several terms as Prime Minister and in 1968 remains active as a member of the Iranian Senate.

But if the rolls of the supporters of the regime contain persons of extraordinary political longevity, how much more replete with such political veterans are the ranks of the Communist Party. Zabih's discussions of the various Communist central committees both within Iran and in exile reveal an amazing continuity in leadership. The inability or unwillingness of the Iranian Communists to include new blood at high levels is another indication of their political failures.

A final central and dominant issue which Zabih poses as continually confronting the Tudeh is one which also unceasingly challenges all Iranian opposition groups. The issue is a policy one—the extent to which it is legitimate to cooperate with a sympathetic government or one which agrees to effect at least sections of an opposition group's political platform. When the policies of the regime coincide with those of the opposition, a commonfront policy of cooperation has frequently resulted in the subversion and cooptation of the opposition. A failure to support such policies, however, puts the opposition in the stance of opposing not only the regime but policies which they, the opposition, had so loudly urged for so long. This dilemma has perpetually plagued the Tudeh, the National Front, and, indeed, all groups who consider themselves in opposition to the regime.

Unfortunately, two substantial flaws mar this otherwise excellent work. Professor Zabih appears on unsteady footing when he ventures into the quagmire represented by the application of social science techniques to historical investigation. A perfunctory and abbreviated analysis of the "social characteristics" of Tudeh leaders; the attribution of support for the Tudeh to "alienation" where the term remains indistinct and poorly linked to particular social or economic groups over time; and a cursory examination of the "backgrounds" of the members of Dr. Erani's Marxist circle of the 1930's all indicate the author's difficulties.

Finally, the study is short on analysis, especially

in key areas which beg for analysis. Why did the Communist movement fail in Iran when it seemed on so many occasions to be on the verge of seizing power? What is the significance of this failure for Iranian politics, for the Soviet Union, for the West? These and similar issues must await future treatment, hopefully from this same author who has established here such a sound foundation.

George Baldwin brings impressive credentials to his task. Author of previous works on the British coal industry and economic development in South India, he served as a member of the Harvard Advisory Group to Iran's Plan Organization from 1958-61. Immersed in the minutiae of planning for Iranian development he has nonetheless retained a capacity for achieving perspective.

Baldwin's basic argument is that given the subordination of planning to politics in Iran and the fundamentally inhospitable political climate, planning may very well not be of direct value. Rather, he proposes that the Government undertake large, economically unprofitable projects, if it must, while fostering the development of the private sector.

In a detailed analysis of Iran's impressive economic development in the late 1950's, he demonstrates that basically this pattern of events occurred. The author attributes that development to government generated demand and the availability of government credit for industrial investment. To the astonishment of the planning groups, the private sector responded vigorously, providing the dynamism behind Iran's growth.

At the root of this expansion lay oil and the massive revenues which annually accrued to the Government. Baldwin astutely notes the substitutability of oil for human resources, especially for the administrative skills which the author found so sadly absent.

It may well be that these human skills are in short supply because of the primacy of politics already noted. The author has culled numerous examples of political considerations overriding planning interests (and also we might add, the canons of proper administration) from his personal experience. The Shiraz fertilizer plant, Iran's three mammoth dams, and the land reform (which had not even been included in the Third Plan) are but three of the more blatant examples.

In addition to a wealth of little known details of Iran's politics and economy, the author provides some general considerations of planning for development which will be of relevance to those with no interest in Iran.

While invigorated by personal experience, the work suffers from an absence of more general research and documentation. Numerous errors of fact and typography impair the work. But perhaps more disappointing is the author's failure to

match his planning projections, made in 1962, with data on Iranian economic performance available for 1965 or 1966. The reader might then have had a better sense for at least the theoretical value of the planning effort in Iran and the developing world in general.—Marvin Zonis, University of Chicago.

Modern Yemen, 1918-1966. By Manfred W. Wenner. (Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins Press, 1967. Pp. 257. \$6.95.)

After an introductory section on the land and its people, Professor Wenner has written a judicious and objective account of the government of Yemen-religiously divided between the highland and northern Zavdis and the lowland and southern Shāficīs-by the Zaydī Imams Yahya and Ahmad. The withdrawal of Ottoman authority in November 1918 was "as far as Yahya was concerned . . . merely the first step in making Yemen a nationstate" (pp. 47-48, 50); but what in this socioreligious setting was a nation-state? The two Imams successively strove to recover a historic Yemen extending eastward more than 600 miles along the southern coasts of Arabia, despite the fact that the tribes and minor rulers of these regions were not Zaydīs and had secured their independence of the Zaydī Imams as long ago as 1728.

It is in discussing the ensuing conflict between the two Imams and the British, who had established a coaling-station at Aden in 1839 and during the following century had gingerly extended a protectorate over the disorderly tribes of their hinterland, that the author's objectivity flags. Following closely, though without acknowledgment, Harold Ingrams's demonstration that the British were slow to realize the verbal ambiguities in the valid Arabic text of the Anglo-Yemeni treaty of 1934 (pp. 158-60; cf. Ingrams: The Yemen [1963], pp. 68-70), he concedes that Imam Yahya was ready to accept a temporary status quo with them only because his territorial aggression to the north was about to involve him in war with Saudi Arabia. Yet while characterizing subsequent British arguments as "quite specious," he refers without qualification to the Imam's "legitimate rights" and relegates to a footnote the admission that there was "some question" about their legality (pp. 164, 167 n. 53). The fact was that both Imam Yahya and the British were imposing their respective authority and public security on many reluctant and unruly tribes; but what for Professor Wenner was laudable in the Imam was apparently reprehensible in the British (contrast pp. 71-81 with 161-4).

The Imams' insistence on reasserting their sovereignty over non-Zaydī tribes that had rejected their predecessors' control two centuries earlier

was for them as unproductive as it would be for Mexico to demand the retrocession of Texas from President Lyndon Johnson. Professor Wenner shows that Imam Ahmad's "monomania" on this theme (p. 159), neglecting the growing educated opposition to his despotic rule, opened the way for that systematic Egyptian radio incitement that led to the military coup d'etat of 1962. In this respect the title of the final section, "The Civil War," is something of a misnomer, since Egyptian paratroopers and war material began to arrive in Yemen within a week of the coup and a "Republic of the Arabian Peninsula" was proclaimed as the ultimate goal of the revolutionaries.

The author's narrative closes in mid-1966 on a note of military stalemate and "the unwillingness of the extremists on both sides . . . to come to any rational compromise" (p. 228). Since then, both the Egyptian and the British socialists have yielded to financial necessity and withdrawn their respective armed forces, leaving in Sancā and Aden two exhausted army-dominated "republics" looking for support to the Soviet Union, while the Imamate still has the support of the Zaydī tribes and a base in Saudi Arabia.

There are frequent discrepancies between the transliteration of place-names in the text and that used on the map (p. 22): thus Bayḥān, Beihan; Bayḍā', Al Beidha; al-Huḍayda, Hodeida. The port of Ghulayfiqa, of tactical significance (p. 75), is not shown on the map, which has no scale of miles and does not illustrate the Yemeni territorial claims as well as the two-page map in the preface to Ingrams: The Yemen.—George Kirk, University of Massachusetts.

Public Opinion and Constitution Making in Pakistan, 1958-1962. By Edgar A. and Kathryn R. Schuler. (East Lansing: Michigan State University Press, 1967. Pp. 286. \$6.00.)

It takes a certain spirit of adventure to write a book about public opinion in a country which had experienced a military coup, a suppression of existing political figures, the destruction of parliamentary institutions, and the imposition of martial law restraints on freedom of the press as a prelude to the process of constitution building. One is tempted to ask, what public opinion? The authors believe that Pakistan public opinion played a significant role in the political process during the four years which the book covers: the period of "constitution making." To what sources do the author's turn for support of this thesis?

The Schulers, while they were in Pakistan during much of the martial law period, were not in a position to undertake personal interviews or other forms of data collection. Their study draws largely on an exhaustive reading of three English language newspapers in the Indian subcontinent.

The Pakistan Observer, published in Dacca, East Pakistan, is used for the East Pakistan viewpoint: Dawn, a Karachi paper, provides a source for West Pakistan opinion, and the Calcutta Statesman is used for the third source because of its fairly heavy news coverage of Pakistan affairs, and because it was sometimes an avenue of expressions of opinion which could not be aired in the more restrained Pakistan press. The authors' basic approach to their information is not encumbered with any systematic data collection technique, such as content analysis. More typically they are satisfied to take a certain action or public statement by the government, i.e., Kyub Khan or one of his ministers, and record the public reactions of various groups and public figures in Pakistan society as reported in the English press. As a result of both the complexity of many of the issues, and the narrow strata of the "relevant" body of opinion on political issues, which might be reported in the press, the opinions most often reported are those of the articulate, educated elite. Students and Bengali intellectuals, Karachi lawyers, the Ulema or religious leaders in Islamic society, and the journalists and editorial writers are the sources of public opinion which form the bases for this book. Occasionally a disenfranchised politician would voice his dissent with the government, a practice which sometimes resulted in the arrest of the politician, as in the case of H. S. Suhrawardy, a leading East Pakistani politician and a former prime minister. Much of the book is organized in terms of an "action-reaction" dialogue between government and public opinion. This approach and the sources used may ignore significant but less "public" bodies of opinion in Pakistan which for a variety of reasons largely supported the government's efforts at establishing a controlled democracy. There is little discussion, for example, of business and industrial leadership opinion, or of the opinion of newly created Basic Democrats. Nor does one find recorded the attitudes of the large landholders who appear to be of some importance in district politics in parts of West Pakistan.

The authors agree with many observers of the Ayub Khan regime that it has been the mildest of dictatorships, and that it has taken positive steps to encourage at least the appearance of public debate, especially during the period of constitution making. Ayub Khan has shown a remarkable concern for the legitimacy of his governmental experiment, hoping, like Charles De Gaulle in France, that the strong presidential system which he has introduced will survive his own demise. As part of this search for legitimacy, Ayub created a Constitution Commission, to recommend the guidelines for the new constitutional order. This Commission undertook a rather novel approach to developing

public opinion. It sent out a questionnaire containing forty questions to twenty-eight thousand persons. About one-third of the questionnaires were in English. To this survey there were over nine thousand replies. Given the complexity of the questions asked, one wonders about the information developed by this approach. For example, question seven reads. "If you prefer the federal form of government (a) what should be the federating units: (b) what form of government would you suggest for each of the units; (c) how would you distribute legislative power between the centre and the units: and (d) what provisions do you suggest for the administration of the federal capital?" One suspects that even in the most sophisticated circles of the oldest Western democracies, such questions could be answered adequately only by constitutional lawyers and political scientists.

The basic format of the book is a chronological development beginning with the military coup through the announcement of the final constitution. The chapters are organized by months in terms of the events or issues which dominate each time period. These chapters are quite short. Chapter IV on the Constitution Commission is six pages and Chapter V on the attitudes of the legal profession seven pages. Two somewhat more analytical chapters conclude the book, one dealing with the various provisions in the constitution and the other discussing briefly who "gained" and who "lost" in the new constitution. As to the impact of public opinion, the authors conclude that except for the establishment of provincial governments as a result of strong East Pakistani opposition to a unitary state, on all other issues, strong central government, indirect elections, and a unicameral legislature, Ayub Khan's wishes prevailed. One can only wonder if there was ever any real contest.-RICHARD N. BLUE, University of Minnesota.

The Origins of Malay Nationalism. By WILLIAM R. Roff. (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1968. Pp. xx, 297. \$8.50.)

Here is a gracefully written, careful and insightful historical study that carries considerable import for the political science of Southeast Asia and of the post-colonial world at large. The author's intention was to, "trace the slow growth of communal, ethnic, and national feeling among the peninsular Malays in the first four decades of this century, and the expression of this feeling in voluntary associations of a predominantly modern and potentially political-nationalistic kind." In doing this he identifies three distinct social movements and their component organizations, and elaborates their interactions with British colonial policy and the relatively stable structure of Malay peasant society. One was a religious reform move-

ment which found its ideological origins outside of the Malaysian area and its base of operations largely in the Straits Settlements of Singapore and Penang. It met violent opposition in the traditional Malay establishment, which British policy had developed and supported. Although the movement developed a form of pre-nationalism, "it never succeeded in elaborating, either organizationally or programmatically, a political nationalism capable of attracting mass support." A movement with a more obvious impact on the course of national events developed out of the indigenous administrative elite fostered by British policy. Its motivations were quite conservative: to preserve Malay privileges against the demands of non-Malays which resulted from the rapid social and economic changes taking place in the non-Malay sector of society. The third and most radical movement drew upon the locally-based intelligentsia turned out by the vernacular education system. Although it revived indigenous literature and provided personnel for later leftwing movements, its political impact was small.

This book meets well the general tests of scholarship. Since the topic deals primarily with ideas and organizations the author appropriately draws much of his evidence from Malay newspapers, magazines, and novels and from the official records of the associations studied. Interviews are extensively and appropriately used and judicious inferences about what was going on are made where no direct evidence is available. The social movement and their attendant organizations are not presented naked but couched in appropriate descriptions of the political, economic, and anthropological background. Dr. Roff is an objective historian, but not one who extinguishes his sense of values. It is obvious that he is unhappy about various British policies, especially the vocational and vernacular education policy promoted by Winstedt. Roff's joy at the irony that this regressive policy should have provided the base for the radical intelligentsia does not push him to overstate the significance of that movement. It would be interesting to speculate, as the author does not, whether the intelligentsia might have been more radical and their movement more widespread had not the British tried so successfully to keep the Malays down on the farm.

Any speculation of this sort would be out of tune with the temper of the work, and that is a cause for sadness. The Origins of Malay Nationalism deals with materials central to the concerns of political science but it is not a work of political science. It would have been too much to expect an explicit analytical framework, or a grounding in theory, new or used. However, one might have expected a more comparative form of analysis in which Malaysian developments are related to

coordinate events in Indonesia, Burma, Ceylon, or, failing all else, India. This the author did not do, beyond making a few references to Indonesian experience and indicating Indonesian origins or influences on Malaysian events.

Despite Dr. Roff's disinclination to compare or speculate, his firm and fulsome job of historiography helps make the Malayan case a fertile field for analysis of the twin processes of nationalism and decolonization. Any true understanding of Britain's relatively successful application of a "go slow" colonial policy will gain much by building upon Roff's careful tracing of the not so radical roots of Malay nationalism.—James F. Guyor, University of California, Los Angeles.

The Emergence of Pakistan. By Chaudhri Mu-Hammad All. (New York: Columbia University Press, 1967. Pp. ix, 418. \$11.00.)

One of the lacunae in research materials during the last two decades since the partition of the subcontinent into India and Pakistan has been in the genre of memoirs and accounts by those who helped establish these two new nations. In the case of Pakistan, the need was particularly acute for nothing comparable to the autobiography of Rajendra Prasad, India's first president, or the two volumes, The Integration of the Indian States and Transfer of Power in India, by V. P. Menon, had appeared.

This condition has been partially remedied in the short span of a few months in 1966 and 1967 by publication of books by three architects of Pakistan. The first to appear was From Memory, by Firoz Khan Noon, the last prime minister before the declaration of martial law in 1958. Published in Lahore by Ferozsons, it has had limited circulation in Pakistan and is virtually unknown elsewhere. In contrast, a second work, Friends Not Masters: A Political Autobiography, by President Mohammad Ayub Khan, published by Oxford University Press, was widely distributed in Pakistan and is relatively well known in other countries as well.

The third volume, presently under review, is a thoughtful, temperate account of Pakistan's establishment by one of that nation's most distinguished civil servants. A professional administrator, Chaudhri Muhammad Ali played a key role in organizing the government of Pakistan as its first and only secretary-general. Later he became finance minister and prime minister and in 1965 was one of the leading figures in the Combined Opposition Party (COP) which contested for the presidency against President Ayub.

A little less than half the book is devoted to problems after the establishment of Pakistan. The first half deals with the familiar prelude to partition: the Lahore Resolution, cabinet mission plan, partition itself, and integration of the states. The analysis is remarkably lucid and judicious, excelling that found in V. P. Menon's two volumes alluded to earlier. A full chapter is devoted to the Radcliffe Award which determined the boundaries between India and Pakistan in Bengal and the Punjab. The aspect of the Radcliffe boundary settlement of the Punjab which continues to rankle Pakistanis is the division of Gurdaspur tehsil in a manner giving India its only means of land access to Kashmir. Chaudhri Muhammad Ali sheds some new light on this controversy. If what he reports is correct, there is now some reason to believe that the division of Gurdaspur was not the sole responsibility of Cyril Radcliffe, the commission's chairman, but rather was made with knowledge of and prior consultation with Lord Ismay, the vicerov's military advisor, and perhaps even with the vicercy, Lord Mountbatten, himself. The heart of the evidence is found on pages 218-219 of the book. The author visited Lord Ismay in Delhi to convey the Quaid-i-Azam's fears concerning Gurdaspur. Being told that Ismay was closeted with Radcliffe, he waited to see him. Ismay professed ignorance of the Gurdaspur boundary issue, but when the author went to a wall map and pointed out a pencilled boundary line drawn across the Punjab, "Ismay turned pale and asked in confusion who had been fooling with his map" (p. 219). This, of course, is circumstantial evidence to which we cannot assign final historical credibility. But it is a personal account which may help to illuminate further this important decision.

The principal disappointment in this well written and otherwise well conceived book is the fact that only thirty-one of its 387 pages are devoted to the activities in which the author played a paramount creative role, namely, in constructing the administrative system of the new government of Pakistan. This reviewer had long awaited this book hoping that it would deal extensively and authoritatively with this aspect of Pakistan's development. Since the death of the Quaid-i-Azam. his successor, Liaqat Ali Kahn, such administrative figures as S. Ikramullah and virtually all the key politicians of the 1947-50 period, Muhammad Ali is clearly the only Pakistani in a position to have dealt with those problems. Our disappointment is mitigated somewhat by the deft and excellent manner with which Muhammad Ali treats the few problems he has selected in these thirtyone pages. We learn, for example, that the appointment of the controversial first pay commission in 1947 headed by Justice Muhammad Munir "was a mistake" (p. 361). There is a strong suggestion that the origin of the commission's statement that the "correct place for our men of genius is in private enterprise and not in the humdrum career of public service" can be traced to Ghulam Mohammad, the finance minister rather than to Munir.

The book ends with promulgation of the first constitution in 1956. We can hope for a second volume by Muhammad Ali covering the forty-four months of martial law and the period of the second constitution (1960 to the present) during which the administrator became a politician opposing the government in power. Whether or not this hope for a second volume will be fulfilled, we can say of the book now under review that it is a forthright, balanced, moderate account, reflecting the constructive disposition of its author. It ranks clearly with the best of the books on India and Pakistan by those who helped create those states.—Ralph Braibanti, Duke University.

Minority Politics in the Punjab. By Baldev Raj Nayar. (Princeton, New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 1966. Pp. ix, 360. \$9.00.)

"Minority" in this study is interpreted by the author to include only the Sikh Akali Dal and its campaign to obtain Punjabi Suba, that is, partition of the Indian province of the Punjab into Punjabi-speaking and Hindi-speaking sections. Although Nayar had the misfortune to publish his dissertation just before the Sikh party's aim was unexpectedly achieved in the wake of the Indo-Pakistan War, his failure to predict the outcome does not detract materially from his excellent work.

The overall organization of the book is behavioral. The author arranges his data into: the social context of the demand for Punjabi Suba, the motivations behind it, the recruitment patterns of the opposing party elites, the resources at their disposal, and their conflicting strategies. However, this framework tends to get lost in the detailed historical exposition within each chapter. Only in the Summary do the more general propositions emerge upon which comparison with other provinces and other minorities in India and elsewhere in the developing world might be based. As it is, these relate more to the general problem of "system maintenance" in a situation of linguistic and religious diversity than to the problems of minorities as such.

Nayar's first finding is that the demand for a separate Punjabi linguistic province has really been a camouflage for creating a Sikh theocratic state. The latter goal he attributes to the fears of orthodox Sikhs that modernization will lead their people to be re-absorbed into Hinduism unless the machinery of the state can be controlled in order to enforce conformity to the external symbols of Sikhism. In other words, it is an example of "boundary maintenance" between two socially

close and philosophically similar faiths. Nayar dismisses the Akali Dal's charges of Hindu discrimination against the minority. On the contrary, so successful have Sikh politicians been in prying concessions out of the Congress government, that it is more likely the majority community which has suffered disadvantages.

The generalizations most susceptible to formulation into comparative propositions are those about leadership recruitment and strategies. Regarding the former, the author discovers a striking similarity in social background and education of Akali and Congress Sikh legislators. From this, he is driven to the conclusion that "the commonplace assumption is not valid that those who make 'parochial,' 'primordial,' or 'particularistic' appeals are in any way less advanced than those who make 'secular,' 'rational' and 'nationalistic' appeals." Part of the explanation lies in infiltration of the ruling party, one of the three Akali strategies he explicates. (The others are constitutional and agitational.) Navar observed a high turnover rate in all but the top leadership of the Akali Dal, Periodically a merger would be negotiated with the Congress and a layer of ambitious young Akalis would be absorbed into its ranks, there to form a cell for promoting Sikh interests from within. The Congress on its side felt obliged to raise ex-Akali Sikhs like the late Chief Minister, Partap Singh Kairon, to power in order to combat its opponent's charges of discrimination. One wonders why this bargaining technique hasn't worked as well for other Indian minorities like the Muslims. The combination of legal and illegal tactics is reminiscent of the Communist Party, and indeed Nayar makes a qualified comparison explicit.

How then was the Akali Dal unable for so long to achieve its major goal? In his analysis of the Sikh community, Nayar demonstrates that despite its emphasis on equality, fissures between Harijan and non-Harijan, Jat and non-Jat persist and vitiate communal political solidarity. Because caste cuts across religious, linguistic and cultural lines, he concludes that it functions to fragment separatism and promote national unity. The Akali Dal, he demonstrates, never enjoyed majority support even among Sikhs. Thus, contrary to the assumption that all social cleavages are inherently detrimental to national integration, Nayar urges the acceptance by Indian national leaders of the inevitability and potential utility of group conflict.

The author's further extrapolation that "given a democratic framework, only a political party or coalition which is secular and broad-based can remain in power in the government of the state" has been belied by the post-election events of 1967. His own secularism and political preference ("continued control of the government by the Congress

party is of crucial importance to the maintenance of the political system") apparently blinded him to a fourth Alkali strategy: coalition with its antithesis, the Jan Sangh.

Lastly, although the level of theoretical abstraction obtainable from this kind of configurative study-in-depth is not very high, it seems preferable that comparative theory should be built up from the solid empirical base of "area" knowledge it offers than down from the premature category-mongering recently fashionable.

As a postscript, it is regrettable that Nayar mars his otherwise admirable objectivity by characterizing the Sikh grievances as "alleged" and the Punjabi-speaking area as "so-called."—Theodore P. Wright, Jr., State University of New York at Albany.

Panditji: A Portrait of Jawaharlal Nehru. By MARIE SETON. (New York: Taplinger Publishing Company, 1967. Pp. 515. \$13.95.)

The author of this highly personal biography of Jawaharlal Nehru is a British journalist who visited India in 1955, and who being introduced to Nehru, became a frequent house guest in the following years. As would be expected, the author is adulatory in her praise of Nehru and his distinguished daughter. The contribution of the book consists principally in the insights which its rambling chapters give of Nehru's great urbanity, gentleness, humanism, his catholic interests, and his desire to promote all sorts of good works. His interest in the poor is indicated by his practice of setting aside a half hour every morning to see all persons, however lowly, who came to see him, listening patiently and kindly to their stories, and rendering whatever aid he could. No appointment was required, and no screening was conducted of those who called to see him. It is little short of astonishing that the head of a great and populous state today could follow this practice.

The last two thirds of the book, by far the most important part, consists largely of an account of the author's visits and conversations with the Nehru's and other important Indian personalities, written usually in the first person. No household item is too small to be related. In this fashion the author describes the major public events and crises which Nehru and the country faced during the ten years after she became a guest of the Nehru household. Interspersed are frequent accounts of the author's other activities, including trips abroad, quite unrelated to the subject of the book. Facts, opinions, hearsay, and sometimes gossip are woven together to throw sidelights on major problems and issues and to portray the attitudes and concerns of Nehru.

The first five chapters, which review the life of

Nehru prior to 1955, are drawn largely from his own writing and are sketchy. They do not reveal the forces, personalities, ideas and ideals, struggles, and disappointments which greatly influenced his character and ability to win the devotion of the masses of Indian population, second only to Mahatma Gandhi, whose heir he became. The book largely fails to explain the basis of Nehru's greatness as a leader, his philosophy, ideals and values. One cannot understand Nehru as a person and as the leader of his country without an awareness of the great influence exerted over his character and career by his distinguished father, Molital Nehru, and Gandhi. Equally important are the factors and events which brought Nehru into the leadership of the fight for independence. The nine prison terms which he served from 1922 to 1945 had a profound effect upon him and his future leadership of the movement for independence. Son of an aristocratic Brahmin of great wealth and distinction, his first contacts with the poor in the large cities and the rural peasants occurred after his return from England where he received his education at Harrow and Cambridge. A student of Fabian Socialism, the dire poverty of the Indian masses led him to become an advocate of government enterprise as a means of elevating the standard of the poor at a time when the leadership of the Congress Party was largely conservative.

One would look in vain in this book for a discussion and assessment of Nehru's leadership of his party and his country, for the basic tenets which guided his life, including his belief in democracy, parliamentarism and free elections; his devotion to Indian nationalism; his support of secularism instead of religion as the basis of the state; and his egalitarianism, indicated by his opposition to the caste system. The book adds to the growing number of biographies of this great statesman, but little to the understanding of his leadership.—Joseph P. Harris, University of California, Berkeley.

The Political Economy of South Africa. BY RALPH HORWITZ. (New York: Frederick A. Praeger, 1967. Pp. 427. \$10.00.)

This is a valuable scholarly contribution to our knowledge of South African economic and political history. Mr. Horwitz has written a thorough, indeed, exhaustive volume detailing South Africa's economic development and to a lesser degree its political evolution. And to the extent that anyone can write interestingly and factually about such essentially undramatic topics as "Economic Geography and Uneconomic Transportation," and "The Political Economy of Food," Horwitz has succeeded. The book reads well and the substantial amount of factual detail he incorporates into his study is accomplished with professional compe-

tence. He has combined an obvious scholarly competence with his extended involvement in the South African academic and economic environment. This involvement included an appointment as Senior Lecturer in Economics and Business Administration at the University of Capetown and a fifteen-year tenure as general manager and editor of groups of business periodicals in the country.

Despite its very real descriptive value the book is marred to a degree by an inadequate interpretative framework. Horwitz accepts implicitly two assumptions which cause him some problems. The first is a causal relationship, the second in the nature of a value commitment. Although it is presented somewhat amorphously Horwitz holds that in the relationship between the political system and the economic, the political is the causal agent. Aside from this point to which we shall return Horwitz values the free market as opposed to the managed market as the political-economic strategy guaranteeing maximum levels of economic development, and he scores apartheid repeatedly for its meddling with the economic lesson making environment.

Simply put it is suggested that South Africa's economic development has been managed and managed negatively by a political leadership committed to controlling economic development in order to render that development functional to the maintenance of a society ordered according to the dictates of apartheid. The concomitant economic growth in industrialization, urbanization, technological advance and secularism was seen by the Afrikaner leaders as being inimical to the preservation of their way of life. Thus, these byproducts had to be controlled so as not to destroy the fabric of the social life desired by the Afrikaner. We do not quarrel with his commitment to free enterprise nor his opposition to a bureaucratically directed and controlled development process. Nor can we seriously question his statement that, "the determination of wages, working conditions, range of jobs and field of employment by custom rather than by competition became from early on the characteristic feature of the labour market." But when this "custom" (read apartheid) filtered through the political structure is hypothesized as bringing about a reduction in the country's level of economic development a demurrer has to be entered. There just doesn't seem to be adequate empirical evidence available in the development literature to support this kind of interpretive model. That is to say that in assessing the relationship between the political system and the economic we are as yet not able to justify utilization of the political as independent and the economic as dependent and his decision to portray the political system as independent in this case would appear to be arbitrary.

This, of course, renders a commitment to free enterprise as the optimal development strategy somewhat academic until the precise relationship between the economy and the political system is empirically defined. That is, the related argument as to which kind of relationship is most conducive to rapid economic growth is quite a sterile one. Competition uncontrolled by government may indeed be most advantageous for economic growth. or it may not be. At present, however, this must be considered an empirical question. To believe in the efficacy of an unmanaged economy as opposed to a managed economy is to believe in the supported proposition that levels of economic development are dependently related to the political system. Such a belief would appear to be unwarranted at this time.

In summary the real and overriding contribution of the book is its well-documented description and it stands on that and should be welcomed by concerned scholars. The theoretical approach is not, however, without some problems and deserves question.—David Gugin, *University* of Georgia.

Tanzania: Party Transformation and Economic Development. By Henry Bienen. (Princeton, New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 1967. Pp. 446. \$11.50.)

Those of us who deal with African affairs know that it is extremely difficult to arrive at an accurate assessment of how African political systems function. It is even more difficult to correlate this data for meaningful comparative analysis. In recent years, analysts have devised numerous metempirical typologies in an effort to organize information about African politics and make it relevant to the comparative study of developing areas. However, the utility of these typologies has not been tested because of the scarcity of empirical data on "entire" African political systems.

Bienen's empirical case study indicates that the models constructed for the study of African politics by Coleman, Rosberg, Tucker, Apter and other analysts are inadequate to explain the political process in Tanzania. These models are based on the study of formal roles and statuses which provide only a superficial understanding of the élites' normative expectations of the system. The models do not specify (1) the ways in which the central institutional processes function, (2) the nature of relationships within the party, or (3) how the party relates to society as a whole.

The focus of the model builders has been on political structures, and especially on political parties. Kilson, Carter, Hodgkins, and Schachter have all asserted the primacy of the party in the allocations of values within the society of underdeveloped countries. Bienen's data provides little evi-

dence to support these views. In fact, his data indicates that the structures of both the party and the state are not even operative everywhere in Tanzanian society. Local communities exist in which there is no effective party presence. Authoritative values are allocated without regard for the dictates of either the party or the state. While this does not completely negate the value of the various models, it certainly creates serious doubts as to their general utility.

A major concern in the comparative study of underdeveloped areas is the relationship between economic and political development. The two have been tied together in various formulas proposed by Pye. Buchanan and Ellis have established that performance in the political sphere is a precondition for economic development. Coleman has outlined this relationship so that correlations between political types and economic indices appear.

Bienen studies this relationship in Tanzania by focusing on the interaction between economic factors and the TANU's operations. He determines (1) what the party is doing to change the economy of Tanzania, and (2) what changes are taking place within the party as it organizes to achieve economic development. In so doing, he seriously questions the validity of the many formulas previously devised in an effort to explain the relationship between economic and political devlopment.

Bienen concludes that the TANU does not provide an institution which can transform the economy and make itself more effective in the process. The party is too weak, too loosely organized, and has too few human and material resources to solve developmental problems. Thus, it is questionable whether countries similar to Tanzania can have highly organized monolithic single-party systems capable of transforming the economy.

Another major area of concern in the comparative study of developing areas is the question of national integration. Most analysts (Almond, Coleman, Lipset, Organski, Deutsch, Pye) assume a linkage between political-economic development and national integration. National integration is considered as a positive corollary to political-economic development.

Bienen approaches this question in Tanzania through an analysis of intra-party relationships: recruitment to party posts; vertical-horizontal communications among the party hierarchies; and the dissemination of ideology as legitimizing doctrines and guides to action. This framework enables him to translate the problems of national integration into questions about the political functioning of élites. (This study, however, is not a systematic study of élites.)

The author concludes that the party itself suf-

fers from integrative problems. The party is without a powerful center. It is essentially decentralized and fragmented. Thus, the instrument designed to bring about national integration and economic development reflects the very same lack of integration found throughout society.

The conditions needed to centralize the TANU and enable it to control from the center do not exist in Tanzania. The lack of economic development has prevented the formation of economic interest groups potentially hostile to the regime. There have been no urban or demographic changes which have altered existing social patterns and increased social cleavage. Thus, conditions of Tanzania do not facilitate the building of a centralized, desciplined party, they have impeded the formation of social classes or emergent political élites who might threaten the present regime.

This case study presents an ideal opportunity for testing the typologies and models currently being used to study African political systems. While it creates doubts about their utility, it provides additional data that may be useful in modifying them. Towards this end, the author has provided an analytical framework which focuses on the political party and its interaction with the economy. The analysis of the evolution of specific political structures as this evolution relates to economic change is a unique and significant contribution towards the comparative study of the problems of developing areas.—Paul Saenz, University of Arizona.

Planning Without Facts: Lessons in Resource Allocation from Nigeria's Development. By Wolfgang F. Stolper. (Cambridge, Massachusetts: Harvard University Press, 1966. Pp. 348. \$7.95.)

Stolper draws on his experience in Nigeria—he was an architect of that country's 1962-68 development plan—for an analysis of the problem of resource allocation in developing nations. He observes a hiatus between development theory and practice: the practitioner, often lacking basic economic data, tends to be skeptical of the theorist's assumptions that starting points can be fixed and the future known. Planning Without Facts attempts to bridge the gap. Stolper's prescriptions are summarized below:

- 1. Given the paucity of data, development must be a process of "optimizing as one goes along" (p. 4); i.e., the long-run is conceived as a series of short-runs involving decisions based only on what is reasonably known of the future. Decentralized decision-making—control responsibility for planning and coordination, decentralized responsibility for execution—will facilitate continuous examination of planning decisions.
- 2. Aggregative and disaggregated data must be joined for purposes of development planning.

Models based on aggregative data will provide checks on the consistency of planning decisions.

- 3. An investment (or commitment of resources) is profitable when it yields an increase in available resources and in the productive capacity of the economy. According to Stolper, "the only valid investment criterion is economic profitability.... Other investment criteria are either invalid, non-operational, or implicit in economic profitability" (p. 5).
- 4. Development planning must not impose a high degree of austerity. In order to avoid demoralization, distortions in the allocative process, and political instability, it is necessary to have a rise in the standard of living, albeit at a rate slower than that anticipated for economic growth.

I shall direct my comments to the third prescription for the following reasons: (a) The economic profitability criterion is central to the analysis in *Planning Without Facts*; (b) That criterion is controversial, as we shall see, even among students of economic development; (c) The argument for the elevation of that criterion to a preeminent position exposes the "underdeveloped" character of our own discipline; and (d) Stolper overlooks important implications for the Nigerian political system of resource commitment based solely on considerations of economic profitability.

Some economists challenge the notion that development planners ought to rely solely on economic criteria. Ralph Turvey, for example, argues "that where [decisions to commit resources yield side effects on the environment, reliance on economic considerations] alone may not produce the best allocation of resources" (in Henry Jarrett ed., Environmental Quality in a Growing Economy: Essays from the Sixth Resources for the Future Forum, 1966, p. 49). In such cases, "who should do what how much is often a question which cannot be decided on a purely technical basis by an economic calculation. Political considerations—judgments of what is equitable—are also required" (p. 52). This group views the economic calculation as a necessary but often not a sufficient condition for decision-making.

While he recognizes that equity considerations will affect decision-making, Stolper comes down hard on the side of profitability when economics and equity are in conflict: "first things first; redistribution requires something to be redistributed. Equity considerations become self-defeating if they prevent growth altogether" (p. 164). He also observes that it is "by no means self-evident that economic profitability is inconsistent with . . . other social and political considerations when the facts of the case are considered" (p. 165).

I shall not dwell on the matter of equity in development planning; it is sufficient to note that there are those in the developing nations who

would regard the subordination of equity to economic growth with trepidation. Instead I shall turn to the question of the relationship, generally and in the case of Nigeria specifically, between economic profitability and other social and political considerations.

Stolper's observation that economic, social, and political considerations need not be inconsistent eventually leads him to conclude as follows: "Bad economics create unnecessary political difficulties, and good, or at least better, economics can substantially help in the process of nation building and political development. . . . Good economic policy and careful planning are essential to political stability . . ." (pp. 316, 320). This is a rather curious conclusion, given Stolper's predilection for development planning based on operational criteria. It is an embarrassing fact that political scientists have not operationalized such concepts as political development and political stability. They have not met a necessary condition for testing the hypotheses implicit in Stolper's conclusion: the specification of operational definitions in terms of concrete and explicit procedures. Until those definitions are stipulated, it will not be possible to establish the precise relationship between economic policy-defined in terms of profitability or any other criterion-and political development and stability. For the moment, then, Stolper's conclusion appears to have passed but one "test," that of plausibility. Or has it?

Regrettably, Stolper's discussion of the two most important sociopolitical factors in Nigeria—regionalism and tribalism—is cursory. Chapter II surveys the socioeconomic character of the four Regions, their constitutional link with the central government in Lagos, and the Federation's planning framework. The question of the relationship between regionalism/tribalism and economic profitability is considered only briefly: "Geographic dispersal of new investments so as to benefit different parts of the country is a worthy aim" (pp. 164-165) insofar as it does not conflict with profitability.

That prescription hardly seems appropriate for the fragile political arrangement that is (was?) Nigeria. Could one reasonably expect that country, with its kaleidoscopic array of politically contentious peoples and Regions, to commit resources solely on the basis of the profitability criterion? Might the strict application of that criterion have favored—or be perceived as having favored—one Region or tribal grouping? If so, would it then be implausible to conclude that good economic policy—defined in terms of profitability—might contribute to the disintegration of Nigeria as a political entity? I think not.

In conclusion, this very stimulating, problematic book directs attention to the complex ramifica-

tions of the total development process. In doing this, it reveals the need for various disciplines to comprehend and participate in the management of that process.—ALVIN MAGID, State University of New York at Albany.

Planning and the Market in the USS.R.: the 1960's. By ALEXANDER BALINSKY, ABRAM BERGSON, JOHN N. HAZARD, AND PETER WILES. (New Brunswick, New Jersey: Rutgers University Press, 1967. Pp. vi, 132. \$4.00.)

On balance, this book attains its goal of illuminating for a "wider audience than . . . the Soviet specialist or professional economist" the complexities of the reforms of Soviet industrial management currently underway. The goal is reached, however, with no help and much hindrance from the theme of the original symposium: "Is the Soviet Economy Moving toward Capitalism?" Most of the clichés associated with that theme-for example, whether we should be "optimistic" about the market content of the reforms-are found in an overlong, confusing and not entirely relevant introduction by the symposium moderator, Alexander Balinsky. That this theme was chosen for a symposium in 1966 is a sobering reminder of how far Soviet studies are from being true social science rather than an arm of American Cold War propaganda.

Fortunately, Abram Bergson (who has done more than anyone else to make social science of the study of the Soviet economy) and John Hazard respectively contribute good papers on the economic and political aspects of the reforms. The third symposiast, Peter Wiles, enlivens the book generally and contributes a specific point here and there, even though saddled with the shopworn topic of the "convergence" hypothesis.

Professor Bergson's paper has three parts: the management reforms themselves, their origins, and their likely implications. He shrewdly avoids "profits," that reddest of herrings on this topic, stressing instead the greater enterprise initiative, the emphasis on sales rather than the mere volume of output, and the attendant financial and pricing arrangements. His conclusion is worth quoting (pp. 50-51):

In sum, the Soviet government is scarcely dismantling wholesale its system of centralized industrial planning, as sometimes has been suggested in the West, but it is adapting this system measurably in the direction of decentralization and increased use of market-type controls.

Further than this, Bergson is appropriately noncommittal, leaving us with a question answerable only with time: To what extent will planning and market elements mix? More precisely, what proportion of each will prove viable under contemporary Soviet conditions, non-economic as well as economic?

Professor Hazard addresses himself to the noneconomic conditions. Wisely spurning the tempting but treacherous subject of the role of "personal ambition," he examines instead three areas of key importance to the success of the reforms: Party-State relations: Union Republic-central government relations; and the emergence of enterprise directors as a potentially influential interest group. He finds the reforms at least in part a response to Brezhnev's desire to "re-Leninize" the Party into an elite, inspirational organ of leadership instead of the broad-based administrative organ shaped by Khrushchev. He also detects 1 new emphasis on Union Republics, rather than the All-Union government, in the ministerial structure which has replaced Khrushchev's territorial system of 1957-65; but he attributes the shift of emphasis more to economic logic than to any renascent nationalism among non-Russian mincrities. Brezhnev and Kosvgin are reversing vet a third Khrushchevian trend, Hazard believes, in enhancing the political power of enterprise directors, by reducing direct Party interference ("petty tutelage") in industry and increasing the directors' laitude in decision-making. But this political power should not be exaggerated, he cautions, for the drectors will still be unorganized, and the trade unions are likely to assume more power in maragement decisions.

Professor Wiles makes the best of a bad job in assessing the possibilities of convergence. His most salient point concerns the erosion by social science of ideology, in which convergence is occurring, he thinks, if only slowly. Good Marxist that he is, Wiles sees the dialectical process in the midst of which Soviet leaders presently find themselves: forced to resort to modern social science for aid in governing Soviet society, yet impelled to recast the Party in a Leninist mold which provides its own all-embracing social science and tolerates ro alternative sources of truth. (Wiles would very likely disagree with Hazard over the probable symthesis, if any, that will emerge from this dialectic.) One wonders if the closest Soviet-American coavergence at the moment is not a common, or at least a similar, set of dialectical contradictions facing their top leaders.—ARTHUR W. WRIGHT, Yale University and Oberlin College.

Planning Reforms in the Soviet Union, 1962-1963. By Eugene Zaleski. (Chapel Hill: The University of North Carolina Press, 1967. Pp. viii, 2C3. \$6.00.)

Professor Zaleski's book is a patient and perspicacious description of Soviet efforts in recent years to develop a more effective form of economic organization. The explanations offered for the problems and motives of economic reform are more or less standard, but it is extremely useful to

have available this comprehensive and coherent survey. Because of its extensive documentation, the book is very useful as a reference work to which one can turn for the details of institutional changes, the chronology of controversies, and the positions of protagonists of different points of view. The various experiments and the changes in legislation area analyzed concretely; and unlike some other treatments, this one covers the less well-known experiments in construction, lumbering, mining, trade, etc., as well as the more famous experiment with the Bol'shevichka and Maiak apparel factories. Zaleski's discussion of the various controversies is especially helpful for its careful analysis of the positions taken by various people and of the arguments for and against a given pro-

A few elements in Zaleski's treatment seem distinctive and it is interesting to look for the special viewpoint which a man with his uniquely extensive knowledge of the whole history of Soviet organizational evolution brings to consideration of the problem of organization and administration in the Soviet economy. One such element is his patient consideration of the details of official explanations and rationalizations for any administrative change. It is easy to feel cynical about the official line, but Zaleski's treatment shows how useful this tedious work is. A second distinctive feature of the book is a detailed exploration of the roles of the republican Councils of Ministers and the republican Gosplans. We tend to think about planning in terms of the central planning apparatus only, but this book shows the important role of the lower level planning organs in the process. Third, Zaleski devotes much attention to the idea of continuous planning as one of the widely discussed reforms, though this emphasis is less easy to agree with. Since the Russians have not in fact done serious long-range planning, there seems little point in taking very seriously all the arguments about whether long-range planning should be done continuously or intermittently. Finally, Zaleski always considers the question of the rank of an official heading an agency-say, whether certain officials within Gosplan are given the assimilated rank of minister. This is one example of his general sensitivity to political issues in economic reorganization which is one of the strong features of the book.

One consequence of Zaleski's emphasis on political, institutional and pragmatic considerations is that there is some neglect of the theoretical-analytical revolution which has been taking place concurrently with the evolution of institutions. There is very little discussion in the book of the theory of optimal planning and its implications for such practical matters of economic reform as pricing. In the end this revolution in theory is

bound to play an important role in economic reform even though its influence so far has not been great. For example, it is only on this theoretical-analytical level that the most momentous issue of all—the rate of investment—is being discussed. Although, as Zaleski notes, this issue has not yet been raised at the policy level, the theoreticians are discussing it under the Aesopean title of "the criterion of optimality in dynamic planning."

Overall, Professor Zaleski interprets the reform as a kind of stalling effort to postpone radical change in the institutions of Soviet-style planning. Certainly, as he shows, the leaders have been cautious in moving toward reform; but there is always some foot-dragging on social change and this may be a good thing. The Soviet leaders and even the proponents of reform do not know for sure where they are going. None of the various strands of reform thought which Zaleski describes has a coherent theory of how everything will hang together when reform is finished. This is even true of the optimal planners, the group which comes closest to such a vision. But I believe it is wrong to interpret this caution as a maneuver from which the leadership can retreat if they wish to. They have gone far enough already that retreat is no longer a feasible option.—ROBERT CAMPBELL, Indiana University.

Soviet Institutions, The Individual and Society. By Karel Hulicka and Irene M. Hulicka. (Boston: Christopher Publishing House, 1967. Pp. xviii, 680. \$12.00.)

This lengthy and detailed book claims to be "an all-encompassing text and reference book" on all aspects of the Soviet political system. It claims also the benefit of an "interdisciplinary analysis" and the uniqueness of heavy, indeed preponderant, reliance on official Soviet sources. These claims are severely undermined by a fourfold failure: the book fails to provide functional equivalents for Soviet terminology and doctrine; it fails to account for political change; it fails to identify "the political" in any arena other than that which is explicitly political by Western standards; and it fails to avoid misleading oversimplification.

Each of the twelve chapters examines a familiar sector of the Soviet system (Communist Party, Youth Organization, Federalism, Agriculture, Economy, etc.), and in each the reader finds a lengthy presentation of the official Soviet position followed by the authors' analysis. In neither part have the authors succeeded in translating Soviet terminology into Western functional terms or sometimes, into adequate English. Thus, we find such literal Sovietese as: "brain worker and manual worker," "objective and ideological measures," "progressive advance," "highly divorced from reality," and "progress toward materialization of . . .

tenets." These are only a few examples of a practice so pervasive in the book, that the student of Soviet politics, the non-expert to whom this book is addressed, would be baffled by the incomprehensible language and prevented from applying to the study of Soviet politics any of the multiform techniques of comparative politics. In fact, the authors stress the uniqueness of the Soviet political system, and processes which are found in most political systems are often characterized by them as uniquely Soviet: for example, we learn that the position of the First Secretary of the CPSU is attained "on the basis of a naked struggle for power," and that "lower level party officials are used as convenient scapegoats to account for failures which would, without scapegoats, be embarrassing for the infallible leaders." Such observations tend to raise needless barriers between the study of Soviet politics and an understanding of comparative political systems.

A much more damaging defect stems from the inability of the authors to account for change. With their highly oversimplified notion of a static, perhaps monolithic, unity, they seem to regard change as aberrant. In their chapter on the CPSU, the authors state: "The CPSU is a rigidly hierarchical organization, in which all subordinates are unconditionally obligated to carry out the policy directives and decisions which are the exclusive prerogative of the central command," and that the Communist Party "has preempted all power for itself.... The authority of the party over the lives of all Soviet citizens is virtually complete." Most of the recent studies in Soviet politics have attempted precisely to shatter this unreal image of the monolith party set off against society. The party itself is an ever-changing body, with aging leaders ensconced at the top and about three million people, or one-fourth of the entire membership with only three or fewer years' standing in the party. A generational problem of unknown magnitude obviously faces the party leaders; how to socialize new life into the old structure remains a thorny question. Further, there are social and economic differences within the party, and these present the possibility of division and dissatisfaction. According to the Hulickas, the rank-and-file carry out party directives. But as of October 1967, about half of the membership had not finished high school. How can the rank-and-file understand and articulate the complexities of national and international policies in a world of advanced technology? More importantly, how can they possibly identify themselves with this highly specialized future of economic development? The existence of a broad and highly differentiated network of party schools underlines the seriousness with which the central leadership regards the issue of party cohesion. As a Soviet official remarked, the party

schools, with their emphasis on participation, tend to eliminate the "wild ideas" of party members.

The authors similarly fail to provide a framework of analysis for the major changes that have occurred at the top levels of the party. About the profoundly important origins and effects of de-Stalinization, the authors write: "although there has been some speculation that Khrushchev consciously decided to use the de-Stalinization issue as a convenient weapon through which he could divide and weaken opposition to his bid for supreme leadership of the party, it is more likely that he merely made after-the-fact use of a situation which had developed on a somewhat unplanned basis" (italics mine). In another use of the passive voice to avoid analysis, the authors write about Khrushchev's fall: "On October 13, Khrushchev, as the supreme leader of the CPSU and virtual dictator of the Soviet Union, probably wielded more personal power than any other individual being during the current era. By October 15, Khrushchev was stripped of his power, retired, cast aside, denied the role of the respected elder statesman . . ." Failure to investigate the processes of change leads surely to misunderstanding of the current reality.

One of the most potent sources of change in the Soviet Union, as in most states, is modernization, and the linking of modernization with Sovietization has been a major strength of the Soviet political doctrine, both internally and externally. The Hulickas seriously underestimate the political effects of modernization as dogma, and they virtually ignore the crucial debate currently claiming the attention of the top decision-makers in the Soviet Union: how to shake the economy out of the doldrums and carry out the thoroughgoing structural reforms that are so urgently needed. while maintaining political power. In fact, the very commitment to high growth rates is itself a political decision. Similarly, in the armed forces, the course of modernization has created a technocracy, for whom the party control and the political education systems are increasingly irrelevant. Many of the national minorities of the USSR represent a case of forced and rapid industrialization. The Hulickas assert that these minorities "attribute to socialism their improved economic and social status. . . ." They do not discuss in this context the obverse problem of the social cost of modernization, the disruptive effects: the breakdown of the family, the creation of urban poor, the destruction of traditional societal patterns.

This anachronistic volume appears at a time when many of its premises and certainly its methodology have been discarded. It does present an unusually large collection of official Soviet statements and directives, but in comparison with the many excellent works currently available, it can-

not stand as an adequate analytic study of the Soviet political system.—ELLEN MICKIEWICZ, Michigan State University.

Juggernaut: The Russian Forces, 1918-1966. By MALCOLM MACKINTOSH. (New York: The Macmillan Company, 1967. Pp. 320. \$6.95.)

Western students of Communist societies frequently resort to monistic and deductive propositions when seeking to define the role of the military in these societies. The military is frequently characterized as the blind instrument of the political elite in the Party; or, the Marshals and Generals are described as the behind-the-scenes manipulators of public political leaders. This either/or approach to the "experts in violence," faceless soldateska or praetorian guard, has obscured the mounting evidence of the military's basic role and place in the Soviet Union, namely that of an institution whose spokesmen clearly embrace the broad political and policy objectives of the Party leaders, but who also retain a strong loyalty to and sense of identification with the military com-

This ambiguity in Western writings on the Soviet military was in part supported by a perceived vagueness in Communist statements on the role of their military. In charting the revolution of the proletariat, the Communist Party's assumption of power, and the creation of a Communist society, neither Marx nor Lenin came to grips with the problem of what would be the nature and the role of the military forces in such a society. Marx and Engels originally saw the successful revolution in Utopian terms of a massive uprising of the lower classes, led by a Communist vanguard. After the fiasco of the Paris Commune, they began to appreciate the need for a well-organized, well-armed, and well-directed military organization, but they never abandoned the view that standing professional armies were alien to a Communist state. Lenin, who so abundantly described most other aspects of the Communist society to be, remained vague on the role of the military in it. And even Trotsky, the creator of the Red Army, who consciously ignored the Communist tenets about the dangers of militarism, subordinating ideology to expediency, reverted to impractical Utopian views once the danger of further anti-Soviet military campaigns had passed. It was Stalin, the mediocre ideologue and ruthless pragmatist, who finally addressed this central problem of the rulers of any Communist society: what should be the role and place of the military in the one-party totalitarian state. He defined the military's role, its organization, its relations with the Party, and its social and political functions. The Red Army emerged from this process as an adjunct of the ruling Party elite; its officers were denied the full authority

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necessary to the practice of the military profession; they were kept in a perennial state of uncertainty about their careers; and the military community, which tends toward exclusiveness, was forcibly kept open through an elaborate system of control and indoctrination.

Malcolm Mackintosh, whose previous works on Soviet affairs are well known and widely respected, has chosen to describe the role and place of the Soviet military by means of a "traditional" historical rendition of the origins and developmental stages of the Red Army. Using both Soviet and Western sources, he skillfully describes the vital role played by emergent amalgam of revolutionary forces in cementing the Bolshevik's hold over Russia and in warding off counter-revolutionary thrusts from within and outside the collapsing Russian empire. Mackintosh proceeds to examine the early stages in the evolution of the Red Army from a quasi-revolutionary force, "a vast straggling, loosely-organized force with few common factors binding it together," which eventually became transformed into a "juggernaut." He describes this evolution as having been shaped and strongly influenced by a variety of factors: (a) Stalin's mounting concerns with potential threats to Soviet security, and his massive program for modernizing and "professionalizing" of the Red Army, (b) the devastating effects on the morale and effectiveness of the military caused by the purges, (c) "the lessons of Finland" which firmly reversed Stalin's distrustful policies vis-á-vis his military, (d) the Soviet-German war, which on the one hand, dramatically illuminated the Party's overwhelming dependence on the military establishment for its survival, and on the other, persuaded Stalin of the need to clearly assert the Party's supremacy over the military, once the major threat of German aggression was over, and finally (e) the profound changes brought about in the military's role in society and in its relations with the Party, both caused by the nuclear technology and the superpower role of the Soviet Union emerging from World War II.

Mr. Mackintosh is an authoritative writer who marshals his materials in a readable and informative manner. The Juggernaut provides an excellent introduction to the complex relations of the military and political elites and to the evolution of their respective roles in the Soviet Union. Two remarks, however, are in order, referring to the author's omission and commission: One would have liked to see a somewhat better balance in the treatment of the several historical periods. It is rather disappointing to see the whole post-war period treated in two slim chapters. Secondly, the author's generous use of rather obscure personalities and events may possibly tax the general reader's interest and attention. These, however, are

minor points. Although he does not depart from traditional interpretations of historical facts, Mackintosh performed an extremely valuable service to the expert and the layman.—ROMAN KOLKOWICZ, Institute for Defense Analyses & The University of Virginia.

The Case of the Trotskyite-Zinovievite Terrorist Centre. (New York: Howard Fertig, 1967. Pp. 180. \$6.50.)

The Case of the Anti-Soviet Trotskyite Centre. (New York: Howard Fertig, 1967. Pp. 580. \$11.00.)

In one sense, the three Moscow purge trials of 1936, 1937, and 1938 were only a tiny but visible part of a great terror which claimed perhaps nine million victims between 1934 and 1940. The dramatic questions they provoked at the time-were the defendants, many of them founding fathers of the Soviet Republic, actually guilty of terrorism, treason, and sabotage; and if not, why did they confess?-have been definitively answered. Western scholars and post-Stalin Soviet spokesmen agree that the defendants were innocent. They were forced to confess. It is therefore reasonable to ask whether the transcripts of these discredited "frame-ups" the first two of which are reprinted here, are of any enduring interest or value. The answer is yes, in at least three general ways.

First, they contribute to establishing the "why" of the terror itself. A number of explanations-for example, that terror was a constituent dynamic of the "totalitarian" system, or that it played an episodically functional role in the party's modernizing effort-no longer seem to serve. Mass terror died with Stalin; the Soviet system continues. Further, the collectivization-industrialization "great leap" was over by 1933, well before the real terror began. Indeed, some members of the Politburo (not including Stalin) were strongly urging a course of "normalization." Today few students would disagree that the purges were dysfunctional and that they negated important economic and military gains of the 1928-33 period. A satisfactory explanation must instead begin with Stalin. His responsibility for the preparation and general conduct of the purges is beyond question. His motives are less clear. Here the transcripts, like several other "official" documents not bearing his name, are revealing. For Stalin's voice is present in the transcripts, particularly in the summations of the prosecutor Vyshinsky. The summations essentially tell of a world of masked conspirators, whose criminal machinations and hatred are directed "primarily towards Stalin." And it is partly for this quasi-autobiographical depiction of Stalin's imagined enemies as enemies of the state that the transcripts are important.

Second, the transcripts can throw light on the

still unclear political history of the thirties. One example must suffice. The 1936 Zinoviev-Kamenev trial differed from the later two in that it was relatively free of judicial pretense; nor did the published record claim to be a verbatim report, only a summary of the proceedings. Its message seems to have been aimed less at the public than at a group within Stalin's own leadership, who since 1932 had contested his claim that former Bolshevik oppositionists were engaged in a terroristic conspiracy and who had resisted his attempts to execute the alleged criminals. The 1936 indictment was designed to demonstrate that such a conspiracy had existed since the early thirties, as "Comrade Stalin warned us." Vyshinsky concluded in his summation: "This trial has fully and distinctly proved the great wisdom of this forecast" (p. 119). The resisters, most of them Stalin's oldest supporters, remained unconvinced by the trial and themselves perished in its aftermath. As our knowledge of the secret struggles within the preterror leadership grows, the transcripts will provide further insights into the history of Stalin's rise to autocratic power.

Finally, the trials are central to one of the large unstudied questions of the October revolution: the transformation of old Bolshevism into Stalinism. Together the trials constituted a public spectacle celebrating the demise of the former and the coronation of the latter. The process which had begun in the late twenties with the distortion of Bolshevism's original programs, and ideals, and the political ouster of its greatest figures, now culminated in the physical destruction of those figures. Many passages in the transcripts speak literally or symbolically of this transformation, particularly in the 1938 trial in the dialogue between the main defendant Bukharin and Vyshinsky. But read as though through a distorted mirror, even the false charges reveal important truths. The final contention that an anti-Soviet, anti-Stalin "bloc of Rights and Trotskyites" existed, for example, was not true; but it bizarrely reflected the fact that for all their profound disagreements, old Bolsheviks of the Left and the Right collectively had represented something quite different from that which succeeded them.—STEPHEN F. COHEN, Columbia University.

Soviet and Russian Newspapers at the Hoover Institution: A Catalog. Compiled By Karol Maichel. (Stanford, California: Stanford University Press, Hoover Institution Publications, 1966. Pp. x, 235. \$6.50.)

German Periodical Publications. PREPARED BY GABOR ERDELYI IN COLLABORATION WITH AGNES F. PETERSON. (Stanford, California: Stanford University Press, Hoover Institution Publications, 1967. Pp. viii, 175. \$5.00.) Two new publications in the Hoover Institution Bibliographical Series will enhance the reputation of its library as one of the richest depositories of material for Russian and German regional studies in this country and simultaneously as a library diligently and unflinchingly doing a great public service by giving detailed information to the scholarly community about its holdings of original papers and those on microfilm.

I. The annotated checklist on Russian language newspapers—imperial Russian, Soviet and émigré—prepared by the Curator of the East European Collection, goes beyond the confines of the Hoover Library by including additional references to the holdings of the Columbia University Library and of the Library of Congress. This leaves the New York Public Library and Harvard University Library holdings of Russian newspapers as the principal untapped sources for Russian research based on newspaper holdings in American libraries.

Mr. Maichel points out that the present catalog contains only about 85 per cent of the Hoover Institution's holdings of Russian newspapers; among them seem to be a fair number of titles which started as newspapers and later became journals. Their titles will be found in a forthcoming catalog of Russian language journals which is as eagerly awaited as a promised list of Polish periodicals and journals.

The listings are of immaculate completeness; for one issue (of December 6, 1917) of Nabat revoliutsii 14 lines are needed; a certain lack of homogeneity in the entries has been pointed out in College and Research Libraries Vol. 28, No. 4, July 1967, p. 292. The bulk of the papers have been published after the turn of the century. Twenty-five titles in the list cover materials of the 1890's and only four titles are listed for the 1870's and 1880's. The enormous problem of preserving old newspapers is brought to the attention of potential users by the fact that in the rather strong collection of papers from the period of the First Russian Revolution (1905-1907) thirty-two titles are on microfilm.

The overwhelming impression in going over the list is, how extremely fragmentary the majority of the newspaper holdings are; indeed, of about 1,110 titles more than a fifth (263) are single issues, in other words, specimen copies. In addition 19 titles are rare items as "one day's newspapers" issued for special occasions; there are also (at least) three annuals listed which usually are not classed as newspapers. Only relatively few long runs of newspapers are listed.

There are several aspects which should be taken into consideration in preparing future similar listings. Unfortunately the items listed are not numbered which makes short hints to true gems among the "fugitive" materials well-nigh impossible, for instance to call attention to certain World War I items—papers published by the Russians during the short occupation of Galicia in 1915 (p. 81) or by the Germans in the Ukraine in 1918 (p. 103) or papers for Russian prisoners of war in Germany (p. 159) and Austria (p. 102).

Instead of lumping together all the titles of papers published in pre-revolutionary Russia, of those published after the revolutions of 1917 and by the Russian emigration, correspondingly the materials should have been divided in three large blocks. Between 191 titles from Tsarist times and 297 émigré newspapers, Russia since 1917 would comprise the largest group with outstanding materials for the early years of Bolshevism.

Indices should be provided for the convenience of users. Since the papers are alphabetically arranged, an alphabetical list of the countries and of places of publication would allow users to find out immediately which papers of particular regions of interest to them are represented in the list. A historian who wants to work about the Russian emigration in any particular country has now no choice but to comb through 235 pages to bring together, for instance, 47 titles of papers published in the United States, 57 for France, 23 for Germany, 14 for Czechoslovakia and Yugoslavia each, 16 for Bulgaria, 11 for Poland, 34 for Manchuria, 27 for China, four for Mongolia, ten for Latin America, etc.

A topical index should be provided indicating party affiliations, issuing bodies (for instance, government agencies, trade unions or provincial and district branches of the Communist Party); also hints should be given as to which papers are primarily literary, religious, economic, military in content, etc. Wherever the entries give editors or main contributors, their names should also be indexed especially for the benefit of historians of journalism. Associations mentioned are, for instance, those of A. F. Kerenskii with *Dni*, Petr Struve with Rossiia i Slavianstvo, P. N. Miliukov with Zveno and Posledniia Novosti, V. V. Shul'gin with Velikaia Rossiia, and many others.

Such small improvements as indicated would greatly add to the serviceability of this type of catalog.

II. The checklist of German language serials and monographic series currently received in 30 Stanford University libraries is principally a tool to be used locally. It includes mainly German language continuations in all subjects published all over the world and gives an impressive picture of Stanford's range of collecting German materials with the Main Library and the Hoover Institution Library in forefront. Although it is not intended as a reference work for general purposes, a subject index greatly enhances the usefulness and usabil-

ity of the volume outside Stanford.—FRITZ T. Er-STEIN, Indiana University Library.

Soviet Empire: The Turks of Central Asia and Stalinism. By Olaf Caroe. 2d ed. (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1967. Pp. xxxv, 308. \$7.00.)

When Sir Olaf Caroe's work on Soviet Central Asia first appeared in 1953, it filled a void. We had lacked a comprehensive guide in English to this little-understood area of the USSR-the Kazak, Uzbek, Turkmen, Kirghiz, and Tadzhik republics. The main contemporary sources were in Russian and Turkish (particularly the writings of Zeki Velidi Togan, an exiled Central Asian leader). Caroe drew heavily but selectively on these sources. He wanted to set the record straight about Tsarist and Soviet rule of Central Asia, to cut through the jargon used by communists and anticommunists, and also to give the "Russians" just due for the economic and social progress they had brought to Central Asia. On the other hand, Sir Olaf left no doubt then or now where he stands. A distinguished member of the former Indian Civil Service, he obviously is sensitive to Soviet charges about Western imperialism. In the new edition he sees "no grounds for reviewing the conclusion (of the first edition) that the Russian presence in Central Asia remains today, more than ever, the primary example of imperial colonialism of an Asian or African territory by a European power."

The only changes for the second edition, reviewed here, are the addition of an "Introduction to the Second Edition" and a brief bibliography of significant works published from 1960-1965 (where is the period from 1953-1959?). Therefore, I will deal first with the main body of the book.

The main purpose of the book, Sir Olaf wrote in 1953, is "to weigh old influences with new, and estimate the part which these peoples (the Soviet Central Asians) are destined to play in the struggle between the communist world and the West." He begins with an excellent geographical survey of the area, which varies from the lush irrigated oases of the Vale of Farghana to the great deserts of Karakum and Kizilkum and the half-desert steppe called "The Plain of Misfortune." (The last three were very real barriers to invading Tsarist armies.) Next there are several chapters summarizing the history of Central Asia from 700 A.D. to the 1917 revolution. These constitute a necessary "essay," Caroe indicates, because a "popular and comprehensible analysis of the story of these lands in English does not exist." Because of the complexity of the forces at play, in what was for centuries a focal point of Asian history, these brief chapters are somewhat rough going.

Caroe next devotes two chapters to the 1917 revolutions and their complex and confusing repercussions in Central Asia, particularly the Basmachi rebellion and Enver Pasha's futile yet heroic attempt to do what the local revolutionaries at Bukhara could not do-unite the disparate anti-Soviet elements and set up an independent state in Central Asia. This part of the book is particularly valuable because it still is the first adequate account in English of the true nature of the Basmachi movement, which was much more than the simple banditry claimed by the Soviets. There also are some fascinating tidbits of conversations between Togan, then the nationalist leader of the short-lived Bashkurd government, and the Soviet leaders. (In May 1920, Stalin told Togan that Trotsky "cared nothing for nationalists." Stalin avowed he understood the "Eastern Turks" because he himself was the son of a Georgian nationalist. The future dictator nevertheless cautioned Togan to do his duty "in the spirit of Great Russia and not worry so much about governing a small tribe.")

The last half of the book describes developments in the five "republics" under Soviet rule, treating collectivization, industrialization, public works (contrasting the ambitious irrigation projects with actual accomplishments), and Soviet efforts to "Russify" and indoctrinate the indigenous population. The treatment up to 1953 of each of these themes is very well done and serves to remind us of significant points in the Soviet record. Using bare Soviet population statistics, Caroe indicates that one out of three Kazaks perished during the collectivization from hunger and terrorism. He calls this genocide. There also is an interesting chapter on the 180,000 Central Asians who fought for Germany during World War II. The tragedy is that these men fought valiantly for a lost cause: they wanted independence for their peoples; the Germans wanted them only to fight "communism."

These later chapters are the most disappointing section of the book because they were not revised for the new edition. Although the original emphasis was on the "Turks of Central Asia and Stalinism," the work would be a much more valuable guide to the contemporary situation if the story had been brought up to the present. Caroe attempts to update the material in his lengthy introduction to the second edition, and revises his population statistics, noting the salient fact that "European" Russians now outnumber Kazaks in Kazakistan and that "Europeans" may now constitute 40 per cent of the total population of the five republics. But a more thorough analysis of the period since 1953 seems in order. Caroe also touches only briefly on what he terms the two major developments in Asia since 1953 and their significance for Central Asia: the withdrawal of

British power from the area and the resurgence of China under a "new dynasty."

Caroe's final judgment on perhaps the crucial issue-the impact on the indigenous peoples of Soviet rule-at one point is properly cautious. The "assimilative forces" of the Soviet system, says Sir Olaf, are "so overpowering that it remains an open question how far the older tradition can hope to survive as anything more than a nostalgic memory destined to fade sorrowfully into history." At the same time, Caroe calls the predominantly Muslim Central Asians "the least assimilable of all elements in the (Soviet) Union," and asserts that the Soviets would have to "torture and oppress these millions for centuries" to bring about their complete assimilation. "Never has anyone been able to force a religion or course of action." he states. "on the Turks." In 1966, Caroe predicts: "However strong the Russian nerve, the Russians will tire of ruling over others who see freedom all around them and will not willingly remain in thrall." Perhaps, but one could argue as did Geoffrey Wheeler (Problems of Communism, Vol XVI, No. 5) that a more likely outcome will be pressure of Muslim Central Asians for greater political, cultural and economic autonomy within the U.S.S.R.-RICHARD F. ROSSER, United States Air Force Academy, Colorado.

The Unfinished Revolution: Russia 1917-1967. By ISSAC DEUTSCHER. (New York: Oxford University Press, 1967. Pp. 115. \$3.75.)

A series of lectures, even so distinguished a series as Cambridge University's Trevelyan Lectures, is at best a questionable vehicle for the systematic analysis of any reasonably complex subject. Perhaps most lectures should never be published in anything resembling the form in which they were given. There is frequently no opportunity for deep analysis. It is impossible fully to support generalizations. Normally the focus is on a big question. In short, the lecture medium is suited to the initial airing of stimulating ideas, not to their careful and rounded presentation. These are the eternal and unavoidable limitations of the medium, no matter how distinguished the lecturer.

On this basis, then, one might simply dismiss this book by saying that it is a 115-page volume of lectures about fifty years of Soviet power and that in it the late Issac Deutscher has not and could not pull off the impossible. This will not be one of the books on which Deutscher's reputation will be based; it just does not compare favorably with any of his most important previous works, such as the controversial biography of Stalin and the three-volume analysis of Trotsky.

Still, the fact that it was written by the distin-

guished journalist and historian and that it was the last book published during his lifetime alone make such cavalier dismissal impossible. And, in all fairness, it must be said that Deutscher did as much as possible to overcome the limitations of the lecture format, and the result is a book that is both coherent and readable, if not highly stimulating.

Stalin's innate cautiousness, according to Deutscher, developed a tendency toward isolationism rather than internationalism—to the detriment of Soviet aims. This thesis stands out most clearly in his chapter on the Soviet Union and the Chinese revolution. By caution with regard to developments in China in 1927 and, particularly, in 1948, Stalin sowed the seeds of the Sino-Soviet conflict. The successors of Stalin, all products of a Stalinist Russia, were unable to abandon "their old search for security within the international status quo." Thus, Deutscher concludes, the "Khrushchevite revisionism" which Maoists denounce "is Stalinist in origin."

Deutscher's final chapter, "Conclusions and Prospects," lacks a close relationship to the rest of the book. The one possible connecting link-if one chooses to view it as such, is Stalin, still the villain of the piece, ruling the Soviet Union from the grave. While acknowledging the significance of developments since Stalin, he characterizes the present situation as a "half-freedom" which can be "even more excruciating than a complete and hermetic tyranny." At the heart of the malaise, he concludes, is the failure of de-Stalinization. The achievement of political maturity for the post-Stalin leadership during "decades of Stalinist falsification" made this task "uncongenial to them" and "went against the grain of their mental habits and interests." So only the limbo of partial de-Stalinization was achieved. Whether Duetscher believes the next generation of Soviet leaders capable of going further is not clear.

Two of Deutscher's basic motifs demand extended comment: his determinism and his conception of the consequences of the Stalinist idea of socialism in one country. In Deutscher's opinion the Bolshevik Revolution has been unique in history in maintaining a kind of continuity throughout the fifty years of the Soviet regime. And, as the title of the volume indicates, it remains unfinished, both in the sense that it "has by no means come to a close" and in that those who subsequently came to power turned their backs on the original revolutionary ideals. These straightforward and sketchily-supported assertions indicate to the reader that he is dealing with an author who takes a long and sweeping view of the historical process.

Even more characteristic of Deutscher is his em-

phasis on the inevitability of the revolution: social conditions dictated that it could not have been otherwise. Indeed, its direction was set over a period of "many decades, indeed of several epochs." Surely this is true, but it is also one of those deterministic statements that says everything and means nothing; it is a truism that purports to be an explanation.

More important for the interpretation of recent and current Soviet actions is Deutscher's second point. Much more than most other historians, he ascribes great significance to the shift from world revolution to socialism in one country. With the advent of the latter came the industrialization and the forced collectivization that exacted the human costs which still mark the Soviet social structure. Unquestionably, this "revolution from above" changed the face of the Soviet Union. That it had and, more important, still has as great an impact on Soviet relations with other countries has been less emphasized by other historians.—Donald D. Barry, Lehigh University.

The Politics of the European Communist States. By Ghita Ionescu. (New York: Frederick A. Praeger, 1967. Pp. viii, 303. \$6.75.)

Ionescu's theme is that dissent exists; it tends to coalesce and aggregate into "opposition" and seek an outlet for expression. The Communist system permits no opposition political party, and expression of dissent and opposition within the ruling Communist Party quickly reaches the limits imposed by Party necessity for unanimity and disciplined consensus. Therefore, the coalescing opposition seeks an institution outside the Party. "Parliament," by whatever name it may be called, provides the logical forum. But such a parliament in countries ruled by Communist Parties must be "inferior" in that it cannot hope to be based on a multi-Party system, free elections, and provider of executive power; it cannot hope to dissolve the government and supply a new one. But it can function as a debating society, and express dissenting and minority views. Even without such a parliament, however, dissent finds expression, and will continue to do so unless the ruling Party employs coercion. But coercion leads to "social and economic inertia," alienation, and also favors the development of a rival, political police, apparat, which might itself become a threat to Party hegemony. If force and the police are not used the expression of dissent is inevitable. And heterogeneous and scattered dissent tends just as inevitably to coalesce and aggregate into an opposition. If such opposition is coopted into the Party, factions result, also threatening the Party. Therefore, from the Party's own standpoint, and in its own interest, a forum for expression of dissent outside

the Party is perhaps necessary. In the absence of coercive force, somehow in some way dissent will unite into opposition, and will find expression outside the Party if not inside it, and in non-parliamentary institutions if not parliamentary ones. Absence of parliament, and Party resistance to factionalism within the Party, mean only that dissent and ultimately opposition will coalesce around something else: the Church in Poland, for example; or in the universities; or through intellectual groups and publications; or around some personality, like Djilas in Yugoslavia; or even through the army.

All this appears as much applicable to the USSR as to Eastern Europe, and indeed Ionescu does not hesitate to apply it to the Soviet Union. But thereby he weakens his other major argument, that Eastern Europe is very different from the USSR, that the Soviet model is inapplicable to Eastern Europe, that the USSR cannot be analyzed in the same framework as Eastern Europe. He argues that Eastern Europe legitimately can be, and should be, analyzed en bloc, but not with the USSR. Most of Ionescu's points concerning differences between the USSR and Eastern Europe are certainly valid, but most of them are irrelevant or only marginally relevant to the political analysis he undertakes. Most disturbing is his assignment of Russia to a category of "Eurasian," "East-oriented," as opposed to an Eastern Europe which is "European" and "West-oriented": "These states (of Eastern Europe) belong geographically to the continent of Europe and have the deepest cultural links with the Western part of it . . ." My own judgment is closer to that of Ilya Ehrenburg: "To speak of western European culture as separate from the Russian, or of Russian culture as separate from the western European is, to put it plainly, a sign of ignorance." This Ionescu approach to Russia, combined with the great emphasis on parliament, gives the book an old-fashioned quality, in striking contrast to the modernity and sophistication of the general political analysis.

At any rate, a major intention of Ionescu is to rescue Eastern Europe from the USSR, and reintegrate it with Western Europe, to construct a new (or rather, reconstruct an old) pan-Europe without Russia and without the United States; he wants to get the superpowers out of Europe, although he clearly recognizes that simple simultaneous withdrawal of the USSR and the U.S. would be unlikely to bring about the democratic pan-Europe he ardently desires.

The recent removal of Novotny as First Secretary of the Czechoslovakian Communist Party in January 1968 illustrates the usefulness of Ionescu's approach. Here the particular aggregator of dissent was the Slovak Party organization, behind

which Czech dissident elements rallied to form a coalition sufficiently powerful to change the top leader. Economic reformers, students and writers, opponents of anti-Semitism and neo-Stalinism, added their separate interests to Slovak dissatisfaction to gain a significant political result. This shows the way in which varying dissident groups come to unite in a coalition, within a Communist system. But it hardly illustrates any significance of parliament for expressing opposition.

Perhaps Ionescu underestimates the degree to which effective dissent can be expressed within the ruling Party apparatus, and overestimates the possibilities for non-Party political influence. But his warning that intra-Party opposition faces serious limitations is well-taken. Those who want to change the present system in Communist countries face a serious dilemma in deciding where to concentrate their offensive. As Ionescu indicates, the decisions will vary in each separate case, depending on where the strongest and best-placed opposition already functions. Other smaller and weaker opponents of the regime will gradually coalesce around that strongest group, hoping ultimately to constitute a coalition powerful enough for political effectiveness. The ruling group will attempt to frustrate such a coalition of dissent, but to do so effectively requires compromise and subtlety. Tough crackdown will only quicken the pace of unifying the various opposition groups, as Novotny apparently did when he arrested writers and undercut economic reform, as well as supporting the Arabs against Israel and refusing to recognize West Germany. He might well have survived the results of any one or some of these actions, but not all of them at practically the same time.

In a number of places, Ionescu over-rates the workers' alleged desire "to assume the responsibility and direction of the management of industry and the economy." Yugoslavia's experience with workers' councils suggests that workers are actually far more concerned with obtaining higher wages than with running factories. But opinions will differ on many of the specific points: the overall theme of dissent-aggregation should prove provocative and useful to all.—ROBERT A. RUPEN, University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill.

The Federation of German Industry in Politics. By Gerard Braunthal. (Ithaca, New York: Cornell University Press, 1965. Pp. xx, 389. \$7.50.)

Unlike many books about the Bonn Republic and the condition of the West German political psyche, Professor Braunthal's study is devoted to a precise investigation of one facet of contemporary West German politics. Its limitations of scope are conducive to the presentation of solid and detailed information on the structure and po-

litical activity of an important West German interest group.

The Bundesverband der Deutschen Industrie is composed of federally structured associations of the various branches of industry, and through this arrangement is said to represent 98 percent of all West German industrialists. It does not enroll individual concerns as members, but Braunthal shows the heavy influence of the spokesmen of the large basic industries—coal, steel, chemicals, machinery, metalworking, and electrical construction—in its policies. Moreover since individual firms are represented only indirectly through their associations, oligarchical and centralist patterns are much in evidence in the BDI.

In the central portion of his work, Braunthal examines the "tactics and targets" of the BDI in the political arena. There are no startling revelations in this account of activities in the areas of public opinion, parties, and the federal legislative and executive structures. Braunthal concludes with the observation that "the executive is clearly the primary target of the BDI." The primary usefulness of the presentation lies in the wealth of detail arising from the author's access to internal BDI memoranda and minutes and from evaluation of interview materials.

Braunthal's major attempt to relate the activities of the BDI to general questions of the West German polity concerns the subject of the political power of the BDI in postwar Germany. He contrasts "neo-Marxist" and "pluralist" views, and rejects the former as an adequate frame of reference for an accurate understanding of the role of German industry in politics. He concludes, rather, that "there are countervailing powers in a pluralistic industrial order," and that "a multiple elite governs the nation." Chapters on the economic and foreign policies advocated by the BDI suggest that there is neither overwhelming consistency in the policy aims of the interest group nor unbroken success in influencing governmental decisions.

The reviewer confesses some dissatisfaction with these conclusions, not because of rejection of the impressive material which the author has compiled, but because of doubts about the meaningfulness of the chosen confrontation of "neo-Marxist" and "pluralist" viewpoints. Braunthal alludes briefly to the narrow base of elite recruitment in West Germany, but does not pursue this theme. He refers in the Preface to the pattern of bureaucratization of West German political life, and citizen indifference to political affairs, but he does not systematically discuss the impact of these phenomena on the pluralist thesis. One may realize, however, that such topics were not within the framework of the book. Indeed, one of the implicit conclusions of Bruanthal's work is that one must look at West German political life in additional ways beyond the frame of reference of interest group analysis to discover both its *modus* operandi and its dilemmas.

Braunthal's book was published before the formation of the "Grand Coalition," and before the open emergence of the "new Right" and the "new Left" in West German politics. The first event seemed to formalize the pattern of bureaucratic decision-making, while the second showed evidences of alienation in the public, based on the suspicion that the decisions being made were irrelevant to important issues. These events promise to reveal much about the character of West German political structures and political life. It is to be hoped that knowledgeable and careful observers such as Braunthal will make additional contributions to our understanding by examining in detail the significance of these events for the mode and substance of political decision-making in West Germany.—George K. Romoser, University of New Hampshire.

Staat, Wirtschaft und Politik in der Weimarer Republik, Festschrift für Heinrich Brüning. Ed. By Ferdinand A. Hermens and Theodor Schleder. (Berlin: Duncker & Humblot, 1967. Pp. vii, 507.)

This Festschrift honoring German ex-Chancellor Heinrich Brüning on his eightieth anniversary consists of some fifteen papers written by historians and political scientists and three memoirs contributed by former colleagues and personal friends.

Of the personal reminiscences, the essay by George N. Shuster on "Dr. Brüning's Sojourn in the United States (1935-1945)"—the one contribution written in English—is of special interest since it deals with a phase of Brüning's life and activities of which on the whole very little is known. Moreover, departing from the generally accepted impression, Shuster shows the ex-Chancellor as being less austere and withdrawn than he is usually pictured.

Among the important scholarly contributions, Ferdinand A. Hermens shows in a paper on "The Brüning Government and the Depression" that Brüning did not pursue a purposely deflationist policy during his chancellorship. The decline of prices during those years, as Hermens shows, was always greater than that of wages. If the contrary impression prevailed, this was due largely to the failure of the government to explain its policies properly to the country. Moreover, because of Germany's commitments under the Young Plan Brüning was unable to reinforce the effect of the price decline by a devaluation of the currency. Once the reparations burden had been eliminated, however, the Chancellor was prepared to

initiate some pump-priming for which the plans were drawn up shortly before his dismissal.

Arnold Brecht presents some "Reflections on the Responsibility for Hitler's Appointment as Chancellor." Whatever the responsibilities of Hindenburg, Papen, Schleicher, and other individuals for that appointment, Brecht points out, it must be shared by the millions of Germans who voted for the Nazis and Communists in the Reichstag elections of 1932 and thus made impossible the formation of a constitutional parliamentary government.

Carl Joachim Friedrich contributes some "Thoughts on the Problem of Pathology in Politics." Since physical organisms produce poisons such as bile which in moderate amounts keep the body functioning, Friedrich wonders whether political organisms are not similarly dependent on such "poisons" for their proper functioning. He examines three such phenomena of political pathology-corruption, treason, and secretiveness. Under certain circumstances and within definite limits, he concludes, these practices may have a positive function and help the politician to loosen up structural rigidities in public life. Friedrich warns, however, that just as only a healthy body can absorb its self-generated poisons, only a political leader of strong character can safely cope with the dangers facing him in the swampland of political pathology.

Several convenient surveys of issues related to the Brüning era also deserve to be mentioned. Werner Conze provides a succinct summary of Brüning's chancellorship and points out the lack of choices the Chancellor had because of Hindenburg's unwillingness to work with the Social Democrats. Ulrich Scheuner traces the varied history of the application of Article 48 of the Weimar Constitution, and Gerhard Schulz surveys the evolution of Germany's agricultural aid programs during the 1920's and early 1930's.

Finally, mention must be made of a collection of contemporary documents assembled by Rudolf Morsey, "New Sources on the Background of Brüning's Chancellorship," which clear Brüning of any complicity in the fall of his predecessor, Chancellor Hermann Müller-Franken. In attesting once again Brüning's loyalty and integrity, the documents underscore the tragic fate of this honorable and sincere patriot who was not permitted to save his country from its impending downfall.

—Andreas Dorpalen, Ohio State University.

Annuaire Suisse de Science Politique—Schweizerisches Jahrbuch für Politische Wissenschaft. (Lausanne: Association suisse de science politique, 1967. Volume VII. Pp. 151. \$4.14.)

This seventh yearbook of the Swiss Political Science Association is devoted to the study of the Federal Council, the seven-man collegial body which serves as the national executive in Switzerland. The six articles devoted to this theme are written in the context of growing criticisms and demands for reform of this body, and are perhaps best viewed in this context, because with one important exception they are only remotely empirical

For example, "De quelques problèmes concernant le Conseil fédéral," by former Federal Councillor Max Petitpierre, rejects suggestions that the Federal Council be elected directly by the people rather than by the legislature, raises questions about the wisdom of increasing the number of its members, and defends its "all major party" composition. The absence of opposition is not so unfortunate because of the existence of referenda and because of the mutual independence of legislators and parties on the one hand and Federal Councillors on the other. One suggestion for change is that a "question hour" procedure be established whereby the Council would respond to queries from the two legislative chambers.

"Le système gouvernemental suisse comparé à d'autres types de gouvernements," by Christian Dominicé, is not as explicitly and thoroughly comparative as one might hope, and is perhaps more of a defense of the Swiss system (for Switzerland) than anything else. Some of the comparisons are as follows. The selection of a Federal Councillor is not influenced so much by his capabilities for a particular function as in other countries. The number of top political posts is more fixed than elsewhere. The sources of recruitment are more restricted than elsewhere.

Kurt Eichenburger discusses "Organisatorische Probleme des Kollegiatsystemes." The collegial system is contrasted with the departmental and directorial systems. Difficulties in coming to a decision, time demands, coordination problems and the dependence on governmental departments are discussed, and the author concludes that the Swiss collegial system has really become a mixture of "collegial," "directorial" and departmental systems.

Somewhat more useful for comparative purposes is Leo Schürmann's "Probleme der Allparteienregierung." This article contends that the existence of direct democracy in Switzerland puts the problem of opposition in a different light than elsewhere. The process of presentation and discussion of alternatives takes place more between government and social groups than between government and parliament. Still more of such quasi-functional analysis of opposition in the context of different institutions would be useful.

The topic of "Le rapport des forces entre l'Assemblée fédérale et le Conseil fédéral de 1848 à nos jours," is taken up by Jean Francois Aubert. This article is more empirical than most of the studies in that it includes occasional hints about how empirical data would be relevant.

The one article that is directly relevant to political science as it is written and reported in this Review is Erich Gruner's "Freiheit und Bindung in den Bundesratswahlen." This thorough, quantitative discussion treats the process of recruitment to the Federal Council from 1848 to 1966. It discusses patterns of representation of cantons, languages, regions and parties; competition for election; and the source of candidacies and conflict in the recruitment process. While no explicit hypotheses are tested and the comparisons are almost all on a time dimension, this article can stand as one of the more thorough and useful treatments of executive recruitment available.

It is mainly this last article which makes the volume of interest to those who are not especially concerned with current reform issues in Switzerland. The book does contain a report on political science in Switzerland, a report of the activities of the Swiss Political Science Association for 1966 and a bibliography of Swiss political science for 1965, all by Roland Ruggieux. Also of interest is the previous volume which is a comprehensive summary of Swiss political issues and events in the preceding year.—WILLIAM R. KEECH, University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill.

The Politics of Futility: The General Jewish Workers Bund of Poland, 1917-1943. By Ber-NARD K. JOHNPOLL. (Ithaca, New York: Cornell University Press, 1967. Pp. xix, 298. \$8.75.)

This is the first scholarly study of that steadfast group whose members never ceased to dream the impossible dream of creating on Polish soil a socialist order in which the Jews were to enjoy complete cultural autonomy and in which Yiddish—that curious polyglot tongue, German in sound, structure and origin but written in Hebrew characters—was to be an official and legal language.

The General Jewish Workers Bund of Poland, commonly called the Bund, like its forerunner in the Czarist empire, was, as its name indicates, a party that could not possibly aspire to governmental power, at least not by itself. The three and a half million Jews who lived in Poland prior to its partition by Nazi Germany and the Soviet Union, not quite ten percent of the general population, formed an obviously limited constituency. Even within that ethnically and religiously restricted electorate, the Bund was competing with other parties, the Poalei Zion (Workers of Zion), a forerunner of Israel's Mapai and Mapam, the non-socialist Jewish National Bloc and also the Polish Socialist Party (Polska Partja Socialistyczna (PPS), the only major Polish party which did not hesitate to nominate Jewish candidate dates for political office but was reluctant to grant-

the Jews national autonomy. The Bund was even prevented from forming an effective pressure group able to influence the policies of other major parties. For in a country in which long before the ascendancy of Hitlerism large segments of the population considered the Jews outsiders, in which the government's proposed solution for the "Jewish problem" was the organization of large-scale emigration, the Bund's official support of a position might easily have had the reverse effect and precluded its consideration.

Professor Johnpoll, who speaks of the Bund as an ecclesia militanta, observes that one result of the isolation of the Bund from the mainstream of Polish life was its devotion to abstract ideology. No question raised more debate within the membership of the Bund than the issue of its international affiliation. While even its right-wingers rejected Eduard Bernstein's revision of Marxism and, pointing to the examples of Italy and Hungary after the First World War, criticized the German Social Democrats and the PPS for their faith in democratic elections, the Bund never became a member of the Communist International. Already at the famous 1903 Congress of the Russian Social Democratic Party in Brussels and London, the five delegates of the then General Jewish Workers Bund of Poland and Russia asked that their party be regarded as the sole representative of the Jewish proletariat in all parts of Russia and withdrew from the Congress when both Mensheviks and Bolsheviks defeated the Bund's proposal. (Incidentally, it was the withdrawal of these five Bundists which allowed Lenin to gain control of the majority of the delegates.) The Twenty-one Points which the Comintern demanded as the price for affiliation were unacceptable to the Bund, not because they stressed relentless class struggle (which the Bund supported) but because of the Bund's belief in the need for an independent political existence for Jewish socialists in Eastern Europe and its lack of confidence in the genuineness of the socialist convictions of the non-Jewish workers. Moreover, but a few years after Lenin's coup in Russia, the Bund felt compelled to accuse the Communists of having turned working class rule into a dictatorship of the Central Committee of the Party over the proletariat and of having embraced Bakuninism rather than Marxism. The Moscow Trials in the mid-thirties ended whatever sympathy the Bund may have ever had with the Soviet system. With the words that Stalin's brand of Communism was but a return "to the unlimited power of the individual who stands above human and divine law, to the tradition of the Mongol Khan, Ivan the Terrible. and Peter the Great," Victor Alter and Henryk Ehrlich, the two best-known leaders of the Bund in the years from 1917-41, bid farewell to the former revolutionary position of the Bund. While in 1921, in opposition to both the Second (socialist) and Third Internationals, the Bund had joined the International Working Union of Socialist Parties (called the Two-and-a-Half International) which included the Austrian and Swiss socialists, the British Independent Labour Party and the Russian Mensheviks, and while in 1930 it had only reluctantly returned to the Second International and continued to attack its social reformism, it now considered itself a spokesman for social democracy and was willing to make common cause with the PPS. Like the PPS, it supported a genuinely independent Poland. Together with the PPS it had supported Pilsudski because of his old record as a socialist and only left him when he turned to authoritarian policies. But at the same time the Bund rejected the assimilation of the Jews into the Polish society as Poles of a Mosaic faith. Having no interest in the religious tradition of the Jews, it wanted the Jews to be recognized as one of the nationalities within Poland, with specific rights to cultural autonomy. Jews had lived in Poland since the end of the fourteenth century, and the Bund insisted that they were Europeans and not Middle Easterners, that their ties were with the countries in which they lived and not with a land where some of their ancestors had once lived. Zionism to the Bund was sheer escapism, and when the Arabs attacked the Jewish settlers in Palestine, the Bundists placed the blame on the Zionists who, they claimed, had intruded upon a foreign land and population. While the membership of the Bund probably never exceeded the eight thousand figure, in the elections to the Sejm (Parliament) of 1928 the Bund received about one hundred thousand votes, an indication of considerable strength if one compares this number with the total vote of little more than five hundred thousand for the candidates of all other Jewish parties.

In May 1933 the Bund warned the Polish government that Hitler's victory in Germany posed an immediate threat to Poland-but preached to deaf ears. When, following the Non-Aggression Pact between Hitler and Stalin, the German army invaded Poland, the Bund, together with the PPS, organized Warsaw's resistance. After the fall of Warsaw, when the Jews were forced into the ghetto and a high brick wall separated them from the non-Jewish community, the Bund, having gone underground in all of Poland, issued its proclamation for "A Free, Independent, Socialist Poland in a Voluntary Federation of Socialist Republics in Europe," rejected all talk of emigration, and, finally, when it became clear that the Warsaw ghetto was to be a death-trap for its four hundred thousand Jews, the Bund, with two Zionist youth

groups, formed a Jewish army which fought against the Nazis for several weeks until the fires set to the ghetto ended all resistance. Despite the protests of William Green, then President of the AF of L; David Dubinsky, President of the International Ladies' Garment Workers Union and a one-time Bundist; as well as labor leaders throughout the Western world, Alter and Ehrlich were accused by the Soviets of "active subversive work against the Soviet Union" and executed. Shmuel Zygelboym, who represented the Bund in the Polish government-in-exile in London, upon receiving the news of the fall of the Warsaw ghetto, committed suicide. Since the Jewish constituency in Poland had died out, the Bund's mission had ended.

Professor Johnpoll's book is packed with a wealth of information, well written and well documented. Its breadth of intellect and its historically grounded understanding of the forces which shaped Jewish life in Poland between the First and Second World Wars is a most welcome addition to the literature on political parties and the range of choices in their decision-making functions. The title of the book, The Politics of Futility, expresses, no doubt, the final verdict of the author's analysis of the Bund's career, This reviewer is inclined to accept Johnpoll's verdict provided it is confined to the specific historic situation of Polish Jewry in the interbellum period. But this reviewer remains mindful of the fact that just in these days, confronted with the Maoist challenge, the Soviet Communists and their friends abroad seem to be forced to revive the very political philosophy which formed the arsenal of the Bund in its opposition to the Stalinist regime.—Joseph Dunner, Yeshiva University.

A Liberal State At War: English Politics and Economics During the Crimean War. By OLIVE ANDERSON. (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1967. Pp. xi, 306. \$8.50.)

As the subtitle of this book indicates, the author set out to investigate the non-military aspects of the Crimean War. British domestic problems, political as well as economic, are discussed at length, while references to other European states are made only to clarify certain governmental actions of the 1850's. Negotiations with minor allies receive relatively more attention than do the other major belligerents, France and Russia. What is especially lacking is a systematic treatment of the French policies which shaped the course of the war and led to its abrupt conclusion in 1856.

British policies were dictated by the exigencies of the military situation. The lack of suitable recruits at home encouraged a search for foreign mercenaries. "Emigration and high wages had from the beginning seriously reduced the pool of human scum which the British Army was accustomed to rely upon" (p. 219). It was no longer possible to pay the smaller German states for corps of mercenaries, as the development of international law would have made this appear a breach of neutrality. Unofficial recruiting abroad for a foreign legion was slow, and harmful to British prestige. Finally, in 1855, important financial measures were negotiated with Sardinia and Turkey. The British would have preferred a subsidy, but the Sardinians insisted on a loan in return for 15,000 men, so as to be regarded as "des alliés et non des serviteurs" (p. 220). Gladstone's suggestion of an outright gift to Turkey because of doubt about the soundness of her credit did not materialize, and under public pressure Turkey was able to raise a large loan guaranteed by the British government.

Governmental economic policies showed evasive and inconsistent patterns of action, with results often contrary to original suggestions. Gladstone proposed meeting the expenses of the war entirely by taxation, as a salutary and moral check which "it has pleased the Almighty to impose upon the ambition and lust of conquest" (p. 195). Only six weeks later the Treasury raised funds by the sale of Exchequer Bonds. Governmental borrowing, resulting in higher prices, was defended by some as a way to make the poor pay their share of war expenditures. Although the Bonds were to constitute not a loan but a provision for the temporary raising of money to be repaid from the proceeds of taxation, they became part of the permanent floating debt in the following year.

The Crimean War created the modern war photographer and special correspondent at the front. It became the subject of unprecedented publicity and discussion, in which *The Times* commanded phenomenal attention, with a circulation ten times larger than that of any of its competitors. Press censorship was unknown, and letters from troops and sightseers to the front were extensively quoted and often printed in full.

In the outburst of patriotic excitement, traditional aristocratic virtues were acclaimed as necessary to carry the nation to victory. But the conduct of the war and military setbacks convinced the public that personal heroism and leadership were no substitute for practical experience, organization, and supply of material resources—typical achievements of the business world. The successful completion of the first military railway at Balaklava furnished tangible proof for the claim that the nation should rely on private commercial experience. The Administrative Reform Association advocated the reorganization of the Civil Service in the image of private enterprise, the use of civil-

ian contractors, and the substitution of business experience for the academic preparation it considered irrelevant. The Association did not escape the criticism of John Stuart Mill, who suggested that "any public matter whatever, under the management of the middle class, would be as grossly, if not more grossly, mismanaged than public affairs are now" (p. 122). His suspicion was soon to be confirmed by a crop of war contractors' scandals, discoveries of patched mortars, defective boots, and profiteering in war material destined for the enemy. The export of saltpeter, an essential war chemical, increased so alarmingly by October 1855 that it was obvious that indirect British trade with Russia must have been quite extensive and that governmental export controls were ineffective.

The Crimean War lowered British prestige abroad, and at the same time discredited the ideas of constitutional liberalism and laissez-faire economic policy. Bitterness between the middle classes and the aristocracy was freely expressed. A new, petty bourgeois, pseudo-antiquarian and xenophobic radicalism emerged in Urquhart's National Movement, which preached that progress can be achieved only by going backwards. But the war also increased middle class self-confidence, and laid the groundwork for the cooperation between the middle class and working class political movements which characterized the post-Crimean generation.—Charles Mark, Adelphi University.

Mao Tse-tung in Opposition 1927-1935. By John
 E. Rue. (Stanford, California: Stanford University Press, Hoover Institution Publications, 1966.
 Pp. viii, 387. \$10.00.)

This is an exceedingly important book about the early history of Chinese Communism. Although much that the author says already has been related in other works on this subject, his is the most lucid and comprehensive study that yet has appeared. Besides making exhaustive use of virtually every English-language work touching on Chinese Communism before 1936, the author also has consulted numerous Chinese language materials, as well as a number of works written in Japanese. The result is a book well suited for use as a text for a large part of a course on the history of Chinese Communism.

Although the author examines almost every significant aspect of Chinese Communist history during the period under consideration, he focuses his attention chiefly on the role played by Mao Tsetung. There emerges an unusually clear image of not only Mao but likewise early Maoism, which, in Professor Rue's words, revolved about the thesis "that the Chinese Communist Party's most potent weapon in the coming revolution would be the

Red Army, recruited from the peasantry whose allegiance had been secured in the course of a genuine land revolution" (p. 205). Inevitably, this conviction brought Mao into conflict with Stalin and his Chinese proteges, who wanted to carry out in China a chiefly urban insurrection modelled after the Bolshevik revolution in Russia, Relying on his impressive knowledge of Soviet history, as well as the history of the Communist International, Professor Rue describes with remarkable clarity how developments in the U.S.S.R. having no intrinsic relevance with respect to China, nevertheless, determined the policies which Stalin tried to force on the Chinese Communists. Mao's consistent and tenacious resistance to these policies and his ultimate triumph over Stalin and his Chinese followers is the principal theme of Professor Rue's book. "Mao, I believe," writes Professor Rue, "would like to be recognized as the man who has moved Communism away from its European proletarian origins, applied the essential elements of Marxism to the mastery of another historical epoch, and restated its fundamentals in universal categories that can be applied in the analysis of any stage of human history and used to incite or inspire revolutionary change in any human society" (p. 291).

Yet, although he adhered stubbornly to his belief in the necessity of mobilizing the peasants through land reform so as to create an effective army, Mao otherwise was pragmatic and almost opportunistic. Examples of his flexibility are his lenient policy with regard to middle and even many rich peasants and his willingness to join forces with liberal minded non-Communist opponents of Chiang Kai-shek, such as the so-called "Third Party" and the Fukien rebels of 1933. Professor Rue portrays Mao as a moderate, who disliked violence within the Party and championed democratic dissent against both left and rightwing dogmatists. His description of Mao's struggle with the Stalinist-minded group known as "The Twenty-Eight Bolsheviks," which dominated the Party apparatus until 1935, and the impact of this conflict on Communist efforts to defeat Chiang Kai-shek's fifth so-called "extermination campaign" in South China is unusually informed and a major contribution to our understanding of Chinese Communist history. I suspect that Professor Rue has written what may become a classic work on the history of the Chinese Communist Party.—Donald G. Gillin, Duke University.

The Fall of Sukarno. By Tarzie Vittachi. (New York: Frederick A. Praeger, 1967. Pp. 192. \$4.95.)

Indonesia. By Bruce Grant. (Baltimore: Penguin Books, 1967. Pp. xi, 247. \$1.65.)

During most of the decade prior to the cataclysmic events of late 1965 and 1966 national Indonesian (that is, Djakarta elite) politics was an ex-

tremely complex, highly personalized, and to a considerable extent unstructured affair. The basic conformation of the Guided Democracy power structure is well known: it consisted of the Army, which possessed a near monopoly over the instruments of physical coercion; the Communist Party, which possessed the largest, best disciplined, most effectively led political organization in the country: and President Sukarno, who used and was used by but neither controlled nor was controlled by the other major elements in the system. Within and among these and other structures there developed labyrinthine and ever shifting patterns of clique and factional alliance and maneuver designed to maximize short- and long-run power positions.

The point of the foregoing is to suggest that the exploration of certain kinds of questions in Indonesian politics—in particular the nature of intra-elite relationships—requires an expertise and sophistication which few possess. It is unfortunate, then, that the American public's interest in Indonesia since late 1965 has been centered largely on the "whodunit" question, precisely the kind of question most difficult to answer satisfactorily. This emphasis is doubly unfortunate because the whodunit question is, by itself, not very interesting from the perspective of social science, that is, it can provide few payoffs for a deeper understanding of the dynamics of Indonesian social and political life.

Where scholars fear (or do not desire) to tread. journalists sometimes rush in, due in part, no doubt, to the nature of their craft. In the case of Ceylon-born journalist Tarzie Vittachi's The Fall of Sukarno, the result is a superficial account, full of the most elementary sorts of errors and profoundly misleading in its implications. For example: Prior to 1965, Indonesia was governed by "a monolithic structure of power, built through twenty years of whimsical dictatorship" (p. 7) (the structure of power was anything but monolithic and Sukarno did not even approach quasidictator status until the late 1950's); "The Indonesian Armed Forces . . . was the only truly disciplined organization in the country . . ." (p. 15) (this should produce a wry smile from Generals Suharto and Nasution, and is refuted by Vittachi's own arguments); "the mahaenist [sic] population of the villages was . . . the strongest repository of religious or spiritual faith. The mahaenists are the santris, the believers" (p. 53) (the term Marhaen, coined by Sukarno and used primarily by the Nationalist Party, refers to an idealized Indonesian common man and not to the devout Moslems); ASU is identified as the student organization of the Indonesian Nationalist Party, where in fact the initials stand for a faction within the party itself (p. 161).

Vittachi's reconstruction of the coup is neither particularly original nor wholly implausible. He argues that the major actors all had contingency plans prepared with regard to various possible scenarios. When, on the night of September 30, Sukarno fell ill during a speech, Lt. Col. Untung and the Presidential Palace Guard, abetted by Communist Party and Air Force elements, moved to immobilize the Army by destroying its top leadership, thus paving the way for a new government in which Communist influence would be increased.

There are many problems with this analysis, including the enigmatic role of Sukarno himself, the view of some writers that the President did not in fact become ill during his speech, the apparent unreadiness of PKI to defend itself against a countercoup, and so on. My purpose here, however, is not to find fault with Vittachi's account of the coup-one can punch holes in all of the present versions-but rather with his underlying assessment of the nature of the Indonesian political system and its relation to the society. For Vittachi, Sukarno was, at least in recent years, a charlatan leading Indonesia to hell in a handbasket, the Communists were evil schemers, and the "truly disciplined" Army, with the support and prodding of the students and the "people" or the "masses" (who, it is alleged, have always looked to the Army for protection) was the savior of the Republic, restoring Indonesia to the rule of law under the Constitution of 1945. This sounds very much like official propaganda, and neglects such important problems as the very real support which Sukarno enjoyed from a considerable segment of the population, the fact that PKI did, after all, have millions of members and supporters of its own, the not unblemished record of the Army as a partner in Sukarno's Guided Democracy, the meaninglessness of statements about the "masses" (who are divided along several dimensions into groups with differing points of view about political matters), the fact that the massacre of the Communists reflected a deeply rooted religion-based cleavage in Indonesian (particularly Javanese) society, and the fact that the Constitution of 1945 was reinstituted initially not in accord with accepted legal procedure but by (Sukarno's) Presidential fiat in 1959. In short Vittachi simply lacks

the necessary qualifications to analyze either the coup itself or, what is much more important, the political and social system within which the coup occurred and upon which its consequences have been and will continue to be profound.

Bruce Grant (an Australian journalist) has produced a very different, and much better, book designed as a general introduction to Indonesian politics and society. Widely read, he combines some of the fruits of recent scholarly analysis with the freshness of personal experience and an observant eye for the nuances of Indonesian political behavior. Although the book inevitably contains errors of fact (mostly of minor significance) the accounts of the Colonial period, nationalism, the roles of Sukarno, the Communists, and the military, the problems of the economy and of Indonesia's foreign relations are generally accurate and cogently presented. The usefulness of the journalistic approach is demonstrated in the chapter entitled "The People," a more or less verbatim presentation of interviews with individuals of a variety of political persuasions.

For the general reader the principal fault of the book is that it is an apparently rather hastily revised version of the author's earlier Indonesia (Melbourne University Press, 1964). While several chapters contain new material, the basic format (and much of the original material) is unchanged. The result is a sense that one is reading two books at once, one describing the pre-coup and the other the post-coup situation. Hasty revision has also led to some curious imbalances, e.g., General Nasution gets several pages, General Suharto only brief mention. Despite these reservations, it remains true that the book is one of the better introductory efforts and the only one so far to incorporate recent events. From the perspective of the political scientist as teacher, however, it is not a very useful work, both because of the broad range of the discussion and because of the lack of any attempt to place the argument within the framework of development theory or, more broadly, systematic political analysis. This evaluation is not, of course, intended as a criticism of Grant, for his purpose was simply to provide a reasonably well-informed introduction to Indonesian political and social life. This he has done.—R. WILLIAM LIDDLE, Ohio State University.

INTERNATIONAL POLITICS, LAW, AND ORGANIZATION

The Islamic Law of Nations. By Shaybani Siyar.

Translated, with an introduction, notes, and appendices by Majid Kadduri. (Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins Press, 1966. Pp. xviii, 311. \$8.00.)

Mr. Khadduri forges here another link in his chain of studies of Islamic law and its capital texts. The volume under review is essentially a

translation from Arabic (pp. 75-292) with a detailed introductory study (pp. 1-74). In a Foreword, Philip C. Jessup (International Court of Justice) welcomes "the opportunity for many of us to become acquainted" with a great Islamic jurist.

The author of the translated text, Shaybani

(750-804), was a disciple of Abu Hanifa (d. 768) and his lieutenant Abu Yusuf (d. 799), under Harun al-Rashid, Born in Iraq of probably non-Arabian stock, he spent most of his life in Kufa but visited the Hijaz and Syria. He was mostly a teacher but served as judge for several years, initially perhaps reluctantly. He wrote extensively but to date his writings are partially lost, partially unpublished. More than other jurists in Islam he paid attention to problems that might be classified as pertaining to international law, i.e., relations between the (then monolithic) Islamic polity and the infidel polities, or between the Islamic polity and its non-Muslim subjects. This became a section of Islamic jurisprudence and was known as sivar. The translation was made from manuscripts. the earliest of them of the 13th century. For the interpretation the translator could draw on an XI century very detailed commentary on a kindred work by the author, but he was careful to distinguish between the XI century concepts of the commentator and the original ones of the VIII century author.

The book opens with a chapter filled with reports (stories, hadith) about how the Prophet and his Companions dealt in precedent cases of raids, war, division of spoils. Prefacing a discussion on a subject with such pious examples (not yet fully canonized at the time) was just getting into vogue, and Shaybani followed therein the prevailing trend. But the following section of the book, the most substantial, is construed as a dialogue between the master (actually the school of) Abu Hanifa, and the inquisitive disciple. 'He' and 'I' trade remarks (hardly any is more than half a page long) about cases, "spcific situations, highly speculative and scholastic in nature, and bearing on every conceivable question that may have arisen, or was believed likely to arise, in the relationships between Islam and other nations" (p. 51). General principles are rarely formulated though they are clearly discernible.

The final section deals with taxation and status of the non-Muslims in the caliphate.

Islamic law is personal, but the school of Abu Hanifa perceived the territorial element, as well as the element of reciprocity (in granting special status to embassies, in the mutual exemption of traders from taxation). But the other schools of Islamic law did not follow Abu Hanifa in this area. Essentially the prevailing view was that there was a division into a pax islamica domain and a non-islamic domain, and the twain were never to meet but in perpetual fighting, for the glory of and till the victory for the true faith. Truce for ten years at most was the most peaceful prospect. And in a way such lucubrations reflected actual conditions, at least along the borders. It took centuries before coexistence was tacitly ac-

cepted. Realities and reversals were bound to force some change. The iconoclast Eobn Taymiya (d. 1327) is refreshing (p. 59). Writing at a time of the (by that time Islamized) Tartars' devastating invasions, he remarked that perpetual holy war contradicts the Koran with the latter's opposition to compulsion in religion (Koran II 257). However, whatever real conditions obtained, the schoolmasters continued to spin and weave their inherited theories based on the Islam-Non-Islam confrontation. Only in the XVI century did Ottoman contacts with Western powers begin to move into a different groove-of reciprocity and mutual interest, and since then Western concepts have increasingly influenced the thinking of Muslims. There were efforts to retain something of Islamic legal thinking or its religious and moral foundations for inter-Muslim relations, with questionable results (cf. pp. 67-70).

A century and a half ago it was suggested that Shaybani was the Hugo Grotius of Islamic law—in his attention to, interest in, writing on relations between the Muslim State and non-Muslims, both under conditions of war and peace. The analogy may be weak, but Shaybani is a jurist in his own right, and fully deserves the attention of the historian of legal tenets, and in particular in tracing the age-long struggle for the emergence of notions of co-existence of men and politics towards and in peace.

The school jurists' discussions, however, should be separated from the actual course of affairs. In the latter, Islam knew not only victories even in its first century, and had to make deals with the Byzantines. The first Umayyad "found it expedient to purchase (658 or 659) a truce from the Emperor . . . at the price of a yearly tribute" (Hitti, History of the Arabs, 5 ed., p. 199, p. 205). Later, embassies and treaties, even about tribute from the Byzantines (cf. ibid p. 204, year 782), exchange of prisoners, securing a Constantinople compound for Muslims (ibid),—all were realities to which the learned faqihs proved not responsive. This, of course, is of a piece with the largely academic character of Islamic jurisprudence.

Mr. Khadduri mentions that while religious doctrine may have been responsible for constant conflict in foreign affairs, "religion as a sanction for moral principles prompted Muslims to adopt a tolerant attitude toward non-Muslims and to observe humane principles" (p. 69). But the phenomenon of toleration (none of the monotheistic faiths developed much tolerance) is to be explained historically: the conquerors were few amidst conquered masses, were busy with taxation, wealth, etc., cared far less about religious matters, were unable to take over the administration of the huge territories the Blitz put under their control. Hence the reference to the favorable Koran pas-

sages concerning poll-tax and humiliation. The Prophet's own policy in Arabia has to be seen against the background of initial weakness coupled with his reverence for the scriptures, etc. This would be a somewhat more sombre but clearer interpretation of the fundamentals of the non-Muslims' status in Islamic society. (Cf. Cahen in the new ed. of the Encyclopedia of Islam, s.v. Dhimma).—Moshe Perlmann, University of California, Los Angeles.

Formosa, China, and the United Nations—Formosa in the World Community. By Lung-Chu Chen and Harold Lasswell. (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1967. Pp. xi, 428. \$8.95.)

The future status of Formosa is a critical problem for the United States as well as the United Nations because it is the heart of the entire China problem. This book by an expatriate Formosan scholar and his Yale mentor, Harold Lasswell, is explosively controversial because it espouses an independent Formosa ruled by the island's 13 million inhabitants. Peking and Taipei denounce any such scheme as totally unacceptable to them, and their friends in the UN have blocked any "One China, One Formosa" proposal to break the perennial deadlock on Chinese representation. The logical argumentation of the book is most persuasive, although its organization and supporting evidence leave much to be desired.

Chen, the principal author, is a 33-year-old honor graduate of National Taiwan University who came to this country in 1960 to receive law degrees at Northwestern and Yale. It is unfortunate that his book does not contain more solid, factual data on postwar Formosa and the attitudes of his fellow-natives, instead of stressing theory throughout the work. Professor Lasswell, who once taught in Peking, is one of our most eminent political scholars whose breadth of expertise lends credibility to many statements in the book, but the reader is left in doubt concerning the extent of his contribution to the actual writing.

The book is divided into three major parts: the first dealing with "One China, One Formosa" as a viable alternative; the second, only one chapter, on the "Transition to Independence," and the final section of four chapters on "Independence and After." The UN is treated in depth only in the first chapter, and plays a relatively minor role in the remaining discussion. The authors claim that a UN decision to seat Communist China as the only China, with a native-ruled Republic of Formosa eligible for a separate membership, would either force the Nationalists to hand over power to the Formosans peacefully or inspire a revolt by natives and dissident mainlanders on the island. This involves two dubious assumptions, not adequately defended in the book, concerning the ease of obtaining a favorable UN decision and securing the cooperation of the 2 million gaishojin (mainlanders in Taiwan). The authors may have been aware of Urban Whitaker's study of UN delegations' attitudes toward their "One China; one Formosa" solution in the early 1960's, but did not cite it or other convincing evidence.

The rest of the book touches upon many topics, usually in a disorganized style only vaguely related to the chapter titles. The past history of Formosa before the Nationalists received the island, courtesy of the American defeat of Japan, followed by Nationalist misrule and suppression of the native majority's political freedom, can be found in several sections of the book. The reviewer concurs in all substantive statements made on these topics, but wishes they had been treated in a more organized and original fashion. The desire of the Formosan majority for an independent future separate from either present Chinese regime is asserted with some evidence, but this also requires far more treatment than the book provides.

What is the potential for revolt inside Formosa? The authors point to the 1947 rebellion, so brutally suppressed by Chinese troops, and the subsequent efforts of the Chiang regime to minimize unrest by economic carrots, police-state arrests, and extremely effective divide-and-rule tactics to separate dissident mainlanders from Formosans and various types of Formosans from each other. Chen acknowledges the wisdom shown by the Nationalists in permitting intellectuals to study abroad, thus ridding the island of many potential rebels (only about 5 per cent of the thousands of college graduates abroad ever return to Formosa). Chen equivocates, however, on the question of Formosan determination to suffer personal sacrifices in the "self-help" effort he considers so important. Based on seven years' study of this question in Formosa and among overseas refugees, the reviewer cannot be so sanguine. Formosans do constitute over 80 per cent of the Nationalist enlisted military forces; their elders are well-educated and anti-Nationalist; and many within the mainlander minority are bitterly dissatisfied, but few experts would predict either a militant uprising or an early evolution toward native rule. The authors, at various places in the book, recognize most of the deterrents to Formosan nationalism but they allow their commendable devotion to the ideal of self-determination to dim their view of the hard realities obstructing its fulfillment.

Perhaps the most original and valuable portion of the book deals with the authors' blueprint for a Formosan national polity after independence. Despite the air of unreality pervading these sections, the concrete suggestions for nation-building are fascinating to any student of developing nations.

One strong point, reiterated throughout the work, is the necessity for the Formosans to cooperate with the bulk of the mainlander minority to avoid a Cypriot-type continuing dissension. They urge, for example, that Mandarin Chinese be accepted as the national language rather than the less-developed Formosan dialect, and suggest legal ways to reassure the mainlanders of their welcome in a Formosan polity. The authors also propose continuation of a defensive alliance with the United States until mainland China, which they assume will remain under Communist rule, accepts the fact of a separate Formosa, Naturally, Quemoy and Matsu would be evacuated and all claims to "reconquer" the mainland renounced by the new regime on Formosa. Civil rights, especially the right to political dissent, would be guaranteed. Political prisons, where thousands of natives now languish, would be abolished, but no Communist party would be tolerated. The authors pledge more complete attention to the rational economic development of the island, after surplus military costs have been eliminated, and a greater emphasis on technical education and population control.

This reviewer cannot quarrel with the basic theme of the book that an independent Formosa is a viable alternative domestically and internationally to the present situation in which Formosans are pawns in the Chinese civil war. Moreover, this book is an excellent rebuttal to the pro-Nationalist work by Frank Morello, The International Legal Status of Formosa (The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, 1966). Its appendix, with the UN voting record on Chinese representation, and the bibliography of most English-language sources are helpful to the general reader.

Precisely because this reviewer agrees with the major theisis of the book, he finds it a painful duty to note its stylistic defects. The general reader will find it both informative and stimulating, but those familiar with the Formosan problem may wish for a tighter, less repetitive, and more original presentation of the authors' case.—Douglas Mendel, Jr., University of Wisconsin-Milwaukee.

The Quest for a United Germany. By Ferenc A. Váll. (Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins Press, 1967. Pp. xii, 318. \$8.50.)

A broad scope and careful research combine to make Ferenc A. Váli's study one of the most significant on the German question. The author, a professor of Government at the University of Massachusetts, has avoided polemics and produced a balanced, well documented analysis of one of the most intractable problems of world politics. In the philosophical tradition of Johann Gottfried von Herder that the only natural state is the nation-state, Professor Váli repeatedly assures his

readers of the "natural desire" of the East Germans to achieve a political union with their kinsmen in the Federal Republic. The author attributes to the members of a nation a collective personality which causes them to draw together into a state. Accordingly, he regards national character as an "important determinant of state action" and writes of a "German psyche" which has demonstrated its ability to assume the historical responsibility for a state. Similarly, the policy of the Soviet Union emerges as a complex interplay between the "national temperament" of the Russian people and the tenets of Marxism-Leninism. The discussion of German sentiment directed toward a national revival is not presented in exclusively organic terms, for a chapter is devoted to analyzing West German opinion on the reunification issue. In this section the author's own extensive interviewing usefully supplements his utilization of reports from German public opinion research institutes. Such data serve to establish the depth of popular feeling for reunification, regardless of whether or not one accepts the interpretation that the division of Germany is "unnatural."

Unfortunately, certain of Professor Váli's generalizations are open to such serious questions that they weaken the impact of an otherwise strong work. Among these is the assertion that a majority of the postwar West German elite favored the founding of the Federal Republic as a step toward the goal of reunification. On the contrary, during the summer of 1948, General Lucius D. Clay had to overcome a pronounced lack of enthusiasm for the new state among German politicans by making it abundantly clear that their reluctance to act would occasion an early cessation of Marshall Plan aid and, above all, a reappraisal by the United States of its commitment in Berlin, Ernst Reuter, the Social Democratic leader in Berlin, responded to the hint that his city might be lost to the West with a plea for the restoration of German sovereignty outside of the Soviet Zone. A German initiative, he argued, would serve to overcome the lack of resoluteness characteristic of Washington's policy in Central Europe. With reference to this turning point in German-American relations, the author might profitably have examined Vom Reich zur Bundesrepublik (1966) by the University of Hamburg political scientist Hans-Peter Schwarz. We must also urge caution toward the statement: "Any communication between the United States and the Soviet Union is examined in Bonn from the point of view of its effect on reunification" (p. 248). Were this so, it would indeed be remarkable. Moreover, error exists in representing the policy of the Sudeten German Association whose former Speaker, Federal minister Hans-Christoph Seebohm, constantly reiterated the demand of his followers for a return to their Bohemian and Moravian homeland and who (apparently unknown to the author) ruled out the necessity of changing frontiers to effect this return. Finally, the acceptance in the foreign ministries of the Warsaw Pact states of the stipulation that West Berlin be included in the area encompassed by trade agreements with the Federal Republic is not as uniform as the text would have one believe.

Professor Váli concludes that a relaxation of tension in Europe through a solution to the German question is now primarily dependent upon the willingness of Soviet policy-makers to support the German nation's right of self-determination. He warns that impatience over the continued existence of the Berlin Wall can lead to unrealistic proposals for direct negotiations between Bonn and Moscow in the hope that extensive German concessions will induce a conciliatory Soviet attitude. While far removed from a new Rapallo, the foreign policy of the Grand Coalition stresses unilateral German diplomatic overtures in Eastern Europe rather than a reliance upon American policy to alter the status quo. The call for an active German Eastern policy issued by Hans Kroll, one-time ambassador of Bonn in Moscow, and Rainer Barzel, chairman of the Christian Democratic parliamentary party, is worthy of more than the casual treatment given it in the book. In 1965, the Social Democratic member of parliament Wenzel Jaksch proposed that his government sponsor a "Marshall Plan" for Eastern Europe. It is well that the "Jaksch Plan" received, at least, bibliographical notice; for Jaksch, unlike Professor Váli, emphasized the need to improve relations among the states of Europe as a prelude to overcoming the division of Germany.-JAMES H. Wolfe, University of Maryland.

Deutschlands Beziehungen zu Frankreich, Grossbritannien, Belgien sowie deutsche Entwaffung, Reparationen, Völkerbund und internationale Abrüstung, Dezember 1925 bis Juli 1926, Akten zur deutschen auswartigen Politik, 1918-1945, Serie B: 1925-1933, Band I, 1. Ed. by Hans Rothfels et al. (Göttingen: Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht, 1966. Pp. lxix, 799.)

This volume inaugurates a new series of dccuments on German foreign policy. It contains over 300 items under the headings Disarmament Belgian/Eupen-Malmedy, International Steel Cartel, Reparations, the Saar, Troop Reductions and the Evacuation of the Occupied Territories of Germany, the League, and more general questions pertaining to Germany's relations with England and France. It admirably fills the longest gap in the published record of German foreign policy. The publication of Foreign Office material began with Die Grosse Politik in the 1920's which is still

the most important record of pre-1914 diplomacy. After World War II the United States and Great Britain commenced the printing of selected diplomatic records. At first the Anglo-American commission was committed to the publication of the sources from 1918 to 1945. But, because of the enormous problems involved in any such undertaking, the commission decided in 1954 to limit its scope to the Hitler period. By this time groups under the auspices of the American Historical Association and Saint Anthony's College, Oxford were microfilming large blocks of captured Foreign Office papers for all periods. These microfilms and the original papers, since returned to Bonn, have formed the basis for a thriving scholarship on Weimar foreign policy.

However officials and scholars of the Federal Republic still believed in the necessity of establishing the printed record; they initiated an agreement in 1960 with the American, French, and British governments to institute an international board for the sole purpose of editing and publishing the archival material from 1918 to 1933. Each volume is to be prepared by a team comprising one German and one non-German member under the supervision of the general editors—Hans Rothfels (Germany), Hajo Holborn (United States), Maurice Baumont (France) and Ronald Wheatley (United Kingdom).

Such a distinguished board would appear to guarantee a well-edited series, and the publication of this, the first volume, has done nothing to lower the expectation. The selection process has been careful and thorough; the editors have included more classes of documentation below the permanent secretary's files which are not customarily used in such publications. There are good explanatory notes and cross-indexing not only to published documents but also the unpublished microfilmed papers. While the documents themselves are ordered chronologically, a long subject index calenders the substance of each item. This chronological arrangement may sometimes cause erroneous impressions since the papers are drawn from many files and present an artificial order that was never seen by any decision-maker. However any alternate ordering would be just as flawed.

This leads to the question: why publish the documents in the first place? Unlike the papers of the Hitler era, these published Weimar Foreign Office documents contain few surprises. The microfilmed Stresemann Nachlass has been so well mined that the outlines of Weimar policy have been clear for a number of years. In addition, numerous monographs have used the far larger store of microfilmed Foreign Office files, and a great many more are in various stages of preparation. Russian and Polish relations have been especially well covered, but Western-oriented studies are

gaining increasing attention. Even in this relatively overlooked field, these documents do not add any striking new evidence about the most important single event within their scope. Using the Stresemann Nachlass, Erich Eyck and Ludwig Zimmermann have already constructed perfectly satisfactory accounts of the struggle over Germany's entrance into the League.

Yet, despite such superfluity, this collection will become a valuable scholarly aid. Modern research in diplomatic history is the victim of the typewriter and carbon paper. There are simply too many documents in any modern archive for any single researcher to peruse, even with a lifetime at his disposal. If the history of Weimar foreign policy is to be written, much of the work will have to be based upon specialized monographs and published sources. Furthermore the publication of these documents allows the scholar to deal with relatively minor questions which shed light on the whole nature of the diplomatic process. For example, the relationship of German civilian aviation to the disarmament question is only tangentially relevant to any major study. Yet, perhaps more than any other set, the documents published on this issue illustrate the limits of Weimar policy as well as the tenacity with which both Briand and Stresemann pursued their goals.

Also the major issues of the 1920's often require research into the policy of more than one nation. With the Public Record Office now open for this period, with Austrian and Italian documents available for much of the 1920's, multi-archival research has now become possible. However even the most indefatigable scholar cannot visit all the archives. He must rely on published sources. Thus the publication of the German documents presents a welcome addition to this task of publishing, one already undertaken by the American, English and Italian governments.—Stanley Suval, North Carolina State University.

Germany and the Atlantic Alliance: The Integration of Strategy and Politics. By James L. Richardson. (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1966. Pp. vii, 403, \$8.95.)

Noting that while "military strategy is an integral part of foreign policy . . . most strategists and politicians inhabit different worlds," James L. Richardson, at present a member of the Arms Control and Disarmament Research Unit of the British Foreign Office, examines the consequences of such a polarization of expertise in this study of the tension between the prevailing doctrines of NATO strategy and the realities of politics in Germany. His plan of presentation can be understood only in terms of his attempt to bring together two disparate universes of discourse. Part I surveys West German foreign policy from 1949

through 1963. Analyses of the Soviet challenge to the West and of Soviet strategic doctrines follow (Part II) and then a more ramified and factual consideration of NATO strategy (Part III). Thereupon the author reverts to a chronological account, this time of "The Berlin Crisis" as intensified in 1958-60 and continued in 1961-62, albeit in a drastically altered nuclear power context (Part IV). It is thus that the stage is set for a concluding appraisal of West Germany's relations with its Western allies and policy suggestions designed to allay the tension between the abiding concern of the Germans with reunification and the Anglo-American desire for détente.

Here the argument can be summarized only sketchily. Adenauer's foreign policy was consistently determined by security considerations due to the exposed position and war-weariness of the German people. Reunification, always secondary to avoidance of war and paradoxically ill-defined in the popular mind in regard to the land east of the Oder-Neisse line, became in the fifties and will remain a politically irrelinquishable goal for the Federal Republic. While variations in intensity have occurred, the ideological commitments and political objectives of the USSR and the USA remain unchanged. The fundamental changes have taken place in the nature and relative scope of the striking power of these two super-powers. Whereas in the first post-war decade the Soviet Union was in a position to over-run Western Europe with conventional forces and the Americans depended for response on a monopoly and then a preponderance of nuclear weapons, the ensuing years found the USSR able to threaten Europe with nuclear destruction and even to bring the USA within the range of its nuclear striking power.

As a result of these developments, the issue context within which Western responses to the threats and challenges of the late fifties and early sixties were discussed was such that, particularly in NATO circles, considerations of nuclear strategy seemed at least to take priority over reunification and even over German security. The Federal Republic, which alone among the Western allies has formally committed itself to refrain from the manufacture of atomic, biological and chemical weapons and to accept full NATO command over its armed forces, found itself in the position of a pressure group rather than that of a full partner in the semi-public debates over matters involving the future form of existence and even the physical survival of the German people. Political leaders and public alike came to be affected mainly by the fall-out from these discussions most often in the form of leaks and rumors. In particular, plans for disengagement which eroded confidence in deterrant power of American military support and strategies which contemplated a conventional war in Europe as a kind of cushion to delay or even to evade a resort to nuclear exchanges impinged drastically on the sensibilities of a highly exposed people.

In the context of the situation as he saw it at the end of 1963, Richardson concluded that the balance of advantage for the Western powers lay in maintaining West Germany's willing partnership in the Atlantic community and that continued support for German reunification was a necessary, even though not a sufficient, means to that end. While questions may be raised as to his interpretation of the evidence available to him when he made his study, even more important are those as to whether subsequent events have undermined his assumptions and rendered his proposals obsolete. But, even if his book may be judged as only an epilogue, his effort to bring together the divergent universes of political and strategic discourse merits attention from the inhabitants of both worlds.—Charles B. Robson, University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill.

The Politics of the Common Market. By W. Hart-Ley Clark. (Englewood Cliffs, New Jersey: Prentice-Hall, 1967. Pp. xi, 180. \$4.95.)

However muddy the waters of European integration may appear, the institutions of the European Communities have continued to develop and the political patterns surrounding them have grown in complexity. Recent decisions have influenced not only the policies of the European Economic Community, the European Coal Community and Euratom, but also the structure and role of these organizations and their component elements. Change of even greater importance can be expected in the next few years. These events are of immediate interest to political scientists concerned with European politics and with theories of integration. A number of books and articles are available to provide a background for observing this shifting pattern. To take a few examples, Leon Lindberg's excellent study The Political Dynamics of European Economic Integration, published in 1963, is still highly relevant and has been made more valuable by Lindberg's more recent articles; Miriam Camps' several works in this area all serve to clarify positions taken by actors as they moved toward major decisions; and the articles in the April-July 1967 issue of Government and Opposition highlight various aspects of politics and decision making in the Communities.

In addition to works such as these, books of a more basic nature have appeared. These are largely directed toward courses on international relations and European government and are designed to provide a brief descriptive introduction to the structure and politics of the Communities. Although varying greatly in quality, the books in

this category face similar problems. Their brevity works against a nuanced and detailed exposition, and they run the risk that certain specific information will be rapidly outdated.

It is in this context that Professor Clark's book is to be considered. Writing before the Treaty fusing the executive of the three Communities was ratified, he attempts to introduce not only the formal structure of the E.E.C., but the relationships between its component elements as they have developed. He presents a chapter on each of the components-the Council, the Commission, the Commission's growing administration, the European Parliament and the Court of Justice. These are complemented by chapters on interest groups and public opinion in the Communities, on relationships between the E.E.C. and other states and on implications for world and European politics. Within the limitations which he has set for himself, Professor Clark has provided a useful introduction; many of the criticisms one could make would be directed more toward the limitations than what was done within them.

Yet there are criticisms to be made. Many statements in the book are too strong or potentially misleading, even when accompanied by qualifications. One is struck by such assertions as, "The Council has done more to unify Europe than any other institution in the history of the Continent." In other places Professor Clark presents good material in such a manner as to lessen its effect. For example, the discussion of public opinion contains valuable information, but could easily confuse students; and in concluding that E.E.C.'s economic regulations may have broad effects on attitude, Professor Clark makes a meaningful point; but the conclusion is scarcely strengthened by the statement, "Women's fashions and the format of women's magazines is already 'unified,' for instance, as is the European taste in toys." There are also statements of questionable relevance to the current situation. For example, in view of the fact that the Parliament has never exercised its power to remove the Commission, and is unlikely to do so in the near future, Professor Clark is not directing students toward central political problems when he says, "There is a crying need for at least some provision for the dissolution of Parliament by the Commission if the removal power is used too often."

More seriously, discussions of certain points are less complete than they need be, even in a brief book. Disproportionate attention is given relatively unimportant subjects to the detriment of more important matters. By drastically reducing such sections as the four-page discussion of the location of a permanent European capital, the author could give more attention to other problems. The book would benefit from a clearer picture of

the actual politics of the Communities. One possibility would be a more extensive discussion of the Commission's power base. In this, the various references to the 1965-66 crisis could be drawn together to illustrate better the interactions between the Commission and the member states. (And with regard to the crisis one might question Professor Clark's tendency to minimize its effects.) One could make a similar request for more focus in discussions of all the Community components and better integration of the parts.

In conclusion, The Politics of the Common Market does not say anything particularly new about the European Communities and does not provide as much information as it could and it should. However it is a useful introduction and is better than other attempts of its kind. It serves to illustrate the need for more and better classroom materials dealing with the substance of politics in the European Communities.—Robert L. Peterson, The University of Iowa.

Arms Control for the Late Sixties. Ed. By James E. Dougherty and J. F. Lehman, Jr. (Princeton, New Jersey: D. Van Nostrand Company, 1967. Pp. xlvii, 265. \$8.50.)

The publication in book form of the papers delivered at a symposium invariably involves problems of focus, coherence, and differential quality. When the topic is arms control, additional questions arise, such as whether the book is already fatally dated and who is supposed to find the book useful. This book, which is the product of a symposium held in April 1966, manifests these problems in a conspicuous manner.

As for focus, there is little. Five complicated topics are discussed: NATO and arms control; ballistic missile defense (BMD); arms control in Soviet and Chinese strategy; nuclear proliferation; and limited war and international peacekeeping. However interrelated arms control issues may be, this is an ambitious undertaking and one wonders how much any mortal is supposed to absorb and retain about, for example, such an abstruse conundrum as BMD when his attention is turned shortly thereafter to the equally murky problem of nuclear proliferation. These topics offer nearly unlimited opportunities for such fecund minds as contributors Edward Teller, Hedley Bull, and Herman Kahn, but I would relish the opportunity to give an examination on just who said what and why to a group of professional political scientists or strategists who had just read the book or heard the papers. It is, in my opinion, just too huge a canvas for either a symposium or

Of course, it is possible to attend only part of a conference or read only selected chapters of a book, especially one of this sort. But are the topi-

cal chapters coherent? That is, do the various contributors to a given chapter address the same basic questions or do they merely speak past each other? The chapter on BMD comes off fairly well in this regard, the one on nuclear proliferation slightly better, and the rest hardly at all. With a few exceptions, the papers were quite obviously prepared without reference to each other. There apparently was a felt need for more coherence because the last three articles come under the heading of "Comments on Preceding Papers." But of those assigned this unenviable task, only Klaus Knorr made any serious effort to accomplish it.

In the field of arms control, standards of appraisal regarding quality vary as much or more as in any other field of political studies; and any reviewer's judgments are bound to be somewhat arbitrary. By nearly any respectable standard, however, there are some excellent articles among the 29 in this book. Moreover, they do not reflect any particular approach or set of assumptions. There was an obvious and successful effort to bring together different-sometimes radically differentperspectives and sets of assumptions. The contributors range from Kenneth Boulding to Edward Teller: most of the categories defined in Robert A. Levine's brilliant The Arms Debate' are represented. (Whatever its merits, however, this eclecticism contributes significantly to the problems of focus and coherence noted above.) On various and conflicting sides of the BMD debate, Joseph I. Coffey, Richard B. Foster and Jeremy J. Stone argue brilliantly; James R. Schlesinger's well-known position on nuclear proliferation is cogently presented and contrasted explicitly with that of Hedley Bull; Herman Kahn puts on still another dazzling display, complete with the expected scenarios, policy desiderata, sweeping assertions and audacious presciptions; and Lincoln P. Bloomfield contributes a thoughtful, tentative essay on the control of local conflicts. It could also be argued that while their contributions were, of course, not designed to be scholarly contributions, the politicized speeches of a retired French Colonel, a German politician, and an Indian diplomat add a welcome reminder of the harsh political world with which the learned essays are allegedly dealing. Similarly, William Kintner sets forth in a clear and forceful essay what is almost certainly a set of dominant attitudes in the American military today.

Perhaps all arms control essays should be published as magazine articles or pamphlets. Technology and policy march inexorably on and the only kind of arms control writing that remains fresh after publication between hard covers is of the rather more abstract, speculative sort. Not

¹ Cambridge, Massachusetts: Harvard University Press, 1963.

long after this book was published, for example, the United States and the Soviet Union each began to move with apparent determination toward the deployment of a BMD, there was a Soviet-American agreement on a non-proliferation treaty draft, and it became known that the United States would very likely develop an anti-satellite missile system. A new symposium would have plenty to talk about, but it is less clear that its deliberations would look especially good in print a couple of years later.

Finally, there is the question of whom this book is designed for. Most specialists will have read the more important of the articles long ago. Other prospective readers will run into the problems noted above. In a profession surfeited with unread books, this one will probably join the majority despite the importance of its subject matter and the high quality of many of its articles.—WILLIAM P. GERBERDING, University of California, Los Angeles.

The Quest for Peace Through Diplomacy. By Ste-PHEN D. KERTESZ. (Englewood Cliffs, New Jersey: Prentice-Hall, 1967. Pp. x, 182. \$4.95.)

This short book by the distinguished diplomat and scholar Stephen D. Kertesz is a review of some of the recent post-World War II developments in the practice of diplomacy. After two short introductory chapters, the author analyses certain aspects of Soviet diplomacy and while revealing a subtle attachment to the notion of "protracted conflict," he does hold out the hope that "Soviet diplomacy might adopt a more cooperative policy."

In the main portion of the book, Dr. Kertesz attempts to describe and to analyze what he calls "the new forms and methods of diplomacy." There is much helpful material in these chapters. Students uninitiated to a study of international organizations can learn the basic composition of the specialized agencies of the UN, the Organization for European Economic Cooperation, the Council of Ministers of the European Economic Community and the various European parliaments. A fairly extensive analysis of the organization, structure and operation of NATO occupies two chapters of the book.

Overall, the approach reveals a distinctly European bias. From this analysis one would have to conclude that non-Western diplomats have nothing to add to the study of post-World War II diplomacy. Even the implications for Western diplomacy of the present revolutionary environment are not fully explored. The author has chosen to concentrate his effort on the new forms of diplomatic activity which have emerged in Western Europe. A full analysis of post-war diplomacy would demand far more than this. The difficulty with the book, on its own terms, is that there is

too much description and too little analysis. There is no explicit theoretical framework which would allow the student to generalize new hypotheses or conclusions about the nature of such new diplomatic activity. Some questions worth exploration in respect to the activity of diplomats in various European organizations would be-What is the impact of these new environments on the attitudes and actions of the diplomats themselves? What means are used by governments in dealing with each other in the context of international organizations? and How do these means differ from those used traditionally? Neither is there any concerted effort to build on the work of other theorists such as Morgenthau, Ilke and others. Further, an analysis of the way in which the use of force as a means of advancing national interests has been affected by the existence of such international organizations would have been worthwhile.

Professor Kertesz firmly believes that NATO is still essential to the West. He says at one point "the Soviet threat to all NATO members is the primary reason for the alliance." He writes of the French disenchantment with NATO but argues for a revived and strengthened organization, concluding "the time has come for European states to make a decision about their aspirations, a choice about their role in world affairs. No outside nation can decide the issues for them."

The book, in summary, is a description of some of the basic structures and procedures of a variety of Western-oriented international organizations. The implication seems to be that certain new diplomatic techniques learned in these contexts might be transferred to a more universal context. However, this is never argued explicitly, nor is there any effort to generalize about these new techniques. Professor Kertesz at times seems to imply that traditional diplomacy is on the way out and that the diplomacy of the international organization is the wave of the future, and yet this point is not clearly developed at the conceptual level. The chief thrust of the book seems to be from a traditional cold war perspective. On the other hand, in the final chapter, the author does call for a common attack on common problems by all governments. It would appear that if valid patterns of interaction among Western powers are established, then the Communist world will inevitably be won over to the view that, in unity, men can achieve a more peaceful world.-Louis F. BRAKEMAN, Denison University.

Diplomatic Investigations: Essays in the Theory of International Politics. Ed. By Herbert Butterfield and Martin Wight. (Cambridge, Massachusetts: Harvard University Press, 1966. Pp. 227. \$6.25.)

This volume of essays on the theory of interna-

tional politics will receive a mixed but predictable reaction from American scholars. Those who seek to discern through the study of history patterns of international relations, who believe that normative considerations are appropriate in the study of international relations, and who are not singularly devoted to the establishment of broad gauge theories of international relations will find the volume fruitful and stimulating. Those who are interested in the "scientific" study of international relations and the systematic development and verification of explanatory and predictive theories will find the volume does not measure up to their goals. In other words the authors pursue a traditional or classical approach to the study of international relations. This approach is highlighted by M. Wight in his provocative essay, "Why is There No International Theory?" with his statement that he perceives "international theory" to mean ". . . a tradition of speculation about relations between states, a tradition imagined as the twin of speculation about the state to which the name 'political theory' is appropriated." There is no mention in the essays of general systems theory, game theory, simulation, or the quantification of international activities.

In its origin and purpose, the volume is the British companion to Theoretical Aspects of International Relations edited by William T. R. Fox. Unlike some contemporary American scholars, the six essayists discuss theories of international politics and not theories about international relations as a discipline of study. Their primary concern is the analysis of the nature of the international society and the theories that attempt to explain the behavior of that society. This analysis involves the study of international law and the study of diplomatic history.

Although their conceptual approach will be challenged, the authors have produced a stimulating volume with the essays maintaining a consistently high level of quality. The essay by M. Wight, "The Balance of Power," is a valuable analysis of the notions of the balance of power and the analytical ambiguity that attends the use of the concept. The two essays by Hedley Bull, "Society and Anarchy in International Relations." and "The Grotian Conception of International Society," and the one by M. Wight, "Western Values in International Relations," are solid discussions of the inter-relation between international law and international society. Bull concentrates on the question, found in many classical writings in international law, whether the international society tends toward an international community or whether it is a Hobbesian state of nature. M. Wight discusses the maintenance of order in the international society and the phenomenon of intervention as a means for the maintenance of that order. Of the essays only two do not concentrate on historical material. Of these, the essay, "Threats of Force in International Relations," written by G. F. Hudson in 1961 provides, with the advantage of hindsight, a brilliant forecast of Khrushchev's rationale for the missile venture in Cuba.

Within the framework of their analysis, the authors present quality contributions to the study of international relations. That some may not fully agree with the framework does not deny the quality of the contributions.—Low C. Piper, University of Maryland.

The Politics of American Foreign Aid. By MI-CHAEL KENT O'LEARY. (New York: Atherton Press, 1967. Pp. 172. \$5.95.)

One ordinarily expects that a foreword written by someone other than the author of a book will be quite laudatory, but a reviewer could scarcely improve on the prefacing tribute by Professor Harold Karan Jacobson in pointing toward the strong points of this book by Professor O'Leary: "Even if it did not fill such an important need, the book would deserve commendation for its grace and humor, its obvious scholarship, its skillful blend of quantitative and nonquantitative techniques of analysis." O'Leary capped diligent and imaginative research with a refreshingly light literary touch. As Jacobson noted, he endeavored to combine traditional and newer analytical perspectives within a single framework. I especially admired his effort to show how recent American foreign aid policies stem in part from what O'Leary indicates as deep-seated "general traits in the American political culture" (p. 9) going back to the origins of the nation. Yet, the end result was somehow not altogether satisfying, and here it ought to be conceded immediately that disappointment is always a function of expectations. Therefore, the perceived problems are probably a consequence of this reviewer's unfulfilled hopes rather than any inadequacies on the author's part. Perhaps, too, the problems are associated with the fact that O'Leary was allowed only 135 pages of actual text in which to treat an enormously complex subject. Finally, there may be yet another partial explanation for the nature of the overall result, but I will hold that for my concluding comment in order initially to suggest why certain aspects of the emphases in this book in the absence of other considerations present a somewhat troublesome picture of the large subject indicated by the book's title.

The first problem which one might cite is an implicit model of the American political process with the Congress as an almost exclusive focal point. O'Leary devotes the first 88 of his 135 pages to an analysis of public opinions and moods—or,

more broadly, "the perceptions and judgments of broad elements of the public" (p. 9)—and how all of these may conceivably be related to "congressional responses." When on page 89 he turns to the Executive Branch and says that the "history of foreign aid is principally the history of policy initiatives taken by the President and his advisers," it makes one wonder whether the history of foreign aid is something wholly apart from the politics of foreign aid. In any case, the title of the chapter beginning on page 89 is "The Executive as Organizer of Attitudes," and the emphasis quickly shifts back to Congress as the focal point around which are configurations of forces the most important of which are public opinions to some extent shaped by presidential actions. It may be useful, in light of the many studies in recent years emphasizing the President and the Executive Branch as the key focus of the political process from which American foreign policy emerges, to have a study that puts the spotlight on the Congress. Yet, even in this connection one might have hoped for somewhat more explicit linkages between the empirical findings of this book and some of the theoretical models of the legislative process formulated in the past decade, not to mention linkages to models of Executive Branch behavior and to models which attempt to relate domestic and international politics.

A second and related problem has to do with an occasional gap between data and conclusions. For example, all of the earlier pages devoted to ways in which public opinion polls and congressional votes can be cut, dried and assessed suddenly appear to have been a diverting but essentially irrelevant playing around with numbers when one finally reads on page 125 that "Until 1963, the chief opponent of foreign aid, Congressman Passman, was so well entrenched in his subcommittee that attempts at political persuasion were a waste of time."

A third difficulty is the relative inattention to trend data. For example, a parenthetical aside on pages 7-8 notes that "the magnitude [of foreign aidl has declined from about 2 per cent of the Gross National Product in 1946 to about one-half of one per cent of the GNP in 1966," but this item of information is not mentioned again nor related to any of the other data or conclusions. In a paragraph on page 23 there is first a reference to a poll in 1959, then back to a poll in 1949, and then forward again to a survey in 1965, as if bits of evidence were picked up wherever they could be found and then scrambled into a conclusion. On page 116 we learn that "Between 1959 and 1963, five special studies of foreign aid were requested by the President," and on page 117 it is noted that the U.S. foreign aid agency has been reorganized and renamed eight times since World War II, but neither of these sets of time-sequential events is further explored with an eye toward suggesting whether they embodied any trends or changes in the politics of American foreign aid.

One is left with the overall impression that American foreign aid policy and politics since World War II is a crazy-quilt subject about which one can say a great deal but from which one can conclude very little in the way of clearcut sets of interrelated patterns. O'Leary himself seems to concede as much when he writes in his conclusion (p. 128): "The twenty-year record of postwar American foreign aid policy is sufficiently vast and complex to provide the observer with evidence for almost any verdict he desires. . . . Judgment of American performance depends upon a baffling calculus . . ." But perhaps it was precisely O'Leary's purpose to reveal this baffling set of circumstances, to hold up a mirror to the events of two decades and to reflect how little sense a pattern-searching behaviorial scientist can make of them. If this was in fact his purpose, he succeeded admirably, and this book is strongly recommended for use as a text in undergraduate and graduate courses for at least three purposes:(1) first, for the wealth of data and bibliographical references; (2) second, for a demonstration of the limits of presently available analytical techniques: (3) third, as a challenge to new generations of students to improve on these techniques. Professor O'Leary in the judgment of this reviewer is one of the ablest younger political scientists at work today, and perhaps what one really ought to say in conclusion here is that any perceived shortcomings in this book are primarily an indication of continuing inadequacies in our arsenal of analytical techniques rather than a criticism of the author. -VINCENT DAVIS, University of Denver.

Imperial America: The International Politics of Primacy. By George Liska. (Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins Press, 1967. Pp. 115. \$2.25.)

In this second of the Washington Center of Foreign Policy Research's Studies in International Affairs, George Liska calls for a fundamental change in our view of the international system and provides, for those who accept his conceptualizations, an attractive blueprint for American global domination.

He has developed a theory of a unifocal empire-oriented international system—unifocal in that it centers on the United States as the world's pre-eminent imperial power, and empire-oriented in that no effective world organization exists. With only one dominant power, the unifocal system is bipolar or multipolar in appearance only, but it does possess multistate and multipolar characteristics.

Liska first outlines the characteristics and as-

pects of imperial systems. He draws from a wide range of past empires and his abundant, albeit cryptic, historical references. The contemporary world is analyzed within this framework. Imperial America has its conceptual roots, not in recent colonial endeavors such as the British Empire, but in historic superstates, especially the Roman Empire.

In these terms, an empire "is a state exceeding other states in size, scope, salience, and sense of task." This is Liska's America—indeed, a superstate, but certainly more than a great power in a state system. It is an empire in an imperial system whose interests are coterminous with the international system. It is both globally paramount over all other states and primarily responsible for maintaining at least a minimum world order.

In this unifocal system, world order or equilibrium is to be maintained, not by any simulated balance between the superpowers, but rather by diverse U.S. policies toward regional areas. The United States would progressively reduce its military, economic and political involvement in Europe. It also would encourage a reformation of this sub-system under Soviet Union domination.

America could not delegate leadership in Afro-Asia or in the Western Hemisphere, where, in contrast with Europe, military force still is the critical instrument of influence and control. A regional balance system is not operative in these areas nor do the involved nations recognize a paramount regional power (not even China in Asia). As a result, America must undertake carefully calculated policies, not designed to achieve domination or containment, but to maintain international order. Extreme forms of local behavior which have external implications would be curbed. A wide spectrum of intervention may be necessary, ranging from intimation of intent to direct, but non-excessive, military sorties. To achieve its objectives, the U.S. would use a variety of instruments-access into friendly lands, traditional statecraft, multilateral associations, economic aid, political-military alliances, and military force.

Liska contends that the world now is moving into this "newly emerging constellation of power and order." Vietnam, which he calls America's first imperial war, is given as a dramatic example. The conflict is not to be justified in the usual official way, e.g., preserve independent peoples or contain Chinese communism. Rather Vietnam is merely one unpleasant aspect of America's role as global, imperial policeman. Liska views Vietnam as a police action which may have to be repeated in comparable situations until another imperial or universal power appears. He believes that Vietnam still may prove to have been an ideal operation for training our new imperial-type political-military establishment and in educating the American

people to the hard facts of the new Americandominated unifocal system.

Liska is not a conventional interventionist or imperialist; he is far too wise to succumb to such American phobias as the anti-communist crusade or to the traditional Pax Americana. In this book, he enhances his reputation as one of the brightest commentators on international politics. If one accepts his imperial, unifocal theme, it is difficult to conceive of a more articulate and tightly-reasoned analysis.

Still, a successful imperial America must adhere to Liska's well-defined guidelines and must accept his goal of world order (not expanded empire). Is such wisdom to be found among Washington imperialists? However, a more basic criticism centers on the validity of his premise of American imperial supremacy.

It would be unfair to say that Liska looks upon America as a global messiah, the Lord's agents on earth. Yet, his imperial America assumes an American mission and supremacy which critics may find not only chilling but illusory and based on assorted misconceptions. A few questions illustrate this point. In the nuclear age, is not the Soviet Union functionally on a competitive superpower level with the United States? Does not geography alone place China, though no military giant, in the position of No. 1 Asian power? Would not the Afro-Asian and Latin American lesser powers be restive recipients of imperial largesse? Can the United Nations be summarily dismissed? Is Vietnam really more than a tragic blunder? Could not global order be best achieved through developing cooperation by diverse centers of policy and power?

The core question is whether world order really depends on the U.S. as global empire policeman. Liska's book should be read for the affirmative argument and for its contribution to the expanding dialogue on the nature of the international system and of America's role in the operation of that system.—CLIFTON E. WILSON, University of Arizona.

Economic Policies Toward Less Developed Countries. By HARRY G. Johnson. (Washington, D.C.: The Brookings Institution, 1967. Pp. xvi, 279. \$6.75.)

This book is a product of both the 1964 United Nations Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD) held at Geneva and the author's long experience as an international economist. Its purpose, which unfortunately is not defined before the final chapter, is to "survey the major issues raised by UNCTAD for U.S. policy toward the less developed countries, and to explore the various policy alternatives open to the United States" (p. 241). The book is focused almost exclusively, however, on the role of international trade, and

hence the trade policies of the U.S. and other developed nations, as a means to foster economic growth in the developing world. Only minor attention is directed to other economic policy issues.

Professor Johnson is successful in his attempt to write for an audience expanded beyond professional economists in terms of the clarity of his analysis, but non-economists may be discouraged by his failure to define this problem early in the book and to outline his pattern of attack. Political scientists accustomed to the current literature of comparative politics will be struck by the limited reference to individual nations and perhaps either impressed or concerned with economists' ability to treat the economic growth patterns of developing nations as a single variable. He does recognize that planning is ultimately a political process where economic decisions are often made on other than economic grounds (p. 69). Yet, an inclination to ignore political realities crops up throughout the book: "If the United States is to maintain its leadership and fulfill the responsibilities it has assumed to both the developed and the less developed countries, it must evolve some positive new approach to the problems aired at UNCTAD" (p. 238, italics are mine).

UNCTAD provided a ready platform for the developing nations to voice their general dissatisfaction with the system of international trading relationships that has grown under the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, leaving the U.S. in an almost isolated position when other developed nations tended to abstain on many votes. We were, Professor Johnson notes, "a lone voice of negation confronting a chorus of hopeful positive suggestions" (p. 7).

Following two introductory chapters on economic growth and development, the book concentrates on barriers to expanded trade imposed by both the developed and the less developed countries. The latter have often contributed to their own plight through the consequences of nationalistic economic policies, their preference for centralized economic planning, an exploitative attitude toward traditional agriculture, a commitment to import substitution, policies of inflation and currency overvaluation, and a general hostility to private investment by foreigners.

The developed nations, on the other hand, erect barriers by their provision of aid in its present bilateral and project-tied forms, their limitations on commodity trade, their tariff and non-tariff restrictions on manufacturers, and their immigration policies. Subsequent chapters explore ways to reduce or mitigate the effects of the barriers erected by the developed nations. Considered are (1) proposals for action within the existing framework, increasing levels of assistance, substituting multilateral for bilateral aid, private foreign invest-

ment, and enlarged opportunities within the GATT framework, (2) possible arrangements for trade in primary products, for example the use of international commodity agreements which are not particularly favored by "most" international trade experts, and (3) the possibility of preference in the markets of developed countries for the manufactured goods of the developing nations.

Professor Johnson then jumps to a discussion of international monetary reform, perhaps a more controversial issue than when the book was written. He argues that the less developed countries would benefit from an international monetary system providing a better combination of liquidity and adjustment mechanisms, preferably an internationally controlled central bank. The author concludes his examination of the role of trade in economic development with a series of questions for future research. Apparently economists, like political scientists, have a few mountains yet to climb.—George M. Platt, The University of Iowa.

American Foreign Policy Beyond Utopianism and Realism. By Donald Brandon. (New York: Appleton-Century-Crofts, 1966. Pp. 295. Paper, \$2.95.)

This book is a temperate, well-balanced and on the whole impartial discussion of the political and intellectual driving forces that have shared in shaping the programs and images of United States foreign policy from the unsteady, early years of the post-revolutionary period to the frustrated years of Southeast Asia's trials and tribulations. It is a chronological analysis, with enough glances both forward and backward to keep the text interesting and meaningful for the reader-whether he is a beginning student or a reasonably well-read layman on American diplomatic thought, practices and history. Professor Brandon writes, so he tells us (and demonstrates), from the viewpoint of "what has been called the Grand Tradition in political philosophy." The basic premise states that the classical and humanist values of the Judae-Christian seeding rather than the "discredited" Utopian and Realist programs which have plagued our previous history form the relevant foundation of our state's participation in world politics today. Hence his appeal to those who make the final choices for direction is first to test their approaches by broad Western philosophic considerations and then to apply these moral and intellectual reflections to the practical international affairs of the moment.

His Utopian analysis is a factual, lively, articulate discussion in the first few chapters, the last two under the rubric of America's first and second crusades. And, as one would surmise, President Woodrow Wilson and his friends, while treated fairly, are nevertheless outside the Great Tradi-

tion. Captain Alfred Mahan's theories and Theodore Roosevelt's sympathetic actions are too realistic for current consideration. The opposite dominant political philosophies are equally analyzed and found wanting for today's needs. A reflection of mood and pace in Brandon's book is demonstrated when he suggests that "Utopian scholars" urged a naive government to be branded "an example of American innocence" without suggesting the application at Nuremberg of the object of scorn, the Pact of Paris of 1927.

The author, in his treatment of America's inescapable problems following World War II, including the heroic attempts in Europe by America to curb the Soviet drive toward its revolutionary goals, reveals more than a dash of latent personal political realism. He concedes that "Realists have performed an invaluable service to the nation by their emphasis upon the reality of power in world affairs. They have done much to overcome the sentimentalism and starry-eyed Utopianism . . ." Nonetheless the United States, in or out of Realism, must recognize that a Pax Americana is out of the question. Without advocating the late Pope John's Pacem in Terris Professor Brandon makes a vigorous but not passionate call for the United States to recognize the continuum of the search for world stability. It means a never-ending search for international cooperation through law and order. He is Aristotlian-he seeks the middle ground. He is a guide to that high ground.

In a book well-written and well-manufactured, Brandon calls not so much for a plague on both extremes, but for prudential doses of each making a blend which will differ problem by problem and era by era. And he offers guidance towards finding the formulae. It is a worthy book for practitioner and student alike.—John T. Holden, University of New Hampshire.

Between Two Worlds. By JOHN HOHENBERG. (New York: Frederick A. Praeger, 1967. Published for the Council on Foreign Relations. Pp. xiii, 507. \$8.95.)

This is an important book, especially for those of us who believe that a political system derives its just powers from the consent of the governed. As the subtitle indicates, the main thrust of the book is upon "Policy, Press, and Public Opinion in Asian-American Relations." The author, John Hohenberg, who is now a professor of journalism at Columbia University, was a professional newsman for some twenty-five years. In 1963, he and his wife spent six months traveling more than 12,000 miles through seven Asian countries, and everywhere they went they talked more or less informally with many different people about the role of the press (including radio and television) in forming public opinion and influencing public pol-

icy. In 1964, Hohenberg and his wife return Asia to conduct a more systematic survey; viewing over a period of four months more 300 persons, including heads of state, foreign isters, American diplomats, foreign correspond university professors and students. They also lected nearly a hundred questionnaires American reporters in Asia that provided a m lany of information about the work of foreign respondents; on their return to the states the culated similar questionnaires among Asian, ish, French, and other foreign corresponder the United States. In 1965 and 1966, unde auspices of the Council on Foreign Relations with the assistance of various organizations ested in the dissemination of news to and Asia, including the Department of State United States Information Agency, and mer of the Washington press corps, Hohe amassed an impressive amount of data or conduct and content of communications "bet two worlds."

The author regards the exchange of ("which includes ideas and opinions") betwee United States and Asia "a political act." He i however, an empirical political scientist; me ology is not his primary consideration no forte; he makes no pretensions to scientifi guiry and does not even claim to be objective the contrary, he freely expresses his own opi and offers his personal value judgments thre out the text; but this is precisely what make analysis both authentic and authoritative. deeply involved and concerned with the releof foreign correspondence to foreign policy, p ularly as it affects American-Asian relations describes his work as "a study in argument ar versity, in the sometimes frightening cacopho a democratic society." As he perceives it, th teraction of journalism and diplomacy takes in a framework of "historic conflict." Althous treats the contestants on both sides with sy thy and understanding, quite obviously he more sympathy and more understanding fo journalists than for the public officials.

The book is difficult to review, for its scor cludes all of Asia, with specific chapters on Restless Japanese," "Red China's Shadow," "Ithe Asian Perimeter" ("Korea: The Forg Front," "Okinawa: The Billion Dollar Base," Changing Philippines," "The Voices of Taiw "South Asia" (India and India's neighbors), of course, "The War in Viet Nam." The chon Viet Nam stands out, perhaps because it most timely; it is a detailed and devastatin tique of "public diplomacy," management of news not only by government officials, high low, by also by publishers and editors, who is determine what Asian peoples know about

United States and what the American people know about Asians. Significantly, the chapter on Viet Nam opens with a cautiously critical discussion of the President's role as "newsmaker"; but the chapter ends with an accolade for the Viet Nam correspondents on whose reports the American people depend for information and for "a true interpretation of the course of events."

A great many names, more American than Asian, clutter the text: the index is virtually a roll call of the newsmen, newspapers, and public officials who have had some part in weaving the tangled web of communications between Asia and the United States since World War II. (The Appendix includes a tabulation of specific information about nearly a hundred foreign correspondents, age, nationality, organization, education, language facility, overseas experience, etc.) Despite too much detail, too many undigested and sometimes irrelevant statistics, and too much repetitious trivia, the overall analysis comes through quite clearly: the obstacles newsmen encounter in getting adequate and accurate information from public officials; the problems foreign policy-makers experience in securing cooperation of the press in engineering consent of the governed; the difficulties both face in persuading publishers and editors, especially in the hinterland, to let the people know what is going on in the world; and the credibility gap which leaves the people anxious to get at the truth but skeptical of even the most reliable sources. As we said, this is an important book, contributing to our understanding of the nerves of public diplomacy that stimulate the messages and convey the responses "between two worlds" which in effect constitute Asian-American relations.-MARIAN D. IRISH, American University.

Hacia America Latina Democratica e Integrada. By Romulo Betancourt. (Caracas, Venezuela: Editorial Senderos, 1967. Pp. 212.)

Since retiring from the presidency of Venezuela early in 1964, Romulo Betancourt has spent most of his time in Europe. There he has been working on a series of books setting forth his ideas on a wide range of subjects and recounting the history of Venezuela's experience with social reform and rapid economic development under the aegis of political democracy over which he presided for five years. The present volume is the first of these several volumes to appear in print.

Betancourt is best known as a doer. However, he is also a thinker, a man of ideas, with a notable capacity for expressing these ideas in sharp and readable prose. The volume under review is evidence of this fact.

This book is concerned principally with two of the major problems facing Latin America: the conflict between democracies and dictatorships, and the need of the area for economic and eventual political unity. Betancourt has long been an advocate of both democracy and Latin American unification.

In the first part of this book, Betancourt goes into considerable detail to defend the policy established by his government in 1959-64 of not extending diplomatic recognition to any Latin American government which had come to power through unconstitutional means, a policy which has been continued by his successor, Raul Leoni. He presents interesting details of correspondence which he had as President of Venezuela concerning this problem with chiefs of state of other American countries, including the presidents of Argentina, Costa Rica and Mexico, and President John F. Kennedy. He also defends the policy against various kinds of criticism to which it has been subjected.

Betancourt also deals with other aspects of the problems facing democracy in the hemisphere. These include a discussion of the Fidelista campaign to foment guerrilla wars against democratic regimes, and an essay on the United States intervention in the Dominican Republic in 1965. The latter includes interesting details, hitherto unpublished, on an attempted mediation of the Dominican civil war by Betancourt Jose Figueres and Luis Munoz Marin.

Betancourt is also concerned with united Latin American efforts for economic development of the area. In one chapter, he deals with the goals and accomplishments of the Alliance for Progress; in another he argues in favor of economic unity of Latin America as well as trade preferences for the area by industrial countries and international price stabilization agreements for key Latin American exports, as part of the answer to the region's economic problems.

This book is valuable not only for the arguments presented in the body of the volume. It is also of interest because it reprints several key speeches on Latin American affairs which Betancourt has made during the last two decades, and because of the publication for the first time of important private correspondence between Betancourt and other leading hemispheric figures when he was President of Venezuela.—Robert J. Alexander, Rutgers University.

Beyond Vietnam: The United States and Asia. By EDWIN O. REISCHAUER. (New York: Alfred A. Knopf 1967. Pp. 242. \$4.95.)

Vietnam Triangle: Moscow, Peking, Hanoi. By Donald S. Zagoria. (New York: Pegasus Press, 1967. Pp. xiv. 278.)

Both these books are interesting and thoughtprovoking. Reischauer quickly claims that his book is not about Vietnam, but is more generally concerned with American-Asian relations. This is true if one is accustomed to thinking in mail-slot terms, but false in the larger sense, for the book places Vietnam in its proper Asian setting. Though Reischauer, former American Ambassador to Japan, escapes from the geographic confines of Vietnam, one soon comes to realize that any such escape is academic, for what has happened in Vietnam colors the acts, thoughts and decisions of America, as well as those of Asian nations. Well along in the book the author acknowledges that American frustrations coming from Vietnam could create a new "occident-centered neo-isolationism,' which he sees as a disaster second only to a nuclear war itself.

In pointing out the choices facing the United States in Vietnam Reischauer, reflects an admittec gloom. Honest negotiations cannot be counted on and the alternatives are major escalation, which would wreck our relationship with most of the rest of Asia, and withdrawal, which would be a defeat that would have catastrophic psychological and political effects in the other Asian nations and intensify the already existing instability throughout the area. The remaining alternative is to continue if in a more flexible manner, the present policy Historical hindsight is used to present the argument that the present situation need not have developed, but that it resulted from a series of decisions by four presidents. The always present alternative has been the acceptance of a united nationalistic, Communistic Vietnam. Acceptance earlier is shown as not having been a threat to our international interests, possibly even enhancing it. A point of no return was reached in 1965 when massive troops were committed by the United States. That the four presidents had academic and theoretic choice is true, but whether they had real choices is debatable. For though Reischauer constantly points out what would have been the results in the international sphere if certain decisions had been taken, he does not apply the same approach to the domestic scene. A weakness in this book is the failure to properly develop the effects of various alternatives on domestic politics.

Healthy references are made to the vastness of United States power. This vast power is a handicap, for any sudden change in attitude would have serious effects upon other, friendly, nations. We can only change gradually. Analogies between contemporary Asia and an earlier, less developed Europe are challenged and pointed to as a major source of misconceptions about Asia. America must also begin to think of long-term solutions, and not merely of day-to-day policies. These long-term problems facing us in Asia reflect the disproportionate emphasis upon Vietnam; America must think through its goals in Asia and create the appropriate plans for accomplishment, and we

must escape from much of the present oversimplifications. To accomplish this, meaningful coordinating mechanisms must be developed, starvation of the State Department must end, and freedom from traditional concepts of diplomacy must be achieved. In reality, the solution to the world problem, as well as to its Asian aspect, lies in reeducation, re-thinking, and the development of a greater appreciation of the world as a whole.

Reischauer's book has a detailed table of contents and several excellent maps. There is no bibliography, and much of the material is based upon his personal experience of the diplomatic world. Due in part to the organization of the book one finds a degree of repetition. This, however, tends to reinforce certain themes which may well need repetition. On the whole, the book is invaluable both to the average person who has not already irreversibly made up his mind on the area and to those perhaps more astute, who will find themselves re-evaluating certain aspects of their Asian views. It gives good, but blessedly short, historical data, and avoids the fruitless legalistic arguments. I strongly recommend this book.

Zagoria's book is a scholarly work which is easy and pleasant to read. The five chapters total 136 pages, and the remaining 142 pages consist of extensive appendixes, sources, and a short index. The main purpose of the work, admirably carried out, is to give the reader a real grasp of the complexities and differences between the three Communist protagonists in relation to the Vietnam struggle. Conflicting elements, especially within Peking and Hanoi, are clearly brought forward, and the constant interrelation with Washington is most valuable. Zagoria's approach utilizes "Kremlinology"-the reading of various pronouncements of the Communist leaders and comparison thereof. This is connected to the global relationship of the three nation states. While admitted disadvantages are noted by the author, one cannot but help be impressed by the way in which he has handled the materials. What could have been a dull, lifeless work turns out to be rather fascinating and dynamic in both scope and approach. The thought, reasoning processes and evidence are impressive. In addition, Zagoria gives a very interesting analysis of the relationship between Hanoi and the National Liberation Front, explaining why Hanoi is not over-anxious to negotiate, and criticizing the policy of escalation. The author's position is moderate, rational, and well thought out, resulting in a worthwhile book.—George G. Bauroth, St. Vincent College.

Abuse of Power. By Theodore Draper. (New York: The Viking Press, 1966. Pp. vii, 244. \$4.95.)

American policy in Vietnam from 1945 to the

present is the subject of this volume, which is both an analysis and pointed critique of a war we never intended to fight. Theodore Draper's handling of this subject is uniformly good. He is at his best when assessing the Vietnam conflict within the framework of contemporary American foreign policy. If this book has any drawback, it is that recent preoccupation with this issue inevitably imparts a sense of déjà vue to some of Draper's factual account and criticism of Administration policy.

Based on the assumption that the main instrumentalities of a nation's foreign policy are political, economic, and military, Draper's main thesis is that recent years have witnessed "the suppression of political by military instrumentalities in the conduct of American foreign policy." This point is substantiated by a comparison of U.S. policy in Cuba (1961), the Dominican Republic, and Vietnam, where in each case military force was resorted to following a political failure. This failure in each country resulted from overtly supporting the wrong leader, and particularly in not being sufficiently astute to recognize why he was the wrong man. In Vietnam this pattern of failure is compounded, and "our military position has been strengthened every time the internal political situation has weakened." That the author sees a general pattern existing in the U.S. response to these three policy crises is thought-provoking, although one wonders whether he might have added perspective to his proposition by examining an instance of a successful use of the political instrumentality, such as the relatively flexible and sophisticated policy of the United States in the extended Congo crisis of 1960-63.

The book has a two-sided appeal, polemical and analytical. A committed partisan on the Vietnam issue, Draper has presented a penetrating rebuttal to the Administration's defense of its Southeast Asian policy. The author documents and priticizes the Administration's inability to tolerate ambiguity with regard to issues of nationalism and communism. The "foreign aggression vice civil war" theory, and the gamut of aborted negotiation attempts, are critically evaluated. The Administration's argument that China is the "real" enemy receives predictably rough treatment. On this score Draper documents the rising rate of Russian aid to Vietnam, and can only view in bemused wonder a Government which claims that the "real" enemy has no intention or capability of getting into the war, while at the same time it painfully ignores the main source of Vietnam's support.

However, Draper is more than a polemicist and his policy study suggests insights for the student of international bargaining and conflict behavior. The book offers a good empirical examination of escalation. Not only does it capture the flavor of the policy pronouncements and rationale that accompany the increasing stakes, but it explores the relationship between theory and force, war costs and war aims which occurs as the expenditure of force rises. Theory, says the author, is necessarily escalated with force, which transforms the image of the war into a final confrontation between the West and the proponents of wars of "national liberation." The main effect this has is to reduce flexibility and capacity for policy-making, both on our part and on the part of our opponents.

Most students of public policy today would agree with Senator Richard Russell's pronouncement that "we have made every conceivable blunder" in Vietnam. Let us hope that this unfortunate situation continues to receive the calibre of analysis that Draper's Abuse of Power represents.—Gilbert R. Winham, McMaster University.

Arms Control Arrangements for the Far East. (Stanford, California: Stanford University Press, Hoover Institution Publications, 1967. Pp. xi, 215. \$5.00.)

This is a report produced under contract for the United States Arms Control and Disarmament Agency by a Hoover Institution Arms Control Project headed by Yuan-Li Wu. The report aims at an objective analysis of arms control and disarmament (ACD) measures and uses the Far East to test a regional approach. The region is defined to include Japan and Taiwan and countries around the Asian rim to India and Pakistan. Communist China, North Korea, and North Vietnam, along with the United States and the Soviet Union, as interested powers, are "extraregional."

Positions of the major outside powers are considered first as a basis for examining regional positions. The basic data are developed from announced positions of the various countries, and are broken down analytically to form charts of considerable length in the appendices. One appendix presents a matrix with 215 analytical items as related to 82 rows of proposals. Small black squares are used to show major power proposals chronologically, and to compare proposals of the United States and the Soviet Union. Another appendix plots bigger black squares for regional attitudes according to degree of enthusiasm for different proposals. Using the matrix, the Hoover team states that 439 questions were answered hypothetically for each of the fifteen countries (Australia and New Zealand being combined as one), giving a total of 6.585 responses. Since this was unmanageable, and slight differences of interpretation might exist, and some countries "if actually put to the test, would probably not take the position we have attributed to them," the questions were grouped and boiled down to 87 (p. 76).

The Hoover team conclude, after the exercise of

developing matrices and applying tests to them, that "previous nonregional proposals, regional responses, and regional proposals, give little insight into the content, application, or efficacy of possible ACD arrangements for the Far East," and thus, "the Far East will have to start from scratch" (p. 16). For the Far East, the conclusion is that instead of attacking the most difficult problems, i.e., actual ACD, "it might be better to work for the acceptance and implementation of ACD arrangements that would be relatively simple to achieve" (p. 120). The hope would be that from minor measures would develop positions producing actual ACD.

The text contains material on the region and groupings and a survey of conflicts and tensions, the latter being the basis of a very simple final chart. A final chapter considers the implications for the national interests of the United States.

The charts, upon which the report bases so much of its substance, although simple in form, are not easy to manage. It seems doubtful whether the methodological breakthrough goes beyond playing games on a matrix. A casual remark with respect to the military regimes which exist in almost one half of the regional countries must be noted. They are described often as "one of the best overall tools for reform and progress available to-the nation" (p. 114). That would be a breakthrough, if substantiated.—Dale Pontius, Roosevelt University.

Harry S. Truman and the Russians 1945-1953. By Herbert Druks. (New York: Robert Speller & Sons, 1966. Pp. xii, 219, \$7.50.)

This study of the evolution of containment is a useful contribution to the current debate about the origins of the Cold War. Herbert Druks has had access to the papers of most of the principal decision-makers of the Truman administrations and some classified documents of the House Foreign Affairs Committee. Additionally, he has canvassed nearly all of the published sources that are relevant to President Truman's statecraft. The resulting treatment is a carefully documented narrative of Truman's major foreign policy decisions during his tenure. Professor Druks' conclusion is that "by raising American foreign policy to a mature level of responsibility, Harry S. Truman became one of the greatest presidents of the United States of America."

Unfortunately the author's conclusion does not follow from his purpose which is to refute partisan charges that President Truman was an "appeaser" or a "warmonger." In this way the reader is provided with two straw men who nearly collapse under their own weight. The book's primary focus is upon the labeling of Truman as an appeaser,

and the account of the hypocrisy and unrealism of Republican unilateralist charges from 1948 to 1952 is a familiar and dreary tale.

Nor are there many revelations in the discussion of the formulation of the Truman Doctrine, Marshall Plan, or President Truman's conduct of the Berlin Blockade and the 1948 campaign. In these instances Harry Truman is characterized as combative, decisive and blessed with competent advisers. Contrarily, Stalin is presented as imperialistic, treacherous and a cunning statesman whose "suspicion" of Anglo-American collaboration was a pretext for his diplomatic intransigence. Hence, most of the book is merely a defense of President Truman's risky and costly decisions to contain the Soviet Union and its proxies from 1947 to 1952. The treatment mirrors the conventional American historiography of that phase of the Cold War.

However, the revisionists argue that the Cold War antedates the Truman Doctrine and was prompted by the American principle of self-determination and President Truman's truculent diplomacy borne of the awesome novelty of atomic capability. Gar Alperovitz's Atomic Diplomacy is the most persuasive of the revisionist theories.

Happily, Professor Druks' third chapter, "From Roosevelt to Truman," is the most thoroughly researched section of his book. Although the author concludes that Truman's statecraft of 1945 was a mixture of conciliation, pressure and deterrence with respect to the Russians, much of the evidence cited lends credence to Alperovitz's interpretation. It becomes clear that in spite of the President's initial determination to continue Roosevelt's policy of "friendly firmness" towards the Soviets, there was a shift towards coercion in 1945 as Truman (1) learned of the atomic project the night he became President, (2) was buoyed by the unexpected degree of success of the first atomic test during the Potsdam Conference and (3) realized the psychological efficacy of the use of these weapons at Hiroshima and Nagasaki. It also is evident that the abrupt cancellation of lend-lease to Russia was an attempt to pressure Stalin into accepting the American version of the vague Yalta agreements about the governments of Eastern Europe. Furthermore, President Truman admitted in an interview with Druks in 1962 that the imminent development of the atomic bomb was the rationale for delaying the Fotsdam Conference in spite of British protestations. The author supports the assertion that one reason for dropping the first atomic bomb was to end the war before the pledged Soviet intervention on August 8th. The author also notes that many American military leaders were averse to the new weapon's use because it would be immoral or unnecessary. Finally, President Truman fired Secretaries Byrnes and Wallace primarily because by the end of 1945 he believed that dissuasion and coercion were the appropriate techniques for dealing with the Soviets.

But here ends this book's evidence for Alperovitz's rather Procustean thesis. As Druks points out. President Truman did not reverse Roosevelt's Russian policy. Rather, the new President acted upon Admiral Leahy's account of Roosevelt's growing disenchantment with the Soviet Union's desire to be ringed with Communist regimes. It was not until the stupendous results of the atomic test were known that Truman and his closest advisers decided that Russian intervention in Asia was an unnecessary, rather than a necessary evil. Until that time the President had been counseled to rely upon conventional aerial bombardment and blockade of Japan and a Russian declaration of war that might obviate or cut short the invasion of Kyushu. Furthermore, President Truman bowed to American public opinion in seeking unconditional surrender until the Japanese overtures after the second atomic raid.

Professor Druks' candid account reveals, as one might expect, that there was no prolonged administration conspiracy to demonstrate atomic power to the Soviets no matter the course of the war with Japan. Instead, the atomic bomb became, after July 21, 1954, the deus ex machina that might cause the Japanese to surrender unconditionally before the Soviets intervened and especially before an invasion of Japan. President Truman's early Soviet policy was a series of improvisations and a combination of accommodation, recalcitrance, and threats that have continued to the present. In his brusque way, Harry S. Truman may have hastened the Cold War. But given the American national style, any United States Fresident would have become angered at Soviet perfidy and repression sooner or later and would have led or been led by domestic opinion leaders to resist Soviet expansionism.

Of course the definitive analysis of the Cold War must await the opening of both the American and Soviet archives. Then fuller explanation must be placed within the framework of the national styles, perceptions and objectives of the decision-makers of both states and the interaction of their respective initiatives and capabilities. In the meanwhile, Professor Druks has made an important addition to our understanding of the epochal decision to use atomic weapons and the development of the Cold War.—Lee Denson, United State Air Force Academy.

Soviet Foreign Aid. By Marshall I. Goldman. (New York: Frederick A. Praeger, 1967. Pp. xiv, 265. \$8.50.)

As we learn from our first introduction to the

treatment of the subject, Dr. Goldman prefers to define Soviet foreign aid rather broadly. In keeping with this preference, he has chosen to include in his geographically oriented survey not only the economic aid extended by the Soviet Union to the countries of the "third world" but also its development assistance to the less industrialized communist countries of Eastern Europe and Asia, He has chosen this particular approach. Dr. Goldman informs us, partly in order to provide some perspective on the evolution of Soviet attitudes and policies toward economically less developed nations since the end of World War II, and in part because, in his words, "certain patterns that were first established in Eastern Europe and China continue to be of significance in the Soviet aid program today."

In the material covered by the first two chapters, which deal with the communist-ruled countries of Eastern Europe and Asia, the reader is presented with detailed information on the specific branches of industry in which the Soviet Union had developed particular capabilities by the end of World War II. He is, therefore, disposed to agree readily with the author that the experience gained in dealing with client countries in the communist camp was in fact indispensable to the future development assistance activities of the government agencies as well as the individual specialists of the U.S.S.R. This previous experience was helpful, first of all, in the sense of providing Soviet personnel with the needed confidence that they will be able to tackle the rather difficult job of transplanting productive capacity of their own manufacture, and the range of operating skills associated with it, into an alien environment and to untrained people speaking a foreign tongue.

In the chapters dealing with the main body of his material, namely the newly developing countries outside the communist camp, Professor Goldman has provided the reader with another useful perspective. He has chosen to examine the record. as well as the impact, of the economic aid programs of the U.S.S.R. in a comparative setting, namely in juxtaposition to the development assistance projects supported by the United States in some of the same countries. To this end, he has introduced into the individual chapters, each devoted to a major recipient area of Soviet economic aid, a judicious amount of economic data, and interpretative comment related to U.S. activities in support of specific development projects in these countries.

Once he has immersed himself in these richly factual and highly readable chapters, the interested reader will continue to be enormously impressed by the industry and patience which Dr. Goldman has brought to his task. In particular, he

will find that the author has painstakingly recorded the details of the economic operations which the U.S.S.R. has undertaken in the case of two major recipients, the U.A.R. and India, to whom it has assigned a special place of honor in its foreign aid program. In several instances, in fact, the author has succeeded in enlivening his account by means of a short personal visit to the Soviet-financed projects which he has described. On occasion, too, he has interviewed key officials who play an active role in guiding the assistance programs, or in supervising enterprises under construction.

While unfolding before the reader the record with respect to the two leading client-countries Professor Goldman has chronicled with great patience, and with a degree of dramatic flair, the evolution of some of the more publicized credit transactions between the U.S.S.R. and the recipient countries, detailing the size and capacity of the installations to be erected, and the psychological impact created by the completed enterprise both at home and abroad.

What this reviewer finds somewhat less satisfactory in Dr. Goldman's treatment of the complex subject of Soviet foreign aid is the fact that he has manifested little interest in synthesizing the material he has laboriously assembled into some meaningful analytical findings. As a rule, of course, we are no more justified in quarreling with a man's interest than with his taste. There are, nevertheless, in a study of this importance, a number of points on which the reader has a right to expect the author to confront some of the issues which he himself has raised in the course of positioning his own generalizations. Dr. Goldman has not tried, for example, to offer a valid rationale for the Soviet venture into the costly and unpredictable enterprise of dispensing development aid to non-communist countries that would be sufficiently persuasive to the careful reader. The reader finds himself quite puzzled by the whole massive Soviet undertaking, especially in light of Dr. Goldman's own opinion to the effect that "a successful aid project that strengthens and stabilizes the economy" in a newly developing country is not very helpful to the cause of revolution (p. 199); or that the cause of "communism does not flourish or spread in countries that seem to be solving their economic problems."

On balance, however, this may be a secondary count on which to cavil with a useful book that contains between its two covers a vast amount of factual material on the actual operations of the program of external financial and technical assistance which the Soviet Union has consistently supported since the mid-fifties.—Leon M. Herman, Library of Congress.

The Soviet Union in the World Communist System. By Vernon V. Aspaturian. (Stanford, California: Stanford University Press, Hoover Institution Publications, 1966. Pp. 96. \$1.50.)

Aspaturian's monograph is part of a comprehensive project inaugurated at Stanford University in 1963 to study integration and community building among the fourteen ruling communist-party states. Its predominant ideas may be summarized as follows.

- 1. After the Bolshevik success in 1917, the accomplishments of the Soviet Union and the pronouncements of its leaders were widely regarded as oracular and infallible, and the strategy and tactics of the CPSU came to be a model for successful revolutionary action outside the Soviet Union.
- 2. Lenin and Stalin envisioned their multinational federation as the beginning of a global communist federation. Although subservient relationships between the CPSU and non-ruling parties ensued under Comintern auspices, in time new ruling-party states with particularistic national traditions demanded a rejection of the Soviet Union's Russified Marxism. Perhaps surprisingly, the trend was heralded by Stalin's own failure to sever the Soviet state from its Russian moorings. But in fact, none of Lenin's successors have resolved the special problem of the U.S.S.R. as an arrested universal state, or the contradiction which resulted from "the necessity to be both ethnocentric and ecumenical simultaneously." Thus, instead of being the nucleus of a world communist federation, the U.S.S.R. by 1965 had become "little more than a Russianized socialist multinational state, controlling an East European empire of dependent states."
- 3. Never in history has a state assumed so many "masks." Institutionalized identities include state, party, nation (Russia), and multiple nation (multi-national federation), all of which have led to "political schizophrenia" and more generally to an uncommonly ambiguous Soviet personality. The four identities in turn operate in five political environments: the Soviet social order; the Soviet multinational order; the communist party-state; the general interstate system; and the world communist movement. The result is a "spectrum of internal and external social, political, and ideological constituencies, whose interests impinge upon and influence the behavior of the Soviet Union in its "multiple political roles."
- 4. Not only do Great Russian interests predominate as the chief national input into the Soviet system, but those of the other Soviet nationalities are arranged in an informal hierarchy of priorities. (Here the study would be measurably enhanced if it were to argue and statistically demonstrate this point, rather than assume it. A number of conclu-

sions about preferential treatment are drawn, but without convincing evidence.)

Professor Aspaturian's study is clearly a provocative supplementary piece for college courses. As part of an effort to illuminate integration and community building among Marxist-Leninist states, however, it has a fundamental weakness: it gives much attention to the multinational character of the Soviet Union, and surprisingly little to the roles of Eastern Europe. Even a slight shift in emphasis would help considerably.

For historical, geographical, and political reasons, Eastern Europe is today the only international context amenable to ideological confirmation in support of the Soviet Union-a situation which is somewhat paradoxical in that, faced with system-wide conflicts, the Soviets must ultimately rely upon East European allies where national particularism began in the first place. Significantly, the old one-way relations have long been replaced by an organizational subsystem (COMECON and the Warsaw Treaty Organization), harboring multiple transactions in an atmosphere of mutual dependence and value sharing. Whatever the dynamics of Soviet identities in various operational environments, the primary virtues of the Soviet revolutionary model have really become the promotion of welfare at home, the support of revolution abroad (or in its contemporary form, wars of national liberation), and the development of Marxist-Leninist solidarity among the most advanced ruling-party states of the system. All this means a monumental effort to impart fresh legitimacy to withered dogmas through a trifold policy which assigns high priorities to what in the Soviet purview are ideologically progressive relationships with East European allies.

Among the study's more controversial assertions (p. 65) is that "since the Cuban missile crisis, the credibility of the Soviet Union's willingness to protect its allies under certain conditions has been undermined." It can be argued convincingly that quite the contrary may be true and that the Soviet Union proved its willingness to confront the United States until presidential assurances were given that Fidel Castro's precarious regime would not be destroyed. The same imperative underpins unswerving Soviet support to the Democratic Republic of Vietnam against the odds that a Marxist-Leninist regime might not survive cumulative American military pressures. The withdrawal of missiles from Cuba might have been a tactical defeat and the Soviet Union's le

for the DRV, the effect of which is to mire the United States in Southeast Asia and direct attention from Europe where America's increasingly nominal allies sense an important shift in U.S. defense priorities.

The heart of the study lies in what it does not do after presenting a whole range of heuristic insights. Themes and themes are paraded in tantalizing fashion before the reader, and after a few glancing blows dropped without adequate exploration. In this sense, the monograph is a skeletal effort deserving of a full-length definitive work on Soviet foreign policy over a half century, a task for which few are better qualified than Aspaturian.—NISH JAMGOTCH, JR., University of North Carolina at Charlotte.

Israel on the Road to Sinai, 1949-1956. By Ernest Stock. (Ithaca, New York: Cornell University Press, 1967. Pp. x, 284. \$6.50.)

Dr. Stock has handled his main theme in a meticulous and objective fashion. He observes piquantly that the sale of French arms to Israel, which made possible Israel's success in the 1956 Sinai campaign, had been approved by the Eisenhower administration which, apprehensive about the effect on the Arab states if American arms were to go to Israel in quantity, referred the Israeli shopping-list to France and gave its "blessing" to the transaction (p. 184).

A smoke-screen of Israeli censorship still surrounds the abortive sabotage operation of 1954 that was apparently designed to damage Egypt's improving relations with the U.S. and Britain. Dr. Stock treats the "mishap" briefly in a section entitled "Ambivalence and Illegitimate Force" (pp. 117-26); but would not its Defense Ministry authors argue that, facing an Egypt that continually claimed to be legally at war with Israel or at least insisted on its "belligerent rights" (pp. 100-102), such a sabotage operation was (subject to the eleventh commandment, Thou shalt not be found out) a legitimate ruse de guerre?

The author frankly tells us (p. 217) that he had written in a concluding paragraph of the book composed some months before May 15, 1967, "The combination of circumstances which made Sinai possible . . . is not likely to recur"; but before these words went to the press, circumstances obliged him to add a "Sequel on the Six-Day War, 1967." Dr. Stock's casual dismissal of the Anglo-French motives for taking seriously Nasser's expressions of the Six-Day War,

the Arab-Israel area" (p. 230). This is precisely what Sir Anthony Eden foresaw and feared in 1956 while Dulles and Eisenhower, preoccupied with their election campaign, chose to pass by on the other side. If indeed the Cold War has "subsided" (p. 232), the present maneuvers of Soviet naval vessels between the Arab ports of the Mediterranean suggest an interim Soviet victory.—George Kirk, University of Massachusetts.

Trade Liberalization Among Industrial Countries:
Objectives and Alternatives. By Bela Balassa.
(New York: McGraw-Hill Book Company, for
the Council on Foreign Relations, 1967. Pp. 246.
\$7.95.)

It would be difficult to overstate the value of this book to students of international politics and economics. In about 150 lucidly and authoritatively written pages of text, Professor Balassa reviews the postwar history of trade liberalization; describes, with measures of the protective effect of tariffs calculated by himself, the system of protection in the industrial countries; evaluates the static and dynamic effects of trade liberalization (including an evaluation of the effects of liberalization on international direct investment patterns); and weighs the relative costs and benefits of alternative groupings of countries between which complete liberalization might proceed.

Implications about the trade stance of groups and industries—their success in winning protection or their stake in expanded trade—can be drawn from tables reporting rates of effective protection by-industry by-country, and export-import ratios by-industry by-country.

With the basic data and some simplifying assumptions, Balassa offers several estimates of the effects of trade liberalization, for example, the per cent increase (from 1960 values) of exports and imports of industrial materials and manufactured goods, by country, that might accompany the formation of an Atlantic free trade area (North America, E.E.C., E.F.T.A., and Japan). In this case, the expected changes generally run from 10 to 15 per cent, and the adverse balance of trade effects are small.

The value of this and similar exercises in the book is not that they offer solid predictions. The protective system basically alters the composition and characteristics of industry within countries, and estimates of the effects of suspending protection must necessarily employ the only data available, which are tariff-distorted. And such exercises neglect gains from intra-industry specialization, widening the field of choice for consumers, and stimulating innovation. The value of the exercises is that they provide quantitative benchmarks, the best available with the state of the art, against which discussion of alternative arrangements (e.g.,

Atlantic free trade area vs. 50 per cent across the board tariff reduction) can be organized, and to which the consideration of less quantifiable effects can be added. Balassa uses the estimates appropriately. The student who follows their derivation will not be misled, but will acquire an understanding of effects of trade liberalization.

Essays on the dynamic effects of liberalization, direct investment and liberalization, and a summary discussion of alternatives, encompass both political and economic considerations.

Complete appendices record data and describe the method and rationale of the computations. There is no bibliography, but there is an adequate index and Balassa conscientiously cites the literature—including some very recently published—in the text and notes. The student attempting to organize a research project, or seeking a grasp of this area, would profitably start with this book.—David S. Ball, North Carolina State University.

The Legal Significance of the Declarations of the General Assembly of the United Nations. By OBED Y. ASAMOAH. (The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, 1966. Pp. 274.)

The most significant aspect of international development is the development of international organizations and, correlatively, the development of a so-called "new" international law. This law, derived from a growing corpus of resolutions and declarations, saliently those of the United Nations General Assembly, promotes the identification of political and legal acts in the context of international organizations and obviates the popular arguments that international organizations lack the legislative and executive authority to formulate and to compel adherence to decisions independently of States: thus embodying one form of problem-anticipating or initiatory developments in international politics.

In The Legal Significance of the Declarations of the General Assembly of the United Nations, Obed Y. Asamoah documents that development. Among relatively few such studies, this analysis focuses upon the role of the General Assembly, as the UN's chartered law-making organ, in modifying legal relations between States: it further suggests that the State practice of presenting declarations in that body has broader implications for customary international law—that the practice arising from political as opposed to contractual pressure is law in all arenas, inter-organizational as well as inter-State. Asamoah's thesis has been affirmed in three recent sessions of the UN General Assembly, in 1963, 1965, and 1966 when it constituted and subsequently reconstituted the Special Committee on the Principles of International Law Concerning Friendly Relations and Cooperation Among States. (See, for example, Chapter III under Legal Questions in the Yearbook of the United Nations 1965.)

Asamoah is concerned less with the formal aspects of authority described by sovereignty and the drafting of treaties than with the informal aspects of the observance and enforcement of international law propounded in organizations originating in treaties. In an introductory functional analysis of the constraints imposed upon the United Nations in the initiation and application of international law, the author holds that the validity of law does not depend upon its observance and that over-emphasis on enforcement obscures the qualitative differences between national and international legal systems, the latter achieving a degree of regularity proportionate to the growing corpus of international practices as binding customary rules. The layman's view (that breaches of international law and the lack of instituted means to prevent or to sanction such breaches indicate that there is no international law qua law) ignores the actual political bargaining integral to the behavior of States in international organizations as expressed in recommendations and the quasi-legislative decisions of which declarations are frequently composed. The element of irreversibility in the development of international customary rules is examined implicitly in this analysis and it is hoped that the author, obviously unable to pursue that subject in the present short monographic context, will soon undertake a close study of the junctures beyond which practice can only become rule.

Without attempting to scale the several types of recommendations and binding decisions obtaining in the General Assembly in terms of their significance for the evolution of rules, Asamoah distinguishes among several of them with detail sufficient to provide the political scientist insight into which practices originating in or confirmed by the United Nations General Assembly are more or less capable of initiating legal and political development within and outside that arena. Binding decisions are narrowly identified with the operation of the UN system itself, pertaining, for example, (1) to admissions to certain relations with non-members, (2) to its subsidiary agencies, and (3) to agreements between States delegating legislative competences upon the Assembly. It is in the first of these, in particular the admission of new members, expulsion, and the control of the UN over non-members, that international organizational development may occur with relatively great frequency and intensity. The question of the irreversibility of membership by expulsion or withdrawal has received attention by policy scientists in several disciplines.

Assembly recommendations lack the legislative competence and enforcement procedures latently

characteristic of binding decisions, which have an internal base in the Charter. But recommendations may embody assertions of principle observed by the international community as legally binding; thus by reformulating a norm, an assertion extends the boundaries of both norm and UN legal presence. As Asamoah clearly indicates, the decisions of international organizations, though protean in scope and origin, are institutionally defined by the membership of States, as in the UN. Hence, it is valid and analytically fruitful to term as unique the rules emanating from international organizational practice not circumscribed by Article 38 of the Statute of the International Court of Justice. This consideration obviates specious comparisons between municipal law and organizational authority with regard to structure and process. Asamoah distinguishes further between the historical influence of the presence of international organizations upon the substance and rate of accumulation of international custom, and the emergent development of an international law internal to the organizations themselves.

Asamoah does not establish an undifferentiated sphere of organizational law; the implicit catalyst if not the aim of the present volume is to isolate a variety of emergent types of organizational law typical of at least one organization and one medium-declarations. What forums exist beyond the Secretariat, but within the UN, which do or could promote de facto the development of international law? Has the signal rule-making role assumed by the General Assembly through declarations lent both that body and its declarations a long-range dominance in international customary practice? Without analyzing the unique attributes of the General Assembly as a rule-making arena or defining its declarations as qualitatively different political processes from those obtaining in other international organizations narrower and more specialized namely, the European Community—the author encourages those exercises by his historical examination of the characteristics of declarations. his categorization of Assembly declarations, and his reference to the interrelationships between declarations and the contexts in which they are promulgated.

Asamoah's categorization may assist analyst and policy-maker in discerning where, in time and in space, the constitutional development of organizations ends and the evolution of practice begins. By delineating Assembly declarations as those (1) positing principles of international law; (2) claiming in quasi-legislative form to create new principles of international law; (3) supporting programs authorized under the UN Charter, the monograph provides the basis for models by which to test the relevance of specific boundaries of organizational constitutions for international legal development.

Assembly declarations have manipulative value according to the modifications they are capable of dictating at any point for such constituted UN behavior as decision-making. As the structure, authorized through evidently flexible norms by the Charter to introduce law, the General Assembly is a delimiting environment for declarations only in that Charter provisions outline the decision-making processes giving initial definition of outcomes. But the Charter is subject to particular opportunistic interpretations of such principles as those of "domestic jurisdiction" and "sovereign equality" in instances which include the Soviet Union's simultaneous endorsement of the intervention in South Africa on behalf of the Indians and refusal to allow examination of the violation of human rights perpetrated in Eastern Europe.

As the author suggests, this contextual analysis of the influence of declarations as an available political instrument in the UN might valuably be extended to other phases and aspects of diplomatic method currently outside the gambit of organizations. The utility of declarations as media of communication, as between States members of the UN and participants in treaty systems perceived by those States as imposing incompatible demands, in establishing coherence among a community of treaty commitments has not been explored as initiatory development.

In this respect as in several others cited above, it is hoped that Asamoah's study of General Assembly declarations will serve as the basis for future collaboration between lawyers and politicians, scholars of the law and political scientists, in seeking new ways to use existing international organizations rather than in encouraging the multiplication of constitutional structures to solve new problems.—A. R. Headley, University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill.

World Politics: The Global System. HERBERT J. Spiro. (Homewood, Illinois: The Dorsey Press, 1966. Pp. xx, 345. \$6.75.)

World Politics: The Global System by Herbert J. Spiro is a useful undergraduate textbook that also endeavors to make a contribution to a systems analysis of international politics. After dispensing with power approaches to international

politics by demonstrating their ambiguities and deficiencies, Professor Spiro uses a systems approach in which many original concepts are offered to define the growth of community in the international system. In doing this, he makes a plea that if the new institutions of international politics are to develop adequately, they must be used in a variety of contexts.

The book contains an interesting discussion of political styles as they have changed over time in the course of which Spiro provides an adequate background for the student of the course of international politics since 1898. Spiro enters a plea against the use of misleading analogies and metaphors although it is doubtful whether he provides any criteria by means of which insightful and useful metaphors can be distinguished from misleading or harmful metaphors.

Professor Spiro defines the political system in such a way that it is broader than the social system, a definitional peculiarity to which he is entitled but which this reviewer finds inutile. He includes a discussion of the role of international law in the system of international politics that the student will find informative and enlightening. In the course of this, the student is confronted with Roman Law and Common Law traditions and various theories of law, a refreshing contrast with the usual textbook approach.

Undergraduate texts necessarily cover many more areas of human knowledge than any one political scientist can be competent in Spiro's major weakness is in the area of strategic theory. It is not true that nuclear weapons cannot be used to acquire some future good. And it is not true that the international politics of the seventeenth century was a zero-sum game although Spiro is right in believing that many writers of the time conceived it as such (although they used a different terminology, of course). The doomsday machine was invented by strategists as a reductio ad absurdum, not as a preferred strategy. The discussion of strategic doctrine is based upon gross misunderstanding of the literature. Professor Spiro is not to be blamed for this, but it is a comment on the Dorsey Press that they could not afford proper critical help to the author for a book being offered as an undergraduate text.-Morton A. Kaplan, University of Chicago.

ANNOUNCEMENTS

The Managing Editor and printers regret that work stoppages and other production difficulties have caused the delayed publication of this issue of the Review.

1968 ANNUAL MEETING AND SLATE OF OFFICERS FOR 1968-69

The 1968 Annual Meeting of the Association will be held September 4-7 at the Washington-Hilton Hotel, Washington, D. C. Professor Joseph LaPalombara, Yale University, is Chairman of the Program Committee.

At the Annual Business Meeting of the Association, to be held at 8:00 p.m. Wednesday, September 4, in the Grand Ballroom, Washington-Hilton Hotel, the Nominating Committee (comprised of Aaron B. Wildavsky, University of California, Berkeley, Chairman; Richard F. Fenno, Jr., University of Rochester; Robert E. Ward, University of Michigan; Harry Eckstein, Princeton University; Leon D. Epstein, University of Wisconsin; and William S. Livingston, University of Texas) will propose the following officers for 1968-69:

President Elect: Karl W. Deutsch, Harvard University

Vice Presidents: James W. Fesler, Yale University

Hans J. Morgenthau, University of Chicago

Vernon Van Dyke, University of Iowa

Secretary: Bernard L. Kronick, University of Santa Clara Treasurer: Francis E. Rourke, Johns Hopkins University

Members of the Council for two years:

Gordon E. Baker, University of California, Santa Barbara

Samuel DuBois Cook, Duke University Josephine E. Milburn, Simmons College Joseph L. Nogee, University of Houston A. F. K. Organski, University of Michigan

Frank J. Sorauf, University of Minnesota

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Herbert J. Spiro, University of Pennsylvania

Frederick M. Wirt, Denison University

NOTICE

RESOLUTIONS AND CONSTITUTIONAL AMENDMENTS AT THE ANNUAL BUSINESS MEETING

In accordance with the Constitution of the American Political Science Association, the attention of members of the Association is hereby directed to the provisions of the Constitution that:

"All resolutions shall be referred to the Council for its recommendations before submission to the vote of the Association at its Annual Business Meeting." (Article VIII)

"Amendments to this Constitution shall be proposed by the Council and adopted by a majority vote of the members present at any regular or special meeting of the Association.

"Ten members of the Association may propose amendments to this Constitution. Such proposed amendments shall be referred to the Council for consideration, and by them referred to the Association for its action thereon at the next Annual Business Meeting with such recommendations as the Council may see fit to make." (Article IX)

The Council of the Association will meet during the afternoon of Monday, September 2, and all day Tuesday, September 3, 1968, in the Thoroughbred Room, Washington-Hilton Hotel, Washington, D. C.

The Constitution of the Association is printed in both the 1961 and 1968 editions of the Association's Biographical Directory.

PROGRAM COMMITTEE: 1969 ANNUAL MEETING

The 1969 Annual Meeting of the Association will be held in New York City at the Commodore Hotel, September 3-6. Suggestions for papers to be presented at the 1969 Annual Meeting are earnestly solicited. As before, the program will be divided into sections, each of which will have a number of panels, with each panel providing an opportunity for one or more papers. All of the sections will include some cross-cultural comparisons. No Section Chairman can possibly be familiar with all of the work going on in his domain; thus it becomes necessary for scholars whose work is just coming to fruition to make this work known to the relevant Section Chairmen. This is particularly true when the research forms part of a dissertation currently under way.

Please advise the Section Chairmen (listed below) of research which, either now or within a year, will very likely form the basis for a high quality research report at the meetings. Since the program is currently being shaped, it is not too early to anticipate events more than a year in the future. Proposals should be submitted preferably by October 15, 1968, but not later than December 1, 1968. Members of the Committee are:

Chairman, Robert E. Lane, Yale University

Empirical Theory-James G. March, University of California, Irvine

International Relations, Organization and Bargaining—Harold Guetzkow, Northwestern University

Legislative Roles, Recruitment and Decision-Making—Samuel C. Patterson, University of Iowa

Mathematical Applications to Political Research—Gerald H. Kramer, Yale University

Normative Political Theory-Christian Bay, University of Alberta

Political Socialization in Cultural Context-Jack Dennis, University of Wisconsin

Urban Politics and Problems-J. David Greenstone, University of Chicago

Political and Social Change—Frederick W. Frey, Massachusetts Institute of Technology

Political Science as a Policy Science—H. Mark Roelofs, New York University, University Heights

Computer Technology and Political Research—Warren E. Miller, University of Michigan

Multi-Ethnic Communities—Aristide R. Zolberg, University of Chicago

Legal and Judicial Behavior-David J. Danelski, Yale University

Parties and Elections-H. Douglas Price, Harvard University

Administration and Organization—C. Dwight Waldo, Syracuse University

Political and Social Indicators: Development and Use—Bertram M. Gross, Syracuse University

Civil Disorder: Cross-Cultural Analysis and American Implications—Ivo K. Feierabend, San Diego State College

Political Personality and Leadership-Alexander L. George, Stanford University

ERRATUM

In Robert A. Dahl's Presidential address published in the issue of December, 1967, line 2 in since 1955...."

ARTICLES ACCEPTED FOR FUTURE PUBLICATION*

September, 1968

- Robert Alford, University of Wisconsin, "Voting Turnout in American Cities"
- Richard Ashcraft, University of California, Los Angeles, "Locke's State of Nature: Historical Fact or Moral Fiction?"
- Edward N. Beiser, Williams College, "The Reapportionment Cases: A Comparative Analysis of State and Federal Judicial Behavior"
- Moshe M. Czudnowski, The Hebrew University, Jerusalem, "A Salience Dimension for the Study of Political Culture."
- Jerome M. Gilison, Johns Hopkins University, "Soviet Elections as a Measure of Dissent: The Missing One Percent"
- A. James Gregor, University of California, Berkeley, "Political Science and the Uses of Functional Analysis"
- Kenneth P. Langton and M. Kent Jennings, University of Michigan, "Political Socialization and the High School Civics Curriculum in the United States"
- Michael Leiserson, University of California, Berkeley, "Factions and Coalitions in One-Party Japan: An Explanation Based on the Theory of Games"
- Milton G. Lodge, University of Iowa, "Soviet Elite Attitudes in the Post-Stalin Era"
- Martin C. Needler, University of New Mexico,
 "Political Development and Socioeconomic
 Development: The Case of Latin America"
- Robert A. Schoenberger, University of Michigan, "Conservatism, Personality and Political Extremism"
- Joel J. Schwartz and William R. Keech, University of North Carolina, Chapel Hill, "Group Influence on the Policy Process in the Soviet Union"
- J. David Singer, University of Michigan, Bruce M. Russett, Yale University, and Melvin Small, "National Political Units in the Twentieth Century: A Standardized List"
- Jack E. Vincent, Florida Atlantic University, 'National Attributes as Predictors of Delegate Attitudes at the United Nations"
- Raymond E. Wolfinger, Stanford University, and Fred I. Greenstein, Wesleyan University, "The Repeal of Fair Housing in California: An Analysis of Referendum Voting"

December, 1968

- Paul R. Brass, University of Washington, "Indian Party Systems: Coalition Politics and the Formation of Non-Congress Governments in North India"
- M. Margaret Conway, University of Maryland, and Frank B. Feigert, Knox College, "Motivation, Incentive Systems, and the Political

Party Organization"

- Ernest A. Duff, Randolph-Macon Women's College, and John F. McCamant, University of Denver, "Measuring Social and Political Requirements for System Stability"
- H. D. Forbes and Edward R. Tufte, Princeton University, "A Note of Caution in Causal Modelling"
- Michael P. Gehlen, University of California, Berkeley, "The Soviet Central Committee: An Elite Analysis"
- Ted Gurr, Princeton University, "A Causal Model of Civil Strife: A Comparative Analysis Using New Indices"
- Allan Kornberg, Duke University, and Hal N. Winsborough, University of Wisconsin, "The Recruitment of Candidates for the Canadian House of Commons"
- Michael Lipsky, University of Wisconsin, "Protest as a Political Resource"
- Allan G. Pulsipher, Texas A&M University, and James L. Weatherby, Jr., University of Minnesota, "Malapportionment, Party Competition, and the Functional Distribution of Governmental Expenditures"
- Harry M. Scoble, University of California, Los Angeles, and Robert Alford, University of Wisconsin, "Sources of Local Political Involvement"
- Ira Sharkansky, University of Wisconsin, "Agency Requests, Gubernatorial Support and Budget Success in State Legislation"
- Gordon Tullock, Rice University, "A Note on Censorship"

March, 1969

- Stephen J. Cimbala, University of Wisconsin, "Foreign Policy as an Issue Area: An Exploratory Analysis"
- Arthur S. Goldberg, University of Rochester, "Social Determinism and Rationality as Bases of Party Identification"
- Arthur L. Kalleberg, University of Minnesota, "Concept Formation in Normative and Empirical Studies"
- Lawrence B. Mohr, University of Michigan, "Determinants of Innovation in Organizations"
- Douglas W. Rae, Yale University, "Decision-Rules and Individual Values in Collective Choice"
- R. J. Rummel, University of Hawaii, "Indicators of Cross-National and International Patterns"
- * Production exigencies may occasionally necessitate publication of articles in issues other than those given in this listing.

Professional Placement Service at 1968 Annual Meeting

(September 3-7, 1968)

A professional placement service will again be available to members of The American Political Science Association attending the Washington, D.C. meeting. The placement service will be provided by the U. S. Employment Service. The primary purpose is to provide an efficient means for employers to meet prospective employees and vice versa.

The Professional Placement Service is entirely separate from the APSA's Personnel Service and requires separate registration. There is no fee for use of the Professional Placement Service by employers or applicants at the Convention.

All State Employment Service local offices accept orders and applications in the field of political science on a year-round basis as a regular part of their professional service.

If you plan to attend the Conference and utilize the Placement Service, please mail the form below as soon as possible, but not later than August 3, 1968. Application and/or employer order forms will be forwarded to you upon receipt of the following information.

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☐ Employer (check either)		☐ No. of Vacancies		
☐ Prospective Candidate		☐ No. of Area(s) of Specialization		
Will you be available for interviews during the Annual Meeting?				
	☐ Yes	□ No		
Fill in appropriate blocks and mail to: Miss Wareteen Smith, USES-DC Professional Career and Information Center, 1111 20th Street, N.W., Washington, D.C. 20036				

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AMERICA'S POLITICAL DILEMMA

From Limited to Unlimited Democracy

By GOTTFRIED DIETZE Has the American Dream of democracy and equal rights come true? Professor Dietze's thesis is that the march of democracy has actually made government less reasonable, has eliminated constitutional checks, has jeopardized the rights of men, and has resulted in a foreign policy that allowed the present Soviet threat to American security.

\$7.95

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
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
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
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
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
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
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Office of publication: Curtis Reed Plaza, Menasha, Wisconsin.

Foreign Agent: P. S. King and Staples, Ltd., Great Smith Street, Westminster, London.

Second class postage paid at Menasha, Wisconsin. Acceptance for mailing at special rate of postage provided for in Section 1103, Act of October 3, 1917, authorized May 12, 1926.

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SEPTEMBER, 1968

THE REPEAL OF FAIR HOUSING IN CALIFORNIA: AN ANALYSIS OF REFERENDUM VOTING*

RAYMOND E. WOLFINGER Stanford University

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In the summer of 1963 the California legislature passed the Rumford Act, prohibiting racial discrimination by realtors and the owners of apartment houses and homes built with public assistance. California real estate and property management interests, which had fought the Act's passage, then placed on the November 1964 ballot an initiative provision (Proposition 14) that would amend the state constitution to repeal the Rumford Act and prevent the state or any locality within it from adopting any fair housing legislation. During most of 1964 intense and lavishly financed campaigns were fought by supporters and opponents of Proposition 14. Almost 96 per cent

* Most of the data on which this article is based were collected by the Field Research Corporation. We are grateful to Mervin Field, Robert Heyer, and Penny Dufficy of this organization and June Chacran and Charles Y. Glock of the Survey Research Center of the University of California at Berkeley for their kind help in making the data available to us. For invaluable advice and assistance in data processing we are indebted to John Gilbert and Ted Cooper. Hale Champion, Russell Murphy, James Payne, Nelson W. Polsby, Edward R. Tufte, and Barbara Kaye Wolfinger made useful comments on an earlier draft of this paper, which was delivered at the 1965 annual meeting of the American Association for Public Opinion Research, Financial assistance was provided by the Graduate Division of Stanford University, the Stanford Computation Center, and the Center for Advanced Study in the Behavioral Sciences.

¹ A brief account of the background and passage of the Rumford Act and the Proposition 14

of the people who turned out on election day voted on the measure, which passed by a ratio of two to one. In one sense the campaign and balloting were an exercise in futility, for in May of 1967 the United States Supreme Court declared Proposition 14 unconstitutional. Some short-term consequences of its passage were apparent, however. For several years there was a severe weakening of legal sanctions against racial discrimination in housing, resulting in abandonment of many cases that were underway before the 1964 election. For eighteen months the federal government froze \$120 million in funds for California urban renewal projects. Less tangibly, it is claimed that the proposition's overwhelming popularity contributed to the Watts riots and other racial violence in California.

Our purpose is to describe various aspects of the voting decision, both for their historical interest and as evidence on more general problems of political behavior, including the role of campaigns in clarifying the choices before voters, the adequacy of "direct democracy" devices such as referenda, the degree to which whites are willing to support Negro aspirations for equality, and the ways in which civil rights attitudes and voting behavior differ among various population groups. We will trace the voters' responses at different stages of the campaign, assess the level of support for the proposition from various elements of the population, and explore to some extent the motivations

campaign may be found in Thomas W. Casstevens, *Politics*, *Housing*, and *Race Relations*: California's Rumford Act and Proposition 14 (Berkeley: Institute of Governmental Studies, 1967.)

that lay behind this voting, touching as we proceed on some broader issues that the Proposition 14 election illuminates.

The major source of data for this analysis is five state-wide sample surveys conducted by the Field Research Corporation's California Poll in March, May, early September, early October, and late October of 1964. Each sample included approximately 1200 persons. The margin of difference between the late October survey findings and the outcome of several candidate and proposition elections was less than five percentage points. We also draw occasionally on analyses of the relationship of aggregate election returns to census data on the 335 incorporated California communities with 1960 populations of 2,500 or more.

I. TWO INADEQUATE EXPLANATIONS: CALIFORNIANS' CONSERVATISM AND VOTER ERRORS

It may be well to begin by pointing out the inadequacies of two arguments that were offered to explain the election outcome. After the passage of Proposition 14 it was said that California is a conservative state and that the success of the proposition was merely a reflection of this conservatism. Another explanation, particularly common among California liberals who fought against the proposition, stressed the confusing intricacies of proposition voting and argued that voters' mechanical or perceptual errors, rather than their underlying beliefs, were responsible for the overwhelming "yes" vote.

There is a good deal of superficial evidence to support the California conservatism thesis. Senator Barry Goldwater clinched the 1964 Republican presidential nomination by his victory in the California primary, the only contested primary he won. The John Birch Society and other radical-right organizations are notoriously successful in the state, particularly in its southern counties. But much of

² The California Poll is financed by four television stations and a number of newspapers in the state, and conducted by the Field Research Corporation. It is based on stratified random samples. The nature of the sample varied slightly from one survey to the next. The March respondents were registered voters. May respondents were voters registered in a party who planned to vote in the June primary. September respondents were registered voters and people who intended to registered voters, excluding those who said they intended not to vote.

this and other evidence reflects intense minority right wing activity rather than widespread conservative attitudes in the population. In the California primary only Governor Nelson Rockefeller opposed Goldwater on the ballot and write-in votes were not permitted. Rockefeller's divorce and recent remarriage had alienated many voters and his young second wife had a baby a few days before the election, thus providing a fresh reminder of her husband's marital troubles. The California Poll clearly showed the thinness of Goldwater's California backing when the state's Republicans were given their choice of all presidential candidates.3 More relevant for our purposes, it does not appear that Californians are any more hostile to residential integration than people in other parts of the North. In the May 1964 California Poll, respondents were asked "If colored people came to live next door, would you move?" Only 13 per cent replied that they would. In response to the same question, 17 per cent of a Gallup sample of respondents in the Northeastern and Midwestern states said "ves" in 1963 and 10 per cent said "yes" in 1965.4

There are two versions of the explanations of Proposition 14's success in terms of voters' mistakes. The first version emphasizes response

- ³ When given a choice among all Republican presidential candidates, California Republicans were not much more enthusiastic about Goldwater than those in Oregon, where all candidates were on the ballot and Goldwater got 19 per cent of the vote. Goldwater wrote off the Oregon primary and did no serious campaigning there, while he built an extremely large and enthusiastic organization in California and spent a good deal of time there before the primary. In the May California Poll Goldwater was the first choice of 27 per cent of the Republican respondents, running second to Lodge, who did not campaign. Rockefeller was in third place and Nixon in fourth. Goldwater placed fourth (behind Rockefeller, Nixon, and Lodge) as a second choice candidate. He was most frequently chosen by Republicans as the candidate whose nomination would be objectionable.
- ⁴ We are indebted to Irving Crespi of the Gallup Organization, Inc. for making the non-California data available. A nationwide study of white attitudes toward Negroes conducted by the National Opinion Research Center in December 1963 showed the three Pacific states (75 per cent of whose population is in California) and the Middle Atlantic region to be the most liberal parts of the country on race relations. See Paul B. Sheatsley, "White Attitudes Toward the Negro," Daedalus, 95 (Winter, 1966), 226–227.

set. Californians vote on anywhere from 15 to 30 propositions in every statewide election. Many of these measures are quite esoteric; a considerable mythology has developed about the impact of mechanical aspects of the ballot on the fate of particular propositions. Since most of the 1964 propositions passed by large margins, it has been argued that the success of Proposition 14 was due in part to its ballot position; surrounded by popular propositions, it received many affirmative votes which were merely the result of inattentive repetition.

This argument may be rejected by examining the vote for two other measures on the ballot in 1964. Proposition 16 was a proposed constitutional amendment to establish a state lottery and license a particular firm, created for the purpose, to conduct the lottery. The antithesis of 16 was Proposition 13, which prohibited naming any firm in any proposed constitutional amendment considered in a referendum, and provided further that any amendment doing so would be void. The first of these contradictory propositions was defeated by 69.06 per cent; the second was passed by 69.09 per cent. Thus the voters evidently were capable of making acute distinctions in referendum voting; more than perfunctory response repetition went into voting on the propositions surrounding number 14 on the ballot.

The second, and for our purposes more interesting error argument concerns the wording of Proposition 14, which appeared on the ballot as follows:

SALES AND RENTALS OF RESIDENTIAL REAL PROPERTY. Initiative constitutional amendment. Prohibits State, subdivision, or agency thereof from denying, limiting, or abridging right of any person to decline to sell, lease, or rent residential real property to any person as he chooses. Probibition not applicable to property owned by State or its subdivisions; property acquired by eminent domain; or transient accommodations by hotels, motels, and similar public places.

A positive vote on Proposition 14 was a negative vote on fair housing legislation, and vice versa. A number of observers felt that the voters found this confusing and voted on the proposition as they felt on the issue of fair housing. As a consequence, the argument runs, many of the "yes" votes were erroneous attempts to express support for fair housing legislation. By examining the shortcomings of this explanation of the passage of Proposition 14, we can begin to move toward a more adequate understanding of the election outcome.

Initially there was considerable confusion

about the proposition's meaning. Only half of the May respondents were sure that they had heard of Proposition 14. By September (the last survey in which the question was asked) this had grown to two thirds of the sample.5 The Rumford Act itself was more familiar. In March 72 per cent of the sample knew something about it; by early September this had grown to 87 per cent. For reasons that will become apparent, we think that by election day most of the initial confusion about the proposition's meaning had been dispelled by the flood of campaign propaganda, so that the vast majority of the electorate cast votes that were consistent with their attitudes toward fair housing legislation.6 Furthermore, as we will show, whatever confusion remained could not have contributed to the proposition's passage.

Table 1 shows voting intentions on Proposition 14 from March through late October. Throughout this period there were substantially more "yes" than "no" intentions. The "yes" vote remained stable through early September and then grew in the final two surveys. Table 2 shows attitudes toward the Rumford Act from March through September (after which the question was not asked). There was essentially no change in the two-to-one opposition to the act during the spring and summer.

The extent of confusion about how to express one's attitudes toward fair housing legislation can be measured through September by combining the respondents who favored the Rumford Act but nevertheless intended to vote for Proposition 14 with those who opposed the act but planned to vote against the proposition. As Table 3 shows, in March 38 per cent of those with attitudes on both subjects were inconsistent. By early September this proportion had dropped to 29 per cent.

In the spring such inappropriate voting intentions were most common in the lowest educational categories (Table 3) and among Negroes. The latter were particularly ill-informed about the proposition in the early stages of the campaign. In March Negroes were about

- ⁵ We excluded respondents who claimed knowledge but were unable to produce a fragment of an accurate description.
- ⁶ We do not mean to imply that confusion and ignorance rarely accompany proposition voting in California. An intensive analysis of voting patterns on individual ballots in the 1964 election indicates some tendency for voters to abstain when unable to make "quick and easy" decisions. See John E. Mueller, "Reason and Caprice: Ballot Patterns in California," (Los Angeles: unpublished doctoral dissertation, UCLA, 1965).

TABLE 1. VOTE INTENTION ON PROPOSITION 14—THROUGHOUT CAMPAIGN^a

	March	May	Early September	Early October	Late October
Would Vote Yesb	48%	48%	47%	54%	58%
Would Vote No	33	32	37	37	27
Do Not Know & Qualified	19	20	15	10	14
			_		
	100%	100%	99%	101%	99%

a In the first four surveys respondents were handed a card with the wording of Proposition 14 as it appeared on the ballot and asked how they would vote. In the early October survey half the respondents indicated their choice by marking a "secret ballot" and placing it in a "ballot box." This technique did not appreciably alter the responses. In the late October survey half the respondents were handed a card with the ballot wording and half were given summaries of the pro and con arguments from the booklet distributed to voters by the Secretary of State. Results of this technique are discussed in the text.

evenly split for and against the proposition, although they overwhelmingly favored the Rumford Act (Table 4).

Assuming for the moment that the level of confusion found in September persisted through election day, Table 5, which reports the vote intentions of supporters and opponents of the Rumford Act, shows why voting errors cannot have been responsible for the passage of Proposition 14, or even have added to the percentage by which it passed. Equal proportions of the friends and the enemies of the Rumford Act had the wrong idea about Proposition 14. But, as the number of cases in each column shows, there were almost twice as

TABLE 2. ATTITUDE TOWARD THE RUMFORD FAIR HOUSING ACT—MARCH, MAY,

AND SEPTEMBER^a

	March	May	Early September
Approve Disapprove	30 % 58	27% 57	33 % 55
Don't Know & Qualified	12	15	12
	100%	99%	100%

A The question (after asking if the respondent has heard of the Rumford Act): "As you may know, the Rumford Act is a law which makes it illegal for apartment house owners, owners of publicly-assisted housing, and real estate brokers to discriminate against anyone because of race, color, religion, national origin, or ancestry in the renting or selling of housing accommodations. From what you know of it, do you approve or disapprove of the Rumford Act?"

TABLE 3. VOTE INTENTIONS ON PROPOSITION
14 INCONSISTENT WITH ATTITUDES ON
RUMFORD ACT, BY EDUCATION—MARCH,
MAY, AND SEPTEMBER^a

77	Per cent inconsistent at each educational level			
Educational Level	March	Maya	Septem- ber	
Less than high school	43%	39%	29%	
High school graduates	33%	32%	33%	
1 to 2 years of college	41%	33%	28%	
More than 2 years				
of college	23%	19%	25%	
		-		
Total inconsistents	33%	32%	29%	

^a Since the May sample was limited to people intending to vote in the June primary, one would expect it to be somewhat better informed than the September sample, which included everyone registered to vote in the general election or who intended to register. This table is limited to people with attitudes on both the Rumford Act and Proposition 14. There seems to be no basis on which respondents who favored the Rumford Act and nevertheless intended to vote "yes" on a proposition designed to invalidate it could be behaving consistently. On the other hand, a complex constitutional argument could be mounted for opposing the act and planning to vote "no" on Proposition 14. We believe that the voters in this second category also were responding out of confusion, however, since they scored lower than consistent voters on various indexes of political information, and since the general literature on voting behavior suggests that such complex rationalizations are not common.

b I.e., to repeal fair housing legislation.

many people against the act, and therefore many more mistaken votes would have been cast against the proposition than for it.

In fact, the number of "wrong" votes resulting from confusion about the proposition's impact on fair housing legislation does not seem to have been great. The rate at which confusion was resolved in the spring and summer was, as we have seen in Table 3, relatively moderate. But between Labor Day and election day this rate must have greatly accelerated. For one thing, by October Negroes were uniformly opposed to Proposition 14, a vote intention consistent with their equally unanimous support of the Rumford Act. For another, a split-sample interviewing technique used by the California Poll in the late October survey produced findings suggesting that confusion was not an important factor in the election outcome. Interviewers handed half the respondents a card bearing the description of the proposition that appeared on the ballot, as

TABLE 4. ATTITUDES TOWARD THE RUMFORD ACT AND PROPOSITION 14 THROUGH

THE CAMPAIGN, BY RACE^a

	Proposi	tion 14	Rumfor	d Act
, -	Whites	Negroes	Whites	Negroe
		Мат	ch	
Approve	50%	41%	30%	56%
Disapprove	33	38	61	16
Don't Know ^b	17	22	8	28
	100%	101%	100%	100%
•		Ma	y	
Approve	51%	29%	26%	73%
Disapprove	32	39	65	16
Don't Know ^b	18	32	9	11
		—		
	101%	100%	100%	100%
		Septer	nber .	
Approve	51%	23%	31%	86%
Disapprove	36	66	61	13
Don't Know ^b	13	11	8	2 .
	100%	100%	100%	100%
	•	Early O	ctober	
Approve	57%	10%	1	,
Disapprove	34	83	•	
Don't Knowb	8	. 6	-	
	_			
	99%	99%		•
		Late Oct	ober	
Approve	60%	15%		
Disapprove	26	80		
Don't Know ^b	14	5		
	100% ·	100%		

a Orientals have been excluded from this table.

TABLE 5. VOTE INTENTION OF PERSONS PRO AND CON RUMFORD ACT—SEPTEMBER

Intention on Prop. 14	Attitude toward Rumford Act			
Yes No	Approve 26% 59	Disapprove 64% 26	DK 28% 21	
DK & Qualified (mostly DK)	14	10	51	
N	$\frac{99\%}{372}$	100% 625	100 % 82	

they had done in previous surveys. The other half of the sample, matched to the first half, was given instead of a summary of the arguments for and against the proposition taken from the booklet distributed to all voters by the Secretary of State. This technique slightly reduced the number of "don't knows," but it provides no support for the contention that the election result was significantly affected by the wording of the proposition or by ignorance of its meaning. Virtually identical proportions of the two halves who had a definite voting intention were in favor of the proposition (67.9 per cent and 68.2 per cent).

Perhaps the most persuasive evidence that voting reflected underlying attitudes toward the Rumford Act is the remarkably close fit between attitudes toward the act in September and toward Proposition 14 in October. As Table 4 shows, 61 per cent of the white respondents were hostile to the Rumford Act in September, while in late October 60 per cent said they would vote for the proposition. This same relationship holds for subgroups in the sample.

It is evident from the Rumford Act's initial and continuing unpopularity that supporters of fair housing faced an uphill fight. The reverse wording of Proposition 14 was not as great a difficulty as many of them thought, for their chief problem was not to explain the relationship between the two measures (which seemed to be the purpose of most of their efforts), but to win converts to the cause of fair housing legislation. As it turned out, changes in response to the Rumford Act occurred most strikingly among Negroes. While Negroes consistently favored the act, many of them evidently were not well enough informed to express an opinion on it in March (Table 4). For the white population, the Rumford Act seems to have remained a fixed point of reference throughout the campaign: as voters learned how to express their attitudes toward it, their vote intentions shifted accordingly.

b Includes a few qualified responses.

TABLE 6. CHANGE IN WHITE RESPONDENTS'
INTENTIONS ON PROPOSITION 14 DURING
THE CAMPAIGN—BY EDUCATION^a

Educational	per cent of group who will vote	per cent of group who will vote;	
\mathbf{Level}	YES	NO	know
Less than 8 grades 9 to 11 grades High school	+23 + 9	-14 - 8	-8 -1
graduates	+15	-13	-2
1 to 2 years of college More than 2 ye	+ 3	- 1	-2
of college	+ 1	+ 2	-3

^a Determined by comparing vote intention of each group in March and late October.

This shift in intentions resulting from clarification probably explains the increased support for the proposition found in the October surveys (Table 1), since, as we have seen, the net effect of confusion favored the fair housing forces rather than acting against them. The likelihood that the process of clarification increased the "yes" vote also is supported by the finding in Table 3 that the greatest clarification on the proposition's consequences occurred at the lowest educational level, since opposition to fair housing is negatively related to education. This likelihood is documented more directly in Table 6, which shows that the greatest changes in the direction of a "yes" vote came in the low education categories. Thus we can see that, at least in this instance of a hard-fought, wellfinanced, highly publicized referendum, the campaign had the consequence of making clear to voters how to express their attitudes. It did not lead them to change those attitudes. nor—by the very nature of referendum decision making—did it lead to the typical outcome of policy formation by elected officials: some accommodation between the initial positions of the contending groups.

II. BACKGROUND VARIABLES AND THE VOTE

It is commonly believed that northern opposition to the civil rights movement has been strongest among members of the working class, particularly second- and third-generation Americans. We cannot explore this proposi-

⁷ See, e.g., Seymour M. Lipset, "Beyond the Backlash," *Encounter* (November, 1964), 11-24. For data showing that various nationality groups

sition directly with our survey data, whi clude no information on the generati respondents' residence in the United and no satisfactory information on their pations. Our ecological data show a slig lationship in this direction; the correcoefficient (Pearson's r) between the against Proposition 14 and the percent the labor force employed in manufactur—.28 for the state's 335 incorporated cit

are more opposed to interracial neighborhood William Brink and Louis Harris, Black and (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1967),

⁸ Quite different findings are reported he chael Rogin, who studied the vote given the bama's Governor George Wallace in the Democratic presidential primary in Wise For 18 suburbs in Milwaukee County, Rogorts a correlation coefficient of -.77 betwee vote for Wallace and the percentage of the force employed in manufacturing. See his lace and the Middle Class: The White Ba in Wisconsin," Public Opinion Quarter (Spring, 1966), 98-108.

This strong negative correlation, plus similar data on the Wallace primary, leads to the conclusion that opposition to racial ity is more common in the middle class th working class. Our findings suggest that this the case. It is not at all clear, however, th dependent variable-voting for Proposition and Rogin's-voting for Wallace-are c rable measures of anti-Negro feeling. Wa opponent was the very unpopular incu governor, who was soundly beaten in the g election that fall despite President Joh landslide victory in Wisconsin. There is no knowing how many of the middle-class Re cans who voted for Wallace were motivaracial prejudice and how many-undistrac a contest in the Republican primary-tovantage of this opportunity to register the tility to the governor. Voting in another I primary requires some effort and sophisti beyond what is needed to vote in a genera tion. Such qualities are more common middle class. Given equal levels of hosti Negroes in the middle class and the working members of the former group would be more to express this attitude by voting in the c tion's primary.

Furthermore, Rogin's measure of racis tudes—Wallace's percentage of the Demprimary vote—inflates the score attained b dle-class districts. The more Republican t trict, the fewer the number of Democrats in the Democratic primary and hence the state proportion of the total Democratic vot

Our survey data do show that people with more education were less likely to vote for the proposition. This relationship is demonstrated in Table 7, which is based on white gentiles only. (Jews, Negroes, and Orientals, groups which are unequally distributed among educational levels and which have distinctive responses to fair housing, have been excluded from this tabulation.) Only one-sixth of whites who had not graduated from high school intended to vote "no" in late October. As the level of education increases, so does the proportion of respondents planning to vote against the proposition. Only the small group with post-graduate training was predominantly opposed to the measure, however. These findings are consistent with the existing literature on the relationship between education and racial tolerance.9

In addition to Negroes and members of various European nationality groups, California has two more distinctive ethnic minorities: Mexican-Americans and Orientals. Discrimination in housing does not appear to be a

tributed by Republicans crossing over. In a district where, say, 75 per cent of the voters are Democrats, a vote for Wallace by a third of the Republicans will account for a far smaller proportion of the total Democratic vote than will a Wallace vote by a similar fraction of the Republicans in a district where only 25 per cent of the voters are Democrats. (We are indebted to John E. Mueller for bringing this point to our attention.)

9 For an inventory of the literature on racial attitudes see Frank R. Westie, "Race and Ethnic Relations," in Robert E. L. Faris (ed.), Handbook of Modern Sociology (Chicago: Rand McNally, 1964), pp. 576-586. For typical survey findings, including data on the relationship between prejudice and social status, see Hazel Gaudet Erskine, "The Polls: Race Relations," Public Opinion Quarterly, 26 (1962), 137-148; and Mildred Schwartz, Trends in White Attitudes Toward Negroes (Chicago: NORC, 1967). The 1963 NORC study included an eight-item scale of prointegration attitudes. Northern white respondents with no more than a grade school education had a mean score on this scale of 3.88; those with nine to twleve years of education averaged 5.01; and respondents who had attended college scored 5.96 (Sheatsley, op. cit., p. 226). For a collection of findings specifically on housing, see Mrs. Erskine's "The Polls: Negro Housing," Public Opinion Quarterly, 31 (Autumn, 1967), 482-498. The most recent surveys reported there show no differences in attitudes on interracial housing by education. income, or occupation (p. 491).

TABLE 7. VOTING INTENTION ON PROPOSITION 14, BY EDUCATION

Educational -	1	Intention	1:
Level	Yes	No	Don't Know
Less than high school	59%	18	23
High school graduates	66%	20	14
1 to 2 years of college	57%	29	15
3 to 4 years of college	52%	39	9
Graduate study	45%	53	2

major problem at present for either of these groups. The Orientals have attained phenomenal social mobility since the war, while Mexican-Americans frequently complain that their problems are overlooked in the currently fashionable concern for Negroes. Perhaps for these reasons, various journalists have claimed that these minorities are unduly hostile to Negroes and expressed their feelings by enthusiastic support for Proposition 14. Our data strongly contradict these assertions: 61 per cent of the Orientals planned to vote "no," as did 53 per cent of the Mexican-Americans.10 While we have far too few cases to permit controls for education, it still is clear that these minorities were much less favorable to the proposition than were whites. In addition, twothirds of the Jewish respondents planned to vote against the proposition.

What we found more noteworthy was the importance of a third class of background char-

10 Unless otherwise indicated, all percentages given hereafter are based only on respondents with a definite voting intention in late October. Data on Mexican-Americans are from a sample survey of Los Angeles County residents directed by Professor Dwaine Marvick, to whom we are grateful for these data. It is likely that Mexican-Americans in Northern California were more hostile to Proposition 14, for reasons we discuss later. In 1960 5.6 per cent of the state's resident's were Negroes, 2.3 per cent were Orientals (fairly evenly divided among persons of Chinese, Japanese, and Filipino origin), and 9.1 per cent were Mexican-American. Ten San Francisco precincts with an average Chinese-American population of 92 per cent voted 74 per cent "no" on Proposition 14. (Source: Murray Adelman and Angus Mc-Bain, "Ethnic Voting in San Francisco," unpublished paper, Stanford University.) The principal Oriental and Mexican-American civic organizations were strongly opposed to Proposition 14.

TABLE 8. PARTY IDENTIFICATION AND VOTE INTENTION ON PROPOSITION 14 WITH EDUCATION CONTROLLED—WHITE GENTILES ONLY

Educational Level	Per cent intendingato vote no:		
Tevel	Republicans	Democrats	
Less than high school	10%	29%	
High school graduates	8%	30%	
1 to 2 years of college More than 2 years	27%	32%	
of college	33%	64%	

a "Don't know" responses were excluded from the bases.

acteristics-political variables-in differentiating the voters. Party identification and, even more, voting intentions in the presidential election, were much more powerful discriminating factors than education. Forty-one per cent of the Democratic respondents were opposed to the proposition, compared to 22 per cent of the Republicans. 11 Table 8, which compares the Proposition 14 vote intentions of white gentile Republicans and Democrats at each educational level, demonstrates the strong relationship between party identification and attitudes toward the proposition. As can be seen, a Democrat without a high school diploma was scarcely less likely to vote "no" than a Republican with a college education. These data show that party identification was, in 1964, at least as strong an independent variable as education, a finding that may serve as a corrective to interpretations of discrimination and backlash politics that place exclusive emphasis on social class as an independent variable.12

Preferences in the presidential election dis-

¹¹ Recent surveys showing no differences by status variables also indicate that party identification is an important independent variable: Erskine, "The Polls: Negro Housing," op. cit., p. 491.

Perceptions of the two parties' stands on this issue were far more common and much less ambivalent in 1964 than in 1960. In the earlier year only 20 respondents mentioned civil rights attitudes may have been much stronger in 1964 than in previous elections. Perceptions of the two parties' stands on this issue were far more common and much less ambivalent in 1964 than in 1960. In the earlier year only 20 respondents mentioned civil rights stands as something they particularly liked about one party or the other, and these mentions were evenly split between the two parties. But in 1964

criminated even more strongly than party identification among supporters and opponents of the proposition. Forty-six per cent of Democrats intending to vote for Johnson planned to vote "no," compared to 16 per cent of the Democrats for Goldwater. Fifty-one per cent of the Republicans for Johnson were opposed to the proposition, compared to only 12 per cent of those sticking with Goldwater. (Ten per cent of the Democrats and 27 per cent of the Republicans planned to defect to the other party's presidential candidate.)

The importance of party identification as an independent variable probably was in part a reflection of nationwide images of the two parties in 1964, which are summarized in note 12. The pronounced association in popular images of the Democratic party with civil rights doubtless resulted both from Senator Goldwater's well-publicized vote against the landmark Civil Rights Bill of 1964 and from that law itself. Although congressional Republicans played an important and constructive role in shaping and passing the bill, it seems likely that for those voters who are aware of such matters it was a Democratic bill, proposed by one Democratic President, passed by a Democratic Congress, and signed into law by another Democratic President.13

And at the state level the very different positions taken on the fair housing issue by the two parties no doubt helped many voters to see what position on Proposition 14 would be congruent with their own attitudes on fair housing. Governor Edmund G. Brown made passage of the Rumford Act part of his "urgent" legislative program in the 1963 session and made several strong public statements in its support during the spring. Legislators voting on the bill divided sharply by party. Re-

67 respondents mentioned the Democratic Party's civil rights stand favorably and only one liked the Republicans'. By the same token, equal numbers of 1960 respondents thought each party had gone too far on this issue, while in 1964 74 respondents said this of the Democrats, compared to only five for the Republicans. See Angus Campbell, "The Meaning of the Election," in Milton C. Cummings, Jr. (ed.), The National Elections of 1964 (Washington: The Brookings Institution, 1966). pp. 267-268. More than 80 per cent of the 1964 respondents correctly identified both Johnson's and Goldwater's civil rights positions, a far higher than normal proportion. See Angus Campbell, "Civil Rights and the Vote for President," Psychology Today, February 1968, p. 29.

¹⁸ David B. Filvaroff and Raymond E. Wolfinger, *The Civil Rights Act of 1964* (in preparation).

publican state senators were unanimously against it, while all but two Democrats voted "yes." All Democratic assemblymen voted for the bill, along with three Republicans; all 25 opposed votes were cast by Republicans. (After the bill had been approved by the senate, nine more Republican assemblymen voted "yes" on final passage of the senate version.) Most Democratic officials and candidates opposed Proposition 14, as did the Democratic State Central Committee, and local clubs worked vigorously against it.

Early in 1964 the California Democratic Council, the party's grass-roots organization, passed a resolution urging that only realtors supporting the Rumford Act be patronized. Ninety-one per cent of a sample of the California delegation to the 1964 Democratic National Convention were strongly opposed to Proposition 14.14 On the other hand, the major Republican citizens groups, the United Republicans of California and the California Republican Assembly, endorsed repeal of the Rumford Act, as did Secretary of State Frank Jordan, the only Republican state-wide office holder.15 Most Republican candidates and party officials took a position of neutrality, while only seventeen per cent of a sample of Republican convention delegates were hostile to the proposition.16 Furthermore, many interest groups generally associated with the Republican party supported the proposition, while many groups usually allied with the Democrats attacked it. Thus as a consequence of the actions of national and state party leaders, the well-known cue-giving functions of voters' party identifications seem to have been in play in this referendum election, albeit to a lesser degree than would be expected in a partisan candidate election.

Finally, we want to touch on another important independent variable, the regions of the state with their intriguing and puzzling differences in political climate. Opposition to Proposition 14 varied enormously from one

¹⁴ Edmond Costantini and Kenneth Craik, "Two Faces of Republican Leadership: Goldwater and Rockefeller Elites in California" (Davis, California: unpublished paper, 1967), p. 10.

¹⁵ A few Republican leaders, including Senator Thomas Kuchel and Caspar Weinberger, a former state chairman, opposed the proposition. Joseph Martin, Jr., having resigned as Republican National Committeeman to work for Rockefeller in the primary, subsequently became Northern California co-chairman of the anti-14 campaign.

¹⁶ Costantini and Craik, p. 10. Three-fifths of the Rockefeller slate defeated in the June primary were opposed to Proposition 14.

city to another and from one part of the state to another in ways that are not explained by differences in any of the conventional Census demographic indices.17 The most interesting and politically important of these variations is between Southern California and the San Francisco Bay Area. The Bay Area voted 42 per cent "no," while the Los Angeles metropolitan area voted 32 per cent "no" and the rest of Southern California was even more hostile to fair housing legislation. 18 Of the 25 cities which voted against the proposition only three—all of them highly deviant communities—are in Southern California.¹⁹ On the other hand, all but one of the 25 cities most in favor of the proposition are in the South, as are all but three of the 60 most favorable cities.

While this regional split is found among members of both parties, it is more pronounced among Republicans.²⁰ Analyzing regional dif-

17 Including income, white collar population, median education, ethnicity, and race. By assigning a numerical value of three to each Bay Area city, a value of one to each Southern California city, and a value of two to all other towns, we were able to compute simple and partial correlation coefficients to measure the relationship between region and votes against Proposition 14. The simple correlation coefficient (Pearson's r) is .55. When the vote for Johnson and Salinger, percentage of the labor force employed in manufacturing, median family income, and percentage non-white population are all partialled out, the coefficient is .39.

18 There are eight counties in Southern California. Los Angeles and Orange Counties, the Los Angeles-Long Beach Standard Metropolitan Statistical Area, contain about three-quarters of the region's population. The other six counties, which include the San Diego metropolitan area, are, by and large, quite similar to the Los Angeles area socially, economically, and politically, and will be combined with it in the discussion that follows.

For present purposes we include the San Jose metropolitan area (Santa Clara County) in the San Francisco Bay Area, which thus includes seven counties. The remainder of Northern California, about 18 per cent of the total population of the state, is excluded from consideration in our North-South comparisons.

¹⁹ The three deviant cities are the largely Jewish communities of Beverly Hills and Lake Elsinore, and Compton, which was 40 per cent Negro in 1960.

²⁰ Cf. Totton J. Anderson and Eugene C. Lee, "The 1964 Election in California," Western Political Quarterly, 18 (June, 1965), p. 465. Regional differences in California generally are much larger

ference by party and region explains much more of the variance than when either independent variable is examined singly. Forty-four per cent of Bay Area Democrats and 32 per cent of those in Southern California intended to vote "no." The difference among Republican respondents was much greater: 33 per cent of the Bay Area Republicans planned to vote "no," compared to only 14 per cent of Southern California Republicans.

The populations of the two regions are virtually identical in education, income, occupation, and age. It is especially interesting that the two regions did not differ on one set of factors of obvious relevance to voting on Proposition 14: attitudes toward Negroes. White respondents from Southern California were no more or less liberal in their responses to a series of questions about race relations asked in the May California Poll.²¹

How then are we to account for the regional split in voting on Proposition 14? An important clue is the finding that results when regional variations in Proposition 14 voting are examined by various indices of socioeconomic status.

The regional difference is greatest at the highest status levels. In the Bay Area 57 per cent of white gentile respondents with three or more years of college intended to vote against Proposition 14; only 31 per cent of the same subgroup in Southern California planned to vote "no." The figures for respondents with less than three years of college are 32 per cent for the Bay Area and 22 per cent for Southern California. The regional difference for the better educated group is 26 per cent, compared to 10 per cent for the less educated respondents. The same phenomenon can be seen by

in Republican primaries than in general elections. In the 1964 presidential primary, for example, Governor Rockefeller carried the Bay Area by more than 60 per cent, but got scarcely 40 per cent of the vote in Southern California.

²¹ Twenty-two per cent of persons moving to Southern California from 1955 to 1960 migrated from the southern and border states, compared to 16 per cent of such newcomers to the Bay Area. However the 1963 NORC survey found that "Northerners who formerly lived in the South (and these may be either Southern migrants or Northerners who spent some time in the South) are only slightly less pro-integrationist than their neighbors who have never been exposed to Southern life" (Sheatsley, op. cit., p. 227).

²² For further data and analysis of this point see Raymond E. Wolfinger and Fred I. Greenstein, "The Political Regions of California," (forthcoming in this Review). comparing regional variations in voting returns from cities with different income levels. Bay Area cities with 1959 median family incomes of less than \$6000 had a mean "no" vote only six percentage points higher than comparable cities in Southern California, whereas Bay Area cities in the over-\$8000 category had a mean "no" vote 19 per cent higher than their southern counterparts. The greatest differences of all are found in the richest communities in the two regions. For example, Southern California's San Marino, which had the highest median income (\$16,728) of any incorporated city in the state, voted 14 per cent "no." Pacific Heights, the highest status neighborhood in San Francisco (\$18,381 median family income and 36 per cent of all families making over \$25,000), voted 48 per cent "no." Both San Marino and Pacific Heights are adjacent to Negro districts.

We explore elsewhere the proposition that the roots of California's political split may be found in the very different orientation of the leadership groups in the two parts of the state.23 California's regional voting patterns seem to be most divergent in referendum and primary elections. Voting choices in such contests are likely to be more responsive to leadership group influence than those in general election voting, where party identification guides most voters. Thus in the former elections newspaper endorsements, for example, will tend to be far more important.24 Most newspapers in Southern California urged their readers to vote for Proposition 14, while those in the Bay Area were largely opposed. The proposition was the creation of the California Real Estate Association, which also contributed a good deal of money to the election campaign; but several real estate boards in the Bay Area passed resolutions opposing it. The San Francisco Junior Chamber of Commerce also took a stand against the proposition. In the North bumper stickers—an index of opinions of the politically active-were predominantly against the proposition; in the South the vast majority urged support for it. Southern California is, of course, a center of highly organized and vociferous radical right activity. While the actual number of people engaged in these activities is small in absolute terms, it amounts to a much larger proportion of the electorate there than around the Bay Area.

23 Thid

²⁴ Or so the conventional wisdom tells us. On the other hand, Mueller's analysis of patterns on individual ballots in the 1964 election indicates minimal press influence on proposition voting decisions (Mueller, op. cit.).

Santa Clara County, at the south end of San Francisco Bay, provides an example of the effects of unusually intense leadership activity in the form of campaigning. In addition to the core city of San Jose, the county includes traditional farm towns as well as a variety of suburbs ranging from brand-new, workingclass tract cities to established, well-to-do communities. Palo Alto and other suburbs heavily settled by people from Stanford University and adjacent scientific industries were the source of an intensive anti-14 effort. This area produced more than 2000 precinct workers who campaigned against the proposition in all parts of the county, and also contributed \$65,000 to the state-wide campaign. Several local real estate boards passed resolutions opposing Preposition 14. The effects of this activity, and the general opinion climate that it both reflected and enhanced, can be seen in the voting returns. Santa Clara County voted 47 per cent against the proposition. More significantly, none of the 15 cities in the county voted less than 42 per cent "no."25

A particularly striking example of the impact of precinct work and other efforts to shape community sentiment can be found in Table 9. which compares the socioeconomic characteristies and voting performance of two quite similar towns, one (Milpitas) in Santa Clara County and the other (Newark) a few miles up the freeway in another county. Both communities are quite new and both are populated largely by skilled and clerical workers who live in moderately priced subdivisions. As Table 9 shows, the demographic characteristics of the two towns' residents (many of whom work in a mammoth automobile assembly plant in Milpitas) are almost identical. Yet Milpitas voted 47 per cent "no" and Newark voted 30 per cent "no." We find it difficult to explain this difference except as a result of the vigorous anti-14 campaign waged in Santa Clara County.

The voting patterns of those parts of Northern California outside the Bay Area also suggest that campaign activity and the positions taken by particular community leaders may have had considerable impact on voting patterns. California contains vast stretches of very thinly populated land which is unsuitable for farming. The occasional towns in this area, which comprises most of California to the north

²⁵ Another example of the effect of precinct work is Marin County, a well-to-do suburban area just north of San Francisco. The county as a whole voted 48 per cent against Proposition 14 and no city in the county voted less than 42 per cent "no."

TABLE 9. COMPARISON OF VOTING AND CENSUS DATA FOR MILPITAS

AND NEWARK

	Milpitas (Santa Clara County)	Newark (Alameda County)
Per cent No on Prop. 14	47	30
Per cent for Johnson	72	69
Per cent for Salinger	63	57
Per cent employed in mfg.	44	44
Per cent non-white	6	2
Median family income	\$6700	\$ 6700

of San Francisco, depend for their livelihood on logging, fishing, livestock, and mining. The only county of the 58 in California which returned a majority against 14 is Modoc County. located beyond the main range of the Sierra Nevada in the extreme northeastern corner of the state, more than 300 miles from San Francisco. The local newspaper there opposed Proposition 14, as did the only metropolitan daily with any circulation in the county. A very active campaign against the proposition was conducted in Modoc County, in good measure by an articulate and energetic minister who organized discussion groups, stimulated the circulation of literature, and easily bested proponents of the proposition in debate. Various prominent citizens in the area publicized their hostility to Proposition 14, as did civic organizations. Not nearly so much was done by the proposition's supporters.

Modoc County is the most striking example of a somewhat surprising finding: many of the places where Proposition 14 was most unpopular are in the backwoods. Several cities in the remoter parts of California even returned majorities against the proposition. On the other hand, other similar towns voted quite strongly for it. Either the long-term character of these towns or the more or less fortuitous inclinations of those people who participated actively in the 1964 campaign, or some combination of these factors, evidently had a good deal to do with the voting in these communities.²⁶

²⁶ At the county level, the proposition fared worst in three counties in the Bay Area: Marin, Santa Clara, and San Francisco (47 per cent "no"); and three backwoods counties, all hundreds of miles from any city of consequence: Modoc, Siskiyou (48 per cent "no"), and Shasta (48 per cent "no"). It was most popular in a disparate pair of counties: Orange, the famed heartland of Southern California conservatism (22 per

There are very few Negroes in the remote parts of California and civil rights is not much of an issue there.²⁷ We think it likely that the lower salience of the issue in such places increased voter susceptibility to the influence of leading citizens or, for that matter, anyone who happened to exert himself on one side or the other on the proposition, even without intensive door-to-door campaigns of the sort mounted in Santa Clara County.

III. MOTIVATIONS UNDERLYING VOTING ON PROPOSITION 14

Opponents of Proposition 14 based their case on the desirability of providing equal housing opportunity for minority groups, particularly Negroes. The "no" vote was solicited, in the phrase of the bumper stickers, as "a vote against prejudice and discrimination." Needless to say, the proposition's proponents did not argue in favor of "prejudice," "discrimination," and "inequality," at least not in their public messages. The "yes on 14" forces stressed the principles of "property rights" and "non-compulsion," and succeeded in wording the proposition accordingly: the state and its subdivisions were barred from limiting the "right of any person to sell, lease, or rent residential real property to any person...he chooses" [our emphasis].

What attitudes and values actually lay behind the voting? Can we attribute the proposition's success simply to race prejudice? Or was it *in part* a vote in favor of "property rights," as many optimistic liberals and complacent conservatives claimed? Were some

cent "no"), and Mono, a vast expanse of deserts and mountains behind the Sierra Nevada (22 per cent "no").

The phenomenon of sharply divergent voting by ecologically similar (and typically rural) political units has been reported for such diverse settings as Indiana, Alabama, and southern Italy. See V.O. Key, Jr. and Frank Munger, "Social Determinism and Electoral Decision: the Case of Indiana," in Eugene Burdick and Arthur J. Brodbeck (eds.), American Voting Behavior (Glencoe: The Free Press, 1959), pp. 281-299; V.O. Key, Jr., Southern Politics (New York: Knopf, 1949), p. 282; and Sidney G. Tarrow, Peasant Communism in Southern Italy (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1966), p. 193.

²⁷ Rogin found that Wallace was less successful in Wisconsin's rural counties and attributed this to the paucity of Negroes and consequent abstract quality of the race issue there (op. cit., pp. 105–106).

people voting for the principle of noncompulsion in social relationships, or perhaps just in real estate transactions?

We have already dismissed the contention that Californians voted "yes" on Proposition 14 mistakenly because of response set or inability to understand that one had to vote "no" on the proposition in order to express approval of fair housing legislation. A rather more sophisticated voter-confusion thesis might be called the "item wording hypothesis." This hypothesis argues that the wording of the proposition, by stressing certain positively valued symbols-"rights," "any person . . . he chooses"-succeeded in winning over the electorate, and that a proposition in support of fair housing, if equally positively worded, would have been approved by the electorate. This explanation falls apart when we look at the California Poll's wording of its question about the Rumford Act. The Act was explained to respondents (after their level of familiarity with it had been ascertained) in positive terms which are fully consistent with current rhetoric in defense of the American Creed:

... the Rumford Act is a law which makes it illegal for apartment house owners, owners of publicly assisted housing, and real estate brokers to discriminate against anyone because of race, color, religion, national origin or ancestry in the renting or selling of housing accommodations.

Nevertheless, we have seen that the voters consistently expressed their disapproval of the act—initially even more so than their approval of Proposition 14. The unpopularity of fair housing legislation among white voters is evident. Homeowners were about 8 per cent more hostile to the Rumford Act, but because they were also more likely to be Republicans, Southern Californians, etc., we are unsure that this finding can be interpreted as indicating the importance of a belief in "property rights."

One serious impediment to believing that opposition to the Act (and opposition to civil rights laws in general) was based on anything but prejudice is the commonplace use of non-prejudice arguments by opponents of such measures in circumstances when it is obvious that these arguments are a mask for intolerance. This is particularly clear, of course, in the southern case against national civil rights legislation. Hence it is difficult to accept such "philosophical" arguments when they are advanced elsewhere. For example, allegations that dislike of "compulsion" underlies opposition to civil rights laws meet the fact that until very recently Jim Crow laws compelling sepa-

ration of the races in various contexts were commonplace in the South. Similarly, it seems likely that most of the people, in both North and South, who still support laws against miscegenation are undeterred by "constitutional" objections to compulsion. It has been less than fifteen years since California law prohibited people born in the Orient from owning land in the state.²⁸ In short, the pitfalls in such interpretations are enormous.

Yet the simple explanation of the election result in terms of "race prejudice" is unsatisfactory, since race prejudice is not a simple, unidimensional phenomenon. The conception that Gunnar Myrdal introduced in his formulation, "rank order of discrimination"29—that attitudes toward different aspects of racial equality can be ranked in descending order of popularity—is now well established by research, although different studies show slight variations in rankings depending upon such considerations as the time and place of the survey and the precise wording of the question.30 And it is also well established that in all regions of the United States there has been a steady increase in receptivity toward equality for Negroes in various spheres, as well as a general decrease in negative stereotypes about Negroes.31

As our comparison of the May 1964 California Poll findings with data from other states indicates, Calfornians clearly have participated in the general trend toward liberalization of racial attitudes; they also fall in the familiar pattern of contextual variation in the extent to which they support Negro equality. Thus in the May survey the substantial disapproval of the Rumford Act was not part of a general pattern of racism: we have already noted that only 13 per cent said they definitely would move if Negroes "came to live next door." Two-thirds favored national legislation requiring equal treatment of Negroes in public accommodations (restaurants, hotels, etc.). Eighty-eight per cent would have no objection to "sending your children to a school where a

²⁸ This was done by means of the alien land law, which, made largely inoperable by court decisions, was repealed by referendum in the 1956 election: 1,391,000 people voted against its repeal.

few of the children are colored." Fifty-eight per cent favored a substantial program of Federal expenditure for Negro education and job training. On the other hand, large majorities (of about 75 per cent) were opposed to Negro mass demonstrations and when the questions about school and residential integration were phrased so as to raise the spectre of substantial numbers of Negroes in the school or neighborhood, white opposition rose sharply.

Attitudes toward residential integration appear to occupy a peculiar position in "the rank order of discrimination" of white Americans, particularly Northerners. These attitudes seem to stand almost as a watershed between areas in which resistance to accepting Negroes as equals is high enough to be virtually at the taboo level and areas in which resistance now has become relatively slight, possibly because of the implications for intimacy of personal association that residential integration has for many people. Thus in a 1966 Harris survey the percentage of whites who would object if their teenage child "dated a Negro" was 88; if a close friend or relative married a Negro, 79. But few objected to more segmented, impersonal interracial relationships—for example, to sitting next to a Negro in a restaurant (16 per cent) or movie (20 per cent). Other studies show that resistance to job and political equality is low. The proportion of objections in the Harris survey to "a Negro family moving next door" was 48 per cent, roughly half way between the two clusters of responses.32 As Hyman and Sheatsley point out in their review of liberalizing trends in racial attitudes over a 22-year period, "the shift of attitudes in the North . . . has been smallest on the residential issue."33 Surveys taken since 1964 indicate that this trend has stopped altogether, at least for the moment.34

We have analyzed the May California Poll findings on racial attitudes in order to see how these attitudes relate to views on fair housing legislation. The general finding that emerges is that people who are opposed to all forms of racial contact and to other civil rights legislation are very likely to be hostile to the Rumford Act, while the most "extreme" minority on the other side, those people who take the liberal position even when it is quite unpopular,

²³ Gunnar Myrdal, An American Dilemma (New York: McGraw-Hill paperback edition, 1964; originally published in 1944), I, pp. 60ff.

³⁰ See the works cited in note 9.

³¹ Herbert H. Hyman and Paul B. Sheatsley, "Attitudes toward Desegregation," *Scientific American* (July, 1964), 16-23; and Schwartz, op. cit., ch. 1.

³² Newsweek (August 22, 1966), p. 26.

³³ Hyman and Sheatsley, op. cit., p. 19. Their review does not consider the taboo areas of interracial marriage and dating. Attitudes on these issues seem to have been reasonably stable.

³⁴ Erskine, "The Polls: Negro Housing," op. cit., pp. 491, 493, 495.

TABLE 10. IMPRESSIONS OF THE RUMFORD ACT, OF WHITE SUPPORTERS

	Attitude toward the Rumford Act		
	Approve	Disapprove	
Equality in housing Force, taking away	47%	19%	
freedom of choice	4%	44%	

are by no means as likely to be wholehearted supporters of the act. Only about one-eighth of the white respondents would definitely move if a Negro family moved in next door; about 14 per cent of these people favor the Rumford Act. Only eight per cent of the minority of whites who are opposed to a public accommodations law favor the Rumford Act. But liberal minorities do not display anything like this level of unanimity. The quarter of whites who say they would not move if many Negroes moved into their neighborhood, the group which might be considered most tolerant of residential integration, divides about evenly on the Rumford Act. Similar relationsips are found on other questions where the most liberal position is taken only by a minority.35 In short, the most tolerant respondents are split on the Rumford Act, while the most prejudiced minority is almost wholly opposed to it.

Can reasons other than antipathy to Negro neighbors help explain the unwillingness of Californians to accept the Rumford Act? The data in Table 10 provide some preliminary clues. In March respondents were asked what the Rumford Act was about. Table 10 shows certain of the answers of white supporters and

35 The extensive nationwide survey of attitudes on racial issues by Louis Harris Associates in 1963 produced similar findings: for any given aspect of race relations a great many more whites said they were for integration than supported laws aimed at securing it. Thus 88 per cent approved equal job opportunities, but only 62 per cent supported federal fair employment practices legislation. See William Brink and Louis Harris, The Negro Revolution in America (New York: Simon and Shuster, 1964), p. 142. Conceivably this is a case of white hypocrisy: lip service in favor of equality and unwillingness to do anything to bring it about. But if talk is so cheap in an interview, if the respondent is insincere in his protestations of belief in equality. why should he become frank when talking about legislation?

opponents of the Act. People hostile to the law seem quite concerned about the element of compulsion involved, while its supporters are totally unconcerned about this aspect. In contrast to the Act's supporters, its opponents do not appear to care much about discrimination —perhaps because they ignore it, but perhaps in at least some cases because they are unaware of it. It appears that a substantial proportion of the white population does not believe that Negroes are discriminated against. Fifty per cent of the May California respondents did not feel that Negroes were denied job opportunities in Calfornia, compared to 33 per cent who acknowledged that this was the case. And nationally, the great bulk (69 per cent) of Americans feel that "most Negroes are treated fairly in the United States," a percentage that (unlike anti-Negro prejudices) has not changed markedly since the early 1940's.36 These and other data suggest that fair housing propaganda emphasizing the theme of racial discrimination is quite ineffective with many people, since their perspectives on this issue do not include acceptance of the fact of discrimination.37 We have no way of knowing how much of this is due to ignorance of and indifference to the problem, and how much to selective perception resulting from anti-Negro sentiment or other stereotyped orientations.

IV. SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS

To summarize: the voting outcome cannot be attributed to the putative conservatism of

36 Bruno Bettleheim and Morris Janowitz, Social Change and Prejucice (New York: The Free Press of Glencoe, 1364), p. 13. See also Schwartz, op. cit., pp. 71-72. There appear to be no useful data on white recognition that Negroes are denied equal opportunities to obtain decent housing (ibid., pp. 52-53), except perhaps for the 1966 Harris finding that two-thirds of all whites think that Negro housing is worse than white housing (Brink and Harris. Black and White, op. cit., p. 136). This latter finding is not quite the same thing as saying that two-thirds of all whites attribute the disparity in housing to racial discrimination.

³⁷ For research suggesting the existence of a group of "naive non-perceivers," i.e., unprejudiced people who are unaware of anti-Negro discrimination, see Edward R. Tufte, Paul Ekman, and Louis S. Levine, "The Perception of Discrimination Against the Negro and Support for Civil Rights" (Princeton: unpublished paper, 1967). For a journalistic account making the same point see Rodney Stark and Stephen Steinberg, "Jews and Christians in Suburbia," Harper's Magazine (August, 1967).

the California electorate; there is no evidence that California voters are more conservative on civil rights than those of other northern states. Nor can it be attributed to mistakes resulting from the complexities of voting on the proposition. Whatever confusion existed at the early stages of the campaign worked against the measure's passage; and most of the confusion seemed to have disappeared by election day as a result of the intensive campaign conducted by both sides.

The fixed point in the campaign was attitudes toward the Rumford Act. Voters were heavily opposed to the Act from the start and remained so, although no doubt the stable percentages on this point conceal some change in both directions. During the final period of the campaign there was a slight increase in the "yes" vote-probably a result of voters' greater ability to connect their views on the Act to the appropriate vote intention. Sympathy with fair housing legislation and opposition to Proposition 14 were positively associated with education, minority group status, Democratic party identification, and residence in the Bay Area as opposed to Southern California. The greater conservatism of Southern California on this and other electoral issues is particularly evident in high income communities; it may be that these communities are especially responsive to the conservative press in Southern California and the region's wellorganized conservative and radical right groups.

The motivations underlying Californians' consistently negative response to fair housing legislation cannot be fully explored with our data, but aspects of the data and of the broader body of literature on racial attitudes suggest that residential segregation is a particularly sensitive issue to whites and that white resistance to Negro equality is particularly strong where housing is concerned.³⁸ In 1967 only 35 per cent of a national sample favored a national fair housing law, 54 per cent opposed it, and the rest had no opinion.³⁹

The numerous propositions on the California ballot in every general election—many of them quite arcane—are a survival from the

²⁸ Myrdal has pointed out that, in the North, residential segregation has performed in much the same fashion as southern Jim Crow laws as a barrier to interracial contact (op. cit., pp. 618-627).

²⁹ Erskine, "The Polls: Negro Housing," op. cit., p. 491. The figures given in the text are based on the three-fifths of the Gallup sample who could give a satisfactory explanation of the term "open housing."

Progressive era, when the referendum was considered a way to reduce the influence of special interests. 40 Among contemporary political scientists it is more common to assume that asking voters to pass judgment on substantive policy questions strains their information and interest, leading them to decisions that may be inconsistent with their own desires. The consequence is subversion of representative government and the exercise of undue influence by groups that can afford to gather the signatures to qualify a measure for the referendum ballot and then wage a publicity campaign that will have an impact on voters. 41

Most of these criticisms are not too relevant to the present case, however. Few referendum items are voted on with the same amount of publicity, debate, and voter information as Proposition 14, where the issue was both immediate and easily understood. But there are other elements in the situation that must be considered in assessing the referendum as a device for making policy. The most obvious point of departure is a comparison of how the Rumford Act has fared in the legislature—the alternative to the referendum as a law-making arena. The remarkable thing about this comparison is the disparity in outcomes between

⁴⁰ While the initiative and referendum are employed in some other states, these devices are most frequently used in California, where there has been an average of 22 propositions on the ballot in every general election since their inauguration in 1911. See Joseph P. Harris, California Politics, 4th edition (San Francisco: Chandler Publishing Company, 1967), pp. 112–113.

41 A measure is qualified for a place on the ballot by submission of petitions bearing the valid signatures of eight per cent of the vote in the preceding gubernatorial election (currently about 500,000 signatures). This task almost always is done by a signature-collecting firm, which currently charges about \$250,000 to qualify a single measure (ibid., p. 115). Proposition 14, however, was put on the ballot by signatures that were collected almost exclusively by volunteers (Casstevens, op. cit., p. 50). In 1964 more than half a million dollars was spent on each proposition on the ballot. See Thomas W. Casstevens, "Reflections on the Initiative Process," in Eugene C. Lee (ed.), The California Governmental Process (Boston: Little, Brown, 1966), p. 89. While the anti-referendum viewpoint is the current conventional wisdom among political scientists, the California system does have its academic defenders: see, e.g., Henry A. Turner and John A. Vieg, The Government and Politics of California, 2nd edition (New York: McGraw-Hill, 1964), pp. 77-87.

the two processes, for the legislature has persistently failed to reflect the wishes of the state's voters. In 1964 there were no signs that either the governor or the legislature was giving serious consideration to repealing the Rumford Act, even as its widespread unpopularity became clear. But two years later, in the aftermath of the Watts riots, black power, and the white backlash, Governor Brown lost by a million votes to a candidate who made capital out of these developments.

Does this mean that those politicians responsible for the passage of the Rumford Act (notably Brown and the Democratic legislators) behaved irrationally? From the standpoint of electoral advantage, it appears that the answer is negative. The state legislators running for re-election in 1964 did not appear to have suffered because of their votes on the Act, despite the electorate's overwhelming repudiation of it. Moreover, in 1967, after Brown's defeat, a bill to repeal the Act passed the state senate but was handily defeated in the assembly. The assembly's bill to modify

42 Our data provide no indications that there was any significant backlash in the 1964 senatorial and presidential voting in California. The state legislators running in the 1964 election undoubtedly were somewhat insulated by a general lack of public awareness of their activities, if not of their identities. Even at the congressional level public awareness of individual legislators and their activities is slight; see Donald E. Stokes and Warren E. Miller. "Party Government and the Saliency of Congress," Public Opinion Quarterly, 26 (Winter, 1932), 531-546. Nationwide, President Johnson probably gained some votes on the civil rights issue, for while he suffered a small net loss of support from Democrats, this was more than balanced by the Republicans and Independents with positive Civil Rights attitudes who voted for him, (See Campbell, "Civil Rights and the Vote for President," op. cit., p. 31).

⁴² Ironically, the Rumford Act was passed in 1963 by a notoriously malapportioned state senate and rejected four years later by a senate that had been reapportioned on a one-man-one-vote basis. Between the 1961 and 1965 apportionments the 21 northernmost counties had four per cent of California's population but elected ten of the 40 members of the state senate. Seven of these senators voted for the Rumford Act, two voted against it, and the tenth abstained. (The ten largest counties, with 70 per cent of the state's population, also had ten senators, five of whom voted "yes," four "no", and one abstained.) These seven "cow county" legislators provided

the Act (supported by Governor Ronald Reagan and bitterly denounced by the California Real Estate Association) was rejected by the senate and the session ended with the Rumford Act intact, still the law of the state. In 1968 Governor Reagan became more favorably inclined toward the Rumford Act and the likelihood that it would be repealed dwindled close to zero.

We have no way of knowing if the Act would have passed in the first place if the state's politicians had known how unpopular it was, but other considerations than the quantitative distribution of attitudes seem to have been highly relevant in the calculations made by the politicians who brought about its passage. The Rumford Act was passed on Governor Brown's insistence, after a long and difficult struggle. In the course of the battle a group of young civil rights workers chained themselves to a stairway in the capitol building as part of a four-week sit-in that ended only when the bill passed. This episode embarrassed the bill's sponsors, who felt that it would alienate moderate white opinion and offend undecided legislators. But it also must have been to some politicians a sign of the depth of Negro feeling. Some Democratic legislators must have been more worried about losing Negro votes than about the real estate and apartment interests.

We noted earlier one cf the advantages of the legislative over the plebiscitory decisionmaking process: the former not only permits but is characterized by compromises between the initial demands of groups of varying size and intensity. In referenda, of course, compromise is impossible once the issue has been formally posed. A second, closely related advantage of legislatures is that they typically take account of the intensity of demands as well as their numerical support, while in referenda every voter's preference, no matter how casual, is equally weighted. The legislative process is responsive to intensity because legislators (consciously or unconsciously) ask themselves how much the interested parties care about the issue since they want to find out what the cost in votes and other forms of campaign support will be of disappointing one side or the other.

Calculations about intensity are relevant to

the Act's margin of victory. It appears that, unconstrained by constituent opinion, they were free to indulge their own liberal beliefs (in some cases) or accede to the claims of party loyalty (all were Democrats) and the Governor's insistence on passing a fair housing bill.

considerations other than electoral advantage. First, a politician may feel on principle that, all things being equal, he would rather respond to an intense minority than a more or less lukewarm majority, particularly if he thinks the minority's claim is legitimate. It appears that Governor Brown's strong support of the Rumford Act was based on such a view, along with a belief that fair housing was essential to any strategy of coping with the Negro problem. Second, as the history of California race relations since Watts reminds us, judgments about intensity are crucial data for the enterprise of making policies designed to minimize civil strife. A key consideration in assessing civil rights proposals is whether their passage or failure will increase or reduce the likelihood of racial disturbances.44

⁴⁴ We think that similar calculations by national politicians were the basis of the federal Fair Housing Act of 1968. We know of no survey data on white attitudes to such legislation which were collected in the spring of 1968, when the bill was passed by both houses of Congress. The most recent findings seem to be those of a year earlier, which showed whites opposed to the proposal by a ratio of three to two (see note 39). We think it un-

While politicians inevitably are imperfect in their calculations about intensity, voters are unlikely to make such judgments at all, particularly when their views are channeled through the referendum process. Nor are they likely to be disposed or able to make calculations about the possible ways in which a policy which they desire might detract from other of their preferences—such as for civil peace. If, as seems likely, the next several years of civil rights politics in the North are characterized by confrontations between angry, demanding Negroes and intransigent whites, with violence a common recourse of disappointed Negroes, then the referendum will become an increasingly inappropriate political tool and processes leaving room for calculation and compromise will be more necessary than ever. But we have no doubt also that the referendum will continue to be a tempting opportunity.

likely that white opinion on this issue changed very much, but the intensity of Negro protest increased considerably. This discussion is, of course, strongly influenced by Robert A. Dahl, A Preface to Democratic Theory (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1955).

FACTIONS AND COALITIONS IN ONE-PARTY JAPAN: AN INTERPRETATION BASED ON THE THEORY OF GAMES

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I. "COALITION GOVERNMENT" IN JAPAN1

In constitutional form and in practice, the Japanese national government is parliamentary. Authority is centered in the Diet,² and power is held by the parties in the Diet. Unlike the pre-war system, for example, the Diet parties really do choose the Prime Ministers.

The post-war party system changed fundamentally in 1955, when the non-socialist parties combined and formed the mammoth Liberal-Democratic Party (LDP). Since its formation in 1955, the LDP has always had a safe majority in both Houses of the Diet. But, from its beginning as a union of several political streams to the present, the LDP has been made up of several rather stable factions. These factions are the key actors in the biennial election of the party president, who naturally becomes the Prime Minister. As a general rule, votes in a party presidential election are on straight lines. So a Prime Minister is chosen by a coalition of LDP factions which controls a majority of votes at the party convention. Furthermore, the factions present nominees for Cabinet posts, and Ministers are chosen from among these nominees. Cabinet posts become rewards for the factions which voted for the Prime Minister, inducements to opposing factions to enter the Prime Minister's coalition, and buffers to soften or weaken the opposition of hostile factions. In short, the struggle over top political leadership in Japan—the president and the top officials of the ruling party, the Prime Minister, and other Cabinet membersis waged by the LDP factions. (The struggle over policy, on the other hand, is waged by

¹ The research reported on in this article was conducted under the auspices of a Fulbright Fellowship, 1965-67. The material gathered in the course of this research has also been used in "Coalition Government in Japan," Transactions of the Asiatic Society of Japan (forthcoming), "Jiminto to wa, Renritsu Seiken to Mitsuketari," Chuo Koron (August, 1967), and "Coalition Politics in One-Party Japan," The Study of Coalition Behavior, S. Groennings, W. E. Kelley, and M. Leiserson (eds.) (Holt-Rinehart-Winston, forthcoming).

2 "National Assembly" would be a better translation, but "Diet" is official.

other actors, within the framework established by the outcome of the factions' struggle over leadership.)³ And because of the wide range of opinion within the LDP, the outcomes of the factions' struggle over top political leadership are very important for Japan. A switch from an Ishibashi to a Kishi, or from a Kishi to an Ikeda, is certainly as significant as, say, the replacement of a Laniel by a Mendès-France.

A brief digression is necessary in order to make clear the peculiar nature of the LDP factions, because these factions are not typical of factions in Japan or elsewhere.4 The year after its formation, the LDP decided that its president would be chosen by vote, with LDP Diet members holding practically all the votes. Up until this radical innovation, and for a little while after it, factions in the LDP were more or less what factions in Japan-or anywherehad always been: a nucleus of a few key lieutenants around a leader, with a rather unreliable following. But after this innovation was put into operation, in the election of Ishibashi Tanzan as LDP president in 1956, the nature of the factions changed. In Ishibashi's election, Kishi Nobusuke, who was the "obvious" winner, the strong man who certainly would have

³ The LDP is at the center of policy-making, and has developed an elaborate organizational structure within the party paralleling the organs of the Diet and the Ministries. But the factions are not unified actors in policy-making. There is some evidence of policy agreement within the "extreme" factions—the Kishi-Fukuda and Nakasone factions, for instance—but it is clear that most factions contain serious internal divisions on policy, and that the factions do not usually attempt to set a policy "line" for their members. All this does not deny, of course, that faction leaders may play an important part in policy making.

⁴ But for a different view, see for example, R. Scalapino and J. Masumi, *Farties and Politics in Contemporary Japan* (Berkeley: Univ. of Calif. Press, 1962), passim.

⁵ On earlier methods of choosing Japanese political party leaders, see Watanabe Tsuneo, Toshu to Seito (Party and Party Leader), (Tokyo: Kobundo, 1961), Chap. 7, and the same author's Seiji no Misshitsu (The "Snoke-filled Room" of Politics) (Tokyo: Sekkasha, 1966).

won if the old method of hanashiai or "talks" had been used, did not win. Parliamentary arithmetic—that is, the skillful coordination of factions into a coalition which was numerically a majority—defeated Kishi and proved just how significant the innovation had been. Thereafter, within two years, the factions became like army "divisions," headed by a "general" who was advised by his "General Staff." There were "line officers," fixed and known memberships, offices, publications, regular sources of funds, and so forth. In a word, the factions became institutionalized, and, because of that change, became able to perform some of the functions of parties in a coalition cabinet system of government.

There have been five LDP Prime Ministers. four of whom gained power after the election system was inaugurated.8 Ishibashi Tanzan was elected in 1956 by a coalition of five factions, led by Ishii Mitsujiro, Ikeda Hayato, Ono Bamboku, Miki Takeo, and Ishibashi himself. Prime Minister Ishibashi began his term with great personal popularity and amid widespread hopes for improvement of relations with Mainland China. But he was stricken with a severe illness less than two months after taking office, and was replaced by Kishi Nobusuke, who had opposed him in the December election. In that election Kishi had been supported by his brother Sato Eisaku and by Kono Ichiro, and later the Ono faction joined this coalition. This main-stream of Kishi-Sato-

⁶ The terms are those used by Japanese newspaper reporters. The present and following historical remarks in the text are based on the vernacular press of the time.

⁷ This does not touch at all upon the fascinating question of what maintains the factions. See G. O. Totten and T. Kawakami, "The Functions of Factionalism in Japanese Politics," Pacific Affairs (1966); 109–122; Watanabe Tsuneo, Habatsu: Nihon Hoshuto no Bunseki (Factions: An Analysis of Japan's Conservative Party), (Tokyo: Kobundo, rev. ed., 1964), Chap. 10; and Kawakami Tamio, "Habatsu Rikigaku ni tsuite no Ichi Kosatsu" (A Study of the Dynamics of Factions"), in Kodo Kagaku Kenkyu (Behavioral Science Research) 2 (1966), 29–36.

⁸ The most informative and perceptive research on the LDP factions in English has been done by Hans H. Baerwald. See his "Factional Politics in Japan," Current History 46 (April, 1964), 223–229, and his yearly summaries of developments in the January issue of Asian Survey, 1964, 1965, 1967. The best description of the history of LDP presidential elections is in Watanabe, Habatsu, op. cit., Chap. 9.

Kono-Ono ruled Japan from 1957 until mid-1959 when, shaken by the controversy caused by the unpopular Police Duties Law revision bill, the Prime Minister changed his coalition. The powerful Ikeda faction, which had been leading the anti-Kishi forces, entered the ruling coalition, and the weaker Kono faction was expelled.

This new ruling coalition or main-stream of Kishi-Sato-Ikeda-Ono governed Japan until the end of 1960, through the great storm which arose over the Security Treaty revision in 1959-60. The same coalition, minus the Ono faction, elected Ikeda to follow Kishi as Prime Minister, over the opposition of all the other factions. But the Kishi-Sato-Ikeda coalition did not last much longer. In 1960-61 the Kishi faction split and the Kishi-Fukuda group went into opposition. Prime Minister Ikeda countered this development by bringing the Kono and Ono factions into his coalition, but this only antagonized the Sato faction, which saw Sato's position as Ikeda's successor to the Prime Ministership in danger. The Prime Minister countered this further loss of support by drawing the Miki faction into the ruling coalition. Thus, when Ikeda, riding the wave of prosperity generated by his "double the national income" plan, was re-elected for a third term in 1964, the ruling coalition was composed of Ikeda-Kono-Ono-Miki-Kawashima. The anti-main-stream was Kishi-Fukuda-Sato-Ishii-Fujiyama. Nevertheless, when Prime Minister Ikeda was stricken by cancer later that year, he nominated Mr. Sato to succeed him as Prime Minister. As his brother had done seven years before, Prime Minister Sato quickly turned his minority coalition into a winning coalition, by the addition of the Miki and Kawashima factions. The ruling coalition of Sato-Kishi-Fukuda-Miki-Kawashima (plus some others: see Section V) has continued to govern Japan to the present, restoring relations with South Korea, surviving the kuroi kiri scandals of 1966, and re-electing Prime Minister Sato to a second term of office last December.9

⁹ Mr. Ishii is presently Speaker of the Lower House. Mr. One held various posts in his long career, including the LDP vice presidency under Prime Ministers Kishi and Ikeda, but died in 1964. Miki Takeo is presently Foreign Minister. Mr. Kone was a perennial strong-man in many Cabinets, and a leading contender for the Prime Ministership, until his death in 1965. Fukuda Takeo later served as Minister of Finance, and is presently the Secretary-General of the LDP. Kawashima Shojiro is a pre-war party veteran

TABLE 1. LDP PRESIDENTIAL ELECTIONS, PRIME MINISTERS, AND COALITIONS

Date of LDP Presidential Election	Victor, i.e., Prime Minister	Main-stream (besides P.M.'s faction)	Neutrals, Opposition
Before 12/56	Hatoyama	Kono, Kishi, Ono, Ishii	Miki, Ikeda, Sato
12/56	Ishibashi	Ikeda, Ishii, Miki, Ono	Kishi, Sato, Kono
2/57	Kishi	Sato, Kono, Ono	Miki, Ikeda, Ishii, Ishibashi
		general election	
1/59	Kishi	Sato, Kono, Ono	Miki, Ikeda, Ishii, Ishibashi
7/60	Ikeda	Kishi (Fujiyama, Kawashima,	Kono, Ono, Miki,
		Fukuda), Sato	Ishii, Ishibashi
7/62	Ikeda	(ran unopposed; an "era of good	faelings")
	IRCUI	general election	
7/64	Ikeda	Kono, Ono, Miki, Kawashima	Kishi-Fukuda, Sato, Fujiyama, Ishii
11/64	Sato	Kishi-Fukuda, Miki, Kawashima, Ishii, Murakami	Kono, Fujiyama, Funada
12/66	Sato	Kishi-Fukuda, Miki, Kawashima, Ishii, Murakami, Mori-Shigemasa	Nakasone, Fujiyama, Funada, Maeo

Notes: For a similar list, see Watanabe's Seiji no Misshitsu, pp. 152, 156. In 1960-61 the Kishi faction split into the Fujiyama, Kawashima, and Kishi-Fukuda factions. After the deaths of Ono and Kono in 1964-65, their factions split into the Funada and Murakami, and Nakasone and Mori-Shigemasa factions, respectively. The Ikeda faction continued after its leader's death; the new leader was Mr. Maeo. The "Miki" faction was once the "Miki-Matsumura" faction. Before 12/56 several factions' leaders were different.

This brief history, which is summarized in Table 1, suggests four questions. First, why did the winner win in each election for party president? That is, why Ishibashi in 1956, Kishi in 1959, Ikeda in 1960 and 1964, and Sato in 1966? Second, when the Prime Minister resigned because of illness and his successor was

who has held various Cabinet and party posts; currently he is the LDP vice president. His faction emerged from the Kishi faction when the latter split in 1961. Fujiyama Aiichiro, for many years president of the Japan Chamber of Commerce, entered full-time politics to become Prime Minister Kishi's Foreign Minister in 1957. His faction was also built up largely out of the old Kishi faction. He was the opposition candidate versus Mr. Sato in Dec., 1966.

¹⁰ Prime Ministers Kishi, Ikeda, and Sato won in uncontested elections in 1957, 1962, and 1964, respectively.

chosen through "talks," why was the particular successor chosen? Why did Kishi follow Ishibashi in 1957, and why did Sato follow Ikeda in 1964? Third, why did the Prime Minister change his ruling coalition? Why did Kishi drop Kono for Ikeda?" Fourth, what is happening now? Is the ruling coalition changing again, and if so why? Who will follow Prime Minister Sato? These are the questions I will try to answer in what follows.

II. A THEORY OF COALITION BEHAVIOR

To answer these questions in a systematic and consistent way requires a theory of coalition behavior. Such a theory was presented over twenty years ago by von Neumann and

¹¹ The question of why Prime Minister Ikeda changed his coalition is answered, in a narrow sense at least, by the observation that the break-up of the old Kishi faction created a new situation.

Morgenstern in *The Theory of Games and Eco*nomic Behavior. The N-M theory is the basis of the propositions developed in this section.¹²

First, three assumptions and some definitions. (1) Actors know what they want. That is, they know what the possible outcomes are (for example, what the winning coalitions are, what a winning coalition wins), and can rank these outcomes as more or less cesired. They know what each other wants, in the same sense. Definition: a "payoff" to an actor is the worth of an outcome to him. Tautologically, an actor tries to get more payoff rather than less payoff. Definition: a "payoff vector" is a list of the payoffs received by each actor. Payoff vector $X = (x_1, x_2, \ldots, x_n)$, where the entry x_i shows the payoff to actor i.

- (2) A coalition controls its member actors' payoffs in the sense that these actors cannot receive the controlled payoffs without entering the coalition. For example, only the members of the Government coalition receive Cabinet posts. Definition: the "value of a coalition" is all the various payoffs which all a coalition's members may individually receive, if the coalition forms. That is, $v(S) = (X, Y, \ldots)$, where X, Y, etc., are the payoff vectors which the members of coalition S control.
- (3) Coalitions are worth forming. For example, if two distinct losing coalitions combine together and become a winning coalition then the payoff vectors in v(S) for the larger, winning coalition certainly include all the payoff vectors in both v(S)s for the smaller, losing coalitions.

Given only these assumptions it is possible to define an N-M "solution." Some payoff vectors are dominated by other payoff vectors. This happens when all the members of a coalition prefer one payoff vector to another (that is, for all these actors the individual payoffs to them listed in the one vector are more valuable than the individual payoffs to them listed in the other vector), and when at the same time the preferred payoff vector is controlled by that coalition (that is, the preferred payoff vector is one of the vectors in v(S)). In symbols,

12 The N-M volume is now available in a Wiley Science Editions paper back(1964). The following relies on the formulation of L. S. Shapley and M. Shubik, "Solutions of n-person Games with Ordinal Utilities," Econometrica 21 (1953), 348-349, with one important modification (avoiding the notion of an "effective set") which was suggested by R. J. Aumann and B. Peleg, "Von Neumann-Morgenstern Solutions to Cooperative Games without Side-Payments," Bull. Amer. Math. Soc. 66 (1960), 173ff.

a payoff vector Y is dominated by a payoff vector X if X is in v(S) and if x_i is greater than y_i for each member i of S. (Intuitively, in open negotiations, Y would be rejected in favor of X). Call the set of all payoff vectors which are dominated by payoff vector X as D(X) = (Y:Y) is dominated by X.

Finally, label the set of all payoff vectors in which each actor receives no less than what he could achieve by himself alone, not in a coalition with anyone else, as C. Intuitively, C is the set of all possible payoff vectors.

Then a solution is defined as a set of payoff vectors $V = (X, Z, \ldots)$, which has two properties. (1) Every payoff vector in the set (C-V) is in D(X) for some X in V. That is, a possible payoff vector which is not in the solution set is dominated by some payoff vector which is in the solution set. (2) No payoff vector in V is in D(X) for any X in V. That is, no payoff vector in the solution set dominates another payoff vector in the solution set. These conditions may be combined: V = C-D(V). That is, the solution is a set of possible payoff vectors which do not dominate each other.

Obviously it is not easy to discover V, since the definition is circular (but not tautological). However, the problem is greatly simplified when the actual situation one is studying has the two properties: "constant-sum" and "simple." A simple coalition situation is defined as one in which every coalition is either losing or winning. A constant-sum simple coalition situation is defined as a simple situation in which every winning coalition controls exactly the same payoffs. If W is any winning coalition, then in a constant-sum simple coalition situation, $v(W_i) = v(W_i)$, for any W_i and W_i .

In a constant-sum simple coalition situation,

¹³ This is the N-M definition. Shapley has refined the concept; according to his classification the definition in the text is of a "strong simple game." See L. S. Shapley, "Simple Games," Behav. Sci. 7 (Jan., 1962), 59-66.

14 Until this point, interval scale measurement has not been assumed, but strictly speaking this statement is meaningless without such an assumption. However, in a situation where the actual physical quantities which underlie the payoffs are in fact constant (as when there are simply 17 Cabinet posts, for example), then I feel that it may be permissible to speak of "constant-sum" without actually demonstrating that interval scale measurement is possible. (And, of course, one can certainly speak of constant-sum without implying that utility is linear with money or some medium of exchange; i.e., there is no assumption here that utility is "transferable.")

the "minimal winning coalitions" are very important. A minimal winning coalition, W^m , is defined as a W which would become losing if any member left the coalition. (There are usually several W^m , and the number of actors in each W^m , and the total resources of each W^m , are not necessarily the same). The reason why the W^m are so important in a constant-sum simple coalition situation is that only the W^m are relevant when considering dominance relations among payoff vectors. 15

In order to apply the N-M solution theory to constant-sum simple coalition situations (which are the type of situation the LDP factions are in), it is helpful to give a concrete interpretation of what defines a W. This can be done by the use of "weights." If one knows which coalitions are winning, then usually he can assign weights to the actors so that a coalition with a majority of the weights is always winning. For example, consider the LDP after the 1958 general elections, the time when Prime Minister Kishi had to form a coalition which would pass the Security Treaty.

where the percentages show how many LDP Dietmen were in each faction. In this situation (considering "intangible" factors as well as these percentages), I think that the W^m were: The Kishi-Sato bloc plus Ikeda, the Kishi-Sato bloc plus any two of Kono, Ono, Miki, or Ishii, and Ikeda plus any three of Kono, Ono, Miki or Ishii. So the weights that should be assigned to these actors in this situation are:

Kishi-Sato Ikeda Kono Ono Miki Ishii
$$w_i = 3$$
 2 1 1 1 1

¹⁵ This was proven by N-M, but the idea is intuitively clear also. If there is a W^n and an actor j not in the W^m , then by the constant-sum condition, $v(W^m) = v(W^m + j)$. So j is unnecessary, from W^m 's viewpoint. Any payoff which the members of W^m can get, they can get without j's help. Thus only W^m needs to be considered when calculating dominance relations among payoff vectors.

¹⁶ Actually the problem of assigning weights is more complex than this hurried treatment shows. Two key questions are: do the weights make blocking coalitions impossible, and is the sum of the weights in any W^m always the same? The N-M theory, as they formulated it and as used here, only applies if both of these questions can be answered positively.

Clearly the same W^m still exist; shifting from resources and "intangibles" to these particular weights has not changed the strategic possibilities for forming coalitions.¹⁷

When winning coalitions are defined with the aid of weights such as these, the N-M solution theory becomes strikingly simple. It states that in a constant-sum simple coalition situation, when an actor is in the actually-formed coalition, his payoff—if it is in the N-M solution—will be directly proportional to his weight. In the example, the N-M solution payoffs, if expressed on an interval scale, are:

or some multiple of these numbers. (Here, clearly, the constant-sum=1; i.e., v(W)=1; for any W). Note that N-M define a solution as a set of payoff vectors, any of which may happen. The whole solution Set is:¹⁹

¹⁷ See the Sources to Table 2 for an explanation of the meaning and the use made here of "intangible" factors. Briefly, the intangible factors I considered in assigning the factions' weights were (1) the financial backing of each faction, and (2) the likelihood that the "others" (not-factionally-aligned LDP members) would support each faction. These factors had to be considered, in assigning weights, since the percentages based upon memberships do not have the properties which N-M theory requires for weights. (See footnote 16.)

However, in the analyses of Sections III, IV, and V, I have used only the memberships of the factions, and a definition of "majority" as 51% of LDP Dietmen, when dealing with coalitions. The weights given in Table 2 were used only for making predictions on payoffs, as in Table 4. (Using the weights would not change any results for N-M theory, but using memberships makes it possible to contrast N-M theory with Riker's and Gamson's theories, as in Section IV.)

¹⁸ This is not how N-M put it; see Section 50.8.1 in N-M. The reason for this phrasing is given in footnote 22.

19 The reader can verify by inspection that none of these vectors dominates another. That one of these vectors dominates any other which is not in the solution will become clear simply by imagining some other vector and comparing it with these. For example, take (0, 1/3, 1/4, 1/4, 1/4, 0), for Kishi-Sato, Ikeda, Kono, Ono, Miki, and Ishii, respectively. Incidentally, it is known that N-M solution payoffs in situations like the present have

Kishi-Sato	Ikeda	Kono	Ono	Miki	Ishii	Coalition
(3/5,	2/5,	0,	0,	0,	0)	K-S+Ikeda
(3/5,	0,	1/5,	1/5,	0,	0)	K-S+K+On
(3/5,	0,	1/5,	0,	1/5,	0)	K-S+K+M
(3/5,	0,	1/5,	0,	0,	1/5)	K-S+K+Is
(3/5,	0,	0,	1/5,	1/5,	0)	K-S+On+M
(3/5,	0,	0,	1/5,	0,	1/5)	K-S+On+Is
(3/5,	0,	0,	0,	1/5,	1/5)	K-S+M+Is
(0,	2/5,	1/5,	1/5,	1/5,	0)	Ik+K+On+M
(0,	2/5,	1/5,	1/5,	0,	1/5)	Ik+K+On+Is
(0,	2/5,	1/5,	0,	1/5,	1/5)	Ik+K+M+Is
(0,	2/5,	0,	1/5,	1/5,	1/5)	Ik+On+M+Is

This N-M theory can be modified in order to make its basic proposition more applicable to on-going coalition situations. The modification takes the form of two supplementary propositions, which concern uncertainty in bargaining and dynamics (passage of time). The effect of the former proposition is to identify which of the several coalitions in the N-M solution set is likely to occur. The effect of the latter proposition is to identify certain contexts in which the N-M proposition should not be expected to hold. In time it may be possible to integrate these propositions into the N-M theory, but at present they are merely qualifications of the basic theory.²⁰

The proposition regarding bargaining is that as the number of actors increases there is a tendency for each actor to prefer to form a W^m with as few members as possible. If there are, say, ten actors, and the size of the W^m ranges from three to seven actors, then there will be a very strong tendency for the W^m with three members to form. The reasons for this tendency, briefly, are (a) that the members of the smaller W^m will prefer to form them, since negotiations and bargaining are easier to complete, and a coalition is easier to hold together,

ceteris paribus, with fewer parties, and (b) that the bargaining advantage objectively held by the members of the smaller W^m vis-a-vis the actors who are not in the smaller W^m (which is reflected in the higher weights and higher payoffs) can only be guaranteed by using the threat which causes the advantage—i.e., by forming the smaller W^m . Because these reasons involve bargaining considerations, I will call this proposition—that W^m with fewest members form—the bargaining proposition.

The proposition regarding dynamics is that when a coalition situation requires only "periodic decisions" (e.g., an election every two years, and the winner is certain to remain the winner all during the entire inter-election period, as in elections for the LDP president). then the N-M solution theory must be modified so as to allow for inter-decision "maintenance" of the winning coalition. More than merely perpetuating the last W^m , by maintenance is meant: ensuring that the ruling coalition (or some part of it) is still (in) a winning coalition at the next time of decision. Over time many features of the situation may change: actors' weights may change (e.g., a general election results in different possibilities for W^m), an actor may even cease to exist (e.g., a faction splits), and so on. An attempt merely to perpetuate the last winning coalition would possibly produce a losing coalition at the next time of decision. Therefore, the N-M theory should be expected to account for the observed coalitions only at the times of decision. The coalitions during the inter-decision period should be easily explained as required by the "maintenance" process. For example, if at one decision-time the W^m ABCD forms, and at the next decision-time the W^m CDE forms, but during the interim there is a coalition of ABCDE, then it seems clear that ABCDE is a result of the "maintenance" process.21

²¹ In the following section a model of coalition maintenance is described, and a proposition (by

a very desirable property: any deviation from a payoff vector in the solution set guarantees that the actor who benefited from the deviation will be absolutely worse off when a solution vector is reimposed (as "must" happen, since the solution vectors dominate all others). See W. Vickrey, "Self-Policing Properties of Certain Imputation Sets," in A. W. Tucker and R. D. Luce (eds.), Contributions to the Theory of Games IV (Princeton: Princeton Univ. Press, 1959), pp. 213ff.

²⁰ In honesty, it must be admitted that these two propositions contradict an essential feature of the N-M concept of a solution, namely, that it is possible for *any* outcome in the solution set to occur. This contradiction points to a serious weakness in my theory. (Cf. footnote 25.)

To sum up. (1) In a constant-sum simple coalition situation the observed result (coalition formed, payoffs received) will be one of the vectors in the N-M solution. Therefore, (2) a W^m will form, and its members' payoffs will be directly proportional to their weights.22 (3) However, when the number of actors is large, as in the LDP, the observed coalition will not be any coalition predicted under (1) but the W^m , or one of them, with the fewest member actors. (4) These propositons will not hold during the inter-decision period when decisions are made only periodically (at fixed and known intervals), as in the LDP; instead the phenomenon of "maintenance" will be observed.

III. EXPLAINING "COALITION GOVERNMENT" IN JAPAN

In this section, the propositions developed in the previous section are applied to the situation described in the first section, in order to answer the questions listed at the end of the latter.

The actors are the conventionally recognized factions within the LDP. Independents (very few) and prefectural delegates to the party conventions are not actors, and do not figure in any way in determining outcomes; they are ignored. Thus a winning coalition is a coalition of factions whose Lower and Upper House Diet members combined make up over one-half of the total number of LDP Dietman.²³ The strengths of all factions over time, and the weights derived from those strengths are given

which maintenance is "easily explained" in the sense used above) concerning inter-decision period payoffs is derived from the model. However, that model was discovered ad hoc (which is the reason why it is discussed in the following section).

²² Thus, even if the N-M solution is not known, and even if payoffs are not measured on an interval scale, this proposition—derived from N-M theory as a logical consequence—can be applied!

²³ This definition of a winning coalition clarifies the meaning of the assumption that the prefectural delegates do not affect the party presidential election. That is, a winning coalition must be able to win in the LDP Diet factions' struggle, without the aid of the prefectural delegates. While the former wording may seem unjustified, the latter certainly reflects the real situation, in my opinion.

in Table 2; data sources and method are explained in footnote 24.24

²⁴ Figures on factions' memberships have been drawn from the vernacular press, plus the books of Watanabe cited in footnotes 5 and 7, the Asahi Nenkan, the Kokkai Binran, the Asahi Journal (weekly), and the Gendai no Me (monthly). The newspapers contain about 40 independent estimates of the strength of each faction in the Lower House at 12 different times since 1955, usually just before and after a general election or LDP presidential election, and the other sources contain about another 10 estimates. (A dotted line indicates a general election.) Of the total of roughly 50 independent estimates, 22 list the names of all the members of each faction as well. Thus I obtained 12 reliable estimates of the strength of each Lower House faction, by taking the average of the 3, 4, or 5 estimates available for each point in time. The same sources and procedure were used for the Upper House. However, since until 1963-64 most of the LDP Upper House members were not tied to a particular faction but rather to one of three clubs, it was necessary to estimate the proportion of a club which belonged to one of the factions in that club. (This was done on the basis of reported voting in Upper House elections, such as for LDP caucus chairman, and in the LDP presidential elections.) But the Kishi and Sato factions in the Upper House have always made up one club by themselves; those figures are precise, based on the names in the official membership list.

Insofar as the "weights" differ from the memberships, this is due to information on the financial strengths of the factions, and on the ties between various of the "others" and the factions. Data on finances was obtained from the Kampo, the Official Report (of the Government), all months since 1956. This data was not used precisely, because reporters, politicians, and factions' staffers assured me that the data is not reliable: instead, relying on my data, which agrees with the widespread rumor that Kishi, Sato, and Ikeda (and Ishii, slightly) have the strongest financial backing, I gave these factions a slight edge when memberships were not clearly decisive. Similarly, depending on newspaper reports of the ties and attitudes of the "independents," I gave the appropriate factions a slight advantage in figuring the proper weights.

For example, in January, 1959, the Kampo data show that the factions with the strongest financial backing (in 1958) were Kishi-Sato, Ikeda, and Ishii, while contemporary newspapers said that the small Ishibashi faction was thoroughly hostile to Kishi, although unable to

TABLE 2. FACTION ME	MRERSHIPS AND	WRIGHTS
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Date	Item ^b	Kishi- Sato•	Ikeda	Kono	Ono	Miki	Ishii		Hato- yama	neutral	total
12/56	%Diet	30	7	8	9	10	11	2	2	3 <u></u> d	100g
1957	$\%\mathrm{LH}$	24 + 9	9	13	10	14	8	6	t	7 —	98
12/56-5/58	w_i	2	1	1	1	1	1	0	0	0	7
6/58	%LH	23+12	15	11	12	11	8	5		3	100
1/59	%Diet	36	15	9	11	9	9	4		7	100
7/60	$\% \mathrm{Diet}$	$42^{\rm e}$	16	9	9	8	8	3		5	100
6/58-11/60	w_i	3	2	1	1	1	1	0	0	0	9
			<u> </u>					Kawa- shima	 Fuji- yama		
1962-63	$\%\mathrm{LH}$	9 + 17	17	11	10	11	5	9	8	3	100
12/60-11/63	w_i	3	2	1	1	1	1	1	1	0	11
12/63	%LH	8+16	16	16	10	12	 4	7	7	 5	101
7/64	%Diet	27	13	15	10	10	7	5	7	6	100
12/63-?*	w_i	4	2	2	1	1	1	1	1	0	13
12/66	$\% \mathrm{LH}$	9 + 16	16	9 - 6	5 - 4	11	5	6	6	5	98
	%Diet	29	14	6 - 3 - 4	3-2-3	10	6	4	7	8	99
		Kishi-		Naka-				Kawa-			
		Sato	Maeo	sone	Funada	Miki		shima			
1967-68	w_i	4	2	1	1	2	0	1	0	0	11

^a On the use of these data, see footnotes 17 and 24.

agree upon a leader among themselves to succeed the ailing Ishibashi. Moreover, the neutrals were said to include a group who were close to or indebted to Prime Minister Kishi, although unable to admit this publicly by joining his faction. Finally, the rest of the neutrals included a group of ex-Liberal Party members who were said to be willing to support either Kishi-Sato or Ikeda, whichever was more expedient, but did not want them to fight each other. On the basis of this information, I reasoned as follows.

a. Kishi+Ikeda are already winning (51%), and in reality they are even stronger than

their memberships indicate;

- Kishi+any two of Kono, Ono, Miki, and Ishii are already winning (54% or 56%), and in reality may be slightly stronger than their memberships indicate;
- c. neither Ikeda+any three of Kono, Ono, Miki, and Ishii, nor Kishi+any one of the same four, is winning on the basis of the memberships; considering the Ishibashi faction's hostility to Kishi, its 4% can always be counted in with the anti-Kishi coalition; financially, an Ikeda vs. Kishi fight would rather evenly split the big

^b %Diet=percentage of all LDP Dietmen in a faction; %LH refers to the to the Lower House. w_i indicates "weight" as discussed in the text; note that the total of the weights is not constant over the years.

[•] The Kishi and Sato factions (after 1960, the Kishi-Fukuda and Sato factions) are inseparable because in the Upper House they form one Club. Also, Kishi and Sato are brothers; they have never opposed one another in an LDP election.

d The small Hatoyama faction no longer acted as a unit after its leader resigned.

Includes Fujiyama and Kawashima; neither was independent yet.

^t The Kono and Ono factions split gradually. The double and triple entries in the following rows show the splinter groups' members. The weights in this row do not satisfy the second condition of footnote 16.

⁵ Because of the numbers of neutrals, a majority is defined here as (100-23+1)/2=39.

What does such a winning coalition win? It wins what it can control of what the LDP factions want. Specifically, a winning coalition controls such valued things as Cabinet posts, the Prime Ministership, the probability that a certain faction leader will become Prime Minister at a later time, a position of influence within the party for a faction or its leader, party endorsement of a faction's nominees in a general election, party funds, and so on. Further, it seems to me, all these aspects of winning are roughly equivalent to, or are reflected in the acquisition of Cabinet and high party posts. For example, an incumbent Prime Minister might promise the leader of a faction to support the latter in the next party presidential election. But if the Prime Minister does not give the man's faction valuable Cabinet and party posts, the promise will not be believed.25

money; the neutrals would also divide rather evenly. Hence these calculations seem reasonable:

Ikeda + Kono + Ono + Miki • = 44 + Ishibashi's $4 + 3\frac{1}{2}$ neutrals = $51\frac{1}{2}$ Ikeda + Kono + Ono + Ishii = ditto Ikeda + Ono + Miki + Ishii = ditto Ikeda + Kono + Miki + Ishii

=42+Ishibashi's $4+3\frac{1}{2}$ neutrals $=49\frac{1}{2}$ But still, this last coalition too would be winning if it should form, even versus Kishi-Sato+Ono+ $3\frac{1}{2}$ neutrals $=50\frac{1}{2}$, since Ikeda and Ishii—with their money and their influence in the ex-Liberal Party-dominated Ono faction—could break the unity of the Ono faction (especially in the Upper House, where Ono's extra strength lay).

In short, in this typical example of the calculations behind Table 2's weights, the memberships determined which were the W^m for seven coalitions, the memberships plus the factors of money and unofficial ties determined three other minimal winning coalitions, and those factors plus an arbitrary judgment based upon knowledge of probable defections decided the last W^m.

²⁵ The assumption that the posts are or reflect all the winnings to be won seems valid except for one serious problem. It is *not* correct to say that a faction leader's calculations regarding his future chances of succeding to the Prime Ministership depend solely upon the posts his faction wins. Moreover, such calculations about future potentialities seem to be very important in determining the strategies and tactics chosen by faction leaders. The failure to include in the operational

There are many reasons why these posts are valuable to a faction—to further the faction's members' careers, to control policy, to strengthen the faction, to get funds, and so forth—which are not important here. But what is important is that these posts can be evaluated, can be ranked according to their value to a faction. On the basis of research and interviews, I believe that the following ranking accurately measures how the faction leaders themselves evaluate the various posts.²⁶

- A: Prime Minister:
- B: Finance Minister, party Secretary-General;
- C: Trade and Industry Minister, Agriculture-Forestry Minister, Transportation Minister, Construction Minister, party Executive Board chairman, party Policy Board chairman;
- D: Foreign Minister and Economic Planning Agency chief—when held by a faction leader; Deputy Prime Minister, Cabinet Minister Without Portfolio, party Vice President;
- E: Foreign Minister and Economic Planning Agency chief—when not held by a faction leader; Education Minister, Welfare Minister, Labor Minister, Defence Agency chief, Justice Minister, Postal Minister, Interior Agency chief, 1958–1960, Interior Minister, 1960-present.
- F: Administrative Management Agency chief, Hokkaido Development Agency chief, Science and Technology Agency chief, Prime Minister's Office chief, 1965-present, Interior Agency chief, beginning-1957.

In brief, what a winning coalition wins is con-

definition of payoff anything corresponding to these calculations about the future is a second serious weakness in my research. (Cf. footnote 20.)

26 Of course, any list such as this can be criticized. There is not space here to raise and answer all of the possible questions which should be asked Three omissions must be explained, however. The Chief Cabinet Secretary (kanbochokan) I have lumped together with the Prime Ministership, since the former is always a "right-hand man" of the P. M. The political under-secretaries (seimujikan) I have omitted on the advice of several newspapermen who insisted that these posts are not part of the same "game." Diet posts-committee chairmanships, speakerships, etc.-are omitted for the same cause: they are given to individuals, and for reasons which are different from the reasons governing the distribution of Cabinet and top party posts.

trol over all these posts, whose value is crudely measured by the A-F ranking.²⁷

At first blush, it might seem likely that a winning coalition would give these posts only to itself, that is, only to members of the factions in the winning coalition. This would be possible, but it has never happened, and the reason is not hard to find. A winning coalition does not exist merely at one point in time. It exists over time, and is vitally concerned with prolonging its period of rule. Posts are given not simply as rewards for supporting a Prime Minister in the past, but also as encouragement to support him in the future. Indeed, posts may be given to factions simply to keep them from stirring up trouble, to silence them, or to weaken them internally. For these reasons, a Prime Minister's basic support coalition does not monopolize all the rewards, the posts. Therefore, the members of a Prime Minister's support coalition are not the only members of the Cabinet. And for this reason, the relations between the support coalition and the Cabinet coalition can become quite complex.

Nevertheless, it is possible to sketch out in a general way how this system works, showing the relationship between the support coalition and the Cabinet coalition. At some point, a party presidential election is held, and a winning coalition—the new support coalition elects the party president. This victor, acting as Prime Minister, then forms a Cabinet and makes appointments to the top party posts. The individuals who receive these posts are members of the factions which supported the Prime Minister in the election, plus some other factions' members. It may even be that all factions will be represented in the Cabinet, but the valuable posts (i.e., the B- and C-level posts) will be given only to the members of the support coalition plus one or two other factions. In a sense, the Prime Minister uses the posts in two ways: as payments on debts he incurred in the election, and as capital investment. Thus a Cabinet is born, and continues for about a year. Then the Prime Minister makes some changes. Now he has fewer "fixed costs" to meet, and so he can "invest" larger amounts than before. This does not mean, of

²⁷ Thus, while the measurement of the payoffs is only ordinal scale level, because the physical "goods" which underlie the payoffs are a constant amount for any winning coalition, and because all the factions do in fact want these posts roughly equally badly, it seems defensible to claim that the situation is constant-sum. (See footnote 14, above.)

course, that he can ignore the members of his support coalition. If he is to keep their allegiance, he must invest with them as well as with newcomers. The factions are now looking to the future. If a faction's rewards decline (for example, if a faction receives only two E-level posts and one F-level post now, whereas immediately after the election it received two C-level posts and an F-level post), then that faction will start feeling and behaving more like an opposition or neutral faction than like a main-stream faction. But, on the other hand, an increase in the value of a faction's rewards will not necessarily buy its support for the Prime Minister. Memories are long, and no one likes to be had cheaply. Thus the Prime Minister is faced with a problem. The supply of rewards is limited. If he starts giving more valuable rewards to opposing factions, in hopes of luring them into supporting them, then he will have less to give to the old support coalition. And it is probable that his "return on investment" will be less if he invests with opposition factions than if he invests with his old support coalition. But, on the other hand, if he does not diversify his investments he will become completely dependent upon his old support coalition. Such dependence would make the Prime Minister vulnerable to threats of desertion by his erstwhile supporters, and thus put him in a weak bargaining position. The Prime Minister must resolve this dilemma by distributing rewards (the posts) skillfully enough to guarantee that he will be supported by a winning coalition in the next election, at which time the whole process begins again.

If this is the way that the "coalition cabinet" system within the LDP works-and I think it is—then a proposition follows immediately. A Prime Minister will have a winning coalition in support of him if, by his distribution of rewards to the factions, he has kept the allegiance of enough of his old support coalition and earned the allegiance of enough of his old opposition that the two groups together constitute a majority of the electors in the party presidential election. To keep the allegiance of one of his old supporters, I think, a Prime Minister must continue to give him, in every Cabinet, rewards valued at not less than one C-level post. To have a chance of gaining the allegiance of a new supporter, a Prime Minister must give him rewards valued at least as much as one C-level post in at least the Cabinet preceding a party presidential

To sum up: if the payoffs of inter-election Cabinet coalitions obey the above proposition on coalition maintenance, then it seems fair to

TABLE 3, PAYOFFS^a

Prime Minister, date	Kishi ^b	Sato	Ikeda ^c	Kono	Ono	Miki	Ishii	Ishibashi		Remarks
Ishibashi*	2e		b	c	c	b, c	e	8		a classic balancing
12/56	d, f			d	d	2d, s	d, e	8		act
Kishi	a, 2c	*****	ь	c	c	b, c	c	е		Kishi kept the same
2/57	d, f			d	ď	2d, e	2d, e,			Cabinet
Kishi		· +c	c	2e-c	d	2c	d	d		Miki, Ikeda down;
7/57	2d, e	d		2d, f	f		2e, f			Kono, Sato up
Kishi	a, b, 3c	b	d	2c	3d	ď	d			clearly the Main-
6/58	ď	2d	f	2e	f	e, f	,			stream cleans up
Kishi*	a, b, 2c	b	c	2c	. 3d		d	đ		Ikeda coming back
1/59	d	2d		3e	f	,				717 2 77
Kishi	a, b, 2c	b	G	d	2c	ď	c			Ikeda in, Kono out.
6/59	2d	2d	d, e	e	d, e. f		_			One being courted
Ikeda* 7/60	2e 2d	3c	a, b 5d, e	*****	d d	-	С			the Main-stream cleans up; some insurance
								Fujiyama		
Ikeda	2c	c	a, b, c	c	b	d	-	2e		Kono up, Sato down
12/60	6	2d	4d	·	D .	u.		20		itono up, bato down
								1	Kawashima	
Ikeda	d	2c	a, b	2c	ь	e	đ	d	e	Kishi down
7/61			3d		d, f			f	d, 2e	
Ikeda	e	b	a, b	2c	e	d	d	c	c	no one opposed Ikeda
7/62		d	3d		d, f				d, 2e	in the election, are these the rewards?
Ikeda	d	b	a, b	С	c	c	d	2e	e	Kishi out; a bid to
7/63		2e	2d		2d, i	d		٠	8	get Miki and Fuji- yama.
Ikeda*		b	a, 2c	2c	2d	b, c		d	c	Miki was loyal in
7/64		d, e	2d	d, f	2G	D, V		u	2d, f	vote; Fujiyama double-crossed.
Sato	-	a, b	2e	2e	2d	b, c		d	c	Sato kept the same
11/64		d, e	2d	ď		,			2d, f	Cabinet
Sato	ь	a, b, 2c	c	d d	2e	2e	d	ď	e	the new Mainstream;
6/65	d	d	2d					f	2c, f	Ikeda down
					Funada					
Sato	b	a, b, 2c	C .	e	c	C	d	d	c	Ikeda hanging on;
8/66	d, e	d	d, e			d		f	2d, f	Funada up.
Sato* 12/66	b, c d	a, 3c d, 3e	đ		b	e 2d, f	ď		e d	Ikeda out, Kawa- shima down; Funada up.

^{*} Cabinet formed just after a party presidential election.

conclude that those interim Cabinets are "easily explained" by the requirements of the maintenance process, as demanded in the previous section.

Table 3 presents the data on payoffs in all Cabinets since the first election of an LDP president. An examination of this historical record shows that the maintenance proposition is consistent with the victories of Kishi in 1959. Ikeda in 1960 (with Kishi's coalition), and Ikeda in 1964. In each case the Prime Minister held together some of his previous

a To Lower House members. By custom, the Upper House receives three posts, one for each LDP club there. (But in the 13 different Cabinets since 7/57, one Upper House club got no post or seven occasions!) These three posts are almost always of low value. Of the 40 posts given in the 13 Cabinets (four were given in 7/64), four were C, 26 were D, and 10 were E. The 4C went to the Seishin club, the Kishi-Sato faction in the Upper House, in 6/58, 1/59, 12/60, and 7/61. (Including these 4C in Table 4's analysis would not change any results.) The Upper House post-holders in 12/56-2/57 were not club-affiliated.

b In a few instances, there is confusion over which of the Kishi-Sato brothers was closer to the post-holder; in 7/61-7/63, I have called Kaya Okinori and his associate Ueki Koshiro as Kishi-Fukuda.

[°] The dotted lines indicate the faction leaders' deaths. For Kono, the man who received D in 6/65 was later in Nakasone; the E in 8/66 went to Mori. For Ono, the 2D in 7/64-11/64 went to a man later in Murakami; the 2E in 6/65 went to a "neutral" between Funada and Murakami. Sources; Faction affiliations of post-holders were obtained from the sources cited to Table 2. Names of post-holders are from yearbooks, like Asahi Nenkan, and the newspapers.

support coalition, by not decreasing the value of the rewards too much, and earned the support of previous opponents, by increasing the value of their rewards, and so he (or his nominee), was re-elected (or elected) successfully. (See also the "Remarks" in Table 3.)

If Table 3 allows the conclusion that interelection coalitions were being maintained in an obvious manner, it does not answer the earlier questions about, Why the particular winner? Why his particular allies? To answer these questions the bargaining proposition—that the observed election support coalition will be one of the W^m with the smallest number of members—is needed. (Plus the data in Table 2).

To return to the historical situation, in 1958 the ruling coalition of Kishi-Sato-Kono-Ono was backing Prime Minister Kishi strongly. Prior to the 1958 general elections this 4-member coalition was stable in the sense that no smaller winning coalition was possible. However, after the 1958 elections, the situation changed significantly. The results of those elections changed the membership of the factions in such a way that a winning coalition composed of just three members was possible. There was only one such winning coalition with only three members. Its members? Kishi, Sato, and Ikeda! And, just as the prediction derived from the bargaining proposition asserts will happen, and as mentioned in Section I, the old coalition of Kishi-Sato-Kono-Ono was broken and a new coalition of Kishi-Sato-Ikeda took its place.

A little bit earlier, when Prime Minister Ishibashi resigned, each of the smallest winning coalitions had to contain one faction. The faction which was in every possible smallest winning coalition was the Kishi faction. Again, as the bargaining proposition predicts, and as Table 1 shows, someone joined the Kishi coalition; Kishi, because of his unique position of power, became Prime Minister.

Again, when Prime Minister Ikeda had to resign in 1964, there were several possible winning coalitions with the fewest member actors. But each of these possible smallest winning coalitions had to contain the Kishi-Sato alliance. It was impossible for a smallest winning coalition to form without the Kishi-Sato alliance. Therefore, as the bargaining proposition predicts, a winning coalition centered upon the Kishi-Sato alliance did form, and Sato became Prime Minister.

The 1964 situation is especially interesting, because for that situation the coalition maintenance proposition and the bargaining proposition give different predictions. Prime Minister Ikeda was maintaining a coalition satisfactorily according to the coalition mainte-

nance proposition. Ikeda's coalition was maintained by Ikeda's distribution of rewards to his supporters, but it was not viable except insofar as those rewards made his supporters loyal to him. As a winning coalition, it was unstable for the reasons summed up in the bargaining proposition, namely, that some of its members could hope to receive more valuable rewards from a different coalition. Thus, Ikeda could win with this coalition, and did in July, but at the time of Ikeda's resignation in the fall of the same year it was impossible for Kono (the heir-apparent) to hold the old Ikeda coalition together. Some of its members deserted, to support Sato.²⁸

The last remaining question concerns the election of Ishibashi Tanzan. At that time the Prime Minister's coalition was in effect irrelevant, since Prime Minister Hatoyama was retiring from politics without naming a successor, and the new method of electing the party leader was just being inaugurated. So the coalition maintenance proposition is irrelevant. There were three alliances at that time, none of which was winning: the Kishi-Sato-Kono alliance, the Ishii-Ikeda alliance (the former Liberal Party), and the Ono-Miki-Ishibashi alliance. In this situation, then, there were two possible winning coalitions with five members and one with six members. The bargaining proposition asserts, clearly, that one of the smallest, that is the 5-member, winning coalitions will form, but it cannot say which one. As Table 1 shows, the coalition which formed in this case was the 5-member coalition of Ishii-Ikeda-Ono-Miki-Ishibashi, as predicted.29

28 Many observers would dispute this interpretation, arguing that Ikeda himself actually double-crossed Kono, under the influence of one of his close aids, Ohira Masayoshi, who was very friendly with Mr. Sato's top advisor, Tanaka Kakuei. See, e.g., Hans Baerwald, "Japan: The Politics of Transition," Asian Survey 5 (Jan., 1965), especially pp. 34-38. Others would simply assert that it was fore-ordained that Sato follow Ikeda, by ex-Prime Ministers Yoshida and Kishi and the business community. Both of these explanations would have Mr. Miki merely realizing which way the wind was blowing, and trimming his sails to fit it. But I have talked with some political insiders who feel that Mr. Miki's switch to support of Mr. Sato came first, and was the main cause of Prime Minister Ikeda's decision to nominate Mr. Sato.

²⁹ At this time, just after the formation of the LDP, there were three major streams within the party: former Liberals, former Progressives, and people who bolted from the Liberal Party during

TABLE 4. WEIGHTS AND PAYOFFS FOR MEMBERS OF RULING COALITIONS

Ishibashi (12/56)	Predict:	Miki ≧Ishii = Ono ≧Ikeda > Ishibashi
	actual:	b, c c c b e
	·	2d, e d, e d
Kishi (7/57)	Predict:	Kishi-Sato > Kono ≧ Ono
•	actual:	2b, c+e $2c-c$ d
		3d, e 2d, f f
Kishi (6/58)	Predict:	Kishi-Sato > Kono = Ono
	actual:	2b, 3e 2e 3d
		3d 2e f
Kishi (6/59)	Predict:	Kishi-Sato > Ikeda
` , ,	actual:	2b, 2c c
,		4d . d.e
Ikeda (7/60)	Predict:	Kishi-Sato > Ikeda
	actual:	5e b, 5d
		2d e
Ikeda (12/60)	Predict:	Kishi-Sato > Ikeda
. , ,	actual:	3c, 2d b, c
		3e 4d
Ikeda (7/63)	Predict:	Ikeda>Kono=Ono=Miki≥Kawashima
	actual:	b c c c c
		2d $2d$, f d e
Ikeda (7/64)	Predict:	Ikada = Kono > Miki ≥ Ono ≥ Kawashima
. ,	actual:	2e 2e b, e 2d e
	•	2d d, f 2d, f
Sato (6/65)	Predict:	Kishi-Sato > Miki ≧ Kawashima
• • •	actual:	2b, 2e 2c c, 2d, f
		2d
Sato (8/66)	Predict:	Kishi-Sato > Miki ≥ Kawashima
	actual:	2b, 2c c c
		2d, e d 2d, f

Finally, here is a summary of this application of N-M theory and the two modifying proposition to coalition politics within the LDP. In the elections of 1956, 1959, 1960, and 1964, the winning coalition was a W^m . In three of these elections (all but 1960) this W^m was unstable according to the bargaining proposition, i.e., the observed W^m did not have a minimal number of member actors. In all three of these cases, within a year the unstable W^m was replaced by a predicted W^m , i.e., by a W^m

1953-54. Tabulating each faction's members' ties with these three streams shows marked differences. (Using data in the Seito-kai-ha Hen of the Gikai Seito 70 Nenshi.) An analysis of the composition of the three factional alliances which existed in 12/66, in terms of these ties, assuming that an alliance is more likely to join with another alliance if their members share the same historical ties, leads to the conclusion that, of the two possible 5-member winning coalitions, the Ishii-Ikeda-Ono-Miki-Ishibashi coalition was much more likely to form!

with the minimal number of member actors at the time. (The reasons why the unstable W^m formed were explained above; briefly, they are: pre-election alliance (1956), maintenance (1964) and a change in the situation due to general election results (1959).) Payoffs to actors who were not in the winning coalition can plausibly be construed as required by the "maintenance" process. (However, it must be admitted, in the absence of a theory of coalition maintenance, the model of maintenance used here is ad hoc, and for that reason not fully satisfactory.) The post-1964 period is discussed in Section V.

The foregoing has dealt entirely with the question of who are the coalition members, ignoring the payoffs received by those actors. But the heart of the N-M theory is its argument about payoffs. Table 4 presents the relevant data (taken from Table 3) for a consideration of whether the payoffs to the members of the winning coalitions were in proportion to their weights (in Table 2), as is predicted by N-M theory.

Several points about Table 4 should be

clarified, since it is the most important part of the application of N-M theory. First, the Prime Ministership itself is not included, since the decision about that office is made "for good" at the party convention. Also, since that office cannot be divided up and is so valuable, inevitably the faction which gets its leader in will get "too much" payoff—even if, as in Ishikashi's case, the faction takes nothing else. So to allow any test of the basic N-M proposition at all, the Prime Ministership must be excluded. Second, Cabinets are not in the table if they were merely hold-over Cabinets (when a Prime Minister suddenly resigned due to illness), nor if the Main-stream was changing. The latter omissions are indicated by a dotted line. Third, for the Sato Cabinets, factions which I regard as "satellites" of the Kishi-Sato bloc are not listed in the prediction. These satellites are discussed in Section V. Their inclusion in the table would improve the performance of the theory.

The predictions of payoffs can be interpreted in various ways. First, most strictly, one may demand that equal weights produce precisely equal payoffs, and of course that unequal weights produce corresponding unequal payoffs. Then of the 45 pairs in Table 4, 37 can be unambiguously compared, 30 and of these 22 are correct and 15 are wrong. Since the a priori probability of two things being precisely

³⁰ Ambiguity occurs because the payoffs are only ranked; distances between two ranks are unknown. E.g., it is not clear whether a payoff of 2c+2z is greater or less than a payoff of 3d+f. The ambiguous cases are identified below. Two cases which are strictly speaking ambiguous I have classified as clear because they seem unquestionable: K-S vs. Ikeda in 7/60, and Ikeda vs. Ono in 7/63. (I.e., I assert that 5c>b+d+e; and that b>c+f.) Of course, to call these two cases ambiguous would not make N-M's correct predictions on them into failures; it would just remove them from the analysis.

equal approaches infinity, a fair statistical significance test is hard to construct. But even making the most stringent assumption—that any predictions would be correct by chance alone one-half of the time—this 22 out of 37 result is significant at p<.13, using the binomial test. However, since all of the 15 errors involve equalities, and since strict equality must be as strange as a straight line to nature, this test is not very meaningful.

Second, one may simply look at the strict inequalities in Table 4, to see whether the basic relationships of power expressed in the weights have been preserved in the observed payoffs. There are 25 such pairs involving strict inequality. Of these three are ambiguous (Ikeda-Miki and Kono-Miki in 7/64, and Kishi-Sato-Ikeda in 12/60), and 22 allow a comparison. Of these 22, all are correct.

Finally, desiring to make some sort of evaluation of the fit between weight and payoff in the 20 cases where weights are equal, one may relax the requirement that payoffs in these cases be precisely equal. For example, when two actors' weights are equal but their memberships in the Lower House are markedly different, it seems to be in keeping with the spirit of the N-M proposition to predict that their payoffs will diverge from equality just as their memberships do. Thus, if two factions each have the same weight, but one has a membership which is larger by eight or more Lower House Dietmen, one may expect that the payoff to the larger faction will be greater than, if it is not equal to, the smaller faction's payoff. (Of course, the strict inequalities must still hold.) If one does reason in this way, then of the 15 pairs in question which are not ambiguous, 10 become weak inequalities; these are written "≥" in Table 4. (The ambiguous cases are Ishii-Ikeda and Ono-Ikeda in 12/56, Kono-Ono in 6/58, Miki-Kawashima in 7/64, and Miki-Kawashima in 6/65.) Of these 10 cases, seven are correct.

Of the remaining five cases of strict equality,

TABLE 5. SUMMARY OF N-M PREDICTIONS

Duadiation on Danaga	Clear (Comparisons	Comparisons	Total	
Prediction on Payoffs:	Correct Wrong		are Ambiguous	TOTAL	
Predictions are:		A CONTRACTOR OF THE CONTRACTOR	***************************************		
Strict inequalities	22	0	3	25	
Weak inequalities	7	3	4	14	
Equalities	0 .	correct on major posts, small dif- ference on minor posts: 4; other: 1	1	6	

all payoffs are equal insofar as major—i.e., C-level or above—posts are concerned. They differ only on the minor posts. These differences from equality are small (e, d, d+f, d-f, and 2d+f), with one exception (the last).

This analysis of Table 4 is summarized in Table 5.

IV. EVALUATION OF THE THEORY

A final judgment on whether the N-M proposition is correct for the data in question is difficult. But a temporary judgment is possible. by comparing the performance of N-M theory with the performance of other theories: Riker's theory of coalition fermation (the "minimum size" hypothesis), Gamson's theory of coalition formation and payoffs (payoffs will be proportional to resources), the Shapley-Harsanvi theory of "value" (in a constant-sum situation payoffs are proportionate to power in the "pivot" sense), and the Japanese newspapers' theory that Cabinet appointments are made in two ways: either to balance all factions, or to benefit primarily the Mainstream.31 (Another "null model" could be the proposition that coalitions form at random. and that payoffs are distributed without rhyme or reason. Another could be that "traditionalistic" factors—personal loyalties, family connections, etc.—determine all the outcomes. Another could be that the zaikai, the top business and financial world, pulls the strings on the politican-puppets. But the first is clearly so wrong that there is no point in using it, and the latter two are not disconfirmable.32)

31 See W. Riker, The Theory of Political Coalitions (New Haven: Yale Univ. Press, 1962), and W. A. Gamson, "A Theory of Coalition Formation," Amer. Sociol. Rev. 26 (June, 1961), 373-382. The Shapley theory of value, which John C. Harsanyi and others have developed further, is best known to political scientists in the guise of the Shapley-Shubik a priori power index; see L. S. Shapley and M. Shubik, "A Method for Evaluating the Distribution of Power in a Committee System," this Review, 48 (1954), 787-792. What I call the newspapers' theory is one of several common sense explanations of "the game of politics in Japan." Two others are mentioned in the parenthesis.

²² The "traditionalistic factors proposition" is not disconfirmable because there are so many such factors; after the fact it is always possible to find some such explanation. The "zaikai proposition" is not disconfirmable because the zaikai is not, usually, unified; some part of the zaikai "wins," even when an Ishibashi defeats a Kishi. Of course, to be not disconfirmable is not to be incorrect, just useless for present purposes.

Rather than to present a full application of each of these theories, it is sufficient, and instructive, to show how they differ from the N-M theory, and how these different predictions compare with the data.

First, the difference between a W^m, a W^m with fewest member actors, and a W of minimum size must be clear. N-M theory predicts the first, the bargaining proposition of this paper predicts the second and Riker's and Gamson's theories predict the third. The first two have already been explained; the third refers to the resources controlled by the members of a coalition.³³ For example, consider the illustration used earlier, of the LDP after the 1958 general election, with the "others" members distributed among the actors so as to make the percentages reflect the intangible features of the situation. (This tampering with the data is only for purposes of illustration).

The W^m here are still the Kishi-Sato bloc plus Ikeda, Kishi-Sato plus any two of the four weak factions, and Ikeda plus any three of the four weak factions. The W^m with fewest member actors is still Kishi-Kato plus Ikeda. But the W of minimum size is Ikeda plus Kono, Miki, and Ishii, with 51% of the LDP Dietmen

Second, the type of predictions about payoffs made by these different theories must be clear. Riker's theory does not make predictions about payoffs, except in special cases. Gamson's theory predicts that the actors' payoffs will be proportional to their resources, for those actors who succeed in forming a coalition. (Thus in a constant-sum situation you get more from one coalition than from another if and only if your resources are a larger proportion of the coalition's total resources, so you prefer the coalition with smaller total resources.) The Shapley-Harsanyi theory of value predicts that in a constant-sum simple coalition situation each actor will receive a payoff which is proportionate to his pivotpower, i.e., to how often his addition to a losing coalition makes it into a winning coalition. The payoffs predicted by these theories in the above example are:

²³ Gamson explicitly states that his theory's predictions depend on resources. Riker says "weights," but in his own applications uses memberships. (If Riker's weights are the same as N-M's weights, then his theory is no different from theirs.)

	Kishi- Sato	Ikeda	Kono	Ono	Miki	Ishii
Riker:	0	?	?	0	?	?
Gamson:	0	.35	.22	0	.22	.22
Shapley:	.4	.2	.1	.1	.1	.1

(If the difference in size between Ono and the other weak factions is considered insignificant, then Riker and Gamson predict any coalition of Ikeda plus any three weak actors. The size of Gamson's payoff predictions will still be the same, and both Riker and Gamson still predict that Kishi-Sato get zero.)

This example, when contrasted with Section II's exposition of the N-M predictions for the same situation, illustrates the following points of comparison. These points are also true in general.

- 1. In constant-sum simple coalition situations, Riker's and Gamson's theories predict the same coalition, but only Gamson's predicts payoffs.
- 2. Riker-Gamson theory predicts a unique coalition, while N-M theory predicts a set of coalitions.
- 3. The Riker-Gamson predicted coalition does not always contain the strongest actor(s), but rather tends to be a large group of weak actors. The bargaining proposition, on the other hand, predicts a small coalition which

always contains the strongest actor(s). The N-M solution set contains both of these predictions, necessarily.

- 4. Riker-Gamson theory, like N-M theory, predicts zero payoffs to actors who are not in the coalition which forms.
- 5. Gamson's predictions on payoff are not the same as N-M's, but they preserve roughly the same rank order (of larger and smaller predicted payoffs) as do N-M's predictions.
- 6. Shapley-Harsanyi value theory, in sharp contrast to all of these other theories, asserts that *all* actors receive some payoff. Thus it makes no predictions, even implicitly, about coalition formation; there is a "consensual" or "fair play" spirit in the theory.
- 7. The size of value theory's predictions preserves the same rank order as do N-M and Gamson's theories. But the predictions are more extreme than in the latter two theories, since the same constant pie has to be split up among everybody.

Since the payoffs to the LDP factions are only rank-ordered, point 5 shows that it is not possible to contrast Gamson's theory with N-M theory on payoffs. So Riker-Gamson theory can only be compared with N-M theory on coalition formation. Referring to the resources of Table 2 (not to the weights), the comparison is given in Table 6.

TABLE 6. COMPARISON OF ALTERNATIVE THEORIES^a

Date	Riker-Gamson	N-M	Bargaining Proposition	Actual
12/56	(Ikeda+Ishii)+(Ono +Miki+Ishibashi)	any Wm	same as R-G, or (Kishi-Sato+Kono) +(Ikeda+Ishii)	(Ikeda+Ishii)+(Ono +Miki+Ishibashi)
2/575	K-S+Ikeda+Ishii; Ikeda+Kono+Miki +Ishii+Ishibashi	any W ^m	K-S and any two (except Ishibashi)	K-S+Kono+Ono
1/59	K-S+Ikeda; K-S+Ono+Ishibashi	any W ^m	K-S+Ikeda	K-S+Kono+Ono, quickly became K-S+Ikeda
7/60	K-S+Kono; K-S+Ono	any W ^m	K-S+Ikeda; K-S+Kono; K-S+Ono	K-S+Ikeda
7/64	five coalitions with 52%, all contain K-S	any W ^m	three coalitions with 3 members, all contain K-S+Kono.	Ikeda+Kono+Ono ÷Miki+Kawashima, quickly became K-S plus several

a Based upon the percentages (not weights) in Table 2.

^b Using Lower House percentages for 1957, and a winning coalition defined as holding 50% (since the total is 98%).

[°] Of course this coalition did not occur, since Kono and Sato were fighting to succeed Ikeda. But the bargaining proposition in this situation necessarily includes Kishi-Sato in its prediction (after the predictions listed, its next prediction would be K-S plus any three), while Riker-Gamson only "accidentally" includes K-S (its next prediction after the 52%-level coalitions is Ikeda+Kono+Ono+Miki+Kawashima, at 53%).

Clearly, N-M was always right. The bargaining proposition and Riker-Gamson were both right in 12/56, and both became right quickly in 1/59. Both were wrong in 7/64, but became right in that Kishi-Sato did dominate the new coalition which formed in the fall after Prime Minister Ikeda's resignation. But the bargaining proposition was right, and Riker-Gamson wrong, in 2/57 and 7/60.

To compare N-M and Shapley-Harsanyi theory, points 6 and 7 above show that the key contrast involves the payoffs to the actors who are not in a coalition. For those actors, N-M theory predicts no payoff, while value theory predicts the same payoffs that they would receive if they were in a coalition. Both predictions are wrong, as Table 3 has already shown. However, the discussion of "maintanance" earlier showed that there is a plausible explanation for N-M theory's failure, an explanation which does not contradict the assertion that the winning coalition controls all the payoffs. Whether there is a comparable modification for value theory is not clear; at any rate, I have found one. Changes in payoff which correspond to entry into, or exit from the ruling coalition, without any change in resources, seem to contradict the basic assertion of value theory (that it is the over-all strategic possibilities, and not the temporal coalition, which determines payoff). Note in Table 3, for example, the change in payoffs to Kishi from 7/64 to 6/65, and to Kono from 1/59 to 7/61. Moreover, changes in payoffs to actors who were not in the ruling coalition, without any change in resources, also seem to contradict the basic assertion of value theory. For example, the payoffs to Fujiyama from 12/60 through 7/64 look much more like an attempt to buy at least neutrality from him in the 1964 election, than like an attempt to reward him in accord with his strategic position.

Finally, what of the common sense proposition that Cabinets will be either balanced or dominated by the Main-stream? This may be adequate as a rough description of Table 3, but closer examination shows that the proposition is incorrect unless it is taken as describing two "ideal types" of Cabinet. (Except for Ishibashi in 12/56, there has been no Cabinet in which posts have been even approximately equally distributed. On the other hand, as noted earlier, the Main-stream has never completely dominated the Cabinet.) But even as a description of two "ideal types," this proposition is not really very helpful, since the cally sort of payoff distribution which it excludes is a Cabinet where the Main-stream does not get payoffs and the outsiders do.

The foregoing evaluation of the performance of N-M theory can be summed up briefly. N-M theory performed well, in predicting both coalitions and payoffs in the LDP during 1956-66. It was more successful than alternative theories. However, its predictions on payoffs must be modified as was done by constructing a "coalition maintenance" model. If one tries to narrow down the number of predicted coalitions within the N-M solution set, the bargaining proposition should be used rather than Riker-Gamson theory.

V. PROSPECTS

In conclusion, a brief picture of the present, and some predictions.

There is not space to describe in detail the shifting situation within the LDP since the deaths of Ono, Kono, and Ikeda in 1964-65. The percentages in the last lines of Table 2 show at least that the situation has become more complex. The bottom line of Table 2 gives my guess, on the basis of field research and interviews, about how the situation is shaping up (assuming that there is no general election before 12/68). The weights given there are based on the following judgments. The Ishii and Fujiyama factions, and the Mori and Murakami splinters of the old Kono and Ono factions, are no longer actors. The Ishii faction is split. One of its leading members ran and won 11 votes against Prime Minister Sato in 12/66, although Mr. Ishii himself was backing Prime Minister Sato. The two splinter groups are satellites of the Kishi-Sato-Fukuda bloc. They back Sato even though they don't receive rewards, which no faction has ever done before. The Fujiyama faction, while able to unite around the candidacy of their leader (many say that the reason Mr. Fujiyama has run so many times for LDP president is precisely to hold his faction together), is too divided to act as a unit in any other context. Since it is likely that Fujiyama himself will not be a serious candidate in 1968, it appears that some of his faction will follow the Kishi-Sato lead and others will oppose it. On the other hand, the remaining factions all appear to be cohesive and capable of acting autonomously. But with all these satellites and fringe members, the Kishi-Sato bloc is far stronger than its official membership figures indicate. It can only be defeated if both of the mediumsized factions (the old Ikeda faction and Miki) join with at least two of the weak factions.

The maintenance model, applied to the payoffs in Table 3, says that Maeo (old Ikeda) and Nakasone are bound to be in opposition to

Sato in the next election in 12/68. If the trend begun for Kawashima in 12/66 continues, he will be in opposition, too. Miki and Funada are Sato's probable partners, but the maintenance model allows that they may double-cross him, as Sato and Fujiyama did Ikeda in 7/64.

The W^m, considering that Maeo, Nakasone, and Kawashima will not be in a coalition with Kishi-Sato, are: Kishi-Sato+Miki, and Maeo+Nakasone+Miki+Kawashima. (Because of the weights, whether Funada joins or not makes no difference.) Of course, if Prime Minister Sato changes his coalition by making a radically new distribution of payoffs before 12/68, other W^m would be possible. But as

34 This manuscript was completed in June, 1967. In December, 1967, Prime Minister Sato reshuffled his Cabinet and changed most of the top LDP executives. Messrs. Nakasone, Kawashima, Miki, Ishii, and Fukuda are now all in some top position in the Government or party, as is the number two leader of the former Ikeda faction (Ohira Masayoshi). The total distribution of rewards is as follows (with the December, 1966, payoffs from Table 3 included for comparison). The single post (an "e") given to the satellites of the Sato faction is included in the rewards for the latter. Also, incidentally, the allotment of Parliamentary Vice Ministerships (seimujikan) did not follow the same pattern as this distribution of major rewards. Rather, the Maeo and Nakasone factions received three and four, respectively, while the Sato and Kishi-Fukuda factions received five and two, respectively. The Miki and Ishii factions received one each, and the Fujithings look now, these two coalitions are likely; Miki holds the key. Which of these two coalitions will occur depends on factors outside the present theory, namely, whether Mr. Sato himself runs again—in which case Mr. Miki is more likely to back him—or withdraws, in which case Fukuda Takeo will be the Kishi-Sato bloc's candidate, and Mr. Miki is more likely to join the opposition coalition. If the coalition is Kishi-Sato+Miki, the former will receive the larger payoff. If the coalition is Maeo+Nakasone+Miki+Kawashima, Miki and Maeo will receive roughly equal payoffs, both larger than Nakasone's and Kawashima's payoffs, which will also be roughly equal.³⁴

yama, Funada, and Kawashima factions received none.

This change in the distribution of rewards from 12/66 to 11/67 is an excellent example of the maintenance proposition at work. Prime Minister Sato is attempting to hold together his old support coalition (asterisked factions), while making overtures toward the major opposition factions, Maeo and Nakasone. The effect of Mr. Sato's skillful reshuffle is to have made it possible for the Maeo and Nakasone factions to consider supporting Mr. Sato in the coming LDP presidential election this fall. Therefore the conclusion above, that the Miki faction will determine the outcome of the forthcoming election by choosing between Kishi-Sato+Miki and Maeo+Nakasone+Miki +Kawashima, is no longer valid. Rather, the Kishi-Sato bloc would appear to have the option of coalescing with a variety of partners in different winning coalitions.

	Kishi- Fukuda*	Sato*	Ikeda (Maeo)	Naka- sone	Funada	Miki*	Ishii*	Fuji- yama	Kawa- shima*
12/66	ь, с d	a, 3c d, 3e	d		b	e 2d, f	d		c, d
11/67	b, e f	a, 2c 2e, 2f	c 2e	c	b	d, e	e		c d

^{*} Voted for Mr. Sato in the 12/66 LDP presidential election.

A COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS OF STATE AND FEDERAL JUDICIAL BEHAVIOR: THE REAPPORTIONMENT CASES*

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The literature discussing the responses of lower court judges to decisions of the United States Supreme Court is limited, and the few comparative analyses of state and federal judicial behavior have tended to be speculative rather than empirical. It has been suggested that a controversial Supreme Court decision is likely to be supported more strongly by federal judges than by state judges, that state courts will probably construe a Supreme Court mandate more narrowly than will federal courts, and that federal courts can be expected to move in a direction hinted at by the Court more aggressively than state courts. Since all federal judges are appointed for life, it is only logical that they should be more independent of local pressures than state judges, many of whom are elected, or appointed for limited periods. The fact that state and federal judges owe their appointments to different levels of the political party hierarchy, and the historical fact that federal judges are less likely

* I would like to thank Professor George Marcus, Director of the Social Science Quantitative Laboratory at Williams College, for his generous assistance.

¹ The leading work in this field is that of Walter F. Murphy. See especially "Lower Court Checks on Supreme Court Power," this REVIEW, 53 (December, 1959), 1017, 1018, 1022; and Elements of Judicial Strategy (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1964), pp. 95-97, 107. A similar conclusion is suggested by John R. Schmidhauser. The Supreme Court: Its Politics, Personalities, and Procedures (New York: Holt, Rinehart and Winston, 1963), pp. 82-33; and by Frank Sorauf, Political Parties in the American System (Boston: Little, Brown and Company, 1964), pp. 123, 124. Monrad G. Paulson has demonstrated that some state supreme court judges continued to employ the doctrine of substantive due process to implement their economic theories despite the United States Supreme Court's abandonment of this practice in 1937: "The Persistence of Substantive Due Process in the States," 34 Minnesota Law Review 91 (1950). The only published work which compares state and federal judicial behavior on the basis of empirical research is Kenneth Vines' "Southern State Supreme Courts and Race Relations," Western Political Quarterly 18 (1965), 5.

to seek future political office than are state judges, suggest a similar conclusion. Finally, the very fact of being a federal judge may produce a sense of identification with the Supreme Court which state judges would not share.²

The purpose of this paper is to subject these theoretical assertions to empirical examination. Unfortunately, the American legal system impedes the construction of a research design for this purpose. Ideally, one would want to compare the responses of state and federal judges to the same case—thereby holding "inputs" constant. Thus Professor Stuart Nagel's study of the relationship of party affiliation to judicial behavior compares the responses of Republican and Democratic judges to cases in which they had all participated.3 Obviously, this procedure cannot be followed in the present situation; state and federal judges do not hear the same cases. One is forced to resort to a less desirable basis of comparison-judicial behavior in "similar" cases.4 The value of the results will depend on the observer's ability to select a universe of cases which present truly comparable situations to state and federal judges. Of even

- ² Murphy, "Lower Court Checks...," pp. 1017, 1022.
- ³ "Political Party Affiliation and Judges' Decisions," this Review, 55 (December, 1961), 843–850.
- 4 This problem could be avoided by means of a simulation technique, such as that employed by Theodore Becker in a different context. If differences in the behavior of state and federal judges result from the pressures of their political environments, it is likely that they would not be revealed by such a procedure. If, however, the significant differences between state and federal judges are a function of the judge rather than his situation (if state and federal judicial systems recruit differentially, or if state and federal judges have internalized different role perceptions, for example) then such a technique should produce positive results. Theodore L. Becker. Political Behavioralism and Modern Jurisprudence (Chicago: Rand Mc-Nally, 1964); "A Survey Study of Hawaiian Judges: The Effect on Decisions of Judicial Role Variations," this REVIEW, 60 (September, 1966), 677-680.

greater importance will be his ability to limit his comparisons to those aspects of "similar" cases in which the stimuli to which the two categories of judges are subjected are truly comparable. The significance of this point will be developed with respect to the specific hypotheses tested below.

I. THE DATA

This study is based on the decisions dealing with legislative apportionment which federal district courts and state courts of last resort announced after the Supreme Court's 1962 decision in Baker v. Carr, but before its "one man, one vote" ruling in Reynolds v. Sims (1964). The reapportionment cases provide a particularly useful basis for a comparative analysis of the state and federal judicial bureaucracies for several reasons. As a result of the Supreme Court's decision in Colegrove v. Green, both federal and state courts (with some exceptions) had declined to intervene in apportionment cases.6 Thus neither federal nor state judges were especially familiar with such cases, nor had they developed local precedents or specialized methods of dealing with them. Suddenly in 1962, as the consequence of a Supreme Court opinion which was generally understood to apply equally to state and federal courts, both sets of judges were faced with a large number of cases dealing with the same subject. Since the state and federal cases were decided during the same period of time, the political and judicial climates are held constant. Finally, the geographic distribution of the relevant state and federal courts does not appear to differ significantly.8

- ⁵ Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186 (1962); Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533 (1964). Note that we are comparing state appeals courts of last resort and federal trial courts.
 - ⁶ Colegrove v. Green, 328 U.S. 549 (1946).
- 7 Strictly speaking, this is not correct. Since a ruling in a legislative reapportionment case occurs within the context of all previous decisions in that subject area, by necessity, this context must differ for each subsequent decision. However, this study does exclude the impact of additional stimuli by the United States Supreme Court, or of major national political events related to the subject matter of the cases. Also, the distribution of the state and federal cases throughout the time period under study is shown to be comparable, in a statistical sense, by means of the Mann-Whitney U Test.
- ⁸ The federal cases occurred in Alabama, California, Colorado (two cases), Connecticut, Delaware, Florida, Georgia (three cases), Idaho,

The subject matter of these cases is eespcially well suited to accentuate anticipated differences between the state and federal judiciaries. As Alexander Bickel put it, "[A]pportionment is a very high percentage of politics with a small admixture of definable principle."9 Legislative apportionment is a major concern of those political interests generally regarded as being able to influence state judges to a greater extent than federal judges. Since, as the law review commentators hastened to point out, the Supreme Court's mandate in Baker v. Carr was anything but precise. lower court judges had room in which to maneuver.10 This was, then, a situation in which differences between state and federal judges should readily have appeared.

One major weakness in the data must be noted. Since all of the apportionment cases were brought by litigants seeking to benefit from the Supreme Court's decision in Baker, attorneys could be expected to avoid those courts in which they anticipated resistance to the Court's decision. Presumably this would

Illinois, Indiana, Iowa, Louisiana, Michigan, Minnesota, Nebraska, New York, North Dakota, Oklahoma (two cases), Pennsylvania, Tennessee (two cases), Virginia, Washington, and Wisconsin.

The state cases occurred in Alabama, California, Colorado, Idaho, Kansas, Louisiana, Maryland, Michigan (two cases), Mississippi, New Hampshire (two cases), New York, Oklahoma, Rhode Island (two cases), Wisconsin, Wyoming, and Vermont.

The obvious sectional bias to consider is an overproportion of southern states in either group. Following V. O. Key's usage of treating the 11 states of the Confederacy as southern, we find that 10 of the 29 federal cases were decided in southern courts, as were 4 of the nineteen state cases. This difference is not statistically significant. Fisher's Exact Probability Test for this distribution produces a p of .16.

- Alexander Bickel, "The Durability of Colegrove v. Green," 72 Yale Law Journal 39, 42 (1962).
- 10 The following are illustrative of the extensive literature which can be cited to document the lack of precision in Baker: Neal, "Baker v. Carr, Politics in Search of Law," 1962 Supreme Court Review 252: McClosky, "The Reapportionment Case," 76 Harvard Law Review 54 (1962); Lucas, "The Meaning of Baker v. Carr," 61 Michigan Law Review 711 (1963) Friedelbaum, "Baker v. Carr: New Doctrine of Judicial Intervention and Its Implications for American Federalism," 29 University of Chicago Law Review 673 (1962).

minimize the chance that state and federal judges would differ.

A total of twenty-nine federal and nineteen state apportionment cases decided during the period between *Baker* and *Reynolds* are germane to this study.¹¹

11 Federal cases: Baker v. Carr. 206 F. Supp. 341 (1962); Baker v. Carr. 222 F. Supp. 648 (1963); Butterworth v. Dempsey, 229 F. Supp. 754 (1964); Daniel v. Davis, 220 F. Supp. 601 (1963); Davis v. Synhorst, 217 F. Supp. 492 (1963), 225 F. Supp. 689 (1964); Dorsey v. Fortson, 228 F. Supp. 259 (1964); Drew v. Scranton, 229 F. Supp. 308 (1963); Germano v. Kerner, 220 F. Supp. 230 (1963); Hearne v. Smylie, 225 F. Supp. 645 (1964); Hedlund v. Hanson, 213 F. Supp. 172 (1962); League of Nebraska Municipalities v. Marsh, 209 F. Supp. 189 (1962): Lein v. Sathre, 205 F. Supp. 536 (1962); Lisco v. McNichols, 208 F. Supp. 471 (1962); Lisco v. Love, 219 F. Supp. 922 (1963); Mann v. Davis, 213 F. Supp. 577 (1962); Marshall v. Hare, 227 F. Supp. 989 (1964); Moss v. Burkhart, 207 F. Supp. 885 (1962), 200 F. Supp. 149 (1963); Nolan v. Rhodes, 218 F. Supp. 953 (1963); Sanders v. Gray, 203 F. Supp. 158 (1962); Silver v. Jordan, unpublished, Federal District Court, Southern District, California, Civil No. 62-953-NC (1962); Sims v. Frink, 205 F, Supp. 245 (1962), 208 F. Supp. 431 (1962); Sincock v. Terry, 207 F. Supp. 205 (1962), 210 F. Supp. 396 (1962), 215 F. Supp. 169 (1963); Sobel v. Adams, 208 F. Supp. 316 (1962), 214 F. Supp. 811 (1963); Stout v. Hendricks, 228 F. Supp. 568 (1964); Thigpen v. Meyers, 211 F. Supp. 826 (1962); Toombs v. Fortson, 205 F. Supp. 248 (1962); Valenti v. Dempsey, 211 F. Supp. 911 (1962); WMCA Inc. v. Simon, 208 F. Supp. 368 (1962); Wisconsin v. Zimmerman, 205 F. Supp. 673 (1962), 209 F. Supp. 183 (1962).

State Cases:

In re Apportionment of the Michigan State Legislature, 126 N.W. 2d 731 (1964), 127 N.W. 2d 862 (1964), 128 N.W. 2d 350 (1964); Blaikie v. Power, 193 N.E. 2d 55 (1963); Caesar v. Williams, 371 P. 2d 241 (1962); Davis v. McCarty, 388 P. 2d 480 (1964); Glass v. Hancock County Election Committee, 156 So. 2d 825 (1963); Griffin v. Board of Supervisors, 384 P. 2d 421 (1963), 388 P. 2d 888 (1964); Le Doux v, Parish Democratic Executive Committee, 156 So. 2d 48 (1963); Harris v. Shanahan, 390 P. 2d 722 (1964); In re Legislative Reapportionment, 374 P. 2d 66 (1962); Levitt v. Attorney General, 180 A. 2d 827 (1962); Levitt v. Maynard, 182 A. 2d 897 (1962); Maryland Committee For Fair Representation v. Tawes, 180 A. 2d 656 (1962), 184 A. 2d 715 (1962); Mikell v. Rousseau, 183 A. 2d 817 (1962); Opinion to the Gover-

II, HYPOTHESES TO BE TREATED

On the basis of the existing literature comparing state and federal judicial behavior, the following five hypotheses seemed appropriate:

- State courts will be more critical of the Supreme Court's decision in Baker v. Carr than will federal courts.
- State and federal courts will differ in their interpretations of the Supreme Court's instructions in Baker v. Carr in three respects;
 - a) Federal courts are more likely than state courts to understand the Supreme Court to have reached the merits of the Tennessee apportionment case, and to have provided substantive guidelines for lower court action.
 - b) Federal courts are more likely to see a "one man, one vote" standard required by the Supreme Court than are state courts.
 - c) State Courts are more likely to read the Supreme Court's instructions as accepting factors other than population as legitimate bases for legislative apportionment than are federal courts.
- 3. State courts will be more likely than federal courts to "duck" apportionment cases by failing to reach the merits of the claim, despite the ruling in Baker v. Carr. This difference will appear in three ways:
 - a) State courts are more likely to deny jurisdiction than are federal courts.
 - State courts are more likely to decline to exercise equity jurisdiction.
 - c) State courts are more likely to show deference to state legislatures, and to delay

nor, 183 A. 2d 806 (1962); Rice v. Frink, 143 So. 2d 848 (1962); Scholle v. Hare, 116 N.W. 2d 350 (1962); Sweeney v. Notte, 183 A. 2d 296 (1962); Wisconsin v. Zimmerman, 126 N.W. 2d 551 (1964); Wyoming v. Gage, 377 P. 2d 299 (1963).

While five of these cases did not deal with the apportionment of state legislatures, they are immediately relevant to several of the hypotheses. Sanders v. Gray involved the Georgia county unit system. Blaikie v. Power dealt with the selection of members of the New York City Council. Heldund v. Hanson, Glass v. Hancock County Election Committee and Griffin v. Board of Supervisors dealt with the apportionment of county governments.

Since many of the cases were handled in several stages, it is possible for a given case to appear in what would seem to be contradictory categories if a court significantly modified its position or its strategy between opinions.

judicial action in order to allow the legislature to act first.

- In their rulings on constitutionality, state judges will permit a greater degree of population inequality than will federal judges.
- 5. State and federal judges will differ in the application of judicial remedies in cases in which state legislative apportionments are found to violate the Constitution. This will be made evident by two related indicators:
 - a) State judges are more likely to defer to the legislature and to decline to provide a judicial remedy while awaiting legislative action—despite the finding of unconstitutionality.
 - b) Federal courts are more likely than state courts to act to provide positive relief once the unconstitutionality of a state's apportionment is established.

This formulation of hypotheses helps to compensate for the basic problem in research design noted above: the comparison of state and federal judicial responses to "similar" rather than identical stimuli. As formulated, the hypotheses differ in the extent to which this is a problem. Hypotheses 1 and 2 require a comparison of the verbal responses of state and federal courts to the identical stimulus-the Supreme Court's decision in Baker v. Carr. The lower court apportionment case is the occasion for the response, rather than the stimulus. We need not assume that the judge's discussion of Baker is tied to the specifics of the case before him. To test Hypotheses 3 and 5. one compares judicial action (or lack thereof). But here too, the action reflects a response to Baker: may a judge still avoid apportionment cases? Must a judge grant positive relief once he has found a violation of the Constitution? Presumably the ramifications of the particular case would have more influence on the judge's action in response to Baker than on his verbal response.

Only Hypothesis 4—which posits that when deciding cases state judges will permit a greater degree of population inequality than federal judges—calls for a comparison of the responses of judges to different but "similar" stimuli. And as will be seen, this is a fatal weakness.

III. FINDINGS

Hypothesis 1. A test of the first hypothesis—that state courts are more critical of the Supreme Court's decision in Baker v. Carr than are federal courts—requires a detailed textual analysis of all the cases involved. I have presented such an analysis elsewhere. 12 It demonstrates

12 Edward N. Beiser, "The Treatment of Legis-

strates considerable similarity in the opinions of state and federal judges. For the most part, the lower courts did not explicitly question the Supreme Court's policy decision to intervene in apportionment cases. However, many judges criticized the procedure the high court had followed; they were particularly upset by the lack of guidance provided for them in Baker. In their references to the Supreme Court's craftsmanship, the remonstrances of many federal judges were at least as strong—if not stronger—than those of state judges. The following comments by federal judges are illustrative:

Until some direction is given with respect to the application of invidious discrimination to the reapportionment cases, the lower courts will continue to have difficulty in determining the standard to be applied....¹³

We are unable to premise an invalidity of the provisions of the State of New York upon the Baker v. Carr determination by reason of the absence of applicable indicia.¹⁴

No guidelines or criteria are laid down for determining the extent or level of disproportion to constitute infringement of the Equal Protection Clause. . . . ¹⁵

[W]e must confess lack of both omnicompetence and prescience, which it appears to us would be necessary to make a judicial appraisal and declaration that the State's time-old method of apportionment is irrational. . . . ¹⁰

It is indeed difficult for judges and attorneys to fully understand the impact of Baker v. Carr... to say nothing of legislators upon whom the primary responsibility of reapportionment rests.¹⁷

The conclusion which emerges from a close reading of the lower court apportionment cases is that, with respect to their assessments of *Baker* v. *Carr*, federal judges differed among themselves; state supreme court judges differed among themselves; and the two patterns of

lative Apportionment by the State and Federal Courts: A Comparative Analysis of the Judicial Process" (unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, Princeton University, 1967).

- ¹³ Davis v. Synhorst, 217 F. Supp. 492, 497 (1963).
- ¹⁴ WMCA Inc. v. Simon, 208 F. Supp. 368, 372 (1962).
- ¹⁵ Lisco v. McNichols, 208 F. Supp. 471, 376 (1962).
- ¹⁶ Hearne v. Smylie, 225 F. Supp. 645, 651 (1964).
- ¹⁷ Mann v. Davis, 213 F. Supp. 577, 586 (1962). Dissenting opinion.

opinion are similar. It does not appear possible to conclude—as we had hypothesized—that as a group, state judges were more critical of the Supreme Court's opinion in *Baker* than federal judges.¹⁸

Hypothesis 2. It is possible to be more precise when testing the hypothesis that state and federal courts would differ in their interpretations of the Supreme Court's instructions in Baker. It was anticipated that the two groups of courts would give different answers to three related questions: had the Supreme Court reached the merits of the Tennessee apportionment case, and provided substantive guidelines for lower court action? Was a one man, one vote standard required in either or both chambers of a state legislature? Could a state legitimately consider factors other than population when apportioning its legislature?

Nine of the twenty-nine federal cases held that the Supreme Court had not dealt with the merits of legislative apportionment, or provided concrete guidelines to enable lower courts to do so. Four of the nineteen state cases reached the same conclusion. While the difference between the state and federal courts is not statistically significant, onte that it is not in the anticipated direction.

- ¹⁸ It is important to remember that the choice between a state or federal court by a litigant was not randomly made.
- 1º Daniel v. Davis, Davis v. Synhorst (first opinion), Germano v. Kerner, Hearne v. Smylie, Lisco v. Love, Lisco v. McNichols, Sobel v. Adams, Wisconsin v. Zimmerman, and WMCA Inc. v. Simon. Citations are in note 11. The state cases were: Caeser V. Williams, Davis v. McCarty, In re Apportionment of the Michigan Legislature, and Mikel v. Rousseau. Citations in note 11.
- ²⁰ Fisher's p=.20. The negative cells in the calculation include only those courts which explicitly stated that the Supreme Court had not reached the merits of *Baker*, or indicated specific guidelines for the lower courts.

The particular results of this study allowed me the luxury of avoiding an important methodological point which may be significant in future research. While I employed Fisher's Exact Probability Test to consider whether the observed results could have occurred as a matter of chance, I am not prepared to defend this as the exclusive decision-rule for determining the validity of the hypotheses tested. Consider this example: If ten of fourteen federal judges refused to apply Baker v. Carr to Congressional apportionment, while only one of five state judges acted in this manner, these results would not be statistically significant. Yet I would be inclined to say that the

Four of the twenty-nine federal courts stated that *Baker* required that at least one chamber of a bicameral state legislature be apportioned strictly on the basis of population.²¹ Only one of the nineteen state courts held that a population-based apportionment was required in at least one legislative chamber.²² While this difference corresponds with our hypothesis, it is not statistically significant.²³

Twelve of the twenty-nine federal courts explicitly stated that factors other than population are legitimate bases for legislative apportionment, at least to some extent. Seven of the nineteen state decisions expressed a similar position.²⁴ Note that again the difference between state and federal courts in this respect, while not statistically significant, is not in the anticipated direction.²⁵

The language of those federal courts which rejected the one man, one vote standard the

difference between these two groups of judges ought not be rejected. The problem is that, with small N's, when one uses the question "could this result have occurred as a matter of chance more than five times in one hundred" to decide whether observed differences are meaningful, he may be requiring results which are more extreme than he would expect on the basis of his theory and experience.

- ²¹ Baker v. Carr, Davis v. Synhorst (later opinion), Moss v. Burkhart, and Toombs v. Fortson, citations in note 11. Moss v. Burkhart was the only decision—state or federal—which understood the Supreme Court to require equally populated districts in both houses of a state legislature.
- ²² Maryland Committee v. Tawes. Citation in note 11. This applies only to interpretations of Baker v. Carr. Other courts reached such conclusions after the Supreme Court's decisions in Gray v. Sanders and Wesberry v. Sanders.
- ²³ Fisher's p = .26. The regative cells in the calculation include those courts which failed to reach the merits, as well as those courts which expressed a negative view.
- ²⁴ The twelve federal cases were: Baker v. Carr, Daniel v. Davis, Germano v. Kerner, Lisco v. Love, Lisco v. McNichols, Mann v. Davis, Marshall v. Harz, Sanders v. Gray, Sobel v. Adams, Thigpen v. Meyers, Toombs v. Fortson, and WMCA Inc. v. Simon. The seven state cases were: Caeser v. Williams, Davis v. McCarty, Griffin v. Board of Supervisors, Levitt v. Attorney General, Levitt v. Maynard, Maryland Committee v. Tawes, and Sweeney v. Notte. Citations in note 11.
- ²⁵ Fisher's p=.23. The negative cells include both courts stating that non-population factors could not be considered, and those expressing no opinion.

Supreme Court was ultimately to adopt was at least as vigorous as that of the state courts. Many relied upon an analogy with the national legislature. To a federal judge in Connecticut, "it would be revolutionary indeed for the [Supreme Court] to hold that it violates the Federal Constitution for a legislature to have one house based on population and another on the unit system."²⁶ An Illinois federal district court opinion rose to rhetorical heights:

Should that which is deemed proper when observed in the presence of the federal government be suddenly deemed improper when associated with a sovereign state? Must the subject be more royal than the king? Must the State be more democratic than the United States?²⁷

These data do not confirm the second hypothesis; it appears that the state and federal courts did not differ significantly in their interpretations of the Supreme Court's mandate in Baker.

Hypothesis 3. It was generally understood that Baker v. Carr required lower courts to deal with apportionment cases. Yet some lower courts employed a variety of techniques to avoid judicial involvement in this area. Ten of the twenty-nine federal courts and six of the nineteen state supreme courts "ducked" apportionment questions by failing to reach the merits of cases before them for resolution.²⁸ Thus contrary to our hypothesis, federal courts were slightly more likely to avoid apportionment cases than state courts; however, this result is not statistically significant.²⁹

The Supreme Court of Alabama was the only court—state or federal—which denied that it had jurisdiction in an apportionment case.³⁰

Two state courts and two federal courts declined to exercise equity jurisdiction.³¹ In seven of the twenty-nine federal cases, judges stayed their hands in order to allow state legislatures to act first;³² two of the nineteen state cases exhibited such deference to the legislative branch.³³ This apparent difference—which is contrary to our expectation—is not statistically significant.³⁴ The data do not confirm Hypothesis 3.

Hypothesis 4. It turns out that Hypothesis 4-the expectation that federal and state judges will react differently to a given degree of malapportionment—cannot be tested in the real world. Two procedures for the verification of this hypothesis present themselves. One might apply a measurement of malapportionment to each of the states in which a court ruled on the constitutionality of the legislature's apportionment.35 Having ranked the states in terms of malapportionment, it would be simple to compare the responses of state and federal judges to approximately equivalent cases. Unfortunately, this procedure would not test the hypothesis. The objective measurement of malapportionment is not necessarily an indicator of the stimulus to which the judge was exposed. The difficulty with this procedure is that we cannot know whether cases based on equivalent factual situations constitute equivalent stimuli in the context of litigation.

In order to overcome this problem, one might compare cases on the basis of the judges' articulated assessments of the degree of malapportionment involved. That is, one might order the cases in terms of the indices of population-inequality which the judges invoke in their opinions. Two statistical measures predominate in the cases under study: the ratio of the most populous district to the least populous district, and the smallest percentage of the population which could conceivably elect a majority of the legislature (The Dauer-Kelsay

²⁶ Anderson, dissenting in Butterworth v. Dempsey, 229 F. Supp. 754, 774 (1964).

²⁷ Germano v. Kerner, 220 F Supp. 230, 233 (1963).

²⁸ The ten federal cases were: Daniel v. Davis, Hearne v. Smylie, Hedlund v. Hanson, League of Nebraska Municipalities v. Marsh, Lein v. Sathre, Silver v. Jordan, Sims v. Frink, Sincock v. Terry, Stout v. Hendricks, and Wisconsin v. Zimmerman. The six state cases were: Glass v. Hancock, In re Apportionment of the Michigan Legislature, In re Legislative Reapportionment, Maryland Committee v. Tawes, Rice v. Frink, and Wyoming v. Gage. Citations are in note 11.

²⁹ Fisher's p = .24.

³⁰ Rice v. Frink. Citation in note 11.

²¹ The state cases were Glass v. Hancock and In re Apportionment of the Michigan State Legisla-

ture. The federal cases were Hearne v. Smylie and Wisconsin v. Zimmerman. Citations in note 11.

³² Daniel v. Davis, League of Nebraska Municipalities v. Marsh, Lein v. Sathre, Sims v. Frink, Sincock v. Terry, Stout v. Hendricks, and Wisconsin v. Zimmerman. Citations in note 11.

²⁵ Maryland Committee v. Tawes, Wyoming v. Gage. Citations in note 11.

³⁴ Fisher's p = .16.

²⁵ The problem of measuring malapportionment in a way which will permit comparative analysis has been discussed recently in Glendon Schubert and Charles Press, "Measuring Malapportionment," this Review, 58 (June, 1964), 302–327; 302 (1964), and Henry F. Kaiser, "A Measure of the Population Quality of Legislative Apportionment," this Review, 62 (March, 1968), 208–215.

index). But Schubert and Press have demonstrated that these indices are not adequate for comparative analysis.²⁶

Thus both procedures fail. When we employ an independent, precise measurement of malapportionment, we cannot demonstrate that the cases as presented to the judges accurately reflect the degree of malapportionment. When we utilize the judicial descriptions of the extent of malapportionment, we find that the indices of malapportionment employed are so imprecise that we cannot determine which cases are equivalent. This difficulty appears to be an unavoidable consequence of the fact that this comparison of state and federal judicial behavior is based on the responses of different political actors to "ecuivalent" rather than identical stimuli. ³⁷

Hypothesis 5. A finding of unconstitutionality did not necessarily induce a court to take affirmative remedial action. In nine of the fourteen federal cases which ruled that a state's legislative apportionment was unconstitutional, the court declined to remedy the situation, in order to allow the legislature to act.³⁸ Similar delays were granted in all five of the state apportionment cases in which violations of either the state or federal constitutions were found.³⁹ The apparent small difference between

36 Op. cit.

37 In only one instance did federal and state judges comment on the constitutionality of the same apportionment. The eight-judge Michigan Supreme Court was forced to decide which of a group of apportionment plans most closely corresponded to the requirements of the state constitution. In the course of their opinions, five of the eight applied the Fourteenth Amendment of the Federal Constitution to the apportionment legislation: three held that it was constitutional, two that it was not. Shortly thereafter, a threejudge federal district court ruled-two to onethat the apportionment did not violate the Fourteenth Amendment. It is interesting that the three state judges and two federal judges who upheld the constitutionality of the Republicanauthored Michigan apportionment were all Republicans. The two state judges and the dissenting federal judge who held it unconstitutional were Democrats. In re Apportionment of the Michigan State Legislcture, 126 N.W. 2d 731 (1964). Marshall v. Hare, 227 F. Supp. 989 (1964). 38 Baker v. Carr, Devis v. Synhorst, Drew v.

38 Baker v. Carr, Devis v. Synhorst, Drew v. Scranton, Mann v. Eavis, Moss v. Burkhart Sincock v. Duffy, Sobel v. Adams, Thigpen v. Meyers, Toombs v. Fortson. Citations in note 11.

³⁹ Harris v. Shanahan, Mikell v. Rousseau, Scholle v. Hare, Sweery v. Notte, Wisconsin v. Zimmerman. Citations in note 11. the behavior of the two sets of judges is in the direction hypothesized, but is not statistically significant.⁴⁰

Several of the decisions granting delays threatened court action if the legislature failed to meet judicial standards; as a group, the federal opinions tended to employ stronger language in this respect than did the state courts. Specific time limitations were imposed in five of the nine federal cases in which delays were granted, and in three of the five state cases.

Of the fourteen cases in which federal district courts found that legislative apportionments violated the Federal Constitution. positive relief was granted in four: an injunction was issued to prevent the use of Washington's apportionment statutes; aspects of two different legislative proposals were imposed by court order in Alabama; a plan submitted by plaintiffs was adopted by the Tennessee court with minor modifications; and in only one state (Oklahoma) did a federal court provide a specific apportionment plan of its own.41 It is clear that at least two additional federal courts were prepared to act when the United States Supreme Court intervened. 42 State courts granted relief in only one of the five cases in which they they held apportionment legislation to be unconstitutional: the Wisconsin Supreme Court reapportioned the state.43 This difference is not statistically significant.44

These differences in the proclivity of state and federal judges to remedy malapportionment seem far too minor to confirm our hypothesis.

IV. IMPLICATIONS

The differences in the behavior of state and federal judges which we predicted do not appear. Of course, it may be that careful selection by litigants of the courts in which they sought to benefit from Baker v. Carr prevented such differences from occurring. It is also possible that by comparing state courts of last resort and federal district courts we looked in the wrong place.⁴⁵

- 40 Fisher's p = .17.
- ⁴¹ Thigpen v. Meyers, Sims v. Frink, Baker v. Carr (later opinion), and Moss v. Burkhart. Citations in note 11.
- ⁴² Butterworth v. Dempsey; Drew v. Scranton. Citations in note 11.
 - 43 Wisconsin v. Zimmerman. Citation in note 11.
 - 44 Fisher's p = .43.
- ⁴⁵ Indeed, with respect to race relations cases, Kenneth Vines suggests that "[t]he role of the southern state supreme court has parallelled that of the national Supreme Court. In both cases, the

Nonetheless, it is interesting that these results are in accord with the only published empirical comparison of federal and state judicial behavior. Professor Vines concluded that differences in the treatment of Negroes by southern state and federal courts were less than might have been expected. While Negroes "have a better chance for favorable decisions in the federal courts than in the state courts, . . . the difference is not one of very great magnitude." Vines found that "in some states, Negroes fared better in the state court than in the federal courts."

Two explanations for the failure of the predicted differences to appear seem plausible. It may be that state supreme court judges are as well (or nearly as well) insulated from political influence as are lower federal judges. Formallegal factors governing judicial selection, tenure of office, and so on may be less significant than

higher court has tended to protect minority groups by reversing decisions made against them in lower courts." Vines, op. cit. (note 1) p. 16.

judicial reformers would imagine. It is also possible that the demands of one's role as a "lower court judge" are of greater significance than either differences in recruitment pattern or institutionalized position. The "bureaucratic phenomenon" may suppress the appearance of differences between state and federal judges.

One virtue of the methodology employed in this paper is that it can be applied extensively to existing data. State and federal judicial responses to virtually every past Supreme Court decision which is viewed as innovative in significant respects can be studied. It would seem desirable that such analyses be based on the comparison of responses to specific stimuli which confronted both state and federal judges. For example, rather than categorizing opinions as "pro-Negro," one might ask: were federal judges more likely than state judges to apply Brown v. Board to non-educational facilities?

Clearly, the present study will not support generalizations about the behavior of state and federal judges. But it appears in order to ask that the received wisdom be reconsidered, and that judgment be suspended until further empirical research is carried out.

⁴⁶ Ibid., p. 10

⁴⁷ Ibid.

VOTING TURNOUT IN AMERICAN CITIES*

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Writing about local elections in 1968, Charles R. Adrian and Charles Press report that, "It is not known whether . . . state and national voting-population characteristics fit municipal voting, too." Although a number of important studies of politics and elections in individual communities have emerged in recent years, the data are far from sufficient to permit more than the most speculative generalizations about the nature of the local electorate.2 This study draws back the curtain, albeit only a bit, on one aspect of local political participation-voting turnout. The data presented constitute, so far as we know, the first attempt at a comprehensive comparison among American cities with respect to turnout. As will be suggested and become obvious, the breadth of the data is not matched by their depth; data were received from only 80 percent of the 729 cities above 25,000 population in 1952, and we were able to utilize comparative turnout figures from only 282 of these. While relationships are suggested between turnout, political and governmental structure, and characteristics of the population, these relationships must be regarded more as leads to future research, than as clear and unambiguous findings.

- * The authors are indebted to Michael T. Aiken, Ruth B. Dixon, Daniel N. Gordon, Willis D. Hawley, Robert L. Lineberry, Donald B. Rosenthal, Peter W. Sperlich, Frederick M. Wirt, and Raymond E. Wolfinger for comments and suggestions above and beyond the normal call of collegial duty. Their willingness to be of assistance in no way renders them responsible for the results. The senior author wishes to thank the Institute for Research or Poverty, University of Wisconsin, for research assistance.
- ¹ Charles R. Adrian and Charles Press, Governing Urban America, 3rd ed. (New York: McGraw-Hill Book Company, 1968), p. 95.
- ² Alvin Boskoff and Earmon Ziegler's study, Voting Patterns in a Local Election, provides a brief review of the state of the literature: (Philadelphia: J. B. Lippincott Company, 1964), Chapter 1. See also Lester W. Milbrath, Political Participation (Chicago: Rand McNally, 1965); but note that references to city elections are infrequent.

Previous work by the present authors has pointed to the importance of the political and social variables included in this analysis of American cities. Lee suggested in a study of nonpartisan elections and politics in California cities that nonpartisanship might tend to reduce voter participation.3 In a study of American cities, this hypothesis was confirmed in a preliminary analysis of the same data used in this article.4 The median turnout in partisan elections was 50 percent, compared to 30 percent in nonpartisan cities; in addition, the related characteristics of council-manager government and the appointed mayor were also seen to have a negative relationship to voter participation. It was not possible, however, to determine whether these relationships were independently associated or, rather, merely reflected underlying characteristics of the cities themselves.

Parallel work on form of government by Alford and others posited the existence of a relationship between form of government and socioeconomic characteristics. For example, "white, Anglo-Saxon, Protestant, growing, and mobile cities are highly likely to be manager cities; ethnically and religiously diverse but nonmobile industrial cities are highly likely to be mayor-council cities." Other features of so-called "reform" type local government—non-partisan elections, at-large elections, small city councils, local elections which are not concurrent with state or national elections—have a similar social base. In this paper, the data and

- ² Eugene C. Lee, *The Politics of Nonpartisan-ship* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1960), Chapters 9 and 11.
- ⁴ Eugene C. Lee, "City Elections: A Statistical Profile," in *Municipal Year Book* (Chicago: International City Managers' Association, 1963), 74-84.
- ⁵ Robert R. Alford and Harry M. Scoble, "Political and Socioeconomic Characteristics of American Cities," in *Municipal Year Book* (Chicago: International City Managers' Association, 1965), p. 95. See also Leo F. Schnore and Robert R. Alford, "Forms of Government and Socioeconomic Characteristics of Suburbs," *Administrative Science Quarterly*, 8 (June, 1963), 1–17;

theoretical notions derived from these previous works are combined. The paper also draws upon two as yet unpublished studies, one of which included a factor analysis and multiple regression of these data.⁶

I. CONCEPTS AND DATA

The Meaning of Voting Turnout. Voting turnout in local elections is the most direct measure of participation in the electoral process, and possibly an indicator of other forms of political participation. We assume that a high level of voting turnout implies several things about the characteristics of the local electorate, although we do not have the data directly to test these assumptions.

For example, where there is a high level of voting turnout, one might assume there has been communication of political information to voters both about the particular election and about the political system of which elections form a part. This political information might be conveyed through a variety of reference groups-neighborhood groups, ethnic groups, political parties, voluntary associations-or through mass media such as television, radio and the press. Whether such political communication exists or not, either the community as a whole or particular groups within it possess norms which define voting as appropriate and proper behavior. Voting turnout is defined thus as the dependent variable, although it would be just as legitimate to turn the question around and attempt to determine the consequences of

and John Kessel, "Governmental Structure and Political Environment: A Statistical Note about American Cities," this REVIEW, 66 (September, 1962), 615-620. Robert L. Lineberry and Edmund P. Fowler present data at some variance with the above and suggest that there are not significant class differences between reformed and unreformed cities, although there is "some support for the argument that reformed cities are more homogeneous." However, as they suggest, varying samples may produce varying conclusions. In any event, the differences between these studies are not central to this analysis of voting participation. See their "Reformism and Public Policies in American Cities," this REVIEW, 61 (September, 1967), p. 706.

⁶ Ruth B. Dixon, "Predicting Voter Turnout in City Elections," unpublished M.A. thesis in Sociology, University of California, Berkeley, 1966; Ruth B. Dixon, "The Reform Movement in American City Government: Has Democracy Been Sacrificed to Efficiency?", unpublished paper, Department of Sociology, University of California, Berkeley, 1965.

higher versus lower levels of voting turnout. A few studies have dealt with this question, particularly with reference to referenda, finding that higher turnout is associated with negative voting. There is no necessary connection between the causes and the consequences of different levels of voting turnout, however.

Varying levels of voting turnout in American cities may also be a consequence of political organization at the local level. For example, the more activity there is of groups interested in electoral outcomes, the more activity of party or other organizations seeking to get out the vote or to mobilize support behind slates of candidates, the higher voting turnout may be. On the other hand, high turnout may occur because of norms encouraging vote turnout held by members of other groups in the community with very little activity of political organizations per se.

As the above assumptions indicate, we see voting turnout as linked to the political and social structure of the local community. It seems possible, however, that relationships of characteristics of a community with voting turnout may be cancelled out by idiosyncracies of a particular election: the personality of the mayor, the issues which happen to be salient at the moment, the accident of having a controversial referendum or bond issue on the ballot, whether or not the local election happens to be held at the same time as a particularly important state or national election. Unfortunately, comparative data are not available to test such "situational" factors influencing voting turnout, and we shall assume that the correlations that we discuss are only reduced by the operations of these situational factors, and not reversed.8 It seems plausible to infer

⁷ Maurice Pinard, "Structural Attachments and Political Support in Urban Politics: The Case of Fluoridation Referendums," American Journal of Sociology, 68 (March, 1963), p. 518. A similar study reported that in cities with high levels of citizen participation, associated with a well-educated population, the local government was frequently immobilized from making decisions on such issues as bond referenda and fluoridation controversies. Robert L. Crain and Donald B. Rosenthal, "Community Status as a Dimension of Local Decision-Making," American Sociological Review, 32 (December, 1967), 970-984.

s See Robert R. Alford, "The Comparative Study of Urban Politics," in Leo F. Schnore and Henry Fagin (eds.), *Urban Research and Policy Planning* (Beverly Hills: Sage Publications, 1967), 263-302, for an analytic scheme which distinguishes "situational" from "cultural" and

that if unique electoral issues and personalities account for most of the variation between cities in voting turnout, there should not be consistent associations between turnout and structural features of the local government and community. As indicated below, however, this is not the case, and relationships do exist. Given the nature of the data in the study, particularly the fact that they relate to only one election for each city, the fact that even modest relationships can be discovered on a national basis is significant.

Our perspective here is one which looks at a "population of elections," not a "population of individual voters," as V. O. Key put it. Correlatively, electorates are not merely "arithmetic sums of individuals," but rather "units playing special and significant roles in the political process and therefore worthy of analysis in their own right," in Austin Ranney's words.9 We are thus not inferring from our data on voting turnout anything about the characteristics of individual voters, nor do we invoke any social-psychological properties of individuals to explain our ecological correlations between characteristics of cities and the level of voting turnout. It would certainly be possible to develop propositions about the intervening processes of communication, definition of the political situation, and the formation of political identities in individuals and groups which connect structural features of American cities to the probability of high or low voting turnout, but these tasks are beyond our scope. We attempt, therefore, to avoid the pitfalls of "the ecological fallacy" (the generalization from group data to individuals) and "the

"structural" factors in explaining decisions, policies and roles of government in urban politics. Situational factors themselves have causes and may be patterned, of course, but, by definition, are not predictable from structural or cultural factors. Voting turnout figures for four Wisconsin cities in April and November elections from 1950 to 1964 ranged from 14 percent to 91 percent, which is partly explainable by situational factors. See Robert R. Alford, with the collaboration of Harry M. Scoble, Bureaucracy and Participation: Political Cultures in Four Wisconsin Cities (Chicago: Rand McNally, forthcoming), Chapter VII.

⁹ V. O. Key, Jr., "The Politically Relevant in Surveys," Public Opinion Quarterly, 24 (1960), 54-61; and Austin Ranney, "The Utility and Limitations of Aggregate Data in the Study of Electoral Behavior," in Ranney (ed.), Essays in the Behavioral Study of Politics (Urbana: University of Illinois Press, 1962), p. 99. contextual fallacy" (the prediction of group action from the characteristics of individuals). 10

The Data. It is essential to an understanding of the data reported below that the nature of the criginal turnout figures and the ambiguity of certain of the variables be clearly understood.

- (1) No national source either collects or reports local voting statistics; few states do so. The data utilized here were collected by the International City Managers' Association in late 1962 from approximately 80 percent of the nation's 729 cities above 25,000 population. The missing cities tended disproportionately to be partisan, mayor-council and Eastern, all characteristics noted below as being associated with high voting turnout.
- (2) For the bulk of the report, data are utilized only for those cities whose local election was not held concurrently with a state or national election, for we do not know for concurrent elections whether the turnout figures represent only the local increment—for example, the vote for mayor—or the vote in the larger race—for example, a vote for governor in 1962. Thus, a valid comparison of concurrent and nonconcurrent elections is impossible, and it is essential to use the narrower base, even though it reduces the number of cities to be analyzed by one-third.
- (5) An understatement of the mayor-council vote may result from the fact that in an undetermined (but quite small) number of such cities, only ward elections were held in 1961–62, which—in an unspecified (but even smaller) number of cities—involved only a portion of the city.
- (4) The data do not distinguish, either in mayor-council or manager cities, those elections in which a mayor appeared separately on the ballot from those in which he did not. The presence of the mayor on the ballot tends to increase voter turnout,¹² and the separately elected mayor is more likely to be found in mayor-council cities than in council-manager cities. Thus, the fact that in a small number of the mayor-council cities the mayor was not on the ballot in the election here reported tends to understate voter turnout in mayor-council cities, insofar as the impact of the mayor is concerned.
- (5) The data do not indicate whether the election reported was a run-off or a primary.

¹⁰ Crain and Rosenthal, op. cit., p. 984.

¹² The following table compares characteristics of American cities above 25,000 population in 1960 and the cities used in this study.

¹² Lee, "City Elections . . . ," op. cit., p. 81.

Characteristics	=	ties 1960		ties g Turnout	Nonconcurr	s with ent Elections
	No.	Percent	No.	Percent	No.	his Study Percent
Form of Government:					***************************************	
Mayor-Council	259	38%	130	30%	73	26%
Commission	77	11	37	9	30	11
Council-Manager	330	50	261 .	61	179	63
		100%		100%		100%
Form of Election:						
Partisan	193	29%	99	23%	50	18%
Nonpartisan	479	71	329	77	232	82
		${100\%}$		100%		100%
Region:		-				
East	164	24%	84	20%	43	15%
Midwest	190	28	122	29	67	24
South	191	28	118	28	95	34
Far West	131	19	104	24	77	27
		100%		100%		100%
Total	(676)	100%	(428)	100%	(282)	100%

See Table 1 for the states comprising each region. By 1962, when the voting data were obtained, there were 729 cities over 25,000 population.

(Approximately 20 percent of the nation's cities employ a run-off if no candidate receives a majority in the initial general election.) The consequences of this fact for turnout are not known. The local elections reported were held in 1961 and 1962, while the demographic data derive from the 1960 Census. Thus, as much as two years may have elapsed from the census to the election, so that changes in population characteristics in the intervening period are not reflected. Inasmuch as the voter-registration ratio is used as a measure of turnout, rather than the voter-adult population ratio, the impact of such changes is minimized insofar as the turnout percentages themselves are concerned. However, similar flaws exist with reference to the registration figures. States employ different laws, and cities and counties often administer the laws quite independently. Thus, the registration base in one city may be full of deadwood, another up-to-date, and the resulting percentage turnout figures be incomparable.

(6) Finally, the use of "partisan" and "non-partisan" as terms to describe the form of elections is a measure, not of the reality of political party activity, but merely of the form of ballot. While we assume that the existence of the party label on the ballot—the definition of

a partisan election generally employed—is associated with a higher degree of party activity than is the case in which the nonpartisan ballot is employed, we have no evidence to support the assumption. "As some formally partisan cities are nonpartisan in fact, so some formally nonpartisan cities are de facto partisan in varying degrees."13 Party activity may have a closer relationship to voter participation than the ballot form, but we have no way of assessing this on a comparative basis. Thus, we are forced to utilize a legal definition of partisan and nonpartisan elections, rather than an actual measure of partisan involvement. Similarly, the mayor-council form of government, associated with a separately elected mayor, includes mayors with widely varying powers and, theoretically, a wide range of impact upon the electorate and, indirectly, upon voter turnout. Again, however, we must employ a legal definition rather than a test of actual mayoral influence which might, in fact be more signifi-

¹³ Charles E. Gilbert and Christopher Clague, "Electoral Competition and Electoral Systems in Large Cities," *The Journal of Politics*, 24 (May, 1962), p. 330.

While none of these shortcomings appears crucial to us, they do suggest the tentative nature of both the data and the findings themselves, as well as the need for additional controls in subsequent studies.

Correlates of Voting Turnout. We shall consider three general categories of factors which may be related to the level of voting turnout in American cities: political structure, social structure, and community continuity. In addition, we shall include region as a separate category, although one of a totally different theoretical nature. The first two categories encompass a variety of possible specific factors related either to the institutions of government, party. and elections or to the demographic and group composition of the community. The third category is of a different order, referring to the development over time of interrelationships. contacts, or communications between different elements of political or social structure.

First, political structure. Institutions which allow greater access to political leaders and. theoretically, greater responsiveness to political demands should encourage higher levels of voting turnout. So, too, should the existence of institutions explicitly designed to mobilize the electorate. We shall follow the assumptions of the recent literature in taking the existence of mayor-council form of government14 and partisan elections as indicating a greater probability of responsiveness "to class, racial, and religious cleavages . . . the enduring conflicts of political life."15 We have already noted that earlier analysis of some of the data presented in this paper showed that the presence of the "reformist" institutions—council-manager government and nonpartisan elections—was associated with lower voting turnout.16 The causal direction of the relationship is difficult to infer, however, since the activity of groups which favor certain political forms may influence both political structures themselves and also the level of

¹⁴ We use "mayor-council" and "nonmanager" interchangeably, although the category includes some 30 commission cities, 10.6 percent of the total of nonmanager communities with nonconcurrent elections.

¹⁵ Lineberry and Fowler, op. cit., p. 715. This article provides a succinct summary of these hypotheses.

Lee, "City Elections...," op. cit., 74-84. Ecological data from Des Moines, Iowa, show a similar pattern; see Robert H. Salisbury and Gordon Blake, "Class and Party in Partisan and Non-Partisan Elections: The Case of Des Moines," this Review, 57 (September, 1963), 589-590.

turnout, or, on the other hand, once in existence, a political structure may be sufficiently inaccessible and unresponsive to discourage electoral participation.

Second, social structure. The existence in a community of groups which provide a social base for political organization would seem to be an important element of social structure which might be associated with voting turnout. Which elements or characteristics of population heterogeneity have an impact on turnout is an important theoretical question: we can only suggest a few possibilities, not all of which are testable with the data available. Religion, ethnicity, education, occupation, neighborhood, and race are obvious and standard bases of social differentiation in American communities. Yet it is not self-evident that variations in any or all of them should be systematically related to levels of voting turnout. at least as measured by aggregate and crude indicators such as those available for comparative studies. It may be, too, that variations in religious or ethnic composition expressed as a percentage of the total population are inadequate measures to relate to voting turnout. Very low or very high ethnicity, for example. may suggest little social cleavage and low turnout: figures between these two extremes, however, might reveal a divided community, high cleavage and high turnout. Only limited data exist on the numbers and social organization of religious or ethnic groups, or on the voluntary associations based on persons with similar occupation or education vis-a-vis aggregate data on their proportion in the electorate. We must, therefore, infer something about social structure from census data on the socioeconomic and ethnic composition of the commu-

We shall use the *ethnic* composition of a city, as measured by the proportion of foreign-born persons and persons of foreign or mixed parentage, and the educational composition of the city as our two indicators of social structure.

Arguments and some data on the persistence of ethnic voting are provided in several recent articles; the point is made that the political system is not merely a dependent variable, but that parties and candidates may continue to serve as a "mediator and mobilizer of minority symbols and interests." Although admittedly

¹⁷ Michael Parenti, "Ethnic Politics and the Persistence of Ethnic Identification," this Review, 61 (September, 1967), p. 717. An earlier statement of this thesis is found in Raymond E. Wolfinger, "Some Consequences of Ethnic Politics," in M. Kent Jennings and Harmon Ziegler

a very inadequate measure, the proportion of persons of foreign stock is closely related (r = .62) to the only indicator of religious composition of a city which is available from the census (the proportion of children in private schools), and we shall use the former as a more direct measure of the religious-ethnic characteristics of a city.

Education would seem to be associated with voting turnout, if the logic of the oft-reported individual correlation of education with political participation can be extended to the ecological or aggregate level.18 We might expect higher voting turnout in cities with a higher proportion of better-educated persons. Yet, such persons are often in a minority in a city, and therefore their behavior alone may not be able markedly to determine the absolute level of voting turnout. The opposite hypothesis also seems plausible: the higher the proportion of less well-educated persons and workers in a community, the higher the voting turnout, for these groups could form the social base for political movements likely to have a stake in influencing local leaders through elections. Here is a case which provides a direct test of alternative hypotheses suggested by an analytical framework which includes both individual level data and ecological level data.

Third, community continuity. The longer a community has existed, the more likely it is that there are groups, institutions and individuals with a stake in the city's political and governmental structures. Similarly, regardless of the age of the community, the more stable the population within the city, the greater the likelihood that such political attachments will exist. Thus, both the age of a city and the stability of its population would seem to have a probable relationship to voting turnout. We shall use two indicators to measure the continuity of the local social and political systems of American communities: the age of the city and the geographic mobility of its population. The age of the city, as measured by the decade in which the city reached 25,000 population, is a direct measure of the length of time that a

social and political organization has existed on a given territorial site. City age does not measure, however, the age of either form of government or form of elections, both of which may have been altered one or more times during the life of the city. Thus, only indirect statements may be made about the continuity of particular political institutions. Geographic mobility—as measured by the proportion of the population who moved to their present home from a different county between 1955 and 1960-is an indirect indication of the continuity of a given set of families and households in a community. Where such mobility is low, a high level of out-migration may or may not have taken place, and thus geographic mobility may not be a good measure of population change. However, for that very reason it is appropriate for our purposes. The "residue" of families left behind is the appropriate population which is attached or unattached to the electoral system. Conversely, a city which has experienced a high level of movement of its population from one county to another probably contains many residents who have lost their ties to social groups and political networks which have been their channels of communication of political stimuli.

Finally, region. It is difficult both conceptually and analytically to suggest or to test the notion that "region" has an independent relationship to voting turnout. As Lineberry and Fowler suggest, "region as a variable is an undifferentiated potpourri of socioeconomic, attitudinal, historical and cultural variations."19 Nevertheless, while not capable of adequate analysis in this study, the possibility remains that such factors as political tradition or culture—the previous existence of particular institutions, the impact of previous events, or the existence of particular value systems-may have a relationship to the character of the community and, thus, to voter participation.20 For example, our data do not permit us to measure the existence—past or present—of leaders or bosses, of citizen organizations and community controversies that may have an enduring impact upon patterns of community politics, including voting turnout, Such characteristics may not be randomly distributed throughout the country and may not be adcquately "explained" by normal demographic

⁽eds.), The Electoral Process (Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice-Hall, 1966). See also Raymond E. Wolfinger, "The Development and Persistence of Ethnic Voting," this Review, 59 (December, 1965), 896-908. Robert Lane has suggested that "the seat of ethnic politics is the local community, not the national capitol." See his Political Life (New York: The Free Press, 1959), p. 239.

¹⁸ See, for example, Lane, op. cit., p. 222; Boskoff and Ziegler, op. cit., p. 16: Milbrath, op. cit., p. 122.

¹⁹ Lineberry and Fowler, op. cit., p. 707.

²⁰ For an example of the use of "political culture" as a variable in categorizing American states, see Daniel J. Elazar, American Federalism: A View from the States (New York: Thomas Y. Crowell Company, 1966).

data. Thus, the oft-asserted likelihood that working-class Eastern and Midwestern cities are more likely to have political machines with a stake in controlling local elections and getting out the vote is not revealed by the data available in this broad national survey.21 Similarly, we cannot assess the possible impact, suggested by David Rogers, that many southern communities have an authoritarian and conservative value system, reflected in a rigid class structure and one-party politics, all of which would be likely to have an effect on voter participation.22 Nor are our data adequate for us to have confidence that the "independent effect" of region can be isolated. Nevertheless, the regional differences suggested below may well hide more important variables than those which are available from census data.

II. FINDINGS

Table 1 displays the correlations of the various indicators of social and political structure and community continuity with four different measures of voting turnout in American cities. In order to avoid the problem of variations in registration from city to city, both the proportion of registrants voting and of adults voting are shown. Also, because cities with elections which are concurrent with state or nation elections have higher turnout than those with nonconcurrent elections, cities are divided into those two categories. Thus, we have two independent replications based on two populations of cities.

All four general factors are associated with the level of voting turnout, regardless of whether the proportion of adults or registrants voting is considered, and regardless of whether the local election was concurrent or nonconcurrent. With regard to political structure, cities without the council-manager form and with partisan elections have higher voting turnout than cities with other forms. With respect to social structure, cities with highly ethnic populations and less well educated populations have higher voting turnout With respect to community continuity and region, cities with stable populations, which are older, and which are located in the East have higher voting turnout than cities with a high level of in-

²¹ We are indebted to Raymond Wolfinger for bringing this point to our attention.

²² David Rogers, "Community Political Systems: A Framework and Hypothesis for Comparative Studies," in Bert E. Swanson (ed.), Current Trends in Comparative Community Studies (Kansas City, Mo.: Community Studies, Inc., 1962), p. 39.

migration, which are younger, and which are located in the Far West or South.

The same general patterns are found if other related indicators are used, such as the percent of foreign born, the percent of persons with five years of education or less, the percent of college graduates, the percent of children in private school, or the decade in which the city reached 10,000 population. Nor do other dividing lines for regions alter the general relationships.

We shall present only the proportion of registrants voting in subsequent tables, because we are concerned with the factors which bring eligible voters to the polls, not with the factors which influence the possibility of registration. Analytically, the two bases are distinct in terms of their relevance for political processes, since it is possible for a city to have an extremely high proportion of registrants voting but a very low proportion of adults voting (particularly in the South), although not vice versa. The act of registration is of course, an important aspect of political participation.²³ In any event, the correlation between adults and registrants voting in this study is high (.81), and separate analysis of the data shows that the relationships described here would not be altered by the use of the "adult" base.

As noted above, we shall report further data only for those cities whose local election was not held concurrently with a state or national election. The correlation of concurrence with the proportions of registrants voting was .30, with adults voting .35. The mean voting turnout of adults in cities with concurrent elections was 43.5 percent, for nonconcurrent elections 31.2 percent, and the "advantage" of concurrent elections is maintained in every sub-group we examined. Concurrent elections are slightly more likely in the East, in cities with partisan elections and a mayor-council form of government, and in older cities, all characteristics themselves linked to higher voter turnout. But, as Table 1 shows, the association does not account for the correlations of these other characteristics with voter turnout. While not included here, all subsequent tables shown were also separately computed for cities with concurrent elections, and the same patterns of relationships hold.

Political Structures and Voting Turnout. Table 2 attempts to assess the independent influence of political structural characteristics upon the level of voting turnout. The table

²³ Stanley Kelley, Jr., Richard E. Ayres and William G. Bowen, "Registration and Voting: Putting First Things First," this *Review*, 61 (June, 1967), 359-379.

TABLE 1. CORRELATES OF LOCAL VOTING TURNOUT IN AMERICAN CITIES, 1961-62*
(Cities over 25,000 population in 1960)

`,		Correlat	ions with:	
	Registran	ts Voting	Adults V	Voting
Cities Characteristic With:	Nonconcurrent Elections	Concurrent Elections	Nonconcurrent Elections	Concurrent Elections
Political Structure				
${\it Non-council-manager}$ vs.	•			
council-manager	.43	.34	.50	.35
Partisan vs. nonpartisan				
elections	.28	.43	.29	.38
Social Structure				
Ethnicity: Percent of the pop	u-	•		
lation native of foreign or mixe	ed		•	
parentage, 1960	.32	.36	.51	.49
Education: Percent of person	n s			
25 years old and over who com				
pleted four years of high school				
or more, 1960	28	16	15	22
Community				
Mobility: Percent migrant t	50			
a different county, 1955-60	32	32	40	49
Age of City: Decade in which	h			
the city reached 25,000 popular		.27	.28	.23
tion	·	•		
Regional Location				
East	.39	.58	.45	.51
Midwest	.04	13	.21	.02
South	15	29	44	45
Far West	19	25	10	20
Mean Registrants Voting	46.9%	59.0%		
Mean Adults Voting		, ,	31.2%	43.5%
N =	(282)	(142)	(294)	(146)

^{*} Entries are product-moment correlations of the actual percentages of registrants voting or adults voting in the last local election held in the given city. Cities in which the local election was held concurrently with a state or national election are separated from those in which it was not concurrent. The N's shown are approximate for a few correlations, since not all data were available on political structure. The direction of the correlation is indicated by the italicized word. The two political structure variables and regional location were treated as dummy variables (presence or absence of the attribute named) for the correlations. All other correlations were computed from the actual percentages. Data on political structure were obtained from the Municipal Year Book, 1963, and all other data are from the 1960 U. S. Census of Population. The correlations are not significantly altered if commission cities are grouped with manager cities for the purpose of constructing a mayor-council/nonmayor-council dummy variable.

States comprising the indicated regions are as follows:

East: Maine, New Hampshire, Vermont, Massachusetts, Connecticut, Rhode Island, New York, New Jersey, Pennsylvania, Maryland, Delaware, District of Columbia.

Midwest: Ohio, Indiana, Illinois, Michigan, Wisconsin, Minnesota, Iowa, North Dakota, South Dakota, Nebraska.

Far West: California, Oregon, Washington, Nevada, Alaska, Hawaii, Montana, Idaho, Colorado, Utah, Wyoming, Arizona, New Mexico.

South (and Border): Texas, Oklahoma, Kansas, Missouri, Arkansas, Louisiana, Alabama, Mississippi, Florida, Georgia, North Carolina, South Carolina, Virginia, West Virginia, Kentucky, Tennessee.

TABLE 2. CORRELATES OF REGISTRANTS VOTING WITH POLITICAL STRUCTURES CONTROLLING FOR SOCIAL STRUCTURE, COMMUNITY CONTINUITY, AND REGION*

(Cities with Nonconcurrent Local Elections)

Characteristic			Controlling and Comm				Correlation within Region				
			Education	Mobility	Age of City	East	Midwest	South	Far West	Cities	
Nonmanager v manager for government		.38	.37	.34	.38	.40	.38	.28	.30	.43	
Partisan vs. no elections	on-partisan N =	.27 (279)	.25 (279)	.23 (279)	.25 (279)	.14 (43)	.40 (67)	. 27 (95)	01 (77)	.28	

^{*} See Table 1 for the states comprising each region and the measures of each variable. Entries are product-moment correlates of the percentage of registrants voting with the two characteristics of political structure indicated. Entries under "Social Structure and Community Continuity" are partial correlations, controlling for each of the variables indicated. The direction of the correlation is indicated by the italicized word.

shows that the overall correlations of political structure and voting turnout remain while controlling for each demographic characteristic and the four regions, although the magnitudes change. (The single disappearance of the association occurs for form of election in the Far West; in that region only 6 or the 77 cities with nonconcurrent elections also had partisan elections.) We may summarize Table 2 simply by noting that both aspects of political structure—the form of government and the form of elections—are related to the proportions of registrants voting, even when important characteristics of social structure and region are held constant.

The correlations suggest that form of government has a stronger relationship to turnout than form of elections. In an attempt to assess this more adequately, Table 3 examines each structural variable, holding the other constant. Form of government does have a more signifi-

cant relationship to turnout than form of election. The election of a mayor (which occurred in 77 percent of the mayor-council cities in the nonconcurrent elections covered by this study) may be a stronger motivating force in relation to turnout than the existence of the partisan ballot. The latter is much more ambiguous in terms of its practical meaning; a partisan ballot, as we have noted, may mask a wide range of party activity, ranging from the total absence of political party organization to total mobilization. Thus, it is not surprising that the more clear-cut variable demonstrates a clearer relationship.

These findings are consistent with those reported by Ruth Dixon, utilizing the same base data as in this study. Analyzing all cities, regardless of the concurrency of the election, she reported a correlation of —.48 between councilmanager form of government and percent of adults voting and —.38 between adult turnout

TABLE 3. THE CORRELATION OF REGISTRANTS VOTING WITH EACH ELEMENT OF POLITICAL STRUCTURE*

(Cities with Nonconcurrent Elections)

Characteristic	0012	ion within f Election	Correlation within Form of Government		
	Partisan	Nonpartisan	Nonmanager	Manager	
Nonmanager vs. manager form of government Partisan vs. nonpartisan	.45	.36		-	
elections N =	<u> </u>	(232)	.24 (103)	.11 (179)	

^{*} Entries are product-moment correlates of the percentage of registrants voting with each aspect of political structure, controlling for the other. The direction of the correlation is indicated by the italicized word.

TABLE 4. CORRELATES OF REGISTRANTS VOTING AND SOCIAL STRUCTURE, CONTROLLING FOR POLITICAL STRUCTURE AND REGION*

(Cities with Nonconcurrent Local Elections)

		Correlati	on within						
Charac-		m of nment		m of	Con	rrelation w	ithin R	egion	All
teristic	Non- man- ager	Man- ager	Par- tisan	Non- par- tisan	East	Midwest	South	Far West	Cities
Ethnicity Education N =	.38 23 (103)	.15 15 (179)	.26 43 (50)	.33 20 (232)	.29 32 (43)	.09 33 (67)	.21 19 (95)	06 03 (77)	.32 28 (282)

^{*} Entries are product-moment correlations of the actual percentages for each city. States comprising the regions are given in Table 1 with the measures of ethnicity and education.

and the nonpartisan ballot. Furthermore, in a multiple-correlation regression including eight political variables, form of government accounted for 22 percent of the variance in turnout, concurrency of election for an additional 11 percent, type of election for 3 percent and form of registration for 2 percent. The author notes Lord Bryce's suggestion that "the most important single factor in affecting turnout is the color and appeal of the candidates," and goes on to state that "the predictive power of these governmental variables is considerable in view of the multitude of factors that are brought into play in influencing citizens to vote." ²²⁴

Social Structures and Voting Turnout. Table 4 shows the correlates of measures of ethnicity and of educational level with the voting turnout of registered persons in cities with non-concurrent elections. Although several of the correlations are very weak, cities with more highly ethnic or less well-educated populations generally have higher levels of voting turnout, regardless of form of government and elections and in each of the four regions. (Again, the Far West does not have many cities with a highly "ethnic" population.)

In noting the relationship between ethnic populations and the existence of mayor-council form of government, Kessel had suggested that the foreign-born "would be especially dependent on political activity because of its exclusion from alternative agencies of community integration." Although our data are not strictly comparable, the parallel existence of a

relationship between ethnicity and turnout would seem to support Kessel's assumptions.

However, the findings relating education to turnout appear to fly in the face of accepted conventional wisdom. If voting turnout reflects an "adding up" of the predispositions of individuals in cities to participate in politics, then we would expect that education would be closely correlated with voting turnout. This is not the case. Although not high, the ecological or aggregate correlation of registrants voting with education is the opposite of the well-known individual correlation.²⁶ (Use of other measures of education does not alter this generalization.)

Voting turnout (registrants voting) is thus inversely correlated with the educational level of a city. We conclude that high educational level of the city as a whole either has no effect or reduces the level of voting turnout. Although better-educated individuals may indeed vote more frequently than less-educated individuals, less well-educated communities vote more (or at least not less) than well-educated communities. We leave for further study the question of whether the relationship between education and voter turnout is curvilinear, a question

²⁶ It should be noted that while these correlations are based upon measures of education as a continuous variable, the measure itself is not continuous for a given city, but rather a single proportion of persons who have achieved a given level of education. See Robert R. Alford and Harry M. Scoble, "Sources of Local Political Involvement," this Review (forthcoming) for an analysis of the relative importance of a variety of factors, including education, for political involvement.

²⁴ Dixon, "The Reform Movement...," op. cit.

²⁵ Kessel, op. cit., p. 617.

TABLE 5. CORRELATES OF REGISTRANTS VOTING AND INDICATORS OF COMMUNITY CONTINUITY, CONTROLLING FOR POLITICAL STRUCTURE AND REGIONS*

		Correlation within Political Structure				Correlation within Region				
Characteristic		Fori Govern		Form of Elections		East	Mid- west	South	Far West	All Cities
		Non- manager	Man- ager	Par- tisan	Nonpar- tisan					
Mobility Age of City		23 .11	16 .24	41 .22	26 .24	49 .15	47 .18	03 .03	06 .34	32 .27
6	N =		(179)	(50)	(232)	(43)	(67)	(95)	(77)	(282)

^{*} Entries are product-moment correlations of the actual percentages for each city. States comprising the regions are given in Table 1 with the measures of mobility and city age. The direction of the correlation is in terms of the cge of the city; thus, the earlier the city reached 25,000 population, the higher the turnout.

unanswered by the existence of the single correlation. It may well be that turnout is lowest at either end of the aggregate educational scale but proportionally higher in communities falling between these two extremes.

Community Continuity and Voting Turnout. Table 5 shows the correlates of the age of the city and the geographic mobility of its population with voting turnout, holding form of political structure and region constant. The older the city and the less mobile its population, the lower the voting turncut, regardless of either form of government or form of election.

Mobility remains highly correlated with voting turnout in the East and Midwest, but drops to nothing in the South and Far West. The age of the city, however, is not correlated with voting turnout in any region except the Far West.

Such findings do not necessarily mean that these factors have no influence in those regions, but rather that we must reconceptualize their relationships to each other and to voting turnout. Community continuity does not appear to be a "factor" influencing voting turnout in the same way as contemporary features of the social and political structure of the city, but rather—we suggest—indicates a greater probability that stable communication networks linking social and political groups to political leaders in a community may have developed. Also, sets of norms encouraging political participation may have developed as a consequence of the existence of networks of access to and influence upon political leaders. These, in turn, may bear some relationship to voting turnout, but a relationship too complex to be revealed by the gross data here employed.

The above findings concerning the positive relationship of mobility and ethnicity and the negative relationship of education to voter turnout are corroborated in a separate study by Dixon. Using multiple-correlation regression involving clusters of related demographic factors, she concluded that "the single most important factor to be considered in predicting the voter turnout of a city is the residential mobility pattern of its inhabitants, which alone can account for 31 percent of the variability in turnout. Knowing the ethnic composition of the city increases the power of prediction an additional 19 percent . . . [while] the factors 'age composition,' 'social status' [which included education as a variable, 'employment stability' and 'city size' contribute little or no information about whether a city has high or low turnout in local election."27

Region. The regional location of a city is associated with a wide variety of political and social characteristics, as Table 6 shows, and many of these characteristics are also associated with voting turnout. Eastern cities are older, have more out-migration and little inmigration, and have more persons native of foreign-born parentage. In addition, they are more likely to have partisan elections and less likely to have the council-manager form of government. Western cities are at the other extreme in all of these characteristics. Thus, it is no surprise to find that important differences exist among regions with respect to voter turnout, as has been suggested in tables presented above. The distinction is most apparent in a

²⁷ Dixon, "Predicting Voter Turnout . . . ," op. cit., 50-52.

TABLE 6. CORRELATIONS OF REGIONAL LOCATION OF A CITY AND SELECTED CHARACTERISTICS RELATED TO VOTING TURNOUT*

		Reg	ion		
Characteristic	East	Midwest	South	Far West	
Political Structure			article consideration of the second consideration of the s		
Council-manager form vs. non-					
council-manager form	29	33	.23	.32	
Nonpartisan vs. partisan	13	20	.13	.18	
Social Structure					
Ethnicity	. 56	.14	60	.06	
Education	23	.03	21	.41	
Community Continuity					
Mobility	34	22	.17	.32	
Age of City	.29	.12	10	26	
Mean registrants voting	64%	48%	43%	41%	
Mean adults voting	49%	37%	23%	30%	
N ==	(43)	(67)	(95)	(77)	

^{*} Note that the table does not present correlates relating the characteristics to turnout, but shows the relationship of the characteristics to region. Entries are product-moment correlations of each variable listed with the regional location of a city, treated for computation purposes as four different dummy variables. Thus, "East"-"Not East" is a "variable" for purposes of computation of the correlations. See Table 1 for the states comprising the regions and the measures. The total number of cases is 282

comparison of Eastern and Far Western cities. Eastern location is positively correlated with all the variables associated with high turnout. Eastern cities have a mean turnout figure of 64.0 percent, compared to but 41.2 percent in the Far West. Nevertheless, the table also reveals once again the difficulty of dealing theoretically and analytically with region as an independent variable. Since we are unable to control for other than a very limited number of these variations, we only note the regional characteristics but offer little by way of explanation other than our previous reference to the possible existence of such factors as political tradition and culture.

Socio-Political Structures, Historical Continuity, Region and Voting Turnout. In the pages above, relationships of varying strength have been noted between form of government, form of elections, ethnicity, education, and mobility and voting turnout. Age of city was seen to have little relationship independent of other characteristics, while region did seem associated with turnout but presented both theoretical and analytical problems which could not be resolved by the data here available. In the tables to follow, we review some of the above findings by the use of other data, in this case the mean turnout in various categories and sub-categories of cities. (The substitution of

median for mean does not alter the results; the two have a correlation of .97.) The demographic variables previously utilized are dichotomized above and below the median value for all cities in the United States, in order to develop a primitive typology of cities along the dimensions we have distinguished.

In Table 7, the average voting turnout is shown for cities classified simultaneously by form of government, form of elections, and the four demographic variables. In every comparison, the relationships appear as predicted. Holding all other variables constant, both partisan elections and non-manager (typically mayor-council) government show a higher turnout than nonpartisan elections and manager government. Similarly, again paralleling the results indicated above, the average turnout among cities with high ethnicity, low education and low mobility is higher (with one minor exception) than among cities with reverse characteristics. Older cities, regardless of their form of government or election, are more likely to have higher voting turnout than younger cities, although the mean differences are not as great as for the political structural characteristics.

Table 8 presents average turnout data by form of government and form of elections, classified according to region. As indicated

TABLE 7. MEAN PERCENT OF REGISTRANTS VOTING, BY SOCIAL STRUCTURE AND POLITICAL STRUCTURE*

(Cities with Nonconcurrent Local Elections) % and (N)

]	Partisan		No	npartisa n			All Cities	•
Characteristic	Non- manager	Menager	AII	Non- manager	Manager	All	Non- manager	Manager	A11
Ethnicity High	65 (19)	45 (9)	58 (23)	58 (44)	42 (57)	49 (101)	60 (63)	42 (66)	51 (129)
Low	62 (15)	49 (7)	58 (22)	48 (25)	40 (106)	41 (131)	53 (40)	40 (113)	44 (153)
Education High	59 (10)	45 (10)	52 (20)	53 (42)	39 (110)	43 (152)	54 (52)	39 (120)	44 (172)
Low	66 (24)	50 (6)	62 (30)	57 (27)	44 (53)	48 (80)	61 (51)	44 (59)	52 (110)
Mobility High	60 (10)	40 (10)	50 (20)	52 (26)	39 (122)	41 (148)	54 (36)	39 (132)	42 (168)
Low	65 (24)	58 (6)	64 (30)	56 (43)	44 (41)	50 (84)	59 (67)	46 (47)	54 (114)
Age of City Old	66 (21)	47 (10)	60 (31)	57 (41)	43 (63)	49 (104)	60 (62)	44 (73)	51 (135)
Youn	g 60 (13)	45 (6)	55 (19)	51 (28)	38 (100)	41 (128)	54 (41)	39 (106)	43 (147)
All Cities	64 (34)	47 (16)	58 (50)	55 (69)	40 (163)	44 (232)	57 (103)	41 (179)	282

^{* 1. &}quot;Low ethnicity" means that there were less than 15 percent of persons in the city native of foreign-born or mixed parentage in 1960. "High ethnicity" more than 15 percent. This figure is the median for all 676 cities in the United States over 25,000 population in 1960.

above, region is itself related to various demographic characteristics themselves associated with turnout; multivariate analysis is thus handicapped by the small size of the frequencies in many of the sub-categories. Again, partisan non-manager cities tend to command a larger turnout than non-partisan and manager cities. However, the impact of other variables hidden under the "region" label is similarly inindicated. In the East, for example, the average turnout in nonpartisan non-manager cities is higher than in partisan mayor-council cities. Whether this reflects the impact of form of government—for example, the possibility that the office of mayor "means" more in the East

than in other parts of the country—or the association of these cities with demographic variables associated with turnout, or a number of other possibilities, cannot be determined with any degree of confidence from these data. Similarly, in the Far West, average turnout in nonpartisan-manager cities is the same as that in the very small number of partisan-manager cities, in contrast to the general pattern. Here, the ambiguous nature of "partisan" as well as "region" is evidenced, as well as the difficulty of generalizing from the very small number of deviant cases. It may well be that partisanship is lacking in those few Western cities, ballot form notwithstanding, that there is a "spill-

TABLE 8. MEAN PERCENT OF REGISTRANTS VOTING, BY REGION AND POLITICAL STRUCTURE*
(Cities with Nonconcurrent Elections) % and (N)

Region		Partisan			Nonpart	isan	All Cities			
	Non- manager	Man- ager	All	Non- manager	Man- ager	All	Non- manager	Man- ager	All	
East	66 (11)	— (1)	67 (12)	69 (19)	54 (12)	63 (31)	68 (30)	56 (13)	64 (43)	
Midwest	61 (16)	53 (5)	59 (21)	49 (28)	35 (18)	43 (46)	53 (44)	39 (23)	48 (67)	
Far West	(1)	39 (5)	40 (6)	56 (7)	40 (64)	41 (71)	55 (8)	40 (69)	41 (77)	
South	69 (6)	43 (5)	57 (11)	47 (15)	40 (69)	41 (84)	53 (21)	40 (74)	43 (95)	
Total	64 (34)	47 (16)	58 (50)	55 (69)	40 (163)	44 (232)	57 (103)	41 (179)	47 (282)	

^{*} See Table 1 for states comprising the regions.

^{2.} Educational level was dichotomized, with "Low education" comprising cities which had 43 percent or less persons 25 years or more who had completed high school in 1960.

^{3.} Mobility was dichotomized with "Low mobility" comprising cities which had 15 percent or less persons 5 years and over who were migrant from a different county between 1955 and 1960, "high mobility" those cities with more than 15 percent migration.

^{4.} Cities which reached 25,000 population by the census of 1930 are classified as "Older," those in the censuses of 1940 to 1960 as "Younger."

TABLE 9. MEAN PERCENT OF REGISTRANTS VOTING, BY REGION AND SOCIAL STRUCTURE*

(Cities with Nonconcurrent Elections) % and (N)

Region	Ethn	icity	Educ	ation	Mob	ilit y	Age of	City	All Cities
Region	High	Low	High	Low	High	Low	Old	Young	
East	64 (41)	(2)	56 (17)	69 (26)	52 (9)	67 (34)	66 (31)	60 (12)	64 (43)
Midwest	48 (40)	49 (27)	45 (41)	53 (26)	41 (25)	53 (42)	52 (39)	43 (28)	48 (67)
South	53 (10)	42 (85)	41 (45)	45 (50)	43 (70)	43 (25)	42 (45)	43 (50)	43 (95)
West	40 (38)	43 (39)	41 (69)	39 (8)	41 (64)	41 (13)	48 (20)	39 (57)	41 (77)
Total	51 (129)	44 (153)	44 (172)	52 (110)	42 (168)	54 (114)	51 (135)	43 (147)	47 (282)

^{*} See Table 7 for explanation of demographic categories, Table 1 for stages comprising the regions and the other measures.

over" effect from the prevailing nonpartisan policy of the area. Again, the data utilized here do not permit an evaluation of these important distinctions.

In Table 9, demographic and regional variables are examined simultaneously. Again, the mean turnout figures reported for the nation as a whole are consistent with the findings already noted: older cities with high ethnicity, low education, and low mobility show higher turnout than cities with the opposite characteristics. However, the relationships are reduced sharply and sometimes reversed when region is controlled. The tendency of Eastern cities to have a higher turnout, even when demographic characteristics are held constant, suggests again that the history and traditions of a region, its political culture, in short, may be as important variables as those which we have been able to utilize in this exercise. Our gross data do not allow a more extensive exploration of the links between the political and social structure of cities and their origins and development within a particular region.

In sum, the tables utilizing mean turnout data are generally consistent with the findings based on correlations. The fact that these two approaches yield much the same results gives confidence in our conclusion that, regardless of the vulnerability of the data and the generally modest nature of the relationships, there is an association between voter turnout and the variables utilized. Cities with partisan elections. mayor-council (or nonmanager) government, high ethnicity, low education, low mobility, and Eastern location tend to have a higher voting turnout than cities with nonpartisan elections, council-manager government, low ethnicity, high education, high mobility and Far Western location.

III. CONCLUSIONS

Voting turnout is generally higher in cities with either or both "unreformed" political structures and more explicit class or ethnic cleavages. Voting turnout is higher, not lower. in cities with less well educated populations, perhaps because in those cities political cleavages based on economic interests are more explicit and visible than in middle-class suburbs or other communities likely to have high proportions of college-educated persons. Cities with more stable populations also have higher levels of voting turnout, possible because of the greater likelihood of integration of the different elements of social and political structure. Whether or not there are direct links of community continuity—as represented by population stability—and stages of development to accessible and responsive political structures and to the existence and organization of social cleavages is a question we cannot answer from our own data. However, some evidence on the matter of integration can be inferred from a recent study.

Lineberry and Fowler found that cities with "reformed" political structures were less likely to be responsive to cleavages in their population than unreformed cities. Specifically, they found that there were higher correlations of ethnicity and religion (as measured indirectly by private school attendance) with taxation and expenditures in cities with the mayorcouncil form of government and partisan or ward elections. They suggest that reformed cities have "removed" the influence of party as a mechanism for aggregating interests, and therefore they expected that the "effects" of social composition would be seen more clearly in unreformed cities. In brief, they suggest that the political structures of unreformed cities are likely to be more integrated with their social structures than those of reformed cities and that "the electoral institutions of reformed governments make public policy less responsive to the demands arising out of social conflicts in the population."28 The fact that voting turnout tends to relate independently and posi-

²⁸ Lineberry and Fowler, op. cit., p. 716.

tively both to "unreformed" political institutions and to characteristics of community clevage is consistent with Lineberry and Fowler's conclusions.

With respect to partisanship, it comes as no surprise to find that in the absence of the political party label on the ballot and the assumed reduced likelihood of party organization and activity, voter turnout is generally less. Although there are many advocates of nonpartisanship who would espouse the thesis that local citizen participation should be just as great without the "artificial" injection of partisan politics, the fact remains that the party remains an agent of political mobilization, both symbolically and practically. To some, this is unfortunate. Richard Childs, perhaps the leading exponent of nonpartisanship and one of its "founding fathers" takes the view that "In partisan local elections, two prominent national party organizations consider it their noble duty to combat the other organization, disparage its achievements, advance rival candidates, and the 'outs' consider it necessary to oust the 'ins,' no matter how good a record the 'ins' may have been making. No matter how meaningless the contest for office may be in a given year, both forces must be marshalled for a fight. But what good is that, even if it does bring out a high percentage of the adult population to the polls?"29

Regardless of the various merits of non-partisan elections, and there are many,³⁰ Childs' view overlooks the fact that elections and participation in the electoral process are not just a means to an end—the election of qualified citizens to public office—but an end in themselves. In fact, one may well ask in 1968 whether a high rate of participation in local elections and the possible reduction of a sense of alienation of many citizens from their community would not more than offset the possible loss of an outstanding candidate.

Insofar as relatively greater turnout in nonmanager cities is concerned, both the theoretical and analytical questions are more elusive. The separate election of the mayor would seem to be the prime factor distinguishing manager and mayor-council cities (although there are some manager cities with a separately elected mayor and some mayor-council cities with an appointed mayor). Yet mayors have a wide range of roles in American cities, ranging from figure-head to strong executive; it would seem that these varying roles and the public's response to them would bear a direct relation to voter interest and turnout, but our data provide no assistance to assess such relationships. Nor do we have data, other than these gross turnout figures, to assess the importance of a separately elected chief executive to the community. Does the existence of an election for mayor serve to increase a citizen's attachment to and interest in the political life of the community? Does the personalization of politics around a contest between two individuals, so familiar at the state and national levels, serve in some sense as a bridge between the citizen and his government? We can only hint at the host of the social-psychological questions which the existence or non-existence of a contest for mayor may suggest.

An alternative, but not mutually exclusive, explanation is that electoral politics is simply regarded as less important in council-manager cities than in nonmanager communities. Council-manager theory notwithstanding, it may well be that the citizen feels that the manager has, in fact, reduced the scope of authority and responsibility of the city's elected officials. The manager hires and fires the department heads; the manager submits the budget and, in so doing, resolves many of the basic resource allocation policies before the council ever sees the document. Such matters may well fall on the administration side of the ancient administration-policy dichotomy, but they represent in many citizens' minds the stuff of city government and politics. Their removal, rightly or wrongly, from the overt political scene may be one explanation of the apparent relationship of the council-manager form to lower voter turnout. In a similar fashion, it could well be that the result of the manager plan and an effective manager is to so "manage" conflict and issues that they do not become political and, eventually, electoral issues. A resulting depressant effect on voter attention and participation would be a likely by-product.

In general, relatively high levels of voting turnout are probably the result of the combined influences of sustained and continuous political organization of parties, wards, neighborhoods, voluntary associations with local political concerns, and simply traditional behavior by social groups which does not require the mobilizing influence of political organization. Where there is high turnout without high activity of parties and interest groups, votes may be "available" for manipulation by political elites, because in such cities individuals

²⁹ Letter to one of the authors dated January 29, 1964.

³⁰ Lee, The Politics of Nonpartisanship, op. cit., Chapter 11.

vote because of their party identification and not their involvement in political organizations. Where there is a high level of activity of political organizations without high turnout, on the other hand, we might expect that the lack of electoral sanctions would result in a high level of competition and conflict between the relatively better-educated leaders of the active organizations.

Paradoxically, voting turnout may not necessarily be a good index of the politicization of the electorate. Voting may be a form of traditional behavior produced by membership in ethnic and other groups which have a certain party identification as part of their group identity. In such cases, a high vote turnout need not mean high issue consciousness or a high level of political conflict. Conversely, voting turnout may be low without denying the possibility of a high level of conflict and concern with issues among the minority of voters who have a high level of political interest.

Thus, it is possible that a high level of action on such policies as urban renewal and poverty programs may be found in cities with low conflict and issue-concern but high voting turnout, precisely because votes can be delivered by political leaders, and bargains and negotiations between local leaders and state and national leaders are possible. A highly active community may have so much conflict that activity leads to stalemate, because leaders are not able to mobilize clear majorities or count on the passive acquiescence of majorities. This argument is consistent with that of Crain and Rosenthal concerning the impact of high levels of education upon participation, conflict and stalemate in fluoridation and other decisions. Although they noted exceptions at the highest educational level, they argued that high-status cities, precisely because they have citizens ready and able to participate in politics, will be less likely to be able to innovate new community programs and less able to make decisions because of higher levels of conflict which lead to stalemate.31 The authors examined data on various types of community decisions—urban renewal, fluoridation, school desegregation, and others-which are related to the educational level of the population in the cities, and found that by and large the cities with bettereducated populations have been less likely to undertake such programs.

Unfortunately, they did not have data on the key intervening variable in their theoretical proposition: political participation. Our data indicate that, in fact, cities with higher levels of education among the population are less likely to have high voting turnout than cities with low levels of education. This finding casts doubt upon the plausible assumption that political participation at the level of the city as a whole has the same relationship to education that it does at the individual level. But if, in fact, there is less political participation in cities with high levels of education, this explanation of differences in decision-making processes cannot rest upon a presumed correlation between education and participation.

As suggested, the answer may partly rest on the possibility that voting turnout may be a poor indicator of other forms of the political activity of groups in cities. Groups composed of better-educated persons may have other channels through which to influence policy than mere voting turnout. Effective political participation by such groups might tend to resolve issues before they become relevant to a campaign and election. In any event, our findings about relatively low turnout in bettereducated cities do at least raise questions about the assumption that correlations at the individual level can be casually extended to the level of community social organization. Crain and Rosenthal make the same methodological point in a different substantive context, suggesting that the greater likelihood of better-educated persons to accept innovation may not be true when the same factors are measured at the community "ecological" level.32

An investigation of the individual correlations of education and political participation in cities with different demographic and economic characteristics is clearly called for. It may well be true—and we suspect—that in all cities, the better educated are more likely to vote than the less well-educated, despite the higher overall levels of voting turnout in less well-educated cities. In high turnout cities, for example, the better-educated stratum in those cities may respond to the political mobili ization of the ethnic less-educated majorities by even higher political participation than the majority social groups themselves exhibit. Nor would one expect that in middle-class, bettereducated, Far West cities with low vote turnout, there would necessarily be any counterresponse by the less well-educated elements in those cities to participate at higher levels. The very fact of the recent migration of less well-

³¹ Crain and Rosenthal, op. cit., 970-984.

educated persons to Western cities should serve to break their ties to the local ethnic neighborhood organizations or other community groups which sustained high voting participation in the Eastern cities from which they came. Thus, a plausible case can be made for expecting the "normal" pattern of individual correlation between education and political participation in both types of cities. It would be possible to compute possible ranges of variations of the individual-level correlations, given certain marginal distributions of educational composition and voting turnout levels in cities, but that problem is beyond our present scope.

A final word on the implications of our data for the controversy over local political subcultures. The operations and functions of a political "ethos" or political culture at the local level may be best understood through a historical perspective of the continuity of social and political structures and the norms of behavior which they enforce, rather than through the current attitudes of social groups in a community. We have noted the difference in direction of the correlation between education and voting turncut at the city and individual levels. This may indicate that the consequences of structural features of a political system, derived in turn from its history, may be visible in collective patterns of political behavior, such as partisan strength, levels of voting turnout, or referenda outcomes, but not at all visible in correlations of political attitudes with individual characteristics.

Banfield and Wilson's original article33 used ecological data on ethnic and class composition of tracts, in relation to referenda voting, which we would regard as appropriate kinds of data for inferences to collective processes, but their theoretical framework was based upon assumptions about individual behavior, not necessary to and even possibly misleading about the actual causal processes involved. Wolfinger and Field questioned that certain ethnic groups hold "private-regarding" or "public-regarding" values, and therefore favor certain political structures in their community. They noted that when region was controlled, the correlations between ethnicity and various aspects of political structure and governmental functions presumed to be precicted by the "ethos" hypothesis vanished. And they suggested that

⁸³ James Q. Wilson and Edward C. Banfield, "Public-Regardingness as a Value Premise in Voting Behavior," this Review, 58 (December, 1964), 876-887.

regional variations in the age of cities may explain more than the "ethos" of groups residing in cities. As they put it, "regional variations may reflect to some extent interaction between cities' natural histories and prevailing political enthusiasms at crucial periods in those histories."34 Our data indicating significant regional differences, particularly the tendency of Eastern cities to have relatively high voting turnout regardless of form of government. method of balloting and social characteristics is consistent with this view. Whereas region may not be a useful analytical tool, as such, the variations among regions suggest the need to introduce into the conceptual framework and research design a recognition of such phenomena as Wolfinger and Field describe.

The regional or even the state location of a city may not be sufficient to identify its political culture accurately. Samuel C. Patterson has recently suggested that while there may be interstate variations in basic political orientations, there are also important variations within states. A few studies have analyzed this topic.³⁵

We have suggested that there is likely to be variation in community political systems linked to the regional location of the city, its age, and the extent of out-migration or inmigration. Sheer length of existence, as well as the proportion of the population which has lived in the city for a long or a short time, would seem to be plausibly related to the degree to which there is historical continuity of leadership patterns and policy-making patterns in a city. Again, these are indirect indicators, because, for example, some cities may have experienced what amounts to a revolution in leadership continuity in certain periods of

³⁴ Raymond E. Wolfinger and John Osgood Field, "Political Ethos and the Structure of City Government," this Review, 60 (June, 1966), p. 326. While we take full note of the Wolfinger-Field vs. Banfield-Wilson controversy as to the use and abuse of "ethos," we make no attempt here to enter into their discussion as to what the latter pair said or implied in City Politics. The issue is discussed in letters to the editor of each pair in the December, 1966, issue of this Review. See "Communications," 998–1000.

³⁵ Samuel C. Patterson, "The Political Cultures of the American States," The Journal of Politics, 30 (February, 1968), 204–207; Alford, with the collaboration of Harry M. Scoble, op. cit., and Oliver P. Williams and Charles R. Adrian, Four Cities (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press. 1963).

their history. But we hypothesize that our indicators would correlate with more direct measures of continuity of leadership and policymaking.

Over a period of years, we suggest, communication networks between social groups and political leaders develop which have some continuity, although incumbents may change.

Political roles and institutionalized locations for those roles develop which are linked to the historical success of certain groups in winning electoral victories or exerting informal influence over policy-making processes. High voting turnout may be one consequence of the development over time of these links of social groups to political organization.

SOVIET ELECTIONS AS A MEASURE OF DISSENT: THE MISSING ONE PERCENT*

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A few questions are still hotly debated among students of the Soviet political system, but certainly the nature of Soviet elections is not one of them. Everyone agrees that they are more interesting as a psychological curiosity than as a political reality. They are seen by various writers as ritualized affirmations of regime legitimacy, as methods of involving the masses in supportive activity, as a means of publicly honoring model citizens, and as a crushing display of unanimity designed to isolate the potential nonconformist. Both Western and Soviet writers see Soviet elections from the positive side, from the side of the dutiful 99 percent who invariably vote for the single candidate on the ballot.

In fact, Soviet and Western writers are in very close agreement on the major functions of elections in the Soviet Union, although their value judgments tend to differ along the lines one would expect. Taking one typical example from the general Western literature on the Soviet political system, we find the purposes of a Soviet election defined as "a public demonstration of the legitimacy of the regime . . . an invaluable educational and propaganda exercise . . . and perhaps most important of all, ... proof that the system of control is unimpaired." In the more detailed Western works on Soviet elections we find the same approach. Thus, Howard Swearer, in a very insightful and valuable article on Soviet local elections, states that "in the Soviet Union, the formal act of voting is comparable in purpose to such civic rituals as singing the national anthem or saluting a country's flag. It is a public display of personal reaffirmation of the Soviet way of life and the party leadership."2 Swearer further suggests that the function of Soviet elections "is not only to legitimize the leadership in the

* The author would like to express his gratitude to Professors Milton C. Cummings and Howard Egeth of The Johns Hopkins University for their invaluable help during the preparation of this article, and to The Johns Hopkins University for providing a summer research grant.

¹ Leonard Schapirc, The Government and Politics of the Soviet Union, rev. ed. (New York: Vintage Books, 1967), p. 108.

² Howard R. Swearer, "The Functions of Soviet Local Elections," *Midwest Journal of Political* Science, 5 (May, 1961), p. 149. mass mind and to help identify the people with its policies, but also to reassure the leadership itself of its popularity and infallibility."3 In a similar vein, Richard M. Scammon, after personally observing a Soviet election, reported that Soviet elections reflect "the need felt by every regime (even a one-party regime) for popular endorsement and consent to its program, no matter how unreal the conditions under which that endorsement be produced."4 Max E. Mote, after studying an election in Leningrad at close hand, suggests that the very idea of an election as a choice between alternatives is not comprehended by the average Soviet citizen, who thinks of voting as "both a patriotic and a social activity, invested with the diverse pleasures which most people derive from performing a commendable action."5

Soviet writers agree with the Western analysis of Soviet elections as essentially positive. participatory, legitimizing, demonstrative, educational and patriotic. One of them writes: "Our elections are not simply acts of selecting people's representatives for the organs of state power. They are a most important form of participation of the masses in the implementation of state power, and of their education and organization in the struggle for sociallism and communism."6 Generally, Soviet commentators see elections as expressions of the pervading unity of Soviet society, a condition brought about by the absence of class conflict. The fact that only one candidate is nominated for each elected position is explained in terms of this assumed underlying unanimity of the Soviet "working masses." Michael Kalinin, titular head of state during Stalin's reign, remarked that the single candidate is "a feature of socialism, a sign that

- ³ Ibid., p. 144.
- ⁴ Richard M. Scammon, "Why the Russians Bother With Elections," The New York Times Magazine, April 6, 1958, p. 63.
- ⁵ Max E. Mote, Soviet Local and Republic Elections, Hoover Institution Studies No. 10 (Stanford, Cal.: Hoover Institution, 1965), p. 77. See also George Barr Carson, Electoral Practices in the U.S.S.R. (New York: Frederick A. Praeger, 1955), pp. 99-100.
- ⁶ A. I. Kim, Sovetskoe izbirateľ noe pravo (Moscow, 1965), p. 7.

amongst the working masses there is not and cannot be any internal disagreements such as is found within bourgeois society."

Thus on both sides of the political fence that used to be an iron curtain, observers have fixed their glance firmly on the positive role of Soviet elections as massive demonstrations of ritualized affirmation. Ninety-nine percent support is indeed a dazzling achievement in an age when many governments achieve power without even receiving the votes of a majority of the registered electorate—and some achieve power without even receiving a majority of the votes cast. It would be difficult to quarrel with the prevailing view of Soviet elections in regard to the functions they perform for the ninety-nine percent. But what of the others? Every year in which elections are held (actually three out of every four years), approximately two million votes are cast against the official candidates, under an electoral procedure which, as we shall see, makes this act difficult, at least potentially disadvantageous, and largely ineffectual. All the positive functions described by Soviet and Western observers have no meaning when discussing these nonconformists. These people have apparently taken the word "election" literally, and have made the only choice Soviet procedure allows.8

It is therefore useful to consider whether Soviet elections may be studied as elections are studied in other countries where two or more candidates are usually nominated for each elected position. Such a study could be made if the following conditions do in fact exist:

- 1) If the Soviet electoral procedure, while heavily biased toward achieving affirmative unanimity, does permit the possibility of registering dissent, and the possibility of avoiding consequent sanctions against the dissenter.
- If reasonably detailed and comprehensive data are available.
- 3) If the data are accurately and honestly compiled, or if the falsification and inaccuracy are randomly or evenly distributed.

It is obvious that under present conditions, Soviet electoral results cannot be considered an accurate reflection of the true state of Soviet public opinion. A heavy bias in favor of the regime is introduced by the well-established system of pressures, controls and propaganda, and until this system is dismantled the relationship between Soviet voting and Soviet

- ⁷ As quoted in P. V. Tumanov, Poriadok organizatsii i provedeniia vyborov v Verkhovnyi Sovet SSSR (Moscow, 1958), p. 23.
- ⁸ The Russian word for elections, vybory, literally means choices, selections, alternatives.

public opinion will remain an enigma. This does not mean, however, that there is nothing to be gained by studying Soviet electoral statistics. If the study is restricted to a systematic comparison of groups, areas and periods in the Soviet system, the environment of pressures—which produces the ninety-nine percent—can be considered either-a constant or a random variable, and the variations in results can be analyzed for clues to the location and relative incidence of dissent to be found in the Soviet Union. For comparisons, we require only the three conditions mentioned.

There can be no doubt that the first precondition does exist in the Soviet Union. Curiously enough, Soviet electoral law is written as though the drafters expected contested elections.9 The present statute governing election of deputies to the USSR Supreme Soviet states that "the voter, in the place set aside for filling out the ballot, leaves on each ballot the name of the candidate for whom he wishes to vote, and crosses out the names of the others."10 In actual practice, of course, only one name appears on each ballot, the name of the candidate representing the "people's bloc of Communists and non-party members." The voter can cast his ballot for the "bloc" candidate by simply folding and depositing his ballot in the appropriate receptacle. In order to vote against the candidate, he must repair to a booth or room, provided by law to ensure "secret" balloting, and cross out the name of the candidate. Since this act invites attention, the Soviet voter's reluctance to take the legal guarantee of secret ballot seriously is quite understandable. Nevertheless, the possibility remains that he will take the risk or will mark the ballot surreptitiously. Many Soviet voters, wishing to demonstrate their superpatriotism, take pen in hand and write patriotic slogans on the ballot, and this practice could distract attention from the occasional dissenter who crosses out the approved name while proceeding to the ballot box.11 Regardless

- ⁹ This may have been the case. See Carson, op. cit., p. 52.
- ¹⁰ Polozhenie o vyborax v Verkhovnyi Sovet SSSR, as amended to March 19, 1966 (Moscow, 1966), p. 23. In this and other cited respects, this statute is typical of all statutes regulating elections to the various levels of soviets.
- ¹¹ In this connection Carson remarks: "Considering the character of the soviet election campaign—the voter's opportunity to stand in public and be counted on the right side—secrecy presents curious problems. The voter has an interest in breaking the secrecy so it will be known that he voted correctly.... Many a voter, there-

of the technique used, the fact that it is possible both to cast a negative vote and to escape serious sanctions is emply evidenced by Soviet statistics. Since approximately two million negative votes are past year after year, and since many of these votes must be cast by the same people who have become habitual dissenters, it follows that the act of voting "no" does not bring about sufficient sanctions to cow a rather large number of brave Soviet souls. Indeed, the futility of the act, rather than the danger, might very well be the major deterrent for many potential dissenters who follow the crowd without enthusiasm, and are counted in the ninety-nine percent.

The second precondition, the availability of detailed and comprehensive data, places some limitations on any examination of Soviet elections, but does not eliminate the possibility of making such a study. In the Soviet Union, publication of data is a "sometime thing," sometimes remarkably consistent, sometimes exasperatingly incomplete. The best data, including not only percentages but also absolute numbers of voters, are published for the elections to the local soviets, which occur every even-numbered year. These data are the most detailed, and therefore the most useful for the purpose of comparison.

The existence of the third precondition, honesty and accuracy in compiling electoral results by Soviet officials, is not so easily determined. We know that the electoral laws have been amended to provide heavy criminal penalties for "a responsible person or member of the electoral commission who commits a forgery of the electoral documents or deliberately miscounts votes or violates the secrecy of balloting,"14 but we cannot be sure that such strictures are always observed. A further check on possible corruption is provided by the electoral laws in the provision that "certified representatives of public organizations and workers' associations, and representatives of the press have the right to be present during the counting of ballots."15 Lecnard Schapiro's evaluation of these safeguards is that "it is less likely now than in the past that blatant electoral fraud

fore, took the precaution . . . of writing in his name and address on his ballot." Op. cit., p. 75.

could be practiced in the presence of so many witnesses,"16 and one would have to agree that the presence of witnesses from outside organizations makes obvious fraud rather unlikely. But if one is disinclined to accept the reality of these formal safeguards from a system notoriously contemptuous of formal rules, there is another argument which seems more convincing: the environment of pressures is so effective that the desired result—a rousing affirmative vote of over 99 percent—could be achieved without recourse to such dirty business as falsifying election returns. Furthermore, in those relatively few cases where the local candidate is very unpopular, it is probably more advantageous for the regime to permit his defeat than to falsify his victory, since it is quite simple to find a more suitable candidate for the required second election in that district. In a system so heavily biased in its favor, the regime can well afford to "let the chips fall where they may," especially since this attitude may provide the leadership with a useful source of information on the location of dissent and the efficiency of local party and government organizations.

It should be emphasized, however, that we don't require a perfect record of honesty and accuracy of the Soviet Electoral Commissions. Our requirements in this regard are reduced by the fact that in dealing with Soviet electoral data we do not have merely a small sample of the voting population, we have in effect the entire population. This means that we can afford to be tolerant of isolated incidents of fudgery and forgery. In addition, since we will deal only with comparisons of data within the system, we can permit uniformly distributed falsification of even major proportions, such as would be produced if every affirmative vote across the country were raised by five percent. Thus our modest requirements, in combination with the Soviet leadership's need for accurate feedback information and the legal safeguards provided by the electoral statutes, permit a certain degree of confidence in asserting that our requirements have been met.

I. THE THEORY AND PRACTICE OF SOVIET ELECTIONS

Soviet voters cast ballots for delegates ("deputies") to the soviets (councils) established on all levels of governmental administration. From the spontaneous and often riotous gatherings that the soviets were during the revolutionary year of 1917, they have become docile tools of the party-state leadership, although with increasing administrative re-

¹² It should be kept in mind that each Soviet voter casts several ballots—as many as seven—so that the two million negative votes represents perhaps on the order of 500,000 to 700,000 dissenters.

¹³ So-called local elections are those held for all levels below the level of republic.

¹⁴ Vedomosti Verkhovnogo Soveta SSSR, 1088 (December 27, 1961).

¹⁵ Polozhenie . . . , p. 25.

¹⁶ Schapiro, op, cit., p. 107.

sponsibilities involving limited discretionary powers. Nominations of candidates for the soviets are endorsed by open meetings of various public and work organizations, but it is no secret that these nominations are actually decided by the party nucleus in prior, closed meetings. Nomination for candidature is considered a reward for model behavior and outstanding achievement in work, and these are the criteria apparently used in making the selection. Indeed, in the few cases reported in which the pre-selected nominee was rejected by the open meeting of the collective, the major difficulty seems to have been that the party nucleus had chosen someone who did not possess sufficient Soviet virtue.17 Because the nucleus takes some considerable care in selecting fitting objects for public approbation, the nomination procedure at open meetings tends to be pro forma.18 It would seem that most Soviet citizens have accepted the idea of nomination as reward for virtue rather than as the first step in a competitive selection process. Max E. Mote reports that a typical Soviet response to the question of why only one candidate is advanced would be: "You see, it would indicate a lack of confidence in the candidate if you were to nominate two men for the same post. It would mean you think one of them is not good enough for the office. We don't want to insult our candidates."19

After nominations are completed, a "campaign" of about six weeks ensues, with daily press coverage in the form of biographical sketches of the candidates, reports on the progress of organizing electoral commissions and of establishing agitation centers (agitpunkty). Press coverage is generally more complete and intensive during elections for soviets at the all-union level (USSR Supreme Soviet) and republic level (Supreme Soviets of the republics) than it is for local elections, in which there are thousands upon thousands of candidates. Nevertheless, even during local elections, many a homely, honest and happy face appears under the heading, "Candidates of the People."

The scope of Soviet organization for elec-

tions is truly impressive. This is certainly one area where the system demonstrates its great ability to mobilize large numbers of people to accomplish a short-term, and clearly defined task. Before the "campaign" reaches its closing hours, a significant proportion of the electorate becomes involved in one or another of the many electoral organizations. (In 1967, one out of every 16 qualified voters in the U.S.S.R. was involved in the work of the electoral commissions alone.20). The Soviet electorate is divided into precincts (izbiratel'nye uchastki) and constituencies (izbiratel'nye okruga), the former being temporary units for the counting of ballots, and the latter being actual units of representation in the various types of soviets. There is virtually no escape from the all-embracing organization of the precincts. They are established on board ships with 20 or more voters, in hospitals, rest homes and sanatoria. in railroad stations, airports and on board long-distance trains-in fact, wherever human life is to be found within the borders of the U.S.S.R.²¹ The invalid is visited in his home by a representative of the local electoral commission, accompanied by a portable ballot box; the isolated weather-observation team sends its votes from the northern frozen wastelands by radio. The network is so all-inclusive and so carefully articulated that it is virtually impossible to avoid voting-in fact, it is probably easier to vote against the nominated candidate than it is to escape the grasp of the local precinct organization and abstain. In this regard, as in so many others, the system demands active involvement, participation that gives visible evidence of one's loyalty. From this point of view, inaction, purposeful non-involvement, is just as despicable as negative action.

The regime attempts to make each election a plebiscite, in which the sole issue, as George Barr Carson puts it, is "support or non-support on a question which no one publicly dares reject—do you favor the soviet system?"22 The front page of all newspapers on election day is decorated with a standardized drawing of stalwart voters ready to deposit ballots marked "For Communism." Press reports of interviews with voters invariably yield such remarks as: "I voted for the candidates so that our splendid Motherland would develop even further, and the cause of peace would win," or "I voted for peace and the flowering of our great Soviet Motherland."23 Thus the vast array of propaganda media attempts to bend

¹⁷ For example, a milling machine operator in Ivanovo was turned down by the collective of the measuring instruments factory because he "didn't share his experience with other workers," and another worker in another locale was refused nomination because of "an incorrect attitude toward criticism." See M. Tarasov, "K itogam vyborov v mestnye sovety," Partiinaia zhizn', No. 5, 1957.

¹⁸ See Mote, op. cit., p. 35, for a description based upon personal observation.

¹⁹ Ibid., p. 29.

²⁰ From data in Pravda, March 26, 1967.

²¹ See Polozhenie . . . , p. 10.

²² Carson, op. cit., p. 66.

²³ Turkmenskaia iskra, March 16, 1965.

the attention of the voter away from local issues—and real potential grievances—and toward the ultimate question of loyalty to the regime and "Soviet patriotism." In other words, the regime attempts to remove issues from the elections entirely. This is done not only by a propaganda campaign and by choosing model, "non-controversial" candidates, but also by a positive attempt to satisfy local grievances in advance of election day. Thousands of "agitators" are sent out to explain the causes of past deficiencies, laud past accomplishments and promise all sorts of future improvements in local living conditions.²⁴

The reason for this emphasis is not hard to discover. The Soviet voter has been molded in a political environment which permits the voicing of dissent exclusively on local issues, on issues that essentially involve the implementation by local officials of policies decided at higher levels. Thus if these issues of local implementation were thrust into the forefront of the election campaign, there is every reason to suspect that the negative vote, and the number of defeated local candidates, would rise sharply. This is particularly true of certain regions where the local party and state organizations have been thoroughly roasted in the official press for shortcomings in past performance. In a country still far short of Utopia, still displaying its full share of corruption and mismanagement, it is still necessary to make each vote against every last officially-sponsored candidate a vote of "no confidence" in the entire regime, and thus a potentially traitorous act.

By this means, the regime attempts to remove elections entirely from the area of limited grievances and to make it a simple test of allegiance to the system. The Soviet voter, in effect, is told to seek redress of his grievances through other administrative channels, and at election time to stand and be counted on the ultimate issue of loyalty. Soviet propagandists make the point that on certain local issues "all the instructions of the voters are collected after the election, and measures are taken to carry them out."25 It is quite clear, however, that such "instructions" are communicated to the candidates informally, and are in no way, either in theory or in practice, connected with the act of voting.

But what of the negative voter? Is he, by reverse logic, dissenting against the entire Soviet system when he crosses out the name of the "bloc" candidate on the ballot? Some Western observers, such as Mote, make this simple reversal: "If casting a vote on election day is a sign of support of the regime, then not casting a vote is a sign of opposition."26 Unfortunately, the matter is not quite so simple. It cannot be assumed that all negative votes and abstentions are expressions of total rejection of the system. These negative votes may also express disapproval of the particular candidates, or local grievances, or personal grievances (resulting from bureaucratic bungling, being passed over for job promotion, etc.), or crankiness, or eccentricity, or even frivolity. Finally, such a negative vote may actually express genuine antagonism to the values of the regime or its basic structure, but this is only one possibility which must be weighed with the others. Some Soviet voters simply may not heed the warnings of the regime that voting is a test of loyalty, and not a means of expressing particularized dissent. They may derive psychological satisfactions from negative voting; they may be deluded into thinking that positive results will issue from this act, or they may simply take Soviet propaganda at face value when statements are made that "the electoral system in the U.S.S.R. shows that constitutional principles combined with practical guarantees ensure genuine democracy and respect for the rights of citizens."27

As this quotation from a typical Soviet source indicates, the dissenting voter does have some support from official Soviet doctrine. The question of elections illustrates the basic ambivalence of current Soviet ideology, which stands athwart two contrary notions of human society and personality. On the one hand, there is the commitment to the model of the conflictless social monolith, and its assumption that there is a single "correct" answer to every problem to which all will agree, once their basic interests are harmonized by the removal of classes. On the other, there is the idea of "the free development of the individual human personality," with its assumptions of great creativity and variety of expression. The two principles are not miscible, despite the vigorous efforts of Soviet ideologists to shake up a single solution. As we have already seen, Soviet elections contain elements of both principles, the idea of the monolithic plebiscite

²⁴ See, for example, the article, "Razgovor byl interesen," Sovetskaia Estoniia, March 3, 1965.

²⁶ N. G. Starovoitov, Poriadek organizatsii i provedeniia vyborov v terkhovnye sovety soiuznykh i avtonomnykh respublik i v mestnye sovety deputatov trudiashchikhsia (Moscow, 1963), p. 76.

²⁶ Mote, op. cit., p. 76.

²⁷ A. Gorshenev and I. Cheliapov, Sovetskaia izbiratel'naia sistema (Moscow, 1959), p. 5.

on the one hand, and the legal provisions for secret ballots, several competing candidates, and run-off elections on the other. Even though the heavy emphasis in the propaganda-especially in the press-is on the plebiscite theme, the knowledgeable Soviet dissenter can take refuge in the contrary, thoroughly respectable concept of Soviet ideology if he wishes. This is especially important since he would most likely justify his negative vote in terms of the inadequate qualifications of the particular candidate. This interpretation of his negative vote would be unanimously seconded by the learned Soviet experts on ideology. In explaining why some candidates are defeated in local elections, two such experts write:

This act [i.e., defeat of a candidate] is only evidence of the high activism of the voters and of the fact that the public organizations and meetings obviously made a mistake when they nominated the candidate. The mistake has been corrected. As a result of new elections in all such areas, other deputies will be elected.²⁸

Thus the dissenter could conceivably relate his negative vote to his high sense of public responsibility and "activism" when confronted with a "mistake" of the nominating organizations.

In any case, one need not accept the interpretation that all negative votes are anti-regime votes in order to conclude that the phenomenon bears closer investigation than has been accorded it in the past. In the absence of opinion polls, we cannot determine the distribution of dissenting views, but the existence of electoral data does permit some analysis of the location of dissent and the frequency of its expression through the ballot.

II. MEASURING DISSENT

The present study of electoral returns is restricted to the biennial elections for the local soviets. There are two reasons for this approach: the reported data are more complete and detailed for these elections, and the relative closeness of these soviets to local issues. and of the candidates to the electors, makes the dissenting vote in these elections more interesting and significant. As already mentioned, the Soviet regime is more permissive toward localized dissent than toward dissent on national issues, and the Soviet voter has consequently become depoliticized on the larger issues. Furthermore, even though negative votes are registered in elections for the all-union Supreme Soviet and the Supreme

TABLE 1. MEAN SIZE OF ELECTORAL UNITS, U.S.S.R., 1967*

Unit	Registered Voters Per Unit
krai	1,603,717
oblast'	887,946
city raion	89,566
okrug	53,861
city	41,895
raion	26,477
poselok	3,767
selo	1,525

^{*} Data calculated from Pravda, March 26, 1967.

Soviets of the republics, the candidates for these soviets are relatively remote from the voter and their qualifications are generally of a higher, more irreproachable level than the local candidates. In fact, as we shall see from the data, the frequency of dissent is inversely related to the size of the electoral unit when other factors are held constant.

As indicated in Table 1, the size of the electoral units is extremely variable in local elections. The average krai, with more than 1.6 million voters can hardly be considered a unit of "local" representation at all, especially since these units are generally vast and sparsely populated. On the other hand, the selo (village) unit is more than 100 times smaller than the krai, and can be considered truly local in character. The poselok (settlement), with almost four thousand electors, can also be counted as a local unit. It is a peculiarity of Soviet electoral organization that such small units are found only in rural areas, for the smallest unit of urban voters (the city soviet) numbers approximately forty thousand.29

Two kinds of information reported in the Soviet press are useful for analysis of dissent: the number of negative voters and absentees, and the number of defeated candidates. Since it is virtually impossible to miss voting by accident, only design or sheer physical incapacitation can account for absenteeism.³⁰ In fact, the vote-getting machine is so marvel-

²⁹ The city raion is found only in relatively large cities, which are subdivided. This explains the fact that they have, on average, considerably more voters than the city soviets.

³⁰ It should be added that those who happen to be away from home on election day receive a "Certificate of the Right to Vote," which they can exchange for ballots at any polling place in the Soviet Union.

²⁸ Ibid., p. 41.

ously efficient that in the Tadzhikistan raion elections of 1957, 1951, 1963 and 1965, with over 400,000 registered voters, not a single lonely Tadzhik absented himself from the polls. Because of this rather awe-inspiring organization, one can assume that in the vast majority of cases, absenteeism is the result of purposeful abstention—one must be an artful dodger, and not merely absent-minded!

Thus it seems reasonable to add the number of absentees to the number of negative voters as an indication of total dissent expressed through the ballot. Since this information is given for the various administrative units shown in Table 1, and since it is given separately for each union republic in the unionrepublic newspapers, a useful basis of comparison can be established. This figure, expressed as a percentage of the total registered voters for the various units will be termed the Individual Dissent Index (IDI), since it is essentially a measure of individual negative choices, made presumably without communication or discussion with others. It represents the acts of a small minority, engulfed in an atmosphere of conformity.

The other piece of published information, the number of defeated candidates, leads to a rather different analysis. The data reveal that candidates are never defeated in any but local elections, and that even in local elections candidates are defeated only in the smaller electoral units. In fact, 98.2 percent of all defeated candidates in the elections studied systematically (1957, 1961, 1963 and 1965) were from the smallest electoral units, the selo and poselok. There was not a single recorded instance in the elections studied of & defeated candidate in any unit larger than the city soviet. This is certainly not the result of increased pressure on the voter in balloting for larger units. In order for a candidate to be defeated, he must receive less than a majority of the votes cast, and under Soviet conditions this can occur only in small, relatively cohesive and relatively isolated communities. Only in a small, cohesive community could there be sufficient communication of the dissenting view prior to the election to assure each vcter that he would actually be a member of the majority by voting "no." Only as a majoritarian could he be absolutely assured of being counted as an "activist" who corrected a "mistake" of the nominating organizations. Only in an isolated community, far from the party-state control levers, could discussion be oren enough to achieve a dissenting consensus. Thus the published information on defeated candidates serves as a measure of group dissent rather than individual dissent in the Soviet Union. Since the different units and republics elect vastly different numbers of deputies, a convenient unit of comparison would be the number of successful candidates for each defeated candidate, which we shall call the Group Dissent Index (GDI). As one might expect, this number in all cases is quite large, for the defeated candidate is a rather rare animal in the Soviet Union, generally representing less than .001 percent of all candidates in any given election.

These two indices are readily obtainable from published Soviet data and provide excellent measures of comparison for two different types of dissent: the dissent of the individual nonconformist surrounded by conformity, and the dissent of the small, cohesive group against the local authorities. The two indices are almost completely independent, for the votes cast against the defeated candidates form a very small proportion (less than one percent) of the total negative vote. In adjudging the reasons for individual dissent, the full range of possibilities already discussed must be considered. The IDI is important as an over-all measure of dissent on all levels in the Soviet Union. Group dissent, because of its rarity and its heavy concentration in small. rural communities of the RSFSR, is not as useful as a comparative measure of dissent in different areas of the Soviet Union-for example, in three elections studied, the Turkmenian and Tadzhik Republics did not report a single defeated candidate—but it does provide us with a clearer picture of a particular type of dissent, based on a consensus opposed to local conditions or candidates.

The two indices can be compared both statically (eliminating the time dimension by averaging results from different areas or electoral units over a period of years) and through time (by following trends shown in successive elections). Because of limitations of data, nine of the fifteen union republics of the U.S.S.R., representing 89.2 percent of its population, have been included.³¹ Complete data for calculation of the IDI were reported by the Soviet press only for the local elections of 1957, 1961 and 1965, although data on defeated candidates have been reported for all local elections.³²

³¹ Data for the missing republics (Armenia, Azerbaidzhan, Georgia, Kirgizia, Moldavia, Uzbekistan) were not readily available or were not completely reported in the local press for one or more elections.

32 Curiously enough, when local elections coincide with elections for the republic supreme soviets—a situation which occurs every four

Static Analysis. A quite revealing comparison can be made of variations of IDI among the nine union republics studied. Table 2 shows the average IDI of the nine republics for three elections, and reveals a striking difference in the amount of dissent registered by the voters in differing areas. Although the republics in general are distinguished by differing national cultures, large-scale population movements of past decades have complicated the picture. Particularly in some of the smaller republics, the in-flow of ethnic Russians and Ukrainians has tended to dilute the distinctive national culture of the area.33 Nevertheless, national differences do remain, and the borders of the union republics can still be taken as approximate lines of division between different peoples.

As shown in Table 2, Estonians are significantly more likely to be dissenters—at least at election time—than any of the other national groups. One can easily relate this opposition sentiment to Estonia's troubled times in the recent past, its brief period of independence, forced entry into the Soviet Union during the Second World War, and Stalin's post-war repressions and the settlement of many ethnic Russians in Estonia. One would be satisfied with this explanation were it not for the fact that the Lithuanians, who for the most part shared the Estonians' fate, indicate very little dissent at election time. This difference in frequency of dissent can only be explained by a careful study of contemporary conditions in the two neighboring republics, a subject beyond the scope of this essay.

Another result which bears some discussion is the high IDI for the Russian Republic. It must be kept in mind that the Russian Republic, which stretches from the Baltic to the Pacific, and contains more than half the population of the Soviet Union, also contains many non-Russian nationality groups living quite remote from the power centers in Moscow and Leningrad. All indications are that these groups, and the Russians who have settled in the austere new towns of the Siberian plains, contribute more than their share to the amount of dissent shown in Russian Republic elections.

The average GDI for the union republics

TABLE 2. MEAN IDI BY UNION REPUBLIC, ELECTIONS OF 1957, 1961 AND 1965*

Republic	Mean IDI (%)
Estonia	1.18
RSFSR	0.86
Kazakhstan	0.55
Latvia	0.44
Turkmenistan	0.32
Belorussia	0.29
Ukraine	0.27
Lithuania	0.25
Tadzhikistan	0.21

^{*} Sources:

Sovetskaia Rossiia, March 19, 1965; March 12, 1961; March 8, 1957

Pravda Ukrainy, March 20, 1965; March 10, 1961; March 7, 1957

Sovetskaia Belorussiia, March 19, 1965; March 24, 1961; March 7, 1957

Kazakhstanskaia pravda, March 20, 1965; March 11, 1961;

Alma-Atinskaia pravda, March 14, 1957

Turkmenskaia iskra, March 19, 1965; March 9, 1961; March 7, 1957

Kommunist Tadzhikistana, March 20, 1965; March 17, 1961; March 7, 1957

Sovetskaia Litva, March 26, 1965; March 9, 1961; March 7, 1957

Sovetskaia Latviia, March 20, 1965; March 22, 1961; March 14, 1957

Sovetskaia Estoniia, March 26, 1965; March 22, 1961; March 15, 1957

during these years is shown in Table 3. Three republics, the RSFSR, Estonia, and Latvia show markedly less reticence in defeating candidates than the others, and these three republics also score high in individual dissent as shown in Table 2. Over-all, the rank-order correlation of GDI and IDI for the nine republics is +0.62. Kazakhstan's pattern of relatively high IDI and low GDI fits very well the picture of a district which has seen a large influx of young people (during Khrushchev's Virgin Lands program) who have subsequently become disillusioned but who have not yet established solidary groups. This hypothesis is supported by the figures, which indicate a rather high level of dissent manifested almost exclusively through individual action.

Another method of comparison has been used to determine if any significant differences exist between urban and rural areas, and between large and small electoral units, in the

years—the press reports only incomplete data. One explanation might be that the subject of elections is allocated a fixed amount of scarce Soviet newsprint regardless of the number of elections held.

³³ For example, the Kazakh people contribute only 30 percent of Kazakhstan's population, and the Kirgiz form only 40.5 percent of Kirgizia, according to the last census (1959).

Table 3. Mean gil by union republic, elections of 1957, 1961, 1963, and 1965*

Republic	Mean GDI
RSFSR	6630
Estonia	7353
Latvia	8022
Lithuania	11220
Belorussia	12117
Ukraine	28120
Kazakhstan	28629
Turkmenistan	**
Tadzhikistan	**
Mean (above nine republics)	8344

^{*} For sources see Table 2

Note: High numerical values of GDI indicate low incidence of dissert.

expression of electoral dissent. In this study three types of electoral units were compared: large urban (city soviet), large rural (raion soviet), and small rural (selo and poselok soviets). The IDI's for each of these units were aggregated for all nine republics, with the results shown in Table 4.

The results indicate that individual dissent is highest in urban areas, which might indicate a weak Soviet reflection of the urban malaise that has afflicted other industrial or industrializing nations. Another interesting result is that small rural units show considerably more dissent than large rural units, even though for the most part the same voters are involved in both cases. This means that there are thousands of rural voters who cast their ballots for their raion candidate, and at the same time vote against their local candidate. Thus the evidence supports the hypothesis that rural voters are more likely to voice their discontent over

TABLE 4. MEAN IDI FOR DIFFERENT ELECTORAL UNITS, NINE REPUBLICS, ELECTIONS OF 1957, 1961, 1965, AND 1967*

Electoral Unit	IDI (%)
Large urban	0.75
Small rural	0.64
Large rural	0.48

^{*} Data in *Pravda*, March 26, 1967 permit this calculation, but not comparison by republic. For other sources, see Table 2.

TABLE 5. ABSENTEEISM AS A PERCENTAGE OF TOTAL NEGATIVE CHOICES

Electoral Unit	Absenteeism (%)	
Large urban	11.3	
Large rural	7.9	
Small rural	5.9	

local conditions than over larger, "political" issues.

Table 5 gives a further indication of differences between urban and rural voting patterns. The results clearly show that the urban voter is more likely to show his opposition by staying away from the polls than the rural voter. It is plausible to conclude that the difference lies not so much in the psychology of the voters, but in the increased opportunities for evasion that are provided by the mass concentration of voters in the cities. The rural voter might be just as apathetic, but he is organized in smaller, more self-contained groups making escape more difficult. This conclusion is given added support by the fact that in rural areas, absenteeism is higher for the large units than for the small units, even though the large units have a lower IDI.

Comparison of urban and rural units for indications of group dissent shows, as already mentioned, that this phenomenon is almost exclusively found in rural areas. Of 910 candidates defeated in five local elections (1957, 1961, 1963, 1965, 1967) throughout the U.S.S.R., only ten were candidates for city soviets. The fact that defeated urban candidates represent only 1.1 percent of all defeated candidates is directly related to the size of urban and rural electoral units, as shown in Table 6. It is quite apparent that on the aver-

TABLE 6. MEAN NUMBER OF ELECTORS FOR EACH CANDIDATE, U.S.S.R., 1967*

Candidate for:	Mean Number of Electors
krai soviet	5432
oblast' soviet	4355
okrug soviet	571
raion soviet	339
city soviet	328
city raion soviet	430
poselok soviet	· 68
selo soviet	48

^{*} Calculated from data in Pravda, March 26, 1967

^{**} No defeated candidates reported in three elections

age it would take only a bare majority of 48 voters to defeat a candidate for the smallest rural unit (selo), while it would take a majority of 328 voters to defeat a candidate for the smallest urban unit. If the hypothesis is correct that pre-election communication of dissent among the voters is required to defeat a candidate, it would follow that the process would be much more difficult in a group of over three hundred than in a group of less than fifty. In addition, the urban group is far less likely to have developed the necessary group solidarity because of the greater fluidity of movement in the urban environment.

Based upon the record of past local elections, then, one can draw the following general conclusions about voting patterns and dissent in the Soviet Union:

- 1. The amount of individual dissent indicated in elections is inversely related to the size of the electoral unit. The Soviet voter is more likely to dissent against local conditions than against policies of wider importance. In this attitude, he reflects the values of the regime, which permits criticism of local implementation, but not of national policies.
- 2. There is more individual dissent in the cities than in the countryside. This may be the result of the greater education, "sophistication," and diversity of the urban population in comparison with the peasantry of the villages.
- 3. There is far more group dissent in the countryside than in the cities. This clearly demonstrated phenomenon can be related to the greater solidarity, cohesiveness and isolation of rural groups, as well as the much smaller size of the minimal rural electoral units (selo and poselok soviets). It is probably true, however, that this rural group dissent is not directed toward politically significant issues.
- 4. Opportunities for abstention from voting are greater in the cities than in the countryside. This conclusion, which emerges from the data on urban and rural absenteeism, is based on the assumption that absentees are for the most part willfully abstaining.
- 5. There is significantly more individual and group dissent in the Russian Republic (RSFSR) and Estonia (followed closely by Latvia and Kazakhstan) than in the other republics studied.

Trend Analysis. Some very interesting and quite unexpected results were obtained from analysis of trends in Soviet voting during the past ten years. As shown in Figure 1, there has been a general and steady decline in electoral dissent over the past decade in both urban and rural areas. This would seem to contradict the expectation that with increased liberalization of Soviet society, with the growth of diversity

and stratification of the population and with loosening of controls over political expression. there would be an increase in nonconformity and diversity of opinions. This cherished ideaor perhaps hope-need not be discarded on the "garbage heap of history," as Trotsky was wont to say, if we recall the previous conclusion that most negative voting throughout the Soviet Union is probably based on economic and local issues rather than on "purely political" issues of national policy. In this case, the decrease in negative voting can be related to the general improvement in living conditions which has occurred in the Soviet Union in the past ten years. As already suggested, the typical dissenting voter has probably resisted the regime's heavy-handed invitation to vote on the ultimate issue of lovalty to communism. and has instead cast his "Nyet" as a little reminder that he hadn't been pleased with the last pay raise, or the increase in food prices, or the lack of adequate recreation facilities in his village. Students of American voting habits will realize that this is far from a frivolous or fanciful explanation of voting behavior.34 It is far less fanciful under Soviet conditions, where the government, if not each candidate, is clearly and wholly responsible for the economic problems that trouble the souls of Soviet voters. A corollary explanation would be that the increased liberalization of Soviet society has opened up more effective channels for the communication of moderately dissenting views and grievances than existed in the past, and that some negative voters have abandoned an act they always knew was more symbolic than effective, and taken advantage of those new channels that can achieve demonstrable results.

The general pattern of decline in individual dissent is repeated in all the union republics studied (see Figure 2), except Tadzhikistan, Kazakhstan and Latvia, which show a slight to moderate increase. A roughly comparable decline in group dissent is indicated in Table 7, although the poor agricultural conditions of trade in 1961 resulted in a sharp increase in group dissent (i.e., lower GDI) during the election of that year. The general decrease of rural group dissent can be ascribed to well-known improvements in the conditions on the collective farms. The effects of the Brezhnev-Kosygin "new deal" for agriculture, announced in March 1965, may possibly be related to the

³⁴ See Angus Campbell, Philip E. Converse, Warren E. Miller and Donald E. Stokes, *The American Voter* (New York: John Wiley & Sons, 1960), pp. 393-401.




Fig. 1. Decline in IDI by Electoral Unit 1957-1967




Fig. 2. IDI by Union Republic 1957-1965

TABLE 7. U.S.S.R. AVERAGE GDI FOR FOUR LOCAL ELECTIONS

Year	Average GDI
1957	9278
1961	7316
1965	9664
1967	15855

marked decline in rural group dissent shown (in Table 7) for 1967.

III. CONCLUSIONS

If our hypothesis is correct that increased liberalization of Soviet society, and the general improvement in living conditions results in a decreased use of elections as a vehicle for the expression of dissent, the study of Soviet elections might prove to be a less rewarding enterprise in future years. On the other hand, there is the possibility that in the long run the idea of an election as a choice between alternatives could make some headway. It is not altogether unreasonable to suggest the possibility that:

Russians are being educated in the procedures of modern elections, and some day in the future may be allowed a choice of candidates on election day.... Certainly there can be no argument that the legal machinery for elections on western European or American lines is all present. Not a word of the present laws would need to be changed. 35

Even this prospect, however, should be treated with caution. It is not enough to offer "a choice of candidates on election day," if these candidates are all hand-picked selections of a single ruling party. This sort of system has been used in Poland without producing any notable increase in the democratic content of Polish politics.³⁶

The Soviet regime has not permitted even this limited choice, and has chosen to emphasize the ceremonial aspects and the theme of social unity. As a result it has had to face the

inevitable consequence of social apathy. The long-term problem is that Soviet elections in their present form present a basic contradiction between structure and function. The structure of Soviet elections in its formal aspect conforms to the functional requirements of a contested election between candidates representing differentiable alternatives. The function of Soviet elections at present, however, is to symbolize mass patriotism and allegiance through a daylong public ceremony. The contradiction is not subtle, and one can assume that it is recognized by many Soviet citizens. By ritualizing the elections, the regime has removed the element of uncertainty and drama which make elections intrinsically interesting, even when the choices offered to the electorate are not. But when choices are not even offered, excitement disappears, and the regime must struggle mightily with pen and loudspeaker to generate enthusiasm.

Under such circumstances, one could imagine two possible alternatives to the present system: the Soviet authorities could eliminate elections entirely, or they could permit a limited choice between pre-selected candidates, as in Poland. The first choice could be easily justified in ideological terms, under the assumption that the stage of pure communism is being approached; it would save money and time, and it would remove the patent ambiguity of the present electoral practices. Still, the regime would lose the positive symbolic benefits, and the citizen's commitment-through-action that the elections provide. The second choice might therefore seem more advantageous since it would retain the symbolic and active supportive elements and at the same time permit a competitive—and possibly even interesting campaign based on the qualifications of the candidates.

One suspects, however, that the most likely future for Soviet elections will be a continuation of the present. They have become entrenched through time as a symbol of regime legitimacy, and as the Soviet regime passes its fiftieth anniversary, it seems more reluctant than ever to tamper with such symbolic institutions. Although Soviet elections do not create much excitement, they still provide a splendid opportunity for the regime to test its mobilization powers, and to prove to the world—and to itself-that it can make just about every ablebodied adult in the Soviet Union perform a useless task at a prescribed time and placeand do it with a smile! But as long as it does this, the few scowling faces in the crowd will provide us with some useful information on dissent in the Soviet Union.

³⁵ Carson, op. cit., p. 75.

³⁶ See B. A. Strashun, Izbiratel'noe pravo sotsialisticheskikh gosudarstv (Moscow, 1963), pp. 175-76; Hansjakob Stehle, The Independent Satellite: Society and Politics in Poland since 1946 (New York: Frederick A. Praeger, 1965), pp. 183-189; and Jerzy J. Wiatr, "Elections and Voting Behavior in Poland," Essays on the Behavioral Study of Politics, ec. Austin Flanney (Urbana: University of Illinois Press, 1962), pp. 235-251.

SOVIET ELITE PARTICIPATORY ATTITUDES IN THE POST-STALIN PERIOD*

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This paper, part of a larger study, is a comparative analysis of five Soviet elites-the central Party apparatchicki, and four specialist elites: the central economic bureaucrats, the military, the literary intelligentsia, and the legal profession. By content analyzing representative periodicals for each elite, data are collected on elite attitudes toward participation in the political system. The overall goal is to gain a measure of the direction and scope of Soviet elite attitudinal change since Stalin; more specifically, (1) to measure the extent to which the elites perceive themselves as participants in the policy-making process, (2) to determine whether the elites perceive their participatory role as expanding over time, and (3) to demark changing patterns of Partyspecialist elite relations from 1952-65.

To ground this study in a theoretical framework, analytical categories and hypothesesderived in part from Brzezinski and Huntington's Political Power: USA/USSR-are formulated to test the perceived extent of elite participation in the Soviet political process.1 Synoptically, models of political systems may be built by reducing to essentials the mode of interaction between the regime and society. A key variable in analyzing this interaction between superstructure and base is the role and efficacy of societal groups in influencing policy formation and implementation. Following this tack a descriptive continuum may be set up for classifying political systems. At one end of the continuum are ideological systems (e.g., the

* An earlier version of this paper was delivered at the 1967 Annual Meeting of the Midwest Conference of Political Scientists, Purdue University, Lafayette, Indiana, April 27–29, 1967. The data were collected at the Institute for the Study of the USSR, Munich, Germany, in the winter of 1965–66, funded by a grant from the University of Michigan Center for Russian and East European Studies. I am indebted to the Institute's staff for their cooperation, to Professors William Zimmerman and Vernon Van Dyke for helpful criticisms, and to Merrill Shanks and Susan Lawther for methodological assistance.

¹ Zbigniew Brzezinski and Samuel Huntington, Political Power: USA/USSR (New York: Viking Press, 1964), Pt. I. USSR), at the other "instrumental" systems (e.g., the United States). In instrumental systems the relationship between the political and social system is characterized by "access and interaction." In an ideological political system—with totalitarianism at the polar extreme—social groups are infiltrated, controlled, manipulated, and denied effective participation in the political process.

Brzezinski, along with a growing number of Western scholars, notes some degree of Soviet systemic change over time, arguing that the central Party apparatus—still dominant in policy-making and implementation—is being forced to tolerate greater elite participation in the political process. The extent to which the specialist elites perceive themselves and are perceived by the other elites as participants is the focal point of this study and the major variable in determining the degree of systemic change along the continuum toward a less ideological political system.

The ideological-instrumental continuum may be graphically portrayed as a five-point scale ranging from perceived Party dominance on the ideological side of the continuum to perceived specialist elite participation at the instrumental end of the continuum, with 3.0 representing joint, relatively equal, Party-specialist elite participation. The analytical categories are comparably scaled and designed to generate data suitable for plotting elite attitudes on the continuum.

The scaled positions within the participatory categories are:

- 1.0 Party participation solely
- 2.0 Party participation primarily
- 3.0 Joint Party-specialist elite participation
- 4.0 Specialist elite participation primarily
- 5.0 Specialist elite participation solely (See Figure 1.)

In this hypothetical situation the Soviet political system is Party-dominant—all the elites are participating within the ideological parameters (1.0-2.9) of the political arena. Instrumentality—operationally defined as specialist elite participation in the political process—would characterize the political system if specialist scores were in the 3.0-5.0 range.

Within the Party's espoused values for the "transition to communism" the knowledge and




Fig. 1. Ideological-Instrumental Continuum.

skills of specialists, it is reasoned, are indispensable. "No single strategic elite." writes Suzanne Keller, "can today know all there is to be known, and none can perform all the functions involved in social leadership." If it is true that the Party and specialists are becoming increasingly interdependent, what, from the Party's perspective, would be the ideal Party-specialist relationship? Ruling out either polar extreme as systemically dysfunctional, a tentative "mix" may be a mini-max position in which the maximum degree of specialist participation is tolerable which still allows for Party dominance in the policy and decision making arena. With 3.0 corresponding to relatively equal Party-Specialist participation, the Party's optimal position would be in the 2.5-2.9 range where the Party could capitalize on specialist elite participation without surrendering control.

I. RESEARCH METHOD

Western analyses of Soviet politics must, of necessity, rely heavily on published sources. Both the totalitarian and Kremlinological models typically portray Soviet communication channels as being monopolistically controlled by the central Party apparat. Rejecting both approaches, this project is premised on the assumption that Soviet specialist elites—due to their strategic role in society—enjoy sufficient leeway in the system to articulate a range of beliefs and values in their specialist journals.

Soviet spokesman grudingly acknowledge

² Beyond the Ruling Class: Strategic Elites in Modern Society (New York: Random House, 1963), p. 70; the five elites in this study generally conform to Keller's concept of strategic elites and fulfill the expectation that elite participation will increase over time.

and Western analyses have demonstrated that specialist journals are vehicles for the limited articulation of elite attitudes.³ Representing a functional sphere of activity in the political system, specialist journals primarily perform an instrumental role—authors, as experts, elaborate on policies within their sphere of competence, suggest ways and means for improving implementation, mobilize support, and most important of all, criticize shortcomings. The overwhelming majority of sampled articles are achievement oriented, that is, are chiefly concerned with questions of how best to fulfill the plan, increase efficiency, and overcome weaknesses.

Within this orientation authors are predominantly concerned with specifics: a manager of a textile factory ir. Petropavlosk argues that Party interference in the running of the plant resulted in decreased production; a Marshal complains that criticism of company com-

³ Soviet references to this problem are numerous. See, e.g., the authoritative editorial titled "Concerning Discussions in Scholarly Journals," in Kommunist, No. 7, 1955, which, after stating that Marxism-Leninism must be the "essential" framework within which specialist discussion should take place, bemoans the fact that scholarly articles "often" by-pass Farty formulas and all too frequently attempt "to reverse fundamental theses of the Party." For a general discussion of the increasing leeway for instrumental criticism in the post-Stalin period, see Sidney Ploss, Conflict and Decision-Making in Soviet Russia, (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1965). A quantitative analysis comparing Soviet elite values manifested in journals is found in Robert Angell's "Social Values of Soviet and American Elites," Journal of Conflict Resolution, 8 (December, 1964), 330-385.

manders at Party meetings undermines the officer's authority and reduces troop morale: a jurist warns that a Central Committee decree calling for the exemplary punishment of "parasites" undercuts the Party's campaign to strengthen socialist law; Tvardovsky, editorin-chief of Novy mir, favorably comments on "truthfulness" in literature, while Khrushchev rails against the young writers' emphasis on "decadent" themes. In sum, although specialist journals are rarely vehicles for an open and direct confrontation with the Party, specialist attitudes are articulated through instrumental proposals and criticisms—within the Party's espoused values of productivity, efficiency, and "communism"—without overtly challenging the Party's role in policy integration. In the Soviet context, rejection of the Party's integrative role is opposition, elite participation in the formulation and implementation of specific policies is politics. Direct opposition is rare, politics is ubiquitous. With the decline of terror in the post-Stalin period controversies are no longer zero-sum games.

By content analyzing articles in specialist elite journals and aggregating the frequencies of occurrence, elite attitudinal trends may be compared. Categories are formulated and data collected on elite beliefs—(who is described as actually making decisions), and elite values (preferences on who should make decisions). The resultant analysis of elite beliefs and values yields a measure of attitudinal trends toward a more participatory, less ideological, political system. All references to elite participation therefore refer to attitudinal, not actual, participation and may be treated as indicators of systemic change.

The Elites. For each elite, "representative" periodical(s) were selected for content analysis:

The Central Party Kommunist (Communist)
Apparat Partinaya zhizn (Party Life)

The Economic Elite Voprosy ekonomiki
(Problems of Economics)
Ekonomicheskaya gazeta

Ekonomicheskaya gazeta (Economic gazette)

The Military Krasnaya zvezda (Red Star)

The Legal Profession Sovetskoye gosudarstvo i pravo (Soviet State and Law)

Sovetskaya yustitsia (Soviet Justice)

The Literary Elite Oktyabr (October)

Literaturnaya gazeta
(Literary Gazette)
Novy mir (New World)

The Sample. To satisfy the definitional re-

quirement of objectivity in content analysis systematic sampling procedures are required.

I. The unit of analysis is the article. Articles in the sample were chosen from the periodicals on the basis of a quota sample. The issues from each periodical were selected at intervals so as to cover the entire year and avoid the inclusion of any one period, e.g., avoiding every December issue of journals or Monday issue of newspapers. From the selected issue only the lead article, the first signed article, was coded. (In newspapers the lead article is the first signed article in the upper left hand corner of page two.)

II. The unit of enumeration, what is being coded and counted, is the major theme of a paragraph. When clearly articulating one position in one category, the major theme could be coded once and only once.

III. The size of the sample is equal for each elite each year, 600 paragraphs per elite for each of the eight sampled years—1952, 1953, 1955, 1957, 1959, 1961, 1963, and 1965—a yearly sample of 3,000 paragraphs (600 paragraphs ×5 elites) for a total study sample of 24,000 paragraphs (3,000 paragraphs per year ×8 years).

Categories and Hypotheses. The categories, or value dimensions, are designed to generate data on Soviet elite attitudes toward the policy-making and decision-making process. Policy-making is operationally distinguished from decision-making in terms of the policy decision's impact on society.. Policy-making entails decisions which affect a) the entire USSR, or b) one or more republics. Decision-making refers to policies affecting any one administrative unit below the republic level, e.g., a region, territory, district, factory or farm. Thus a decision affecting all collective farms in a republic is operationally defined as policy-making, while a decision affecting a specific collective is defined as decision-making.

Reliability. Reliability tests were administered to establish a presumption of objectivity. Twenty-five percent of all sampled articles were recoded by a second coder working independently of the first. The articles included in the reliability test were selected by means of an "accidental sample," i.e., chosen randomly for each journal each year. The formula for testing reliability is:

Total number of agreements

Total number of paragraphs in the article

= percentage of reliability

The total study reliability is statistically significant at 89.4 percent.

TABLE 1. ELITE PERCEPTIONS OF THE POLICY-MAKING ARENA, 1952-1965

Policy-Making is the Responsibility of

- 1.0 the Party leadership solely
- 2.0 the Party leadership primarily
- 3.0 both the Party and specialist participating
- 4.0 the specialists primarily
- 5.0 the specialists solely.

Elites	1952	1953	1955	1957	1959	1961	1963	1965	All Years
Party	1.9	1.9	2.0	1.4	2.9	2.7	1.7	2.3	2.1
Economic	000	2.5	2.3	1.5	3.2	3.0	2.8	3.6	2.5
Legal	000	1.3	2.3	2.9	1.7	4.0	2.5	3.8	2.7
Military	$(1.8)^{b}$	(1.6)	1.6	1.3	000	2.2	3.3	2.7	2.1
Literary	1.8	1.0	1.8	2.9	2.4	2.0	2.5	3.1	2.3
All Elites	1.8	1.6	1.9	2.1	2.5	2.6	٤.7	3.2	2.4
Specialists	1.8	1.6	1.9	2.1	2.4	2.8	2.8	3.3	2.4

F(33,106) = 3.089, significant at .001

- An example of position 5.0, taken from the illustrative material used in training the coders, is: The formation of our military world view has taken place in a creative atmosphere . . . and is the result of the common effort of military theorists and practical military people. Thanks to this, we have developed a body of unified theory on the basis of which a broad state program has been carried out to prepare the country and armed forces for the defense of the Fatherland. Kommunist Vooruzhennykh sil, No. 10 (May 1962), p. 12.
- ^b Data for the military were unavailable for 1952 and 1953. The mean score for all elites was assigned the military for these years and noted within the brackets.

II. ELITE PARTICIPATORY ATTITUDES IN THE POST-STALIN POLITICAL STSTEM

The Soviet political system—when conceived as an ideological system—is characterized by central Farty apparat dominance in the political arena.

I. ON POLICY MAKING

Hypothesis I: Over time the specialist elites increasingly describe themselves as participants in the policy-making process.

In operational terms Party primacy will be reflected in mean scores of 1.0-2.9 on Category I—Who is Repsonsible for Policy-Making?—while higher, participatory scores of 3.0-5.0 in the later years would support the hypothesis that the policy-making process is becoming less ideological over time (Table 1).

The general trend is toward increased specialist elite participation in the policy-making arena. Note, for example, the gradual, rather steady increase in Specialist scores from 1953 onward, culminating in 1965 with an instrumental score of 3.3. While the thrust toward greater specialist elite participation is significant, the trend is uneven for each of the individual elites. A zig-zag course is the character-

istic pattern, perhaps test described by the un-Leninist notion of two steps forward one step back. For the specialist elites, reversals are typically followed by a resurgence which marks an advance beyond the previous low. This dysrhythmic process is a common phenomenon on all the categories and as will be shown, is a function of Party-specialist elite conflict.

By dividing the eight sampled years into two equal periods, 1952-57 and 1959-65 overall participatory trends are more readily illustrated (Table 2).

TABLE 2. ELITE PERCEPTIONS OF THE POLICY-MAKING ARENA, 1952-57 to 1959-65

Elites	1952–57	1959-65	% Change
Party	1.8	2.4	+33%
Economic	1.9	3.3	+74%
Legal	2.4	2.9	+21%
Military	1.6	2.3	+44%
Literary	1.9	2.7	+42%
All Elites	1.9	2.7	+42%
Specialists	1.9	2.8	+47%

With a 47% Specialist increase in 1959-65 over the earlier period, hypothesis I is supported—

table 3. Elite values toward participation in the policy-making arena, 1952-1965

Policy-Making Should Be The Responsibility Of

1.0 the Party leadership solely

2.0 the Party leadership primarily

3.0 both the Party and specialists participatinga

4.0 the specialists primarily

5.0 the specialists solely

Elites	1952	1953	1955	1957	1959	1961	1963	1965	All Years
Party	1.9	1.4	1.5	2.1	2.1	2.2	2.0	2.4	1.9
Economic	1.0	1.2	3.0	1.6	2.9	3.4	2.7	3.1	2.2
Legal	1.2	1.4	1.9	2.9	2.7	3.2	3.7	3.3	2.5
Military	(1.3)	(1.3)	1.4	2.8	2.3	2.4	3.2	3.4	2.3
Literary	1.4	1.3	2.9	2.7	2.8	3.0	3.1	3.6	2.6
All Elites	1.3	1.3	2.1	2.5	2.6	$^{2.7}$	$^{2.9}$	3.2	2.4
Specialist	1.2	1.3	2.3	2.5	2.7	3.0	3.2	3.4	2.4

F(38,177) = 7.246, significant at .001

An example of position 3.0 is contained in a speech by Khrushchev at a meeting of agronomists: You say "Comrade Khrushchev said thus and so." Am I the highest authority in agricultural science? You are President of the Ukraine Republic Academy of Sciences and I am the Secretary of the Party Central Committee. You must help me in these matters, and not I you. I might be wrong, and if I am, you, as an honest scientist, should say: "Comrade Khrushchev, you do not quite understand the matter." If you explain things to me correctly, I will thank you for it. Let us say I was wrong. But you will say, "Comrade Khrushchev said this and I supported him." What sort of scientist is this comrades? This is toadyism and timeserving.

Pravda, December 25, 1961.

the perceived boundaries of the political arena are expanding over time. As specialist elite participation increases, Party dominance decreases: all the elites recognize greater specialist elite participation, although in 1959–65 the Party at 2.4 defines the parameters of the policy-making arena in more restrictive terms than do the Specialists.

Juxtaposed to the belief category—who is described as actually making policy—is its counterpart, a value category on who should make policy.

Hypothesis 2: The Specialist elites are pressing the Party for greater influence in the policymaking arena.

To show the extent of specialist elite pressure on the Party for a larger role in policy-making, three operational prerequisites need be met: 1) Specialist scores on the value category (who should participate?) must increase over time, 2) must be demonstrably higher than Party scores, and 3) be appreciably higher, more participatory, than perceptions of actual participation (Table 3).

Again the trend is toward greater specialist elite participation. In 1963 and 1965 the Spe-

cialists are in the participatory range, and in 1965 only the Party opts for Party dominance. The general trend for Specialists is continuous and marks a steady increase from 1952 through 1965. Developments over time are more clearly demonstrated by comparing the 1952–57 period with 1959–65 (Table 4).

TABLE 4. ELITE VALUES TOWARD POLICY-MAKING 1952-57 to 1959-65

Elites	1952–57	1959-65	% Change
Party	1.7	2.2	+29%
Economic	1.5	2.9	+93%
Legal	2.0	3.1	+55%
Military	1.7	$^{2.9}$	+71%
Literary	1.9	3.2	+68%
All Elites	1.8	2.9	+61%
Specialists	1.8	3.1	+72%

In support of the hypothesis that the specialist elites are pressing the Party for greater participation in the policy-making arena, the three requisite conditions are met:

1) Specialist scores increase over time. The

TABLE 5. COMPARISON OF SPECIALIST ELITE PERCEPTIONS AND VALUES OF THE POLICY-MAKING ARENA

Is-Should Categories	1959	1961	1963	1965	1959–1965
Specialist beliefs (who makes policy?)	2.4	2.8	2.8	3.3	2.8
Specialist values (who should make policy?)	2.7	3.0	3.2	3.4	3.1
% should $>$ is	13%	7%	14%	3%	11%

instrumental average of 3.1 in 1959-65 marks a 72% increase over 1952-57.

- 2) By 1959-65 all the specialist elites opt for a more participatory role in policy-making than the Party deems desirable. In every year from 1955 through 1965, Specialist scores are higher, i.e., more participatory, than are Party scores. Since increased elite participation directly reduces Party dominance the Party, as expected, claims that actual elite participation in the later period is greater (2.4) than desirable (2.2).
- 3) Specialist scores on who should make policy are appreciably higher in the 1959-65 period than on the question who is described as making policy (Table 5).

In sum, on the important question of policymaking, a strong participatory trend is manifested by the specialist elites and recognized by the Party. Not denying the Party's ability to check, at least temporarily, elite participation,⁴

4 Note, e.g., the effect of Khrushchev's 1957

a distinct feature of the post-Stalin period is this attitudinal development away from strict Party dominance.

2. ON DECISION-MAKING

In an ideological political system the Party is portrayed as dominant in local as well as policy level decisions, reserving for itself the role of final arbiter in disputes over implementation.

Hypothesis 3: Over time the specialist elites increasingly depict themselves as participants in the decision-making process (Table 6). The years 1959 and 1961 represent the high tide of decentralization. Participatory Party

victory over Malenkov and Zhukov on the economic and military elites, and the effect of the 1962-63 anti-parasite legislation on the legal elite. The zig-zag course for the individual elites is apparently a result of major policy disputes between the Party and specific elite.

TABLE 6. ELITE PERCEPTIONS OF THE DECISION-MAKING ARENA, 1952-1965

Elites	1952	1953	1955	1957	1959	1961	1963	1965	All Years
Party	2.4	2.4	2.6	2.6	3.3	4.0	2.1	3.1	2.8
Economic	000	2.5	3.3	2.8	4.2	3.8	2.5	$^{2.2}$	3.0
Legal	3.0	000	3.1	2.8	2.5	2.8	2.9	2.5	2.8
Military	(2.5)	(2.6)	2.5	2.9	2.2	2.7	3.3	3.0	2.7
Literary	2.1	2.7	4.1	$^{2.9}$	4.3	2.7	4.0	3.2	3.2
All Elites	2.5	2.6	3.5	2.8	3.1	3.1	2.9	2.8	2.9
Specialists	2.5	2.6	3.2	2.8	3.3	2.9	3.2	2.7	2.9

F(35,154) = 1.166, significant at .001

An example of position 5.0 is:

Indeed, if the chief means to be used in war is nuclear missiles, this means that we are obligated to construct both the theory of the art of warfare, the operational tactical training of troops and their indoctrinating with regard for the use, above all, of these weapons. This means that each officer, master sargent, sargent, soldier and sailor must learn to act, to carry out his duties and battle orders, as required by the conditions of nuclear-missile war."

Krasnaya zvezda, May 11, 1962.

scores in these years mirror Party efforts to increase production and efficiency through local initiative. By late 1961, however, the Party line changed as the inevitable consequences—"localism," "family circles," and fraud—threatened economic planning and central Party control.

The third hypothesis—a predicted Specialist increase over time—is tenuously supported with an 8% participatory increase in 1959-65 over the earlier period (Table 7).

TABLE 7. ELITE PERCEPTIONS OF THE DECISION-MAKING ARENA, 1952-57 TO 1959-65

Elites	1952–57	1959-65	% Change
Party	2.5	3.1	+23%
Economic	2.9	3.2	+11%
Legal	2.9	2.6	-12%
Military	2.6	2.8	+ 8%
Literary	3.1	3.6	+18%
All Elites	2.8	2.9	+ 5%
Specialists	2.8	3.0	+ 8%

The level of elite participatory attitudes in both periods is high, significantly higher than on policy-making, and seemingly reflects greater tolerance by the Party of specialist elite participation at the local level. With an instrumental score of 3.0 in 1959-65, the Specialists perceive themselves as relative equals to the Party in decision-making.

Hypothesis 4: The Specialists are pressing the Party for greater influence on the decision-making level (Table 8).

For specialists, instrumental scores on who should make decisions are manifested in every

year from the death of Stalin onward, and a 16% overall increase is recorded over time (Table 9).

TABLE 9. ELITE VALUES TOWARD DECISION-MAKING 1952-57 TO 1959-65

Elites	1952–57	1959-65,	% Change
Party	2.7	2.9	+ 7%
Economic	3.4	4.1	+21%
Legal	3.0	3.7	+23%
Military	3.0	3.0	000%
Literary	3.3	3.6	+ 9%
All Elites	3.1	3.5	+13%
Specialists	3.1	3.6	+16%

In both periods the Specialists score in the instrumental range, and in 1959-65 all the specialist elites press for greater participation than the Party believes desirable.

When specialist elite perceptions of the decision-making process (who makes decisions?) are compared to elite values (who should make decisions?) two patterns emerge:

1) Despite ups and downs through the years; in each of the sampled years the Specialists opt for greater responsibility in decision-making than they depict themselves as having (Table 10).

2) Of all the elites in the 1959-65 period, only the Party claims that elite participation (perceived by the Party to be 3.1) is greater than desirable (2.9). If it is true that the Party is seeking a formula for balancing a high level of specialist elite participation with Party control, a comparison of Party and Specialist scores on who should make decisions suggests that the specialist elites seek to upset the mini-

TABLE 8. ELITE VALUES TOWARD PARTICIPATION IN THE DECISION-MAKING ARENA, 1952-1965

Elites	1952	1953	1955	1957	1959	1961	1963	1965	All Years
Party	3.1	2.8	3.4	2.1	3.7	3.6	2.3	2.1	2.9
Economic	3.3	4.0	4.3	2.2	4.5	3.8	4.0	4.2	3.8
Legal	1.7	3.6	3.3	3.3	4.1	4.1	3.2	3.4	3.4
Military	(2.9)	(3.3)	2.3	4.1	3.0	2.9	2.9	3.2	3.1
Literary	3.8	2.6	3.7	3.2	3.9	4.5	3.2	3.4	3.5
All Elites	2.9	3.0	3.3	3.0	3.9	3.7	3.3	3.3	3.3
Specialists	2.9	3.1	3.3	3.2	3.9	3.8	3.4	3.6	3.4

F(37,194) = 1.767, significant at .001

a An example of position 5.0, taken from Khrushchev's speech at the Moscow Writers' Union: I do not think I ought to take up an analysis of your works in my address. I am not a literary critic, as you know, and for that reason do not feel called on to analyze your literary works. Pravda, May 22, 1959.

TABLE 10. COMPARISON OF SPECIALIST PERCEPTIONS OF THE DECISION-MAKING ARENA TO SPECIALIST PARTICIPATORY VALUES, 1952-65

Should-Is Categories	1952	1953	1955	1957	1959	1961	1963	1965	1952–57	1959–65	All Years
Who makes decisions	2.5	2.6	3.2	2.8	3.3	2.9	3.2	2.7	2.8	3.0	2.9
Should make decisions	2.9	3.1	3.3	3.2	3.9	3.8	3.4	3.6	3.1	3.6	3.3
% should > is	16%	19%	3%	14%	18%	31%	6%	33%	11%	20%	14%

max formula at the Party's expense (Table 11).

TABLE 11. COMPARISON OF PARTY AND SPECIALIST VALUES TOWARD PARTICIPATION IN DECISION-MAKING (WHO SHOULD MAKE DECISIONS?)

Elites	1952-57	1959-65	All Years
Party Specialists	2.7 3.1	2.9 3.6	2.8 3.4
% Spec. > Party	15%	24%	21%

Scanning the data on the decision-making categories it appears that the military is closest to the Party's position, but this compliance is, as will be demonstrated in the discussion of Party-Specialist conflict, directly traceable to Zhukov's defeat in 1957, and scores in the later years suggest that the military has strengthened its position since the Cuban missile crisis. The economic elite, despite its decline in 1957 following Malenkov's fall and Khrushchev's industrial reorganization, scores in the instrumental range on decision-making, reflecting a degree of success in its drive for greater managerial influence at the factory level. (Scores on the policy level follow a similar course.) The legal elite—the only specialist elite to experience a decline in participation on the decisional level, apparently a result of the Party's post-1958 retreat on socialist legality -topped all elites with a 23% increase over time on who should make decisions, indicating dissatisfaction with Party dominance. (An identical pattern occurred on the policy-making categories.) In both the 1952-57 and 1959-65 periods, the literary elite scored in the participatory range on decision-making and is, predictably, kept from still higher scores by the more Party-oriented attitudes articulated in the conservative journal Oktyabr. All in all, specialist elite participation in the decision-making arena is significant at 2.9 for All Years, and pressure to enhance their participatory role (3.4 for All Years) is growing increasingly strong over time.

3. AUTHORITY SOURCES IN PROBLEM SOLVING

A relationship exists between the form of political system and the type of rationalizations used in initiating, defending, and criticizing policy decisions. Historically, the dominance of the Party in the Soviet political system is linked to its claim of ideological supremacy. Certain sources of authority are supportive of CPSU dominance, e.g., the justification of policy decisions based on an appeal to Leninist historical consciousness, whereas other authority sources, for instance, a policy recommendation based on empirical evidence or expert opinion, are more conducive to specialistelite participation in the political process. In the category tapping the authority sources appealed to by the five elites in justifying their position on policies and decisions, lower scores of 1.0-2.9 reflect a Party dominant ideological system, scores in the 3.0-3.9 range are conducive to joint Party-specialist participation, and the higher scores of 4.0-5.0 support a more instrumental environment for specialist elite participation.

Hypothesis 5: Over time, as elite participation increases, the elites will opt for more instrumental forms of justification (Table 12).

As specialist elite participation increases it is hypothesized that the elites will tend increasingly to justify and criticize policy decisions in more instrumental terms, since appeals to historical consciousness and ideological awareness

TABLE 12. ELITE JUSTIFICATIONS FOR POLICY RECOMMENDATIONS, 1952-1965

What is the authority source appealed to in policy and decision making? How are policy decisions justified?

- 1.0 recommendations are based on an understanding of the laws of historical development/by analogy to a theory or decision of Marx, Lenin, Stalin in the past
- 2.0 recommendation is generally derived from Marxism, Leninism, Stalinism
- 3.0 recommendation is derived from Marxism. Leninism, Stalinism, in conjunction with practice/scientific Marxist-Leninist analysis/Marxism and objective analysis^a
- 4.0 recommendation is based on expert opinions/the clash of opinions/discussion
- 5.0 recommendation is derived from objective investigation/by empirical methods/by scientific findings

Elites	1952	1953	1955	1957	1959	1961	1963	1965	All Years
Party	2.3	2.5	2.8	3.3	3.9	3.4	3.1	2.5	2.9
Economic	2.1	2.6	3.2	2.8	3.1	3.1	3.8	3.6	3.1
Legal	1.5	2.7	3.2	3.8	3.5	3.7	4.0	3.2	3.1
Military	(2.1)	(2.5)	2.3	2.6	2.3	2.3	2.7	2.9	2.5
Literary	2.2	2.2	2.5	3.4	3.3	2.5	3.2	3.1	$^{2.9}$
All Elites	2.1	2.5°	2.8	3.2	3.4	2.9	3.3	3.1	2.9
Specialists	2.0	2.5	2.8	3.1	3.1	2.9	3.4	3.2	2.9

F(38,209) = 2.661, significant at .001

^a An example of position 3.0:

Marxism is not an "universal master key" which can be applied without study practice and without analyzing the data of practice. Authors who construct their conclusions merely on superficial analogies, [position 1.0] or interpretations, comparisons, and "analyses" of quotations [position 2.0] and not on the study of facts—on the study of life—need to be reminded of how the founders of Marxism described the significance of the theory they established.

Kommunist, No. 7, 1955.

are more supportive of Party dominance. Comparing the two periods, the trend over time marks a significant change away from strict ideological appeals (Table 13).

TABLE 13. ELITE JUSTIFICATIONS FOR POLICY RECOMMENDATIONS, 1952-57 TO 1959-65

Elites	1952-57	1959–65	% Change
Party	2.8	3.2	+14%
Economic	2.6	3.5	+35%
Legal	2.8	3.5	+25%
Military	2.4	2.6	+ 8%
Literary	2.7	3.0	+11%
All Elites	2.6	3.2	+23%
Specialists	2.6	3.2	+23%

With Specialists in the instrumental range in four of the last five years and showing a 23% increase over time, the hypothesis is generally affirmed. In the 1959-65 period all elites but the military tend to evaluate policies in instrumental terms more conducive to specialist

elite participation. Party scores are high; throughout the Khrushchev years from 1957–1963, the Party scored in the instrumental range. This development may qualify as one indicator of what some observers, notably Barrington Moore, foresee as a Soviet potential for "technical-rational" development.⁵

4. PARTICIPATORY VALUES: AN OVERVIEW

Although the hypotheses and categories are analytically distinct, all relate to the basic question of elite participation. By collapsing the categories into one dimension and averaging each elite's score on all five categories, a Grand Mean score is derived which may serve as a general indicator of overall participatory trends in the post-Stalin period (Table 14).

Readily visible at the outset is the year by year instrumental increase for Specialists from 1952 through 1965. Participatory trends are manifested by all the elites (Table 15).

⁵ Terror and Progress—USSR (New York, Harpur Torchbooks, 1954), chap. 7.

TABLE 14. ELITE ATTITUDES TOWARD PARTICIPATION: ALL CATEGORIES COMBINED 1952-1965

Elites	1952	1953	1955	1957	1959	1961	1963	1965	All Years
Party	2.3	2.2	2.5	2.3	3.2	3.2	2.2	2.5	2.6
Economic	2.3	2.6	3.2	2.2	3.6	3.4	3.1	3.3	2.9
Legal	1.9	2.3	2.8	3.2	2.9	3.6	3.3	3.2	-2.9
Military	2.	2.2	2.0	2.7	2.5	2.5	3.1	3.0	2.5
Literary	2.2	2.0	3.0	3.0	3.4	2.9	3.2	3.3	2.9
All Elites	2. I	2.2	2.5	2.7	3.1	3.0	3.0	3.1	2.8
Specialists	2.I	2.2	2.7	2.8	3.1	3.1	3.2	3.2	2.8

TABLE 15. ELITE ATTITUDES TOWARD PARTICIPATION: ALL CATEGORIES COMBINED, 1952-57 TO 1959-65

Elites	1952–57	1959-65	% Change
Party	2.3	2.8	+22%
Economic	2.5	3.4	+36%
Legal	2.6	3.2	+23%
Military	2.5	2.7	+ 8%
Literary	2.6	3.2	+23%
All Elites	2.5	3.1	+24%
Specialists	2.6	3.1	+19%

A 24% All-Elite increase in the latter period is significant and indicative of the rapidity of change since Stalin. Thru 1959-65 Specialists scores are in the participatory range and in 1963 and 1965 every specialist elite is over 3.0.

The military is perennially low among the specialists and at times below the Party as well. In all probability this reflects Party efforts to exercise exceptionally rigorous political controls over the military. Although not readily apparent from the figures, Marshal Zhukov's removal in 1957 was a crucial development in Party-military relations. By comparing attitudinal scores from an equal sample of articles from Krasnaya zvezdx for the period immediately preceding and following Zhukov's ouster, the effects of Zhukov's dismissal on the military elite are demonstrated (Table 16).

TABLE 16. MILITARY ATTITUDES SURROUNDING MARSHAL ZHUKOV'S DISMISSAL

Categories	Pre- Zhukov Ouster	Post- Zhukov Ouster	All 1957
Who Makes Policy?	1.7	1.0	1.3
Who Should Make Policy?	3.6	1.5	2.8
Who Makes Decisions?	3.5	2.0	2.9
Who Should Make Decisions?	4.4	2.8	4.1
Authority Source	2.7	1.9	2.6
All Categories Combined	3.3	1.9	2.7

The "price" Khrushchev paid for the military's support against the anti-Party group was for a time exceedingly high. From the data Zhukov's major thrust was for greater autonomy in the decision-making arena: a score of 4.4 represents a virtual denial of Party influence over local level military affairs. Not until 1963—following the Cuban missile crisis—did the military recover from the post-Zhukov crackdown. The decline in military scores following an open confrontation against the Party is a characteristic pattern for all the specialist elites, again demonstrating the Party's capacity to thwart, temporarily, elite participation in the political process.

While a dysrhythmic pattern of elite behavior is typical for all the categories, 1963 marks a crisis year in Party-elite relations, for contrary to earlier developments the party's retreat in 1963 to a more Party dominant position was not, as in the past, accompanied by a general decline for the specialist elites but by an overall Specialist increase to a more instrumental position. In short, Party-elite relations became significantly more conflictful as both Party and elites denied one another a dominant role in the political arena.

III. PARTY-SPECIALIST ELITE RELATIONS

The Party, confronted with more elite participation than it considers desirable and with

6 Secondary support marking the missile crisis as a turning point in military-Party relations is found in Thomas Wolfe, Soviet Strategy at the Crossroads (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1964), and Roman Kolkowicz, The Soviet Military and the Communist Party (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1967).

7 See Carl Linden, Khruschhev and the Soviet Leadership (Baltimore: John Hopkins University Press, 1966), for a discussion of the Cuban missile crisis as a variable in Khrushchev's fall and as a possible cause for the Party's loss of control over the elites in 1963 and 1965, esp. pp. 146-147.

TABLE 17. PARTY-ELITE	RELATIONS: ACCOMMOD	DATION OR	CONFLICT:	ALL CATEGORIES
	COMBINED, 195	52-65*		

Elites	1952	1953	1955	1957	1959	1961	1963	1965	All Years
Economic	17	+.35	+.73	12	+.36	+.23	+.91	+.88	+.37
Legal	48	+.07	+.29	+.84	30	+.37	+.03	+.78	+.34
Military	-(.20)	+(.05)	47	+.44	74	69	+.80	+.56	03
Literary	13	22	+.49	+.69	+.16	25	+.97	+.82	+.36
Specialists	24	+.02	+.23	+.45	12	10	+.95	+.77	+.27

^{*} minus scores denote accommodation, plus scores conflict.

still higher elite aspirations, finds it increasingly difficult to enforce mini-max boundaries on the specialist elites. Comparing elite beliefs and values, two types of Party-elite relations may be identified: accommodation or conflict. Accommodation exists when both the Party and specialist elites substantially agree on the allocation or responsibility in policy and decision making. Conflict—opting for mutually exclusive values—exists when the Party and elites substantially disagree on the allocation of responsibility in the political arena.8

Tentatively:

Hypothesis 6: As specialist elite participation increases, Party-elite conflict increases.

And:

Hypothesis 7: As specialist elite participation increases beyond Party dominance, i.e., beyond mini-max boundaries, the intensity of conflict increases.

Focusing on system-wide trends, Partyelite relations may be typed by comparing differential scores on the combined category (Table 17).

All-Year differential scores show that the economic, literary, and legal elites are in conflict with the Party. The military, at -.03, is in a

* In operational terms, accommodation exists when the Party's score on the participatory categories is higher than the elite's score, i.e., when the specialist score is within the Party's prescribed boundary of the political arena. (E.g., if the Party score is 2.90 and the specialist score 2.50, the extent of accommodation is —.40, the minus sign denoting accommodation.) Conflict exists when the specialist elite score is more participatory than that of the Party. (E.g., if the Party score is 2.50 and the elite score 3.00, the level of conflict is +.50, plus signs denoting conflict.) For clarity all mean scores are carried two decimal places in the accommodation conflict tables.

"bare bargain" relationship. The years 1952, 1959, and 1961 are periods of accommodation, 1955, 1957, 1963 and 1965 years of conflict. Since 1959 and 1961 are the only two years in which the party scored in the instrumental range. Party-elite accommodation in these two years is largely due to the Party's permissive definition of the boundaries of the political arena. With +.27 the All-Year conflict score, those years above the mean constitute "crisis years"; rank ordered the crisis years in Party-Specialist relations are 1963, 1965, and 1957, notably, all periods related to succession crises. thereby lending support to the notion that when the Party is internally divided elite participation increases.

On scanning the differential scores of the individual elites an interesting pattern emerges: following an open confrontation against the Party, the elite typically moves from conflict to accommodation, then, in the next sampled year back into a conflict relationship with the Party. For example, note the two-steps-forward, one-step-back pattern for the economic elite in the years from 1955 thru 1959, the legal elite's 1959 accommodating position following the Party's 1958 retreat on the Fundamental Laws, and the military's 1959 score following Marshal Zhukov's ouster. Accommodation, it appears, is enforced accommodation—is a result of successful Party efforts to thwart elite encroachments in the political arena, rather than a sign of a consensual definition of the boundaries of the political system. Within this framework, conflict signifies the Party's inability to control the participatory beliefs and aspirations of the specialist elites.

As predicted in hypothesis 6, Party-elite conflict increases over time (Table 18).

A threefold increase in conflict is significant, especially so when it is recalled that All-Elite participation scores on the combined category increased by 24%, and the Party moved from 2.3 in the early period to a mini-max score of

TABLE 18. PARTY-ELITE RELATIONS: ACCOMMODATION OR CONFLICT ALL CATEGORIES COMBINED, 1952-57 TO 1959-65

Elites	1952-57	1959-62
Economic	+.20	+.60
Legal	+.18	+.47
Military	05	02
Literary	+.21	+.43
Specialists	+.12	+.37

2.8 in 1959-65. In the later period, then, Partyelite conflict increases at a sharper rate than does elite participation, thereby supporting the predicted increase in intensity of conflict as Party dominance is threatened by the Specialist elites.

Conflict characterizes Party-elite relations in the post-Stalin period and in particular in the later years. This conflict is becoming generalized throughout the system. All the dimensions are in conflict (Table 19).

Two inferences may be drawn from this comparison of conflict scores. First, the focus of Party-specialist elite conflict is changing over time: in 1952-57 the question of elite participation on the decision-making level was most in conflict, while in 1959-65 participation in the policy-making arena ranks as the major source of Party-elite conflict. Since specialist elite participation in the policy-making arena threatens the Party's integrative role, this development constitutes a most serious challenge to the Party's position in the Soviet political system.

Secondly, while all dimensions but the perceived boundaries of the decision-making arena are in conflict in 1959-65, this one instance of accommodation is a result of the Party exceeding its mini-max boundaries with a participatory score of 3.1. That responsibility for decision-making is in contention is apparent

from the +.73 1959-65 conflict score on who should participate—the Party opting for 2.9 (the absolute maximum level for maintaining dominance in the decision-making arena), the Specialists denying Party dominance with a 3.6 average in 1959-65. Thus, by the later period the 2.5-2.9 mini-max range no longer represents the boundaries of compromise but a field of conflict.

IV. CONCLUSION

Three systemic trends emerge from a review of the data:

1. Elite participatory attitudes show a marked increase over time, reaching the instrumental level in 1959-1965. By plotting All-Elite grand mean scores on the ideological-instrumental continuum this trend is graphically depicted in Figure 2.

With 3.0 corresponding to joint Party-elite participation, the trend is away from Party dominance toward what appears to be a "polyarchical" system, toward what H. Gordon Skilling calls a "pluralism of elites." 10

- 2. Conflict characterizes Party-specialist elite relations in the post-Stain period. Party-elite conflict exists in both periods. In 1952-1957, with a Specialist participation score of 2.5, the extent of Party-elite conflict is +.12, while in 1959-65 the level of Specialist participation climbs to 3.1 and the level of conflict to +.37. In short, as specialist elite participatory attitudes increased by one-quarter, Party-elite conflict showed a threefold increase, despite the Party's move from 2.3 to a mini-max position of 2.8.
- 3. Concomitant with the attitudinal development toward elite participation and the intensification of Party-elite conflict is the trend
- ⁹ Robert A. Dahl, *Preface to Democratic Theory* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1956), chap. 3.
- ¹⁰ "Interest Groups and Communist Politics," World Politics, 18 (June, 1966), p. 449.

TABLE 19. PARTY-SPECIALISTS RELATIONS: ACCOMMODATION OR CONFLICT, 1952-65

Categories	1952	1953	1955	1957	1959	1961	1963	1965	All Years
who makes policy?	14	26	08	+.71	47	+.14	+1.13	+1.05	+.26
who should make policy?	69	06	+.82	43	+.49	+.75	+1.15	+.93	+.48
who makes decisions."	+.10	+.23	+.63	+.21	01	-1.13	+1.10	32	+.10
who should make de-									
cisions?	11	+.25	17	+1.08	+.15	+.24	+1.02	+1.50	+.50
authority sources	36	04	04	18	•	+.50	+.32	+.71	+.02
All Categories	24	+.02	23	+.45	12	+.10	+.95	+.77	+.27

IDEOLOGICAL		F	'AR'	ey-si	PECIA	LIS	T		INSTRUM	IENTAL
(party dominance)			(partic	ipation	1)			(specialist pa	rticipation)
	1952	1953	1955	1957	1963	1959	1961	1965		
***************************************	×	×	×	×	×	×	×	×		
1.0	2.0				3.0				4.0	5.0

Fig. 2. The Ideological-Instrumental Continuum All-Elite Scores on All Categories

toward an erosion of the ideological foundations of Party dominance—toward what Almond and Powell call the "secularization of values." Over the years all the elites, the Party included, increasingly come to rely on scientific knowledge and expert skills as crucial resources in the decision-making process.

In sum, the Soviet political system is com-

¹¹ Gabriel A. Almond and G. Bingham Powell, Jr., Comparative Politics: A Developmental Approach (Boston: Little, Brown & Co., 1967), pp. 24-25; the secularization of culture is described as:

the process whereby traditional orientations and attitudes give way to more dynamic decision-making processes involving the gathering of information, the evaluation of information, the laying out of alternative courses of action, the selection of a course of action from among these possible courses, and the means whereby one tests whether or not a given course of action is producing the consequences which were intended.

petitive. By 1959-1965 participatory elite attitudes and Party-elite conflict reach levels which are incompatible with the totalitarian model. The Party's capacity to dominate what Stalin fondly called the "commanding heights" is an empirical question, not an absolute given in the post-Stalin period. This is not to deny that the Party is more powerful than the elites, but rather that the Party is not omnipotent. Party-specialist elite interdependence, not Party dominance, characterizes Party-elite relations. New models of Soviet politics are obviously needed. The conception of the Soviet political system as a monolith is a myth.

¹² See H. Gordon Skilling, op. cit., pp. 449-551; Alex Inkeles, "Models in the Analysis of Soviet Society, Survey, No. 60 (July, 1966), pp. 3-12; Joel J. Schwartz and William R. Keech, "Group Influence on the Policy Process in the Soviet Union," this REVIEW, 840-851.

GROUP INFLUENCE AND THE POLICY PROCESS IN THE SOVIET UNION*

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It has become widely recognized that Soviet officials do not formulate public policy in a vacuum, and that, indeed, their deliberations take into account in some fashion the needs and demands of various elements of the society. Further, it has been observed that social groups of various types play a noticeable, if only rudimentary role in articulating interests to the top of the hierarchy. In fact one author has gone so far as to assert that communist policy-making results from a "parallelogram of conflicting forces and interests." While such viewpoints are now far more widely accepted than in the early fifties, relatively little effort has been devoted to illustrating cr illuminating how Soviet public policy in general or even a given Soviet policy can be importantly affected by group activity.

We propose here to make a contribution in that direction. Using the Educational Reform Act of 1958 as an exemplary case, we intend to show how and through what process groups can affect policy outcomes, and by identifying circumstances under which this takes place to generate some hypotheses about when such influence is most likely to recur. In their excellent analysis of Soviet policy formation, Professors Brzezinski and Huntington identify what they call "policy groups," which come closest of any nongovernmental groups to participating in policy formation. These groups, such as the military, industrial managers, agricultural experts and state bureaucrats.

whose scope of activity is directly dependent on the allocation of national resources and which are directly affected by any shift in the institutional distribution of power, . . . advocate to the political leadership certain courses of action; they have their own professional or specialized newspapers which, at times and subject to over-all Party control, can become important vehicles for expressing specific points of view.²

- * The authors wish to express their appreciation to the University of North Carolina Research Council for supporting the research on this subject.
- ¹ H. Gordon Skilling, "Interest Groups and Communist Politics," World Politics, 18 (April, 1966), p. 449.
- ² Zbigniew Brzezinski and Samuel P. Huntington, *Political Power: U.S.A./U.S.S.R.* (New York, 1963), p. 196.

In this article we will investigate an instance wherein such groups seemed to influence policy with the result of virtually scuttling one of Khrushchev's own major proposals.

We do not mean to challenge the view that ultimate power in the U.S.S.R. resides at the top of the Communist Party hierarchy. Neither do we mean to infer that the top party leadership was forced by a "policy group" to act against its will. We do not suggest that the instance we cite is modal. Indeed it is the best example we are aware of. We hope that the major payoff in this paper will be in showing why things happened as they did. This is the first step in finding out whether and how often to expect them again.

The first major section of the paper will describe the situation we use as a basis for our speculative analysis about the Soviet decision making process. The second will attempt to explain why things happened as they did, and the third will report some hypotheses about when such phenomena are likely to recur.

I. DEBATE OVER THE 1958 ACT

A prominent feature of post-Stalin Russia has been the nationwide discussion of certain legislative proposals. This does not constitute a totally new innovation in the Soviet Union. During the preceding period such important laws as the constitution of 1936 received nationwide discussion before enactment. A few differences, however, deserve mention. First, the frequency of these discussions has substantially increased. Second and more important, the impact of these discussions on the proposed legislation has in some instances been far more than peripheral. This especially applies to the debate which surrounded the Educational Reform Act of 1958. A closer look at this debate will afford us an opportunity to consider how the opinion of various "publics" can influence the policy process.

There can be little doubt about whose initiative lay behind the proposed reform. At the thirteenth Komsomol Congress in April of 1958, First Party Secretary Khrushchev severely criticized the existing school system and demanded fundamental changes.³ This attack seems to have been motivated by three prob-

³ Khrushchev's statement can be found in XIII S''ezd vsesoiuznogo leninskogo kommunisticheskogo

lems facing Soviet society in the mid-fifties, the cause of which Khrushchev linked to the existing school system.

First, the Soviet press had unceasingly criticized the denigrative attitudes of the younger generation toward physical labor.4 In the opinion of the First Secretary, the undue emphasis upon classical academic training and the neglect of the polytechnical side of education were largely responsible for this attitude.

Second, competition for admission to higher education had reached an excessive degree and this likewise had caused great concern among political leaders.5 The competition itself has largely been a by-product of changes in the economic and educational systems.

Prior to 1950 the rapid growth of the economy and the underdeveloped secondary educational facilities maintained the demand for skilled technical cadres at a higher level than the supply. Throughout this period the number of available places in higher education exceeded the number of secondary school graduates. The post war years, however, witnessed a remarkable acceleration of secondary school facilities and enrollment. In 1949, out of a total enrollment of thirty-three million pupils only about one million were in grades eight to ten. Four years later the number of pupils in secondary education had risen to four and one half million. Now the annual supply of secondary school graduates greatly exceeded the number of vacancies in higher education. Since the Soviet regime, for reasons of its own, was unwilling to widen the availability of higher education, the gates of universities were closed to millions of youth regardless of their educational attainment.

An inevitable consequence has been the intensification of competition for the available number of places. The pressures for admission

souiza molodezhi: stenograficheskii otchet (Moscow 1959), pp. 278-282.

became abnormally high because of the widespread notion that a college degree represents the key to individual advancement and entrance into the new class of Soviet intelligentsia. Consequently, those high school graduates initially denied admission refused to accept their fate. Instead of entering the labor force, many of them became perennial college candidates. Very often they applied to schools whose area of specialization was of no genuine interest to them. But in the absence of alternatives they would often enter an agricultural institute just to be able "to study somewhere." Here again Khrushchev charged that the educational system had bred such attitudes. By allowing students to continue their education uninterruptedly and by stressing almost exclusively academic material, the schools naturally generated the expectation that the path to life lay solely through higher education.

The third problem involved the increasing stratification of Soviet society. The notion that higher education was the key to membership in the "new class" had a firm basis in fact. Yet these educational channels for upward social and political mobility were being drastically constricted as a consequence of their preemption by the incumbent political and bureaucratic elites. Khruschchev himself admitted that in the competition for admission to college the influence of parents often proved more important than the merit of the candidates. He further stated that only thirty to forty per cent of the enrolled students in higher education institutions came from worker and peasant backgrounds.9 The differential access to a prime source of mobility gravely concerned the First Sectetary. Both the content and tenor of his statements clearly indicate that Khrushchev sought to eliminated privilege and inequality from the Soviet educational system. 10

Finally we should mention an additional factor which may have influenced the reform movement. At the time of the debate some western scholars argued that the specifics of Khrushchev's proposals owed much to the serious labor shortage the Soviet economy was about to experience.11 The argument may be

⁴ See, for example, L. Bueva, "Tvorcheskii trud- osnova kommunisticheskogo vospitaniia molodezhi," Kommunist, Vol. 37, No. 3 (Feb., 1961), p. 53; and also Komsomol' skaia pravda, March 2, 1956; February 10, 1957.

⁵ See XIII S'ezd. op. cit., p. 280. See also S. Pavlov, "Sovetskaia molodezh' v bor'be za kommunizm," Kommunist, Vol. 36, No. 4 (March, 1960), p. 63.

⁶ Nicholas DeWitt, Education and Professional Employment in the USSR (Washington, 1961), p. 140.

⁷ In his speech to the XIII Komsomol Congress, Khrushchev noted that "last year higher educational institutions were able to accept

^{400 000} new students, half of them for full time study .--. However, at least 700,000 secondary school graduates failed to gain admission last year to higher or technical schools and between 1953-1956 about 2,200,000 failed to gain admission" XIII S"ezd, op. cit., p. 278.

⁸ Ibid, p. 282.

⁹ Pravda, September 21, 1958.

¹⁰ XIII S"ezd, op. cit., p. 280.

¹³ See, for example, DeWitt, op. cit., p. 15.

briefly summarized as follows. Because of severe war losses and a declining birth rate in the post war period the Soviet Union would have one-third fewer people entering the labor force during the late fifties and early sixties than normally would have been the case. Consequently the ambitious economic growth program could be achieved only if the vast majority of young people were channelled into the active labor force instead of higher education. It is important to note, however, that the Soviet press never cited a labor deficit as cause for the reform. Other evidence also casts doubt apon the validity of this thesis. 12

While there is room for disagreement as to what problems motivated the reform, there is no ambiguity regarding Khrushchev's proposals for dealing with them. In September of 1958, the party secretary published his "thesis" on school reorganization.13 He suggested that continuous acedemic education be abolished and that all students be required to combine work with study. In effect this meant phasing out the ten year school which at that time constituted a completed sceondary education. After finishing a seven or eight year primary school, said Khrushchev, every young person should enter the labor force. Those who wished to prepare themselves for higher education could continue their studies in evening and correspondence schools. Successful students would receive two or three days released time from work to facilitate studying.

The substitution of part time work and study for full time education in secondary day schools had, from Karushchev's point of view, two advantages. First, it would intsill in the younger generation a respectful attitude toward physical labor. Second, it would equalize access to higher education. The secondary day schools had become the province of children from the urban intelligentsia. Evening and correspondence schools, on the other hand, recruited most of their students from worker and peasant families. The difference in the quality of education offered by these two divisions gave the day school graduate an obvious advantage. By fusing the two channels into one undifferentiated system, Khrushchev hoped to eliminate the class bias in Soviet education. The road to a higher education would be the same for all irrespective of the positions or jobs which the parents held in society.

Study in higher educational institutions was

also to be put on a part time basis. The student would acquire the first two or three years of his college education through evening or correspondence courses. Thereafter he could complete his training on a full time schedule. Moreover, no individual was to be granted admission to higher education unless he had already worked full time after completing secondary school. Once again we see Khrushchev's determination to deemphasize the purely academic side of education and to enhance the importance of work experience.

If we compare Khrushchev's September Memorandum with the actual law adopted in December 1958 we find that the two differ not only in detail but in basic principle.14 To begin with, the old secondary day school was preserved more or less intact both in form and content. Khrushchev's demand that work be combined with study had received token satisfaction by increasing the number of hours devoted to polytechnical training within the schools. But the quantity and quality of academic subjects had in no way been sacrificed. The law established an eleven year day school to replace the old ten year day school system. The addition of another year permitted greater emphasis upon labor training without simultaneously diluting the quality of academic education. Indeed, the number of hours devoted to purely academic subjects proved to be exactly the same under the new system as it had been under the old.15

The maintenance of continuous secondary full time education must be seen as a rebuff to Khrushchev's demands. When the new law went into effect, it became apparent that nearly all the former ten year schools would continue to operate as part of the new eleven year system. Some figures also suggest that the number of students enrolled in the new system was comparable in size to the two senior grades of the old ten year school. It is true that Khrushchev recognized in his memorandum the need for some full time day schools. But he envisaged

¹² For a refutation of the labor deficit thesis see "Facts and Figures," Bulletin of Radio Free Europe, September 22, 1958.

¹³ See Pravda, September 21, 1958.

¹⁴ For a text of the law see Spravochnik partiinogo rabotnika (Moscow, 1959), pp. 517-533.

¹⁶ For an analysis of this point see an article by Klaus Mehnert in *Die Welt*, July 18, 1959.

¹⁶ The actual law left this point unclear but later developments indicated that just as many children—about a third of the total—would attend full time high schools as had been the case before the reform. See Thomas Bernstein "Soviet Educational Reform," (M. A. Thesis, Columbia University, 1962), p. 111, and articles in *The New York Times*, September 2, 1959; Wall Street Journal, June 29, 1960.

that they would operate only during a transitional period and he expected their number to be sharply reduced right from the beginning of the reform.

While the eleven year system might have satisfied the demand that work be combined with study, it could not possibly have achieved Khrushchev's other expressed purpose—the elimination of privilege and inequality. The perpetuation of a bifurcated full time and part time school system insured that inequality would persist. Nevertheless the disadvantages faced by the evening and correspondence student might have significantly diminished had the law incorporated Khrushchev's suggestion regarding releasted time for study. Yet in this area as well important modifications were made. The reorganization decree left this question open and subsequent legislation resulted in a far less liberal policy.17 Under these circumstances the vast majority of college students would continue to come from the full time secondary schools and an inevitable byproduct would be the continuation of class bias in higher education.

The provision for admission to and study in higher educational institutions likewise markedly deviated from Khrushchev's suggestions. Instead of absolutely requiring full time work before admission, the law merely stipulated that priority would be granted those with the record of employment or military service. But precedence for people with production experience already existed before the reorganization of the school system. Thus the wording of the law gave only formal recognition to an on-going practice. It cannot be interpreted as a "concession" to the demands made by Khrushchev in his memorandum.

His insistence upon part time study during the first few college years appears to have been more successfully realized. At least the law accepted it in principle. However, even here some important alterations occurred. The law explicitly exempted from this requirement all students in difficult theoretical disciplines. Similarly, the requirement would be inoperative in both non-technical higher educational institutions and in arts faculties at universities since "factory work for students cannot in these cases be connected with their future

¹⁷ Instead of the two to three days released time from work as suggested by Khruschchev, students in evening schools received only one additional free day for study. See A. I. Shebanova, "O l'gotakh dlia lits sovmeshchaiushchikh rabotu s obucheniem," Sovetskoe gosudarstvo i pravo Vol. 30 (November, 1960), pp. 99–102.

job."18

Generally speaking, the education reform failed to implement the most important goals and purposes which Khrushchev had articulated in his memorandum. What factors can account for the observable disparity between the September proposal and the December law? To answer that question we must look briefly at the discussion which ensued during this period of time. The content of that debate clearly revealed that different societal groups, or at least some members of them, opposed Khrushchev's reform.

Teachers and administrators identified with the ten year school obviously wished to preserve and protect their institutional bailiwicks. But a frontal assault on the First Secretary's ideas would not have been good politics. Instead they opposed the reform more deviously. Essentially they argued that to prepare youth for manual labor it was not necessary to send them after the eighth grade to factories or farms. A much better way would be to bring the factories and farms into the schools by setting up first class workshops. Under these conditions it would be possible to teach pupils the same skills they could learn by entering the labor force. To substantiate their case the proponents of this approach assumed the initiative even before the appearance of Khrushchev's September memorandum. Prior to the opening of the school year in 1958, Y. I. Afanasenko, Minister of Education for the Russian Republic, announced that the number of schools giving training in industrial and agricultural skills would double. He further announced that the Russian Republic had begun experiment with extending secondary schools from ten to eleven years. Under the extended program students would spend half of their time at school and the other half at jobs on farms, in factories, or at construction sites. He mentioned that fifty schools with this program had operaetd the last year and this number would increase to two hundred this year. Here, in embryonic form, was the eleven year school system that became law in December of 1958. Thus, through word and deed, those occupational groups associated with full time secondary education sought to protect the organization they had built with effort and care.19

¹⁸ This point was made by the Soviet Minister of higher education and was reflected in the final law. See V. P. Eliutin, "Soveshchanie rabotnikov vysshei shkoly," *Vestnik vysshei shkoly*, Vol. 16, No. 10 (October, 1958), p. 9.

¹⁹ Literaturnaia gazeta, August 30, 1958.

Other groups opposed to the reform included higher educational and scientific personnel. Their arguments were perhaps more telling. They warned that it would be impossible under the new system to ensure the supply of highly qualified cadres for economic and societal growth. How can we, they asked, perfect and advance scientific knowledge when new entrants to higher educational schools would have only eight years of regular schooling behind them and who. in the following years, would have forgotten the little they had once learned. Several prominent educators and scientists went so far as to assert that a hiatus between incomplete and complete secondary school as well as between complete secondary school and higher education would result in irreparable damage to the state. For creative work in scientific research often manifests itself when the individual has reached his midtwenties and the acquisition of theoretical knowledge on a large scale demands uninterrupted study.20

The warning of experts reinforced grave doubts raised by many parents. The basic argument of the latter was that a shortened basic school program would adversely affect the physical and intellectual maturation of adolescents. Furthermore, it was said that channeling young people into production at an early age does not give them a chance to adequately choose a skill which best suits them.21 While both of these points had merit, parental views were somewhan suspect because other motives could be reacily discerned. As Khrushchev himself pointed out, many parents were determined that their children receive opportunities for maximum education. They saw his plans as a threat to that opportunity and responded by attacking it. To the extent that pedagogical experts echoed parental concerns. as some did, they served as a linkage between public opinion and political decision makers. By atriculating the interests of an amorphous group in technical terms, the experts transformed their claims into a politically relevant issue.

A few words must also be said about the attitudes of factory managers. Although their

opposition did not find explicit expression in the debate, their behavior left few doubts as to where they stood on the issue. Long before the question of reform had arisen, managers had displayed a reluctance to hire and train juvenile workers. Under the new arrangements they would become responsible for all sorts of educational functions for which the factory was ill prepared. Moreover, the large influx of school children and the necessity to train them would inevitably divert managers from their own duties of production and plan fulfillment. In light of this fact it is not surprising that the reform act failed to implement Khrushchev's suggestions regarding released time from work. That would have greatly complicated the managers' tasks and we can assume that their views were transmitted to the proper authorities.22

At this point, our task is to account for the role of groups in forming educational policy in this instance by interpreting a number of facts. The objective facts we must work from are, in summary, that Khrushchev made a far-reaching proposal to deal with a number of educational problems facing the regime, and that the substance of the proposal was radically modified. The major proponent of the reform was obviously Khrushchev himself. The most important—indeed the only—opponents of the changes we can identify are the social groups cited above.

Here we should note that if one quantifies the number of articles which appeared during the debate, the oppositional point of view is clearly a minority. It is quite possible that a "war of memoranda" may have been raging behind the scenes and that during this exchange the minority position was in fact the majority point of view.²³ Whatever may have been the case, it is undeniable that the opposi-

²² For a scathing criticism of managerial attitudes toward juvenile workers see the lead editorial in *Pravda*, September 25, 1957.

²³ There is some evidence that the opposition was far greater than one would gather from simply reading the official press. For example, relatively few parental criticisms found their way into print. But during 1963–64 when the first author of this paper was conducting interviews in the Soviet Union, it was learned that a very large number of urban middle class parents had strongly criticized Khrushchev's proposals at "PTA" meetings held during the reform debate period. Similarly, Professor William Johnson of the University of Pittsburgh told the same author that opposition among educational officials was far more widespread than the official press revealed. Professor Johnson was in the Soviet Union at the time of the

²⁰ For examples of such arguments see *Literaturnia gazeta*, June 26, 1958; December 20, 1958; *Pravda*, September 24, 1958; October 17, 1958; November 19, 1958. K Ia Kondrat'ev and P.A. Shi'lov" O nekotorykh voprosakh universitetskogo obrazovaniia," *Vεstnik vysshei shkoly*, Vol. 16, No. 10 (October, 1958), pp. 17–23.

²¹ See Pravda, November 30, 1958; December 2, 1958; Literaturnaia gazeta, December 20, 1958.

tional arguments were closer to the form of the finally enacted law.

There are several possible interpretations which would explain the outcome of the educational reform debate. One might argue, for example, that the disparity between the September memorandum and the December law resulted from Khrushchev changing his mind. Once the technocratic elites had pointed out the potentially dangerous consequences inherent in Khrushchev's proposals, the First Secretary simply revised his original position. There is no way, of course, to verify or falsify this interpretation. Since we have no knowledge of Khrushchev's preference schedule or to whom he would most likely listen, we must allow for the possibility that anyone who had a position and stated it prior to the outcome might have influenced Khrushchev. If we accept this interpretation, however, we must resolve certain questions which detract from its credibility.

When Khrushchev spoke to the Komsomol Congress in April, 1958, he stated that the Party Central Committee had, for some time, been discussing the improvement of public education. Presumably, experts had been consulted during the course of such discussions. We might also presume that Khrushchev sounded out experts between April and September when he was preparing a detailed proposal for educational reform. In light of this, it seems unlikely that Khrushchev changed his mind because he heard convincing arguments which had not been made in the far longer period which preceded publication of his memorandum.

It is also important to recall that Khrushchev clearly identified himself personally with the issue of educational reform. He placed his public prestige squarely upon the line. As Richard Neustadt has pointed out, chief executives cannot afford to make indiscriminate public pronouncements. If they are sensitive to the prerequisites of power and influence, they must carefully weigh the consequences which flow from what, when and how they say things.24 All the evidence we have on Khrushchev's career suggests that he was highly sensitive to the requisites of power and influence. Thus not only did the First Secretary have ample opportunity to consult expert opinion on the educational question, but he also had a

Our own inclination then is to discount. though not categorically reject, the possibility that Khrushchev simply changed his mind between September and December. An alternative interpretation is that bureaucratic groups prevailed over the First Secretary and forced him to act against his will.25 To accept this, however, would demand a rewriting of the literature on political power and resources in the Soviet Union that we think is neither necessary nor appropriate. It is quite easy on the other hand to imagine more important actors prevailing over Khrushchev with the social groups associating themselves spuriously, so to speak, with the stronger actors. In suggesting this interpretation we must argue inferentially because the only direct evidence we have about opposition to the proposal relates to the groups. In the section below we will attempt to account for what happened and to assess the role of the social groups in it.

II. THE ROLE OF SOCIAL GROUPS IN SHAPING THE ACT

Brzezinski and Huntington express the orthodox interpretation in arguing that the key political resource in the Soviet Union is control of the party organization, and that such control can be shared only at the top.

Thus, insofar as there are limits on the power of the top leader in the Soviet Union, they stem from his sharing control of the apparat with a small number of colleagues... the principal limits on the power of the Soviet leader are inside the Kremlin.²⁶

We agree, and we feel that those colleagues were crucially important in defeating Khrushchev's proposal. But the opposition of the groups identified above was not coincidental. We submit that the groups were mobilized after the dispute was left unresolved at the top.

Such an argument forces us to take sides in a dispute among Soviet scholars about whether or not there is conflict within the Soviet leadership at times other than succession crises. It is the position of the "conflict" school that policy issues such as those on agriculture, heavy industry, consumer goods, foreign affairs, Stalinism, economic reorganization and education are continuous sources of dispute

vested political interest in doing so before publicly stating his position.

debate and is known to have extensive contacts with Soviet educators.

²⁴ Richard Neustadt, *Presidential Power* (New York, 1964).

²⁵ For an analysis of the reform with this type of implication see David Burg, "Some thoughts on the Soviet educational reform," *Bulletin*, 6 (March, 1959), 32–36.

²⁶ Brzezinski and Huntington, op. cit., p. 145.

among the top leadership. When one issue is resolved, another is likely to take its place. We think there is strong evidence for this viewpoint, which became more compelling than ever with Khrushchev's political demise in October, 1964.²⁷

In this specific case, Khrushchev stated in April. 1958, that the Party Central Committee was presently engaged in preparing a resolution on the improvement of public education.28 But the September "theses" proved to be simply a note by Khrushchev with the "approval" of the Central Committee, instead of a formal resolution by that august body. This suggests that Khrushchev's educational reform was a highly personal document which lacked support among a substantial element of the top political leadership. Esoteric evidence to support this thesis is provided by the unusual silence of the top political leadership during the educational reform debate. Khrushchev appears to have been the only Praesidium member to have played a significant role in the reform discussions and to have clearly and publicly expressed his attitudes. Sidney Ploss has argued that in the context of Soviet politics the silence of leaders on a topical issue must be construed as disagreement with the expressed viewpoint of their colleagues.29 It is also significant that major amendments to Khrushchev's plan were reflected in the Central Committee resolution on education reform which was finally issued on November 16, 1958.30

If, as we have argued, the important conflict was on the top leadership level, and if the persons on that level have the power to determine policy outcomes, what role did the social groups play? The answer hangs on the nature of conflict among the leaders. It is well known that such conflict involves elements of power struggle and elements of dispute over policy alternatives. Sometimes these elements operate independently of one another; more often they intertwine. Since Khrushchev had decisively defeated his rivals for power in 1957, we can assume that in the case of the education

reforms of 1958 the elements of power struggle were less important than at almost any time since Stalin's death, and that the elements of unadulterated policy dispute were correspondingly more important. Indeed, it is unlikely that Khrushchev would have survived such a defeat as this had this policy dispute involved much power struggle.

Insofar as this was really a policy dispute, it involved numerous problem-solving considerations, as we emphasized above. The problems and policy positions associated with them involved a number of questions of judgment about what courses of action would solve the problem, and what the consequences of such action would have for other goals of the regime. It is here that the groups play an important role. Numerous groups have recognized expertise about what problems are in their own area. The ten year school personnel had an authoritative position for a judgment that students could get work experience without radically changing the school organization and curriculum. The scientific community had good claim to special insight into the needs of training scientists. Parents may be viewed as having some legitimate judgment about the needs of adolescents, although this is less apparently expertise. One student of the reform debate has argued that

The most important factors responsible for the change in Khrushchev's original proposals probably were the arguments of experts—the function of expert opinion was to point out to the leadership the possibly harmful consequences to Soviet society of the literal adoption of Khrushchev's original plans.³²

It is hard to identify any concrete resource other than their own recognized expertise which the groups might have used in the dispute. Neither money, votes nor popularity were relevant to its resolution. Only the expert judgment was clearly relevant. The only reasonable alternative would seem to be that the regime may have accorded the positions of these groups a certain legitimacy just because they were group preferences, much as an American public official might yield to a constituent's demand simply because he views it as legitimate and because he may view his job as one of servicing such demands when they are legitimate and do not conflict with other goals. We have no reason to believe that Soviet officials view their jobs this way. Communist ideology, unlike democratic ideology, supplies

²⁷ See for example, Carl A. Linden, Khrushchev and the Soviet Leadership 1957-1964 (Baltimore. 1966).

²⁸ See XIII S''ezd, op. cit., p. 282.

²⁹ See Conflict and Decision-Making in Soviet Russia (Princeton, 1965), p. 17-18.

³⁰ For an analysis of these amendments see Rudolph Schlesinger, "The Educational Reform," Soviet Studies, 10 (April, 1959), 432-444.

²¹ See Brzezinski and Huntington, op. cit., pp. 267, 269-283, 295-300.

³² Bernstein, op. cit., p. 119. See also Brzezinski and Huntington, p. 214.

its own policy goals, rather than depending on public expressions of preference to define them. Besides, we have already seen that the goals of these groups conflicted with the goals of none other than the First Secretary of the Communist Party. It does seem apparent that insofar as groups influenced the outcome of this issue it was through the communication of their expert judgments to people at the top of the hierarchy who were in a position to influence outcomes. The expertise became a resource to be used in making a case that more harm than good would result from the proposed reform.33 We contend that in the Soviet Union policy issues are often decided on the basis of such debates. If such is the case the arguments of persons who are recognized as being knowledgeable can be an important resource for the proponent or opponent of a policy proposal.34

One can see elements of ambiguity in this interpretation of the role of these groups as articulators of expert judgment. It may appear, for example, that the ten year school personnel are looking out for themselves when they oppose changes in their institution. The position of the parents seems even more transparent. There may even have been some selfinterest involved in the position of the scientists. The point is that there is no objective way for either Soviet leaders or American scholars to clearly separate the elements of self-interest from those of expert predictions of dire consequences. We would argue that in western democracies as well there is often an almost indecipherable mixture of preference and prediction in policy debate. For example,

33 In this instance, many political leaders may have been especially inclined to "believe" these arguments. As primary members of the new class, Communist Party cadres had good reason to support the educational status quo. They were among the chief beneficiaries of the existing system. Their children enjoyed advantageous access to full-time secondary and higher education. There is no question that such cadres hoped to perpetuate the provision of such education for their children. Khruschhev's proposals surely must have caused consternation among party cadres which other top party leaders would readily have been conscious of. In this respect the party itself was probably an important constituent pressure group which reinforced the doubts Khrushchev's colleagues had about the widsom of his proposals.

³⁴ For a view of government as problem solving and adapting to environments in which communications play a crucial role, see Karl W. Deutsch, *The Nerves of Government* (New York, 1963).

social welfare policies in the United States are commonly defended in terms of the prospects of contraction and recession if welfare funds are not fed into the economy. The very ambiguity between preference and prediction may serve to enhance the prospects of group influence through the pressing of interests with the support of expert judgments. The congruence of one's interests with one's predictions is probably less important than the persuasiveness of the predictions and the acknowledged expertness of predictors, no matter whose interests they seem to support.

This almost inevitable mixture of self-interest and expertise provides a channel through which groups in the Soviet Union may influence policy when higher powers seek their judgment. We do not know how common this occurence is, but we are confident that expertise is not used in this way to resolve all policy disputes. We will devote the remainder of this paper to an assessment of conditions leading to such a state, and to hypotheses about when to expect it. Our first set of hypotheses deal with what conditions within the current post-Stalin regime will be associated with such group influence. The second set will attempt to identify what it is about post-Stalinist Russia that makes this possible in contrast with the Stalin era.

III. SOME HYPOTHESES

Leadership conflict has already been cited as an important factor in leading top officials to look to group expertise. It is more than conceivable that monolithic leadership would itself seek expert advice, but we expect that it would do so more surreptitiously than through semi-public debate. More importantly, it could ignore the advice when it chose to rather than in effect being reversed by it. Under conditions of leadership conflict, unresolved disputes may lead some of the participants to broaden the scope of conflict by involving policy groups who might shift the balance. The dynamic involved may be something like the following. There is a split, for example, among the Politbureau, wherein the First Secretary is about to prevail. Holders of the minority position may react to their imminent defeat by contacting their sympathizers among the "policy groups" and urging them to state their position on the issue in their specialized publications, in hopes that the balance of power will shift in their favor when more actors are involved. Broadening the scope of conflict may change the outcome.35

³⁵ See Ploss, op. cit., pp. 61, 84, 286, for other

We hypothesize that the more and greater the disputes on the top policy making level, the more likely it is that policy groups will be involved and listened to.

Brzezinski and Huntington point out that policy-makers are "more responsive to the demands or aspirations of groups" during a struggle for power, which would seem to bear out our point.36 They use Khrushchev's struggle as an example but they themselves point out elsewhere that victors in power, struggles often reverse themselves and adopt the policies advocated by their opponent.37 This pattern would seem to reduce the long term impact of group influence in a power struggle. Our own example is of an unreversed policy decided in a period when the heat of the struggle for power had diminished, whether it had completely died or not. Indeed the absence of a threat to his power may well have made Khrushchev more willing to yield. Brzezinski and Huntington say that while policy is the means to power in succession struggles,

In stable dictatorial conditions, however, the leader may sometimes exercise power in matters that do not affect the security of his position. Then, as with the education reform of 1958, he can tolerate substantial amendments to his original proposal.³⁸

It may be, then, that conditions of tranquility lend themselves more effectively to more or less permanent and far-reaching group influence than do power struggles. Leaders are probably more eager to solicit the support of groups when they are trying to secure power or ward off threats to their position, but group influence may be more permanent and real outside of power struggles. We are not prepared to predict that group influence over policy will be greater under power struggles or more ordinary policy conflicts, but we are prepared to argue that under either of these conditions of leadership conflict group influence will be greater than when leadership is relatively monolithic. Such an hypothesis is at the core of our whole argument.

examples and a discussion of changes in the scope of conflict in the Soviet Union. See also E. E. Scattschneider, The Semisovereign People (New York, 1960), for a discussion of the impact of other kinds of changes in patterns of conflict in the United States.

Bauer, Inkeles and Kluckhohn observe that the failure of a policy may lead the Politburo to adopt an approach that they recently opposed.39 Our example does not directly support this observation, although of course it does not conflict with it, but the important point suggested by it is that the nature of the issue may be an important variable. Pursuing the rationale for our argument of group influence in the educational reforms it is apparent that the problematic character of the issue and the fact that the consequences of a shift were not known with certainty made the judgment of policy groups more important than they would have been otherwise. The obvious implication of this is that the more problematic the consequences of a given course of action the more likely it is that groups would be involved.

A related point that is derived from interest groups politics in western democracies is that groups are likely to be more influential in policy outcomes when the issue is narrow and technical than when the issue is broad and general. In democratic polities, this is partly because other publics are less likely to be paying any attention or to care when the issue is technical. Thus the field is left relatively open for the interested group. A further rationale would be pertinent in the Soviet Union. It is not so much that other actors are or are not concerned; it is rather that technical advice and opinions are at a premium on technical issues.

We hypothesize that the more problematic and technical the issue, the more dependent on expert judgment elites will be. Consequently they will be more likely to consult policy groups, who will thereby be more influential on such issues.

While we hope that the above hypotheses help account for conditions varying within the current post-Stalinist regime which we associated with such group influence as we have illustrated, we do not argue that such influence ever occurred in the Stalin era. We know of no such prominent examples. In this final section we will identify several underlying conditions which in part distinguish the two eras and make groups more important in policy formation, or at least potentially so, in the present.

One important change is that the rigid dictatorial one-man rule of the Stalin period has

³⁶ Op. cit., p. 198.

³⁷ Ibid., pp. 193, 240-252.

³⁸ *Ibid.*, p. 270.

³⁹ Raymond A. Bauer, Alex Inkeles and Clyde Kluckhohn, *How the Soviet System Works* (New York, 1956), p. 98.

⁴⁰ See Harry Eckstein, Pressure Group Politics (Stanford, 1960).

given way to collective leadership. While there may be one dominant leader, his power is shared among several key figures at the apex of the political structure. Under conditions of a diffused power structure, group influence is far more likely. When power is exercised in an autocratic manner, groups must gain the ear of the all-powerful leader if they are to influence the policy process. During a period of collective leadership the access routes to points of decision making become more numerous. Indeed, the very nature of collective leadership may make political leaders more responsive to group demands.

Carl Linden has argued that the transition from autocracy to oligarchy brings with it a constant struggle for political primacy at the very top. Since no individual is automatically assured of predominant power he must secure that position by winning and holding the support of a combination of societal groupings. His actual or potential rivals, on the other hand, can build their own constituency coalitions by identifying with those elements discontented with an incumbent leader's policy. The politics of leadership struggle then intertwines with the politics of group conflict. It is this interdependence which facilitates group influence on the policy process.⁴²

We hypothesize that the larger and more collective the top leadership, the greater the prospects for the sort of disputes that can lead to the involvement of social groups in policy formation.

The attitudes of those leaders and their methods of social control will also have an important bearing on the prospects for group influence. Under a system of terror individuals are frightened into silent submissiveness and live in an atomized state. Unaware that others share common attitudes, grievances and interests, the terrorized citizen accepts his lot and does not attempt to influence the behavior of

⁴¹ Dispersion of decision making can assume a "personalized" as well as an institutional form. Instead of separation of powers between executive legislative, and judicial groups one may find a separation of powers between leaders at the top of an outwardly monolithic political structure. See Ploss op. cit., p. 286. On the relationship between group influence and a diffusion of power see Harry Eckstein, "Group Theory and the Comparative Study of Pressure Groups," Comparative Politics edited by Harry Eckstein and David Apter (New York, 1963), p. 396.

decision makers.⁴³ Only when terror subsides does this condition of "pluralistic ignorance" end and the opportunity for interest articulation emerge. For now communication, both through the formal mass media and through informal personal interaction, assumes a more candid and realistic nature. Under these new conditions the communication process itself facilitates group influence. It serves to generate widespread awareness of commonly shared attitudes which in turn becomes a powerful factor inducing groups to influence policy outcomes in their favor.

The leasning of terror enhances the prospect for group influence in other ways as well. David Easton points out that not all societal claims and demands are converted into policy outputs. Only those which become public issues have this possibility.44 In any polity this requires the patronage and support of some political authority figure. In a system where terror is no longer all-pervasive individuals may be far more likely to risk identification with unresolved issues since the consequences of poor choices are far less serious. At best it may mean that one's power position remains static. At worst it may mean a diminution in political power and perhaps even demotion. But it does not mean internment or execution as it so often did during the Stalinist period. The individual has lost a political battle but not necessarily the war. He remains on the scene with the possibility of recouping his losses and rising once again to top political positions.

We hypothesize that groups will be influential as technocratic spokesmen only when terror subsides and the regime accords them legitimacy of expression of their point of view.

The kind of expert judgment involved in the interest articulation we have described is a function of the nature of the society. Harry Eckstein has noted that modernization increases the significance of groups in the political process.⁴⁵ We suggest that the modernization of Russia positively relates to potential group influence in several ways. First, it in-

- ⁴³ This condition of "pluralistic ignorance" is discussed in Bauer and others, op. cit., p. 263.
- "David Easton "The Analysis of Political Systems" Comparative Politics: Notes and Readings edited by Roy C. Macridis and Bernard E. Brown (Homewood, 1964), pp. 94-95.
- ⁴⁵ "Group Theory and the Comparative Study of Pressure Groups," Comparative Politics, op. cit., p. 395.

⁴² Op. cit., pp. 20-21.

troduces a functional specialization and differentiation into the society which in turn generates a diffusion of interests competing with one another to write the laws of society to their advantage. During the early stages of Soviet rule the party preempts interest articulation not only because it wants to but also, to some degree, because it has to. The society which the Bolsheviks inherited was largely composed of an undifferentiated mass of peasants who had traditionally played a politically passive role. Thus the task of identifying and articulating interests fell to the party by default.

This is not to say that at the time of Bolshevik ascendancy there were no functionally specialized groups with political experience in the protection of their interests. They existed but they were far fewer and far less significant than in the present period. Furthermore, those groups tended to be stigmatized by their identification with the old regime. Thus any demands put forth by them lacked an essential ingredient for success—the presumption of legitimacy. The a priori belief of the party that such individuals were disloyal deprived them of any political currency which could be used in the process of trading support for recognition of their demands.

The modernization of Russia has fundamentally altered this situation. Not only has it generated a complex economic and social pluralism but it also has provided new cadres to staff these skilled groups.46 Those who possess scarce technical capabilities are far more likely to exert influence today than in the past. Such technocrats are products of the new system (the new Soviet man) and their loyalty is not impugned. Consequently, their attempts to influence the political process is perceived in legitimized rather than counterrevolutionary terms. The arguments of scientific, educational, and managerial experts may have been motivated by selfish concerns. But. as we noted earlier these arguments were made in the context of what would best serve the interests of the Soviet Union. Given the fact that these experts are the products of the Soviet period, their counsel cannot be ignored on the grounds that the purveyors of such ideas are politically suspect. The handicap which afflicted old specialists simply does not operate in the contemporary period.

⁴⁶ For an interesting suggestive article on the growth of pluralism in Russian society see Henry L. Roberts, "The Succession to Khrushchev in Perspective," *Proceedings of the Academy of Political Science*, 28 (April, 1965), 2-12.

Stalin's transformation of Russia insured the increased importance of groups in the policy process in yet another way, although the full impact of this development had to await the dictator's death. It was during the thirties and forties that the politicization of society reached totalitarian dimensions. As politics came to predominate in all areas of life individuals realized that the protection of their interests could be achieved only by gaining access to and influencing the political structure. Unlike western political systems where many issues are resolved in the private sector of the society. the struggle over who gets what when and how in the Soviet Union takes place entirely within the public domain.47 Thus individuals and groups are perforce compelled to focus their attention and pressure on the decision-making process if they hope to maintain or improve their status.

The fourth contribution of modernization stems from the fact that a complex technological society requires stable occupational group membership. As we have already suggested the behavior of managers, teachers, educators and scientists was motivated in part by their desire to protect interests derived from their occupational roles. Such a phenomenon occurs, however, only when individuals have an opportunity to firmly anchor themselves in one occupational role so that it becomes for them an important reference group. This connotes, in turn, an absence of the recurring purge so characteristic of the Stalinist period. Stalin purposefully removed leading strata of important groups lest they become too closely identified with the interests of those groups and more specifically lest they use the economic, social and political resources inherent in those groups for the purpose of delimiting the decision making power of the leader.

Now this is a very costly procedure and one

⁴⁷ We are identifying here a difference of degree. As Eckstein notes, pressure groups have become very active and significant in the postwar political systems of Britain, France, etc., for similar reasons. "One rather obvious reason for this development is the growth of the social service state- of positive government regulating, planning, directing, or entirely drawing into itself all sorts of social activities. This trend has given social groups a greater stake in politics and therefore mobilized them to a much greater extent while making government increasingly dependent on the collaboration and advice, technical or otherwise, of the groups," Comparative Politics op. cit., p. 395.

that a developed society cannot afford to engage in for very long. Managers, teachers, scientists and other specialists are not created overnight and their summary purge means not only a loss of experienced and skilled personnel but also the forfeiture of scarce economic resources invested in their education and training. As Soviet society has become more complex and sophisticated this type of gross economic waste proved intolerable. We do not imply, of course, that high ranking Soviet personnel are no longer removed from their positions. The official press is full of accounts concerning the removal of such personnel. We do argue, however, that "the purge" today significantly differs from its Stalinist predecessor. At present leading occupational strata are not removed in the wholesale manner reminiscent of the thirties and forties. More importantly their removal is seldom if ever accompanied by internment or execution. Most often they seem to be demoted to a less prestigious and influential job but within the same area of expertise.

We hypothesize that the more modern the society, the more dependent it is on technical expertise, which in turn improves the prospects that groups may influence policy when higher powers seek their judgment.⁴⁸

We have attempted in this article to illustrate that under some circumstances social groups can influence policy formation in the Soviet Union. We have specified those circumstances as clearly as we could, providing hypotheses according to which we expect group influence to vary. If our analysis is sound and valid, we hope that it may provide some guidelines for further research on group influence in the comparative study of Communist political systems. Indeed, we hope that some parts of our analysis may be relevant to the study of the role of groups in policy formation in noncommunist political systems as well.

⁴⁸ See S. N. Eisenstadt, *The Political Systems of Empires* (New York 1963), for a suggestive analysis of the role of skill groups in historical bureaucratic empires.

⁴⁹ See Robert C. Tucker, "On the Study of Comparative Communism," World Politics, 19 (January, 1967), 242-257.

POLITICAL SOCIALIZATION AND THE HIGH SCHOOL CIVICS CURRICULUM IN THE UNITED STATES*

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Attempts to map the political development of individuals inevitably become involved with the relative contribution of different socialization agencies throughout the life cycle. Research has focused to a large extent on the family and to a much lesser degree on other agents such as the educational system. At the secondary school level very little has been done to examine systematically the selected aspects of the total school environment. To gain some insight into the role of the formal school environment, this paper will explore the relationship between the civics curriculum and political attitudes and behavior in American high schools.

A number of studies, recently fortified by data from Gabriel Almond and Sidney's Verba's five-nation study, stress the crucial role played by formal education in the political socialization process.

[None of the other variables] compares with the educational variable in the extent to which it seems to determine political attitudes. The uneducated man or the man with limited education is a different political actor from the man who has achieved a high level of education.

Such conclusions would not have greatly surprised the founders of the American republic, for they stressed the importance of education to the success of democratic and republican government. Starting from its early days the educational system incorporated civic training. Textbooks exposing threats to the new republic were being used in American schools by the 1790's. By 1915, the term "civics" became associated with high school courses which emphasized the study of political institutions and citizenship training.²

- * Financial support for the study reported here came from the Dan'orth Foundation and the National Science Foundation. Kenneth Langton also wishes to acknowledge the support of the National Institute of Mental Health. We express our appreciation to Philip Converse for his helpful comments.
- ¹ Gabriel Almond and Sidney Verba, *The Civic Culture* (Princeton Princeton University Press, 1963), pp. 135-136.
- ² For a short historical background and bibliography on the civics curriculum in American

Throughout this period to the present, however, there has been controversy over the objectives, content, and impact of government courses. While most educators can agree that the development of good citizenship is important, the "good citizen" is something of an ideal type whose attitudes and behavior vary with the values of those defining the construct. Yet when the literature on the development of civics is examined a few consistent themes appear. The civics course should increase the student's knowledge about political institutions and process, make him a more interested and loyal citizen, and increase his understanding of his own rights and the civil rights of others. The literature also implies that good citizenship does not exist in vacuo; it means active political participation as well as loyalty and interest.3

It is apparent that curriculum, teachers, school climate, and peer groups all may contribute to the political socialization process; but the relative contribution of each is unclear. Attempts to assess the actual impact of the school in general, and the curriculum in particular, have produced controversial and inconsistent results. College studies which have examined general curriculum effects (for ex-

high schools see, inter alia: I. James Quillen, "Government Oriented Courses in the Secondary School Curriculum," in Donald H. Riddle and Robert S. Cleary (eds.), Political Science in the Social Studies (36 Yearbook, National Council for the Social Studies, 1966, pp. 245–272; and Franklin Patterson, "Citizenship and the High School: Representative Current Practices," in Patterson, et al., The Adolescent Citizen (New York: Free Press of Glencoe, 1960), Chap. 5.

³ See for example: Educational Policies Commission, Learning the Ways of Democracy: A Case Book in Civic Education (Washington: National Education Association of the United States, 1940), Chap. 1; and Henry W. Holmes, "The Civic Education Project of Cambridge," Phi Delta Kappan, 33 (December, 1951), 168-171.

'For related bibliography and a general discussion of this problem see: James S. Coleman, "Introduction" in James S. Coleman (ed.), Education and Political Development (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1965), pp. 18-25.

ample, liberal arts vs natural science programs) upon the political values and beliefs of students have generated differing results. Because of the lack of comparative research designs and controls for pre-selection as well as the differences in institutional cultures being examined, the impact of college curricula is still an open question.

Other inquiries have been more focused. Arthur Kornhauser⁷ and Albert Somit, ⁸ among others, used student panel studies to measure attitude change resulting from exposure to one or more specific courses. While Kornhauser found significant change in attitudes toward liberal economic positions among students in

⁵ C. Robert Pace, "What Kind of Citizens Do College Graduates Become," Journal of General Education, 3 (April, 1949), 197-202; W. H. Holtzman, "Attitudes of College Men Toward Non-Segregation in Texas Schools," Public Opinion Quarterly, 20 (1956), 559-569; Theodore Newcomb, Personality and Social Change (New York: Dryden, 1943); Rose Goldsen, et al., What College Students Think (Princeton: Van Nostrand, 1960): A. J. Drucker and H. H. Remmers, "Citizenship Attitudes of Graduated Seniors at Purdue University," Journal of Educational Psychology, 42 (1951), 231-235; and Irvin Lehman, "Changes In Attitudes And Values Associated With College Attendance," Journal of Educational Psychology, 57 (April, 1966), 89-98.

6 Allen H. Barton, Studying the Effects of College Education (New Haven: Edward Hazen Foundation, 1959), p. 76; Charles G. McClintock and Henry A. Turner, "The Impact of College upon Political Knowledge, Participation, and Values," Human Relations, 15 (May, 1962), 163–176; and Theodore M. Newcomb, "The General Nature of Peer Group Influence," in Theodore M. Newcomb and Everett K. Wilson, College Peer Groups (Chicago: Aldine, 1966), p. 2.

⁷ Arthur Kornhauser, "Changes in the Information and Attitudes of Students in an Economics Class, "Journal of Educational Research, 22 (1930), 288-308.

8 Albert Somit, et al., "The Effect of the Introductory Political Science Course on Student Attitudes Toward Political Participation," this REVIEW, 52 (December, 1958), 1129-1132; Marvin Schick and Albert Somit, "The Failure to Teach Political Activity," The American Behavioral Scientist, 6 (January, 1963), 5-8; James A. Robinson, et al., "Teaching with Inter-Nation Simulation and Case Studies," this Review, 60 (March, 1966), 53-65; and Charles Garrison, "The Introductory Political Science Course As An Agent of Political Socialization" (Unpublished Dissertation, University of Oregon, 1966).

an economics class, Somit concluded that introductory courses in political science which emphasized personal political participation had no significant impact on the students' own attitudes along that dimension.

At the high school level the outcome of research on the association between curriculum and political socialization has also been mixed. Moreover, the conclusions of these studies are often hampered by their lack of generalizing power to broader universes of students and by the rather restricted nature of the dimensions being studied.

In a quasi-experimental study of three Boston-area high schools, Edgar Litt found that while civics courses had little impact upon students' attitudes toward political participation, these courses did affect students' "political chauvinism" and "support of the democratic creed." Experimental pedagogical methods have also resulted in some observable short term cognitive and affective changes.10 However, other studies of the relationship between formal courses in social studies and politically relevant attitudes report either inconclusive or negative results. The early New York Regent's Inquiry on Citizenship Education, which found that the quantity of work done in social studies was not reflected in changed "citizenship" attitudes, was later echoed by the Syracuse and Kansas studies of citizenship¹¹ and data from the Purdue Opinion Panel.12

Almond and Verba asked adult respondents in their comparative study to recall if any time was spent in their school teaching about politics and government. They compared the level

⁹ Edgar Litt, "Civic Education Norms and Political Indoctrination," *American Sociological Review*, 28 (February, 1963), 69-75.

¹⁰ See, e.g., C. Benjamin Cox and Jack E. Cousins, "Teaching Social Studies in Secondary Schools and Colleges," in Byron Massialas and Frederick R. Smith (eds.), New Challenges in the Social Studies (Belmont, California: Wadsworth Publishing Company, Inc., 1965), Chap. 4; and Robert E. Mainer, "Attitude Change in Intergroup Programs," in H. H. Remmers (ed.), Anti-Democratic Attitudes in American Schools (Evanston, Illinois: Northwestern University Press, 1963), pp. 122-154.

¹¹ Franklin Patterson, et al., op. cit., pp. 71-73; Roy A. Price, "Citizenship Studies in Syracuse," Phi Delta Kappan, 33 (December, 1951), 179-181; and Earl E. Edgar, "Kansas Study of Education for Citizenship," ibid., 175-178.

¹² H. H. Remmers and D. H. Radler, *The American Teenager* (New York: Charter, 1962), p. 195.

of subjective political competence of individuals who reported that time was spent in their school teaching about politics with those who reported that it was not. The authors indicate that the data show "a relatively clear connection between manifest political teaching and political competence in the United States, Britain, and Mexico." They conclude that manifest teaching about politics can increase an individual's sense of political competence, but this is less likely to happen in nations (like Germany and Italy) whose educational systems have been dominated for much of the life span of the respondents by anti-democratic philosophies.

In addition to the mixed findings of various studies, there is also some question as to the potential of the secondary school for political socialization. It is possible that by the time students reach high school many of their political orientations have crystallized or have reached a temporary plateau. Recent research¹⁴ on the political socialization of American preadults argues that the elementary school years are the most important for the formation of basic political orientations.¹⁵ It is also possible that the high school civics courses to which students are exposed offer little that is new to them, that they simply provide another layer of information which is essentially redundant.

Granting either or both of these points one should, perhaps, not expect dramatic movements simply on the basis of one or two courses. However, some incremental changes should be visible. One might also hypothesize differential incremental effects according to some central characteristics of the students, their families, the school, the curriculum, or the political orientations themselves. It is to an

¹³ Almond and Verba, op. cit., p. 361.

¹⁴ Robert D. Hess and David Easton, "The Role of the Elementary School in Political Socialization," The School Review, 70 (1962), 257-265; David Easton and Robert Hess, "The Child's Political World," Midwest Journal of Political Science, 6 (August, 1962), 229-246; Robert Hess and Judith Torney, The Development of Political Attitudes In Children (Chicago: Aldine, 1967); and Fred Greenstein, Children And Politics (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1965).

¹⁵ On the other hand, Adelson and O'Neil find important political cognitive development taking place during the adolescent years. See Joseph Adelson and Robert O'Neil, "The Growth of Political Ideas in Adolescence: The Sense of Community," Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 4 (September, 1966), 295–306.

examination of such possibilities that we now turn.

I. STUDY DESIGN

The data to be employed come from a study conducted by the Survey Research Center of The University of Michigan in the spring of 1965. Interviews were held with a national probability sample of 1669 high school seniors distributed among 97 secondary schools (public and non-public). An important feature of the student sample is that it was drawn from a universe of 12th graders; school dropouts in that age cohort are therefore automatically eliminated. For all but 6% of the sample each student's mother or father, designated randomly, was interviewed. Additional interviews were conducted with 317 of the students' most relevant social studies teachers. Finally, in order to determine some general academic and structural characteristics of each school, interviews and questionnaires were administered to school officials.

The particular social studies courses taken by each student were determined in the following way. In each school a list was made of the social studies courses offered during grades 10–12. As each individual course offered in a school was read to the respondent, he indicated if and when he had taken it during the past three years—that is during the 10th, 11th and 12th grades.

We were particularly interested in those courses which are commonly referred to as high school government or civics courses. A broad array of courses were included under this rubric. They ranged from the usual American Government and Problems of Democracy courses, through Political Science, Americanism, Communism and Democracy, to International Relations, World Citizenship, and Comparative Politics. Contemporary History courses which were essentially studies of current events were also included in this dimension. Normally, however, we distinguished between history and civics courses. While both types of courses (as well as other social studies) may have an impact on students' political orientations, in this paper we shall generally limit our focus to the civics curriculum.

Each student in the sample was scored according to the number of government courses he had taken during his three years of high school. About one-third of the students had not taken such a course, and of those who had the great majority had taken no more than one (Table 1). Therefore in the following analysis when we talk about the direct impact of the

Table 1. Number and type of civics courses taken by american high school seniors $\hbox{ in grades } 10{-}12$

Number of Courses	Percent	Type of Course Among Those Taking A Course	Percent
0	32	American Government	67
1	59	American Problems	37
2+	9	Other	10
	100%		114%
N =	(2060)b	N =	=(1401)

^a Percentages exceed 100 because some students have taken more than one course.

civics curriculum upon political orientations it will mean for most students the difference between no civics course and one civics course. Since a civics course is usually taken by requirement, we may assume that there is little self-selection bias at work.¹⁶

Table 1 also shows a breakdown of the type of course experienced. The division is between the more frequently-taken American Government course, the less popular American Problems course, and a sprinkling of more esoteric titles. The "Problems" course is commonly called Problems of Democracy, Contemporary Problems, Problems of American Life, and so forth. Schools typically offer either American Government or American Problems although they are occasionally found together, and infrequently—in nonpublic or especially small schools-neither course may be offered.17 Whereas the American Government courses focus heavily on the forms, structures, backgrounds, and traditions of American political

¹⁶ A regional pattern is present. Appreciably more students in the West and Midwest had taken such courses than was true in the South and, especially, in the Northeast. It appears that this variation did not influence the findings reported below. Other personal and school characteristics did not discriminate among takers and nontakers of civics courses.

¹⁷ For a more detailed account of social studies curriculum offerings see M. Kent Jennings, "Correlates of the Social Studies Curriculum: Grades 10–12," in Benjamin Cox and Byron Massialas (eds.), Social Studies in the United States (New York: Harcourt, Brace, & World, 1967).

life, the Problems courses are more eelectic in terms of the disciplines utilized, emphasize a wider scope of socio-political activities, are more contemporary in nature, and are typically organized around major problems in American public life. Because of the different emphases and formats of the two types of courses, educators have suggested that they will have differential effects.

In selecting the dependent variables for this analysis, we attempted to touch on many of the consistent themes in the "civics" literature which are germane for political science. Rather than examine only one or two variables, we have elected to pursue a wide variety so that the possible variations in effects may be uncovered.

1. Political knowledge and sophistication.—
For better or worse, performance on factual examinations is a prime way in which the success of a course and teacher is evaluated. Students were asked six questions dealing with recent and contemporary political events and personalities. The pattern of responses formed a Guttman-type political knowledge scale. Another measure (explained below), touching more directly on political sophistication, ascertained the students' perception of ideological differences between political parties.

2. Political interest.—A hallmark of the "shoulds" of political education in the United States is the shaping of citizens to take an active interest in political affairs. Although numerous studies of adults suggest that the schools and other socializing agents fall short of the goals envisioned by the authors of civics textbooks, it is nevertheless possible that these achievements would be even less impressive in the absence of intensive inculcation in the civics courses. Among many alternative measures of interest available in the interview protocols, we shall rely on the answers to a straightforward inquiry. 19

18 Respondents were asked to identify (1) the number of years a U.S. Senator serves; (2) the country Marshall Tito leads; (3) the number of members on the U.S. Supreme Court; (4) the name of the Governor of their state; (5) the nation that during WWII "had a great many concentration camps for Jews"; and (5) whether President Franklin Roosevelt was a Republican or a Democrat.

The six items formed a Guttman scale with a coefficient of reproducibility (CR) of .92.

19 "Some people seem to think about what's going on in government and public affairs most of

b This is a weighted N resulting from a factor applied to correct for unavoidably imprecise estimates made at the time the sampling frame was constructed. All results reported here are based on weighted N's. In the case of multivariate analysis using data from the parents as well as students, the base weighted N will be 1927, a reduction occasioned by the fact that interviews were not held with 6% of the students' parents.

- 3. Spectator politicization.—A more direct measure of interest in political matters is the degree to which students consume political content in the mass media. If the civics curriculum spurs an interest in politics, it should be reflected in greater media consumption. Separate soundings were taken of the students' behavior vis-a-vis television, newspapers, and magazines.²⁰
- 4. Political discourse.—Even more dramatic evidence of the success of the civics experience would be an upsurge in the pre-adult's level of politically-tinged dialogue. In view of the fact that there are relatively few ways in which the high school senior can (or does) assume active political roles, the frequency of political conversations is not an improbable surrogate for forms of adult-level political activity. For present purposes the student's report of the frequency with which he discusses politics with his peers will be used.²¹
- 5. Political efficacy.—The belief that one can affect political outcomes is a vital element of political behavior, and Easton and Dennis have demonstrated the rising sense of efficacy as the child progresses through elementary school.²² Much of civic education's thrust is toward developing a sense of civic competence. Efficacy was measured by the students' responses to two items.²³

the time, whether there's an election going on or not. Others aren't that interested. Would you say you follow what's going on in government and public affairs most of the time, some of the time, only now and then or hardly at all?"

²⁰ Students were asked how often they "read about public affairs and politics" in newspapers or magazines and how often they watched "any programs about public affairs, politics, and the news on television."

²¹ "Do you talk about public affairs and politics with your friends outside of classes?" (If yes) "How often would you say that is?"

²² David Easton and Jack Dennis, "The Child's Acquisition of Regime Norms: Political Efficacy," this Review, 61 (March, 1967), 25-38; Almond and Verba, op. cit., Chap. 12; and Angus Campbell, et al., The American Voter (New York: John Wiley, 1960), pp. 103-105, 480-481.

²² The following two items were used to construct a three point political efficacy scale with a CR of .94.

- (1) Sometimes politics and government seem so complicated that a person like me can't really understand what's going on.
- (2) Voting is the only way that people like my mother and father can have any say about how the government runs things.

- 6. Political cynicism.—While trying to create interest in politics and a sense of efficacy, the civics curriculum almost inevitably tries to discourage feelings of mistrust and cynicism toward the government. Indeed, cynicism seems in part to be antithetical to a feeling of civic competence.²⁴ A six-item scale was used to arrange the students on a political cynicism dimension.²⁵
- 7. Civic tolerance.—Considerable discussion exists in the citizenship literature on the necessity for inculcating norms of civic tolerance. Even though the curriculum materials and the teachers often fail to grapple with the complexities of these norms, a proper and necessary role of civics courses is seen as creating support for the "Bill of Rights," due process, freedom of speech, recognition of legitimate diversity, and so forth. In order to probe the effect of exposure to civics courses on these types of beliefs, a three-item civic tolerance scale was devised. 27
- ²⁴ Robert E. Agger, Marshall Goldstein, and Stanley Pearl, "Political Cynicism: Measurement and Meaning," *The Journal of Politics*, 23 (August, 1961) 477-506.
- ²⁵ The following six items formed a political cynicism scale which had a CR of .92.
 - (1) Over the years, how much attention do you feel the government pays to what the people think when it decides what to do...?
 - (2) Do you think that quite a few of the people running the government are a little crooked not very many are, or do you think hardly any of them are?
 - (3) Do you think that people in government waste a lot of money we pay in taxes, waste some of it, or don't waste very much of it?
 - (4) How much of the time do you think you can trust the government in Washington to do what is right?
 - (5) Do you feel that almost all of the people running the government are smart people who usually know what they are doing, or do you think that quite a few of them don't seem to know what they are doing?
 - (6) Would you say the government is pretty much run by a few big interests looking out for themselves or that it is run for the benefit of all the people?

²⁶ See Byron Massialas, "Teaching American Government in High School," in Cox and Massialas, op. cit., pp. 167-195.

²⁷ The following three agree-disagree questions formed a Guttman scale with a CR of .95.

(1) If a person wanted to make a speech in this

8. Participative orientation.—Instilling a propensity toward participation in public life becomes especially evident as a civic education goal as the adolescent approaches legal age. In particular, one might hypothesize that the participation ethic would displace a more basic and early-formed orientation such as loyalty to country. Responses to an open-ended question tapping the students' view of the "good citizen" form the basis of the participative-orientation measure.²⁸

Before turning to the findings it will be instructive to consider some of the factors which could affect the relationship between exposure to civics and the dependent variables. For example, one could argue that a positive association between exposure and political knowledge may only be found among students from less educated and less politicized families. This "sponge" theory maintains that children from more culturally deprived families are less likely to be saturated with political knowledge and interest in the family environment: therefore they are more likely to be affected by the civics curriculum when they enter high school. Conversely, one might hypothesize that it is the child from the more highly educated family who is most likely to have developed the minimal learning skills and sensitivity to politics which would allow him to respond to civics instruction.

The academic quality of the high school could also affect the efficacy of the civics curriculum. A school that sends 75% of its seniors on to a four year college might be presumed to have a significantly different and better academic program than a school that sends only 15% of its students.

Since we are focusing on civics courses rather than history courses—taken in moderate to heavy amounts by virtually all high school students—we also want to be sure that we are measuring the independent effect of the civics curriculum and not the interactive effect of the history courses. One can easily think of other possible predictor variables: grade average, sex, political interest, and so forth.

The problem of multiple predictors clearly calls for a form of multivariate analysis. We chose the Multiple Classification Analysis

Program (MCA).²⁹ This program is useful for examining the relationship of each of several predictors to a dependent variable at a zero order level and while the other predictors are held constant. Eta coefficients and partial beta coefficients indicate the magnitudes of the relationships for zero order and partial correlations, respectively. The program assumes additive effects and combines some features of both multiple regression and analysis of variance techniques. Unlike conventional regression procedures the program allows predictor variables in the form of nominal as well as higher order scales and it does not require or assume linearity of regression.

In the subsequent multivariate analysis seven variables were held constant while the independent effect of the civics curriculum was examined: 1) quality of the school;³⁰ 2) grade average; 3) sex; 4) student's political interest;³¹ 5) the number of history courses taken; 6) parental education; and 7) parental politicization (discussion of politics within the family). Information on the latter two variables was based on interviews held with the students' parents, not from students' reports, as is commonly the case.

II. FINDINGS FOR THE WHOLE SAMPLE

One of the first points to be established here is that scant differences emerge in the dependent variables as a consequence of whether the student had taken a more traditional American Government course or the more topicallyoriented, wider ranging American Problems course. There is a consistent, though quite small tendency for students taking the former course to consume more political content in newspapers, magazines, and on television, and to discuss politics with peers more frequently. But compared with students taking the American Problems course they more often stress the loyalty (48% versus 37%) rather than the participation aspect of good citizenship behavior. Aside from these rather meager differences, students taking the two major types of courses are virtually indistinguishable in terms

community against religion, he should be allowed to speak.

⁽²⁾ If a Communist were legally elected to some public office around here, the people should allow him to take office.

⁽³⁾ The American system of government is one that all nations should have.

²⁸ The question wording is found on page 27.

²⁰ Frank Andrews, James Morgan, and John Sonquist, *Multiple Classification Analysis* (Ann Arbor, Michigan: Institute for Social Research, University of Michigan, 1967).

⁸⁰ School academic quality is based on the percent of seniors going on to four year colleges or universities in each school. This information was obtained from school sources.

³¹ When political interest was examined as a dependent variable in the MCA analysis it was, of course, dropped as a control variable.

of their political orientations. Knowing this, we may proceed with some confidence to treat them (and those taking a sprinkling of other courses) together and to focus our analysis primarily on the amount of exposure, viz., none, one, or two courses during grades 10–12.

An overview of the results offers strikingly little support for the impact of the curriculum. It is true that the direction of the findings is generally consonant with the predictions advanced above. That is, the more civics courses the student has had the more likely he is to be knowledgeable, to be interested in politics. to expose himself to the political content of the mass media, to have more political discourse, to feel more efficacious, to espouse a participative (versus loyalty) orientation, and to show more civic tolerance. The possible exception to the pattern is the curvilinear relationship between course-taking and political cynicism. Thus, the claims made for the importance of the civic education courses in the senior high school are vindicated if one only considers the direction of the results.

However, it is perfectly obvious from the size of the correlations that the magnitude of the relationships are extremely weak, in most instances bordering on the trivia. The highest positive eta coefficient is .06, and the highest partial beta is but .11 (for political knowledge).³² Our earlier anticipation that course-taking among older adolescents might result in only incremental changes is borne out with a vengeance. Indeed, the increments are so miniscule as to raise serious questions about the

²² For convenience partial beta coefficients will be referred to as betas or beta coefficients. The beta coefficient is directly analogous to the eta, but is based on the adjusted rather than the raw mean. It provides a measure of the ability of the predictor to explain variation in the dependent variable after adjusting for the effects of all other predictors. This is not in terms of percent of variance explained. The term beta is used because "the measure is analogous to the standardized regression coefficient, i.e., the regression coefficient multiplied by the standard deviation of the predictor and divided by the standard deviation of the dependent variable, so that the result is a measure of the number of standard deviation units the dependent variable moves when the explanatory variable changes by one standard deviation." Andrews, op. cit., p. 22.

As mentioned earlier, the MCA program assumes additive effects. While some interaction may be present, a close scrutiny of the statistical analysis makes it doubtful if the impact is particularly large.

utility of investing in government courses in the senior high school, at least as these courses are presently constituted. Furthermore, when we tested the impact of the history curriculum under the same control conditions it was as low or lower than the civics curriculum.³³

It could be argued that the inclusion of a key variable, viz., the quality and type of teaching. would produce differential effects among those students who have taken one or more courses. This may be true, and in another place this possibility will be examined in detail. However, given the meager zero-order correlations, it is doubtful if that impact will be particularly large.34 Another factor which might elicit differential patterns among students taking such courses is the content of the materials used and the nature of the classroom discourse. This contingency, too, will be dealt with elsewhere, but it faces in large part the same difficulty as does the teacher contingency. It also confronts the reality of considerable uniformity in curriculum materials and the domination of the textbook market by a few leading books.35

Do these findings mean that the political orientations of pre-adults are essentially refractory to change during the senior high school years? This possibility cannot be easily dismissed. Certainly the pre-high schooler has already undergone, especially in the American

³³ In a preliminary analysis the impact of taking social studies courses as a whole was examined. The number of social studies courses taken accounted for little difference in the students' orientations.

³⁴ We were interested in what effect the students' perceptions of the quality of their civies teachers and courses as well as the sex of the teacher might have on the relationships. Students were asked to rank each of the courses they had taken from extremely good to extremely poor. They also ranked the quality of their teachers in the same way. Prior to the MCA analysis the relationship between the civics curriculum and the dependent variables was examined within contingency tables controlled for course and teacher ratings. Course and teacher ratings had no consistent, significant effect upon the relationships. Controls for the sex of the student's teacher also produced no significant differences.

²⁵ See James P. Shaver, "Reflective Thinking, Values, and Social Studies Textbooks," School Review, 73 (1965), 226-257; Frederick R. Smith and John J. Patrick, "Civics: Relating Social Study to Social Reality," and Byron Massialas, "Teaching American Government in High School," both in Cox and Massialas (eds.), op. cit., pp. 105-127, 167-195.

context, several years of intensive formal and informal political socialization. He may have developed, by the time he reaches secondary school, a resistance to further formal socialization at this stage in his life cycle. But there is also an alternative or additional explanation. If the course work represents information redundancy, there is little reason to expect even modest alterations. By redundancy we mean not only repetition of previous instruction, though there is surely a surfeit of that. We mean also redundancy in the sense of duplicating cues from other information sources, particularly the mass media, formal organizations, and primary groups. Students not taking civics courses are probably exposed to these other sources in approximately the same doses as those enrolled in the courses. Assuming that this is the case, and that the courses provide relatively few new inputs, the consequence would be lack of differentiation between course takers and non-course takers.

For these reasons it would be well to look at courses and teachers which do not generate information redundancy. That is the virtue of examining the finer grain of teacher performance and course content, as proposed above. Another strategy, and one to be adopted in the remainder of this paper, would be to look at subpopulations of pre-adults where redundancy might be less frequent than for pre-adults in general. Less redundancy could be occasioned either by infusion of new information where relatively little existed before, or by information which conflicts with information coming from other sources.

Among the universe of subpopulations one could utilize, perhaps none is as distinctive as that of the Negro minority. The unique situation of Negroes in American social and political life and the dynamics now at work have been well-documented. Because of cultural differ-

36 In addition to such classics as Gunnar Myrdal's An American Dilemma (New York: Harper & Bros., 1944), see more recent works: Thomas F. Pettigrew, A Profile of the American Negro (Princeton: D. Van Nostrand, 1964); William Brink and Louis Harris, The Negro Revolution in America (New York: Simon & Schuster, 1964); Kenneth B. Clark, Dark Ghetto (New York: Harper & Row, 1965); Lewis Killian and Charles Grigg, Racial Crises in America (Englewood Cliffs: Prentice-Hall, Inc., 1964); Donald R. Matthews and James W. Prothro, Negroes and the New Southern Politics (New York: Harcourt, Brace, & World, 1966); Dwaine Marvick, "The Political Socialization of the American Negro," The Annals, 361 (September, 1965), 112-127; and

ences between the White majority and the Negro minority, the frequent exclusion of Negroes from socio-political life, the contemporary civil rights ferment, and the less privileged position of Negroes in our society, it seems likely that information redundancy would occur less often among the Negro preadults. Therefore, the student sample was divided along racial lines.

III. FINDINGS FOR THE NEGRO SUBSAMPLE

Although the Negro portion of the sample is not as large as one might desire for extensive analysis (raw N=186, weighted N=208), it is sufficiently large to permit gross comparisons with White students of similar social characteristics and also permits some analysis within the Negro subpopulation. The subsample size and the fact that the dropout rate is appreciably higher among Negroes than Whites underscores the admonition that this subsample should not be extrapolated to the Negro age cohort in general. It should also be noted that the subsample contains twelve respondents classified as non-Whites other than Negro.

Demographically, the Negro students are located disproportionately in the South (55% versus 25% for Whites) and come from more disadvantaged backgrounds than do the Whites The latter is true despite the fact that the backgrounds of Negro students who have persevered through high school are undoubtedly less deprived than are those of their cohort who dropped out. Social status differences between Negroes and Whites are more pronounced in the South than in the North.

Negro and White students have taken civics courses in approximately the same proportions (Negroes 63%, Whites 68%). When the association between the civics curriculum and the dependent variables discussed above was reexamined within both racial groups, some intriguing differences appeared. These caused us to reassess the place of the civics curriculum in the political socialization of American youth.

Political Knowledge. White students score more highly on the knowledge scale than do Negroes; and when parents' education is controlled the differences persist at all levels. Civics courses have little effect on the absolute political knowledge level of whites (beta = .08). The number of courses taken by Negroes, on the other hand, is significantly associated with their political knowledge score (beta = .30).

William C. Kvaraceus, et al., Negro Self Concept: Implication for School and Citizenship (New York: McGraw-Hill Book Co., 1965).

The civics curriculum is an important source of political knowledge for Negroes and, as we shall see later, appears in some cases to substitute for political information gathering in the media.

Although the complex multivariate analysis holds parental education constant, it does not allow us to observe easily the singular role of this crucial socialization factor upon the relationship between curriculum and political orientations. Therefore, contingency tables were constructed with parental education controlled for all relationships between the number of government courses taken on the one hand, and each political orientation on the other. All instances in which education makes a distinctive imprint are reported.37 For the case at hand-political knowledge-controls for parental education did not alter the effects of the curriculum among either Whites or Negroes.

In another attempt to measure political knowledge as well as ideological sophistication, students were asked which political party they thought was most conservative or liberal. Each party has its "liberal" and "conservative" elements, but studies of roll call voting in Congress as well as the commentary of the politically aware places the Republican party somewhat to the right of the Democrats. Forty-five percent of the students said that the Republicans were more conservative than the Democrats. Thirty-eight percent confessed to not knowing the answer.

In answering this question the student was faced with a problem not of his own making. It can be presumed that some respondents made a random choice (i.e., guessed) to extricate themselves. One gauge of the frequency of guessing is how often the Democrats were assigned a conservative position (17%). If we make the reasonable assumption that this form of random guess is symmetric around the midpoint of the response dimension, we can say that an additional 17% of the students guessed "correctly" by putting the Republicans in the conservative column. Accordingly, we may deduct 17% from the 45% who said Republicans were more conservative, leaving 28% who are able to connect the conservative label to the Republican party.38

³⁷ Parental education was used as a summary control variable because we felt that it best captures the tone of the whole family environment as well as other sources of socialization.

³⁸ We have borrowed this method of adjusting "correct" answers from Donald E. Stokes, "Ideological Competition of British Parties," paper

TABLE 2. THE RELATION BETWEEN THE CIVICS CURRICULUM AND KNOWING THE IDEOLOGICAL POSITION OF THE REPUBLICAN AND DEMOCRAT PARTIES AMONG NEGRO AND WHITE STUDENTS

Number of Civics		Adjusted : Correct	Percentag Respons	
Courses	Courses Negro White			
	%	N	%	N
0	0	(72)	29	(543)
1+	19	(122)	31	(1184)

We are less interested in the absolute number of students who are able to connect symbol with party than with the role the civics curriculum plays in this process. Again we see that course work has little impact on White students while the percent of Negroes who "know" the parties ideological position increases as they take more civics courses (Table 2).

These findings using both measures of political knowledge offer an excellent example of redundancy in operation. The clear inference as to why the Negro students' responses are "improved" by taking the courses is that new information is being added where relatively less existed before. White students enrolled in the courses appear to receive nothing beyond that to which their non-enrolled cohorts are being exposed. This, coupled with the great lead which Whites in general already have over the Negro students, makes for greater redundancy among Whites than Negroes.

One should not deduce from these results that the white students have a firm grasp on political knowledge; as Table 2 and other data indicate, they clearly do not. Rather, White students have reached a saturation or quota level which is impervious to change by the civics curriculum. From their relatively lower start the Negro students' knowledge level can be increased by exposure to the civics curriculum.

Political Efficacy and Political Cynicism. Almost twice as many Negro students as White scored low on the political efficacy scale. When the effect of parental education is partialed out the racial differences remain at each educational level, although they are somewhat diminished. Interestingly enough, the difference in the percentage of those who scored low is

presented at 1964 Annual Meeting of the American Political Science Association, Chicago, Illinois.

TABLE 3. THE RELATION BETWEEN THE NUMBER
OF CIVICS COURSES TAKEN AND POLITICAL
EFFICACY AMONG NEGRO STUDENTS, BY
PARENTAL EDUCATION

3	Elementary	,			
Pol	Political Efficacy				
				Gamma	
Low	Medium	High			
07		-	N		
	-•			.56	
30	21	40	(99)	.00	
,	7.1.01	,			
	_				
Poli		сy			
Low	Medium	High			
56	20	24	(41)		
34	27	39	(62)	.36	
	College				
Pol	litical Effica	ıcy			
Low	Mediun				
32	32	36	(15)		
37	19	44	(24)	.02	
	Poli Low % 64 30 Poli Low 56 34 Pol Low 32	Political Effice Low Medium % % 64 20 30 27 High School Political Effice Low Medium 56 20 34 27 College Political Effice Low Medium 32 32	Low Medium High % % % 64 20 16 30 27 43 High School Political Efficacy Low Medium High 56 20 24 34 27 39 College Political Efficacy Low Medium High 32 36	Political Efficacy	

a Parental education was set by the highest level achieved by either parent. "Elementary" means neither parent exceeded an eighth grade education; "high school" that at least one parent had one or more years of high school training; and "college" that at least one parent had one or more years of collegiate experience.

less between Negro and White students whose parents have had only an elementary school education (13%) than between Negro and White students whose parents have had a college education (24%).

The number of civics courses taken by White students has little perceptible effect on their sense of political efficacy (beta=.05). Among Negroes, though, course exposure is moderately related to a sense of efficacy (beta=.18). As can be seen in Table 3, this is particularly true for Negroes from less educated families. The strength of the relationship decreases significantly among higher status students. Course-taking among the lower-status Negroes acts to bring their scores into line with their higher status cohorts. There is but a faint trace of this pattern among White students.

Although Negro students at all levels of parental education feel less efficacious than their White counterparts, it must be concluded that without the civics curriculum the gap would be even greater. As in the case of political knowledge, we have another illustration of less redundancy at work among the Negro subsample. For a variety of reasons the American political culture produces a lower sense of efficacy among Negro youths compared with Whites. But by heavily emphasizing the legitimacy, desirability, and feasibility of citizen participation and control, the civics course

adds a new element in the socialization of low and middle status Negro students. Since those from the less educated families are more likely to be surrounded by agents with generally low efficacy levels, the curriculum has considerably more effect on them than on their peers from higher-status environments. Leaving aside the possible later disappointments in testing the reality of their new-found efficacy, the Negro students from less privileged backgrounds are for the moment visibly moved by course exposure.

While Negroes as a whole are less politically efficacious than Whites, they are not at the same time more politically cynical. The proportion of twelfth graders falling into the three most cynical categories of a six point political cynicism scale includes 21% of the White and 23% of the Negro students. This relatively low level of political cynicism among Negroes may seem ironic, but it is consistent with their view of the "good citizen" role (discussed later). The high school civics curriculum has only a slight effect upon the cynicism level of Whites (beta = .11) and none among Negroes (beta = .01). However, this difference suggests that the cynicism of the latter may be somewhat less moveable than that for Whites.

Civic Tolerance. One of the abiding goals of civic education is the encouragement and development of civic toleration. Negroes as a whole score lower on the civic tolerance scale than do Whites. When parental education is controlled the racial differences remain at each education level, although they are moderately attenuated. Again, as with political efficacy, the differences in the percentage of those scoring low is less between Negro and White students whose parents have had only an elementary school education (18%) than between Negro and White students whose parents have had a college education (28%). What we may be witnessing is the result of Negro compensation for the White bias in American society—a bias to which higher status Negroes may prove most sensitive.

The number of civics courses taken has little effect on White students' civic tolerance scores (beta = .06), with somewhat greater impact being observed on those from homes of lower parental education. There is, however, a moderate association between exposure and Negro students' sense of civic tolerance (beta = .22). The more courses they take, the higher their level of tolerance. Negroes are more intolerant even when educational controls are introduced, but the civics curriculum appears to overcome in part the environmental factors which may contribute to their relatively lower

TABLE 4. GAMMA CORRELATION BETWEEN NUMBER
OF CIVICS COURSES TAKEN AND POLITICAL
INTEREST AND DISCUSSION WITH PEERS
AMONG NEGRO STUDENTS, BY
PARENTAL EDUCATION

Parental Education	Political Interest	Political Discussion
Elementary	+.31	+.20
High School	18	31
College	21	36

tolerance. The items on which the civic tolerance measure is based all have to do with the acceptance of diversity. Aggregate student and parent data suggest that these items tap a dimension of political sophistication less likely to be operative in the Negro-subculture. To the extent that the civics courses preach more tolerance, the message is less likely to be redundant among the Negroes than the Whites. Unlike political knowledge and efficacy, though, course-taking exerts its main effect on Negro twelfth graders from better-educated families, thereby suggesting that a threshold of receptivity may be lacking among those from lower-status families.

Politicization—Interest, Discussion, and Media Usage. Students were asked about their interest in public affairs and how often they discussed politics with their friends outside class. There is little difference between racial groups among those who expressed high interest in politics or said they discussed politics weekly or more often with their friends. Nor did controls for parental education uncover aggregate racial distinctions. Moreover, the civics curriculum appears at first glance to have little impact upon these two indicators of politicization among Negroes (beta = .15 and -.07. respectively) or Whites (beta = .06 and .04). Yet an examination of Table 4 indicates that curriculum effect is differentially determined by the educational level of the Negro students' parents (in contrast to a lack of variation among Whites). The differential effect may account for the low beta coefficient in the multivariate analysis.

As Negroes from less educated families take more civics courses their political interest and frequency of political discussion with peers increases. Since less educated parents ordinarily evince lower states of politicization, one could explain this in terms of nonredundant information spurring an upsurge in student politicization. Students from higher status families, however, actually appear to undergo depolitici-

zation as they move through the civics curriculum.

In their excellent social and psychological inquiry into the personality of the American Negro, Abram Kardiner and Lionel Ovesey observed that it is the higher status Negro who is most likely to identify and have contact with Whites and their culture.³⁹ But due to their race, the disappointments are more frequent and their aspirations more likely to founder on the rock of unattainable ideals.

Because of his parents' experiences, the higher status Negro student may have received a more "realistic" appraisal of the institutional and social restrictions placed upon Negro participation in the United States. Upon enrolling in the civics course he finds at least two good-citizen roles being emphasized. The first stresses a politicized-participation dimension. The second emphasizes a more passive role: lovalty and obedience to authority and nation. If he has absorbed from his parents the probability of restrictions, the participationpoliticization emphasis in the curriculum may have little impact upon the higher status Negro student. Redundancy is low because the information conflicts with previous learning. The "reality factor" causes him to select out of the curriculum only those role characteristics which appear to be more congruent with a preconceived notion of his political life chances. As we shall see later, higher status Negro students' perception of the good citizen role is compatible with the above interpretation.

Students were also asked how often they read articles in newspapers or magazines or watched programs on television that dealt with public affairs, news, or politics. In the aggregate, students from each racial grouping employ newspapers and magazines at about the same rates; but Negro students use television more often than do Whites, and at all levels of parental education. The civics curriculum has a different impact upon political media usage among Whites and Negroes. Table 5 shows that for White students there is a consistent—but very weak-association between taking civics courses and use of the media as an access point to political information. Among Negroes there is a consistently negative but somewhat stronger association between the civics curriculum and political media usage.

Observing the same relationship within contingency tables under less severe control conditions, the civics curriculum continues to have

³⁹ Abram Kardiner and Lionel Ovesey, *The Mark of Oppression* (Cleveland: The World Publishing Co. [a Meridian book], 1962).

a negative—although fluctuating—impact upon political media usage among Negroes at all levels of parental education (Table 6).

Negative correlations among Negroes might be explained on at least two dimensions: substitution and depoliticization. A civics course may increase a student's political interest while at the same time acting as a substitute for political information gathering in the media. This is what appears to be happening among Negroes from less educated families. Negative associations between course work and media usage suggest that the former may be substituting for political information gathering in the media. But as we saw before, there is a significant increase in political interest among lower status Negroes as they take more civics courses. The lack of depoliticization in this group was further confirmed by the positive correlation between the civics curriculum and discussing politics with one's school friends (Table 4).

The case of the higher status Negro seems to be of a different order. Negative correlations between the civics curriculum and media usage may indicate substitution, but what is even more apparent is the general depoliticization of higher status Negroes as they move through the curriculum. The more courses they take the less likely are they to seek political information in newspapers, magazines, and television. In addition there is also a decrease in their political interest and propensity to discuss politics with their friends.

Citizenship Behavior. Interjecting race adds a special complexity to the relationship between the civics curriculum and the student's belief about the role of a good citizen in this country. Students were asked:

People have different ideas about what being a good citizen means. We're interested in what you think. Tell me how you would describe a good citizen in this country—that is, what things about a person are most important in showing that he is a good citizen.

Taking only their first responses, 70% of the

TABLE 5. PARTIAL BETA COEFFICIENTS BETWEEN
NUMBER OF CIVICS COURSES TAKEN AND
POLITICAL MEDIA USAGE AMONG NEGRO
AND WHITE STUDENTS

Media	Negro	White
Newspapers	17	+.07
Television	21	+.04
Magazines	10	+.10

TABLE 6. GAMMA CORRELATIONS BETWEEN NUMBER
OF CIVICS COURSES TAKEN AND POLITICAL
MEDIA USAGE AMONG NEGRO STUDENTS,
BY PARENTAL EDUCATION

Media	Parental Education			
Media	Primary	Secondary	College	
Newspapers	07	36	28	
Television	39	42	17	
Magazines	27	07	42	

Whites and 63% of the Negroes fell along two general dimensions: loyalty and political participation. Within these two response dimensions there are distinct racial differences. Sixtyone percent of the Negro responses focus on loyalty rather than participation. Only 41% of the White students, on the other hand, see the "good citizen" role as being one of loyalty rather than political participation. When we probe the relationship between taking civics courses and citizenship orientation some interesting differences are revealed. More civics courses mean more loyalty and less participation orientation for Negroes. In Table 7 there is a 24% difference in loyalty orientation between those Negroes who have taken no civic courses and those who have taken one or more. Civics course work has a slightly opposite effect among White students.

TABLE 7. THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN CIVICS CURRICULUM AND GOOD CITIZENSHIP ATTITUDES AMONG NEGRO AND WHITE STUDENTS

Number	ľ	Vegroes Stress	ing:
of Civics Courses	Loyalty	Participa- tion	
	%	%	Na
0	51	49	(41)
1+	75	25	(85)
	,	Whites Stressi	ing:
,	Loyalty	Participa- tion	
0	46	54	(395)
1+	39	61	(803)

^a These N's run lower than corresponding N's in other tables because those respondents not mentioning either loyalty or participation in their first response are excluded from the base.

TABLE 8. THE RELATION BETWEEN CIVICS
CURRICULUM AND CITIZENSHIP ATTITUDES
AMONG NEGRO STUDENTS, BY
PARENTAL EDUCATION

Number of Civics	Ele		
Courses	Loyalty	Participation	
	%	%	N
0	8 3	17	(6)
1+	63	37	(28)
	${ m Hig}$		
•			
	Loyalty	Participation	
.0	Loyalty 54	Participation 46	(24)
.0 1+			(24) (41)
-	54 90	46	
-	54 90	46 10	
-	54 90	46 10 College	

In other words, while the civics curriculum has little impact upon the White student's view of the good citizen role, it appears to inculcate in Negroes the role expectation that a good citizen is above all a loyal citizen rather than an active one. Yet looking at this same relationship among Negroes under the more severe multivariate control conditions the size of the beta coefficient (-.10) is not large. While it is predictably negative (i.e., loyalty orientation increases with course work), the magnitude of the coefficients reduces our confidence in the earlier contingency table.

The difference in findings may be the result of moving from a relatively simple bivariate analysis with no controls for other possible intervening variables to a more sophisticated mode of multivariate analysis under more rigorously controlled conditions. This unundoubtedly accounts for part of the difference, but we also found, as before, that the civies curriculum has a differential effect upon Negroes depending on the educational level of their parents.

Negro students whose parents have some secondary school or college education increase their loyalty orientation by 36% and 28%, respectively, as they take more civics courses (Table 8). Negroes from less educated families, however, increase their participation orienta-

tion much like White students. Due to the small N for Negro students who have taken no courses and whose parents have an elementary school education or less this relationship should be treated quite cautiously. Although differences between Negroes from different levels of parental education have been mentioned before, the most one would want to say here is that the civics curriculum seems to increase the loyalty orientations of higher status Negroes while having a slightly opposite effect among lower status Negro students.

A number of interpretations can be placed on these findings. Both loyalty and participation are emphasized in the civics curriculum, and for White and lower status Negro students the dual emphasis has about equal effect. But as we noted earlier, the higher status Negro may have received from his more active parents a "realistic" appraisal of the institutional and social restrictions placed upon Negro participation in American politics. Consequently, the participation emphasis in the curriculum has little impact. The reality factor may cause the higher status Negro to select out of the curriculum only those role characteristics which appear to be most congruent with a preconceived notion of his political life chances.

Another rationale for the findings might be found in the relative fulfillment of White and Negro needs to belong, to be accepted in this society. If we assume that the Negro is cut off from many of the associational memberships and status advantages that most Whites take for granted, then his unfulfilled need to belong and to be accepted is probably greater than that of his white counterparts. This may be particularly true of the higher status Negro and his parents. Because of their relatively higher education in the Negro community, they have had more contacts with Whites-contacts which, because of their race, have led to more frequent rebuffs. The one association not explicitly denied Negroes is that of being a loval American. It is entirely possible that the psychic relief a higher status Negro receives in "establishing" his American good-citizenship is greater than that of his White counterpart or his lower status racial peer. As a consequence, the loyalty emphasis in the curriculum may have the most impact on the higher status Negro.41

41 In 1942 Gunnar Myrdal completed a comprehensive codification of the Negro culture and circumstances in America. He maintained that Negroes in this country were "exaggerated Americans," who believed in the American Creed more strongly than Whites. Gunnar Myrdal, op. cit.

⁴⁰ The beta coefficient for White students is +.07.

Regional Effects. The Negro students are located disporportionately in the southern part of the United States. Because of possible cultural differences we thought it advisable to control for region as well as parental education. Therefore the Negro subsample was divided into South and non-South with controls for high and low parental education employed in each region.⁴²

When controlled for region as well as parental education, the effects of the civics curriculum upon political knowledge, interest, discussion, television-newspaper-magazine usage, and loyalty-participation orientations were consistent with the results for the Negro subsample as a whole in all except two cases. Among the seven variables discussed above there are 28 cases (two for each region because of the education control or four for each variable) in which a possible deviation from the Negro subsample as a whole could occur. Due to the small marginals and the fact that there were 26 consistent findings, we attach little conceptual significance to these two exceptions.

In both regions the civics curriculum continued to be negatively associated with political media usage at all educational levels except for newspaper reading among higher status students outside the South. The relationships are slightly stronger in the South than in the non-South. The differential consequences of

42 The Negro subsample was not large to begin with, and a regional control in addition to the control for parental education reduced cell frequencies even further. Because the differential effects of parental education were found primarily between students whose parents had only an elementary school education versus those with high school or college education, we combined students from the latter two categories into one category. This retained the substance of the original education break in the South, but it still left only a small number of students outside the South whose parents had an elementary school education or less. In order to enlarge this latter group the parental education cutting point in the non-South was moved to a point between those parents who were at least high school graduates and those who had only some high school or less. If there are important regional differences in curriculum effect they should be apparent under these control conditions.

The respective raw and weighted N's for the four groupings are as follows: southern low educated—33, 44; southern high educated—48, 64; non-southern low educated—45, 42; non-southern high educated—53, 50.

parental education were remarkably consistent across both regions. As before, civics courses had a negative effect upon the political discussion (and political interest in the South) of higher status Negroes while having a positive impact upon lower status Negroes. Finally, in both regions the civics curriculum continued to have its greatest negative effect on the participatory orientations of Negro students from the more educated families.

There appeared to be different regional effects on only three of the dependent variables. The first of these was political cynicism. In the South course work increases cynicism slightly among high and low status Negroes while in the North political cynicism decreased as the student was exposed to the civics curriculum. However, in both regions the outcome of taking a civics course is to make the student from the higher educated family relatively more cynical than his lower status peer. As with cynicism, exposure to civics means a slight decrease in civic tolerance among high and low status southern Negroes. This is also true of lower status Negroes outside the South. For all three cases the magnitude of the relationships are quite small, the highest being a gamma of -.14. It is only among higher status nonsouthern Negroes that a stronger, positive relationship develops—+.39.

The political efficacy of lower status students in the South was increased much more by the civics curriculum (.64) than was the efficacy of their higher status peers (.32). This is consistent with the picture for the entire subsample. However, while there was a positive relationship between exposure and increased efficacy among higher status students in the non-South there was a negative relationship among lower status students. We are at a loss to explain this negative sign other than point to the small frequencies which may account for this departure.

IV. CONCLUSION

A number of studies in the United States and other countries have stressed the importance of education in determining political attitudes and behavior. The man with only a primary school education is a different political actor from the man who has gone to high school or college. Yet direct evidence demonstrating the effect of college and high school curriculum upon political beliefs and behavior of students is scarce and generally inconclusive.

Our findings certainly do not support the thinking of those who look to the civics curriculum in American high schools as even a minor source of political socialization. When we investigated the student sample as a whole we found not one single case out of the ten examined in which the civics curriculum was significantly associated with students' political orientations.

The lack of positive results raised many questions in our minds concerning the simple correlations between years of education and political orientations which are so prevalent in the literature, particularly the differences between people with high school versus college education. Of course, high schools and colleges are complex institutions. While the formal curriculum may have little effect, there is still the acquisition of conceptual skills, the social climate of the school, and the presence of peer groups, all of which may play a significant role in the political socialization process.43 These caveats still overlook one of the chief difficulties in studying the influence of higher education: the danger of confounding the effect of selection with that of socialization. For example, do the highly educated feel more politically competent because of their college socialization experiences or were they significantly different in this respect from their non-college bound peers before they ever entered college?

College bound students do differ significantly from those who are not planning to obtain a higher education. They tend to come from families with above average income and education and have all the cultural benefits of their higher status.⁴⁴ We found among the high school seniors a strong positive correlation between parents' education and students' intention to attend a four year college or university $(\gamma = .52)$. Because there was also a strong correlation between high school grades $(\gamma = .53)$ and college intentions, we feel confident that stated intention to attend college is a fairly good predictor of future attendance.

The fact that college bound students enjoy higher social status than those not planning to pursue a higher education suggests that there also may be important political differences between the two groups. Indeed, students who plan to attend college are more likely to be knowledgeable about politics ($\gamma = .39$); to express greater political interest (.32) and efficacy

⁴³ See Almond and Verba, op. cit., Chap. 12; Kenneth P. Langton, "Peer Group and School and the Political Socialization Process," this REVIEW 61 (September, 1967), 751-758; and M. L. Levin, "Social Climates and Political Socialization," Public Opinion Quarterly, 25 (Winter, 1961), 596-606.

⁴⁴ Ernest Haveman and Patricia West, They Went to College (New York: Harcourt, 1952).

(.37); to support religious dissenters' rights of free speech (.37) and an elected communist's right to take public office (.44); to read about politics in newspapers (.18) and magazines (.34); to discuss politics with their peers (.26); and they are three times as likely to place the correct liberal-conservative label on the Democratic and Republican parties as are those students who are not planning to pursue a college education.

To summarize, there is a lack of evidence that the civics curriculum has a significant effect on the political orientations of the great majority of American high school students. Moreover, those who are college bound already have different political orientations than those who do not plan to attend college. These two conclusions suggest that an important part of the difference in political orientations between those from different levels of education, which is frequently cited in the literature and is usually explicitly or implicitly ascribed to the "education process," may actually represent a serious confounding of the effect of selection with that of political socialization.

Although the overall findings are unambiguous, there is reason to believe that under special conditions exposure to government and politics courses does have an impact at the secondary school level. When White and Negro students were observed separately, it became clear that the curriculum exerted considerably more influence on the latter. On several measures the effect was to move the Negro youthsespecially those from less-educated familiesto a position more congruent with the White youths and more in consonance with the usual goals of civic education in the United States. Among White students from less educated families this pattern was barely visible. With respect to some quasi-participative measures, taking a civics course served to depress Negro performance, especially among those from better-educated families. In virtually all instances the Negro students were much more affected by taking such courses than were the whites, regardless of whether the results were positive or negative.

We argued that one explanation of the singular consequence of the curriculum upon Negro students is that information redundancy is lower for them than for White students. Because of cultural and social status differences, the Negro students are more likely to encounter new or conflicting perspectives and content. The more usual case for Whites is a further layering of familiar materials which, by and large, repeat the message from other past and contemporary sources.

It is conceivable that other subpopulations of students are differentially affected by the curriculum; that variations in content and pedagogy lead to varying outcomes; or that there will be delayed consequences from course exposure. In the main, however, one is hard pressed to find evidence of any immediate course impact on the bulk of the students. The programmatic implications of this conclusion are forceful. If the educational system continues to invest sizable resources in govern-

ment and civics courses at the secondary level—as seems most probable—there must be a radical restructuring of these courses in order for them to have any appreciable pay-off. Changes in goals, course content, pedagogical methods, timing of exposure, teacher training, and school environmental factors are all points of leverage. Until such changes come about, one must continue to expect little contribution from the formal civics curriculum in the political socialization of American pre-adults.

CONSERVATISM. PERSONALITY AND POLITICAL EXTREMISM*

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I. INTRODUCTION

The empirical study of political ideology in mass publics must ultimately be related to political behavior; otherwise, the ideological description of such publics exists in an action vacuum. Yet, the most detailed and sophisticated descriptions and analyses of American conservatives and their characteristics are those which have most notably failed to connect their findings (about opinions, attitudes and ideologies) with consistent or predictable political activity of any kind.¹

This absence of systematic linkage between belief and behavior is primarily a consequence of the general absence of ideological structure in the political orientation of the broad American electorate. But it is also a consequence of the researchers' reliance on a priori ideological measures of doubtful validity.

Hence, when the student of politics is informed that reputed conservatives are, or tend to be, authoritarian, anti-Semitic and ethno-

- * I am grateful to Donald Stokes, Dale Neuman and William Riker for their comments and suggestions on earlier versions of this paper.
- ¹ T. W. Adorno, E. Frenkel-Brunswik, D. J. Levinson and N. Sanford, *The Authoritarian Personality* (New York, 1950); H. McClosky, "Conservatism and Personality," this Review 52 (1958), 27-45, esp. 44-45. See also M. Rokeach, *The Open and the Closed Mind*, (New York, 1960); and B. Anderson *et al.*, "On Conservative Attitudes," *Acta Sociologica*, 8 (1965), 189-204.
- ² A. Campbell, P. Converse, W. Miller and D. Stokes, *The American Voter* (New York, 1960), p. 249; P. Converse, "The Nature of Belief Systems in Mass Publics," in D. Apter (ed.), *Ideology and Discontent* (New York, 1965), pp. 206-261.
- ³ See, e.g., The critiques by R. Christie, H. H. Hyman and P. Sheatsley in R. Christie and M. Jahoda (eds.), Studies in the Scope and Method of 'The Authoritarian Personality' (Glencoe, Ill., 1954); M. Rokeach, op. cit., pp. 3-30; R. Brown, Social Psychology (New York, 1965), pp. 526-546. Campbell et al., op. cit., pp. 209-214, 512-515; W. Kendall, "Comment on McClosky's 'Conservatism and Personality,", this Review 52 (1959), 1111-1112; M. J. Rosenberg, "Images in Relation to the Policy Process: American Public Opinion on Cold-War Issues," in H. Kelman (ed.), International Behavior (New York, 1965), ch. 8.

centric,⁴ or imbued with "...feelings of worthlessness, submissiveness, inferiority, timidity ..., ... hostile and suspicious, ... rigid and compulsive, ... inflexible and unyielding ...,"⁵ he must question the adequacy of the political designation "conservative" both on descriptive and predictive grounds.

Because of these methodological and empirical problems, I suggest that the findings of prior resaerch and hypotheses related to them, be tested in a different manner. For example, if one examines the membership and/or known supporters of organizations which exist to aggregate and channel conservative political demands, the analysis of political ideology and its correlates can be conducted in a definitively political context, with the labels being supplied (or implied) by the actors themselves.⁶

Such an approach, using a criterion of active self-definition, avoids the ambiguities both in abstract, a priori definitions of ideological propensity and in the passive self-definition occasionally employed by pollsters ("Do you consider yourself a conservative, a liberal or a middle-of-the-roader?").

By shifting the focus to the level of conscious, deliberate and specific supportive behavior, comparisons are facilitated both among ideologically-based groups and between aggregates who "know" what they are, ideologically, and those who, operationally, must be told."

- 4 Adorno, et al., op. cit., pp. 265, 179.
- ⁵ McClosky, op. cit., pp. 37-38.
- 6 S. H. Barnes, "Ideology and the Organization of Conflict: On the Relationship Between Political Thought and Behavior," Journal of Politics, 28 (1966), 513-530, esp. 521-524. For relevant, not necessarily deliberate, examples of this approach, see M. Chesler and R. Schmuck, "Participant Observation in a Super-Patriot Discussion Group," Journal of Social Issues, 19 (1963), 18-30; R. Wolfinger et al., "American's Radical Right: Politics and Ideology; in Apter (ed.), op. cit., pp. 262-293; F. Grupp, Jr., "Political Activists: The John Birch Society and the ADA," a paper delivered at the 1966 Annual Meeting of the American Political Science Association, New York City.
- 7 The mere act of joining an ideologically-oriented group or party does not guarantee either

II. SETTING

One major effort to mobilize conservatives for political action has been made in New York state. There in 1961 a group of intellectuals, journalists, business and professional men founded the Conservative Party of New York, with the stated aim of (1) offering a conservative alternative to the relatively liberal programs and candidates of the two major parties and the seemingly influential Liberal Party, and (2) eventually pressuring the state Republican (and conceivably, the Democratic) party to move to a suitably conservative posture.⁸

The Party, a segment of whose membership will be discussed herein, has experienced slow but steady growth since 1962. Its gubernatorial poll increased from 141,877 (2.4%) in 1962 to 510,023 (8.4%) in 1966. Three Conservative Congressional candidates (in 1966) and the Party's candidate for Mayor of New York City (in 1965) have received more than 10% of the total vote in their constituencies. The Party's mean vote percentage in 16 New York State Congressional Districts was 6.4% in 1966.

The core of the Conservative Party's supporters can be readily located from public registration lists. This analysis is based upon the interview responses of a random sample of male Conservative Party members in Munroe County, New York, which comprises the City of Rochester and its suburbs. Interviews (each

ideological support or even interest. A discussion and justification of certain analytical exclusions can be found in R. A. Schoenberger, *Conservatives and Conservatism* (unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, University of Rochester, 1966; University Microfilm No. 67-8986), pp 40-44.

8 The key points of the Conservative Party Platform, derived from "... the American tradition of individual liberty, limited constitutional government, and defense of the Republic against its enemies," include belief in balanced budgets. opposition to or curbing of "... centralization of governmental power, monopoly union power, deficit spending and oppressive taxation...", the wish for the confinement of "... the Supreme Court . . . to its proper judicial functions," support for the "Neighborhood School" principle, opposition to state legislative reapportionment, public housing and foreign aid (except for "our friends"), See "Introducing: The Conservative Party of New York State" (New York, 1965), unpaged pamphlet. Available from Conservative Party State Headquarters, 141 E. 44 St., New York, New York 10017.

⁹ Females were excluded primarily because of the need to economize resources, Informal in-

TABLE 1. MISANTHROPY

Per cent who agree that	Conserva- tives (N = 45)	licans
1. "Most people can be trusted."	91%	92%
2. "People are more in- clined to look out for		
themselves than to help others."	(89)	(75)
3. "Human Nature is fundamentally co- operative."	78	92
4. "No one is going to care much what hap-		02
pens to you, when you get right down to it."	(40)	(35)
5. "If you don't watch yourself, people will		
take advantage of you."	(58)	(71)

Proportions in parentheses are those giving the misanthropic response.

lasting about 90 minutes) were completed with 45 Conservatives, 10 in a universe of 325, and with a control sample of 48 Republicans, the latter intended to provide a contrast between Conservatives (all but one of whom had been a Republican) and their unchanged, generally less ideological, former fellow partisans.

III. FINDINGS

A. Personality. Conservatives do not appear to differ substantially from Republicans on either of the two psychological measures employed. On specific assertions of social trust and distrust (Morris Rosenberg's "misanthropy" scale"), the results are, at best, ambiguous. Comparing total male sample requires discovered, as one would suspect, that numerous Conservative females registered as

The 1966 Conservative Congressional candidate in the district dominated by the eastern, and most populous, half of Monroe County polled 6.4% of the vote.

they did only at their husband's request.

¹⁰ The upper case "C" is used only when referring to registered Conservative Party members or to the Party itself.

¹¹ M. Rosenberg, "Misanthropy and Political Ideology," American Sociological Review, 21 (1956), 690-695; and "Misanthropy and Attitudes Toward International Affairs," Journal of Conflict Resolution, 1 (1957), 34-45.

TABLE 2. MISANTHROPY, BY RESPONDENTS
WITH AT LEAST SOME COLLEGE

I	er cent who agree that	Conserva- tives (N = 40)	licans
1.	"Most people can be trusted."	93%	95%
2.	"People are more in- clined to look out for		
	themselves than to help others."	85	80
3.	"Human Nature is fundamentally co-		
1	operative." "No one is going to	78	90
· .	care much what hap- pens to when you	37	50
5.	get right down to it." "If you don't watch yourself, people will	31	50
	take advantage of you."	58	60

sponses to each of the items (Table 1), it is apparent that the dominant direction of Conservative response is the same as that of the Republican sample. Moreover, the intersample differences are not consistent in direction, Conservatives appearing to be more trusting than the Republicans on item five and notably less so on two and three.

Since there is a long-recognized tendency for poorly educated people to respond uncritically to assertions like these and because of the disporportionate number of Conservatives with relatively high educational achievement, 12 I have isolated this segment of the samples (Table 2). Here, the distances between the resulting sub-samples diminish, with notable but non-significant differences occurring only on two of the five items (3 and 4). Again, the differences are not consistent in direction. 13

This absence of significant¹⁴ differences between samples recurs in an "authoritarian-equalitarian" scale, borrowed from a larger battery employed by the Survey Research Center in 1952 (Table 3). Here, however, Con-

TABLE 3. AUTHORITARIANISM-EQUALITARIANISM

Per cent who agree that	Conserva- tives (N = 45)	licans
1. "Human Nature being what it is, there will always be war and conflict."	73%	77%
 "Most people who don't get ahead, just don't have enough will 	,,	
power." 3. "A few strong leaders could make this country better than all the	51	52
laws and talk." 4. "An insult to your honor should not be	22	38
forgotten."	22	33

servatives tend to be less authoritarian on each of the four items, with the largest difference appearing on the sole assertion with overt political content ("a few strong leaders... better than all the laws and talk.").

Comparing the college-educated sub-samples (Table 4), the gaps between samples increase; Conservatives continue to respond in a less authoritarian pattern. The normative differences¹⁵ between Conservatives and Republicans consistently favor the former.¹⁶

B. Civil Liberties. The major politically relevant characteristic imputed to the maladjusted American conservative is his willingness to suppress, or to tolerate the suppression, of the civil liberties of his fellow-citizens. 17 The

 14 x², p<.05, df=1. All subsequent references to significance refer to this statistical measure and convention.

¹⁶ The average item-percentage difference between Conservatives and Republicans in Table 4 is +10.75. The range is +5 to +20.

16 Where sample responses are scored and indexed, with education controlled, the number of Conservatives in the high (normatively negative) range does not differ importantly or significantly from the Republicans. The per cent "highly misanthropic" are: Conservatives—12; Republicans—15. The per cent "highly authoritarian" are: Conservatives—17; Republicans—15. The scoring procedure is that used by G. Almond and S. Verba, The Civic Culture (New York, 1963), pp. 262–263.

¹⁷ The concept of authoritarianism is politically empty unless those persons it purports to de-

¹² Eighty-nine per cent had attended college, 62% received the bachelor's degree and 31% had started or completed graduate or professional school requirements.

¹³ The average item-percentage difference between Conservatives and Republicans in Table 2 is -0.8 (sign indicates normative evaluation). The range is +13 to -12 across items.

TABLE 4. AUTHORITARIANISM-EQUALITARIANISM,
BY RESPONDENTS WITH AT
LEAST SOME COLLEGE

Per cent who agree that	Conserva- tives (N = 40)	licans
1. "Human Nature being what it is, there will al- ways be war and conflict."	72%	80%
 "Most people who don't get ahead, just don't have enough will 	1270	00 70
power." 3. "A few strong leaders could make this country better than all the	50	60
laws and talk." 4. "An insult to your honor should not be	20	40
forgotten."	20	25

discovery or expectation of such behavior underlies and justifies most analyses of radical right organizations and joins the authoritarian personality to right-extremist, anti-libertarian perspectives. 18

To explore the possibility that Conservatives may not be attached to the standards of American civil liberties, I employed a ten-item measure covering key features of the Bill of Rights, a measure primarily derived from one applied to a 1957 sample of Berkeley college students.¹⁹

Comparison of the responses (Table 5) indicates that Conservatives offer predominant and broad support to libertarian assertions and comparable opposition to anti-libertarian ones. Where this finding does not obtain—on assertions supporting "double jeopardy" (item 8) and opposing academic freedom of belief (item 9)—it is notable that the reservations of

scribe are anti-libertarian. See Peter Viereck's phrase "... authoritarian reactionaries..., hypocritically pretending to be devoted to civil liberties," in D. Bell (ed.), The Radical Right (Garden City, N. Y., 1964), p. 196.

¹⁸ See, e.g., S. A. Stouffer, Communism, Conformity and Civil Liberties (Garden City, N. Y., 1955), pp. 94-97; D. Bell, op. cit., pp. 88, 358; R. Wolfinger et al., op. cit., pp. 270-273.

¹⁹ H. C. Selvin and W. O. Hagstrom, "Determinants of Support for Civil Liberties," *British Journal of Sociology*, 11 (1960) 51-73.

Conservatives are largely shared by Berkeley respondents.

On nine of the ten items, Conservative responses are more libertarian than those of the Republican sample, usually by significant margins.²⁰ Even when only the highly educated respondents are considered, large inter-sample differences remain, with Conservatives demonstrating greater support for civil liberties than Republicans.²¹

Beyond the item analysis, a summary table of libertarianism (Table 6) indicates that a large majority of Conservatives favor most of the libertarian assertions, with an overwhelming difference between Conservatives and Republicans. Moreover, 92% of the Conservatives and only 58% of the Republicans offered more pro-libertarian than anti-libertarian responses.²²

Although the measure is admittedly crude, weighing each item equally, one is able to clearly differentiate Conservatives from Republicans along lines of commitment to or at least acceptance of libertarian assertions. Of most obvious importance is the consistently libertarian attitude complex of both Conservatives and, to a slightly lesser degree, the small group of Goldwater Republicans.

These findings do not permit the inference that Conservatives will be in the forefront of any movement to expand or even protect the generality of civil liberties. Robert Lane has suggested that this fight is usually led by a triumvirate composed of the legal, clerical and teaching professions,²³ none of which is represented among the Conservatives. The latter

²⁰ The average item-percentage difference between Conservatives and Republicans is +17.1; between Conservatives and Goldwater-voting Republicans, +8.4. If any inference is to be drawn, it is that Goldwater Republicans are less anti-libertarian than Johnson-voting Republicans.

²¹ The average distance between college-educated Conservatives and Republicans dimishes to +11.6.

²² The mean Conservative score (defined as the number of prolibertarian responses) is 7.8 of a possible 10; for Republicans it is 6.0. College-educated Republicans have a mean of 6.75 and Goldwater-voting Republicans (8 of whom have not attended college) a mean of 7.1 (!). College-attending Conservatives achieve a score of 7.9.

²³ R. E. Lane, "The Fear of Equality," this Review, 53 (1959), 35-51. See also, S. A. Stouffer, op. cit., J. W. Prothro and C. M. Grigg, "Fundamental Principles of Democracy: Bases of Agreement and Disagreement," Journal of Politics, 22 (1961) 276-294.

TABLE 5. ATTITUDES TOWARD CIVIL LIBERTIES BY ALL RESPONDENTS AND BY RESPONDENTS WITH AT LEAST SOME COLLEGE EDUCATION

	Per cent who agree that	All Conserva- tives (N = 45)	All Republicans (N = 48)	Berkeley Studentsa (N = 894)	College Republicans (N = 20)	College Conserva- tives (N = 40)
1.	"There should be a law to prevent people from making speeches against our form of			440, ———————————————————————————————————		
2.	government." "Books which oppose churches and religion should be removed	$2^{ m d}$	27	G	20	2
3.	from local public libraries." "A high school teacher whose	$4^{\mathbf{d}}$	27	b	15	5
	loyalty has been questioned before a committee of Congress should be fired, even if he swears under oath that he isn't					
4.	a Communist." "State governments should have power to pass laws making public speeches against	7	8	0	10	5
5.	racial and religous groups il- legel." "When the police are looking	7ª	31	10	25	2
6.	for evidence against a sus- pected criminal, they should not have to have a warrant to search a house." "Large-scale roundups of 'un- desirables' are proper as long	13ª	33	11	30	13
7.	as they are restricted to people with known criminal records." "The government is acting	22 ^d	58	19	45	20
	properly when it refuses a passport to a Socialist." "If a man accused of a major	27	44	10	40	22
	crime is acquitted, and apparently incriminating evidence is later discovered, he should be retried."	53ª	79	53	70	50
9.	"Legislative committees should not investigate the political beliefs of university faculty	υ 0 -	. U	JJ	10	UU
10.	members." "It is not reasonable to suspect the loyalty of a lawyer	(44)	(35)	(61)	(40)	(55)
	who represents accused Communists before a Congressional Committee."	(67)	(77)	(79)	(90)	(65)

^a The proportion giving the libertarian response is parenthesized. Data from H. C. Selvin and W. Hagstron, "Determinants of Support for Civil Liberties." *British Journal of Sociology*, 11 (1960), pp. 52-53. I have reversed one and slightly altered four of their items. Responses are not controlled by sex.

b Question not used by Selvin and Hagstrom.

^o Phrasing employed by Selvin and Hagstrom or Stouffer unsuitable for comparison.

d Differences between Conservatives and Republicans are X^2 significant, p < .05 df = 1.

TABLE 6: RELATIVE SUPPORT FOR CIVIL LIBERTIES^a

	Conservatives $(N=45)$	Republicans (N=48)
Stronger	69%	21%
Weaker	31%	79%
	100%	100%

"The cut is made at the place where the frequency distributions for the two groups of respondents intersect, i.e., at eight pro-libertarian responses.

are nearly all corporation employees working in executive, engineering, accounting, statistical or technical capacities.

C. Extremism. The relationship between conservatism and rightist extremism (or radicalism) has never been clear. It has not been possible to estimate the ratios of conservatives willing and desiring to effectuate policy changes through traditional democratic procedures, including third parties, to those who prefer or abide techniques of personal and group harassment, slanderous or libelous allegations and put forward or support wild—and probably unattainable—policy objectives (e.g. "impeach Earl Warren," "get the U.S. out of the U.N. . . . ," "abolish the 16th Amendment").

In the current context, the extremist style is principally manifested by a perception (presumably common to Birchers, Christian Crusaders—both Hargis and Schwarz versions—. Minutemen, etc.) that the group's enemies are engaged in a generally successful conspiracy against its continued well-being or even survival, having infiltrated and gained significant control over major decision-making and communications centers of American society.24 Specifically, it is charged that the United Nations, the executive and judicial branches of the federal government, the major political parties, the schools, the press, unions, and financiers are all subject to control or major influence by the conspirators (i.e., Communists) or their "pseudo-liberal," "Fabian socialist," fellow-travelling associates.25

²⁴ R. Hofstadter, The Paranoid Style in American Politics and Other Essays (New York, 1965), Ch. 1. See also J. Higham, Strangers in the Land (New Brunswick, N. J., 1955), pp. 81, 85, 180; E. Shils, The Torment of Secrecy (Glencoe, Ill., 1952), ch. 1.

²⁵ J. Stormer, None Dare Call it Treason (Florissant, Mo., 1964); P. Schlafly, A Choice Not an

Regardless of whether such beliefs are pervasive among members and supporters of "radical right" organizations they do not, with rare exceptions, appear to dominate the Weltanschauung of Conservatives. Whatever their various perceptions of the influence of domestic Communism, the subject seldom appears anywhere on their lists of problems confronting the political system. Only two Conservatives mentioned domestic Communism in any form. (One, also a member of the John Birch Society, complained that the government was riddled with "... Reds and security risks"; the other -who claimed that the John Birch Society was "... a collection of neurotics and buffoons"complained about "... the increase of leftist subversion in education . . . and in civil rights groups.")

Conservatives do not rationalize their act of joining the new party as an anti-Communist step. Rather, they view it as either a protest against the liberal policies and leadership of the state Republican Party or a positive identification with the conservative movement or philosophy or both.

When asked if they could think of any organization hurting the conservative cause (only 7 of 45 thought any was helping), 71% named the John Birch Society, with 60% including the members as well as the leadership in their indictments. Their comments were dotted with such epithets as "kooks," "radicals," "bigots," "a WASP front," and other barely printable phrases. Among the far-right groups, only the John Birch Society and the American Council of Christian Churches (led by C. C. McIntyre) received any praise, each from one respondent. Sixteen percent could think of no organization either to praise or to damn.

It would appear, based on their responses to the questions discussed above, that the large majority of Conservatives consciously avoid adopting both the presumed perspective and the group identification of right-wing extremists. A final check on the accuracy of this finding is contained in an analysis of their responses to the items on a "domestic Communist threat" scale (Table 7). Conservative responses to each assertion, covering American society in general, college faculties and each of the

Echo (Alton, Ill., 1964); C. Manly, The Twenty Year Revolution (Chicago, 1954). See esp., A. G. Heinsohn (ed.), Anthology of Conservative Writings in the United States: 1932-1960 (Chicago, 1962) and any publication of the John Birch Society or its Western Islands Press.



TABLE 7. PERCEPTIONS OF COMMUNIST DANGER OR INFLUENCE IN AMERICAN SOCIETY

Per cent who agree that	Conservatives ^a (N=45)	Republicans (N = 48)	College Republicans (N=20)
1. "Communist professors do not have very much influence in American colleges and universities."	42	48	45
2. "The danger to the United States from Communists liv- ing here is <i>not</i> as great as the danger from Russia or			
China." 3. "Communists do not have	56	73	75
very much influence in the Democratic Party."	67	81	75
4. "Communists do not have very much influence in the Republican Party.	84	85	90

a Within arithmetic limitations, the five non-college educated Conservatives, responded exactly as did their colleagues to each of the items.

major political parties, were, in the aggregate, similar to the Republicans but consistently, though not significantly, more threat-perceiving. Only once, with regard to Communist influence in colleges and universities, did even a bare majority of Conservatives reject one of the assertions.

Although the data do not support any inference that most Conservatives are totally devoid of a belief in serious Communist influence in major domestic institutions, only a minority (26%) accepted at least three of these extremist assertions. If the extremist criteria are tightened somewhat, to include either a desire to see the U.S. withdraw from the U.N. or to impeach Earl Warren, the percentage in this category drops to 17 (8 respondents). (Only one, the Bircher, responded negatively to all six items.) No Republicans were found in the latter group of extremists.

IV. THE POLITICS OF CONSERVATIVES

As most Conservatives are quick to acknowledge, it is their political views which separate them importantly from other segments of the population.

In their responses to a series of general openended and specific closed-ended questions, both the most salient political interests of Conserva-

²⁶ Fifty-eight per cent accepted no more than one; 31% accepted none. Comparable figures for college-educated Republicans were 65% and 30%; for all Republicans, 72% and 29%.

tives and those dimensions on which they stand farthest apart from the sampled Republicans coincide.

Analysis of the verbal responses indicates clearly that the major political interest of Conservatives is in the role, direction and/or activities of the federal government in domestic economic affairs, with a concomitant fear for the present and future freedom of the individual in a "government dominated" society. A substantial majority of Conservatives (60%) commented at some length about their dislike of (1) government intervention into the affairs of business and businessmen, (2) the "socialistic" direction in which the nation's economy is moving, or (3) the size and power of the government in general.²⁷

An additional 25% focussed upon the individual rather than the government acting upon him. They expressed the belief that people were becoming dependent upon "gov-

²⁷ The segregation of responses into these, and allied, categories is for the purpose of expository convenience. There is evidence that respondents falling into only one would quickly endorse the remarks of their colleagues in the others. For example, 80% of the Conservatives (36 of 45) agreed that "it seems clear that the United States is on the way to becoming a Socialist country," although only ten mentioned the word "socialism" during the interviews. Seventy-four per cent (34 of 48) of the Republicans disagreed with the assertion.

TABLE 8. ATTITUDES TOWARD FEDERAL SOCIAL AND ECONOMIC ROLES*

Per cent opposed to any federal role in	Conserva- tives (N = 45)	Republicans (N = 48)
1. Financing Education		
(building and operatin costs)	g 91	54
2. Financing Public		
Housing	78	25
3. War on Poverty	80	31
4. Medical Care for the	;	
Aged	60	6
5. a. Combatting Depres-		
sions	24	
b. Combatting Depres-		
sions through public expenditures	58	19
6. Setting Minimum Wage	•	
Rates	62	33

^{*} All inter-sample differences in Table 8 are significant, p < .01.

ernment hand-outs," distracted by "bread and circuses," and bewailed the prospective "disappearance" of the individual and "subjugation of his rights."

This general antipathy to the activities, or "consequences" of the activities, of the federal government is illustrated in Table 8. When asked specifically. Conservatives reject every listed federal welfare program enacted since 1932, usually by overwhelming majorities. Only when it comes to combatting depressions do Conservatives indicate a slackening of hostility to a federal economic or welfare role. Yet, even on this issue, no longer a subject of major party controversy in principle, the Conservative majority endorses either a summary statement of the Hooverian approach ("balance the budget, increase tariffs and lower interest rates") or absolute non-interference with the business cycle (the federal government "should not interfere at all except, possibly, to stop regulating business").

While most Conservatives (78%) disagree with the assertion that "this country would be better off if the federal income tax were abolished" (as do 94% of the Republicans), nearly half (47%) would prefer a flat-rate to a graduated structure. Only 15% of the Republicans accept this view.

Conservative opposition to governmental economic and welfare activity is not restricted to the federal branches. Given the choice of a variety of governmental programs which in-

TABLE 9. ATTITUDES TOWARD GOVERNMENTAL SOCIAL AND ECONOMIC ROLES*

Per cent opposed to any governmental role in	Conserva- tives (N = 45)	Republicans (N = 48)
1. Financing Public		
Housing	29	4
2. War on Poverty	38	13
3. Medical Care for the		
Aged	58	6
4. Combatting Depres-		
sions	24	
5. Regulating Public		
Utilities	49	17

^{*} All inter-sample differences in Table IX are significant, p <.01.

cluded state or national and state participation, substantial numbers of Conservatives opted for neither (Table 9). Whereas no Republican respondent could accept a policy of total government inaction during a depression, one-quarter of the Conservatives had no such inhibition. An equal number were at most localists on all three specific social welfare items, relating to public housing, the anti-poverty program and medical care for the aged. Only one respondent, a follower of Ayn Rand, denied any government any role in any endeavor (except defense of life and property).

Allied to the Conservatives' general probusiness, anti-governmental attitudes is a widespread antipathy toward labor unions. Eighty per cent believed that they "...do more harm than good," compared with 40% of the Republicans.²⁸ No other political dimension, including civil rights and foreign policy, ranked so high on their lists of interests or elicited such near-uniformity of response as did the areas of economic regulation and welfare.

v. discussion

Monroe County Conservatives differ substantially, on the measures employed, in their psychological make-up, attitudes toward civil liberties and in their susceptibility to the doctrines and admiration for the behavior of the "radical right," from other conservatives and rightists examined by social scientists. The large majority of them cannot be classified as authoritarian or misanthropic, anti-civil-libertarian or currently vulnerable to the obsessive anti-Communism of right-wing fringe groups.

²⁸ Forty-five per cent of the Conservatives volunteered anti-union comments.

But there are common political and social denominators by which Conservatives can be distinguished from other political aggregates. The Conservatives examined here are mostly well-educated, well-paid family men, with upper-status occupations and suburban residences.²⁹ They are bound together politically by a consistent and highly salient opposition to the modern welfare and regulatory role of the federal government, combined with a solid hostility to the perceived power and influence of labor unions. While other political dimensions attract their interest and concern they rarely rank as high, occur as frequently or elicit such near-uniformity of attitude.³⁰

In short, Monroe County Conservatives can be characterized by their relatively high average socio-economic position and by their possession of a distinct and coherent ideology which, while limited in breadth, is appropriate (within the American political tradition) to their socio-economic position.

These findings seriously contradict the conclusions of McClosky and the Berkeley group. Most Conservatives do not fit the mold of psychic maladjustment, anomy, alienation and outgroup hostility found jointly or separately by these scholars. There are two possibilities which may account for the strong psychological-political correlations heretofore discovered and their general absence from my sample. One is that the kind of conservatism represented by the New York Conservatives is crucially different, in terms of key issues and social and demographic sources, from the variant(s) manifested by the radical right. Recent research into the background and attitudes of radical right activitists suggests that this is likely.

A large segment of Ira Rohter's sample of Oregon rightists is disproportionately older, rural-born, less well educated, lower in income and occupational status and likely to belong to fundamentalist religious denominations than is my sample. ²¹ His respondents are found to be comparatively maladjusted on eleven of twelve psychological measures. ³² (They were politically

²⁰ The median family income for Conservatives in 1964 was nearly \$12,000; 85% earned more than \$8,000. Ninety-six per cent were employed in white-collar jobs, 84% in business, managerial, professional or technical capacities.

³⁰ The Party platform, summarized in note 8, is an accurate, if too short and general, summary of the views of the majority of the sample.

³¹ I. S. Rohter, *Radical Rightists: An Empirical Study* (Unpublished Ph.D. Dissertation, Michigan State University, 1967), pp. 124-144.

32 Ibid., pp. 154-265, passim.

efficacious.) Mark Chesler and Richard Schmuck have found similar, though fewer. such associations in their midwestern samples. but suggest that a political "value strain"—the unhappy perception of the difference between what is (or will be) and what should be-underlie adoption or acceptance of radical right perspectives.33 It must be noted that heavy concentrations of older, less well-trained and economically successful, fundamentalist and ruralborn individuals have been found by all students of the subject except Wolfinger, who believes that San Francisco area Christian Anti-Communist Crusaders, at least, "... are not social and psychological cripples."34

Despite some elements of overlap, it may be in order to hypothesize that two major strains of right-wing attitudes and behavior are distinguishable on the basis of 1) political grounds—one concerned primarily with questions of economic and social policy, the other with a powerful and conspiratorial domestic Communist threat; 2) social differences—one a segment of the young, educated, technologically competent and economically successful middle to upper-middle class, the other older, less competent and less "successful" on these dimensions; and 3) psychological differencesone reasonably well adjusted to their environment and able to cope with, though dissenting from, the major political tendencies of their time, the other hostile toward many of the social forces of the era and less able to keep their

It is urgent to separate analytically the type of conservatism displayed by the New York State Conservative Party and the radical variant(s) which provide support for the John Birch Society. The persistent political warfare between William Buckley's National Review (the major journalistic supporter of New York Conservatives) and the John Birch Society, inter alia, indicate that those differences are strongly reflected in the political arena. The distinction seems to me to be that between reasonable political intelligence and its ab-

social-psychological balance when confronting

them.

³³ M. Chesler and R. Schmuck, "Social Psychological Characteristics of Super-Patriots" in R. A. Schoenberger (ed.), *The American Right Wing* (New York, forthcoming, 1969).

³⁴ R. Wolfinger, et. al., "The Radical Right..." op. cit., p. 285. Another recent study, of Dallas rightists, concludes that the availability of rightist organizations may better account for rightist behavior than psychological predispositions. See A. C. Elms, "Psychological Factors in Right-Wing Extremism," in Schoenberger, op. cit., ch. 6.

sence, with their associated causes and correlations.

The second explanation of the discrepancy between my findings and those of McClosky and the Berkeley group is that "conservatives" attitudinally defined and derived from a population cross-section and those surveyed on the basis of overt, politically relevant behavior are actually two distinct empirical universes sharing the same label. The former group of inactive, inefficacious, alienated and largely illeducated individuals may be psychologically conservative but no evidence has been offered to demonstrate a consistent relationship to any broad variant of political conservatism. (That many radical rightists are recruited from McClosky's universe of "extreme conservatives" appears probable, however.)

McClosky himself found that the correlations "... between classical conservatism ... and ... party affiliation, attitude on economic issues and liberal-conservative self-designation . . . tend to be fairly low . . ."²⁵

It is clear, on the evidence presented here, that some people who identify, register and vote as Conservatives do not possess the personality attributes assigned to "conservatives" selected on other bases. For this group, at least, politics is primarily a legitimate means to express political and economic dissatisfactions and desires, one which dominates, if not supercedes, its utility as a political outlet for clinical and social psychological maladjustments.

²⁵ H. McClosky, "Conservatism and Personality," op. cit., pp. 44-45.

A SALIENCE DIMENSION OF POLITICS FOR THE STUDY OF POLITICAL CULTURE

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The present trend in the comparative study of politics is a departure from the country-by-country approach and a search for analytical models based on dimensions common to all political systems. This trend is in part based on the assumption that the construction of new concepts and conceptual frameworks for comparative politics would provide the starting point for a general empirical theory of political systems. One of the new concepts which has become common currency is "political culture." Originally proposed by Almond in 19562 and developed by Almond and Verba in The Civic Culture, the concept of political culture

¹ For a discussion of the problems and trends in the comparative study of politics see Roy C. Macridis, The Study of Comparative Government (New York: Random House Inc., 1955); Roy C. Macridis and Bernard E. Brown (eds.), Comparative Politics (Rev. ed.; Homewood, Ill.: The Dorsey Press, 1964), pp. 1-11; Harry Eckstein, "A Perspective on Comparative Politics, Past and Present," in Harry Eckstein and David E. Apter (eds.), Comparative Politics (New York: The Free Press of Glencoe, 1963), pp. 3-33. Models for the comparative study of political systems have been proposed in David E. Apter, "A Comparative Method for the Study of Politics," The American Journal of Sociology, 64 (1958), 221-237; David E. Apter, The Politics of Modernization (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1965), esp. pp. 1-42 and 223-265; Gabriel A. Almond, Introduction to G. Almond and J. Coleman, The Politics of the Developing Areas (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1960); Gabriel A. Almond, "A Developmental Approach to Political Systems," World Politics, 17 (1965), 183-214; G. A. Almond and B. G. Powell, Comparative Politics (Boston: Little, Brown and Co., 1966). A model for the comparative study of political participation has been proposed by Stein Rokkan in "The Comparative Study of Political Participation: Notes towards a Perspective on Current Research," in Austin Ranney (ed.), Essays on the Behavioral Study of Politics (Urbana: University of Illinois Press, 1962), pp. 47-80.

² Gabriel A. Almond, "Comparative Political Systems," *Journal of Politics*, 18 (1956), 391-409.

³ Gabriel A. Almond and Sidney Verba, *The Civic Culture* (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1963).

refers to patterns of politically relevant orientations of a cognitive, evaluative and expressive sort. It is intended to provide a researchable connecting link between the psychological tendencies of individuals and groups and the structural-functional characteristics of political systems, and to translate such concepts as "historical heritage" or "national character" into sets of cultural components more amenable to measurement and comparison across nations.

The study of political culture thus involves comparisons between the orientations of social groups towards specific political objects, between those of particular groups towards different objects, and between patterns of orientations and patterns of behavior. From a methodological viewpoint, all empirical political research is comparative research; we must therefore expect to encounter the problem of the comparability of political data, and in particular, the problem of equivalence of meaning, in all areas of political study. In the comparison of cultural data across nations the requirements of equivalence of meaning are probably more difficult to meet than in any other area. Generally speaking, there are two possible sources of differences in meaning in cross-cultural data: (a) cultural differences of a non-political nature, such as language, education or the degree of frankness or "openness" of personal opinions, and (b) cultural differences of a political nature.

The problems involved in the interpretation of these differences have been encountered in political survey research; some of their implications for the study of political cultures have been discussed in *The Civic Culture* and elsewhere. The present paper deals with one

'Some of the major problem-areas in cross-national political survey research have been examined in: Sidney Verba, "Survey Research and the Study of Comparative Politics," (Center for Advanced Study in The Behavioral Sciences, 1963); and Erwin Scheuch, "Progress in The Cross-Cultural Use of Surveys," (Paper submitted to the International Social Science Council, Round Table on Comparative Research, 1965). For a review of current efforts in cross-national research, including survey research, see Stein Rokkan, "Comparative Cross-National Research:

of the problems of cultural differences of a political nature. It suggests that one of the significant variables in political cultures is the salience of politics in social action, attitudes and behavior, and that it is possible to measure the magnitude of salience for different individuals, groups or nations. The resulting scores on this dimension may be used as a filter variable capable of increasing the equivalence of meaning of cross-cultural data. The concept of salience is also proposed as an element for a general theory of political behavior

I. "OBJECTIVE" AND "SUBJECTIVE" POLITICAL RELEVANCE

Most contemporary definitions of politics in some fashion associate the political system with legitimate coercion or with the authoritative allocation of values. Although the emphasis has shifted from the legal and institutional aspects of government towards a more comprehensive view including all politicallyoriented social action, the "political nature" of an act is considered as determined by its relationship to the process of authoritative rule-making and enforcement. This definition centers on the authoritative facet of political decision-making, and not on the contents of decisions. It implies that whatever the goals of human behavior, such behavior becomes politically relevant if it affects the use of authority. The term "affects," however ambiguous, can be interpreted as referring to those components of authoritative decisions, allocations, etc., which an observer would impute to social action preceding the decision, on the basis of his "objective" interpretation of observable data.

The cultural dimension in political analysis, however, refers to the personal, subjective meaning ascribed by individuals and groups to behavior which has been "objectively" defined as politically relevant. It is concerned

The Context of Current Efforts," in Merritt and Rokkan (eds.), Comparing Nations (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1966). The problems of equivalence of meaning encountered in intranational survey research also apply to cross-national research; they are discussed in the literature on methods in survey research. For recent contributions in this area see Philip E. Converse, "New dimensions of meaning for cross-section sample surveys in politics," International Social Science Journal, 16 (1964), 19-34; Adam Przeworski and Henry Teune, "Equivalence in Cross-National Research," Public Opinion Quarterly, 30 (1966), 551-568.

with orientations towards political actors or roles, towards political actions or structures. Such orientations are unlikely to be directed towards an abstract concept of authority: most will be directed towards the "who" and "what" of politics, associating authorityrightly or wrongly—with a particular actor, policy-goal or decision. In the evaluation of cultural data one is therefore confronted with the interpretation of the private, subjective meanings attributed by different individuals to given political objects. These cognitive orientations, and the evaluations associated with them, may differ because of differences in the psychological attributes of individuals. or because of differences in socio-cultural characteristics of a non-political nature, such as language,5 education, religion or ethnic origin.6 They may also vary because of differences in the way in which even individuals with similar socio-cultural characteristics perceive the relevance of a given political object to their goals and goal-oriented action.7 It has been shown

⁵ With respect to semantic differences, see, for example, C. E. Osgood, G. J. Suci and P. H. Tannenbaum, *The Measurement of Meaning* (Urbana: University of Illinois Press, 1957); C. E. Osgood, "Cross-cultural comparability in attitude measurement via multilingual semantic differentials" in I. D. Steiner and M. Fishbein (eds.), *Current Studies in Social Psychology* (New York: Holt, Rinehart and Winston Inc., 1965), p. 95

⁶ The most comprehensive presentation and analysis of the psychological and social factors affecting political involvement is Robert E. Lane's Political Life (Glencoe: The Free Press, 1959). Since this study is based almost exclusively on data from the United States, where the politicization of life is relatively low, the salience of politics is not treated as a separate dimension. Its expression in political life is discussed as an aspect of ethnic—or economic—group politics, or in terms of the "conscious needs served by participation in political life."

⁷ Attitude research has shown that attitudes vary as a function of the perceived importance of the attitude-object in leading to or blocking the attainment of values, and as a function of the rated importance of the values associated with that object; see Milton J. Rosenberg, "Cognitive Structure and Attitudinal Affect," Journal of Abnormal and Social Psychology, 53 (1956), 367–372. See also S. M. Lipset's distinction between social "characteristics" and social "factors" affecting the rates of voting turnout. Among the "factors" Lipset includes "the relevance of government policies to the individual": Seymour

recently that opinions and non-verbal behavior are based on attitudes towards objects and attitudes towards situations. Hence, the subjective relevance of a political object to the goal-oriented action of an individual can be seen as such a situational component of political behavior.

In cross-cultural, in contradistinction to intra-cultural, comparisons, one evaluates orientations towards different political objects. It is assumed that the objects are equivalent, but this assumption rests on the researcher's "objective" evaluation of the objects' structural and functional characteristics in the political systems concerned, whereas orientations towards these objects are based on the subjective perceptions of the respective populations. Since, by definition, one is dealing with different objects, indicators of their equivalence of meaning for the populations concerned are required. One such indicator is the equivalence in the subjective relevance of these objects to the goal-oriented action of the individuals or groups concerned, i.e., an indicator of an equivalent perception of the "objectin-situation," according to some common criterion of measurement.

Subjective relevance may or may not coincide with the objective relevance of a political object to an individual; it is the relevance as the individual perceives it. The concept of relevance, however, must be operationalized if one wishes to assign to a given political object different magnitudes of relevance for various individuals or groups. For this purpose it is useful to inquire into the way in which the political system is articulated with the goal-oriented actions of individuals and groups, and with the values attached to these goals.

II. GOAL-ORIENTED ACTIONS AND THE POLITICAL SYSTEM

One may conceive of all social action as directed towards the attainment of goals. Some goals are shared by groups, or even by the

Martin Lipset, *Political Man* (New York: Doubleday & Co., 1960), pp. 186-190. On the relevance of government policies to business and industry, as a factor affecting the political interest and involvement of members of these sectors of the economy, see Lane, op. cit., pp. 321-326.

⁸ Milton Rokeach, "Attitude Change and Behavioral Change," Public Opinion Quarterly, 30 (1966), 529-550. "Attitude" is defined by Rokeach as "a relatively enduring organization of beliefs about an object or situation predisposing one to respond in some preferential manner."

entire community, others are personal goals. The attainment of community goals may be sought by a great number of the community's members, or by a smaller number on their behalf. It is assumed that the individual participating in action oriented towards community goals is aware of the fact that he cannot attain these goals by himself. From the viewpoint of his own goal-orientation (i.e., motivation), his action is expressive: the act of participating in the attainment of community goals is considered as a goal per se. Goals not shared with others may also lead to expressive action, although most personal goals lead to an instrumental orientation towards action.

The attainment of community goals is generally sought through action channelled into the political system; group goals and personal goals may or may not be sought through political action. Some areas of social life are regulated by authoritative decisions; in those which are not, individuals and groups seek to attain some of their goals without having recourse to the political system, while seeking other goals by addressing demands (and providing supports) to governmental structures, or to political parties and other political elites. This distinction between goal-oriented action channelled through the political system and action which takes place within and between the various sub-systems of society but does not affect the process of authoritative decisionmaking, can serve as a starting point for the construction of an operational concept of the relevance of politics. It is perhaps necessary to add that the validity of this distinction is not impaired by the fact that even social action which does not affect the political system may be affected by political decisions. One may argue that a good deal of our roles in social subsystems are structured by the expectations of other actors and that these expectations are partly based on legal norms. The consequences of a contract, the requirements of corporation law, motor traffic regulations and innumerable other norms are part of the web of "complementary expectations" that impose limitations on the actor, and such legal norms are, of course, a regulatory output of the political system. Nevertheless, most of these norms do not prescribe any action, but merely define the conditions regulating certain types of behavior, if and when it occurs. Such rules must be considered as parts of the systems within and between which social action is taking place. This is implied in Parsons' definition of a social system as a system of interaction, oriented by complexes of complementary expectations concerning roles and sanctions.

It is now possible to return to the concept of the personal relevance of politics. Let us suppose that citizens A and B have expressed equal support for candidate X or have been equally involved in the election campaign supporting him; but whereas A seeks to attain some of his personal goals through political action, B does not have recourse to the political system in his endeavours to attain equivalent goals. If A expects to attain his goals with the help of the office for which X is competing, the relevance of the success or defeat of X is much higher for A than for B. It appears, therefore, that without knowing the subjective personal relevance of the political object "electoral success of candidate X" to A and to B, one would ascribe equivalent scores of partisanship or participation to their opinions or behavior. But if the differences in relevance are known. the apparent equivalence in partisanship. participation, etc., is no equivalence at all. Without the expectation of personal goalattainment, A would not support X, or would not support him to the same extent. Assuming that B does not expect equivalent "rewards" from the electoral success of X, the difference between input and expected reward, i.e., the net propensity to support X, is—ceteris paribus—greater for B than for A.

This hypothetical example suggests that "objective" differences in political opinions and behavior must be interpreted in terms of subjective personal relevance in order to assess net differences in partisanship, participation, etc. The importance of an indicator of equivalent perceptions of the "object-in-situation" in cross-cultural comparisons, where not only the situations, but also the objects of orientation are different, has already been mentioned.

Although the comparison of political orientations or behavior is a step preceding theory building, the heuristic value of comparative analysis lies precisely in the use of a conceptual framework for identifying and classifying data which lends itself to the formulation of statements about the relationship between variables. Political opinions and voting behavior have often been analyzed in terms of sociocultural variables, but, as Bendix and Lipset pointed out some time ago, social attributes are merely shorthand indicators of group-

determined interests, and "the effort to relate voting trends to various sub-groups of the population has a rationale only if it is assumed that these groupings are also interest constellations of a certain if varying cohesiveness." Without subscribing to a monistic "self-interest theory" of political behavior, "I the present analysis suggests a "personal relevance" dimension for the interpretation of data in the comparative study of political culture and as an element for a conceptual framework of a theory of political behavior.

III. MEASURING MAGNITUDES OF RELEVANCE

Assuming that orientations towards political objects can be viewed as structured by particular situations in which the political object is perceived as more or less relevant in terms of goal-oriented social action, the next problem is to find a unit capable of measuring magnitudes of relevance in different situations. Confronted with the problem of evaluating attitudes towards the output of local government in different countries, the authors of The Civic Culture admit that they "shall have to keep in mind . . . that the structure of government and community organization changes from one nation to another." They claim, however, that this does not make the attitudinal data any less significant, because "the norms to which an individual adheres are largely determined by the role that the system allows him to play ... [and] these norms in turn have a feedback effect on the structure": furthermore. attitudes towards government depend also on certain social and attitudinal characteristics of individuals. 12 Without questioning the validity of these assumptions, it seems that rather than drawing conclusions about the impact of structural differences on cultural patterns from

11 On the "self-interest axiom" in social action see Anthony Downs, An Economic Theory of Democracy (New York: Harper and Brothers, 1957), pp. 27ff. According to Bendix and Lipset, "cultural, socio-psychological and situational determinants . . . intervene between the economic position of individuals and their collective actions, . . . these intervening conditions modifythough they do not nullify-the impact of economic self-interest on conduct " ("Political Sociology," op. cit. p. 88). On economic interest and political involvement see Lane, op. cit. pp. 102-108, 321-334; an example of a recent study is Frank Lindenfeld, "Economic Interest and Political Involvement," Public Opinion Quarterly, 28 (1964), 104-111.

¹² Almond and Verba, op, cit. p. 168.

⁹ See Arthur L. Kalleberg, "The Logic of Comparison: A Methodological Note on the Comparative Study of Political Systems," World Politics, 19 (1966), 69-82.

¹⁰ Reinhard Bendix and Seymour M. Lipset, "Political Sociology," Current Sociology, 6 (1957), 79-99.

structure-bound orientations. one ought to interpret such orientations by means of comparable indicators of the relevant aspects of structural differences.

One way of overcoming this difficulty is to compute an index reflecting the ratio between social action addressed to the political system and other goal-oriented action, in terms of the preference rank-order assigned by individuals, groups or nations to their goals of social action. I propose to call this index the salience of politics. The concept of salience is based on the assumption that at any given time, individuals and groups view the goals towards which their action is oriented as ranking in a certain order of preference, in terms of the values attached to these goals. Goals in different areas of life may be assigned to the same rank, and ranks may be classified as broader or narrower in range; but it is assumed that there is always a certain order of preference, however limited the number of goals.

The salience of politics can be measured at the orientational and at the non-verbal behavioral level. At the orientational level, the salience will be lowest when an individual sees no relationship whatsoever between a given political object and his goal-oriented behavior, which is channelled entirely towards nonpolitical objects. And salience will be highest when he expects to attain the goals he values most through the given political object rather than through non-political action. Between these points of minimum and maximum salience, the magnitude of salience is computed from the ratio between the rank-order of goals which are sought through the given political object and that of goals sought through nonpolitical channels.

A distinction can be made between the salience of a given political object and the salience of "politics in general." An individual may expect goal-attainment with the help of a candidate for the state legislature without relating this expectation to his orientations towards the party's candidate for the mayoralty. Demands addressed at one level of the political system are not necessarily related to demands at other levels; it is even likely that at any given time, demands will not be expressed at more than one level. Yet, on the support side of the "interaction of expectations," there can be-and seems to be in many political systems-some degree of coordination between orientations (and behavior) at different levels of the political system, due mainly to the organizational efforts of activists, factions or parties. These efforts are probably more successful at any particular level when there is some expectation of "rewards" at any other level of the system. It is therefore possible to conceive of a salience of "politics in general" For the study of orientations towards a given political object, the salience of "politics in general" can be regarded as indirect salience, the magnitude of which can be assessed from the preference rank-order of the goals associated with demands at other levels of the political system.

At the level of non-verbal behavior, the salience of politics is the relative frequency of action aimed at the attainment of highly valued goals and directed at the political system, as compared to non-political action for the attainment of equivalent goals. At the micropolitical level, the magnitude of "behavioral" salience can be computed only from past behavior. At the macro-level of analysis, the relative frequency of political action for the attainment of highly valued goals can be measured either at any given moment or for a given period of time. In the first instance, frequency refers to the number of cases in specific groups or in the total population; in the second, to the number of cases at successive times of measurement. The latter type of measurement can also be used to indicate successive stages of a process through which the attainment of highly valued goals by political action has become-or has ceased to be-a component of the political culture of specific groups of society.13

By measuring the salience of politics it is possible to determine the preference-level of goals at which the political system is articulated with social action. Anchored in value-orientations towards goals as well as in externalized social action, the salience of politics is a dimension of the "bridge" linking macro-and micro-political analysis, which Almond and Verba set out to construct in their operational concept of political culture.

Used as a filter variable, the salience dimension is capable of increasing the equivalence of

¹³ The correlation between salience at the orientational and at the behavioral level is a researchable variable. One may assume that for any given individual the present perception and evaluation of politics in terms of goal-attainment will be related to his past experience with goal-seeking through political action. At the macro-level of analysis, one would expect a high positive correlation between the orientational and the behavioral magnitude of salience, except in periods of rapid change.

meaning in the evaluation of cultural data. This refers to the procedure which consists in calculating relationships within nations and comparing them across nations. It is used, for example, in the comparison of income groups across nations, when respondents are matched according to their position on the scale of income-distribution (e.g., the top X per cent of earners in each nation), rather than according to the equivalence of their incomes in each other's currency. One could add that-mutatis mutandis—the salience dimension of politics also attempts to equalize differences in the purchasing power of the respective currencies and differences in culturally-determined consumer habits or saving propensities.

Political orientations do not refer to objects in their objective structural setting, but to subjectively perceived "objects-in-situations." To increase cross-national (or cross-cultural) equivalence of meaning, one has to evaluate differences in the meanings ascribed to "objects-in-situations," rather than objective structural differences. It has been suggested that this can be done through the use of the relational concept of relevance. Objects O1, O2, \dots O_n will have equivalent meanings for actors $A_1, A_2, \ldots A_n$, if their salience for these actors is of the same magnitude. Obviously, this equivalence of meaning is expressed only in terms of the preference-level of goals, for the attainment of which the given political object is perceived as instrumental. This does not imply, however, that the equivalence of meaning refers only to cases of an instrumental orientation towards politics. Goals have been defined so as to include expressive orientations. both towards unshared personal goals and towards participation in the attainment of group or community goals. Furthermore, equivalence of meaning is also obtained in cases where the given political object is not perceived as relevant to the attainment of any goal. Classification of data according to the magnitude of salience is not necessarily the only procedure through which equivalent subjective meanings can be assigned to political objects,14 but it is a procedure consistent with the assumption that all social action, including political action, is goal-oriented, and that at any given time goals can be considered as ranking in a specific order of preference. The

¹⁴ A method for the measurement of the crossnational validity of political concepts through a differentiation between identical and equivalent indicators has been proposed by Adam Przeworski and Henry Teune, op. cit. operational advantage of the concept of salience consists in its ability to translate objective structural differences into a dimension on which comparable scores can be plotted.

IV. POLITICAL "SALIENCE" AND RELATED CONCEPTS

However, the measurement of the personal relevance of politics is not merely a device for increasing the equivalence of data in comparative analysis. The magnitude of the salience of politics is a characteristic of the political cultures of groups or nations. It is also associated with specific structural and functional characteristics of both the political and the social systems, or of important sub-systems of each. One cannot expect a high frequency of personal goal-seeking through political action unless political groups, parties or office-holders can command sufficient resources (including material resources, as well as positions of power or prestige) to meet a substantial part of the demand: and citizens will not seek highlyvalued goals through political action if such goals can be attained at lesser cost through non-political channels. These structural and functional characteristics are reflected at the cultural level of politics. If highly-valued goals are sought more frequently through political action in nation A than in nation B, one may expect the stakes of politics to be higher in A than in B, and this difference to be expressed in the intensity of political competition and conflict and in the patterns of political conflict resolution. Where the salience of politics is highest, as, for example, in totalitarian dictatorships in which most areas of social life are subjected to governmental or political decisionmaking, no overt competition and conflict can be tolerated, and conflict resolution is authoritarian and repressive. Examples of a high salience of politics, for specific political subcultures, can also be found in non-totalitarian systems.15

The concept of salience is related to La Palombara's "magnitude" of politics, which he proposes as a dimension of political change. Magnitude is "the ratio of political activity, however institutionalized, to all of the other activity that takes place in society." This formulation seems to imply the possibility of quantifying the total function performance of

¹⁵ See infra.

¹⁶ J. La Palombara, "Notes, Queries, and Dilemmas," in J. La Palombara (ed.), Bureaucracy and Political Development (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1963), pp. 42-43.

the political system and assumes all social goals to be of equal or equivalent value. The concept of salience is based on the very assumption that goals are given different values, and relates the performance of political and government functions to the value-orientations towards the goals that are sought by means of political action. It thereby circumvents the difficulty of quantification at the total-performance level and plots relative frequencies of performance on a scale of value-orientations towards goals.

In considering the salience of politics as a dimension of political culture, I use the term "political culture" in a sense which goes beyond the meaning Almond originally ascribed to it. Almond has consistently defined political culture as a pattern of orientations—cognitive, affective and evaluative—and Verba has adopted the same definition.¹⁷ Yet, the salience of politics also refers to a particular type of non-verbal behavior: social action addressed to the political system for the attainment of highly-valued goals. This implies a concept of political culture which includes both orientations and non-verbal behavior. This interpretation rests on the assumption that the interest in political culture centers on the impact of beliefs and values on political behavior, and not on belief-systems or value-systems as such. Furthermore, the extent to which beliefs, affects and values are externalized in political behavior is in itself a very relevant dimension of political culture. This was recognized by the authors of The Civic Culture when they emphasized the importance of the divergence between orientations and actual behavior in a civic culture: "A citizen within the civic culture has . . . a reserve of influence . . . he is not the active citizen; he is the potentially active citizen . . . the inconsistencies within attitudes and inconsistencies between attitudes and behavior . . . can maintain the tension between citizen activity and citizen passivity."18

This interpretation of culture is not restricted to political culture alone. We have the support of two leading anthropologists for a "behavioral concept" of culture. According to Kroeber, "everyone is agreed that culture at least contains channelled or selected forms, norms and values, a stream of related ideas and expressible patterns. Some would stop

¹⁷ Sidney Verba, "Comparative Political Culture," in L. Pye and S. Verba (eds.), *Political Culture and Political Development* (Princeton, N. J.: Princeton University Press, 1965), p. 549.

¹⁸ Almond and Verba, op. cit., pp. 481-482.

there; but most anthropologists would include in culture also human behavior—at any rate such human behavior as is influenced or conditioned by ideas or forms and in turn is engaged in producing, maintaining or modifying them";19 and Kluckhohn adds that most social scientists would agree that "culture consists of patterns, explicit and implicit, of and for behavior "20 "The explicit culture consists in those regularities in word and deed which may be generalized straight from the evidence of the ear and eye."21 No less significant is the fact that Parsons has found it necessary to revise his original position on the status of cultural systems, which he has come to consider as "systems of action in the direct sense."22

The origins of the micro-analytical concept of salience can be found in attitude research, though without special reference to politics. Duijker, quoting Chein, includes the "degree of salience of object in personal life space" as one of ten dimensions of all attitudes.²³ Rosenberg has shown that attitudes vary as a function of the perceived importance of the object in leading to or blocking the attainment of values.24 Himmelstrand defines salience "in terms of the kind of stimuli required to call into action the dispositions which make up the attitude" and constructs a salience scale for the measurement of attitude salience which he applies to a study of political knowledge.25 An earlier application of the concept in the study of political attitudes is reported by Rokkan and his associates in the study of

- ¹⁹ A. Kroeber, The Nature of Culture (Chicago, 1952), p. 107.
- ²⁰ C. Kluckhohn, "Culture and Behavior" in G. Lindzey (ed.), *Handbook of Social Psychology* (Cambridge, Mass., 1954), II, pp. 923-924. The emphasis is mine.
- ²¹ C. Kluckhohn, "The Study of Culture," in D. Lerner and H. D. Laswell (eds.), *The Policy Sciences* (Stanford, 1951), p. 88. The emphasis is mine.
- ²² Talcott Parsons, "Culture and the Social System," Introduction to Part IV of Talcott Parsons, Edward Shils, Kaspar Naegele and Jesse Pitts (eds.), *Theories of Society* (Glencoe, Ill., The Free Press, 1961), p. 964.
- ²³ H. C. J. Duijker, "Comparative Research in Social Science with special reference to Attitude Research," *International Social Science Bulletin*, 4 (1955), p. 560.
 - 24 See note 7.
- ²⁵ Ulf Himmelstrand, Social Pressures, Attitudes and Democratic Processess (Stockholm: Almquist and Wiksell, 1960), pp. 157, 166, 181.

teachers' attitudes.20 By correlating attitudes with elements of the social and political structural setting and with political issues, a number of theoretical propositions have emerged from the growing body of voting studies and the comparative studies of citizen participation in which the micro-analytical concept of salience must be considered as implicitly assumed. The elementary finding that the ratio of party members to party supporters (voters) in Western Europe is relatively higher in the Labor parties than in other political parties implies that politics has a higher degree of salience for wage-earners and other Labor voters than for the supporters of other parties. even if party membership cannot be considered a reliable indicator of salience. In voting studies, the salience of political issues is assumed to be one of the determinants of voting decisions. Thus, according to The American Voter, which is probably, so far, the voting study with the most sophisticated theoretical orientation, issue familiarity is defined in terms of awareness of the issue and awareness of its political relevance, and one of the determinants of the intensity of issue opinion is the relevance of the issue to the values of the opinion holder.27 This, however, refers only to the salience of political issues: i.e., it is assumed that the issue has already been channelled into the political process and is recognized as such by the opinion holder. Furthermore, the political issue is assumed to be related to the values of the opinion holder without inquiring into goal attainment through non-political action. When the nature of the issue excludes non-political goal attainment, the perceived salience of politics in terms of issues is in fact merely the perceived salience of the issue. It is possible that for the study of voting decisions one need not go beyond the salience of the issue, but for the study of political culture it seems necessary to measure frequencies of political and non-political goal-seeking.

Studies of political interest and apathy

²⁵ Aubert, Fisher, Rokkan, "A Comparative Study of Teachers' Attitudes to International Problems and Policies," Journal of Social Issues, 4 (1954), 25-39; S. Rokkan, "Party Preference and Opinion Patterns in Western Europe," International Social Science Bulletin, 4. (1956), 587-588. See also S. Rokkan, "Citizen Participation in Political Life," International Social Science Journal, 12 (1960), pp. 12-13.

²⁷ A. Campbell, P. Converse, W. Miller, D. Stokes, *The American Voter* (N.Y.: John Wiley & Sons, 1960), pp. 177-178.

come somewhat closer to a micro-analytical conceptualization of salience. An interesting typology of attitudes towards politics in terms of salience, constructed from a survey of attitudes of a sample of students at the University of Frankfort, has been proposed by Habermas and his associates in Student und Politik.28 Campbell, in discussing the determinants of political interest,29 introduces the concept of the "expected differential" likely to result from the choice of one rather than another of the available alternatives, and the concept of the "relative psychological cost" which the electorate must pay for participation in the electoral process. Transcending electoral behavior, Almond and Verba have inquired into "subjective competence" as an orientation towards political action in the area of feedback to government performance.30 Furthermore, they consider salience as determining the balance between activity and passivity, but it is not clear whether salience refers to affective, to instrumental or to both affective and instrumental orientations towards politics.31 In his discussion of the aspects of "political style," Verba mentions "the extent to which a differentiation is made between the political and other spheres of life," i.e., "the degree of politicization of private life."32 This is precisely the area in which the operational concept of salience proposed in this paper is capable of making some useful distinctions between the "levels" at which the political is articulated with the non-political sphere of life. The use of structural criteria and of the concept of "cumulativeness of social activity" enables Allardt to construct a typology of political activity in terms of cumulativeness with other social activity and of expressive or instrumental goal-orientation.33 This combination of goal orientation and structural approaches should be conducive to a more elaborate framework for a theory of political action, of which the "interest theory" pro-

²⁸ Habermas, Friedeburg, Oehler, Weltz, Student und Politik (Frankfurt: Neuwied, 1961), pp. 71-123.

²³ A. Campbell, "The Passive Citizen," Acta Sociologica, 6, (1962), 9-21.

³⁰ Almond and Verba, op. cit., pp. 180-261.

³¹ Ibid., pp. 481-482.

³² S. Verba, "Comparative Political Culture," op. cit., pp 544-550.

³³ E. Allardt, "Community Activity, Leisure and Social Structure," *Acta Sociologica*, 6 (1962), 67-82.

pounded by Bendix and Lipset is an example.34

It is not unlikely that the earlier over-concentration of empirical studies on voting behavior and political socialization in terms of attitude formation is partly responsible for the fact that few political scientists have so far attempted to construct a framework for a theory of political action. Electoral behavior sheds little light on the components of political action, because in the act of voting there is no interaction. Voting may be the outcome of previous interactions, but the act of voting is a terminal point, and whatever its relevance at the macro-political level, there is no political action of other actors than can be considered as complementary to any specific individual act of voting (wherever the vote is secret). Furthermore, voting sometimes reflects group conformity rather than orientations towards specific political issues, candidates or parties. In Parsons' typology voting is either an expressive or a responsible action;35 since the expected goal-attainment is "shared" with many other actors, it could be, at best, an imperfect instrumental action. Many political actions, however, are predominantly instrumen-

In Downs' "Economic Theory of Democracy"36 an attempt has been made to view voting as a quasi-instrumental action. In this "economic" model of political action, voting is the link between two sets of goal-pursuing processes: voters seek to maximize their "utility income" from government action by electing the party most responsive to their wants, and party leaders seek the rewards of office (power, prestige or income) by strategies devised to maximize voting support on election day. This is a model of rational decision making but rationality is defined as action efficiently designed to achieve consciously selected political ends. Hence only "political rationality" is considered, and it is admitted that individually rational but politically irrational mechanisms can be employed to decide for whom to vote (party loyalty, family socialization, the attractive personality of a leader, etc.). Thus, "personal rationality" in voting decisions may

³⁴ Bendix and Lipset, op. cit. Neil J. Smelser has used these elements for his macro-political theory of collective behavior: see his *Theory of Collective Behavior* (London: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1962).

³⁵ This refers to the typology in T. Parsons and E. Shils (eds.), *Towards a General Theory of Action* (New York: Harper and Row, 1951, 1962), p. 75. ³⁶ Anthony Downs, op. cit.

contradict the assumptions of the model. Yet. even the politically rational voter cannot vote rationally, because he lacks the necessary information about the voting intentions of other voters. Furthermore, in a two-party system rationality leads parties to becloud their policies in a fog of ambiguity, thus discouraging rational behavior by voters; and in a multiparty system, where there is uncertainty about the composition of the government coalition. voting is, at best, a preference poll. Whatever the other merits of "An Economic Theory of Democracy," it has provided an excellent demonstration of the fact that voting behavior is not a useful starting point for a micro-analytical conceptualization of political action.

V. THE UTILITY OF THE SALIENCE CONCEPT

The operational concept of the salience of politics has been presented in this paper within the framework of comparative cultural analysis and no assumptions have been made about the relationship between magnitudes of salience and specific types of orientations of forms of behavior. And yet, if the usefulness of the concept in comparative analysis can be demonstrated, it should find its place in the conceptual framework for an empirical theory of political behavior.

For the purpose of increasing the comparability of different situations in the interpretation of cultural data, attention has been focused on the magnitude of salience in terms of goal preference. For a theory of political behavior, however, it is necessary to consider not only the preference level of expected goal attainment, but also the costs involved in seeking these goals through political rather than non-political channels. Furthermore, it may be necessary to inquire into what Parsons has called the "cathectic meaning" of an object, "in respect of which its significance in terms of goal-attainment or of blockage of such attainment is paramount."37 This will be referred to here as the "role" of the political object in the perceived or actual process of goalattainment.

There are four possible "roles" in which a political object can be perceived in this process:

(a) It may be a goal, as in the expressive type of political action, either in the "consummatory" or in the "inclusion-membership" sense of the term.²⁸

³⁷ Talcott Parsons, "Culture and the Social System," op. cit., p. 967.

38 Ibid. Parsons admits that "in one sense inclusion is also a category of reward, the reward of

TABLE 7. INTERRELATIONS OF PREDICTORS AND ATTITUDES

Developed	Long Distance fro USSR and Chir		ensity	Authoritarian	High Growth Rate
High		· .			High
	Low	Low		Low	
Underdeveloped	Close to USSR a	nd High	Densit y	Non-authoritarian .	Low Growth Rate
High UN Pay	One Party and Mobilized	Close U.S. Relations	Bigness	Close to U.S. and Low Ratio People to School	Racially Heterogeneous
	High	High	High	High	High
Low					_
Low UN Pay	Multiple to No Party and Non- Moblized	Far U.S. Relations	Smallness	Long Distance fro U.S. and High Ra People to Schoo	tio Homogeneous

Babaa also sees a number of reasons (i.e., protection, dignity) why the "non-aligned" should view the United Nations in favorable terms.24 J. Karefo-Smart has maintained, "... even though the Charter was written and adopted while most of the African states were still colonial territories, the Africans nonetheless hold the Charter of the United Nations in the highest esteem."25 In regard to the General Assembly in particular, Robert Keohane has pointed out, "Yet it cannot be properly said that the actions of the General Assembly merely reflect the power realities of international politics. On the contrary, the quasiparliamentary nature of the organization gives the small and poor states, over thirty of which have become independent only since 1960, arithmetical advantage in its internal political

Nations, (New York: Foreign Policy Association, 1962), p. 54.

process."²⁶ Related themes are stressed by Catherine Senf Manno:

Here we describe more definitely the nature and extent of imbalance in actual voting results, in order to document the conclusion that 'great powers' of East and West have not succeeded-in terms of voting victories-in offsetting their small share of formal voting strength by informal sources of influence decision power in the General Assembly is inversely related to power in an economic or military sense . . . As between the underdeveloped and the advanced countries, the newly independent countries and those still administering or recently divested of colonial possession, there is not a balance of winnings and losses, but rather a constant pressure through massive majorities of the former for redistribution in their favor.27

²⁴ Khalid I. Babaa, "The 'Third Force' and the United Nations," *The Annals*, 362 (November, 1965), 81-91.

²⁵ John Karefa-Smart, "Africa and the United Nations," *International Organization*, 19 (1965), p. 766.

²⁶ Robert Owens Keohane, "Political Influence in the General Assembly," *International Conciliation*, No. 557 (1966), p. 5.

²⁷ Catherine Senf Manno, "Majority Decisions and Minority Responses in the UN General Assembly," Journal of Conflict Resolution, 10 (1966), pp. 7-9.

Thus, underdeveloped states frequently seem to "get more" out of the UN than developed states. In view of this, it may be possible to formulate a theoretical basis for this in a "formal" set of statements. Thus, "causal" reasons for a lack of enthusiasm with the United Nations by delegates from developed states and positive orientation by the underdeveloped states might be postulated as follows:

States differ in their economic development. States with higher economic development generally have high capabilities to supply human needs, regardless of international organizational affiliation, than states with lower economic development. International organizations may be considered devices which augment, in a limited way, the capabilities of states. Because the capabilities of developed states are already high, the contributions of international organizations to their capabilities are generally less significant, as a fraction of total capabilities, than in the case of states with lower development. Because statesmen may value an augmentation of capabilities to the extent that it is a "significant increment" representatives from underdeveloped states may generally value international organizations more than developed states. This may be particularly true if representatives from underdeveloped states are in a position to have a considerable voice in the organization (i.e., have a majority where majority rule is used). Thus, attitudinal differences might be expected among statesmen, toward the United Nations, related to their home states' economic development. One might expect, for example, that representatives from economically underdeveloped states would be more satisfied, see things in more dynamic terms. and be more inclined to bolster the organization than representatives from developed states.

Unfortunately, if high development is causally linked to negative delegate attitudes, the likely permanence of a developed-under-developed split in the world may indicate long-run negativism by delegates from developed states. Also, delegates from underdeveloped states, because of their possibly "weaker" position, 28 do not seem to possess many levers to bring (if this is possible) their colleagues from more developed states to a more positive and dynamic outlook. Kenneth Boulding has pointed out, "One does not negotiate from strength; one may dictate from strength, but

one does not negotiate."²⁹ Lloyd Jensen comes to a similar conclusion when he argues, "Thus there appears to be considerable evidence to reject the theory that nations [people?] negotiate most seriously from positions of strength."³⁰ Thus, if the present study can be assumed to have tapped some of the attitudinal propensities in the existing situation, regardless of its ultimate basis, possible "position" inflexibilities on the part of the delegates from developed nations, because of their relatively "strong" position, might be suggested.

The relevance and interpretation of other predictors seem somewhat less clear. The importance of "Distance" may indicate a kind of negative/static "attitudinal sphere of influence" emanating from the USSR and China, or it may simply provide a geographic reference that helps "locate" less positive delegate attitudes, the reasons for which are obscure. Generally speaking, this predictor seems to indicate that African and South American delegates are frequently more "positive" and "dynamic" in their outlooks than delegates closer to the USSR and Communist China.

The predictor of "Density" and the remaining predictors appear even harder to grapple with and, at this point, it seems unwise to attempt to formulate possible "causal explanations" without replication and additional evidence.

A question that might arise in connection with these findings is—what possible difference can it make what delegates think about the UN? Are not delegates simply "mouthpieces" of their respective state governments without an important shaping role in the institutions in which they operate?

I do not accept this view of the role of delegates because of the character of the United Nations diplomatic process. The difference between "traditional" diplomacy and United Nations diplomacy, the latter sometimes called "parliamentary diplomacy," has been frequently discussed. Parliamentary diplomacy,

²⁹ Kenneth Boulding, Conflict and Defense (New York: Harper Torchbook, 1963), p. 323.

²⁰ Lloyd Jensen, "Military Capabilities and Bargaining Behavior," Journal of Conflict Resolution, 9 (1965), p. 163.

³¹ See: H. G. Nicholas, The Evolution of the Diplomatic Method (New York: Macmillan, 1954), p. 84; H. G. Nicholas, The United Nations as a Political Institution (London: Oxford University Press, 1961), pp. 88-122; Sydney D. Bailey, The General Assembly of the United Nations (New York: Frederick A. Praeger, 1960), pp. 8-18; Gary Best, Diplomacy in the United Na-

²⁸ That is, such delegates have less, in the way of state capabilities, standing "behind" their wishes, desires and demands.

in contrast to traditional diplomacy, is characterized by public debate and voting. Traditional diplomacy, on the other hand, tends to be characterized by secret or semi-secret bargaining. The various activities connected with parliamentary diplomacy, in addition to bargaining, seem to open avenues of possible state agent impact upon the international political process not present in the traditional situation.

It is not enough, then, to understand the formal policy positions of states, interacting in the UN parliamentary situation, although this is important. Attention must also be directed to tendencies and biases of those participating in that process.

To illustrate potential delegate impact, it has been pointed out that former United Nations Ambassador, Henry Cabot Lodge "frequently got his instructions changed and 'usually wins his point' in differences with the State Department. . . 'Sometimes the 'instructions' he gets from Washington are verbatim playbacks of what he wrote himself' in part because developments 'happen too fast to rely upon specific instruction.'"32 Richard F. Pederson, in discussing the variegated functions of the United Nations Missions, which include: "(1) negotiation and parliamentary action; (2) the formulation of policy and tactics; (3) influencing opinion; (4) information gathering; (5) representation; and (6) public relations,"33 has also stressed the freedom of and potential impact of individual delegates:

Other characteristics of the UN which uniquely influence negotiations include the fact that all UN negotiation is, in effect, multilateral as is also the "openness" of UN activity, e.g., the fact that at any moment any one of the negotiators may make a public test of negotiating strengths by taking an

issue out of private talks and into the public forum... they [the delegates] have a large measure of discretion in tactics... There are exceptional cases when issues must be decided immediately and UN delegations are compelled to vote without instructions from their governments; such votes may establish governmental policy... a UN delegation in its advisory capacity may exert significant influence on national policy... Some delegations, in fact, receive only general instructions, allowing them the latitude to make many decisions themselves.... Information and the consequent assessment of it by delegations are often crucial elements in final governmental policy decisions.³⁴

This being the case, the delegate orientations implied by the analysis in this study suggest that developed-state representatives may provide a kind of check or "resistance" to developments in the United Nations to augment its role in world affairs. This would be the expected effect of those who appear less satisfied with things, particularly the general role and performance of most of the organs; tend to view many organs decreasing now and in the future; express a desire to decrease the role and powers of certain organs; and do not expect much change in respect to present Charter membership arrangements and gentlemen's agreements.

To summarize, United Nations delegates' responses to a questionnaire were found to be related to eleven predictors generated from a factor analysis of 48 variables relating to the respondents' home states. In all, 98 "significant" correlations were found. Of all of the predictors considered, economic development was the best in the sense of generating numerous correlations. High "Development Factor" scores were found, for the most part, to be related to negative and/or static attitudes. Because of the important organizational role of delegates, attitudinal negativism by delegates from developed states is likely to have considerable relevance for patterns of present and future support, development, and use of the United Nations.

tions (Northwestern University, 1960, unpublished dissertation).

³² Cecil B. Crabb, Jr., American Foreign Policy in the Nuclear Age (Elmsford, N.Y.: Row, Peterson & Co., 1960), p. 442 f.

³³ Richard F. Pederson, "National Representation in the United Nations," *International Organization*, 15 (1961), p. 258.

³⁴ Ibid., pp. 258-264.

NATIONAL POLITICAL UNITS IN THE TWENTIETH CENTURY: A STANDARDIZED LIST*

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When a field of study begins to develop more rigorous methods, well-defined concepts, and greater emphasis on systematic comparison, it is well on the way to becoming a science. In the past decade or so, these traits have become increasingly evident in the study of comparative politics and international politics. But the development of sharper methodology and conceptual sophistication on the part of individual researchers is not quite sufficient. One of the earmarks of a healthy scientific discipline is the extent to which each set of findings may be compared to and combined with the results of earlier investigations; in short, research must become cumulative. Certain obstacles still inhibit us, among which might be counted: disagreement as to the precise boundaries of comparative and international politics; highly disparate theoretical frameworks; lack of consensus regarding the specification and measurement of key variables; and insufficient data storage and retrieval arrangements. Another difficulty has been in the absence of a generally agreed delineation of our empirical domains: What are the political entities whose attributes and relationships must concern us? More simply, we have not yet defined our population,

* The early stages of this enterprise occurred while the first author was a visiting scholar at Michigan. We are grateful to Susan Jones, Barbara Milsten, and Wendy Hoag for assistance in the preparation of earlier lists, and to William Foltz, Michael Hudson, and Robert Tilman for their comments on later drafts. This list of national political units has been agreed to by representatives of a group of quantitatively-oriented international politics scholars and the Inter-University Consortium for Political Research in the hope that such standardization will contribute to greater comparability and cumulativeness in international and cross-national research. For specification of sub-national groups or regions, a supplementary two-column code is being worked out and may soon be available through the Consortium.

and until the population is defined, we know neither the domain about which we seek to generalize, nor the criteria for selecting a sample from that population.

Although this is hardly the most pressing issue facing our two fields, and while a successful delineation of our population is far from a sufficient condition for the growth of a scientific discipline, it does strike us as a necessary precondition. In earlier works, each of us has indeed defined his population of political entities, but both of those efforts were of a particular nature, tailored to the needs of rather specific research enterprises.1 Neither list would suffice for the widely varying research enterprises already under way, or for those that are bound to follow in the years ahead. In the present paper, therefore, we attempt to remedy those shortcomings and propose a list of all those units which might be included in these two closely related fields. More particularly, we offer here a population of those national or quasi-national political entities which should serve the needs of most comparative and/or international politics scholars concerned with such entities, or a sample thereof,

¹ One is Singer's Correlates of War Study, examining a range of systemic and national attributes which are associated with the onset of all international war above a given magnitude since 1815: the population is defined in J. David Singer and Melvin Small, "The Composition and Status Ordering of the International System, 1815-1940," World Politics, 18 (January 1966), 236-282, and it includes all independent entities since 1815 with populations exceeding 500,000. The other is Bruce M. Russett, and Hayward R. Alker, Karl W. Deutsch, and Harold D. Lasswell, World Handbook of Political and Social Indicators (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1964), now undergoing substantial expansion and updating at Yale by Michael Hudson, Charles Taylor, and Robert Hefner. The new version deals with U.N. members and all other independent states or colonies with populations exceeding one million.

- (b) It may be a means, (i.e., a sufficient condition) towards achieving political or non-political goals; in this sense most political actions are instrumental.
- (c) It may be a necessary condition: when political or non-political goals cannot be achieved unless the actor acts in a specific way towards a given political object.
- (d) It may be an obstacle: when action directed at a given political object prevents the attainment of a goal.

A theory of political behavior would have to consider the structural conditions, both psychological and environmental (social and cultural), which are likely to be conducive to one rather than another of these four possible ways of perceiving the role of politics in the process of goal attainment.

The concept of salience does not imply that all political actions are instrumental, or are perceived to be instrumental, for the achievement of non-political goals. Expressive action, in which a political object is highly valued as a goal per se, or action in which a political object is instrumental for the attainment of another political goal, can also be assessed according to the rank-order of the value attached to the goal. The concept of salience is also useful for the distinction between mere instrumentality (type (b)) and "politics as a condition" (type (c)).

Examples of political action as a (necessary) condition for the attainment of non-political goals can be found in totalitarian systems. where certain educational or occupational goals cannot be attained without membership in one of the organizations of the ruling party or clique. In these cases the salience of politics is very high, but this condition need not necessarily apply—to the same extent—to all groups of a given society. An example of "politics as a condition" in a non-totalitarian system is party patronage in societies open to rapid and large-scale immigration, where important sectors of the economy are highly politicized. In Israel, a country of mass immigration, all political parties have performed, or are still performing, distributive and allocating functions. When immigrants have no financial means of their own, the supply of services, credit and occupational opportunities by political parties becomes an important factor in political mobilization among immigrants. Other groups, such as the more firmly established or wealthier veteran settlers, can attain their highly valued goals without channeling their action through the political process, although the pattern of what had previously been "politics as a condition" and has now become an instrumental orientation towards political parties, has survived among many veteran settler groups. An instrumental orientation towards politics can come very close to "politics as a condition" even in democratic systems which do not face problems similar to that of immigrant absorption. This happens when one political party has a quasi-monopoly of influence in a particular geographic area, causing the development of special relationships such as the parentela between certain associational groups and the politically dominant Christian-Democratic party in the traditional South of Italy.39

In a different perspective, it may prove useful to inquire into the correlation between the magnitude of salience and the stage of economic, social and political development. Is what one may assume to be the relatively low salience of politics in the United States determined by the homogeneity of the political culture or by factors pertaining to the economic system? Furthermore, is a low salience of politics in terms of goal attainment a prerequisite of stable democracy?

Is it possible to measure political development-in terms of integration and mobilization or distribution and regulation—through measurements of changes in the magnitude of salience? Presumably, in developing countries the salience of politics will increase up to a certain stage in the processes of development: thereafter, however, the different patterns of adaptation and integration through which the political system meets the impact of change along different and sometimes contrasting dimensions, may accelerate or slow down the further increase of salience; and we know that at a relatively late stage in the development of the Western political systems there was a clear tendency for a decrease in the salience of politics, particularly in the area of economic activity.40

³⁹ J. La Palombara, *Interest Groups in Italian Politics* (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1964), pp. 306-348.

⁴⁰ Peter Nettl has recently discussed the status, of the political "subsystem" within society in terms of two variables: (a) the range of the political subsystem, which refers to the area of goals drawn into the process of collective goal-attainment; and (b) the salience of the political subsys-

[&]quot;acceptance" (p. 968). The distinction between rewards and facilities is parallel to that between consummatory and instrumental action.

The use of the proposed operational concept of salience in empirical research may suggest the need for modifications or additional refinements of the concept. There is little doubt, however, that empirical political theory re-

tem, which is its weight relative to other subsystems, i.e., the relative priority assigned to politics. The historical examples of shifts in range and salience cited by this author (Guizot's "enrichissez-vous!," the shift towards the welfare-state in the last fifty years, the depoliticization in Sweden, America and other countries, and Nkrumah's "Seek ye first the Kingdom of Politics") point towards a macro-political concept of salience similar to that presented in this paper, particularly with reference to the problems of devel-

quires operational concepts capable of comparing the "functional quality" of politics in different cultures and subcultures and of measuring the politicization of social life.

opment or change. See Peter Nettl, Political Mobilization (London: Faber and Faber Ltd., 1967), pp. 56-102. Although it is possible to distinguish analytically between "range" and "weight," it seems that the priorities implied in the concept of "weight" are a function of the specific range of goals sought through political action and of the priorities assigned to these goals.

⁴¹ This term has been proposed in Heinz Eulau and David Koff, "Occupational Mobility and Political Career," Western Political Quarterly, 11 (1962), p. 508.

POLITICAL DEVELOPMENT AND SOCIOECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT: THE CASE OF LATIN AMERICA*

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One way of acquiring insight into the processes of political development in Latin America is to compare the countries of the area systematically in terms of the "degree of development" which each can be said to have attained. Ideally, such an enterprise can lead to the understanding of the past history of the "more developed" countries by reference to the present problems of the "less developed" while an understanding of the problems confronting the more developed countries can make possible a glimpse into the future of those now less developed. Isolation of the factors responsible for a state's being more or less developed can moreover prove instructive for the understanding of the relations between political and socioeconomic phenomena.

Perhaps most important, such comparisons provide the means for holding constant effects attributable to characteristics shared by all, or nearly all, of the Latin American countries. Thus it can be argued with much plausibility that military intervention in politics, say, derives from elements in the Hispanic tradition. Yet it is clear that the frequency of military intervention varies from country to country, even where they share equally in that tradidition. Thus one is forced to go beyond the "Hispanic tradition" thesis with which the investigation might otherwise have come to rest.

In the present article I will be concerned with the problem of the relation of political development to socio-economic development in the Latin American context. For reasons that will become apparent below, I will not at this point attempt a rigorous analysis of the concept of political development, which has already been the subject of a large and rapidly growing literature.

* The author wishes to thank the Harvard Center for International Affairs and the University of Michigan Faculty Research Fellowship Committee for providing him with the necessary time free of other duties. He also wishes to thank Walter C. Soderlund, a doctoral candidate at the University of Michigan, whose research is reflected in the data on constitutional stability, and Richard Loebl of Harvard College, who performed the statistical calculations.

I. MEASURING POLITICAL DEVELOPMENT

The most common assumption about the relation of political development-typically understood as "stable democracy"-and socioeconomic development is that the two are positively correlated. The most notable early attempts to demonstrate this relation were those of Seymour Martin Lipset and Gabriel Almond and James S. Coleman: Lipset showed that in indices of wealth, the countries of Latin America he classified as "democracies and unstable dictatorships" ranked higher on the whole than those he called "stable dictatorships;" Almond and Coleman demonstrated a similar correlation between indices of wealth and the degree of "competitiveness" of the countries of the area.2 Unfortunately, in both cases the assignment of countries to the different political categories was quite subjective, and borderline cases appear to have been handled so as to strengthen the perceived relationship, which thus becomes questionable.

Russell Fitzgibbon has attempted to eliminate at least individual subjectivity in his periodic pollings of his colleagues on their judgment of how democratic the countries of Latin America are in relation to each other.3 A great many difficulties of definition and weighting limit the value of the Fitzgibbon rankings, however. For our present purpose they cannot be used in any case since Professor Fitzgibbon defines democracy so as to include several social and economic variables; his rankings, accordingly, do not represent a purely political dimension and cannot be used as a basis of comparison with rankings on an independent socioeconomic dimension.4 This same criticism vitiates the otherwise well-conceived attempt in this direction by Charles Wolf, Jr. The prob-

- ¹ Political Man: The Social Basis of Politics (New York: Doubleday Anchor, 1963), pp. 27-63.
- ² Gabriel Almond and James S. Coleman, *The Politics of the Developing Areas* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1960), p. 541.
- ³ See Russell H. Fitzgibbon and Kenneth F. Johnson, "Measurement of Latin American Political Change," this REVIEW, 55 (September, 1961), 515-526.
 - ⁴ As Lipset points out, op. cit., p. 31n.
 - ⁵ "The Political Effects of Economic Programs:

lem thus remains one of finding a "hard" measure of political development to match against measurements of social and economic development.

Several scholars have attempted to develop such indices, but all too often have failed to ensure that the data used, especially given Latin American circumstances, actually relate to the dimension in question; alternatively, they have tried to combine several sets of data into composite indices but have assigned relative weight to the different sets arbitrarily.

Some Indications from Latin America," Economic Development and Cultural Change, (October, 1965).

⁶ A good example of the distortions introduced by these two failings is provided in the otherwise interesting and provocative article by Phillips Cutright, "National Political Development: Its Measurement and Social Correlates," American Sociological Review (April, 1963), reprinted in Nelson W. Polsby, Robert A. Dentler, and Paul A. Smith (eds.), Politics and Social Life: An Introduction to Political Behavior (Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1963). Cutright constructed an index of political development, understood in a democratic sense, based on such acknowledged criteria of democracy as freedom of elections and respect for their results, and the existence and size of opposition representation in the legislature. The index was formed by assigning to each country one point for every year in which it was ruled by a chief executive chosen in free elections, one point for every year in which more than one party was represented in the legislature, and one point for every year a minority party held more than thirty per cent of the legislative seats. This represents a substantial contribution in several respects. Using number of years as a criterion creates the possibility of plotting positions along a dimension which has a more than purely notional meaning. Moreover, assigning one point for each year in which a chief executive chosen in free elections actually remained in office reflects not only the number of free elections that were held, a la Lipset, but also the degree of respect for their results which existed; this is an important variable in the Latin American context. However, taking the existence of a legislative opposition into account in constructing the index drastically distorts the results obtained. This is so, among other reasons, because of the common practice in Latin America of providing for the mandatory representation of opposition parties in the legislature. During the period since the end of World War I used by Cutright, at least six Latin American countries operated under constitutional or legal provisions earThe present writer has attempted to avoid at least the grossest errors of this type by mea-

marking legislative seats for an opposition party. The irony of the situation, and the reason why use of this criterion distorts Cutright's index so greatly, is that the provision for guaranteed opposition representation is particularly favored by the dictatorships, since it serves to take in foreign democrats with the illusion of a tolerated opposition. The opposition members, however, even holding the up to thirty-three per cent of the legislative seats legally guaranteed them, are of course powerless to oppose legislation passed by a disciplined majority loyal to the president. It is generally recognized, accordingly, that provisions for guaranteed legislative seats for the opposition frequently met with in the more dictatorial countries constitute no more than democratic window-dressing, and legitimate democratic opposition parties normally boycott elections that they feel will be conducted so as to favor the president's party. At the same time, however, there is never a lack of opportunists, sometimes renegades from the democratic opposition, who will organize a spurious opposition party to contest the elections in order to enjoy the privileges and emoluments of the opposition legislative seats, which are really sinecures.

The distortion introduced by considering the existence of a formal legislative opposition as a factor in determining a country's political development can clearly be seen in the case of Nicaragua. During most of the period covered by Cutright's article, Nicaragua was a notorious dictatorship under the Somoza family, easily one of the two or three most stable dictatorships in Latin America. And yet on Cutright's scale of political development, which embraces all the independent countries in the world, Nicaragua scores the same number of points as the Netherlands, substantially more than Israel or Austria, and enjoys the fifth highest place among the Latin American countries.

Deane Neubauer has recently devoted an article to a critique of Cutright, along rather similar lines. "Some Conditions of Democracy," this Review, 61 (December, 1967), 1002–1009. Unfortunately, he then goes on to construct his own index, which is liable to some of the criticisms applied to Cutright. Neubauer implicitly acknowledges this, explaining that he constructed his index "in a manner analogous to that used by Cutright... to enhance overall comparability between the two studies...," op. cit., p. 1006, footnote 8. This means that the value of Neubauer's index is limited to its use in criticizing Cutright. It cannot validly be used to draw con-

suring political development by means of a radically simplified non-composite index, based on the number of years during a given period in which a country has been ruled constitutionally.

A "constitutional" year has been defined operationally as one in at least six months of which the country was ruled by a government chosen in (more or less) free elections, and in which that government on the whole respected constitutional procedures and individual civil liberties, and in which no extra-constitutional changes of government took place. This captures the two aspects of a government's democratic legitimacy, its origin and its performance. It should be noted that this index is designed to discriminate among the Latin American countries, for which it provides an appropriate degree of "spread." It would probably not be usable in the same form in other contexts.

Table 1 gives, in Column I, the number of years over the period from 1935 to 1964 inclusive (approximately the length of time in which democratic practices have begun to take hold widely in Latin America) which qualified as "constitutional and democratic" on the basis of the criteria stipulated above. Clearly, coding problems arise here, and there are a great many borderline cases. To take this into account, Column II gives the number of years not spent under governments which were unequivocally dictatorial; that is, it includes, in addition to the years totalled in Column I, years spent under provisional governments and under other governments not democratically elected which nevertheless ruled constitutionally. Column I thus reflects exacting, Column II permissive, criteria of constitutionality. Column III gives the means between the two sets of figures, thus providing a rather rough index of constitutionality, but one which is probably as authentic as any that can be devised. The rank ordering in Column IV is based on the mean figures of Column III.

If we return to the question of the correlation of degree of stable democracy with level of economic wellbeing, now on the basis of rather "harder" data, some relation, but a rather weak one, is found to exist. The coefficient of correlation between the constitutionality index figures of Column III and life expectancy at birth (which, following Russett,⁷

table 1. Years of constitutional government, 1935-1964*

	I	II	III	IV
	Strictly defined	Loosely defined	Mean of I and II	Rank order based on III
Chile	30	30	30	1
Uruguay	27	27	27	2
Costa Rica	24	30	27	2
Mexico	24	30	27	2
Panama	20	29	24.5	5
Colombia	20	22	21	6
Brazil	16	19	17.5	7
Ecuador	13	22	17.5	7
Bolivia	11	18	14.5	9
Peru	9	18	13.5	10
Guatemala	10	14	12	11
Cuba	8	15	11.5	12
Honduras	5	14	9.5	13
Argentina	4	13	8.5	14
Venezuela	6	9	7.5	15
El Salvador	0	13	6.5	16
Nicaragua	1	9	5	17
Paraguay	1	4	2.5	18
Dominican				
Republic	0	4	2	19
Haiti	0	1	.5	20

^{*} The data were compiled, from a variety of sources, by Walter C. Soderlund, and classified by Mr. Soderlund and the author.

can be regarded as a "naturally composite" index of socioeconomic wellbeing) is .37.


Figure 1, which is a "scattergram" plotting rank order on the constitutionality index against that on GNP per capita, indicates these relations graphically. The hypothesis that political development correlates with economic development can be regarded as being weakly confirmed, in the sense that the top right and bottom left quadrants are fuller than those at top left and bottom right. Deviations from the center line appear greater than would be expected in terms of the Lipset or Almond and Coleman theses, however. If one thinks in terms of an undifferentiated process of socio-

⁸ Using figures from P. N. Rosenstein-Rodan, "International Aid for Underdeveloped Countries," The Review of Economics and Statistics (May, 1961). Figures are estimates for 1961 in real terms. Slight changes in rank-orderings, but not differing consistently in any one direction, are obtained by using other sets of GNP figures or other economic development indices.

clusions about the process of political development, which Neubauer then attempts to do.

⁷ Bruce M. Russett, et al., World Handbook of Political and Social Indicators (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1964), pp. 320-321.

Fig. 1. Wealth and stable democracy



Note: Broken line indicates positions that would be occupied if the two characteristics were perfectly correlated. See text for sources of rankings.

economic development, or "social mobilization," of which GNP per capita is simply one indicator, then clearly social mobilization stands in some causal relation to political development defined as the attainment of stable constitutional functioning, but is modified by, or mediated through, other social-sys-

⁹ See Karl W. Deutsch, "Social Mobilization and Political Development," this Review, 55 (September, 1961), 493-514.

tem characteristics which make its effects not wholly determining.

II. THE PARTICIPATION DIMENSION

But this result was only to be expected; the attainment of stable constitutional functioning is, after all, only one dimension in which political development takes place. To specify adequately the concept of political development for our era, one has surely also to stipulate another dimension, which is that of the extent

of participation in the polity on terms of equality. 10 Otherwise one would run the risk of accepting as authentic a constitutional facade masking an undemocratic reality. Many commentators have fallen into this trap, which Latin American circumstances bait rather well.

That is, the attainment of constitutional stability can be regarded as only one aspect of political development, the other being extent of participation on terms of equality. If one wishes, accordingly, to perform a more adequate test of the proposition that stable democracy is correlated with wealth—or, in more general terms, that political development in a democratic era accompanies economic development—it is necessary to take into account not only the formal following of constitutional procedures, but also a measure of participation that can reflect the substantive as well as the purely formal nature of a country's pretensions to democracy.

If political development has two aspects, one the maintenance of constitutional integrity, the other the extent of participation, then a country's degree of political development could in principle be represented by a single score which combined its separate scores on constitutionality and on participation. The political development score would then be a middle term between the scores on constitutionality and on participation.

Now if political development and economic development are closely correlated, then a country's economic development score should, likewise, represent a mean between its constitutionality and its participation scores. This proposition may be subjected to a rough test. As a rather crude index of political participation, we use the percentage of the population voting in general elections around 1960, using figures referring to relatively fair elections where available. These electoral participation figures are of course not wholly satisfactory for several reasons. Apart from the point that electoral participation is after all only approximately related to political participation in general, it is clear that electoral participation may be affected by transitory circumstances peculiar only to the election in question and not reflecting long-term regularities. It is also true that the freest elections for which figures

¹⁰ This appears to be essentially the same dimension referred to by Frederick Frey as the "distribution and reciprocity of power." "Political Development, Power, and Communications in Turkey," in Lucian W. Pye (ed.), Communications and Political Development (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1963), p. 301

TABLE 2. COMPARISON OF RANK ORDERINGS
ON CONSTITUTIONALITY, ECONOMIC
DEVELOPMENT, AND
PARTICIPATION

	Constitu- tionality	Life Ex- pectancy	Electoral Participa- tion		
Argentina	14	2	1		
Bolivia	9	20	8		
Brazil	7	8	14		
Chile	1	7	15		
Colombia	6	13	17		
Costa Rica	2	3	6		
Cuba	12	3	10		
Dominican					
Republic	19	16	4		
Ecuador	7	17	18		
El Salvador	16	14	16		
Guatemala	11	18	19		
Haiti	20	19	7		
Honduras	13	15	13		
Mexico	2	10	11		
Nicaragua	17	11	5		
Panama	5	5	11		
Paraguay	18	8	10		
Peru	10	12	20		
Uruguay	2	1	3		
Venezuela	15	6	2		

Sources: Constitutionality index, see Table I; life expectancy, Russett, op. cit., pp. 197-198; electoral participation, Yvan Labelle and Adriana Estrada, Latin America in Maps, Charts, Tables, CIF Study 1 (Cuernavaca: Center of Inter-Cultural Formation, 1963), except for figures on Cuba, Nicaragua, Paraguay, and the Dominican Republic, which are calculated by the author from population figures given by Russett, op. cit., p. 18-20, and election results given in the Hispanic American Report for February 1963 (Dominican Republic) and April 1963 (Nicaragua and Paraguay). The figure for Cuba is from the Statistical Abstract for Latin America, 1956 (University of California Press: Berkeley and Los Angeles, 1957).

are available were sometimes not very free. The figure for Cuba is especially unsatisfactory on this score; Cuba has not had a free election for over twenty years, and a good case could be made for leaving Cuba out of the reckoning entirely; but instead the figure for the less-than-free presidential election of 1954 has been used.

If the hypothesis we are testing is correct, then the indicator of economic development (again, life expectancy) should appear as a mean term between the constitutionality indicator and the participation indicator. If the hypothesis is incorrect, then the economic development indicator should appear as a mean term in slightly less than one-third of the cases, that is, about six times out of twenty. Table 2 gives the rank orders for the twenty Latin American countries with respect to the three indicators.

As can be seen from the table, the hypothesis is confirmed in 13 of the 20 cases, or about twice the frequency that one could expect if the relationship hypothesized did not hold.¹¹

¹¹ It is worthy of note that of the seven cases in which the economic development index, that is, the rank ordering on life expectancy, falls outside the range between the constitutionality and the participation rank orderings in Table 2, only one of these cases, that of Bolivia, seems to constitute a genuine exception to the hypothesis posited. The seven cases will be examined in turn.

One of them is, of course, Cuba, where the rank orderings on constitutionality, economic development, and participation respectively are 12-3-10. Here the participation ranking is much lower than the hypothesis would predict; however, this is only to be expected, since the ranking given, in the absence of a free election having been held, is that of the most recent election, that of 1954, which was notoriously rigged and the outcome (that of the "election" of the incumbent Batista) was known beforehand. If Fidel Castro were overthrown tomorrow and free elections held, I would anticipate a high turnout figure comparable to those shown in Venezuela or the Dominican Republic.

In the case of Paraguay, where the rank orderings run 18-8-10, it is clearly the middle figure, that for life expectancy, which must be suspect. Paraguayan statistics may be the worst in Latin America, but in any case if Paraguay is indeed eighth in life expectancy among the Latin American countries, that is the only social or economic indicator on which it reaches eighth place; on other economic indicators, Paraguay ranges between 12th and 18th place.

In four of the remaining five cases the economic development indicator falls only slightly outside of the predicted range: on Panama the rank orderings are 5-5-11; on Honduras 13-15-13; on El Salvador 16-14-16; and on Uruguay 2-1-3.

Only the case of Bolivia, with rank orderings of 9-20-8, constitutes an unequivocal exception to the hypothesis postulated. The problem can be stated clearly: the participation and constitutionality indices indicate that Bolivia is politically a relatively developed country, yet at the same

In order to make sure that this result was not an accident due to some peculiar property of one of the indices used, I checked the test several times, substituting rank ordering on other indices which also could be regarded as representative of the dimension in question. Thus when the 1960 Fitzgibbon and Johnson rank orderings on constitutional democracy were substituted for my constitutionality index, the relationship hypothesized again held good in thirteen cases. When GNP figures were substituted for life expectancy as an index of economic development, the relationship held in twelve cases.

It proved more difficult to find an index of participation that could be regarded as an alternative to the electoral participation figures used here. An index of equality in income distribution might be used as a rough reflector of the same dimension, but such an index is not available for all the twenty countries or anything close to that. Other sets of figures on electoral participation are available than the one given by Labelle and Estrada on which my rankings are based, but these have been peculiarly susceptible to computation errors and acceptance of propagandistic figures.¹²

time it remains economically extremely backward. Clearly Bolivia has been mobilized politically by some means other than economic change. The explanation for this is presumably that in Bolivia the Indians were mobilized, and were given a sense of personal efficacy usually found among occupants of higher-status positions in more developed societies, by having been enlisted into combat during the Chaco War. It is thus likely that 30 years ago, before the Mexican economy had developed to its present point, the rank orderings for Mexico would have shown a similar inconsistency, since the processes of change at work in Mexico resemble those operating more recently in Bolivia.

12 Thus the table given in the Statistical Abstract of Latin America for 1964 (Los Angeles and Berkeley: University of California Press, 1965), on electoral participation is incomplete; I have not checked all of the figures which it gives, and many agree with those given by Labelle and Estrada and used here, but two of them are patently false: the Nicaraguan figure of an electoral participation of 80% of the population is surely extraordinary in that only some 50% of the population are of voting age; and, apparently due to an error in computation, the Chilean turnout was reported as 55%, when the correct figure should have been about one-third of that. Russett's electoral participation table gives turnout as a percentage of voting age population, rather than

Strong confirmation of the hypothesis is provided, however, by computation of coefficients of correlation among the three sets of raw scores. The correlation between the economic development indicator (life expectancy) on the one hand, and the political development indicators (the constitutionality index and electoral participation) on the other, is .69, which is significant at the .01 level. If per capita GNP (Russett's figures) is substituted for life expectancy as the indicator of economic level, the correlation actually rises to .72.

The necessity of taking both aspects of political development into account is demonstrated by the smaller size of the correlation of the economic development indicator with the indicators of either aspect of political development alone. The correlation of life expectancy with the constitutionality score is .37, significant at the .1 level, and with the electoral participation figure is .49, significant at the .05 level.

It can be stated with a considerable degree of assurance, therefore, that political development, conceived of as the heightening of both observance of constitutional norms and popular participation in politics, is indeed commensurate with economic development.¹³ This has not appeared clearly from the literature so far because, among other things, authors have relied on conceptions of political development which stress either the constitutional stability factor or the participation factor but not both.

III. RELATIONS BETWEEN STABILITY AND PARTICIPATION

Yet one interesting aspect of the relationships described above is that—for the intermediate stages of political development, at least; that is, before the attainment of completely stable functioning and maximum participation—there is a partially *inverse* relation between stability and participation.¹⁴ In other

the whole population; the raw figures are not given, so the computations cannot be checked, but at least one figure, that given for Paraguay, is patently false, and other computation errors may have crept in, as they have in other of the tables Russett gives.

¹³ This may also be formulated as the principle that political development and economic development are aspects of a single process, the position taken by Hélio Jaguaribe in his *Desenvolvimento Econômico e Desenvolvimento Político* (Rio de Janeiro: Editôra Fundo de Cultura, 1962).

¹⁴ This conclusion appears to be confirmed by attitude survey data from Chile and Argentina turned up by the project headed by Alex Inkeles

words, a country developing economically develops politically, but this heightened level of political development can appear either as a greater fidelity to constitutional norms or as a higher degree of participation in political processes; whether one or the other direction is taken depends in large part (as the author hopes to demonstrate elsewhere) on the degree of egalitarianism in the social structure.

This formulation appears to confirm the scattered impressionistic insights of previous observers; for example, it can be regarded as an alternative formulation of Bagehot's principle, re-emphasized in recent years by Harry Eckstein, that the stability of the British constitutional order has been due to the deference showed by the British lower class to its social superiors. The deference premise is equivalent to saying that constitutional stability increases in proportion to social inequality, or in proportion as possible participants refrain from active political participation.¹⁵

One might also transpose the argument into the following terms: any stable political order needs to embody the principle of authority and, to some extent, that of hierarchy. In a democratic political order, however, these principles necessarily conflict with the principle of equality. As one reaches higher levels of economic and social development, however, the resources are created which enable a society embodying both types of principle to survive—resources, that is, of private satisfactions, of governmental budgetary capability, and of education and political sophistication.

Conclusions of interest can be drawn by contemplating the implications of change in the various components of this set of relationships. If participation is treated as the independent variable, then if participation increases greatly, constitutional integrity will tend to deteriorate unless the country's economy develops at the same time, providing a higher level of welfare to match the higher level of participation.

Chile provides a recent case of the working out of this set of relationships in Latin America. Constitutional stability has always been high—in the Latin American context—except for an interlude during the Depression. Chile's eco-

and still in progress at the time of writing: that as the propensity to participate in politics increases, support for the existing political order tends to decrease. See also the very interesting formulation of the problem in Deutsch, op. cit., p. 39.

¹⁵ The conclusion of Claude Ake on this point appears similar. See A Theory of Political Integration (Homewood, Ill.: Dorsey Press, 1967), p. 15.

nomic level has been relatively rather low, however, and, as the theory outlined here would predict, participation has also been extremely low, the turnout of 17.9% of the population in the Presidential election of 1958 representing the high point reached by electoral participation to that time. Politicization advanced. however, as Christian Democrats and the Socialist-Communist alliance, FRAP, competed in organizing the masses, even including the hitherto neglected rural population, and as secrecy of the ballot became guaranteed. Thus electoral participation rose to 26.76% of the population for the 1963 municipal elections and finally to 31.83% for the climactic Presidential election of 1964.16 It was generally thought by observers that this election was crucial for deciding whether Chile's future path would be democratic or not. With the victory of the Christian Democratic candidate, the probability grew that Chile could make the "breakthrough" into a political order that would allow for both constitutional stability and high participation, on the Uruguayan pattern—that is, in which democracy could be strong both formally and substantively.¹⁷ The Christian Democratic government moved in the direction of fulfilling its historical task in this sense by attempting to remove the last barriers to total participation by abolishing the literacy requirement for voting, and organizing peasant unions. At the time of writing the voting reform had not been consummated. although the odds were in its favor. Clearly, however, the new political order could only persist if it were underpinned by the higher level of economic well-being that would be demanded by the newly participant groups, who would be likely otherwise to reject the established system and turn to anti-constitutional alternatives. This was clearly understood by the Christian Democratic administration, whose "Revolution in Liberty" aimed at the maintenance of constitutional norms while reaching new heights not only of participation and equality, but also of production and welfare.

On the other hand, a high order of constitu-

¹⁶ These figures are given on page 2 of *The Chilean Presidential Election of September 4, 1964*, Part II (Washington: Institute for the Comparative Study of Political Systems, 1965).

17 The author does not mean to imply that "nothing is wrong" in Uruguayan politics. The point is that no extra-constitutional changes in the holders of power have taken place, at the same time as there is mass participation in politics and respect for civil liberties.

tional integrity can be maintained while economic conditions are deteriorating only by politically restrictive policies which lead to a reduction in participation. This is demonstrated by developments in Colombia under the presidency of Guillermo León Valencia (1962–1966); constitutional stability was guaranteed by the bi-partisan National Front agreement, the economy stagnated, and the already low electoral participation showed a drop. If participation in Colombia increases substantially, therefore, constitutional stability can only be maintained by a resumption of economic growth.

Some superficially paradoxical but extremely interesting conclusions for the understanding of dictatorship also follow. A low order of constitutional integrity, that is, a state of anarchy or dictatorship, is compatible with a low order of political participation only where the degree of social and economic development is also low. For higher levels of economic development, however, the imposition of dictatorship should tend to increase participation. This apparent paradox can be understood in the sense that under a dictatorship aspects of life which were formerly not politicized become so, and individuals apathetic towards politics need to start paying attention to political factors.

The politicization of the population of an economically developing country by a dictatorship has effects which surprise outside observers. One of these is the "unexpectedly" high electoral participation in the free elections held after the overthrow of the dictator: the extremely high turnout figures in Venezuela after Pérez Jiménez and in the Dominican Republic after Trujillo are well known. Thus also parties whose success depends on the politicization of marginal members of the society. such as the Communists and other extremist parties, typically do much better after the overthrow of the dictator than they did before his assumption of power. It hardly needs to be mentioned that this point has policy implications for the United States. It should also be pointed out that in a fairly well-developed society the dictatorship itself finds that it has to encourage mass participation in its own subsidiary organs in order to maintain itself in power.18

We are now in a position to see what was wrong with the standard formulations, of which Lipset's is the best known, which corre-

¹⁸ This point is discussed in my Latin American Politics in Perspective (Princeton: Van Nostrand, 1963), p. 18.

late "stable democracy" and "wealth." Stable democracy, or "political development," is usually defined solely in terms of the observance of constitutional norms—but this is a purely formal criterion which does not take into account the difference between countries where constitutional forms are a façade masking an undemocratic reality and those in which observance of constitutional forms is accompanied by general political participation and a democratic spirit.

It is understandable that those especially concerned with social justice in Latin America should become impatient with traditional formulations of this type and, conscious of the realities of social inequality that lie behind the constitutional façade, become cynical about constitutional forms and espouse revolutionary ideology.

The problem is genuine. At any level of development between those of the completely undeveloped and the completely developed societies19 (the latter represented in Latin America, if at all, only by Uruguay) there is an inverse relationship between mass participation and constitutional stability. One is thus presented with a dialectical tension: if mass participation rises faster than the level of economic development, then constitutional functioning breaks down, usually with the imposition of a military regime, as conservative forces in the society react against the attempts of constitutional governments to gratify desires of the newly participant masses through drastic social change.20

It is thus possible to explain on the basis of the foregoing principles some of the major apparent failures of the hypothesis that stable democracy and wealth are correlated. Three of the wealthiest countries in Latin America by

¹⁹ In other words, one should not expect that the relationships discussed here will be of help in comparing countries like Britain and the United States, for example, in which mass participation and constitutional stability can be taken for granted.

²⁰ This was demonstrated empirically in my article "Political Development and Military Intervention in Latin America," this Review, 60 (September, 1966), 616-626.

GNP per capita figures-Argentina, Cuba, and Venezuela—have at the same time extremely poor records of constitutional integrity (these are the countries in the top left quadrant of Figure 1). This, however, is not surprising in view of the formulation developed here that for any intermediate level of development there is an inverse relation between mass participation and constitutional stability, in that these are three countries with extremely high orders of mass participation. This cannot be shown in terms of electoral participation for Cuba since there have been no free Cuban elections recently, but Argentina and Venezuela rank first and second respectively in electoral turnout, as Table 2 shows. The high order of participation in all three is suggested by the figures on the proportion of the population unionized; in 1955 over 25% of the population was unionized in each of these three countries, while in no other Latin American country for which figures were available was the proportion higher than 10%.21

IV. CONCLUSION

A series of cautionary points should be made. In the first place, the correlations observed should be taken only as more or less approximate pointers to the underlying social processes, not as a complete summary of those processes, which are doubtless too complex to be exhaustively described by a statement about the relationship among three variables. At the same time, there are clearly important aspects of politics altogether outside the processes to which these data relate. Finally, it is altogether likely that the most satisfactory summary of the relations involved would take account not only of states of the key variables at a given moment of time but also of rates of change, "thresholds," and "breakthroughs." Such a more complete formulation ought then to be comprehensive enough to be applicable to Africa and Asia, to Western Europe and North America, and I hope that other scholars will make attempts in this direction.

²¹ Calculated from data given in Harold E. Davis (ed.), Government and Politics in Latin America (New York: Ronald Press, 1958), pp. 68-69.

LOCKE'S STATE OF NATURE: HISTORICAL FACT OR MORAL FICTION?

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For nearly two centuries, the mere mention of the "state of nature" was sufficient to provoke a controversy. Did the writer intend an historical reference or was he employing a fictional concept as a means of presenting an a priori ethical argument? The question, at least in so far as it applies to John Locke, has never been satisfactorily answered—although it has frequently been brushed aside as unimportant. Yet, many of the "contradictions" which seem to characterize Locke's political thought might be resolved if only we could be certain of the meaning he attributed to the state of nature.

Lacking that certainty, we are left to choose from among the various meanings others have associated with Locke's use of the concept. First, it is charged that, if Locke did intend his portrait of the state of nature to serve as an historical account of the origins of government. it is bad history. Most political societies did not begin as Locke suggests. As one writer puts it, "history and sociology lend but little support to this theory of free men entering into a compact and so creating a political group."1 Secondly, if the state of nature is but a fiction abstracted from history, that in itself may be grounds for rejecting its usefulness as a concept. Marx, for example, is critical of the 'state of nature' approach to politics because it assumes in an abstract fashion precisely what must be proven by reference to concrete historical facts.2 Thirdly, in addition to these general methodological objections raised against the state of nature concept, there are special defects charged to Locke's use of that concept. Assuming that Locke means to present us with a logical construct, what initially appears to be the peaceful, idyllic natural condition of man is quickly transformed into a hostile, war-like state as the argument proceeds in the Second Treatise. Thus, in supplying two different descriptions of the state of nature, Locke is censured for involving himself in a logical contradiction which renders useless the key to understanding the framework of his political thought. Alternatively, supposing the

Lockean state of nature to be a description of the historical existence of men, it is difficult to see how their actions in that state can be meaningfully related to the Law of Nature, as Locke contends, since a rational understanding of the precepts of natural law is not likely to be the possession of individuals living in a rude and primitive state. Without such an understanding, what reasons have we for imagining that their relations with each other are not as Hobbes describes them? In short, we are led to believe that Locke is either a superficial, inconsistent thinker or a recondite Hobbesian.³

According to the critics, therefore, (1) Locke is a poor historian and sociologist: (2) Locke is neither an historian nor a sociologist, though he should be: (3) Locke is an illogical and contradictory theorist; and (4) Locke is a deceptive thinker concealing his true moral beliefs behind the facade of history. Before defending Locke against these criticisms, let me state positively the thesis of this essay. It is that Locke regards the state of nature as both an historical and a moral description of human existence. Obviously, this proposition will prove a helpful tool of analysis only if we are able to demonstrate when, in a specific instance, Locke is refering to one or the other condition. In order to make that determination, it is necessary to understand some of the reasons for the two-sided nature of this Lockean concept.

Politics—and hence, a political theory—is for Locke comprised of two parts, "very different the one from the other." The primary objective of a political theory is to explain the origin of political society, "and the rise and extent of political power." That is, the "foundation" of politics is laid in an "inquiry into the ground and nature of civil society, and how it is formed into different models of government." In considering these matters, which constitute "a part of moral philosophy," one's aim is to discover "the natural rights of men, the origins and foundations of society, and the

¹ Richard Aaron, John Locke (Oxford, 1955), p. 273.

² Karl Marx, *The German Ideology* (International Publishers, 1960), p. 17.

³ Leo Strauss, Natural Right and History (Chicago, 1952), pp. 203-214.

⁴ The Works of John Locke (12th edition, London, 1824), vol. II, p. 408. (Hereafter cited as Works.)

duties resulting from thence." The second ingredient of politics is prudence, by which Locke usually means the art of governing men within an already established political society.

It is worth noting that Locke clearly commits himself to the genetic approach to politics. A political theory is a theory of origins. Now, an historical account of the beginnings of government is one possible genetic explanation. However, this approach can be rejected for purely technical reasons since, Locke observes. "government is everywhere antecedent to records." Moreover, history records that governments have diverse origins, and so provides us with no unequivocal guidance for assessing the 'lawfulness' of political power.8 Even if this were not the case. Locke is prepared to argue that history is not merely an inadequate but also an improper source for supplying the foundations of a political theory. Historical precedents are not "sufficient to establish a rule." For, "at best, an argument from what has been to what should of right be

⁵ Thoughts on Education (Works, vol. VIII), sec. 186; Locke to Reverend King, August 25, 1703, Works, Vol. IX, pp. 305-306; Locke to Cary Mordaunt, 1697, MS c. 24, ff. 196-197. (Manuscript references are cited according to their shelf mark in the Bodleian Library, Oxford University, where they are housed.)

⁶ The Second Treatise is described on the title page as "An Essay Concerning the True Original, Extent, and End of Civil Government." In the First Treatise, Locke writes: "We must know how the first ruler, from whom any one claims, came by his authority, upon what ground any one has empire, what his title is to it, before we can know who has a right to succeed him in it..." par. 94. cf. par. 83. Two Treatises of Government (ed)., Peter Laslett (second edition, Cambridge, 1967). (Spelling and punctuation have been modernized.)

7 Second Treatise, par. 101.

8 The first argument does not quite apply to Filmer, however, since he does attempt to support his position with citations from an historical record that antedates government, i.e., the Bible. Locke himself refers to Filmer's "History out of Scripture on which he pretends wholly to build his government." First Treatise, par. 128; cf. par. 154. The statement does make sense, though, assuming, as Locke did, that this so-called historical argument had been refuted in the First Treatise and that once divine history was discounted, no reference to human history could possibly take its place. The second argument is used against Filmer by showing that even Scripture records that men lived under different forms of government.

has no great force." It is true that history is the chief source of man's prudential information, but this information is secondary and supplemental to a clear understanding of true moral principles. The "great question" of government, as it is phrased by Locke, is not "whether there be power in the world, nor whence it came, but who should have it." Consequently, the study of history is useful only "to one who hath well settled in his mind the principles of morality and knows how to make a judgment on the actions of men." Or, conversely, the "doubts" arising from a study of

⁹ First Treatise, pars. 58, 59; Second Treatise, par. 103. The point is also stated in an unpublished manuscript: "For that which was very fit and reasonable to be done at one time may be very unfit and unreasonable at another." MS c. 34, f. 89.

10 In matters of prudence, "a man is principally helped" by "the history of matter of fact." Journal, June 26, 1681, MS f.5. From history "one may learn great and useful instructions of prudence." Ibid, April 6-10, 1677, MS f.2. In fact, "history teaches this (prudence) best, next to experience." Locke to Reverend King, August 25, 1703, Works, vol. IX, pp. 305-306; cf. Essay Concerning Human Understanding (ed.) Alexander Fraser (Dover, 1959), Bk. 4, ch. 16, #11. (Hereafter cited by Book, chapter, and article numbers.) The study of history, however, is only instrumentally important to an understanding of morality. Locke writes: "I do not deny but history is very useful and very instructive of human life, but if it be studied only for the reputation of being an historian, it is a very empty thing." Journal, March 29, 1677, MS f.2. Thus, while the "great end" of history "is to give an account of the actions of men as embodied in society . . . with the reading of history, I think the study of morality should be joined. I mean not the ethics of the Schools . . . but such as . . . above all the New Testament teaches, wherein a man may learn how to live, which is the business of ethics." Locke to Cary Mordaunt, 1697, MS c.24, ff. 196-7; cf. note 12 below.

in First Treatise, par. 106 (italies added); cf. par. 122. In light of this, the question of origins should be rephrased. The purpose of political theory is not really to provide a narrative account of the origins of government, but rather, to relate the proper origins of government. Obviously, Filmer's Patriarcha did offer a genetic explanation of political society; in that sense it was a political theory. But Locke refutes it because it is a "false" political theory. And, being false, it is more like a "fiction" than a political theory. First Treatise, pars. 34, 147. See notes 74 and 105 below.

12 Journal, April 6-10, 1677, MS f.2.

history can be resolved only through a reference to "the Law of Nature, or the revealed Law of God." ¹³

A proper political theory, then, should present a moral position relatable to the record of human history without blurring the distinction between the two "very different" kinds of statements incorporated into the general argument. I suggest that Locke's political thought, as it is expressed in the Two Treatises on Government, attempts precisely this, and that, in light of what Locke conceives a political theory to be, the traditional interpretations of Locke's particular substantive recommendations are either erroneous or seriously inadequate accounts of his political theory. I am also hopeful that an exploration of the manner in which Locke is able to bring together the two components of politics, the moral and the prudential, will provide some illumination for the student interested in the techniques and the pitfalls of constructing a theory of political action.

If, as Locke did, one regards the Bible as an historical document, the First Treatise represents an effort by Locke to meet Filmer on his own ground, and to refute the latter's principles using the very historical record offered in support of them. Yet, having shown that history will not support "the false principles and foundation of Sir Robert Filmer," Locke immediately shifts the ground of his argument. He does not attempt, as he might have, to provide another historical description of the origins of government to stand alongside Filmer's account. Rather, he offers a definition of political power, and asserts that "to understand political power right, and derive it from its original," one must consider what is meant by the state of nature. Only after one has clearly in his mind the meaning of this moral 'fiction' is he free to consult history for supporting evi-

13 First Treatise, par. 124; cf. par. 153. Hence, the telling argument against Filmer's theory is that for all of its reliance upon "Scripture history," it cannot "be accommodated to the nature of things" nor can it "be made to agree with that constitution and order which God had settled in the world." Ibid, par. 137. And, in the opening sentences of the Second Treatise, Locke repeats the point, "it having been shown in the foregoing discourse" that "there being no Law of Nature nor positive Law of God" to support Filmer's arguments, we "must of necessity find out another use of government, another original of political power," e.g., one which does conform to the Law of Nature. Second Treatise, par. 1; cf. par. 143.

dence. ¹⁴ Locke, therefore, begins the Second Treatise with a legal-moral definition of the state of nature. ¹⁵

I. THE MORAL STATE OF MAN

What is that "state all men are naturally in?" Until recently, it was assumed that Lockean man resided in a tranquil community of friends, living together under the "law of reason." According to this view, Locke's description of the state of nature is appealing, but one can discover no satisfactory reason for man's abandonment of that state for political society.16

14 To avoid any confusion, I would like to make it clear that I accept Laslett's evidence that the Second Treatise was written, or at least begun, before the First Treatise. Cf. Laslett, op. cit., Introduction, pp. 45–66. Indeed, given Locke's belief that one's moral principles should be "well settled" in his mind prior to consulting history, we should expect this to be the case. Nevertheless, the sequential remarks in the text above are appropriate, refering to the order of the two treatises as the work was published.

In a way, the use of the term 'fiction' here and in the title of this article is somewhat misleading, since it would not have been acceptable to Locke. For him, a 'fiction' was a creation of one's "fancy," a poetic construction bearing no relationship to reality. For that reason, he was prepared to label it "false." First Treatise, par. 147. Filmer maintained that any theory which presupposed a state of nature was just such a "fiction." Ibid, par. 34. Locke, of course, did not agree. Or, to put it another way, Locke believed it possible to use the state of nature as a 'truth-concept,' not only because it referred to actual human history, but also because, properly stated, it set forth the logical and moral conditions of human existence. And, because it described the "nature of things," it was true. Having said this for Locke's benefit, I retain the word 'fiction,' to be understood as most contemporary readers would understand it: namely, as a logical construct independent of but relatable to a body of factual information. In this sense, it is very close to Locke's own understanding of the 'state of nature.'

15 "since a definition is the only way whereby the precise meaning of moral words can be known." Bk. 3, ch. 11, #17.

¹⁶ William A. Dunning, A History of Political Theories (New York, 1921), p. 345; Alfred Cobban, In Search of Humanity (New York, 1960), p. 93; Basil Wiley, The Seventeenth Century Background (New York, 1955), p. 265; Richard Goldwin, "Locke," in Leo Strauss and Joseph Cropsey

An alternative interpretation, responding to this point, suggests that while Locke does begin with a description of a peaceful state of nature, his argument in the Second Treatise gradually moves away from that description and toward a replica of the Hobbesian state of war. Since political society actually emerges from the latter state, reasons for its origins are plentiful and clear. But this answer begets another question: why did Locke begin his work with an account of man's natural state which he rejected but a few pages later? The answer is a paradox advanced with firm conviction. Once the shadow of doubt has been cast upon Locke's character and his essential honesty, all other doubts resolve themselves. All queries and contradictions may be put to rest, we are assured, by reading the Two Treatises on Government as a superb exercise in deception. Locke is really Hobbes in disguise.17

A variation of this theory is advanced by Sheldon Wolin, who does not, however, subscribe to the notion that Locke's real intentions and beliefs are purposely masked from the reader. Rather, he maintains that after positing a peaceful state of nature, Locke places man in a "fallen state of nature." Political society arises out of the latter, and represents, in intent at least, a restoration of the ideal state of nature.¹⁸

Now, all three theories share the assumption that Locke begins the Second Treatise with an idealistic portrayal of the natural condition of man. However, a careful examination of Locke's words will not support this assumption. More important, a denial of this commonly-held belief will lead us to the formulation of another interpretation of the Lockean state of nature. We will begin by delineating and considering in order the three possible states of nature, i.e., as seen from the legal, moral, and historical perspectives.

What "puts men out of a state of nature," Locke explains, is their agreement to establish "a judge on earth, with authority to determine all the controversies" between them. Locke adds a further qualification, that for the maintenance of a legal order, the judge must be "indifferent" and he must execute the law

"impartially." Whenever these conditions are not met, men exist in a state of nature. But while the legal statement of the state of nature may be viewed as independent of the other two definitions—for important reasons to be mentioned later—it should be noted that Locke frequently merges 'legal' with 'moral.' This is hardly surprising, since he grants the status of law to his standard of morality, the will of God. Special care, therefore, must be taken to distinguish between these two uses of a term so crucial to Locke's argument. As a negative example of the importance of noting this distinction, we may cite Richard Cox's treatment of Locke.

In his portrayal of Locke as a Hobbesian. Cox equates the former's legalistic characterization of the state of nature as a state of "anarchy," with the latter's description of the "nasty" and "brutish" struggle among men. Cox does this by insisting that Locke means by anarchy not merely "the absence of government in a formal or technical sense, but literally a condition of chaos, enmity, confusion, misery, and destruction."20 When the passages in the Second Treatise cited to support this assertion are consulted, it will be discovered that only "confusion" actually appears in the text.21 The other terms are Cox's. The reader will easily perceive the difference in meaning when words like "misery, enmity, and destruction" are omitted from the argument. Those are precisely the words which do characterize Hobbes' state of nature.22 It is not surprising, therefore, that they are offered to us by Cox, and not by Locke.

All that Locke says concerning anarchy is that it is "to have no form of government at all." It is a state "where laws cannot be executed," and where, as a consequence, there is no government. "Instead of government and

⁽eds.), History of Political Philosophy (Chicago, 1963).

¹⁷ Richard Cox, Locke on War and Peace (Oxford, 1960); Leo Strauss, op. cit., p. 224; William T. Bluhm, Theories of the Political System (Englewood Cliffs, 1965), pp. 303ff.; Richard Goldwin, in Strauss and Cropsey, op. cit., pp. 435ff.

¹⁸ Sheldon Wolin, *Politics and Vision*, (Boston, 1960), p. 307.

¹⁹ Second Treatise, pars. 89 (italics added), 125, 131; First Letter on Toleration (Works, vol. V), p. 10.

²⁰ Cox, op. cit., pp. 75-76.

²¹ The citations by Cox from the Second Treatise are pars. 94, 198, 203, 219, 225.

²² Because of the "general inclination of all mankind, a perpetual and restless desire of power after power that ceases only in death," men, according to Hobbes, are naturally "inclined" to "contention, enmity, and war." Leviathan, Library of Liberal Arts, New York, 1958, Part I, chapters 11, 13, 15; Part II, chapter 17. Locke agrees that "the state of war is a state of enmity and destruction," but he nowhere describes the state of nature in those terms. Second Treatise, par. 16. Also, see note 49 below.

order," there is "anarchy and confusion."²³ This is simply Locke's technical, legal way of defining the state of nature, and nothing more. It does not differ from his initial declaration that where "there is no common superior on earth" to act as judge, men are in a state of nature.

Cox compounds the confusion of his interpretation when, in order to bolster his thesis that the state of nature and the state of war are identical, he asserts that "Locke says that the dissolution of government will always 'bring back again the state of war.'"24 But Locke makes no such statement. What he says is that "those who set up force again in opposition to the laws do rebellare—that is, bring back again the state of war."25 Because Locke means to state this as a special condition attached to the dissolution of government, "always" is the key word missing from Locke's argument, a word conveniently supplied by Cox. The dissolution of government returns men to a state of anarchy in the legalistic sense. Whether or not a state of war then ensues, depends upon whether or not men resort to force. Even the dissolution of society only returns the individual "to the state he was in before, with a liberty to shift for himself and provide for his own safety, as he thinks fit."26 There is no assertion that with the collapse of society itself men are necessarily returned to a state of war. The fact is, for Locke, the natural condition of man is one of uncertain peace.

Cox's objective is to identify Locke with Hobbes, and consequently he ignored the three categorical descriptions of the state of nature. Locke's aim, however, is to demonstrate that although "some men have confounded" the two states, there are important differences between the state of nature and the state of war. These differences relate almost entirely to a

²³ Second Treatise, pars. 198, 219, 203. (Where there are multiple references in a note, they will be listed according to the order in which they appear in the text of the article rather than by the chronological numbering of the paragraphs.)

- ²⁴ Cox, op. cit., p. 79.
- 25 Second Treatise, par. 226.
- ²⁶ Ibid, par. 211. The point is that there are circumstances not dependent upon the use of force by some men—which does institute the state of war—whereby men are returned to the state of nature. See Locke's statement that when a government is "dissolved" by a "calamity" men are returned to the state of nature. Ibid, par. 121. This return may also be the result of a neglect of duty or an abdication by the executive. Ibid, par. 219.

single issue, namely, the extent to which men in the state of nature are able to obey the commands of natural law. In other words, if the state of nature is identical to the state of war, it must follow that men in their natural state are necessarily unable to prove themselves obedient to the Law of Nature. That is precisely the point Locke is unwilling to concede.

Without a "law truly governing nature," Locke argues, "there would be no religion, no fellowship among men, no fidelity, and countless other such things." If, instead of a 'law,' men depended upon prudential maxims to direct their social relations, the "common life of man" would be marked by "fraud, violence, hatred, robbery, murder, and such like."27 These transparent paraphrases of the Hobbesian description of the state of nature reveal the extent to which, in Locke's view, Hobbes had denied the natural ability of men to obey the will of God. He knows, of course, that Hobbes speaks of natural laws. But the real question for Locke was, "what does it mean to speak of a 'natural' law when the 'nature' of man makes it impossible for a rule to function as a 'law' until civil society is established?"

What is really at issue is a matter which we cannot enter into here; viz., what kind of being is the Author of the Law of Nature? Since Hobbes denies to man any knowledge of the moral character of the Deity, it suffices for his notion of natural law that we know God to be the possessor of "irresistible power."28 In refusing to accept this position, Locke is drawn into asserting that God is both reasonable and good, and hence men are able to adhere to the precepts of natural law not only as respectors of power but also as moral agents. Locke's account of the state of nature and his differences with Hobbes on this point are thus grounded in the theological conviction that God cannot have issued rules for men to obey and then have created beings who, in their most

27 Essays on the Law of Nature, (ed.) W. Von Leyden (Oxford, 1958), Essay VII, p. 201; Essay I, p. 119; Essay VI, p. 189. To claim absolute liberty, as Locke believed that Hobbesian man did, is to "negate the law of nature." Essay II, p. 123. Locke specifically rejects this claim in Essay VIII, pp. 207, 211, 213. (Hereafter this work will be cited as Essays.) Also, Locke argues, "were there no law (of nature), there would be no moral good or evil, but man would be left to a most entire liberty in all his actions." First Tract on Government in Two Tracts on Government, (ed.) Philip Abrams (Cambridge, 1967), p. 124.

28 Hobbes, Leviathan, Part II, chapter 31.

natural state, are necessarily unable to follow those rules.²⁹ Therefore, it must be *possible* for men in the state of nature to obey natural law.

Now, it cannot be stressed too much that Locke, in developing this position, does not have to prove that the state of nature is at every moment either peaceful or warlike. All that he feels compelled to demonstrate is that, Hobbes to the contrary notwithstanding, the state of nature need not be warlike, and that, in following the command of natural law which urges us to preserve ourselves and to do "all reasonable things" we can to preserve mankind, we are not automatically brought into conflict with others. Indeed, it is only because some men, in exercising their freedom, "miscite" the law that we are faced with violent conflict. What draws Locke's censure is not so much his disagreement with Hobbes about the actions of specific men as it is his unwillingness to accept the latter's denial of man's free will.30 In the state of nature, a state of freedom, it is possible for men to behave both well and

29 In fact, God "cannot choose what is not good." Bk. 2, ch. 21, #50, 51 (italics given). "Wisdom and goodness must be ingredients of that perfect or super excellent being which we call God." Journal, August 1, 1680, MS f.4 (italics added). Also, see Essays, Essay VI, p. 183ff. Locke recognized, however, that he had not actually resolved the controversy over man's free will versus God's omnipotence. He confesses in a letter to a friend: "I own freely to you the weakness of my understanding—that though it be unquestionable that there is omnipotence and omniscience in God our Maker, yet I cannot make freedom in man consistent with omnipotence or omniscience in God; though I am as fully persuaded of both as of any truths I must freely assent to." Locke to William Molyneaux, January 20, 1693, Some Familiar Letters Between Mr. Locke and Several of his Friends (London, 1708), pp. 26-27. In the First Treatise, Locke argues that God cannot be supposed to have created man and placed him in a natural condition where he would "perish again, presently after a few moments continuance." par. 86. cf. Second Treatise, par. 6.

30 Referring to those who view the universe in mechanistic terms, as Hobbes certainly did, Locke declares that "by denying freedom to mankind, and thereby making men no other than bare machines, they take away not only innate, but all moral rules whatsoever, and leave not a possibility to believe any such, to those who cannot conceive how anything can be capable of a law that is not a free agent." Hence, "morality and mechanism... are not very easy to be reconciled or made consistent." Bk. 1, ch. 2, #14 (italics added).

badly. As a state extended over a period of time, the state of nature will be both tranquil and violent, though at any given moment, and always because of specific social circumstances, it will be either one or the other.

Locke develops this argument in two ways. through the use of definitions by which he sets his position apart from the theories of Filmer and Hobbes, and through the citation of historical examples to support his assertions, again as an implicit refutation of those two theorists. Having attacked throughout the First Treatise Filmer's contention that men are not by nature free, Locke turns in the Second Treatise to a defense of his conception of man's natural freedom. But Hobbes, too, granted men perfect freedom in the state of nature. Locke therefore must advance an argument which refutes Filmer's position without. at the same time, accepting the Hobbesian alternative, if, as we have suggested, he intends to distinguish his viewpoint from that of his two adversaries.31

The "natural liberty of man," according to Locke, "is to be free from any superior power on earth" and "to have only the law of nature for his rule." It is "a liberty to follow my own will in all things where the rule prescribes not." Locke makes it perfectly clear that he is not speaking of "a liberty for every man to do what he lists." Rather, freedom exists only when the individual's actions are "within the allowance of those laws under which he is." The "end of law," Locke maintains, is to "preserve and enlarge freedom." For, "where there is no law, there is no freedom."32 Thus, in Locke's view, no man could be called "free" in the state of nature who was not, on most occasions, an obedient subject of natural law. In other words, Locke defines freedom in such a way as to deny that Hobbesian man is "free."

Men cannot be free in the state of war, Locke argues, because the relations between them are governed by force, not by law. "There are two sorts of contests amongst men, the one managed by law, the other by force." The former men share with God, the latter with the beasts. Hence, in making force his guide, a man declares himself to live "by another rule"

at These, of course, were not Locke's only adversaries. From letters to his father and friends, Locke seems very early in life to have staked out a position for himself somewhere between the "glorious Oceana" of Harrington and the "goblins of war and blood" of Hobbes. MS c.24, ff.49, 173-4.

³² Second Treatise, pars. 22, 57.

than the one established by God.33 He becomes "degenerate," and, in fact, shows that he has "quit the principles of human nature." Such an individual must be looked upon as a "noxious creature" or a "wild savage beast," and may be treated accordingly by other men.34 This is precisely the 'brutish' state of Hobbesian man. It is a state of "unrestrained liberty" which Locke explicitly equates with the natural condition of the "brutes," and not with that of man.35 And since he further describes this departure from the human condition as a state of "declared war against all mankind," there can be little doubt that Locke read the Hobbesian state of nature as a description of unrestrained liberty and brute violence, and. consequently, as a "lawless" condition of human existence.36

Perhaps at this point I should introduce the paragraph in the Second Treatise which has been responsible for considerable confusion, and especially for the assumption that Locke initially presents an idyllic portrait of the state of nature. Locke writes:

And here we have the plain difference between the state of nature and the state of war which, however some men have confounded, are as far distant as a state of peace, good-will, mutual assistance, and preservation, and a state of enmity, malice, violence, and mutual destruction are one from another. 37

Most commentators have concentrated upon the comparison contained in the last part of the sentence, but a careful reading indicates that Locke places his emphasis upon the opening part of the statement. Since it is the initial sentence of section nineteen of the Second Treatise, the "here" is obviously intended to link the discussion just concluded in the previous sections with what follows. A knowledge of the context in which the above statement is made is therefore crucial to any interpretation of its meaning.

The sentence cited appears midway in the chapter entitled, "Of the State of War." The general topic discussed in that chapter is the use of force by one man against another, and

the conditions under which force may or may not be "lawfully" employed. The point that Locke is trying to make is that while it may be necessary to resort to the use of force in the state of nature, this does not necessarily convert that state into a state of war, because of certain limitations placed upon the use of force by the Law of Nature. Or, to put it another way, he insists that there is a distinction between the lawful and "unlawful" exercise of force even in the state of nature. According to Locke, it is unlawful for one man to employ force as a means of enslaving another, while it is lawful to resist with force such an attempted encroachment upon one's liberty. It is the immediately following sentence which begins. "And here we have the plain difference" between the state of nature and the state of war. If the latter were accepted as a general description of man's natural state, it would mean that every man employed "force without authority," i.e., without a notion of limitations derived from natural law. Whereas, in the former state, force is generally employed only in self-defense.

Admittedly, most men cannot act in selfdefense unless there are some men who use force aggressively. Yet, Locke feels that the distinction he accepts is important because it indicates that most men are willing to keep their actions within the bounds of natural law. There is, he suggests, a "natural community" of men in the state of nature to which a-social individuals, following the "brutes" in relying upon the principle of force to direct their social relations, constitute the exceptions.38 In other words, for Locke, the state of war describes a particular incident between an "aggressor" and an "innocent party" occuring within the context of a relatively peaceful state of nature. Since it is not a generalized condition of man. Locke cannot accept the Hobbesian meaning of the term, viz., "a general war and a perpetual and deadly hatred among men."39

This point is restated in several ways by Locke throughout the chapter on the state of war. In the opening sentence of that chapter the circumstances under which men encounter the use of force are listed. A particular action may be the result of "a passionate and hasty" use of force. Or, force may be the means of expressing a "sedate, settled design upon another man's life." Only in the latter instance can the term "state of war" properly be applied. Why should Locke bother to make this

²³ First Letter on Toleration, p. 45; Second Treatise, par. 8.

³⁴ Second Treatise, pars. 10, 11, 16, 172, 181.

³⁵ Ibid, par. 63.

³⁶ Essays, Essay V, p. 163: Second Treatise, par. 11. For a more extensive discussion of Locke and Hobbes on natural law, see my paper, "Natural Law and Political Obligation," presented to a Conference on the Thought of John Locke, York University, Toronto, December 2-3, 1966.

³⁷ Second Treatise, par. 19 (italics added).

³⁸ Ibid, par. 128.

³⁸ Essays, Essay V, p. 163.

⁴⁰ Second Treatise, par. 16. "Every imprudent action does not make a man culpable in foro con-

point? Hobbes, for example, makes no such distinction. Because every action of the individual is traceable to his passions, the Hobbesian state of war is always the expression of a passionate design upon another man's life. Locke rejects this view, contending that while it may be true that men sometimes allow themselves to be guided by their passions, and, as a consequence, resort to force, this in itself is not sufficient to place one man in a state of war with all others. Mistakes in judgment are allowable.41 It is only when the individual "declares himself to live by another rule than that of reason and common equity" that he places himself in a state of war with other men. In consciously employing force against others. he indicates that he has "revolted" from the level of "his own kind to that of beasts by making force, which is theirs, to be his rule of right."42 That is, an individual must adopt, in principle, the rule of force as an alternative to the principles dictated by natural law. Locke maintains that one cannot assume a priori that men are in a state of war with each other, as Hobbes does. Rather, an incident of war is an expressly "declared" action. It must be the result of "a declaration of a design" to commit injury, because men are presumed by Locke not to harbor attitudes of "enmity and destruc-

scientiae," Locke to Reverend King, August 25, 1703, Works, vol. IX, pp. 305-306.

41 Not surprisingly, Locke's argument regarding revolution, which is a state of war between the ruler and the people, restates the same limitations. Thus, he maintains, "revolutions happen not upon every little mismanagement in public affairs." Mistakes are permitted the ruler, so long as "the main of (his) conduct" is directed toward "nothing but the care of the public." Locke is willing to go even further. "Great mistakes" and "many wrong and inconvenient laws" will be tolerated by the people "without mutiny or murmur." In other words, a state of war must be a "declaration of a design" revealing moral corruption, and not simply human fallibility. Consequently, the "ill designs of the rulers" must be easily visible to members of society. The people must hold "strong suspicions of the evil intentions of their governors," suspicions based upon "manifest evidence" and "the general course and tendency of things." There must be, Locke concludes, "a long train of abuses, prevarications, and artifaces, all tending the same way" as a prelude to a state of war. Second Treatise, pars. 20, 165, 205, 210, 225, 230 (italics added).

42 Ibid. pars. 8, 172, 181. The individual must separate himself from "the ties of the common law of reason." par. 16.

tion" toward each other.43

Moreover, each person must decide, according to his own "conscience," whether "another hath put himself into a state of war" with him, and what course of action he should then take to defend himself. Locke warns that the individual must answer to God for the correctness of this judgment. If every man is naturally in a state of war, what do "conscience" and "judgment" have to do with the matter? Such a stipulation makes sense only if one knows that there is a difference between the "hasty" use of force by an otherwise reasonable man and the "declared" use of force by one who has in some fashion renounced the rules of "common equity."

Since, in Hobbes' view, everyone is engaged in the state of war, there can be no grounds for moral distinctions between individuals existing in that state. Yet, this is obviously not true for Locke. Throughout his chapter on the state of war, he is careful to draw a distinction between the "aggressor" and the "innocent party" whose grievances ought to be redressed. Men may be foolish in the Hobbesian state of nature if they do not contest with others, but who is "innocent?" In sum, if all men are naturally in a state of war, there can be no "lawful" and "unlawful" use of force, no important distinction between a "hasty" and a "sedate" resort to violence, no appeal to "conscience" or "judgment" to decide something which could not be otherwise, and no moral separation between the "innocent" and the "aggressor."

Suppose we approach this conclusion from another direction. Both the state of nature and the state of war are without a "common superior" to act as judge, and thus, according to Locke's legalistic definition, both are states of "anarchy." In each state one may expect controversies between individuals to occur. 45 These contests may assume two forms, "one managed by law, the other by force." Keeping in mind Locke's intention and his view of the structure of a political theory—i.e., one begins with a clear statement of moral principles—the difference between the state of nature and the state of war must be a moral difference. Yet, the morality of the comparison cannot turn upon the absence of a common judge, the existence of conflict, or specific incidents of force,

⁴³ Ibid, pars. 16, 17; Thoughts on Education, sec.

⁴⁴ Second Treatise, pars. 21, 241, 242.

⁴⁵ For, "in all collections of men," there are bound to be a "variety of opinions, and contrariety of interests." *Ibid*, par. 98; *First Letter on Toleration*, p. 53.

for all of these are common to both states. What, then, is the distinguishing factor?

To answer that question, let us recall the manner by which moral evaluations are made, outlined in Book Two, chapter twenty-eight of the Essay Concerning Human Understanding. There Locke explains that moral judgments are premised upon "the conformity or disagreement of our voluntary actions to some law."46 Methodologically speaking, all that is necessary is a comparison of a particular voluntary action with a general rule, "whether the rule be true or false." This neutral definition will not do, however, since in "measuring an action" by a wrong rule, we may be led into "judging amiss of its moral rectitude."47 One is therefore obliged to determine what is the "true" rule of morality. For Locke, the Law of Nature is that "rule prescribed by God, which is the true and only measure of virtue."48 The state of nature, in so far as it is Locke's picture of the moral state of man, is one "truly governed" by natural law. The state of war is governed "by another rule" (force) which men have voluntarily adopted as the standard for "measuring" their actions. It is the "plain difference" between these two laws, one premised upon "peace, goodwill, mutual assistance, and preservation," and the other upon "enmity, malice, violence, and mutual destruction" that permits us the moral separation of the state of nature from the state of war. The state of nature "governed" by the Law of Nature is the only acceptable moral description of man, regardless of whether or not, in any particular instance, he succeeds in living in perfect obedience to the commands of that law. "Men living together according to reason, without a common superior on earth with authority to judge between them, is properly the state of nature." But the "declared design of force upon the person of another, where there is no common superior on earth to appeal to for relief, is the state of war." What is decisive is that in one state there is a "law of reason" which men make an effort to obey-and they are generally successful in that effort—while in the other state, the effort is not made because of a predisposition of hostility toward others.⁴⁹ So it would require an unusual employment of language to say that the latter state was 'governed' by the Law of Nature. What actually governs men in their relations with each other is the alternative rule of force.

If the purely ideal state of nature (i.e., the periect fulfillment of natural law commands) is the expression of God's vision, the validity of the Law of Nature cannot be challenged on the basis of what men do.50 At the same time, Locke insists that natural law is "a fixed and permanent rule of morals" which is "firmly rooted in the soil of human nature." Hence, "a manner of acting" has been prescribed for man "that is suitable to his nature." Natural law not only discloses "the eternal order of things" it also establishes "immutable" duties for men, duties which "cannot be other than they are."51 Locke asserts that it is "every man's duty to be just, whether there be any such thing as a just man in the world or not."52

The framework of the universe, being the workmanship of God, is indeed of an ideal nature, one expressing reason, harmony, and peace. When Locke makes reference to these qualities in his discussion of the state of nature, he does so in the context of qualifying language which reveals that he is speaking of what conditions would be like if men lived "according to the law of nature"-because, it is under that law that "all men alike are friends of one another and are bound together by common interests."53 Locke is offering us a definitional statement characterizing the law "whereby" men are "united into one fellowship and society."54 His supposed description of the peaceful state of nature refers not to the state but to the law of nature, to that which ought to exist, according to God's will. It is the law that "teaches" that "no one ought to harm another in his life, health, liberty, or possessions." Or, it is the law "which wills the peace and preservation of all mankind." The "peace and safety" of men are "provided for by the law of nature."55 In short, Locke is not de-

⁴⁶ Bk. 2, ch. 28, #5.

⁴⁷ Bk. 2, ch. 28, #20.

⁴⁸ Bk. 1, ch. 2, #6, 18; Bk. 2, ch. 28, #8; Bk. 4, ch. 3, #18; Bk. 4, ch. 10, #7; Epistle to the Reader, pp. 18-19

⁴⁹ Second Treatise, par. 19 (italics given). Thus, Locke argues, "the state of war (does not consist) in the number of partisans, but the enmity of the parties." First Treatise, par. 131. See note 22 above.

⁵³ The Law of Nature cannot be "altered to comply with (man's) ill-ordered choice." Bk. 2, ch. 21, #57. "The nature of good and evil is eternal and certain, and their value cannot be determined either by the public ordinances of men or by any private opinion." *Essays*, Essay I, p. 121; Essay VII, p. 199.

⁶¹ Essays, Essay VII, pp. 199, 201; cf. Essay I, p. 117.

⁵² Journal, June 26, 1681, MS f. 5.

⁵³ Essays, Essay V, p. 163; Second Treatise, par. 19.

⁵⁴ Second Treatise, pars. 128, 172.

⁵⁵ Ibid, pars. 6, 7, 8.

scribing the "peace and safety" of the state of nature, but rather the purpose of natural law.

From the outset, Locke is fully cognizant of the violence and conflict present in the state of nature. How else could one explain the fact that a major portion of his discussion in the chapter, "Of the State of Nature," is concerned with the "punishment" of "transgressors" and "criminals" in that natural state? Locke mentions the "offenses" committed against natural law. He grants to every man the power to kill a "murderer" or to punish the "criminal" for the "unjust violence and slaughter he has committed." Locke concedes that there are "inconveniences" attached to man's natural condition which "must certainly be great."56 Whence arise these criminals, transgressors, murderers, offenses, unjust violence and slaughter, and great inconveniences if the state of nature is so peaceful?

The fact is, Locke is a great deal more subtle than he has been portrayed by most of his interpreters. He is aware that if men could live in an ideal state of nature, they would cease to be men and become gods. But if, on the other hand, men could not live according to the Law of Nature in their natural condition, they could not distinguish themselves from the beasts. Locke's objective is limited: to prove that it is possible for men to live in obedience to natural law, and, on that basis, to show that they are moral beings.⁵⁷

It is in support of this assertion that Locke is led to consult history. He raises the question, "where are or ever were there any men in such a state of nature?" near the end of his chapter on the subject. First, he observes that "princes and rulers... all through the world are in a state of nature." The example is instructive for the confirmation it provides of the interpretation of the Lockean state of nature I have presented. For, while it is true that the history of any country would disclose its engagement in a state of war with other countries, such incidents have been the exceptions to the rule of an uncertain peace. There are periods during which most nations do not

openly violate the precepts enjoined by natural law. Thus, from a panoramic historical perspective, one would conclude that the state of nature (between princes and rulers) is generally peaceful, though at times there are outbreaks of violence. Does Locke intend this example to serve as a macrocosmic description of individual relationships in the state of nature? His second example, stated in the same passage, indicates that he does.

Locke alludes to "the promises and bargains for truck, etc., between the two men in the desert island, mentioned by Garcilasso de la Vega in his history of Peru" as transactions conducted between men "in a state of nature in reference to one another." The example concerns two shipwrecked sailors who discover each other in Robinson Crusoe fashion and who, for a period of three or four years, live together, parting now and then in disagreement, until they are finally rescued. These men do not live in perfect tranquility, anymore than do states with respect to each other: but most of the time they do live reasonably well together. And, in their existence, a state of war is a particular exception to the general rule. That, it must be stressed, is all that Locke has to demonstrate in order to establish his point. The Lockean state of nature is one in which men can, but sometimes do not, live according to the rules of "common equity."

Locke illustrates the positive aspects of his position, pointing out that "not every compact" between men in the state of nature leads to the creation of political society. "Other promises and compacts men may make with one another and yet still be in the state of nature." Such agreements are binding because "truth and keeping of faith belongs to men as men, and not as members of society." Locke speaks of "men living in neighborhood without the bounds of a commonwealth."59 And, he adds, those who "liked one another so well" as to constitute themselves into a body politic must "be supposed to have some acquaintance and friendship together and some trust in one another."60

We might summarize Locke's position by citing an observation recorded in his *Journal*. "Our state here in this world," he wrote, "is a state of mediocrity." It is a state wherein "we are not capable of living together exactly by a rule, not altogether without it." That is Locke's picture of life in the state of nature.

⁵⁶ *Ibid*, pars. 6-13.

⁶⁷ In the context of speaking of the inhabitants of the West Indies, who reside under state of nature conditions, Locke records in his *Journal* that the individual can improve his lot if he cultivates that knowledge which will "shorten or ease" his labor and increase his "stock of riches." And, he adds, "another use of his knowledge is to live in peace with his fellow men, and this also he is capable of." Journal, February 8, 1677, MSf. 2 (italics added).

⁵⁸ Second Treatise, pars. 14, 145, 183, 184.

⁵⁹ Ibid., par. 14; Third Letter on Toleration (Works, vol. V), p. 212.

⁶⁰ Second Treatise, par. 107 (italics added).

⁶¹ Journal, March 20, 1678, MS f.3 (italics added).

The natural human condition is one in which agreements are both kept and violated, where peace and violence intermingle, where men good and bad, and in varying degrees, reside. The moral state of Lockean man is one of capabilities. It is not necessary that an individual be "actually endowed with" certain general qualities or abstract characteristics, only that he be "at least susceptible of these specific qualities."62 Thus, men are "equipped" with the "faculties" for reasoning. Every man is born "with a title to perfect freedom."63 It is in this sense that all men are by nature rational and free, in that they possess the capacity to be so. "Thus we are born free as we are born rational, not that we have actually the exercise of either."64 Similarly, Locke speaks of men as "beings capable of laws." And a few sentences later, he asks, "is a man under the law of nature?" His reply is that men in the state of nature are under the law because they are "supposed capable to know that law." Not that the individual actually does know it in every instance, but only that "he is presumed to know how far that law is to be his guide."65 Therefore. Locke concludes men possess "the same relative capacity of being ranked among moral, social creatures, and of being treated accordingly."66 These assumptions and conclusions about men are necessary to a moral perspective. As a view of human nature, they are meant to provide the individual with the proper guidelines for his relationships with others, although particular persons may in fact "declare" themselves by a consistency in their actions to be of another nature. The Lockean state of nature thus serves as a useful illustration of this moral "fiction."

II. THE HISTORICAL STATE OF MAN

Since Locke's references to man as a rational and moral being refer to his capacities, it is possible that, those capacities may not be fulfilled. Specifically, this means that historical and social conditions now enter into the argument, as aids or hindrances to man's development. So, for example, explaining why some men may not possess a knowledge of natural law, Locke cites the "barbarous habits" or "evil customs" under which they might have been raised. He observes that men may be

"brought up in vice" in some societies, indicating the extent to which social conditions can prevent the realization of a natural capacity.67 The question is, under what kinds of social conditions can men gain a knowledge of their moral duties? It is a commonly accepted notion that the primitive conditions of life in the state of nature could not have been conducive to an awareness of natural law. The fault in this critique lies in its failure to appreciate that Locke's conception of the state of nature is not static, but developmental. Men may reside in different social surroundings and still be in the state of nature. Hence, we cannot omit the historical dimensions of the concept from a discussion of its place in Locke's political theory.

At first glance, it is surprising how much Locke is willing to concede to Filmer's argument. He grants that the first form of government was the political projection of the father's authority over the family. Nevertheless, Locke insists, the "foundations" and "ends" of paternal and political power "are so perfectly distinct and separate" that "there is no way to identify them"—though, of course, that is exactly what Filmer does. Es There is no way to identify them, that is, if the moral "foundations" and "ends" of political power are kept separate from the historical fact of patriarchical authority and government.

Having made this point, Locke then proceeds to employ the paternal metaphor throughout his discussion of history and the first form of government. He observes:

It is with commonwealths as with particular persons, they are commonly ignorant of their own births and infancies.

67 Essays, Essay I, p. 115, First Treatise, par 58. Men may be "cooped in close by the laws of their countries," and so prevented from acting in accordance with the precepts of natural law. Bk. 4, ch. 20, #4. "Fashion, discipline, and education have put eminent differences in the ages of several countries and made one generation much different from another in arts and sciences." Conduct of the Understanding (Works, vol. II) sec. 24; Bk. 2, ch. 21, #71. Locke observes that "men's tempers commonly [grow] good or bad with the conditions and circumstances they are in." MS c.34, f.25; Bk. 1, ch. 3, #12. More specifically, the "great difference and contrariety of opinions" amongst men are generally traceable to their "worldly interests" and the inequalities arising from certain "temporal advantages." Journal, April 6-10, 1677, MS f.2.

⁶² Works, vol. II, p. 309.

⁶³ Second Treatise, par. 87 (italies added).

⁶⁴ Ibid., par. 61, "We are born with faculties and powers capable of almost anything." Works, vol. II, p. 331.

⁸⁵ Ibid., pars. 57, 59, 60 (italics added).

⁶⁶ Works, vol II, p. 312.

⁶⁸ Second Treatise, pars. 71, 173, 174.

And a few paragraphs later, Locke refers to "the infancies of commonwealths," and to "young societies" which require "nursing fathers" to guide them through "the weakness and infirmities of their infancy." Still later in the Second Treatise, he returns to his characterization of "the infancy of governments" and the consequent need for governors to act "as the fathers of them, watching over them for their good."69

"Perhaps at first," Locke admits, "some one good and excellent man" had a certain "deference paid to his goodness" by being granted "a kind of natural authority" over other men. Even this conjectural language is all but abandoned a few paragraphs later when Locke declares:

I will not deny that, if we look back as far as history will direct us toward the original of commonwealths, we shall generally find them under the government and administration of one man.⁷⁰

There is no mistaking the portrait we are offered of the ruler as a father-figure, since, "as it often happens where there is much land and few people, the government commonly began in the father." He "in effect" became "the lawmaker and governor" because of the childlike trust men in the early state of nature evinced for the father's ability to govern wisely.71 Moreover, the institution of monarchy appeared "simple" and "obvious" to individuals without a knowledge of the various "forms of government" men might devise. They were ignorant of the "inconveniences of absolute power." Besides, monarchy was "best suited" to the conditions of men in the earliest historical state of nature since what they most needed was protection against foreign invasion. Monarchy provides men with such protection, and therefore, Locke concludes it was "natural" for men "to put themselves under a frame of government which might best serve to that end."72

It is true that a consultation of history lends considerable support to the argument that the earliest form of government was a patriarchical monarchy. But, Locke insists, this admission "destroys not that which I affirm," although some men have made the mistake of concluding from their reading of history that all govern-

ment is "by nature" patriarchical or monarchical. Rejecting that viewpoint, Locke states that "it may not be amiss here to consider why people in the beginning generally pitched upon this form" of government. The explanation offered for their action must be placed within the context of an historical reading of the state of nature. One must visualize men passing through several stages of economic and social development. Also, what Locke says retains the status of an explanation; it is not a justification of the historical origins of government. The political society envisioned by Locke is justified on grounds other than those supplied by history. The political society envisioned by Locke is justified on grounds other than those

Locke refuses to grant that any inevitability is attached to the origins of government. He takes pains to point out that even the institution of a monarchy is the result of man's exercising his "natural freedom." And, he adds. there are some historical examples of men using their freedom to institute a different form of government.75 It is not necessary to deny that monarchy was the earliest form of government; Locke simply wants to show that men might have acted otherwise. Hence, an admission that monarchy was a "likely," "easier," or "natural" solution to the problems faced by men in "the first ages" should not be taken to mean that monarchy was the only possible solution to those problems, a viewpoint he probably—but inaccurately—attributed to both Hobbes and Filmer. History tells us the prudential reasons why men established governments; we have yet to learn from Locke the proper moral foundations of the political order.

Monarchy arose, Locke suggests, because men were "accustomed" by experience "to the rule of one man." Individuals "grew up" within a family, "acquiescing" by degrees to the exercise of authority by a single person. To However, this reliance upon custom, tradition, and utility proved in time to be a poor foundation for government. At some definite point in history, men were forced "to examine more carefully the original and rights of government,

⁶⁹ Ibid, pars. 101, 110, 162.

⁷⁰ Ibid, pars. 94, 105, 110.

⁷¹ Ibid, pars. 74, 75, 76, 94, 107, 110, 111, 117. Locke also reverses the metaphor, labelling the natural relationship of the father to the child "a temporary government," par. 67.

⁷² Ibid, pars. 107, 110.

⁷³ Ibid, par. 106 (italics added).

⁷⁴ The dichotomy is not as sharp as this sentence implies, because Locke merges several propositions together. Thus, all 'governments' are the products of consent, and consent is a necessary—though not a sufficient—prerequisite of the proper political society. Given this view, the historical origins of government does supply at least a part of the justification for the "true extent and end of government." See note 98 below.

⁷⁵ Second Treatise, pars. 105, 112; cf. par. 103.

⁷⁶ *Ibid*, pars. 107, 110, 112.

and to find out ways to restrain the exorbitancies and prevent the abuses of that power" which the people had "intrusted in another's hands only for their own good."⁷⁷ Why should Locke suppose that such an examination, in fact, ever occured? The answer to that question is to be found in Locke's discussion of the various forms of property associated with certain historical stages of the state of nature.

Although history may be divided into an infinite number of chronological periods. Locke stresses the importance of dividing history into two periods according to the specific stage of development of property within a society. The earliest phase of history he names "the first ages of the world." It is a time of "innocence," a "poor but virtuous" period in history.78 It is "innocent" and "virtuous," be it noted, not because men are at one point in history innately different in character from men in some other age. Rather, Locke makes it clear that men are shaped by their social circumstances. and especially by their attitudes toward and their possession of property. Locke is well aware of the ability of political and social institutions to restrict or develop men's capacities to be rational, moral beings.

In the earliest stage of the state of nature, there were "few trespasses" against the Law of Nature because men had "no reason" to invade the rights of others or engage in quarrels.⁷⁹ The lack of "reasons" refers to the fact that men's "possessions" were not very large.⁸⁰ The "first age" is a time "before the appropriation of land," when men merely "gathered" such goods as were supplied by nature. Locke tells

us that "men, at first, for the most part contented themselves with what unassisted nature offered to their necessities." In general, the population was nomadic; men "wandered" freely "up and down"; consequently, land as such was not of real value to them. What we are presented with, then, is a picture of "the equality of a simple, poor way of living" where men are able to confine "their desires within the narrow bounds of each man's small property." ¹⁸¹

Concomitant with this economic description. Locke observes that during this first period, men had need of few laws and few "officers" to "look after the execution of justice." Since they "stood more in need of defense against foreign invasions and injuries than of multiplicity of laws," Locke remarks that "a few established laws served the turn." In short, men resided in a society with a subsistence standard of living where the form of government was simple, and the laws were few. It was a "golden age" before "vain ambition ... corrupted men's minds into a mistake of true power and honor." At this time, there were "no contests betwixt rulers and people about governors or government."82

This situation changed dramatically "when ambition and luxury in future ages" succeeded in corrupting men. These vices "taught princes to have distinct and separate interests from their people," leading to the aforementioned re-examination of the foundations of government. Locke observes that "a long continuation" of society develops those "necessary arts" by which individuals are able to provide "for their safety, ease, and plenty." In effect, the institution of monarchy at an early age in history produced the conditions which led to its downfall by introducing men to "ambition and luxury." sa

Locke provides a rather clear account of the social and economic factors responsible for the changes in the life of man during what we have labelled the "second phase" of history. The most important of the events which brought to an end the first era of man's existence was the invention of money. But why was money invented? Although it may, in fact, have been true that in some parts of the world land was scarce, Locke refuses to accept this as an explanation. Instead, he suggests that the appearance of money is traceable to "the desire

⁷⁷ Ibid. pars. 111, 162.

⁷⁸ Ibid, pars. 110.

⁷⁹ *Ibid*, pars. 31, 51, 75, 108, 109.

⁸⁰ Ibid, pars. 36, 37, 38. Beneath this veil of "history," of course, is the Christian view of man's fall from grace. Elsewhere, Locke writes that when man was created by God, he was "put into a possession of the whole world" in a state where "there was scarce room for any irregular desires. But instinct and reason carried him the same way, and being neither capable of covetousness or ambition when he had already the free use of all things . . . [the fall of Adam is then explicitly mentioned and when private possessions and labor which now the curse on the earth had made necessary, by degrees made a definition of conditions, it gave room for covetousness, pride, and ambition, which by fashion and example spread the corruption which has so prevailed over mankind." A note entitled, "Homo Ante Et Post Lapsum," 1693, MS c. 28, f. 113 v. See also Second Treatise, pars. 56, 57.

⁸¹ *Ibid*, pars. 45, 36, 38, 107; cf. Bk. 2, ch. 16,

⁸² Ibid, pars. 107, 111, 162.

⁸³ Ibid, par. 101.

⁸⁴ Ibid, par. 45; cf. par. 36.

of having more than man needed." With its introduction into the world, "the intrinsic value of things which depends only on their usefulness to the life of man," was transformed. 5 Objects now took on an "imaginary value," fed by the appetites of men's imagination in pursuit of luxury and power. The love of power and property, Locke argues, are the "two roots of almost all the injustice and contention that so disturb human life." 5

In conjunction with this psychological explanation for the changed form of property, Locke offers a sociological account of the transformation. "Fixed property in the ground," he maintains, is associated with the founding of cities. "Families increased and industry enlarged their stocks" until they "incorporated" themselves and "built cities."87 It is only at this point that money makes its appearance. For, once men settled in cities, they began to engage in commercial trade with each other in order to increase their wealth. Trade, Locke notes, is "the foundation of riches." And, money is "necessary to the carrying on the trade."88 It is "commerce with other parts of the world" that "draws money" to the individual.89 Moreover, the "want of people and money" go together as do "riches and multitudes."90

We have already hinted at what happened when men began to "enlarge" their possessions, engage in trade, and by tacit consent accept money as a universal commodity of exchange. These complicated economic transactions gave rise to disputes and controversies among men. Now laws were needed to "settle the properties of those of the same society." "In all collections of men," Locke observes, a "variety of opinions and contrariety of inter-

85 Ibid, par. 37. Money is "little useful to the life of man in proportion to food, raiment, and carriage," par. 50. The "intrinsic value" of money is not "natural," but is, rather, "a barren thing and produces nothing." MS e. 8, ff. 11, 20.

- 86 Thoughts on Education, secs. 105, 110.
- 87 Second Treatise, par. 38.
- 88 Works, vol. IV, pp. 5, 7, 12–14, 16, 148; MS e. 8, ff. 7, 10.
 - 89 Second Treatise, par. 48.
- or Ibid, par. 108; cf. pars. 74, 162; First Letter on Toleration, p. 42. "A multitude of strong, healthy people being the riches of every country and that which makes it flourish." Journal, July 15, 1678, MS f. 3. In the First Treatise, Locke argues that absolute monarchy is a barrier to and is incompatible with the growth of population and riches. pars. 33, 41.
 - 91 Second Treatise, pars. 38, 45.

ests" emerge. ⁹² The need for some "common superior" to act as "judge" in deciding these "controversies" obviously grew in proportion to the frequency with which men interacted with each other within the same city and between cities.

With the accrual of material wealth, the Lockean state emerges, with its division of political power, its impartial judges, and a multiplicity of laws. For, within civil society, "the laws regulate the right of property, and the possession of land is determined by positive constitutions." The "great art of government," according to Locke, is manifest in "the increase of lands and the right employing of them." The Lockean state is an institution designed to secure "protection and encouragement to the honest industry of mankind."93 That the creation of political society is responsive to the new economic needs of men living under the 'second phase' of monarchy is evident. We cannot suppose, Locke argues, that "anyone entered into civil society for the procuring, securing, or advancing the salvation of his soul, when he, for that end, needed not the force of civil society." But the individual does enter political society "for the procuring, preserving, and advancing" of his "civil interests." These include "life, liberty, health, and indolency of body; and the possession of outward things, such as money, lands, houses, furniture, and the like." Locke goes so far as to assert that "the temporal good and outward prosperity of the society" is "the sole reason of men's entering into [civil] society."94

In a state of nature in which the exchange of commodities is simple, where peoples are nomadic, where there is no "fixed property," a simple form of government will suffice to preserve the minimum of order that enables men, generally speaking, to obey the precepts of natural law. However, in a state of nature in which complicated economic transactions take place within and between groups of men, where land is valuable, where the economy has developed beyond the subsistence level, and where quarrels and contentions among men over property rights are frequent, it becomes necessary "to examine more carefully the original and rights of government, and to find out ways to restrain the exorbitancies and prevent the abuses" of the power granted the monarch.

⁹² Ibid, par. 98; cf. First Letter on Toleration, p. 53.

⁹³ Ibid, pars. 50, 120, 42 (italics added).

⁹⁴ Second Letter on Toleration, p. 119; First Letter on Toleration, pp. 10, 43.

It may be objected that what we have labelled the "second phase" of the state of nature is not that "natural condition" of man, but the "early stages" of civil society. 55 But Locke is quite explicit regarding the conditions under which political society comes into being. It is precisely at this point that his argument shifts from historical description to moral prescription. 96 And, in order to make clear the full

95 This is the view of Sterling Lamprecht, The Moral and Political Philosophy of John Locke (New York, 1962), p. 127, and Peter Laslett. See Laslett's note to par. 111, op. cit. p. 360. Sheldon Wolin's distinction between the "ideal" and the "fallen" states of nature parallels in many respects the argument offered here. Wolin, op. cit., pp. 306-309. However, there is no attempt by Wolin to portray the two different stages of the state of nature as descriptions of man's actual historical development. Also, I cannot accept Wolin's conclusion that the effect of Locke's dichotomous view of the state of nature "was to obscure the political character of civil society." On the contrary, Locke's separation of the early from the later stage of man's development in his natural condition provides us with precisely the information and rationale we need in order to understand Locke's commitment to political institutions of a particular form.

96 The shift occurs at this point in Locke's argument as we have presented it. The actual order of discussion in the Second Treatise employs several such shifts and is considerably more difficult for the reader to follow. This is due less to Locke's devious nature or to his indifference as to the distinctive nature of the arguments themselves than it is to the fact the Second Treatise was pieced together and revised over a ten year period. as Laslett has shown. The breakdown of the chapters of most interest to us seems to be as follows: The first four chapters of the Second Treatise essentially set down the moral framework for the discussion of government. Chapter five. "Of Property," is much more historically-oriented. Chapter six, "Of Paternal Power," is a rather balanced mixture of historical and moral arguments. Chapter seven, "Of Political or Civil Society," returns to the level of ethics, laying down the criteria for distinguishing between the various forms of government. This discussion is summarized and carried over into the first part of Chapter eight, "Of the Beginning of Political Societies." But, beginning with paragraph 100 of that chapter, Locke returns to history to account for the origins of government. It will be seen, therefore, that in our presentation of Locke's historical view of the state of nature, we have cited almost exclusively from Chapters five and eight, while the shift to which reference is made in the text above returns force of Locke's meaning of political society, it will be helpful to comment briefly on a notion which has become the subject of the most confused and tortuous reasoning practiced upon Lockean political theory by two centuries of scholars. I refer to the idea of consent. As this subject has recently been reexamined elsewhere, ⁹⁷ I will limit my remarks to those aspects of Locke's discussion of consent which bear directly on the argument of this essay.

Very early in his life. Locke came to the conclusion that any justification for political authority had to be traceable to one of two sources: the direct appointment of God, or the consent of the people. Throughout the First Treatise, he insists that if Filmer's view of divine appointment is rejected, we must fall back upon the notion of consent. However, unlike his critics. Locke does not stop there. In fact, that is merely the beginning point of his argument. For, in Locke's view, all governments are the product of consent.98 Yet, an indiscriminate acceptance of consent as the source of legitimacy of political power would hardly provide him with any grounds for distinguishing his position from that of Hobbes. Thus, against Filmer, Locke argues that consent is a necessary condition of political society, but, against Hobbes, he maintains that it is not a sufficient condition.

In developing the latter point, Locke refuses to follow Hobbes in equating consent with coercion. He therefore denies that a legitimate government can be the product of conquest. 99 In addition, there are certain things to which an individual cannot freely consent and still retain his standing as a "rational" being. He carnot, for instance, consent to his own slavery, i.e., put himself under

us to the arguments Locke advances in Chapter seven.

⁹⁷ See Hanna Pitkin, "Obligation and Consent," this Review, 59 (Dec. 1965), 990-999; and John Dunn, "Consent in the Political Theory of John Locke," *The Historical Journal*, 10 (1967), 153-182.

^{98 &}quot;All government, whether monarchical or other, is only from the consent of the people." Notes on Samuel Parker's Discourse of Ecclesiastical Polity, MS c. 39. Governments cannot "be founded on anything but the consent of the people." Second Treatise, par. 175; cf. pars. 102, 104, 105, 106, 112, 119, 198. Also, there is a relevant historical note by Locke ("Politia," 1682, MS c. 42) cited by Lasletz in his note to par. 106, op. cit., p. 356.

⁹⁹ Second Treatise, pars. 175, 176, 186.

the arbitrary will of another.100 Moreover, "no rational creature can be supposed to change his condition with an intention to be worse."101 And since individuals living under an absolute monarchy are in a "far worse condition" than those living in the state of nature, no reasonable person could give his consent to such a government.102 Clearly, Locke is not making descriptive statements about reality. He was well aware of the existence of absolute governments, past and present, and of the theoretical defense provided for them by Hobbes.103 Rather, he is proscribing a particular form of government, and he does so, not by denying that it is a government and hence the product of men's consent, but by denying that it is a legitimate or "lawful" government. In a purely de facto sense, a government or a "commonwealth" is "any independent community," regardless of its particular form.104 Even a tyranny is a "form of government," although the tyrant "has no right to be obeyed" since his subjects owe their allegiance not to individual rulers but to lawful forms of government.105 Political society refers to the latter,

 $^{100}\ Ibid,$ pars. 23, 135, 137, 149, 164, 171, 172.

103 The Turkish government is specifically mentioned as an absolutist state. *Ibid*, par. 192; *First Treatise*, par. 33. Also, there seems to be an obvious reference to Russia ('Czar') in the *Second Treatise*, par. 91. Explicit mention is made of Ceylon in par. 92.

104 Ibid, par. 133.

105 Ibid, par. 201; cf. pars. 93, 192, 198, 202, Hence, Locke is not entirely clear in his argument. He wants to maintain that, as an historical description, all government-even Filmer's patriarchical and absolute monarchy-is the product of consent (see note 98 above). At the same time, he wants to argue, against both Hobbes and Filmer, that no "rational" man could consent to live under an absolute monarchy as a part of his moral conception of human nature (see notes 100-103 above). And, finally, he grants that tyrannyeven without consent—is a de facto, though not a de jure, form of government. Either consent is an inherent part of the meaning of "government," and history records the actions of irrational men in consenting to a tyranny, or consent is only a necessary ingredient of "lawful" governments, and his statement about the origins of government is a case of history ideologized. The latter seems to be the most accurate reading of Locke's view. In the First Treatise, he contrasts "lawful government" with "tyranny" or "usurpation": pars. 72, 81. Later, he contrasts "tyranny and usurpation" with "elections and consent": ibid.

and therefore there is a specific distinction to be made between "government" in general based upon consent, and the additional special features Locke incorporates into his concept of a legitimate political order. "The only way," he declares, "whereby any one . . . puts on the bonds of civil society is by agreeing with other men to join and unite into a community."106 "There only is political society where everyone of the members has quitted his natural power" and "resigned it up into the hands of the community." Thus, whenever "any number of men" give up their natural power and "resign it to the public, there and there only is a political or civil society."107 In other words, the terms laid down by Locke for the creation of political society do not correspond with his description of absolute monarchy; for individuals did not resign their power to the "public" or the "community," but placed it in the hands of one man. Yet, "that which begins and actually constitutes any political society is nothing but the consent of any number of freemen capable of a majority to unite and incorporate into such a society." 108 Locke could hardly be more emphatic in his choice of words. The "only" way that political society can be created is in the manner outlined in the Second Treatise. Locke's meaning becomes perfectly clear once we realize that absolute monarchy does not qualify as a "political" society, and that those who live under such a government are still residents of the state of nature. Mere consent to absolute monarchy or a general submission to a conqueror, does not remove men from the state of nature.109 What does put men into a "political" society is the consent of the majority establishing a law-making authority which acts for the common good, and which, in particular, does not "raise taxes on the property of the people without the consent of the people . . . or their deputies."110

In stating that men give up their political

¹⁰¹ Ibid, par. 131.

¹⁰² Ibid, pars. 137, 91, 93, 135, 163, 164.

par. 148. Thus, Locke's point is that even if tyranny is the product of consent, it is not legitimate, although, as a matter of historical fact, it is usually not instituted by consent but by force.

¹⁰⁶ Second Treatise, par. 95 (italics added).

¹⁰⁷ Ibid, pars. 87, 89 (italics added).

¹⁰⁸ Ibid, par. 99 (italics added).

¹⁰⁹ Moreover, "general submission" and "general consent" are not the same. The latter seems to be tied to some system of elections, whereas the former is merely the product of force. Notes on William Sherlock's The Case of the Allegiance due to Sovereign Powers Stated and Resolved..., MS c. 28, f. 96.

¹¹⁰ Second Treatise, pars. 142, 87, 89, 141.

power to the community, Locke explains that "in all cases" the individual "has given up to the legislative" the power to punish offenses against the Law of Nature. After repeating that this authorization is a definitional component of political society, Locke declares:

and this puts men out of a state of into that of a commonwealth by setting up a judge on earth... which judge is the legislative, or magistrates appointed by it.¹¹¹

Thus, "whenever there are any number of men, however associated, that have no such decisive power to appeal to, they are still in the state of nature." It is the immediately following sentence that begins:

Hence it is evident that absolute monarchy, which by some men is counted the only government in the world, is indeed inconsistent with civil society, and so can be no form of civil government at all.

Those living under the rule of an absolute monarch "are still in the state of nature." For, the monarch having "both legislative and executive power in himself alone," the people can have no "judge" who can render "fair" and "indifferent" decisions. The ruler "is as much in the state of nature with all under his dominion as he is with the rest of mankind." This means that the people are also in the state of nature.

Now one understands the importance of Locke's legalistic definition of the state of nature, which he repeats at this point in his argument.

Wherever any two men are who have no standing rule and common judge to appeal to on earth for the determination of controversies of right betwixt them, there they are still in the state of nature. 112

That is precisely the relationship between the absolute monarch and any individual member of society, since they have no common judge to decide controversies between them. Consequently, men in such a society "are apt to think themselves in the state of nature in respect of him (absolute monarch) who they find to be so." In any event, they could never "think themselves in civil society till the legislature was placed in collective bodies of men." For.

in well-ordered commonwealths... the legislative power is put into the hands of diverse persons who, duly assembled, have by themselves, or jointly with others, a power to make laws; which... they are themselves subject to...¹¹⁴

Clearly, Locke is replying to the Hobbesian contention that the ruler is not a party to the formation of civil society, but remains in the state of nature. According to Locke, however, if the ruler remains in the state of nature vis-avis the people, they likewise stand in the same relationship to him. The result is that no political society has been constituted at all. Because, "no man in civil society can be exempted from the laws of it." To say otherwise, Locke argues, is to claim that "the state of nature and civil society are one and the same thing." The conclusion forced upon us is that there is only one way for men to leave the state of nature. and that is by ceding their power to the community, with the assurance that some form of legislative body will be established to act as judge, deciding issues on behalf of the common good. In all other instances, and especially in the case of absolute monarchy, men are still in the state of nature.

III. SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS

Beginning with a conception of human nature, and drawing upon history, Locke uses both moral criteria and historical information to formulate his conception of political society. If, as Locke suggests, a knowledge of our "rights" and "duties" follows from a knowledge of the "foundations" and "original" of political society, then a proper understanding of what Locke means by the state of nature, from which political society emerges, is crucial to any explication of other Lockean notions, e.g., "property," "natural rights," political obligation, etc. Moreover, since the state of nature functions as a critique of existing society by indicating the legal and moral boundaries of political relationships, a clear idea of when men are or are not returned to their natural state 'with a liberty to shift for themselves as they see fit,' is essential to an appreciation of the Two Treatises as a practical, revolutionary document. Finally, Locke was writing within a particular intellectual climate. one in which a portrayal of "natural man' was certain to draw theological and political criticism. Earlier, we mentioned Locke's efforts to separate his political theory from that of Filmer and Hobbes, in order to indicate the intellectual context of his argument. Locke's interpretation of the state-of-nature concept discloses some of the reasons for and the de-

¹¹¹ *Ibid*, pars. 88, 89 (italics added).

¹¹² Ibid, pars. 90, 91, 174 (italics added).

¹¹⁸ Ibid, par. 94 (italics added).

¹¹⁴ Ibid, par. 143.

tails of that separation. In short, the state of nature is the cornerstone of Lockean political thought; it is important for its political implications; and it was a focal point of intellectual controversy in the seventeenth century.

What all these comments share in common is their prefatory importance. I began this essay with a statement of the standard intellectual accusations made against Locke, viz., that he is a superficial, abstract, inconsistent, and deceptive thinker. And, with an allowance for his human failings, I have attempted, using his discussion of the state of nature as an illustration of his general approach to political problems, to indicate my reasons for rejecting these characterizations of Locke. Yet, there is another set of charges laid to Lockean political thought, to which I have not explicitly responded. These are more distinctly political and ideological criticisms. It is said, for example, that Locke is the progenitor of liberalism, that he is the apologist for the rising bourgeois class, that he is the father of the empiricist attack on religion and traditional philosophy, and so forth. It is never an easy matter to deal with such ideological charges. but one thing does seem certain; there is a question as to what Locke did say which must be answered before all the innuendoes of meaning can be extracted from his words in order to support one of the ideological positions cited above. For reasons of priority and space, I have considered here only the intellectual, not the political, accusations against Locke. It is in this sense that the explication of Locke's thought in this essay is prefatory to a more general and political assessment of Lockean political theory.115

Aside from the ideological implications and uses of historical scholarship, there is, it seems to me, another reason for rereading Locke in light of what has been said generally about 'classic' political theorists, and about Locke in particular. One of the criticisms frequently advanced by contemporary political scientists, including historians of political thought, is that traditional political thinkers did not understand the is/ought dichotomy, or the difference between an analytic and an historical argument.¹¹⁶ The effect of this criticism is

115 The ideological aspects of liberalism as they are related to Locke's political theory and the intellectual and historical events of seventeenth century England provide the primary focus for my longer—but yet uncompleted—work, The Roots of Liberalism.

116 See, for example, George Sabine, A History of

to question the relevance of studying the classic writers in light of the preoccupations of modern political thought. Although it must be admitted that Locke does not make it especially easy for the reader to follow these distinctions, because he is not so painfully self-conscious of them as modern writers are, nevertheless such a simple criticism of his political thought will not do. Locke does attempt to blend together deductive hypotheses, historical evidence, and ethical assumptions, keeping in mind the 'very different' foundations of the various statements. If, as I believe, the problems and objectives of combining these various elements are generic to the creative activity of formulating a theory about politics, something may be learned concerning theory construction from reading a theorist such as Aristotle or Locke. In the opinion of a contemporary political scientist who shares this conviction, and who also selects Locke as the example illustrative of his point, "there are insights in the work (Two Treatises) that could be tapped as an aid to inquiry into systematic theory." And, he continues:

The thoughtful, so-called political theorists were in fact total social scientists who . . . felt free to explore every aspect of political life. In narrowing the study of the political thoughts of these earlier social philosophers to a reporting of their moral wisdom, contemporary political theory has helped to conceal from the rest of political science valuable resources for an understanding of causal theory, particularly of alternative conceptual frameworks. Clearly, the wisdom of the great social theorists needs to be scrutinized for its insights about general political theories.¹¹⁷

This is not to suggest, by way of analogy, that a study of Beethoven's techniques of composition, harmonic structure, or orchestration, should result in the student's composition of music which sounds like that of Beethoven. Indeed, the greater fault in this regard is chargeable to political science, which is still echoing worn-out dogmas, while contemporary music has advanced a considerable distance from its old masters. Hopefully, with an appreciation of what a thinker like Locke was asserting, we shall be in a better position not only to learn from but also to transcend the political thought of the past.

Political Theory (Third Edition, New York, 1961), pp. 523-540.

¹¹⁷ David Easton, *The Political System* (New York, 1943), p. 313.

NATIONAL ATTRIBUTES AS PREDICTORS OF DELEGATE ATTITUDES AT THE UNITED NATIONS¹

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The purpose of this paper is to explore United Nations delegate attitudes toward the major organs of the United Nations, i.e., the Security Council, General Assembly, Economic and Social Council, Secretariat, International Court of Justice, and the General and Main Committees of the General Assembly. In respect to these organs, the study probes "delegate satisfactions" concerning voting procedures, membership arrangements, and general role and past performance; "delegate perceptions" in respect to present and future importance and the probability of changes occurring in respect to membership arrangements; and "delegate desires" in respect to modifying roles and powers. The study also attempts to ascertain if delegate attitude patterns can be related to "predictors" generated from attributes of the delegates' home states. That is, is it possible to predict delegate attitudes from information about their home states?

The potential importance of delegate attitudes in respect to the United Nations will be treated in detail later in the paper. Here, suffice it to say that delegates make decisions, relay information, give advice, and engage in other types of activities which allow them to help shape the institutions in which they operate. Because this is the case, it is assumed that the discovery of attitudinal patterns and the relationship of these patterns to various other indices is a potentially fruitful line of inquiry, which may facilitate an understanding of, and provide a basis for predictions about, the political processes of the United Nations.

It is apparent that a host of variables might "account" for United Nations delegate atti-

¹ I would like to thank the Research Advisory Committee of Central Michigan University for its financial support of the data gathering phase of the project; the Political Science Department of Florida Atlantic University for financial support of the data analysis phase; and, the vote of the Florida Atlantic University Research Committee to support the project out of NSF Institutional Grant monies. The generous counsel of Dean J. Clyde, Allan Nash, and Andrew Baggaley and the assistance of Daniel Cousens, David Joslyn, Derold Clement, Michael Novak and James Turner are greatly appreciated.

tudes. Such variables could be categorized in a variety of ways, such as: (1) genetic, (2) past experience, (3) environmental, etc. However, to attempt to organize all relevant factors into a coherent theory of delegate attitudes at this time is probably premature; to accomplish this, more needs to be known about the formulation and pattern of attitudes of actors at the international level (and national level). In view of this, the objectives of this study are very modest. Basically, the study aims to answer a kind of pre-theory question-what kinds of national attributes appear to be related to delegate attitudes? Further, if certain national attributes are found to be related to delegate attitudes, how may this be interpreted and what does it suggest, if anything, about possible tendencies and developments at the United Nations? National attributes are selected as a starting point because of their "accessibility" compared to other potentially relevant indices, such as those relating to the personality of the delegates.

The present study, then, is offered as a modest first step in the problem of attempting to account for the orientations and predilections of delegates of the United Nations. Like many pilot studies, it is deficient in, but a struggle toward, theory.

I. DATA COLLECTION

Data used in the study were collected from March to December, 1965. All United Nations delegations were contacted² and 68 cooperated with the project.

Questionnaires were initially sent to Ambassadors in Permanent Missions. The Ambassadors were told, "If you choose, you may have anyone in your delegation who is competent complete the questionnaire." Although each respondent was told that his personal identity was not important, personal identification cards enclosed with some of the questionnaires indicate that at least 15 of the respondents were actually Ambassadors.

- ² See: Permanent Missions to the United Nations, United Nations Document, ST/SG/SER.A/186, January, 1966.
- ³ It is possible that many more of the responding delegates were also Ambassadors. It is probably desirable to have as many Ambassadors as possible within the group of responding delegates,

All respondents were also told: (1) All replies would be held in the strictest confidence. (No one but the research staff would be allowed to see the completed questionnaires); (2) The results of the study would be used solely for academic purposes. (In any published results, it would not be possible to identify those that helped us, either by person or nation); and (3) the respondent was contributing to a carefully planned and important scientific endeavor.

The collected sample tended to distribute well across many ways of classifying the respondents' states. For example, using cut-off points established by Banks and Textor in their A Cross Polity Survey, the sample may be compared, in terms of national attributes, with the "ascertainable" universe of states.

The sample tended to cut through other ways of classifying the respondents' states as well. In these terms, then, the sample may be viewed as fairly "representative" of all possible respondents' states even though it is not random. Also, "factors" which emerge from factor analysis of the respondents' states correspond well with factors which emerge from factor analysis of all or most states (i.e., economic development, density, size, etc.).

In connection with working with biased samples, Zetterberg has argued:

The relationships expressed in the theoretical propositions, in other words, claim to be universally present. They are, accordingly, present both in representative and non-representative samples. To disprove or demonstrate their existence is, hence, possible in any kind of sample—biased or unbiased. This important, and perhaps surprising, consideration, however, should immediately be qualified. When using a biased sample for a verification, we must have assurance that the relationship we want to prove is not introduced into our data by selective sampling. This possibility, however, is in most cases rather un-

but, as the project has been set up, this is not necessary. That is, as explained above, the major purpose of the project is to relate non-personal data to delegate response patterns. A delegate's "rank," then, is considered to fall in the same analytical category (personal) as "age," "education," etc. These are potentially fruitful lines of inquiry, but are not pursued here for reasons explained above.

- ⁴ Arthur S. Banks and Robert B. Textor, A Cross Polity Survey (Cambridge: M.I.T. Press, 1953) pp. 54-117.
- ⁵ Phillip K. Gregg and Arthur S. Banks, "Dimensions of Political Systems: Factor Analysis of A Cross Polity Survey," this REVIEW, 59 (1965), p. 607.

likely.... On balance, it appears that non-representative samples are not much inferior to representative samples when we want to disprove a theoretical hypothesis.

If it is assumed that the propensity of delegates to cooperate is unrelated to their questionnaire responses, the tests of significance employed in this study can be viewed as applying as if the sample were random. If this assumption is deemed unwarranted, the tests of significance can be ignored and the correlations given later in the study can be seen as descriptive of the cooperative universe. In this case, it is assumed that the cooperative universe is large enough to make assertions about it meaningful.

II. QUESTIONNAIRE CONSTRUCTION

Please place one mark on each answer line according to the following scheme:

To mark here means that you are neither really satisfied nor dissatisfied with the situation.

Highly Moderately
Slightly
Slightly
Satisfied

Dissatisfied

Naturally, you can mark anywhere on the answer line. The major idea is that satisfaction, or dissatisfaction, increases as you move away from the "0" on the answer line. We understand that you may hold certain reservations or qualifications in mind in marking a particular answer line. What we want is your general impression of the situation.

Similar instructions and appropriate answer lines were employed in connection with other questions probing additional "satisfaction"

⁶ Hans L. Zetterberg, On Theory and Verification in Sociology (Totowa, New Jersey: The Bedminster Press, 1963), pp. 54-55.

TABLE 1. SOME CHARACTERISTICS OF THE RESPONDENT'S STATES

		Size			***************************************		1	····	· I	Populati	on	
	Sar	nple	Univ	erse					Sar	nple	Uni	verse
•	N	%	N	%			•	•	N	%	\overline{N}	%
Very Large	5	7.3	6	5.2			Very	Large	3	4.4	4	3.4
Large	12	17.7	26	22.6			Larg		12	17.7	23	20.0
Medium	24	35.3	36	31.4			Med	ium	24	35.3	34	29.6
Small	27	39.7	47	40.8			Sma	11	29	42.6	54	47.0
	68	100%	115	100%				•	68	100%	115	100%
Agric	ultura	l Populat	ion						Lite	racy R	ate	
	Sa	mple	Uni	vėrse					Sa	mple	Un	iverse
	N	%	. N	%					N	%	\overline{N}	. %
High	24	35.2	56	49.5			High		19	27.9	25	23.8
Medium	28	41.2	33	29.2			Med		20	29.5	30	28.6
Low	13	19.2	17.	15.1			Low		14	20.5	24	22.8
Very Low	3	4.4	7	6.2			Very	Low .	15	22.1	26	24.8
	68	100%	113	100%					68	100%	105	100%
				Freedor	n of t	he Pro	ess					
							Sa.	mple		Uni	verse	•
				\			N	%		N .	- %	i
Comp	olete I	reedom					26	38.3		43	44.4	
Inter	mitter	it Freedo	m				17	25.0		17	17.5	
Freed	lom Ir	nternally .	Absent				17	25.0		21	21.6	
Freed	lom Ir	nternally	& Exter	nally A	bsent		8.	11.7		16	16.5	
							68	100%		97	100%	
				Status	of Le	gislatu	ıre	- And the second				
					San	nple		Un	ivers	3e		•
					Ň	%		N		%		
		Fully Effe			19	28.0		28		8		
		Partially 1			18	26.4		23		3		
•		Largely In			13	19.2		21		21		
	,	Wholly In	effectiv	B	18	26.4		28		8		
				Margina and a state of the state of the same	68	1009	6	100	10	0%		
			G	eograph								
•			_		San	nple				Uı	iverse	
				N		······································	%			N		%
Africa (include	es N.	Africa)	•	17			25.1			33		8.7
Americas		11. \		10			14.7			24		0.8
Asia (includes		alia)		11			16.2			20	1	7.5
Eastern Europ	96			6			8.8			9		7.8
Middle East				10			14.7			11		9.6
Western Europ	pe			14			20.5			18	1	5.6
				68		1	00%			115	10	0%

matters and in respect to the organ's "increasing or decreasing importance," delegate desires to "increase or decrease importance" and the "probability or improbability" of certain changes occurring.

The problem of questionnaire validity was approached by having 51 non-delegate judges? "answer" the questionnaire. They were asked to "assume you are a UN delegate with positive feelings, perceptions, desires about the United Nations, who sees things in dynamic terms. Which ends of the following answer lines would you choose?" (The questionnaire was then administered). At least 95% of the judges agreed on each of the terms selected and how they should be labeled, i.e., as expressing either "positive feeling," a "positive perception," a "positive desire," or a "dynamic perception."

It was decided to label delegate responses that "deviate toward" (using the mean value on the answer line as the zero point) the end of the answer lines predicted by the judges as "positive" or "dynamic" delegate reactions, and those that "deviate away" as "negative" or "static" delegate reactions.8 Thus, each deviation toward "satisfied" is viewed as an indication of a "positive feeling," each deviation toward "dissatisfied" a "negative feeling," each deviation toward "increase" a "positive desire," each deviation toward "decrease" a "negative desire," each deviation toward "increasing" a "positive perception," each deviation toward "decreasing" a "negative perception," each deviation toward "probable" a "dynamic perception" and each deviation toward "improbable" a "static perception."

Reliability of the questionnaire was estimated at .93 by the "Kuder-Richardson formula 20." Scores were generated for the formula by treating each "positive" and "dynamic" delegate deviation as "correct" and each "negative" and "static" deviation as "incorrect."

⁷ A panel of 51 upper division international relations students at Florida Atlantic University were asked to judge the statements.

* Technically, then, it is movement away from the mean value, not actual agreement or disagreement with the judges, which defines "positive," "dynamic," "negative" and "static" attitudes. Thus, whenever a subject deviates from the central tendency, he is viewed as evincing one of these kinds of attitudes. "Attitude" is employed here in a broad sense to include "feelings," "perceptions," and "desires." A respondent having a score exactly equal to the mean value, of course, does not evidence either a "negative," "static," "positive," or "dynamic" attitude.

9 Reliability, of course, refers to the character-

Scores for the remaining data analysis were generated by dividing each answer line into 21 parts, with magnitude increasing moving from left to right and with "O" scored as 11. The following example gives some possible marks and the scores that would result:

The actual delegate responses tended to range across the answer lines, i.e., in 39 questions they range from 1 to 21, in nine from 1 to 20, in one from 1 to 19, in two from 1 to 17, in one from 1 to 16, in one from 1 to 14, and in two from 1 to 13.

III. FINDINGS

Overall. The overall results in terms of means and standard deviations may be summarized in the following table:

TABLE 2. SUMMARY OF RESPONSES

Questions	Organs	Mean	Stan- dard Devi- ation
Degree of satisfaction or dissat-	SC	10.4	7.0
isfaction with voting proce-	GA	4.7	4.5
dures	ECOSOC	5.2	5.6
	ICJ	4.4	4.1
	MC	4.4	4.2
Degree of satisfaction or dissat-	sc	9.9	7.6
isfaction with charter mem-	GA	3.6	3.9
bership arrangements	ECOSOC	9.0	7.3
	ICJ	5.9	5.3
	SEC	7.3	6.3
Degree of satisfaction or dissat-	sc	7.9	6.7
isfaction with understand-	ECOSOC	8.4	6.8
ings and agreements to allo-	ICJ	7.0	6.1
cate seats	SEC	7.6	6.3
	GC	6.5	5.4
	MC	5.9	5.0
Degree of satisfaction or dissat-	SC	9.6	5.8
isfaction with general rule	GA	6.3	4.5
and past performance of or-	ECOSOC	5.6	4.7
gans	ICJ	5.6	4.5
-	SEC	5.4	3.8
	GC	5.7	3.7
	MC	5.3	3.8

Where SC = Security Council

GA = General Assembly

ECOSOC = Economic and Social Council

ICJ = International Court of Justice

SEC =Secretariat

GC = General Committee of the General Assembly • MC = Main Committee of the General Assembly

istics of an entire test instrument and not its individual items. Because of the decision to work with individual items and not an aggregate score in this study, the above estimate is given simply for informational purposes.

TABLE 2-(Continued)

Questions	Organs	Mean	Stan- dard Devi- ation	
Present increasing or decreas-	SC	7.7		
ing importance of organs	ĞA	6.3	5.6	
	ECOSOC	9.1	6.4	
	ICJ	8.3	3.8	
	SEC	7.5	4.7	
	GC	7.5	4.7	
	MC	7.0	4.6	
Future increasing or decreasing	SC	6.1	5.1	
importance of organs	GA	6.9	5.5	
	ECOSOC	8.9	6.4	
	ICJ	7.8	4.6	
	SEC	6.8	5.0	
	GC	7.2	4.3	
	MC	6.9	4.5	
Desire to increase or decrease	sc	6.6	5.3	
the role and power of organs	GA	5.2	4.9	
	ECOSOC	6.4	5.2	
	ICJ	6.2	4.8	
	\mathbf{sec}	5.9	4.5	
	GC	6.6	4.4	
	MC	6.5	4.7	
Probability of changes in char-	SC	4.9	5.4	
ter memberships arrange-	GA	8.6	7.3	
ments	ECOSOC	6.6	6.2	
	ICJ	10.4	6.5	
	SEC	9.6	6.2	
Probability of changes in un-	SC	6.6	6.1	
derstandings and agreements	ECOSOC	6.3	5.8	
to allocate seats	ICJ	9.8	6.5	
	SEC	8.5	6.6	
	GC	7.8	6.0	
	MC	8.7	6.2	

Table 2 shows that, generally speaking, (viewing the mean as the central tendency) delegates tend to be satisfied, expect and wish organs to increase in importance, and expect changes to take place. That is, the means of the answer marks tend to lie between "O" and the satisfied, increasing, increase, and probable sides of the answer lines. The table indicates variation, however, moving from organ to organ in the analytical categories. For example, generally speaking, United Nations delegates seem less satisfied with the voting procedures of the Security Council than with those of the General Assembly. Also, they seem to feel that it is less probable that changes will occur in respect to the Charter membership arrangements for the International Court of Justice than for the Security Council.

The standard deviations show the dispersion of the answer marks on the answer lines. For example, delegates seem to be closer together in respect to their evaluation of the general role and past performance of the

Secretariat than on the question of the voting procedures of the Security Council. It has already been pointed out, however, that delegate answer marks tend to range, for the most part, completely across the answer lines. The question can then be asked, "What kinds of delegates, in terms of their home states' characteristics, mark the "negative" and "static" sides of the answer lines and what kinds of delegates mark the "positive" and "dynamic" sides?

Predicting Delegate Attitudes. To answer the above question, it was decided to employ a "scattergun" approach and consider a large number of variables relating to national attributes. Thirty-four of the independent variables considered were taken from Banks and Textors' Cross Polity Survey. 10 These were: Size of

10 Banks and Textor, op. cit. Selection of the 34 variables from the total of 57 treated by Banks and Textor was based upon the possibility of constructing a scale with direction for each variable, although in some cases, it is a nominal one, i.e., religious homogeneity (two categories). Also considered was the relative absence of ambiguous codings for the responding delegations. Although many of the Banks and Textor variables are soft, i.e., partially or completely subjective, nevertheless it has been successfully demonstrated that they are amenable to factor analysis and the factors tend to agree, in some respects, with other analysis of state social, economic, and political variables. See Gregg and Banks, "Dimensions of Political Systems . . ." op. cit., p. 607. The preference for the Banks and Textor variables over "hard" data collections, particularly over the excellent data in Bruce Russett, et al. World Handbook of Political and Social Indicators (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1964), lies in the fact, as explained by Arthur S. Banks and Phillip M. Gregg, that, "Despite the focus implied by the title, [World Handbook] most of the data series in this collection are of limited political significance." Arthur S. Banks and Phillip M. Gregg, "Grouping Political Systems, Q Factor Analysis of A Cross Polity Survey," The American Behavioral Scientist, 9 (1965), p. 6. In addition, the World Handbook's value was limited simply because data was not included for many of the responding delegations. For example, the World Handbook only covers 41 cases in respect to the expenditure of central governments as a ratio to gross national product; 18 cases in respect to employment by the general government and public enterprises; 44 cases in respect to votes for the Communist Party as percentage of total votes: 74 cases in respect to death by domestic violence per one million, through the years 1950-1962; and, 88 Country, Population of Country, Population Density, Population Growth Rate, Agricultural Population, Gross National Product, Per Capita Gross National Product, International Financial Status, Economic Development Status, Literacy Rate, Freedom of the Press, Newspaper Circulation, Religious Homogeneity, Racial Heterogeneity, Linguistic Homogeneity, Date of Independence, Westernization, Political Modernization, Systems Style, Constitutional Status, Representative Character, Freedom of Group Opposition, Political Inculturation, Interest Articulation by Associational Groups, Interest Articulation by Institutional Groups, Interest Articulation by Non-Associational Groups, Interest Articulation by Parties, Party System, Political Leader ship, Status of Legislature, Status of Executive, Character of Bureaucracy, Participation by Military, Communist Bloc.

Fourteen additional variables derived from other resources¹¹ were: United Nations Dele-

cases in respect to military personnel as a percentage of the total population. The N's for the Banks and Textor variables are, in most cases, considerably larger than this.

¹¹ United Nations delegate size was taken from Permanent Missions to the United Nations, op. cit. Time in the United Nations was scored by the number of years a respondent's state had been in the United Nations by December, 1965. Intergovernmental memberships were taken from Mosche Y. Sachs, ed., Worldmark Encyclopedia of the Nations, Vol. I (New York: Harper & Row, 1963), pp. 247-265. Alliance scores are explained above. Military size (total men under arms) was taken from Worldmark Encyclopedia of the Nations, op. cit., Vol. 2-5, and supplemented by 1966 Reader's Digest Almanac and Yearbook (New York: Reader's Digest Association, 1965). Distances from the US, USSR, and China were based on the great circle distances to closest possible points between states (states with mutual borders with the US, USSR, and China were coded 0). Percent urbanization was taken from Worldmark Encyclopedia of the Nations op. cit., Vol. 2-5. Ratio of people to schools was found by dividing a state's total number of schools into its total population. The number of schools was taken from UNESCO, Survey of World Education, Vol. 3 (New York: International Document Service, Columbia University Press, 1961) and total population was taken from International Yearbook and Statesmen's Who's Who, 1966 (London: Burkes Peerage). United Nations Emergency Force Pay and United Nations Pay were taken from House of Representatives Report, No. 1564, 89th Congress. Import and Export Figures to the gations Size, Time in the United Nations, IGO Memberships, Alliance, Size of Military, Distance from U.S., Distance from U.S.S.R., Distance from China, Percent of Urbanization, Ratio of People Per School, United Nations Emergency Force Pay, United Nations Pay, Import from U.S., Export to U.S.

After data collection was complete and the cooperative delegations had been identified, each participating delegation state was coded on the first thirty-four variables by ranks suggested by the Cross Polity Survey. For example, in respect to the variable of size, Banks and Textor give four gradations: "Very Large" (two million square miles and above). "Large" (300,000-1.9 million square miles), "Medium" (75,000-299,000 square miles), and "Small" (below 75,000 square miles). Thus, countries falling in the "Very Large" category were coded 1, those in the "Large" category 2, etc. Rank numbers were then assigned to each state on each variable following procedures similar to those outlined by Alker and Russett in World Politics in the General Assembly. 12 The rank numbers for the remaining variables were calculated from cardinal magnitude (i.e., the number of IGO memberships) except for "Alliance" which was originally coded 1 = U.S. Ally, 2 = Neutral, 3 = U.S.S.R. ally. Thus, the rank numbers on all variables ranged from 1 to 68 with average rank scores assigned in cases of ties.

Because of their large number and possible confusing interrelationships between them, it was decided to factor analyze the independent indices.¹³

United States were taken from 1965-66 issues of Overseas Business Reports (Washington: U.S. Printing Office).

¹² Hayward R. Alker, Jr., and Bruce M. Russett, World Politics in the General Assembly, (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1965), pp. 30-31.

13 The principal component solution was employed. Unities were placed in the principal diagonal of the correlation matrix and the factor matrix was rotated using Kaiser's varimax criterion. The minimum eigenvalue for which a factor was rotated was 1.0. See Harry H. Harmon, Modern Factor Analysis (Chicago: University of Chicago Press 1960), Chapter 9; Henry F. Kaiser, "The Varimax Criterion for Analytical Rotation in Factor Analysis" Psychometrica, 23 (1958), 187-200; Henry F. Kaiser "Computer Program for Varimax Rotation in Factor Analysis" Educational and Psychological Measurement 19 (1959), 413-420; Dean J. Clyde, Elliott M. Cramer,

Factor analysis is generally considered a useful research tool because it can reduce a large number of variables to a smaller number with little loss of information. Factor analysis dispenses with a priori assumptions about what should be related to what and, instead, demonstrates what kinds of relationships are present in the data. Each factor, using methods explained below, has the desirable characteristic of being orthogonal to every other factor in the analysis. This means that "factor

Richard J. Sharin, Multivariate Statistical Programs (Coral Gables, Florida: University of Miami, 1966), pp. 15-19.

14 For applications of factor analysis in connection with United Nations voting see: Hayward R. Alker, Jr., and Bruce M. Russett, World Politics in the General Assembly, (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1965); Bruce M. Russett, "Discovering Voting Groups in the United Nations," this Review 60 (1966), 327-339; Hayward R. Alker, "Dimensions of Conflict in the General Assembly," this REVIEW, 58 (1964), 632-658. For other applications of factor analysis of interest, see: Bruce M. Russett, "Delineating International Regions," Carnegie-IDRC Joint Study Group on Measurement Problems, Paper No. G60, Indiana University, February, 1965; Bruce M. Russett, International Regions and International Integration (Chicago: Rand-McNally, forthcoming); Raymond D. Cattell, "The Dimensions of Cultural Patterns of Factorization of National Characters," Journal of Abnormal and Social Psychology, 44 (1959), 215-253; Raymond D. Cattell, H. Breul, and H. Parker Hartman, "An Attempt at a More Refined Definition of Cultural Dimensions of Syntality of Modern Nations," American Sociological Review, 17 (1951), 408-21; Rudolph J. Rummel, "Dimensions of Conflict Behavior Within and Between Nations," General Systems, Yearbook of the Society for the Advancement of General Systems Theory, Ann Arbor, Michigan, 1963; Brian J. L. Berry, "Basic Patterns of Economic Development," in Atlas of Economic Development (by Norton Ginsberg, Chicago, 1961) pp. 110-119; Arthur S. Banks and Phillip M. Gregg, "Grouping Political Systems, Q Factor Analysis of A Cross Polity Survey," The American Behavioral Scientist, 9 (1965), 3-6; Phillip M. Gregg and Arthur S. Banks, "Dimensions of Political Systems: Factoral Analysis of A Cross Polity Survey," this REVIEW, 59 (1965), 602-614; Raymond Tanter, "Dimensions of Conflict Behavior Within and Between Nations, 1958-1960," Journal of Conflict Resolution, 10 (1966), 41-64; and R. J. Rummel, "Dimensions of Conflict Behavior Within Nations, 1946-1959," Journal of Conflict Resolution, 10 (1966), 65-73.

scores" calculated from factor loadings on one factor have zero correlations with factor scores calculated from all other factors. Thus, confusing interrelationships between original variables are eliminated through the technique of factor analysis, and, when a particular factor dimension is being discussed, we know that it is a "unique dimension" which does not overlap with other dimensions. In short, factor analysis shows how variables are related to orthogonal linear dimensions cutting through the data and how many such dimensions are needed to account for the bulk of the original variance.

The 48 original variables under consideration reduced to 11 factors. The amount of variance explained by each factor and the variables loading above .30 are given in the following table.

TABLE 3. RESULTS OF FACTOR ANALYSIS

Factor I (Variance accounted for = 21.6%) (Development)

High Newspaper Circulation (.88) High Literacy Rate (.86) High Per Capita Gross National Product (.86) High Economic Development Status (.83) High Percent Urban (.83) Westernized (.83) Low Agricultural Population (.79)

15 Factor scores were calculated using the formula: $F = ZA (A'A)^{-1}$ where F is an $N \times m$ matrix of factor scores, Z is an N×n matrix of scores on the original variables in standard score form, A is an n×m matrix of factor coefficients (loadings) and N=subjects, n=variables and m = factors. See John L. Horn and Wilbur C. Miller, "Evidence on Problems in Estimating Common Factor Scores," Educational and Psychological Measurement, 26 (1966), 617-622, for the advantages of this formula over other possible formulas, such as: F = ZA (defined above) or F = ZB where B is an $n \times m$ matrix in which unity is substituted for each "salient" coefficient and zero is substituted for every other loading. The most obvious advantage of the formula employed in this study is that it produces truly orthogonal factor scores, whereas the other formulas may not. In this connection, a check correlating each set of factor scores with every other set of factor scores showed them to be truly orthogonal with correlations of .0. See also John L. Horn, "An Empirical Comparison of Methods for Estimating Factor Scores," Educational and Psychological Measurement, 25 (1965), 313-321, and Gene B. Glass and Thomas O. Maguire, "Abuses of Factor Scores," American Educational Research Journal, 3 (1966), 297-304.

Table 3 (Continued)

Negligible Interest Articulation by Non-Associational Groups (.78) Modern Bureaucracy (.77) Significant Interest Articulation by Associational Groups (.70) Politically Modern (.60) High Gross National Product (.55) High International Financial Status (.54) Old (.43) High Political Inculturation (.43) Large Military (.43) High United Nations Pay (.43) Low Ratio of People per School (.42) Linguistic Homogeneity (.40) Representative System (.40) Effective Legislature (.39) Many IGO Memberships (.38) Long Time in UN (.38) Significant Interest Articulation by Parties (.37) Low Distance from US (.34) Non-Communist (.30) Religious Homogeneity (.30) High United Nations Emergency Force Pay (.30)

Factor II (Variance accounted for = 16.7%) (Authoritarianism)

No Effective Constitution Limitations (.87) High Censorship (.87) Ineffective Legislature (.83) Opposition Groups Not Tolerated (.82) Not Representative System (.81) Strong Executive (.79) Elitist Political Leadership (.77) Participation by Military (.72) Significant Interest Articulation by Institutional Groups (.64) Negligible Interest Articulation by Associational Groups (.47) Mobilized System Style (.47) Communist Bloc (.41) Traditional Bureaucracy (.37) Communist Alliance (.31)

Factor III (Variance accounted for = 7.8%) (US Relations)

Large Import from US (.86) Large Export to US (.77) Allied With West (.72) Linguistic Homogeneity (.55) Religious Homogeneity (.43) Non-Communist (.42) Long Distance from USSR (.40) Long Time in UN (.32) High Population Growth Rate (.30)

Factor IV (Variance accounted for = 9.3%) (Bigness)

Big Population (.87) High International Financial Status (.73) Big Gross National Product (.72) Big Country (.67) Large Military (.66) Large United Nations Delegation Size (.59) High United Nations Pay (.53) Long Time in UN (.33) Significant Interest Articulation by Institutional Groups (.31) Politically Modern (.31) High Economic Development Status (.30) Many IGO Memberships (.30)

Factor V (Variance accounted for = 4.4%) (Party-Mobilization)

One Party System (.76) Mobilized System Style (.65) High Political Inculturation (.54) Negligible Interest Articulation by Parties (.35) Communist Bloc (.31)

Table 3 (Continued)

Factor VI (Variance accounted for = 3.6%)
(Density)

Low Population Density (.87) Big Country (.59)

Factor VII (Variance accounted for = 3.2%)
(Growth Rate)

High Population Growth Rate (.76) Non-Elitist Political Leadership (.33) Linguistic Heterogeneity (.32) Small IGO Memberships (.30)

Factor VIII (Variance accounted for -3%) (Racial)

Racial Heterogeneity (.80) Short Time in UN (.43)

Factor IX (Variance accounted for = 5.2%) (U.S. Distance)

Low Distance from U.S. (.75) Low Ratio of People per School (.58) Old (.47) Many IGO Memberships (.44) Politically Modern (.39) Long Time in UN (.44) Religious Homogeneity (.35) Non-Communist (.35)

Factor X (Variance accounted for = 3%) (UN Pay)

High United Nations Emergency Force Payment (.68) High United Nations Payment (.44) Limited Interest Articulation by Institutional Groups (.31)

Factor XI (Variance accounted for =4.4%) (Distance)

Long Distance from China (.81) Long Distance from USSR (.68) Low Political Inculturation (.37)

Those possessing the highest factor scores tend to possess the characteristics indicated, and those with low factor scores, the opposite characteristics. Thus, concerning the first factor dimension, a state with a high factor score tends¹⁶ to have high newspaper curculation, a high literacy rate, high per capita gross national product, high economic development status, a high degree of urbanization, a high degree of Westernization, a low agricultural

¹⁶ The term "tends" must be emphasized because it is possible that a subject's very high score on one variable can "make up" for a deviation in the wrong direction on another variable. Nevertheless, an extensive visual check failed to reveal a single case where subjects with high factor scores on the factor dimensions did not have deviations on the means in the predicted "direction" on variables loading .30 or above on the factors.

population, and so forth. Variables load differently on the factor dimensions and, therefore, variable scores contribute differently to factor scores. Thus, in respect to "newspaper circulation," a score of 2.0 (standard score) moves a state further up the factor dimension than a score of 2.0 on the "status of legislature" variable. In terms of its overall features, the first factor might be christened "Development Factor," and the remaining possible names are given in Table 3.

The factor analysis, then, produced eleven predictors, each of which is orthogonal to the others. Any variance explained by one predictor, in a dependent variable, then, will not also be explained by another predictor. For example, if it is found that both the "Development" and "Authoritarianism" dimensions are related to one of the questionnaire variables, we know that both predictors have explanatory power and that the relationships are not the result of an interrelation between the predictors.

It was decided to rank all scores, both independent and dependent, and use the correlational technique of Spearman's rho to test for relationships. Ranks for Spearman's rho were assigned by treating each original score which is higher to be a higher rank number and by assigning average ranks in cases of ties between original scores. Thus, an original score sequence of 1, 2, 4, 4, 6 became 1, 2, 3.5, 3.5,5 as rank numbers. Table 4 shows the relationship between the predictors and the questionnaire data.

In Table 4 the characteristics of high scores have been indicated. Thus, in respect to the

17 The naming of factors is always arbitrary. Alker and Russett have argued, "Factors are not born with names but must be christened by their parents who may not be able to agree on what they should be called." Alker and Russett, World Politics in the General Assembly, op. cit., p. 36. In fact, "factor names" may fall short of describing all of the variables loading most heavily on the factor. A listing of the heaviest loadings, then, makes it clear which are the important tests involved in producing factor scores. Simply referring to factor dimensions by their "name," then, may not do complete justice to the actual loadings.

¹⁸ See Andrew R. Baggaley, Intermediate Correlational Methods (New York: John Wiley & Sons, 1964), pp. 21–23. Once rank numbers were assigned, the Spearman correlational formula was employed for convenience. As Baggaley points out, the results of applying the Spearman formula to rank numbers is exactly the same as applying the Pearson formula to such numbers.

questionnaire, high scores in the first part of the table indicate dissatisfaction with the voting procedures of the listed organs and, in respect to the predictors, high scores indicate high development, highly authoritarian, and so forth.

Interpreting the correlations in these terms, the findings may be summarized as follows:

The higher a respondent's home state's score is on the "Development Factor," the stronger the respondent's:¹⁹

- satisfaction with the voting procedures of the Security Council;
- (2) dissatisfaction with the voting procedures of the General Assembly;
- satisfaction with the Charter membership arrangements of the Security Council, Economic and Social Council, and Secretariat;
- (4) dissatisfaction with the general role and past performance of the General Assembly, Economic and Social Council, Secretariat, and General Committee;
- (5) view that the General Assembly, International Court of Justice, General Committee, and Main Committees are decreasing in importance at present;
- (6) view that the General Assembly, Economic and Social Council, International Court of Justice, Secretariat, General Committee, and Main Committees will decrease in importance in the future;
- (7) wish to decrease the role and powers of the General Assembly, General Committee, and Main Committees;
- (8) view that changes are imporbable in the Charter membership arrangements of the General Assembly, Economic and Social Council, International Court of Justice, and Secretariat:
- (9) view that changes are improbable in the understandings and agreements to allocate seats and positions on the Economic and

19 The opposite relationships are, of course, also true. That is, the lower a respondent's home state score is on the "Development Factor," the stronger the respondent's dissatisfaction with the voting procedures of the Security Council. These generalizations may be stated in these terms because in almost all cases the answer marks ranged across the entire answer line. In those few cases where they did not, a statement such as "less satisfied," instead of "dissatisfied," is, of course, more technically true. In all cases, however, at least some of the respondents marked the "negative" or "static" sides of the answer lines (as indicated above).

TABLE 4. RELATION BETWEEN PREDICTORS AND QUESTIONNAIRE DATA.20

		<i></i>	REDATIO	TODA II								
·		Factor I High Devel- opment	Factor II Author- itarian	Factor III Close U.S. Rela- tions	Factor IV Is Big	Factor V One Party Mobi- lized	Factor VI Low Den- sity	Facter VII High Growth Rate	Factor VIII Racial Heter- ogen- eity	Factor IX Low Distance from U.S.	Factor X U.N. Fay	Factor XI High Distance U.S.S.R. and China
Voting dissatis- faction	SC GA Ecosoc ICJ MC	34 .25 21 .06	28 06 10 .05 18	.29 .14 .02 .09 .11	21 .16 25 .09 02	.14 18 .22 .10	.02 04 14 .02 06	10 16 11 .05 09	.15 .02 .09 .10	03 52 26 35 33	27 14 03 05	.28 04 ,15 05 07
Character membership dissatis- faction	SC GA Ecosoc ICJ Sec	31 .14 27 07 36	29 17 14 15 .03	14 .07 .04 07	16 08 10 11 02	.27 07 .32 .39	.06 34 .06 .20	.03 03 .18 .33 .33	07 .20 04 .03 .13	08 18 .05 .10	12 07 11 07 .04	02 38 .02 16 22
Under- standings dissatis- faction	SC Ecosoc ICJ Sec GC MC	02 .04 05 .07 .11	07 .03 13 07 .12	04 11 .10 .15 17 23	09 .04 .04 .13 02	.45 .49 .34 .14 .24	17 17 .02 17 06 16	.11 .14 .27 .40 .13	.14 .13 .14 .17 .09	.13 .20 .22 .19 .09	21 22 10 04 26 30	08 12 05 06 23 29
General role and performance dissatisfac- tion	SC GA Esosoc ICJ Sec GC MC	.20 .42 .36 .22 .26 .32	25 07 12 02 .23 .04 04	.08 09 14 29 19 .02	05 .02 08 .12 .16 07 12	.22 .09 .21 .08 .33 .16	04 34 14 .02 09 38 30	.13 15 .05 .13 .09 11 04	.04 15 04 12 15 12 02	.32 09 07 .05 .13 .07 12	08 .12 .04 08 05 10	.06 07 18 29 16 12 15
Organs decreas- ing in importance at present	SC GA Esosoc ICJ Sec GC MC	09 .42 .22 .42 .19 .34	11 05 13 07 .03 26 22	.16 04 .14 03 .10 .10	31 .10 05 .17 05 .08 07	.18 34 02 .12 15 15 21	07 40 .03 21 34 38 39	.22 .06 .03 .09 02 .14 03	.07 06 11 05 .08 14 12	.28 .10 .03 12 03 .25	.14 .15 02 .09 .07 .08	21 .03 .12 25 21 07
Organs decreasing in impor- tance in the future	SC GA Ecosoc ICJ Sec GC MC	14 .59 .31 .29 .35 .44	16 13 .02 12 .11 17 15	.14 .02 07 16 .15 .02	.05 .16 .15 .15 .08 .19	07 22 15 .11 26 11 20	.05 20 .09 12 26 17 22	.14 24 16 09 10 10	.15 07 .21 .13 .14 18 11	.16 11 04 15 06 .07	02 .02 .04 06 17 05 07	14 .02 .10 25 25 .12 .15
Desire to decrease importance	SC GA Ecosoc ICJ Sec GC MC	14 .45 .21 07 .15 .38	25 04 .14 .14 .28 09 05	.11 11 12 08 .07 09 08	04 .11 .19 .15 .28 .21	.02 03 08 .03 17 .03 05	06 17 09 .16 20 13 17	14 13 11 18 10 21 21	.17 .12 .36 .23 .18 .03	05 15 19 15 06 03 03	03 08 21 .04 04 .03	.05 04 11 16 14 03 04
Improbable to change the member- ship ar- rangements	SC GA Ecosoc ICJ Sec	.12 .32 .27 .41 .35	11 20 .14 12 04	.18 04 .04 15 20	.27 .14 .81 .17 .27	30 19 12 .12 .08	.04 09 .14 09 09	16 05 11 07 08	.26 05 .07 18 11	.12 11 05 06 19	03 .07 04 .02 .05	07 .08 19 09 11
Improbable to change under- standings	SC Ecosoo ICJ SEC GC MC	.21 .34 .30 .25 .18	02 .08 13 10 07 09	.32 .25 08 .06 .06	20 .03 .12 .06 .10	26 16 .03 .05 .02 06	.02 07 02 08 09 04	14 18 13 24 03 04	03 03 24 27 17 24	10 28 17 10 04 06	.11 .22 .16 .13 .13	28 41 42 42 31 34

Social Council, International Court of Justice, Secretariat, and Main Committees.

The higher a respondent's home state score is on the "Authoritarianism Factor," the stronger the respondent's:

- (1) satisfaction with the voting system of the Security Council:
- satisfaction with the Charter membership arrangements of the Security Council;
- (3) satisfaction with the general role and past performance of the Security Council;
- (4) view that the General Committee is increasing in importance at present;
- (5) desire to increase the role and performance of the Security Council;
- (6) desire to decrease the role and importance of the Secretariat.

The higher a respondent's home state score is on the "U.S. Relations Factor," the stronger the respondent's:

- dissatisfaction with the voting procedures of the Security Council;
- (2) satisfaction with the role and performance of the International Court of Justice;
- (3) view that changes are imporbable in the understandings to allocate seats and positions on the Security Council and the Economic and Social Council.

The higher a respondent's home state score is on the "Bigness Factor," the stronger the respondent's:

- satisfaction with the voting system of the Economic and Social Council;
- (2) view that the Security Council is increasing in importance at present;
- (3) wish to decrease the importance of the Secretariat;
- (4) view that future changes in the Charter membership arrangements of the Security Council, Economic and Social Council, and Secretariat are improbable.

The higher a respondent's home state score

 20 All significant correlations have been underlined. Because N is the same in every case, all correlations greater than $\pm .25$ are significant at the .05 level or less, and all correlations $\pm .32$ or above are significant at the .01 level or less. The generalizations that follow, then, are based upon these levels of significance. That is, every relationship is significant either at the .05 level or less. If the exact level is of interest, then it may be ascertained by reference to the table to see whether the correlation lies between $\pm .25$ and $\pm .31$, or is greater than $\pm .32$.

is on the "Party-Mobilization Factor," the stronger the respondent's:

- dissatisfaction with the Charter membership arrangements of the Security Council, Economic and Social Council, and International Court of Justice;
- (2) dissatisfaction with the understandings to allocate seats and positions on the Security Council, Economic and Social Council, and International Court of Justice;
- (3) dissatisfaction with the general role and past performance of the Secretariat;
- (4) view that the General Assembly is increasing in importance at present;
- (5) view that the Secretariat will increase in importance in the future;
- (6) view that changes in the Charter membership arrangements in the Security Council are probable;
- (7) view that changes in the understandings to allocate seats and positions on the Security Council are probable.

The higher a respondent's home state score is on the "Density Factor," the stronger the respondent's:

- satisfaction with the Charter membership arrangements of the General Assembly;
- (2) satisfaction with the general role and performance of the General Assembly, General Committee, and Main Committees;
- (3) view that the General Assembly, Secretariat, General Committee, and Main Committees are increasing in importance at the present:
- (4) view that the Secretariat will be increasing in importance in the future.

The higher a respondent's home state score is on the "Growth Rate Factor," the stronger the respondent's:

- dissatisfaction with the Charter membership arrangements of the International Court of Justice and the Secretariat;
- (2) dissatisfaction with the understandings and arrangements to allocate seats on the International Court of Justice and the Secretariat.

The higher a respondent's state score is on the "Racial Heterogeneity Factor," the stronger the respondent's:

- desire to decrease the importance of the Economic and Social Council;
- (2) view that changes in the Charter membership arrangements of the Security Council are improbable;
- (3) view that changes are probable in the understandings and agreements to allocate seats and positions on the Secretariat.

The higher a respondent's home state score is on the "U.S. Distance Factor," the stronger the respondent's:

- satisfaction with the voting systems of the General Assembly. Economic and Social Council, International Court of Justice, and Main Committees;
- dissatisfaction with the Charter membership arrangements of the Secretariat;
- (3) dissatisfaction with the general role and past performance of the Security Council;
- (4) view that the Security Council and General Committee are decreasing in importance at present;
- (5) view that changes are probable in the understandings and agreements to allocate seats and positions on the Economic and Social Council.

The higher a respondent's home state score is on the "UN Pay Factor," the stronger the respondent's:

- satisfaction with the voting system of the Security Council;
- (2) satisfaction with the understandings and agreements to allocate seats and positions on the General Committee and Main Committees.

The higher a respondent's home state score is on the "Distance Factor," the stronger the respondent's:

- dissatisfaction with the voting procedures of the Security Council;
- (2) satisfaction with the Charter membership arrangements of the General Assembly;
- (3) satisfaction with the understandings and agreements to allocate seats and positions on the Main Committees;
- (4) satisfaction with the general role and past performance of the International Court of Justice;
- (5) view that the International Court of Justice is increasing in importance at present;
- (6) view that the International Court of Justice and Secretariat will be increasing in importance in the future;
- (7) view that changes are probable in the understandings and agreements to allocate seats and positions on the Security Council, Economic and Social Council, International Court of Justice, Secretariat, General Committee, and Main Committees.

If the predictors are listed in the order of the number of significant correlations produced and in terms of tendencies of *high* predictor scores to predict either "negative," "static," "positive," or "dynamic," questionnaire scores

TABLE 5. PREDICTORS AND ATTITUDES

Predictor	Nega- tive	Static	Posi- tive	Dy- namic	
Development	18	8	4	0	=30
Distance	1	0	6	6	=13
Party-Mobilization	7	0	2	2	=11
U. S. Distance	4	1	4	0	= 9
Density	0	0	9	0	= 9
Authoritarianism	1	0	5	0	= 6
Bigness	1	3	2	0	= 6
U. S. Relations	1	2	1	0	⇒ 4
Growth Rate	4	0	0	0	= 4
UN Pay	0	0	3	0	= 3
Racial Heterogeneity	1	1	0	1	= 3
		****		_	
	38	15	36	9	98

(see "validity" discussion above) the results may be tabulated as follows as in Table 5.

Table 5 shows that high economic development factor scores were associated 18 times with negative questionnaire scores.21 8 times with static questionnaire scores, 4 times with positive questionnaire scores, and 0 times with dynamic questionnaire scores—for a total of 30 significant associations. Low predictor factor scores, of course, predict the opposite kinds of questionnaire scores. Thus, low economic development scores were associated 18 times with positive questionnaire scores, 8 times with dynamic questionnaire scores, and so forth. If the proportion of correlations between the categories "positive-negative" and "dynamicstatic" are considered, then each tends to receive "its share" of significant correlations. Thus, "positive-negative" questions constituted 80% of the total questions and receive 76% of the total correlations, while "dynamicstatic" questions constituted 20% of the total questions and receive 24% of the correlations. Altogether, the 11 predictors produced 98 significant correlations. Because the analysis took place at the 5% level and 605 correlations were considered, however, 30 "significant" correlations could have been expected by chance. There are, therefore, 68 more "significant" correlations than expected by chance, if it is assumed that there is no "actual" relationship between the variables in the universe.

The analysis shows that the "Development Factor" is far and away the most important predictor. Trailing considerably behind it are

²¹ Technically, of course, it is more proper to say that economic development scores have a positive correlation with questionnaire scores However, because high questionnaire scores are assumed to connote negative behavior, the analysis is facilitated by stating the relationships in this way.

dimensions such as "Distance," "Party-Mobilization," "Density," and "U.S. Distance." The analysis also shows that some predictors have hardly any explanatory power, particularly "Racial Heterogeneity" and "United Nations Pay."

In addition to importance, an interesting question arises as to the "purity" of the predictors. To make this analysis, the negative and static categories were lumped together and also the positive and dynamic categories. The "purity" (and importance) of a predictor were estimated by subtracting the number of positive and dynamic associations from the number of negative and static associations and expressing the resulting difference in absolute terms. Thus, if high predictor scores tend to associate fairly equally with both the negative/static category and the positive/dynamic category, the predictors' purity index should fall toward zero. Also, of course, the fewer correlations associated with a predictor, the lower will be its index. The scoring scheme, then, takes into account both purity and importance. That is, the larger the number of significant correlations made by the predictor and the greater the tendency for high predictor scores to be associated with either negative/static scores or positive/dynamic scores, the larger will be the predictor's index.

Table 6 shows the results of the analysis.

Again, Table 6 can be understood in terms of the kinds of responses associated with high factor scores. The analysis shows "high development" predicts negative/static questionnaire scores, "high distance" predicts positive/dynamic scores, and so on. The overall results can be expressed even more clearly, if presented in terms of lines symbolizing factor dimensions, and an indication is given of the kind of factor scores (high or low) that predict negative and/or static questionnaire scores. Again, the predictors are listed in order of their purity/importance index.

TABLE 6. "PURITY" OF THE PREDICTORS

(22 Negative and Static)
(11 Positive and Dynamic
(9 Positive and Dynamic
(4 Positive and Dynamic
(4 Negative and Static)
(3 Positive and Dynamic
(3 Negative and Static)
(2 Negative and Static)
(2 Negative and Static)
(1 Negative and Static)
(1 Negative and Static)

Table 7 may be read as follows: If a respondent's state is high on the "Development Factor" (highly developed) predict negative/static responses; if low on the "Distance Factor" (i.e., close to the USSR and China) predict negative/static responses, etc. It should be remembered, because the predictors are listed in order of their purity index, that the "Development Factor" had more total correlations in one direction than "Distance," "Distance" had more than "Density," "Density" had more than "Authoritarianism," and so forth.

Factor scores opposite those indicated in the table, of course, predict the opposite kinds of questionnaire scores. Thus, if a respondent's state is low on the "Development Factor" (underdeveloped) predict positive/dynamic responses; if high on the "Distance Factor" (i.e., far from the USSR and China) predict positive/dynamic responses, and so on. Table 4, of course, indicates the specific kinds of predictions that can be made in regard to particular areas and is the basis of these generalizations.

If just the three most important predictors are considered, frequent positive/dynamic delegate responses should be predicted for states that are underdeveloped, located away from USSR and China, i.e., in Africa or South America, which have a low population density. On the other hand, delegates from developed states, close to the USSR and China, i.e., in Europe, with a high population density, should tend to frequently give negative/static questionnaire responses. Generalizations beyond these first three predictors should be made with the utmost caution because of the rapid falling off of the purity-importance index and the knowledge that it is possible that a number of the correlations upon which these tables were built were due to random variation.

Literature about the United Nations has frequently indicated a basis for developed-underdeveloped attitudinal differences and also tends to emphasize a more positive outlook by the less developed. For example, A. F. Shihata argues, in connection with the International Court of Justice, that, "... the record shows that some new states have adopted an attitude more favorable to the Court than that adopted by many older nations." F. O. Wilcox sees various reasons why the "non-aligned nations" (most of which are underdeveloped) need the United Nations.²³ K. I.

²² Abraham F. I. Shihata, "The Attitude of New States Toward the International Court of Justice," *International Organization*, 14 (1965), p. 222.

²³ Francis O. Wilcox, UN and the Nonaligned

from 1900 to the present. Despite our belief in their importance, it does not, however, include the infinite number of sub-national and extranational actors in world politics, territorial or otherwise. The list is so conceived as readily to accommodate most of the modifications in territory or status that can be anticipated in the decades immediately ahead. In addition to delineating such a population, we specify the general political-legal status of each entity, and the time period during which each such status was held. Finally, in order to make more efficient and more accurate the borrowing of data from one research enterprise to another, we propose a simple three-digit coding scheme keved to the major continental regions, which others might see fit to continue. In short, we offer here what might be called a "prominent solution"; while it may not represent the very peak of refinement, it nevertheless reflects what we consider a reasonable balance among a number of competing requirements, it is convenient for ready reference, and all of the data from both our projects are already stored in accord with this particular scheme. In order to maximize replicability and cumulativeness, we invite others to adopt it for their own investigations, and to advise us as to any errors or inconsistencies which may have escaped our successive and independent scrutinies.

As to the time span covered, we had originally hoped to go as far back as the Congress of Vienna, but soon settled upon 1900 as a reasonable point of origin. First of all, the amount of interest in nineteenth century data is quite limited, especially among those doing quantitative political research. This is, of course, partly due to the lack of much available data during that period, especially if one tries to go beyond the major Western powers. Secondly, the coding problem is markedly eased by the turn of the century, by which time the unification of Germany, Italy, and Russia had been completed, almost all of the Indian subcontinent had come under the British Raj, and Africa had been largely carved up by the colonial powers. An earlier starting date would not only have necessitated a dramatically longer list, but one with a far greater likelihood of error and ambiguity.

and the same holds true for the date of annexation, federation, or disunion. Our general rule was to use the politically effective date rather than that which reflected a declaration of independence or the mere signing of a treaty or convention. Thus, despite careful investigation and our preference for dates which are politically operational, there will certainly be room for disagreement on occasion, and there may even be discrepancies of more than a year or two.

Let us now summarize our selection and classification criteria. In order to compile an exhaustive list of the territorially based political units which are, have been since 1900, or are likely to become national political entities, we began by assembling a thoroughly undiscriminating card file including all units that might possibly qualify. This list (and subsequent information regarding the status of its entities) was based on the examination of nearly one hundred different gazetteers, yearbooks, atlases, diplomatic lists, and the like. (The list is, of course, too numerous and diverse to warrant reproduction here.) We then proceeded to refine the list as follows.

Leaving aside past or present political status for the moment, we first eliminated all entities whose population never exceeded 10.000 people.2 This avoided the almost impossible task of identifying the scores of island kingdoms and chiefdoms (most of which are now gone) as well as a number of politically esoteric enclaves. Almost no useful and accurate data could be expected to exist for them, and we assumed furthermore that such entities would be of little interest to most comparative and international politics scholars. At the same time, this relatively low population threshold permitted the inclusion of such modest "postage stamp" entities as Andorra, Monaco, and Liechtenstein; the only entity included whose population never met that figure is Vatican City, whose diplomatic role is sufficiently important to justify this exception. Naturally the user is free to raise the population threshold and thereby reduce the size of his universe.

Before going on to another set of deletions, we proceeded to ascertain the political status of each remaining entity, and the dates during

analysis of the wide range of status conditions that might exist, and we therefore settled on a fairly gross, and only semi-operational, set of distinctions. Furthermore, any change in an entity's status which did not last for one month or more was not included. Thus, British Somaliland's two weeks of independence in 1960 as well as Rumania's brief and admittedly complete occupation in 1944 are not accounted for here. At any given time, an entity was classed as independent if it enjoyed some measure of diplomatic recognition as well as effective control over its own foreign affairs and armed forces.

If the entity did not satisfy the territorial and demographic, or diplomatic and political, requirements of "sovereign" independence, it was classified as dependent, under one of three relatively general categories. The first group embraces colonies and dependencies, characterized by a fairly durable status in which the entity exercised almost no control over its foreign affairs, armed forces, immigration, or trade. Originally, we attempted to differentiate between those entities which exercised no appreciable control over either their foreign affairs or their domestic affairs and those which enjoyed some degree of self-government at home while having no external sovereignty. But when it came to applying these criteria, we found it impossible to identify the cutting point on the domestic autonomy continuum. That is, many entities whose foreign policy was not essentially under their own control also turned out to suffer appreciable legal and political restraints on their domestic policy as well. Even when the colonial power which dominated the entity's foreign policy permitted a wide range of internal self-government, it often turned out that this "self-government" only applied to a small sector of the population. with little or no political power in the hands of the native population and a great deal of it in the hands of the non-indigenous military officer, civil servant, or colon. In just about every case, there was some form of visible or invisible veto invested in the foreign power or its local surrogates. Thus, even though one could devise a coding scheme which might operationalize the varying degrees of self-government, the effort did not seem justified for the purposes at hand. Some question still remains about Greenland and about the Caribbean territories of France and the Netherlands which might well have been coded as incorporated into the metropolitan country. Data for them still are separately reported in the U.N. Yearbooks, however, as "non-sovereign territories," so we have resolved ambiguities about their legal status by listing them separately here too.

In a second group we placed those entities whose dependent status was intended by the major powers to be fairly temporary. These are, of course, the mandate and trust territories whose gradual transition to independence was the moral and legal responsibility of the metropolitan power assigned to it by the League of Nations or the United Nations. Illustrative here are Tanganyika from 1922 to 1961 or Eritrea from 1945 to 1952. The distinctions made within this class by the League Covenant (Article 22) and the U.N. Charter (Article 77) did not seem worth specifying, given the purposes of this particular enterprise. It should also be noted that we have defined this class rather broadly, and include under it a number of other units whose administration was made a matter of international responsibility, such as Danzig and the Saar.

In a third and final group are those entities which had enjoyed independence until overrun and occupied by foreign military forces. If the nation at hand suffered only a partial occupation and it retained effective control over a viable (intuitively defined) sector of its population and territory, it was not classed as occupied. Thus, even though the Belgian government and its army was pushed into the relatively small Ypres-Nieuport sector during World War I, it remained in the independent classification. In World War II, on the other hand, the government went into exile and there were no effective Belgian fighting forces remaining on the continent or resisting the Axis overseas. Following this criterion, we also treated a nation as continuing in existence if an effective fighting force of 100,000 or more troops persisted in its struggle against the enemy elsewhere along the front, even if the home territory were completely overrun: Serbia during World War I is an example of such a case. Finally, even if not under the military government of a foreign power, if a nation's legitimate government went into exile, or was replaced by a puppet regime, the entity was treated as experiencing the occupied status.

Beyond these considerations of war-zone occupations, there are certain difficulties in classifying occupations which occurred outside of a major combat theater or in peace-time. It seemed unreasonable, for example, to try to differentiate between those nations whose independence is effectively limited by economic penetration or inclusion within another's

(Text continued on page 950)

NATIONAL POLITICAL UNITS IN THE TWENTIETH CENTURY

	Western Hemisphere (002-199)	Indep	endent	D	epende	nt	Part Larger	of Entity
Code Nó.	Name	from	to	from	to	type	from	to
002	United States of America	— ,						
003	Alaska				1959	col	1959	
004	Hawaii				1960/	\$661	1960	- \
005	Virgin Islands			<u>.</u>	<u></u>	col		5
006	Puerto Rico			_		col:	10	1
010	Greenland					col	2542	
011	Faeroe Islands					col		
020	Canada	1920			1920	col		
021	Newfoundland	1920	1933	1933	1920 1949	col col	1949	
030	Bermuda					col		
031	Bahamas			_		col		
040	Cuba	1902			1902	col		
041	Haiti	_	_	•				!
042	Dominican Republic	_	_				• ;	
050	(West Indies Federation)			1958	1962	col		
051	Jamaica	1962	_		1962	col	1958	1962
052	Trinidad and Tobago	1962	_		1962	col	1958	1962
053	Barbados	1966	_		1966	col	1958	1962
054	Dominica					col	1958	1962
055	Grenada					col	1958	1962
056	St. Lucia			.—		col	1958	1962
057	St. Vincent			_		· col	1958	1962
058	Antigua	·				col	1958	1962
059	Montserrat					col	1958	1962
060	St. Kitts—Nevis—Anguila				,	col	1958	1962

	Western Hemisphere (002–199)	Indep	endent	Γ	epende	nt		rt of Entity
Code No.	Name	from	to	from	to	type	from	to
065	Guadeloupe					col		
066	Martinique					col		
068	Netherlands Antilles					col		
070	Mexico							
080	British Honduras					col		
090	Guatemala							
091	Honduras		—					
092	El Salvador		_					
093	Nicaragua							
094	Costa Rica		_			<u> </u>		
095	Panama	1903						1903
096	Panama Canal Zone			1903		col		1903
100	Colombia		_					
101	Venezuela	_						
110	Guyana [British Guiana]	1966			1966	col		
115	Surinam [Dutch Guiana]			_	_	col		
120	French Guiana					col		
130	Ecuador		_					
135	Peru							
140	Brazil		_					
145	Bolivia							
150	Paraguay							
155	Chile		_					
160	Argentina							
165	Uruguay							

	Europe (200-399)	Indep	endent	D	epende	nt	Par Larger	t of Entity
Code No.	Name	from	to	from	to	type	from	to
200	United Kingdom		_					
201	Isle of Man	-				col		
202	Guernsey and dependencies					col		•
203	Jersey					col		
205	Eire [Ireland]	1922	_					1922
210	Netherlands	1945	1940	1940	1945	occ		
211	Belgium	1945	1940	1940	1945	occ		
212	Luxembourg	1918	1914 1940	1914 1940	1918 1944	occ occ		
220	France	1944	1942	1942	1944	oec		
221	Monaco	1944	1942	1942	1944	occ		
223	Liechtenstein							
225	Switzerland							
230	Spain	_						** * *
231	Gibraltar					col		
232	Andorra	_						
235	Portugal	_	_					
255	West Germany/Germany	1949	1945	1945	1949	occ		
256	Saar			1920 1945	1935 1947	man occ	1935	1920 1945
				1947	1957	col	1957	_

	Europe (200-399)	Indep	endent	Ι	epende	nt		rt of Entity
Code No.	Name	from	to	from	to	type	from	to
265	East Germany	1949		1945	1949	occ		1945
290	Poland	1919 1945	1939	1939	1945	occ		1919
291	Danzig			1920 1939	1939 1945	man occ	1945	1920 —
300	(Austria-Hungary)	_	1918					
305	Austria	1918 1955	1938	1938	1955	occ		1918
310	Hungary	1918	-					1918
315	Czechoslovakia	1918 1945	1939	1939	1945	occ		1918
317	Slovakia	1939	1945				1945	1939
325	Italy							
326	Trieste			1943 1947	1947 1954	occ man	1954	1947
328	Vatican City	- ,						
331	San Marino	_						
338	Malta	1964			1964	col		
339	Albania	1912 1921 1944	1914 1939 —	1914 1939	1921 1944	occ		1912

	Europe (200-399)	Indepe	endent	D	epende	nt ·		rt of Entity
Code No.	Name	from	to	from	to	type	from	to
345	Yugoslavia/Serbia	1944	1941	1941	1944	occ		
346	Bosnia			#******	1908	occ	1908	,
347	Herzegovina				1908	occ	1908	
348	Montenegro	_	1919				1919	
350	Greece	1944.	1941	1941	1944	oce		
351	Crete	·		grannopy	1913	occ	1913	
352	Cyprus	1960			1960	col		
355	Bulgaria	1908		Manager	1908	col		
360	Rumania							-
365	U.S.S.R./Russia							
366	Estonia	1918	1940				1940	1918
367	Latvia	1918	1940				1940	1918
368	Lithuania	1918	1940				1940	1918
369	Ukraine .	1918	1920	1941	1943	occ	1920	1918
370	Byelorussia			1941	1943	occ	_	
375	Finland	1919						1919
380	Sweden		_					

	Europe (200-399)	Indep	endent	D	epende	nt		rt of Entity
Code No.	Name	from	to	from	to	type	from	to
385	Norway	1905 1945	1940	1940	1945	oce		1905
390	Denmark	1945	1940	1940	1945	occ		
395	Iceland .	1944			1944	col		
	Africa (400–599)							
400	Azores [Western Isles]					col		
401	Madeira Isles					col		
402	Cape Verde Islands					col		
403	Sao Tome and Principe					col		
404	Portuguese Guinea					col		
410	Canary Islands					col		
411	(Spanish Guinea)				1960	col		
412	Rio Muni			1960		col		1960
413	Fernando Po			1960		col		1960
420	Gambia	1965			1965	col		,
430	(French West Africa)				1958	col		
431	(Mali Federation)	6/60	8/60	1959	1960	col		
432	Mali [Sudanese Republic]	1960	<u>.</u>		1960	col	1959	1960
433	Senegal	1960	_		1960	col	1959	1960
434	Dahomey	1960	_		1960	col		

	Africa (400-599)	Indepe	endent	D	epende	nt		t of Entity
Code No.	Name	from	to	from	to	type	from	to
435	Mauritania	1960	and the state of t		1960	col		
436	Niger	1960	*******		1960	col		
437	Ivory Coast	1960	******		1960	col		
438	Guinea [French Guinea]	1958			1958	col		
439	Upper Volta	1960		— ,	1960	col	4	
450	Liberia		gallannah			THE PERSON AND THE PE		
451	Sierra Leone	1961		-	1961	col		
452	Ghana [Gold Coast]	1957	ab.cab.di		1957	col		
460	(German Togoland)		***************************************	 1916	1916 1922	col occ		•
461	Togo [French Togoland]	1960	,	1922	1960	man		1922
462	British Togoland (to Ghana)			1922	1956	man	1956	1922
470	(Kamerun)			 1916	1916 1919	col occ		
471	Cameroun [French Cameroons]	1960		1919 1922	1922 1960	occ man		1919
472	British Cameroons (split between Cameroun & Nigeria)			1919 1922	1922 1961	occ man	1961	1919 —
475	Nigeria	1960			1960	col		
480	(French Equatorial Africa)	-			1958	col		

	Africa (400–599)	Indep	endent	D	epende	nt		rt of Entity
Code No.	Name	from	to	from	to	type	from	· to
481	Gabon	1960		_	1960	col		1960
482	Central African Republic	1960		_	1960	col		1960
483	Chad	1960		_	1960	col		1960
484	Congo (Brazzaville) [French Congo]	1960		_	1960	col		1960
490	Congo (Kinshasa) [Belgian Congo]	1960			1960	col		
500	Uganda	1962			1962	col		
501	Kenya	1963			1963	col		-
510	Tanzania/Tanganyika/German East Africa	1961		1916 1922	1916 1922 1961	col occ man		
511	Zanzibar	1963	1964		1963	col .	1964	
515	(Ruanda-Urundi)			1922	1962	man		1922
516	Burundi	1962						1962
517	Rwanda	1962					-	1962
520	Somalia/Italian Somaliland	1960		1941 1950	1941 1950 1960	col occ man		
521	British Somaliland				1960	col	1960	
522	French Somaliland			_		col		
530	Ethiopia [Abyssinia]	1941	1936 —	1936	1941	occ		

	Africa (400–599)	Indep	endent	Ι	Depende	nt		rt of r Entity
Code No.	Name	from	to	from	to	type	from	to
531	Eritrea			 1941	1941 1945	col occ	1952	
540	Angola				_	col		
541	Mozambique					col		
550	(Federation of Rhodesia and Nyasaland)			1953	1964	col		
551	Zambia [Northern Rhodesia]	1964	******		1964	col	1953	1964
552	Rhodesia [Southern Rhodesia]					col	1953	1964
553	Malawi [Nyasaland]	1964			1964	col	1953	1964
560	South Africa	1920	*******	1903	1920	col		•
561	Cape Colony				1910	col	1910	
562	Natal .			_	1910	col	1910	
563	Transvaal		1903	1903	1910	col	1910	
564	Orange Free State/Orange River Col.		1900	1900	1910	col	1910)
565	South West Africa [German West Africa]			 1915 1922	1915 1922 —	col occ man		
570	Lesotho [Basutoland]	1966	gravenský		1966	col		
571	Botswana [Bechuanaland]	1966	*******		1966	col		
572	Swaziland ,			_		col		
580	Malagasy [Madagascar]	1960	<u> </u>	_	1960	col		

	Africa (400-599)	Indepe	endent	, D	epende	nt	Par Larger	
Code No.	Name	from	to	from	to	type	from	to
581	Comoro Islands			1947		col	_	1947
585	Reunion					col		
590	Mauritius	1968	·		1968	col		
591	Seychelles					col		
	Middle East (600–699)				-			
600	Могоссо	1956	1911	1911	1956	col		
- 601	Tangier			1923 1940 1945	1940 1945 1956	man occ man	1956	1923
602	Spanish Morocco			1912	1956	col	1956	1912
605	Ifni			1934		col		1934
606	Spanish North African Presidios (incl.: Alhucemas, Ceuta, Chafarinas, Me- lilla, and Penon de Velez)					col		
609	Spanish Sahara				_	col		
615	Algeria	1962			1962	col		
616	Tunisia	1956			1956	col		
620	Libya/Tripolitania, Cyrenaica, Fezzan	1952		1912 1942 1946	1942 1946 1952	col occ man		1912
625	Sudan [Anglo-Egyptian]	1956			1956	col		
630	Iran [Persia]	_						

	Middle East (600–699)	Middle East (600-699) Independent				Dependent			
Code No.	Name	from	to	from	to	type	from	to	
640	Turkey/Ottoman Empire								
645	Iraq [Mesopotamia]	1932		1917 1920	1920 1932	occ man		1917	
650	(United Arab Republic)	1958	1961				-		
651	United Arab Republic [Egypt]	1922 1961	1958		1922	col	1958	1961	
652	Syria	1946 1961	1958	1918 1923	1923 1946	occ man	1958	1918 1961	
660	Lebanon	1946		1918 1923	1923 1946	occ man		1918	
663	Jordan [Transjordan]	1946	Accounts	1918 1923	1923 1946	occ man		1918	
666	Israel [Palestine]	1948	Marine Ma	1918 1923	1923 1948	occ man		1918	
670	Saudi Arabia/Nedj	1902			1902	occ	The state of the s		
671	Hejaz Sultanate	1919	1926				1926	1919	
672	Asir	1914	1926	1926	1914 1930	occ col	1930		
673	Al Hasa				1913	occ	1913		

	Middle East (600–699)	Indep	endent	D	epende	nt		t of Entity
Code No.	Name	from	to	from	to	type	from	to
674	· Jabal Shammar		1921				1921	
678	Yemen	1918					-	1918
680	People's Republic of Southern Yemen [Federation of South Arabia/Aden Colony]	1967	***************************************		1967	col		
681	Aden Protectorate			— 1915 1918	1915 1918 1963	eol occ col	1963	
690	Kuwait	1961	A	_	1961	col		,
692	Bahrain					col		
694	Qatar			_		col		
696	Trucial Oman States					col		
698	Muscat and Oman	-						
	Asia (700-899)							
700	Afghanistan	_						
710	People's Republic of China/China	_						
711	Manchukuo	1932	1945				1945	1932
712	Mongolian People's Republic	1921	***************************************					1921
713	Republic of China [Taiwan, Formosa]	1949	p					1949
720	Hong Kong			_		col		
721	Масао			_		col		
730	(Korea) [Chosen]		1905	1945	1948	occ	1905	1945
731	North Korea	1948						·

	Asia (700–899)	Indepe	endent	D	epende	nt	Part of Larger Entity	
Code No.	Name	from	to	from	to	type	from	to
732	South Korea	1948						
735	Far Eastern Republic (to U.S.S.R.)	1920	1922				1922	1920
740	Japan	1952	1945	1945	1952	occ		
741	Ryukyu Islands			1945 1951	1951 —	occ col		1945
750	India	1947			1947	col		
751	French India (incl.: Pondicherry)				1954	col	1954	
752	Portuguese India (incl.: Goa, Diu, and Daman)			1961	1961 1962	col	1962	
760	Bhutan					col		-
761	Sikkim .				_	col		
770	Pakistan	1947				-		1947
775	Burma	1948	No Annabasia	1937 1942 1945	1942 1945 1948	col occ col		1937
780	Ceylon	1948	abornos y		1948	col		
781	Maldive Islands	1965			1965	col		
790	Nepal	_						
800	Thailand [Siam]	_						
810	(Indochina)				1949 1945	col occ		

	Asia (700-899)		Independent		Dependent			t of Entity
Code No.	Name	from	to	from	to	type	from	to
811	Cambodia	1953	**	1949	1953	col		1949
812	Laos	1954		1949	1954	col		1949
815	(Vietnam)			1949	1954	col		1949
816	North Vietnam	1954	numbers.					
817	South Vietnam	1954		_				
820	Malaysia/Federation of Malaya [Malayan Union]	1957	*******	1946	1957	col		
821	Federated Malay States		,	1942 1945	1942 1945 1946	col occ col	1946	
822	Unfederated Malay States (incl.: Johore, Kedah, Kelantan, Perlis, Trengganu)			1942 1945	1942 1945 1946	col occ col	1946	
823	Sabah [North Borneo]		**************************************	 1942 1945	1942 1945 1963	col occ col	1963	
824	Sarawak			 1941 1945	1941 1945 1963	col occ col	1963	
827	(Straits Settlement) (incl.: Penang and Malacca)			— 1942 1945	1942 1945 1946	col occ col	1946	
830	Singapore	1965		1946	1963	col	1963	1946 1965
835	Brunei				1941 1945 —	col occ col		

	Asia (700–899)	Indepe	endent	Dependent			Part of Larger Entity	
Code No.	Name	from	to	from	to	type	from	to
840	Philippines	1946		 1942 1945	1942 1945 1946	col occ col		``
850	Indonesia [Netherlands East Indies]	1949		_	1949	col		
851	West Irian [Netherlands New Guinea]			1942 1945 1962	1942 1945 1962	col occ col man		
860	Portuguese Timor			_		col		
	Oceania (900-999)							
900	Australia	1920		1901	1920	col		
901	New South Wales			_	1901	col	1901	-
902	Western Australia			_	1901	col	1901	******
903	South Australia			_	1901	col	1901	SALARANT
904	Victoria				1901	col	1901	ggennak
905	Queensland				1901	col	1901	4000004
906	Tasmania				1901	col	1901	
910	Papua and New Guinea			1946		man		
911	Papua	-				col	1946	
912	New Guinea [German New Guinea]			— 1914 1921	1914 1921 —	col occ man	1946	Parasadh.
920	New Zealand	1920		<u></u>	1920	col		
925	Cook Islands					col		

	Oceania (900–999)	Indep	endent	Dependent			Part of Larger Entity	
Code No.	Name	from	to	from	to	type	from	to
930	New Caledonia					col		
935	New Hebrides					col		
940	Solomon Islands					col		
945	Gilbert and Ellice Islands		***************************************			col	_	
950	Fiji Islands					col		
955	Tonga Islands [Friendly Islands]					col		
960	French Polynesia [Oceania]					col		
980	U. S. Pacific Trust Territories (incl.: Caroline, Marshall, and Mariana Islands)			1914 1920 1944 1947	1914 1920 1944 1947	col occ man occ man		
985	Guam			1941 1944	1941 1944 —	col occ col		
990	Western Samoa	1962		1914 1920	1914 1920 1962	col occ man		
991	American Samoa				_	col		

(Text continued from page. 934)

sphere of influence on the one hand, and those similarly constrained by partial military occupation, on the other. For example, even though U.S. Marines remained in Haiti, Nicaragua, and the Dominican Republic during much of the period between the Spanish-American War and the mid-Thirties in order to establish or buttress friendly regimes, these governments cannot be thought of as fully subjugated and their areas colonized. As a matter of fact, these three nations continued to enjoy diplomatic relations with most of the international system's members. Moreover, the fact that Guatemala and Honduras, for example, were not occupied need not suggest that they were any more independent than those Caribbean states which were partially occupied. Conceivably, these two nations were sufficiently docile not to

require a military presence. Among other temporary invasions or occupations which were not sufficiently dominant or permanent to justify reclassification of the object nation were those of Iran from 1941 to 1946, Lebanon in 1958, and the Congo from 1960 to 1963.

A special word is also necessary in regard to the status of certain British Commonwealth members. After considerable indecision (associated with our search for a finer discrimination among dependent entities) we settled on 1920 as the date marking the effective independence of Canada, Australia, New Zealand, and South Africa. First of all, they participated in the Versailles Conference in a far from servile role and were subsequently admitted to membership in the League. Second, even though they did not establish normal diplomatic relations with other nations until well after London formally acknowledged their in-

dependence via the 1931 Statute of Westminster, and even though the Crown continued to be represented by Governors-General, the Imperial Conference legitimized, as early as 1926, what had already been the case in fact, and recognized them with England as "autonomous communities...equal in status, in no way subordinate one to another..." Furthermore, Canada had consummated several treaties with the U.S. after 1923, exchanged missions with Washington in 1926, assumed a seat on the League of Nations Council in 1927, and established diplomatic relations with France and Japan in 1928.

Once the list of dependent entities with the requisite 10,000 population was established, it was pared down to exclude all those dependencies which are geographically contiguous to (or immediately off-shore) the metropolitan nation or another dependency which was itself contiguous to the metropolitan nation. (The Isle of Man, Guernsey, and Jersey, for which data are reported separately in the U.N. Yearbooks, were retained.) This exclusion merely recognized the impossibility of drawing a consistently valid and reliable distinction between component parts of various federations or unions and contiguous dependent territories. By the same token, we also excluded territories transferred from one contiguous nation to another without an intervening period of relative autonomy.

With the two basic classes of entity (independent or dependent) identified, the lists were recombined. The three types of dependency are indicated by "col" for colony, "man" for mandate, and "occ" for occupied.

The next problems were those of fission and fusion, including a change of name, and these were handled as follows:

- (a) Where the name of an entity has been changed, we use the most recent one, and in cases of possible confusion add the earlier name in brackets; e.g., Iran [Persia].
- (b) A larger entity which subsequently became divided into separate entities has

its original name in parentheses; e.g., (French Equatorial Africa). Its present-day components are listed immediately below. In those cases in which several entities merged for a while and then split apart again, the combined entity's name is shown in parentheses and the original components are listed below, indicating their present separate status, e.g., (Federation of Rhodesia and Nyasaland), with Zambia [Northern Rhodesia], Rhodesia [Southern Rhodesia], and Malawi [Nyasaland].

- (c) Where there has been either merger or disunion around a dominant "core" territory, the present name of the core unit is used and both the core and the subsequent unit receive the same code number; e.g., Saudi Arabia/Nejd, or West Germany/Germany.
- (d) A larger entity which split temporarily but subsequently returned to the earlier boundaries is listed in its present status, with the peripheral entity indented below; e.g., Czechoslovakia with Slovakia below.
- (e) Smaller entities which subsequently merged into a larger one are indented one space in, under the larger one's listing; e.g., Alaska and Hawaii under the United States.

Thus, the indentation is used as a visual convenience for those who will be gathering highly contemporary data, and indicates that the indented unit is, at press time, part of a larger entity, but had been in the past an administratively separate unit. If a unit never experienced a particular status, no dates at all are entered alongside it under that status column; a dash under the "from" column means that such status existed as of 1900, and a dash under the "to" column means that the status continues as of date of publication.

(EDITOR'S NOTE: For comments on this article and its list of national political units, see Communications to the Editor, pp. 952-955.)

COMMUNICATIONS

TO THE EDITOR:

A central task in applying systems analysis is to enumerate all actors within a particular arena, since the notion of "system" focuses attention upon interrelationships between parts of a whole. Because "National Political Units in the 20th Century" is the most comprehensive international census to appear so far, I am sure that members of the profession will be extremely indebted to Russett, Singer, and Small for years to come. But since all of the authors have conducted empirical investigations using lists based upon different criteria, further discussion appears warranted in the interest of demonstrating how to utilize the list in practice.

The criteria need to be examined more carefully. The obvious focus in the present enumeration is on whether a particular unit, in classical "political-legal" terms, may be classified as "independent" or "dependent." An exclusive emphasis on "political-legal" aspects of politics has of course long since been abandoned within political science; yet until publication of the Russett-Singer-Small list there was no classification of international actors relevant to the age-old concern for sovereign status. A study on the control of epidemics, however, would be incomplete without discussing the U.N.; international economists treat cartels and regional common markets; students of Southeast Asian military activity can hardly avoid including the Vietcong. In short, the criterion of legal status will not be satisfactory for all studies that are international and crossnational in scope. Different criteria will yield different lists, but to draw up all possible additional lists would be a most formidable task, one that the authors wisely have sidestepped. The question of whether the authors' formal criteria are preferable to behavioral ones, nevertheless, will be reraised as further efforts emerge.

A mere list of international actors, hence, will develop systems theory only if a type of system is specified; and, having defined such a whole, deductively derived criteria will serve the function of identifying members of a system. To illustrate, one could scarcely conceive of estimating "stability" of bipolar world power distributions without providing a list of mili-

¹ J. David Singer and Melvin Small, "The Composition and Status Ordering of the International System," World Politics, XVIII (January, 1966), 236-82, is superseded by the present list.

tarily autonomous members which confront one another on strategic-security issues. In structuring research to answer this question, the smaller units reported by Russett, Singer, and Small will be nonmembers of such systems. But quite different members would qualify: The Pathet Lao, Vietminh, Greek Communists (1946-1949), Yugoslav Partisans, and Falangists certainly have been independent in a military sense. Nevertheless, in compiling just this sort of list of late,2 I am convinced that the present list, however insufficient by itself to frame particular behavioral studies with specific data requirements, is so standardized as to constitute an essential initial source to consult. Readers, no less than are the compilers themselves, should be aware of biases built into any such enumeration.

MICHAEL HAAS

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TO THE EDITOR:

At first sight, this article ["National Political Units in the Twentieth Century," by Bruce M. Russett, J. David Singer and Melvin Small] appears to ask a simple, straightforward question capable of a routine answer: "what are the political entities whose attributes and relationships must concern us?" The authors themselves do not attach undue importance to this problem and emphatically aver that in their opinion "this is hardly the most pressing issue facing our two fields" (of international relations and comparative politics). Indeed they think it can be solved essentially by the application of common sense and by consulting standard works of reference.

A cursory glance makes it clear however that the list falls somewhat short of its avowed promise to introduce "standardization" in the enumeration of political entities. Our purpose here is to argue that this failing is attributable to the absence of an adequate theoretical basis.

The authors offer us "a population of ... national or quasi-national entities" and we take this to be a population of states, actual or potential. For even though they studiously avoid applying such familiar if variously interpreted terms as "state" or "political system,"

Michael Haas, "International Subsystems," paper prepared for presentation at the Annual Meeting of the American Political Science Association, Washington, D. C., September, 1968; Haas, International Conflict (Indianapolis: Bobbs-Merrill, forthcoming), Appendix D.

their consistent reference to "national" units does in fact amount to using an adjectival form of the term "state" (confirming the identity political entity = national state previously established by Singer and Small in World Politics January 1966 page 245).

Hence we take this to be a list of what Russet, Singer and Small should call nation-states, even though they shy away from the word. We find the list unsatisfactory because it includes entities which on no reasonable account can be called states, either actual or likely, such as Alaska, Ifni, Gibraltar, Trieste, Danzig, Andorra, the Panama Canal Zone, San Tome and Principe, and excludes others which could also be judged to have been states or likely to become states, such as Tibet, Quebec, Kashmir, Biafra and why not, after all, Scotland, the Basque Country, Nagaland, the Kurdish Republic and so many others. In any event, how do the authors assess the likelihood of the emergence of a new state? Provided our threshold of likelihood is appropriately low, the number of candidates for statehood is, of course, extremely large. For instance, all the world's federal units, and not only Alaska and Quebec, might be looked upon as potential states. And so might all "agencies or bodies having an organized existence, governmental character and substantial autonomy: (this is the useful definition of a "governmental unit" adopted by the United States Statistical Abstract). The United States had, in 1962, 4,645 such units the population of each one of which exceeded 10,000 and all of which, we would hazard to guess, were more important than Ifni (Abstract for 1967 p. 414: this includes states, counties, municipalities and townships). That, of course, is still not all: for likely states might arise not only by splintering or fission (of which process the colonial revolution is the contemporary exemplar and the only one the standardized list seems concerned with) but also by amalgamation or fusion e.g. the European Economic Community, or the United States of Central America. The moral of all this is that a list of potential national-states is plainly impracticable without an explicit theory for the universe of which they are a part; anything else can be no more than a fusillade in the dark.

So much for potential or likely states; but what about actual or real, observable states? At the source of the difficulties confronting Russett, Singer and Small is lack of clarity about the criteria used to establish the existence of a state: namely confusion between subjective (participants') and objective (observers') criteria of statehood. Intuitively, the

important criteria would seem to be subjective. that is those which participants in the social process themselves regard as significant. Thus in respect of statehood we would ask how do we know that participants in interstate relations treat some entities as states and not others? We would inquire into their perceptions in these matters, and also into their practices. and would soon notice that "recognition," a well-understood diplomatic institution, is a key phenomenon here and that it has close links with the network of diplomatic representation and, more recently, with membership in international organizations. Broadly, entities recognized as members by other entities and joined together in a global network would constitute a world system. The system could be a club of sovereigns, or an association of organizations, partly formalized e.g. as the United Nations, not necessarily a closed-circuit association, but possibly an open-ended one. In the pure nationstate system statehood amounts to membership in such a circuit, and the criteria for judging whether an entity does or does not belong to the circuit are the criteria of statehood. (Conversely, of course when the system changes its nature and its structure, the characteristics and the relationships of the member units change too. Yet the authors proceed on the assumption that the world political system has continued unchanged for the past 70 years.)

Singer and Small imaginatively applied the subjective criterion of "recognition" in their earlier study (ibid., pp. 246-9) but have failed to carry it through in this latest work. But even in their earlier study they confused the matter further by adding to this subjective standard (a state is a state if it is so regarded by other states) an extraneously objective one, in the shape of a population-exclusion factor. They in effect also said: a state is a state only if the population it controls exceeds 500,000. In their latest work they have lowered their sights considerably but still insist that a state cannot be (the Vatican excepted) unless its population exceeds 10,000. This is unconvincing: a state is a state irrespective of the population it controls. Population size describes no more than an attribute of a state (e.g. its "importance") but does not bear upon its existence.

The authors introduce a second objective criterion, that of independence, interpreted as control over territory and absence of occupation or of dependent status. Hence a state occupied by foreign (but hostile) troops, such as Belgium in World War II (surely also in World War I) on their reckoning was not a state in the period 1940–4. This again flies in the face of common sense. Of course, Belgium was un-

der hostile occupation, but it also had a government in exile (as it did in the First World War), continued to exercise authority in the Belgian Congo and retained recognition by numerous other states; hence, conclusively, remained in existence. Civil war regimes present similar difficulties. Independence, in any event, is a treacherous concept hardly susceptible to an either-or treatment. More promising would be a search for measures of "degrees of autonomy." Pending the development of such measures the use of "independence" as an objective criterion of political status should preferably be discontinued.

Even though conventional wisdom points the other way there are thus significant grounds for doubting that either population size or independence seen as territorial control can serve as objective standards of statehood. The essential character of states resides in their organizational features: states are first and foremost organizations of varying degrees of complexity and formality, they are organizations of a governmental character (hence concerned with order, use and control of violence and incidentally with a host of other functions) and they are relatively autonomous organizations. In this conceptualization we thus follow the definition used for the Statistical Abstract. As all organizations, states are, of course, oriented to populations, but states are not to be confused with populations, nor with any particular type of control over populations. States, too, are oriented to a territory but this is not to say that a piece of territory such as Ifni (and what happened to Antarctica?) does by itself constitute a state. Nor need we base our listing upon the supposition that in respect of a certain territory one particular political entity must always exercise a monopoly of jurisdiction. This condition certainly does not apply in federal and other complex states, characterized by a multiplicity of overlapping jurisdictions; it ignores international, and regional and functional organizations at all levels and generally presents a superficial and in fact misleading picture of political life. The game of dividing the world's surface into a number of mutually exclusive territorial entities may be a fascinating one, but belongs to "Monopoly" and not to political science.

An inventory of states thus represents, by all acounts, a formidable problem, amounting in some respects to a global census of political entities. But, depending on the criteria we choose, we could construct at least three lists to cover the problems and the period of the article under discussion.

(1) A historical list for the pre-1945 period: a complex arrangement taking note of the fact

that the Western states-system of that period was in large part still imperial, hence also to a great extent traditional, hierarchical and nonnational. This would be, of course, a subjective list based on the Western point of view, but since the Western system did not at that time completely cover the earth, residual parts of non-Western political systems in Asia, Africa, and even in the Americas would have to be separately accounted for.

(2) The contemporary universal nation-state system is essentially a post-1945 phenomenon, with a new structure and new membership criteria; thus with reference to these latter criteria all its actual participants could be listed on a subjective basis of who recognized whom as what (without troubling about such extraneous data as population limits and territorial control). This could give us the composition of the system as seen by the members themselves and it should be a complete accounting. A simple beginning and the ideal basis for such an enterprise is membership of the United Nations (surprisingly the authors do not use it at all); additions could then be made to such a list only on the basis of criteria of subjective recognition, as evidenced by diplomatic representation, political contact, full or associate membership in international organizations, etc. The United Nations Organization is itself, of course, a member of that changing system and so are increasing numbers of other organizations, such as the EEC and the OAU, if once again we apply criteria of subjective acceptance.

(3) Finally we could attempt the staggering, but stimulating tack suggested by the question: what are the entities which politically shape a world system? In the modern world the scope of such an inquiry is tremendous and would include a great deal besides states, for the number of autonomous political authorities alone runs into the tens of thousands, and that of other politically important organizations could easily be of a similar order. Yet this, precisely, is the universe of political science, and it is here that objective criteria of exclusion could help greatly in simplifying our work. For organizational dimensions, as measured by size of the budget, number of personnel. geographical scope of operations, would help us to distinguish between entities whose actions do and do not have significant, i.e. global repercussions. Yet other criteria could also be thought of but whatever they are we would have to conclude that for the contemporary world system such a list should feature not only the United States and say, Dahomey, but also the State of California, the Royal Dutch-Shell Petroleum Company, the Ford Foundation, the World Bank and the Roman Catholic Church. This would bring home the fact that the world abounds with politically significant entities about which we know little, confined as we are by the theoretical perspectives of the nation-state system.

To conclude: a seemingly innocuous question has led us into one of the crucial problems of contemporary political science. If the information assembled by Russett, Singer and Small is intended to serve only as a check list against which certain statistics (e.g. mortality rates or election results) may be conveniently tabulated it would (despite gaps) have utility but it will require considerable academic caution. If it is, on the other hand, to present basic political data and an authoritative definition of the universe whose attributes and relationships we are to study, it must be judged inadequate.

George Modelski
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JEAN-LUC VELLUT Université Lovanium (Kinshasa)

TO THE EDITOR:

Given the frequency with which authors chide their critics for attacking a work on grounds other than those selected by the authors, one might expect that critics would become more cautious. Alas, they do not. We stated our objective, our criteria, and the limitations. We intended neither an analysis of "the essential character" of statehood, a theoretical diagnosis of the global system, nor an

exhaustive listing of all government units in

the world, past and future.

We claim to do nothing more than offer a prominent solution to the need for a defined population, with standard code-numbers, of "territorially based political units" of a "national or quasinational" nature, to serve comparative and international politics scholars who might want to compare or generalize about, "such entities, or a sample thereof, from 1900 to the present." At no point do we even suggest that this is a list of states, nor of all relevant actors in world politics. In response to Haas's original communication, we explicitly declared that "despite our belief in their importance, it (the list) does not, however, include the infinite number of sub-national and extra-national actors in world politics, territorial or otherwise." In earlier papers each of us has manifested his awareness of that importance; most recent is Singer's "The Global System and its Sub-Systems" in the Rosenau volume on national and international linkages. Had our critics taken our original language

seriously or thought to check with us before publishing their critique, there would have been no doubt as to our intention here.

As to other Modelski-Vellut complaints, there is again the problem of careless reading. (1) In their earlier listing Singer and Small made no pretence of identifying all states since 1815; rather they sought to define a considerably smaller population embracing only "nation-members of the international system" and made quite clear their criteria of inclusion. (2) At no point do we suggest that Belgium was not a state from 1940 to 1944; we merely say (at some length in the text) that it was not an active and independent member of the international system during that period. (3) We left unused code numbers throughout the list to permit the addition of new entities, without trying to predict which particular ones (Quebec, Biafra, or Delaware) might emerge, and anticipated a supplementary two-digit code for those who need sub-national distinctions. (4) Since, as Modelski and Vellut admit, we did not call our entities "nation-states" we need not rebut the charge that we proceeded "on the assumption that the states system has continued unchanged for the past 70 years." Anyone who wants separate listings for before and after World War II might begin with our compilation, with its dates. As we say at two points, one may always select a sub-set from a defined population by modifying the criteria used in the original definition.

We fully agree that other criteria might better suit particular theoretical interests, but remain persuaded that our list will be useful to many scholars in several disciplines. Nor do we doubt the potential value of a standardized listing of other types of social entities in the global system, and we will welcome one compiled by any of our critics. If Modelski and Vellut also care to list all past and present national units having fewer than 10,000 people, or all the sub-national "governmental units" in the world, beginning with the 4,645 in the United States, we are sure they will find the exercise an engaging one.

Bruce M. Russett

Yale University

DAVID J. SINGER

The University of Michigan

MELVIN SMALL

Wayne State University

TO THE EDITOR:

In a research note in the March issue of this *Review* ("A Theorem about Voting"), Thomas Casstevens asserts as a theorem and then attempts to prove the following proposition: in a

single-member district using the simple-majority single-ballot system of election, a rational voter will always vote for the candidate he most prefers.

The validity of this proposition is, of course, far from obvious, when applied to a multi-party system: in particular, if some voter prefers candidate A to B and B to C, and if candidate A has little chance of winning, while B and C are running evenly, then one might suppose that elementary strategic considerations would lead such a voter to cast his ballot for B, rather than waste it upon A. Casstevens' proposition, however, asserts that such strategic considerations will never arise, which if true would be both surprising and disturbing.

In fact, however, the proposition is not true. The proof is technically incorrect because of the treatment of ties, but the more fundamental difficulty is that the proof is essentially irrelevant to the theorem as stated, because of its dependence upon an unjustifiable "reduction postulate." It may be worthwhile to elaborate briefly on these points.

If there are more than two candidates and a finite number of voters, the probability of a tie in general will not be zero. The fact that it may be small is essentially irrelevant, since the proof depends upon showing that if a voter switches from one candidate to another, the resulting decrease in the probability of the first candidate winning must precisely equal (in magnitude) the increase in the probability that the second candidate will. Once the possibility of ties is admitted, however, such a switch in votes will in general also affect the probability of a tie (perhaps only slightly), so that exact equality will no longer hold and the result will not follow. (It is true, of course, that if the number of voters is infinite then the probability of a tie can be zero, as assumed; in that case, however, the contribution of any single vote to the outcome is also zero, which contradicts another of the basic assumptions of the proof.)

The more fundamental difficulty, however, lies in the presence of a "reduction postulate," to the effect that "if the voter changes his decision from [A] to [B], then the probability of [A] winning decreases and the probability of [B] winning increases, but the probability of [C] winning is not affected." The only justification offered for this assumption is that it "does not contradict the mathematical theory of probability," which may be true, but is in any event quite irrelevant. It certainly is not implied by that theory, or by the theory plus the institutional context in which elections are held; hence, its status is that of an assumption which is certainly not true of all elections, but which might be true of some (though plausible examples in which it is true are difficult to devise). Even if the technical difficulty arising from the treatment of ties could be resolved, the most that would follow is that in those rather special elections where the "postulate" happens to hold, voters will act in accord with their true preferences.* This, however, would clearly be a much weaker and a less surprising result than the theorem as originally stated.

GERALD H. KRAMER

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* In similar vein, an alternative "postulate," which would simplify the proof even further, would be to assume that all candidates are running equally well; or, more precisely, the conditional probability of a candidate winning, given that the voter in question votes for him, is equal for all candidates. This also has the status of an assumption which is true of some elections (and voters), and not of others, and it is trivial to show that the voter in question will act in accord with his true preferences in those elections for which this "postulate" happens to be true. It is clear, however, that this fact does not preclude the possibility of strategic considerations arising in other elections which will lead voters to act quite differently.

BOOK REVIEWS AND NOTES

Beginning with this issue, Professor Richard F. Fenno, The University of Rochester, becomes Book Review Editor.

BOOK REVIEWS Germino, Beyond Ideology, HARRY GIRVETZ..... 958 Lipset and Rokkan, editors, Party Systems and Voter Alignments: Cross-National Perspectives. Robert C. Fried..... 960 Stone, Strategic Persuasion: Arms Limitations through Dialogue: Cox, Prospects for Peacekeeping: Miller, World Order and Local Disorder: The United Nations and Internal Conflicts. LAWRENCE S. KAPLAN..... 961 Barnett (with Vogel), Cadres, Bureaucracy, and Political Power in Communist China: Bruce D. Larkin..... 963 McLin, Canada's Changing Defense Policy, 1957-1963: The Problems of a Middle Power in Alliance: Rosenbluth, The Canadian Economy and Disarmament. GILBERT WINHAM.... 965 Spaulding, Imperial Japan's Higher Civil Service Examinations. Edwin O. Reischauer.... 966 Hayek, Studies in Philosophy, Politics and Economics. WILLIAM C. MITCHELL.. 968 Davison, International Political Communication, KARL W. DEUTSCH..... 969 Russett, International Regions in the International System: A Study in Political Ecology. Michael K. O'Leary... 970 Kerr, Islamic Reform: The Political and Legal Theories of Muhammed Abduh and Rashid Rida, Fauzi M. Najjar.... 971 BOOK NOTES POLITICAL THEORY, HISTORY OF POLITICAL THOUGHT, AND METHODOLOGY..... 973 American Government and Politics..... 980 Comparative Government and Politics.... 995

BOOK REVIEWS

Beyond Ideology: The Revival of Political Theory. By Dante Germino. (New York: Harper & Row, 1967. Pp. ix, 254. \$5.00.)

Political theory as "the study of the principles of right order in the psyche and in society," which is to say "reflection on the good life for man and society," is neither dead nor dying and this book is a protest against premature obituaries. Its thesis is that political theory is enjoying a revival which the neopositivists and behavioralists who dismiss political theory as normative and therefore outside the purview of science are unable to see. So argues Dante Germino who, instead of disassociating political theory and political science, insists that they are inseparable provided one does not confuse "authentic" political theory with ideologizing, utopianizing, partisan contention, subjective moral preference; and provided further that one does not commit the error of limiting science to dealing with overt behavior to the neglect of inner experience. If statements about the latter are by the positivist's criterion unverifiable, inner experience is nonetheless real and knowable by other means than sensory observation. Germino avoids the German term sometimes badly translated as "understanding," but it is to acts of "Verstehen" that he refers when he speaks of verifying propositions about inner experience by "meditatively re-enacting" such experiences. "Political theory is an experiential, as opposed to an exclusively experimental science," he writes, thereby placing himself in the ranks of phenomenologists like Alfred Schuetz, although he could also invoke the authority of MacIver ("imaginative reconstruction"), Weber ("interpretive understanding") and Cooley all of whom long ago urged that because we deal in the human sciences with motivational attitudes and intended meanings we cannot stop at the observation of external behavior. Whether or not we agree with Germino that Plato and Hegel transcended the level of ideology we may still affirm (with Mannheim if not with Marx) that it is possible to transcend bias or, as Germino puts it, make "the leap to the perspective of theory." One problem is that a writer who denies that Marxist doctrine is significant as political theory and asserts that Hegelianism is, or who dismisses Bentham and Burke as mere publicists and virtually ignores Locke and J. S. Mill may himself have failed to get 'Beyond Ideology."

Can one affirm that value judgments made at the level of theory have cognitive status and

as such are confirmable or disconfirmable? Are they objective in the sense that they are something more or other than expressions of subjective preference? If political theory is to be identified with political science the answer must be affirmative. "Objectivity in political theory comes not from the vain attempt to avoid evaluation and thereby appear impartial but through the adoption of critical standards and criteria of evaluation that are not transitory or parochial but are based on an experientially sound anthropology." Many would go this far with the author but question the basis on which he reaches this conclusion once they are confronted by the specific uses to which he puts it. What, according to Germino, is "an experientially sound anthropology" and who qualifies as "sound"?

Those who qualify fall into two groups which the author, following Maritain, calls the "theocentric" and the "anthropocentric" humanists. Western theocentric humanism is rooted in classical philosophy, Judaism and Christianity. Its great exemplars were Plato. Aristotle, Augustine, Aquinas. As these were governed by the Platonic dictum that "God is the measure of all things," so the anthropocentric humanists have been governed by the Protagorean dictum that "man is the measure of all things." In the case of the latter as exemplified by Machiavelli, Hobbes, Rousseau, Hegel, the basis for a model society is not laid up in heaven but here on earth: "immanent" temporal existence is substituted for a timeless transcendent realm; the ordering principles are sought within the human community, as in the case of Hobbes' sovereign and the mundane contract from which the sovereign's authority is derived.

Although most modern political theory is of the anthropocentric variety, representatives of both traditions share a common opposition to the "messianic humanism" of a Comte, Marx, Mazzini, or (to mention a 20th century writer) Harold Laski which would "turn man into something other than he is or can become" (and is therefore antihumanistic), whereas for true humanists "man remains man, a finite creature of limited capabilities." It is, to be sure, difficult to see how this can be reconciled with an earlier statement that Augustine and Aquinas shared with the great classicists a belief that pleasure, power, honor, glory are illusory ends, the chief end of man being the vita contemplative; or the statement that for the theocentric humanist "existence is bathed

in a new light" and the "human person . . . discovers himself as little lower than the angels." Perhaps this reviewer has missed the point: if this is not an example of a millenarian fantasy involving "a qualitative transformation of existence" I fail to see what is. But we are told that millenarianism is precisely what theocentric and anthropocentric humanists, i.e. all political theorists in the authentic sense, reject, as they do the belief that man can conform reality to his will. While at one point "pseudoobjective descriptivism" is dismissed (along with "opinionated ideology"), we are told in this context that the task of political theory is to describe the human condition not to transform it. To be sure authentic political theorists may be concerned with changes within the realm of the possible, according to the author, a qualification which, while used to exclude Marx, specifically does not exclude Plato (presumably on the basis of Eric Voegelin's distinction between a utopia and a paradigmatic society) or Rousseau whose concept of a free body politic modelled after the "bands of peasants ... regulating affairs of state under an oak. and always acting wisely" surely suggests millenarianism to this reviewer.

For Germino the hallmarks of authentic political theory are (1) openness, meaning critical detachment from the contemporaneous world of practical activity; (2) theoretical intention, meaning avoidance of the temptation to impose one's will on reality with a view to changing it; (3) contentration on universal or perennial problems, namely, those that "confront man as man rather than particular men at a particular time and place"; (4) realism, which avoids imposing "one's model of the food society directly upon a concrete historical situation"; (5) modesty, that is, the recognition of limits to knowledge; (6) intellectual honesty and integrity. The author often seems to apply these criteria arbitrarily. One wonders why a Plato, who believed that "true lovers of wisdom should come to hold political power" and who travelled to Syracuse "to work for the . . . overthrow of a despotism" (Epistle vii). should not be excluded by Germino from the charmed company-all the more so in that in going to Sicily Plato was expressly trying to

terion of modesty, but the philosopher who promised with characteristic reticence to answer the question, "What is the ultimate design of the world?" (Introduction, *Philosophy of History*) is nevertheless acceptable.

After Hegel political theory went into a decline brought about by the impact of Comtean positivism and Marxian ideologism in the nineteenth century and, in the English-speaking world, by the ascendancy of the logical positivists and language analysts. It was at least partly rescued from this state of desuetude. the author believes, by Croce, Bergson, Benda, Scheler and the phenomenologists, and, in general, all those (T. H. Green, Whitehead, Collingwood) who have stood guard at the citadel of metaphysics. Supplementing them have been those writers "who rediscovered the crucial importance of elites in any body politic," notably Mosca, Pareto, and Michels. (This is perplexing. The neo-Machiavellians, as Germino almost parenthetically concedes, were positivists par excellence. Mosca and Pareto explicitly eschewed moral judgments, although in practice they may have been incorrigible moralizers. It would be difficulty to find better exemplars of scientism and what Germino earlier criticizes as "pseudo-objective descriptivism.")

√However, the rescue of political theory remained to be completed and this has been accomplished since World War II by such writers as Oakeshott, Arendt, Jouvenal, Maritain, Leo Strauss, and, in Germino's judgment, the greatest political theorist of them all, Eric Voegelin, whose strong theocratic and elitist bias is shared by the author.

The author closes with a polemic against the behavioralists (e.g. Skinner, Simon, Caswell) whose position entails a closed society because they support the "world-immanent values of the modernizing ethos... to the detriment of the life of the spirit in openness toward transcendence." In its stead he proposes a society inspired by a new or theocentric liberalism and, as such, open to the "experience of transcendence." (In terms of conventional political labels the author turns out to be a liberal rather than a conservative, although conservatives are more likely to be attracted to this as to Vocaselin's kind of approach to political

deserves attention even from those who, like this reviewer, are unable to share his commitment to an ontologically grounded theory of politics which fails to reckon with the insights of evolutionary naturalism.

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Party Systems and Voter Alignments: Cross-National Perspectives. Edited by Seymour Martin Lipset and Stein Rokkan. (New York: The Free Press, 1967. Pp. xvi, 554. \$9.95.)

In the sixty-four page essay ("Cleavage Structures, Party Systems, and Voter Alignments") with which they introduce this book, Seymour Martin Lipset and Stein Rokkan have made an impressive and exceptionally important contribution to the comparative study of political parties. Their introduction, perhaps more important than the book itself, synthesizes and systematizes much of what is known about the relations between social stratification and competitive party politics. Variations in the traits of party systems, they show can be traced to variations in social cleavages, as differentially translated into political cleavages. Using Parsonian categories, they present a typology of possible bases for social cleavage, and argue that such cleavages can occur and be located at a range of points on two axes-"periphery-center" and "cross-local functional." They attempt to demonstrate that the Parsonian categories can be adapted for the study not only of consensus, integration, and stability but of cleavage, disruption, and development.

Having identified and mapped the "critical lines of cleavage," Lipset and Rokkan outline a theory to explain the translation of "cleavage structures" into party systems. Here the variables are political, rather than sociocultural. They include: "the traditions of decisionmaking in the polity"; "the channels for the expression and mobilization of protest"; "the opportunities, the payoffs, and the costs of alliances in the system"; and "the possibilities, the implications, and the limitations of majority rule in the system." These constitute four "thresholds," of varying historical height, which, in different combinations, produce, if not a single required pattern of partysystem development, a set of ten party-system types that can be arranged into several patterns of development.

Which social cleavages are translated into party oppositions and which are aggregated within the parties? While admitting that not

much is known about variations in the saliency and intensity of cleavages, Lipset and Rokkan suggest as the critical factors the timing and character in each "Western" polity of what they call the National Revolution (against peripheral resistance to nation-building and against the Roman Church) and of the Industrial Revolution. The major variations among "Western" party systems emerge, they argue, in the period before universal suffrage, when the processes of political-cultural and economic mobilization resulted in the formation, in some but not all "Western" (i.e. West European) polities, of religious, regional, and agrarian parties. The authors present an impressive "Model for the Generation of the [West] European Party System," consisting of seven key sets of actors, postulated rules on the formation of alliances, and an eightfold typology of the possible resulting party oppositions. Admittedly the latter typology accommodates some empirical examples much better than others and a host of "special factors" must be adduced to account for the many misfits: vet the model must be accounted an example of historical sociology at its best.

The eleven essays that follow, written without guidance from the Lipset-Rokkan typologies or models, can themselves be located on the functional and territorial axes, some of them stressing class and others stressing regional factors in voting and partisanship.

Class factors are emphasized by Robert R. Alford in excerpts from his Party and Society, dealing with class voting in Anglo-American political systems. Alan D. Robinson applies Alford's concepts, hypotheses, and indices to New Zealand, finding a high rate of class voting in that country a "class polarization," however, that has curiously little impact on policymaking. The "deviant" case of the "workingclass Tories" in England is analyzed by Robert T. McKenzie and Alan Silver, who find that workers who vote for the Tories resemble workers who vote for Labour in social characteristics, while many of the latter share the conservative social and political perspectives of the former. Working-class Tories, they conclude, are not so much deviants from working class political culture as they are normal representatives of a British national political culture, under fewer cross-pressures than their fellow-workers who vote for Labour. Joji Watanuki, in his essay on Japanese voting, also stresses the "deviant" in the relations between stratification and partisanship in Japan. Correlations between class and voting in that country are abnormally low, with large numbers of the poor voting for the Right and large numbers of the better off (the white collar employees) voting for the Left. This is explained by the predominance of what Watanuki calls "cultural politics" over "class politics."

In one of two essays, Juan Linz investigates the "sociology of political consensus," probing the social changes that help to account for the many differences between the party systems of Weimer and Bonn. In a second essay, Linz analyzes in detail the Spanish party systems of 1875-1923 and 1931-1936, and then courageously predicts the shape of the third Spanish party system, yet to come. He uses Italy as a model both for purposes of historical comparison and for the prediction of future development. Mattei Dogan presents a long study on "Political Cleavage and Social Stratification in France and Italy," which surveys and compares the voting behavior of various social groups in those countries. He pays particular attention to "regional polymorphism"-regional diversities in the socio-economic and motivational bases for party support hidden behind nationally uniform partisan cleavages, while Linz explores the diversification within the regionalist politics of Spain. Immanuel Wallerstein shows the rather limited importance of class cleavages in West Africa as compared to ethnic-regional cleavages and broadbased nationalist movements, sometimes themselves only federations of ethnic-regional groups.

Regional factors are stressed even more by the analysts of Finland (Erik Allardt and Pertti Pesonen), of Norway (Stein Rokkan), and of Brazil (Glaucio Ary Dillon Soares). Rokkan sees the Norwegian party system as the result of the superimposition of "functional-economic cleavages" onto an existing set of "territorial-cultural cleavages" by uneven processes of economic development, urbanization, and bureaucratization. Glaucio Ary Dillon Soares explores "the politics of uneven development," using Parsonian concepts to characterize what he calls the two political cultures of Brazil: the culture of the Northeast, with its stress on particularism, ascription, and religion, and a "politics of backwardness," based on traditionalism vs. the culture of the Southeast, with its relatively greater stress on universalism, achievement, and secularism, and a "politics of development," based on class and ideology. The growing emphasis on the "territorial-cultural" axis among political sociologists should prove to be just as fruitful as their previous emphasis on the "functional-economic" axis. It may allow comparative political sociology to spread the scope of its analysis beyond what in comparative politics has almost become the "dark continent" of Europe to include in systematic theory the party systems of a broader variety of polities.

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Strategic Persuasion: Arms Limitations through Dialogue. By JEREMY J. STONE. (New York: Columbia University Press, 1967, Pp. xiii, 176. \$6.95.)

Prospects for Peacekeeping. By ARTHUR M. Cox. (Washington: The Brookings Institution, 1967, Pp. xii, 178. \$3.95.)

World Order and Local Disorder: The United Nations and Internal Conflicts. By LINDA B. MILLER. (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1967, Pp. 234. \$6.50.)

It is worth observing that while two of the three books under review implicitly or explicitly identify the United Nations as the major instrument of keeping peace in the years ahead, each shares the assumption that the major hope for peace as well as the major threat to peace lies in the relationship of the two superpowers, the United States and the Soviet Union. Despite all the discussion about the end of the Cold War and the end of the bipolar world of the 1940s and 1950s which has preoccupied scholars in the last few years, the roles of the United States and the Soviet Union in or out of the United Nations dominate the pages of these three books. It is true Jeremy Stone alludes to a "growing disinterest in nuclear war"; Linda Miller sees an increasing dependence of both powers upon the United Nations for solutions to international problems they could not handle otherwise; Arthur Cox emphasizes the United States' recognition of the superiority of United Nations action in peacekeeping over the unilateral action and even over the intervention of a regional alliance. Yet it did not require the crisis in the Middle East in 1967 to alert each of the authors to the understanding that neither the internal difficulties of nor the external challenges to the superpowers in 1967 had changed the loci of power in world affairs. 1967 was closer to 1947 than the authors may wish to admit openly.

The continuing Soviet-American confrontation is probably most clearly expressed in Stone's Strategic Persuasion in which the United Nations makes no appearance. Indeed, it is surprising that the author was unable to find any place at all for the United Nations in light of his concern for suitable auspices of the dialogue between the great powers. His approach to the question of arms limitations is

the subtle technique of persuasion through dialogue. His essay—and it is essentially a speculative essay—takes for granted that there are no meaningful quantitative methods of reducing the arms stockpile or of slowing the arms race. The key to avoiding a holocaust is communication between the United States and the Soviet Union in such a way that the intentions of both parties are at all times perfectly clear. If this objective could be achieved the tensions generating the arms race would be relaxed. The result would not necessarily be the end of potential war but it might be the atrophying of the destructive nuclear weapons system.

In his discussion he avoids the formal methods of treaty or convention, such as the protracted Geneva discussion of arms control. Such a path with its fixed positions and above all with its bureaucracies talking to themselves or to their constituencies and administrative superiors frequently stimulates rather than ameliorates the problems. If there is a direct approach to arms limitation in which the parties sit across the table from each other, it should be under private auspices, as in the Pugwash conferences and it should be conducted by men with a considerable degree of objectivity about the problems. Stone weighs the merits and defects of scientists as members of the dialogue as compared with economists or politicians. Whatever the composition of the discussants their objective should not be formal treaties but means of improving the continuing dialogues.

But even more satisfactory than a direct confrontation, in the author's opinion, is the indirect approach to arms limitation which requires a sophistication on every level of government that is not apparent at this time. The President or the Congress must be continually aware that a Defense Secretary's report to the Congress or a Cabinet member's article in a journal of public affairs has a Soviet audience, one to which communications can be made. His primary example of how the strategic dialogue can be conducted by indirection are the various ways the United States and the Soviet Union reported the successes of their atomic and hydrogen bomb experiments. They could either produce terror or reduce tension. He

to end secrecy in atomic matters and end interest in a nuclear war as a solution to international problems? It seems too optimistic and too simplistic. The role of the United Nations and the new nations which comprise a majority in the organization might have an effect on the strategic debate; and China's role, which is dismissed merely as a factor supporting the decline in Soviet-American rivalry, might be a very different one in the future.

Arthur M. Cox's study of peacekeeping is more monographic in nature than Stone's book. While the United Nations does not appear in the title, the emblem on the jacket makes it clear to the reader that the United Nations is the peacekeeper he has in mind. By peacekeeping he means "the use of soldiers not to fight and win, but to prevent fighting, to maintain cease-fires, and to provide order while negotiations are being conducted." In the first generation of the United Nations the preventive force has been used as observers and fact finders on a disputed border as in Greece or Kashmir, as emergency force maintaining cease fire in the Gaza Strip, or as soldiers helping to suppress secession in Katanga. Inevitably, the use of troops has become a subject of cold war controversy in which the United States and the Soviet Union clashed repeatedly over the years. In the early phase of UN history the United States had been a strong supporter of collective measures, including peacekeeping forces, but as the balance of power changed in the United Nations the United States was increasingly willing to act independently in the Dominican Republic, in the Stanleyville airlift, and in bombing of North Vietnam. Hostility or indifference of the Third World accounted for a large part of American disenchantment with collective action.

The author points out that the Soviet Union was far more opposed to peacekeeping in principle, particularly during the long period in which the United States dominated the UN. But with the rise of the former colonial countries courted by the Soviet Union there has been a shift in practice if not in theory. To win support in the Afro-Asian world the Russians had to temper their attacks on U-Thant and on the Congo operation, and even supported poutral action in the India-Pakistan contro-

States policies, which he feels are in special need of the advantages offered by the peacekeeping services of the United Nations. The Vietnam involvement is brought up infrequently, but is obviously a major reason for urgency in promoting the peacekeeping function of the United Nations. Unilateral intervention is suspect in a neutralist-dominated world, as well as being a tempting invitation to Soviet counter-action. And America's numerous regional military alliances have no better chance of success, since as anticommunist military alliances they inject the Cold War into any area of operation and are incompatible with the impartial role the UN could play. It is in the interest of the United States to maintain peace and if the United Nations can serve this purpose it should be given much more support than has hitherto been the case. He is convinced that American initiative will be followed by Soviet response, if only to win friends among the Afro-Asian bloc.

Cox's mood is optimistic, and such problems as he points out such as authorization by Security Council or General Assembly, financing, staffing are all soluble if the will is there. The author's presentation is pedestrian, frequently repetitious, and brushes aside such questions as the United Nations' failure in the Middle East in 1967. He is vague about the relation of the Vietnam war to the peacekeeping process. Yet his prognosis is convincing: namely, the balance of terror between the superpowers makes the impartial peacekeeping machinery of the United Nations increasingly useful to both, if for different reasons. His proposals for strengthening the present machinery are both modest and sensible.

In Linda Miller's assessment of the United Nations' encounters with internal conflicts the rivalry between the superpowers once again is the dominant feature. Where the Soviet Union and the United States are in rough agreement, whatever the reasons, the United Nations can act with some effectiveness. This was particularly true of colonial conflicts in which Indonesians or Algerians strived for independence with an approving world looking on and beleagured European powers willing to accept the United Nations mediation as a face-saving device for abandoning their empires. Although the United States position as an ally of France or Portugal has made a clearcut stand more difficult than it had been for the irresponsible Soviet Union, seeking to profit from Western embarrassment, American action has served the colonial rebels whenever possible. In cases involving simply the breakdown of domestic order the United Nations role has been more

difficult to define. In Cyprus and the Congo United Nations peacekeeping reflected both Cold War tensions and anticolonial feelings. Miss Miller feels that here the United Nations role is a limited one, "creating circumstances favorable to negotiations between parties." The only interest of the United Nations should be in restoration of stability rather than in any particular solution to internal disorder.

Essentially the author suggests that there is no such thing as a local disorder; the world, and the superpowers, are involved or involve themselves. The most dangerous and least amenable to United Nations treatment is the proxy war where charges of internal or external aggression intrude the Cold War directly into a local situation. In the Hungary crisis of 1956 intervention would have been rebuffed by the direct interest of the Soviet Union, or would have touched off a Third World War. Similarly, United States action in Lebanon, Guatemala, or in Vietnam, removed the United Nations from any effective role in those areas. A community of interest among the superpowers is necessary before the United Nations can be heard, beyond serving as a forum for verbal attack. The latter role is not necessarily negligible, as Russia's discomfort in Hungary in 1956 and America's unpopularity over Vietnam revealed ten years later. But Professor Miller is frank in using that adjective to describe the United Nations' influence in conflicts directly involving the United States and the Soviet Union. In this respect she is more pessimistic than the other authors. Her case studies, however, suggest important successes for the United Nations, and offers more hope for the future than she seems willing to concede.

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Cadres, Bureaucracy, and Political Power in Communist China. By A. DOAK BARNETT, with a contribution by Ezra Vogel. (New York and London: Columbia University Press, 1967. Pp. xxix, 563, \$12.00.)

This work is an unparalleled account of institutional life in a Chinese ministry, county, commune and production brigade in the late 1950s and early 1960s. But the cases—and they are said to be real, not hypothetical—are presented "without specifically identifying the areas or institutions that are described" (p. xviii). Why? To guarantee the disguise of the three primary informants, each a refugee. Hints and approximations soften the elusive uncertainties of source and object. Nonetheless, the reader walks blindfolded as the author steers him into the Chinese political terrain,

describing the fauna and flora in great detail, but refusing to let the reader touch it for himself.

It is fortunate that Mr. Barnett and Mr. Vogel are trusted guides. This is a most important source of vivid images of Chinese political and administrative life. However maddening the repeated references to Ministry M, County X, Commune C and Productive Brigade B, the frustration of dealing with disguised objects can be tolerated. In time it will be possible to judge how representative, and in what ways unrepresentative, these images actually are. My guess is that they will stand up very well; and, in any case, they provide a description against which comparison can be made.

The plan of the work is straightforward. The ministry, county and commune-and-brigade cases are taken up in three separate parts. Each part is self-contained. Except in the case of commune-brigade relations, vertical ties receive scant attention. The discussion is organized around key institutions and topics, especially those involving personnel recruitment and management. In a concluding chapter Mr. Barnett advances generalizations and hypotheses on bureaucracy and politics in China. Ninety-odd pages of glossary are required for Chinese characters which would appear more conveniently beneath the text.

Although structured around institutional forms, the work is sustained throughout by concern for the political functions performed by party and government mechanisms. It is not, of course, rich in the informal politics and internal disputes which doubtless concern leadership; the informants knew structure. personnel, formal responsibilities and customary practices, but more intimate details of political life were presumably not known. Descriptions of the public security apparatus and coercive techniques acknowledge both the bases of apparent stabilities and the sanctions in reserve. County and local economic concerns are approached through relevant institutions. The author has endeavored to place local events in the broader context of concurrent national movements, too, and to record something of the changes of local institutional rôles which preceded his informants' departures from China in 1962 and 1964.

Barnett elects to omit any discussion of the eight bureaus of Ministry M "which were responsible for conducting the bulk of the ministry's substantive work" (p. 95). He argues, first, that he could not do so and still preserve the anonymity of the ministry; and, second, that each was sui generis "rather than typical

of organizations found throughout the bureaucracy" (ibid.). At the other extreme are detailed small-scale accounts: a page devoted to the Forestry Bureau and the Meterological Station in County X (pp. 283–284) and four pages given to county-supervised industries, one employing 36 workers (pp. 300–304). The People's Bank of China branch in County X, we are told, employed two bank policemen and a messenger in the manager's administrative section (p. 293). I prefer the detailed account and wonder what scenes were sadly left on the cutting-room floor. Other readers, concerned more with conventional centers of power, may find they are put off by these choices of scale.

Is this a handbook? There are moments in which one is reminded of Brunnert and Hagelstrom's Present Day Political Organization of China, first published in 1910. In fact Barnett's is a very different book. First, it is a set of case studies. Second, since it does not specify the cases, it is not a work of reference. Third, it is far more concerned with relations within and among institutions, especially spatial and control relations. Fourth, it is directed in part to the quality of life enjoyed by cadres in the bureaucracy. Fifth and most important, it responds to current questions about political and social life which—despite some startling parallels—are qualitatively different from those which exercised Brunnert and Hagelstrom.

As a citable source, the volume rests on the reputations of Mr. Barnett and Mr. Vogel. The argument for disguising the identity of the informants is clear enough. Had the informants not been promised anonymity, they would not have talked. But anonymity, as l'affaire Le-Clair recently demonstrated to The New York Times, is not guaranteed merely by hiding names. The threatened institution can put two and two together and, if essential facts are not falsified, stand a good chance of identifying the party who wants to live outside its rules and controls. Punitive action can be taken.

The journalist's imperative—that he protect his sources—is not the scholar's imperative—that the evidential basis of his work be open. But scholarship directed at social systems in change, although it handles data in a manner more systematic and more telling than that of journalism, may be deprived of key data if it does not follow the journalist's canon. We might conclude that a book which must be handled responsibly by the reader is better than none. Is it responsible, then, for a scholar to speculate on the identity of a deliberately disguised "case study"? Without pursuing the puzzle that far, it should be sufficient to note that only five ministries correspond to Bar-

nett's description of Ministry M and that County X is even more closely specified to the careful reader. It is tempting to wonder whether the elaborate masque only puzzles the readership and comforts the informants. A party official bent on uncovering an informant's identity would be little hindered by having to examine personnel records in two counties rather than one. Or is there a false scent? One trusts not.

The mystery of Ministry M should not obscure the main thrust of Barnett's conclusions. He judges the Chinese leadership "remarkably successful" in extending the outreach and impact of central decisions and central power (p. 428). He observes that the party has had some success in resisting the rise of parallel bureaucratic structures (p. 430) but has suffered a "seemingly irresistible growth of complex bureaucratic patterns of social stratification" even among party members (p. 433). Such patterns have been one target of the Great Proletarian Cultural Revolution. Barnett also notes the existence of bureaucratic politics focussing more on allocation of resources and methods of implementing policies than on more fundamental issues (p. 440). And he concludes that "the key issues concerning the political process in Communist China still relate more to the question of how the ruling elite attempts to implement Party-defined programs and impose its will on the population than to the question of how persons outside of the elite may try to exert some minor influence on public policy" (p. 441). The Cultural Revolution has turned our attention back upon the old questions of who constitute the elite and how programs are defined. But it has also highlighted the difficulties of the leadership in "imposing" or inducing acceptance of its will at all levels. The author's attention is well-placed.

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Canada's Changing Defense Policy, 1957-1963: The Problems of a Middle Power in Alliance. By Jon B. McLin. (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins Press, 1967. Pp. xii, 251. \$8.50)

The Canadian Economy and Disarmament. By Gideon Rosenbluth. (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1967. Pp. x, 189. \$5.50.)

The politics of arms and armaments is a traditional concern of the student of public policy, but this concern is heightened today with the increasing amounts of public funds spent on modern defense establishments. The above titles provide a useful glimpse into the defense problems of a middle-ranking power, and one which has a unique position in world politics.

Canada's uniqueness derives from its geographical position and its close political ties with the United States, both of which drain the classic concern for national security from Canadian defense thinking. Instead, Canada's defense policy is primarily directed toward securing goals other than national security, such as the preservation of diplomatic influence or the maintenance of multilateral alliances. McLin's book develops the thesis that Canada's postwar defense policy can be separated into three periods: 1946-56, 1957-63 and 1964 to the present. The first and third periods are characterized by widespread consensus on the objectives and instruments of Canadian defense policy. The middle years are viewed as a period of transition, during which the increasing costs of the defense establishment persuaded the government to accept a limited peacekeeping role in lieu of maintaining its relatively strong postwar position within the Atlantic alliance. This middle period was marked by confusion and controversy which ended with the fall of the Diefenbaker government on February 5, 1963.

In general McLin provides a compendium of detail on the defense questions of 1957 to 1963, which is complete down to the tactical roles of various items of military hardware. For the defense specialist this detail is desirable. What is unfortunate for the generalist is that the author does not satisfactorily analyze these questions within the broader context of Canadian politics. There is almost no consideration given to the role of public opinion or interest group politics in defense decision-making, and the interplay between the parties is inadequately developed. McLin has written about a controversial topic in a turbulent period of Canadian politics,, but in failing to analyze important factors in the policy process his book fails to capture the spirit of the controversy.

For the specialist and generalist alike the book includes a useful discussion of the extent to which Canadian defense decisions and weapons procurement can be dependent on very minor alterations in U.S. policy. This discussion is of interest to students of alliance politics, for its points out the political liabilities for nations which become linked in a "special relationship" with the United States with respect to defense and security matters.

Rosenbluth's The Canadian Economy and Disarmament is a study of defense problems and policy written from the perspective of the economist rather than the political analyst. Essentially a replication of studies done of other national economies, this book attempts to project the likely effects of disarmament on the

Canadian economy, and to suggest alternatives which will make the adjustment process palatable both economically and socially. Special concern is given to the structure of Canadian defense expenditure and to the effects on research and development which occur with reductions in defense expenditure.

From the perspective of the political scientist concerned with public policy, this book presents important data about the relationship between the defense establishment and society. Rosenbluth uses input-output analysis to show which elements in society are primarily reliant on defense production, as well as those which are linked secondarily through the production process. One could easily posit hypotheses from these data as to the location and intensity of future political opposition to cutbacks in defense spending, let alone to complete disarmament. Also revealed in Rosenbluth's statistics are the close economic ties between Canada and the United States with respect to weapons procurement. The existence of these ties is likely to make collaboration with the United States a prerequisite for major Canadian defense decisions, if such decisions are to be implemented with a minimum of international and domestic friction.

For students of the Canadian economy the book commands a more general attention than the title indicates. The economic adjustments from disarmament are similar to adjustments caused by more normal circumstances such as automation or trade liberalization, and thus the author's findings are applicable to situations other than a disarming economy. For example Rosenbluth includes a brief discussion of factor mobility and presents a convincing argument that the demand for labor should be geographically mobile as well as labor itself. The author also suggests policies for bringing about adjustments to demand changes, which at the same time would maintain the growth in aggregate demand that is essential in making these adjustments possible.

As an analysis of public policy, Rosenbluth's work presents a challenging approach to political scientists. Economists are perhaps more willing than political scientists to make use of less than realistic assumptions in the course of theory-building and analysis, particularly if such assumptions promote useful investigation. Rosenbluth's assumption of disarmament is clearly unrealistic but he escapes the charge of being academic because of the practical "contingency plan" aura the book projects. Possibly political analysis could become more versatile if political scientists were more willing

to follow similar research techniques. For example, a politically-oriented study of the effects of disarmament might reveal strengths and weaknesses of various occupational groups in the society, which would undoubtedly affect the pattern of economic adjustments to disarmament policies. Such a study would be a useful complement to Rosenbluth's analysis. In the long run, economic criteria are not the most important considerations in building armies and defense industries, and it is unlikely that they would be the major considerations governing the dissolution of defense establishments.

In his conclusion McLin has referred to the desire of Canadian leaders to achieve some measure of distinctiveness in Canadian defense policy. Fact is, Rosenbluth's book points to what could be the most distinctive contribution of all. The likelihood of Canada's disarming is indeed remote, but what can be said is that Canada, more than any other Western nation, is in a position to seriously consider this step.

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Imperial Japan's Higher Civil Service Examinations, By Robert M. Spaulding, Jr. (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1967. Pp. xiv, 416. \$10.00.)

For all the wonders of Japan's hundred-year "leap forward" in economic strength, no one would deny that political modernization has had a large part in the "miracle" of post-feudal Japan. Much attention has been paid to the changing nature of the top political leadership, but relatively little to the operations of government at the levels below the top. In some ways, the Japanese success in maintaining an efficient and unbroken flow of governmental services, such as tax collection, police protection, and the operation of courts, despite the tremendous disruptions of the shift from feudalism and isolation during the past century, is even more impressive than the mixed quality of top political leadership during this period. Certainly the development of an extremely strong and modernized civil bureaucracy has been an outstanding achievement and gives Japan today one of the most important foundation stones on which its spectacular economic success has been firmly based.

Professor Spaulding has contributed greatly to our understanding of this whole aspect of modern Japanese government by his meticulous study of the development of the examination system for higher civil service posts between 1884 and 1943. A major merit of his work is that he does not shy away from the complexities of the subject. Past treatments have tended to be great oversimplifications, merging original intentions, early beginnings, and ultimate outcomes into a vague whole. Professor Spaulding shows how complicated, diverse, and sometimes contradictory the system actually was, as is the case with all complex institutions developed over time in response to specific needs.

While this is the greatest merit of this book, it also might be called its greatest weakness, because the less knowledgeable reader can, become easily lost in the mass of detail. The author, however, works manfully to avoid this danger by putting his materials whenever possible into excellent tabular form. There are no less than 12 diagramatic figures, 61 statistical tables, and 10 appendices, all of which will help make this book an indispensable starting point and reference aid for anyone studying this aspect of Japanese government and history.

Professor Spaulding shows clearly that the nineteenth century Japanese, although they were familiar with the concept of civil service examinations from their borrowing of Chinese government institutions more than a millennium earlier and although they used German models for their new system, actually developed it in response to specific needs. They started off with the creation of special schools to produce the type of higher government servants they required. In the military field, as in other countries, this became the major source or recruitment, and the Tokyo Imperial University and subsequent Imperial Universities were designed primarily to produce top civil administrators for government. The adoption of the first examination system in 1884 was only a temporary measure to expand the judiciary in preparation for the elimination of extraterritoriality. The expanded system of 1887 was merely designed to supplement the inadequate flow of Tokyo University graduates into administrative posts, and, after six years of little use, it took on importance only in 1893 when it became evident that Tokyo graduates alone outnumbered the number of openings and thus would have to be subjected to examinations along with other applicants. Finally from 1918 to 1923 the system was standardized into the tripartite diplomatic, general administrative, and judicial system that has become familiar to students of modern Japan and has now for several decades produced not only the great bulk of Japanese governmental leadership below the top decision-making posts, but also a surprisingly large number of the top decision makers as well.

Professor Spaulding has done such an excellent job of sorting out an extremely tangled body of material that it is unfair to blame him for not having taken on other even more difficult tasks. But one would hope that in further studies he would try to evaluate the results of the examination system more deeply. He does deal at great length with the long wrangles in Japan over discrimination against the students of private law schools (as opposed to the national ones), the narrow legalistic training of all candidates for the examinations, and the balance between the examination route to government office and the "free appointment" system for the top political leaders and the "screening" system for teachers in government schools and other "technical personnel" below the high administrative posts. One would wish, however, that some day he would try to evaluate more fully the examination system in terms of its recruitment of real talent from a broad spectrum of Japanese society and the efficiency of its products in government service. On both scores it probably rates high, but at present such an estimate is little more than a guess.

Professor Spaulding does show, through very conclusive statistics, how the products of the civil service examination system did take over the great bulk of high administrative posts from vice-ministers down to bureau and section chiefs. He also points out how the Japanese dropped the prolonged, unsalaried training period for the successful examination candidate which was an important part of the German system but constituted a serious economic barrier to high government posts for the less wealthy. He also argues that the Japanese examination system was really just the capstone of a pyramical system of scholastic examinations, which was broadly open to all Japanese. He gives a few statistics to show the broadening scope of this system, such as the drop of the percentage of upper class (shizoku origin) law school students at Tokyo University from 82 per cent in the late 1880's to 50 per cent in 1895. He does not try, however, to develop these themes in detail or to evaluate the ultimate performance in government of the products of the examination system. These comments are not criticisms of an excellent book which opens up a whole new subject for serious study. They are merely offered as encouragement for more.

Edwin O. Reischauer

Harvard University

Studies in Philosophy, Politics and Economics. By Friedrich A. Hayek. (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1967. Pp. x, 356. \$6.50.)

The title of this collection of F. A. Havek's latest writings is apt: it consists of essays or studies and they are about philosophy, politics, and economics. Some twenty-five essays, about equally divided among these three areas, testify to the extraordinary range of Professor Hayek's concerns, his vast erudition, and skill at conveying his messages. It would be a very rare political scientist who could not find at least one of these essays interesting and relevant to his own interests. Conversely, it would require a rather strange political scientist who would find all or even many of the studies germane to his own concerns. This reviewer is no exception as the remainder of the review will make clear. I should add that some of Hayek's points, especially in the philosophy section were not particularly meaningful to me so I intend to avoid discussion of them. Others, more learned in matters philosophic, will have to provide their own guidance among these eight chapters on such diverse topics as "explanation," "kinds of rationalism," and the "legal and political philosophy of David Hume."

While several of the essays in this volume are published for the first time relatively little is said that would disconfirm Hayek's observation that most of our basic ideas are formed early in life and only painfully revised in subsequent years. Hayek's philosophical commitments have been known for a long time because he has taken extreme and often unpopular but always articulate positions on science, political life and economic policies. These essays only restate those basic views in different contexts and on different occasions. This is not to say that Hayek has not learned; he has as he generously admits that Karl Popper taught him how to modify his views on "scientism." Hayek no longer views the physical and social sciences as quite so distinct because he has learned to observe what each does rather than what each claims it is doing. Attention to the processes of scientific inquiry suggest a much smaller gap than does comparison of the outputs, especially as they are ideally stated. Still, social scientists are well advised not to imitate their more esteemed colleagues in the physical sciences. This seems like eminently sound advice for political scientists and particularly so now that the battle over behavioralism is over and political behavioralists feel sufficiently secure that they need not continue arguing methodology from a defensive posture.

Professor Hayek's political and economi values have remained more constant and havundoubtedly been anathema to the liberal es establishment of American social science. Per haps they should have been so, but times dechange and as "new" issues arise and experi ence accumulates we may find it necessary to review our own values and perhaps even admi to finding the highly individualistic philosophy of a Havek somewhat more informed and rele vant than previously was the case. The growth of central planning and our widespread ex perience with some of the less admirable conse quences of bureaucracy and controls, etc. of the past three or four decades serves to remine us of Hayek's basic insights into social, political, and economic organization. While the intellectual and polemical debates over "planning" versus "laissez faire" have waned greatly the search for appropriate and optima practical solutions to make political and economic choices continues in the real world ofdaily affairs. We now have had several decades of hard experience with various and diverse forms of public planning under a variety of conditions to compare with many more decades of private planning. The character of the current debate and the search is, therefore, quite different from earlier days when Hayek and his colleagues were first attempting to understand and predict the behavior of collectivist institutions for making social choices. The polemics of an earlier day provide little solid advice on operating various institutions especially in newly-developing nations although they may have served to educate socialists somewhat and perhaps even delayed the onrush of socialism. In any case, while some of Havek's most dire predictions about socialism inevitably leading to totalitarianism have vet to be realized, if they ever will, many of his less dire assertions have been amply realized. Thus, Hayek had warned us on the shortcomings of complete planning and particularly of public bureaucracy. Ironically, many present-day radicals make similar observations and complaints about contemporary society. The quest for greater individualism and free choice, in all walks of life, through greater decentralization of power appears a major theme not only in Hayek's writings but those of today's selfproclaimed radicals. Few radicals demand socialism anymore even if their heroes may be Mao, Castro, or Ho. Several socialist countries are experimenting on a vast scale with decentralized decision-making through the use of markets and a more freely operating price mechanism as well as adapting some typical capitalist inducements or motivations to

achieve more efficient production and distribution. Perhaps, Hayek was right in dedicating The Road to Serfdom "To the Socialists of All Parties."

One of the more interesting chapters in Hayek's collection concerns The Road to Serfdom and its reception in Britain and the United States. Written some twelve years after the original publication date (1944) this essay constitutes an instructive chapter in the sociology of ideas. Hayek claims that the book received a most serious reception in Britain but a somewhat hysterical one in the United States. The author suggests that Europeans having had experience with socialism were open to his analysis but that many influential Americans were naive idealists with glittering hopes for public planning. One might add that those Americans who welcomed Hayek's book were not exactly playing it "cool" themselves. In any event, planning today assumes countless institutional forms and what is most needed is not further polemics but hard-headed analyses of the functioning and consequences of specific choice processes in all their great variability and social settings. Such inquiries are no longer likely to sound like The Road to Serfdom. More likely they will resemble the far more descriptive and dispassionate analyses of a Bergson, Nove, Stolper, Montias, or Hacket.

Although the positions taken by Professor Hayek on science, socialism, and economic policies have not been notably popular among academics his stature as a scholar is unassailable; he is a remarkable man. Oscar Lange, if I am not mistaken, is reputed to have said that a statue of von Mises ought to be erected in Moscow or Warsaw for his contribution to the socialist understanding of the economic problem of allocation. I would add Havek not only for his technical contributions but his pleas for human liberty. He has served mankind well. As this volume amply conveys his high esteem for economic liberty and political freedom so too it reinforces his stature as a concerned philosopher.

WILLIAM C. MITCHELL

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International Political Communication. By W. Phillips Davison. (New York: Frederick A. Praeger, 1965, Pp. xii, 404. \$7.50.)

"Librarians faced with the necessity of classifying a book with 'Communication' in its title," the author wryly observes, "are tempted to hide it instead." Unlike any such bewildered librarian, Professor Davison insists on clarity and relevance, and he maintains both admi-

rably throughout his substantial, thoughtful and fact-filled book.

The author defines "communication" as "the whole process by which meaning is transferred" (his emphasis). The plural "communications," is then to "refer to the messages themselves." This process and these messages are then to be studied in the bulk of the book as "a tool of foreign policy."

The reader is to learn how they are used, and how they could be used more effectively, to advance national policy goals, and particularly the foreign policy goals of the United States.

For this task, a formidable array of professional experience and competence has been brought together. Professor Davison himself has had a rich experience in the practices, as well as in the study, of international communication, through his service with the United States government, the RAND Corporation, and a number of leading universities. In addition, this book has benefitted from the work of a 1962-63 study group of the Council on Foreign Relations which included not only several leading educators and businessmen but also such specialists in journalism, communications research or international relations as Lester Market, Philip E. Mosely, Ithiel de Sola Pool, Leo Rosten, Hans Speier, Shepard Stone and Ralph K. White. Another dozen of specialists read parts of the manuscript, or contributed ideas which, says the author, were "incorporated without explicit citations."

The resulting book is, within the limits of its size and objectives, the most thorough, authoritative and up-to-date treatment of its subject than we have. Its large array of information is organized with sensitivity and good judgment. In order to know what one can do with communications, Mr. Davison insists, one must first know how and through what channels they are flowing, and what effects they are likely to have in the context of the existing memories and predispositions of the audiences which they reach. "People," he reminds us, "have an almost unlimited capacity to ignore information they find unwelcome or irrelevant."

Accordingly, the first part of the book deals with the international network of communication channels, the impact of communications on individuals and organizations, and the respective political roles of communication in democracies, Communist states, and developing nations. Only after drawing the attention of his readers so thoroughly to what is likely to happen in the world in any case—that is, to the autonomous probabilities and predispositions

of individuals and nations—does the author proceed in the second part of the book to discuss the deliberate use of communications to implement national policy. Here he first analyses the general structure of international communication programs, and then discusses in separate chapters "Communist International Communication" and the foreign information and cultural activities of the United States. The last two chapters of the book are then increasingly prescriptive: One deals with the problem of "focussing" or coordinating American Communication programs while the other examines the roles of the United States government in international communication. together with possible ways for making these more effective.

A book which covers such a broad field and summarizes so much knowledge and experience for the general reader, cannot avoid including a great deal of matters that will be quite familiar to specialists. Yet, even these familiar topics are treated with lucidity, and often with impressive humanity and wisdom. The policy recommendations range widely, from a call for a new form of area-wide reports on United States information activities (to supplement the present more narrowly segmented reports on an agency basis) to such shrewd and philosophic point as the observation that "the most important tool for explaining the United States to peoples from other countries is 'the big ear' "-a dramatic highlight for the author's persistent concern for keeping the flow of international communications free and keeping it a two-way process.

Here at the end, perhaps the book points bevond its own limits toward a task of communication research that is yet to be done. Messages are not only means to influence recipients and tools to promote policies which are supposed to be given. What we tell others also tends to be fed back into our own memories and to shape the premises of our own decisions tomorrow. Those who use communications to manipulate other people often end up having manipulated themselves, for today's manipulative message is often tomorrow's decision premise of the actor who first uttered it. Causation in the communication process moves not in straight lines but in feedback loops. The words "tool," "use." "effect," "impact," and the like, so frequent in Professor Davison's book, eventually will have to be supplemented by another set of words stressing the continuous process of orientation and reorientation, perception and misperception, goal pursuit and goal change, which are going on in each actor in world politicswhether it be a nation, a people, a government, an interest group, or an individual statesman. It is one more indication of the merits of Mr. Davison's book that the momentum of its argument may well tend to move future research and policy analysis somewhat more in this direction.

KARL W. DEUTSCH

Harvard University

International Regions and the International System: A Study in Political Ecology. By BRUCE M. RUSSETT. (Chicago: Rand, McNally & Company, 1967. Pp. xvi, 252. \$8.50.)

In its opening pages, this book holds out promise of being a very model of proper modern scholarship in the social sciences. For one thing, Professor Russett promises to deal with important topics: "relations between political systems and their social and physical environment." "the formation and decomposition of coalitions among nations," and "the conditions of peaceful change in the [international] system." (vii) Furthermore, the work is based on a formidable array of data, much of which were collected for the same nations over time. And the author demonstrates, as he has in previous work, a clear mastery of many complex and varied tools of the social sciences. In light of these favorable portents, it is most surprising to find that the book itself is, in two respects, a remarkably narrow work. For almost the entire study rests upon but one theoretical proposition, and the bulk of the analysis is performed with but a single statistical technique.

The dominant proposition—actually of such broad import that it might be termed a paradigm-is that reliance upon social and economic variables is the way to explain political phenomena. At the beginning of his book. Russett alludes to economic and social "determinants" of politics. (vii) In an intriguing compound sentence he goes on to state that "International relations is truly an interdisciplinary study, and any attempt to explain its political aspects must depend heavily on social and economic variables." (viii) Few would challenge the first part of that sentence, but the second part is a good deal more questionable. Certainly some environmental variables will be part of any sound theoretical study of politics. But how many, and which ones? And what is the relative potency of the environment and such political variables as the structure of political relations, the nature of coalitions, the dynamics of political-decision-making, and the like? In what ways does political action alter the environment? In the presentation of his research, Russett clearly judges these questions to be of secondary importance. By far the greater part of the text is devoted to categorizing nations on the basis of religion, culture, urbanization, gross national product, trade, and other social and economic characteristics. Political behavior is assumed to flow more or less directly from this non-political milieu. Such an assumption holds up rather well for some after-the-fact predictions. Both Albania and Mainland China, for example, do not cluster well with the other communist states on the basis of ecological factors. But the assumption may be cast in some doubt by the recent behavior of two other communist mavericks, Romania and Czechoslovakia, which Russett claims are unambiguous members of the "core group" of communist states. (171)

Heavy reliance upon factor analysis is, in a sense, the methodological counterpart of Russett's basic ecological paradigm. Factor analysis, in Russett's hands (or rather computer), is an extension of correlational techniques for the purpose of grouping ecological variables into a smaller number of general factors. But the theoretical-contributions of factor analysis can be only as great as the theoretical importance of the variables which are analyzed. Briefly, the dilemma of the factor analyst-theoretician is this: he must begin with some good theory before he can generate more theory from factor analysis. Russett proceeds as if his ecological perspective does in fact provide such theory. But until that theory is confirmed, a work, such as International Regions, which relies heavily on factor analysis, must be considered essentially a pre-theoretical sorting out of possibly interesting and relevant theoretical variables.

Problems associated with Russett's single theoretical perspective and single statistical technique are quite clearly illustrated in his treatment of U. N. roll-call votes. Consistent with his attraction to the ecological paradigm, Russett studies voting, a political act, in order to measure attitudes, a non-political ecological phenomenon. Despite the obvious conceptual difficulties involved, he says this is necessary simply because elite and mass attitudes are so hard to get at directly. But it does not follow from this why one should decide to pick out U. N. roll-call votes as the means for studying attitudes. This is especially so since votes would seem better measures of other interesting phenomena, such as international concordance and conflict, and the public stances of governments on the issues considered in the General Assembly.

Another difficulty with the analysis of voting is the technique used by Russett to render

U. N. roll-calls susceptible to factor analysis. Since nations regularly select one of three voting options, Russett has found it necessary to assign an artibrary number to each of these positions. The numbers he has selected are 0 for a "No" vote, 1 for an "Abstain," and 2 for a "Yes" vote. These numbers are then correlated and factor analyzed. For Russett's 0, 1, 2 coding to be valid, the three voting positions must comprise a single dimension in such a way that "Abstain" is a moderate position, spaced equidistantly between "Yes" and "No." Contrary to this requirement, we know that some nations, as a matter of fact, abstain because they feel that a given resolution does not go far enough; others abstain because they feel even considering the resolution is improper. From what we do know about the reasons for voting, we can say that some countries, for a variety of reasons, adopt a common and distinct voting position of "Abstain," just as others, for a variety of reasons adopt, the common and distinct positions of "Yes" and "No." Voting positions are, in other words, nominal categories. They are not ordinal, and they are certainly not interval, as Russett's coding makes them out to be. And finally, his coding scheme results in treating any pair of agreeing votes the same, irrespective of whether the agreement appears as part of a large majority, or as part of a tiny minority. It has been plausibly argued that votes are especially important for political analysis when they are very closely divided; from this point of view we might wish to know how the agreement patterns differ as votes approach a nearly even division. Alternatively, it is interesting to note which states remain "foul-weather friends" and vote together even when they are opposed by a large majority. But these are concerns of one who views voting as a political phenomenon, rather than, as Russett, the registering of psychological predispositions. Russett's only acknowledgement of variations in vote distributions is his exclusion of those roll-calls in which 90% or more of the members cast the same votes since distributions of this sort cause serious distortion in correlation coefficients.

But however much one chooses to agree or disagree with Russett's arguments, it must be admitted that a brief review cannot do full justice to a book which tackles so many important questions and analyzes such massive amounts of data. At the very least, one should not be surprised if this book, as the author himself suggests, "stimulates work which makes it obsolete." (viii)

MICHAEL K. O'LEARY

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Islamic Reform: The Political and Legal Theories of Muhammad Abduh and Rashid Rida. By Malcolm H. Kerr. (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1966. Pp. vii, 249. \$6.95.)

Modern Islamic reformism has been generated partly from within but mainly as a response to the Western assault, in both its intellectual and political dimensions, against the Muslim world. Modernism was born when Muslims for the first time asked the question: "why have the Europeans made so much progress while the peoples of the East remain backward?" "What is the secret behind the progress of the West and the cause for the backwardness of the East?" The impulse behind these and similar questions was the fear that the political ascendancy of the West, with its intellectual advances and pervasive influences of material civilization, would gradually erode the traditional bases for faith in God and menace Islamic existence.

In response to this challenge, three broad groups of reformists have evolved in modern Islam. (1) The revivalists, a strongly conservative group, advocate return to the purity and literalism of the Shari'a (Islamic Divine Law) as a means of strengthening Islam and uniting the Muslims. (2) The secularists, a Westerneducated group, call for the separation of church and state and for the adoption of Western science and civilization. (3) The modernists who maintain that Islam is not opposed to progress, rather it is compatible with it, and consequently a reformulation of Islamic doctrines in terms of modern thought is not only possible but desirable. Their concern is essentially how to relate the past to the present and the future in a positive and meaningful way-how to become modern and remain Muslim at the same time. The dominant figure in this group is Muhammad Abduh, an Egyptian theologian of impressive intellectual ability, whose political and legal theories and those of his disciple, Muhammad Rashid Rida, an Egyptian of Syrian origin, are the subject of the volume under review.

Islamic Reform, by Dr. Malcolm H. Kerr, Chairman of the Political Science Department at the University of California at Los Angeles, is purported to be a study of the political and legal theories of the two Egyptian reformers. Yet, the author devotes half of the book to an exposition of the classical Islamic theories of the Caliphate (Islamic State) and canonical jurisprudence (fiqh). His justification seems to be that such an extensive analysis is important or necessary because "many modern reformists such as Rashid Rida, under the influence of

Muhammad Abduh, proclaimed it their objective to make these doctrines to serve as . . . a basis" for determining the processes of politics in the modern age. (p. 12) In view of the fact that classical Islamic theories have been adequately expounded by Gibb, Gardet, Khadduri, Laoust and Tyan, to whom the author readily acknowledges his debt, the need for such a lengthy "introduction" becomes questionable. However, he does examine these doctrines with a fresh emphasis and the negative purpose "to show that they were not suitable as a basis for determining, with any precision at least, the processes or substance of medieval Muslim politics."

Analysis of classical Islamic theories on their formal level reveals that traditional jurisprudence, like the traditional doctrine of the Caliphate, "was closely tied to its theological foundations." This umbilical relationship between theology on the one hand and constitutional theory and jurisprudence on the other, hastened, in the judgment of the author, the obsolescence of the theory of the Caliphate and restricted the positive evolution of Islamic Law. Even ijma' (consensus of the community) ijtihad (personal opinion) and istislah (public) interest), these promising and dynamic legal sources were also prevented by Muslim jurists from becoming wide-open doors for innovations and adaptations. Istislah, which Dr. Kerr regards as a principle of tremendous potential for positive reform, was subordinated by the jurists to Koranic considerations and restricted as an independent source of the Law. Only a fourteenth century radical champion of istislah, Naim ad-Din Taufi, asserted that every public interest is a necessity and must therefore take precedence over everything else, including the religious texts (p. 97). As Dr. Kerr later indicates, even the modern reformers have hesitated to go that far.

After outlining "some of the fundamental elements in the idealist tradition of Muslim legal and constitutional theory, and having tried to show that these elements were outgrowths of a conservative theology," the author then turns his attention to consider how this tradition was reformulated in late 19th and early 20th centuries by Abduh and Rida. Although Abduh is the most important figure, less space is devoted to him than to his disciple, simply because so much has been already said about him that the author admits he can add nothing more.

Abduh's dominant position in Islamic modernism derives from the fact that he is the first Muslim thinker to attempt a separation of religious issues from the political conflict of the

time, so that, in Gibb's words, "they were no longer interdependent and each was set free to develop along its own appropriate lines." He knew that Islam's fate in the face of modern secularism depended on its revitalization as a system of beliefs rather than a political order. Consequently, the two most important components of his program were: (1) the reformulation of Islamic doctrine in the light of modern thought, and (2) the reformation of Muslim higher education. Yet, according to Dr. Kerr, Adbuh's reformist theology was not "thoroughly naturalist as it purported to be," and since Rida's legal and constitutional doctrines were based on this theology, they were bound to fail. "The shakiness of this basis," says our author, "underlay the incoherence of Rida's ideology, and thus appears to have contributed something to its failure as a political program." (p. 103)

The central point in Abduh's reformist theology is the assertion that the theory of natural law (and for that matter, the law of causality) is identical with the theory of divine voluntarism in the orthodox Ash'arite theology which dominated the Muslim mind since the beginning of the 10th century. His difficulty stems from the fact that a thoroughgoing naturalism would completely negate the cardinal Islamic dogma that God's constant intervention sustains this world. Less than that would not satisfy modern scientific thought. Rida accepted Abduh's reformist theology by insisting on the naturalism of Islamic legal and constitutional doctrines, "without consistently interpreting their processes in the ways that naturalism would demand." (p. 106) Rida was fighting a losing battle. When he wrote his treatise on the

Caliphate in 1922, the Turkish Grand National Assembly had stripped the Ottoman Caliphate of all its temporal powers (in 1924 it was completely abolished by Mustafa Kemal). This must have conditioned his decision to revive the classical constitutional and legal doctrines and base them on Abduh's shaky naturalism. He was bound to end up in fundamentalism, and Dr. Kerr's final epitaph that Rida's "intellectual career symbolizes in some ways the political failure of the whole Islamic modernist movement," is well deserved.

But in the final analysis, how does one judge the success or failure of an intellectual career? Is Plato a failure simply because his ideal regime is unrealizable? True to the Islamic ideal with its postulate that temporal life must have spiritual significance, Abduh and Rida dreamed of a reformation whereby the true spirit of Islam would infuse public life in all of its aspects thus leading to a revitalization of the Muslim nation with a culture and a way of life that is genuinely its own. Pragmatically, they have not been successful; but no serious person would ridicule their spiritual concern!

Dr. Kerr's training in modern political science and his intimate knowledge of the Middle East qualify him to address himself to the subject of Islamic modernism. His book is a welcome addition to a new kind of political literature on Islam and the Middle East. There are a few typographical errors that could have been avoided. Strangely enough, they abound in the text more than in the English transliterations of the Arabic.

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NOTES

POLITICAL THEORY, HISTORY OF POLITICAL THOUGHT, AND METHODOLOGY

The Nature of Political Inquiry. Вт FRED M. FROноск. (Homewood, Illinois: The Dorsey Press, 1967. Pp. vii, 218. \$5.00.)

The purpose of this book is to provide "a quick, wide scan of some landscape too often overlooked in contemporary political science, with a particular emphasis on values in political investigation." The landscape surveyed includes the epistemological premises of logical positivism and metaphysics; the nature of functional and causal explanations; the characteristics of scientific social analysis; the role of values in political behavior and political

analysis. The terrain is wide and in places treacherous. But there are tried and trustworthy guides—Brecht, Hempel, Kuhn, Mannheim, Merton, Nagel, Polanyi, Strauss, Familiar landmarks soon come into view: the scientific enterprise rests on epistemological premises which cannot themselves be validated through scientific method; value-statements cannot ultimately be verified through scientific method, yet values are an aspect of all social behavior including political behavior; scientific method presumes the value of objective neutrality, yet at any given time most scientific anal-

ysis is directed by a dominant paradigm which is defended by partisan adherents; although scientific knowledge is explicit and publicly accessible, the actual process of scientific inquiry involves tacit and intuitive elements which defy scientific analysis; total exclusion of value premises from political inquiry is impossible, but within the domain of empirical political phenomena, including the processes by which values are formed and applied, scientific method yields valid findings. Many other points are touched upon in Frohock's survey, but these are among the central tenets of the argument.

How should the argument be described? For want of a more elegant term I would call it sensible positivism; it is positivism shorn of its claim to a monopoly of truth, shorn of its epistemological arrogance. But if logical positivism is arrogant, it is also philosophically coherent; sensible positivism is appealingly modest—but is it a coherent doctrine? On the evidence of this book the answer must be a reluctant no. The answer is reluctant because sensible positivism is surely the prevailing epistemological faith among political analysts who share an empirical orientation. Although one may quarrel with some of Frohock's specific interpretations, his basic conclusions are widely accepted by the community of practicing political scientists. Yet these conclusions do not comprise a distinctive solution to basic epistemological problems.

An explicit purpose of Frohock's survey is to show how concern with fundamental problems in the philosophy of science can guide the selection and formulation of subjects for empirical research. We must ask, then, what redirection of effort is required if we take seriously the tenets of sensible positivism. Apparently, not much, For Frohock, the very model of a modern sensible positivist seems to be David Easton. Easton's strictures in The Political System on the connection between empirical theory and normative premises are quoted approvingly, and his work on the political socialization of children is cited as distinctly appropriate for enlightened research. Other subjects are also recommended-including the effects of political symbols and the impact of irrational forces on political behavior. Actually, however, I cannot see that any major current strand of empirical research falls outside the pale by the suggested standards. Studies of community formation, decision-making and the policy process, political participation and compliance—these are as much concerned with values and the place of values in political behavior as studies of political socialization.

Nor am I entirely convinced—and this is more serious—of the implications Frohock draws concerning the additional kinds of empirical research that should be included on our agenda. He calls

for greater attention to work by psychologists on early learning experiences and by ethologists on the biological bases of human behavior, which has perhaps not had sufficient impact in political analysis. This is fair enough. But two comments seem in order. First, why must we traverse such arduous terrain in order to decide that the origins of political cognition and the process of political socialization are appropriate subjects for further study? And second, why does our philosophic sojourn necessarily lead us to place greater emphasis on political psychology and less emphasis, say, on political economy? Frohock is familiar with recent efforts to apply economic analysis to the study of politics. But aside from some interesting comments on the concept of rationality he does not examine the claims of this important school of analysis. Yet his philosophic arguments hardly disqualify economic types of analysis as a useful approach to political phenomena. Frohock defines politics as prescriptive behavior that is "public, comprehensive, categorical, and/or legitimate." He gives no reason why such behavior cannot be studied within the framework of economic models. In other words, a major alternative type of analysis, neglected by Frohock, is also consistent with sensible positivism. It is thus difficult to accept as decisive the recommendations said to derive from his philosophic inquiry.—EDWIN FOGELMAN, University of Minnesota.

Marxism: A Re-Examination. By IRVING M. ZEIT-LIN. (Princeton: D. Van Nostrand and Co., 1967. Pp. v. 170. \$1.95.)

Sidney Hook once wrote that conflicting doctrinal interpretations of Marx "were ways of making history, innocently paraded as methods of reading it." This astute observation has wide and continuing application but a special poignancy in the attempt of some East European scholars to emphasize the humanist foundations of Marxist thought in order to build a more just socialist society and preclude the revival of Stalinism. This attempt has gained force from the rediscovery of Karl Marx's Economic and Philosophic Manuscripts, written by him in 1844, when he was 26 years of age, and first published in 1932, which form the point of departure for Professor Zeitlin's reevaluation of Marx.

In these early writings, Professor Zeitlin points out, Marx was deeply concerned with "alienation" which, under the capitalist mode of production, did not develop the worker's mental or physical energies, left him unfulfilled, and with a feeling of misery rather than well-being. "Communism" which will abolish private property and human self-alienation, wrote Marx, "is humanism." While, says Professor Zeitlin, Marx later abandoned the term "alienation" in favor of more precise, scien-

tific and politically effective terms, such as "exploitation" and "commodity-fetishism," he insists that Marx "was moved in *all* his work by humanistic values." (Author's emphasis.)

Many Western scholars, of whom Daniel Bell is typical, have argued that it is "myth-making" to read the conception of alienation back as the central theme of Marx because the historical Marx moved from concern with the individual worker's incapacity to express himself in his work to the doctrine of surplus value, seen as exploitation of the workers en masse so that for Marx "the only social reality is not Man, nor the individual but economic classes."

The curious thing to me is that although these positions, tenaciously held and seriously debated, seem irreconcilable, the conflict is more apparent than real, more Talmudic than substantive. It is true that Marx, to distinguish himself from the utopian socialists with their appeals to humanity, reason and justice, insisted that conceptions of justice derived from the existing economic order, that it was not a question of what the proletariat ought to do but what, in view of its being, it will be compelled to do as "capitalist production creates with the necessity of a natural process the negation of itself." Accordingly, he sought to eliminate from manifestoes and programs all references to abstract justice and rights of man as "ideological nonsense" which would only encourage hypocrisy and confusion of thought.

On the other hand, it is impossible to read Marx's writing, early and late, without being impressed with his passionate indignation as the cruelties and barbarities inflicted by capitalism in his day on men individually and collectively and his implicit and explicit affirmations that only under communism would men be truly human, free, and equal. Thus, for example, in Das Kapital he wrote that capitalist manufacture "converts the labourer into a crippled monstrosity" by reducing his work to detailed manipulation just as in certain places "they butcher a whole beast for the sake of his hide or his tallow." He set forth a searing condemnation of the labor of children of nine or ten years "dragged from their squalid beds at two, three, or four o'clock in the morning and compelled to work for a bare subsistence until ten, eleven, or twelve at night, their limbs wearing away, their frames dwindling, their faces whitening, and their humanity absolutely sinking into a stonelike torpor, utterly horrible to contemplate." As for communism, in his Critique of the Gotha Program in 1875, Marx specifically envisioned that it would come with "the all-around development of the individual" and end "the enslaving subordination of the individual to the division of labor." How, in fact, can it truly be maintained that communism, conceived of as a stateless, classless society, built upon voluntary cooperation and complete freedom, and proclaiming the principle of equality, "from each according to his ability, to each according to his needs," (however utopian) is bereft of humanist concern with the individual? I believe, then, that Professor Zeitlin is essentially right when he maintains that Marx did not abandon the concept of alienation but "sharpened and concretized it as an objective process in the world of work."

What I find far less convincing is Professor Zeitlin's attempt, on the bases of Marx's analyses of events of his time and journalistic writings, to reformulate and denigrate Marx's economic determinism. While it is true that in these writings, Marx did not, as Zeitlin says, automatically assume that political events were always effects of economic causes, and attempted to treat such relationships empirically, there is no evidence to suggest that he considered conflicting data anything other than aberrant or transient conditions which did not undermine or make it necessary for him to recast his general theoretical formulations. It is dubious, too, whether Marx-so passionately convinced of the validity of his theories-would have shared Professor Zeitlin's notion that "his conception of society, and the historical change it underwent, was to be regarded above all as a 'guide to study."

For the rest, Professor Zeitlin undertakes to analyze which of Marx's theories have stood the tests of time and experience and to erect on this basis a guide for the analysis of structure and change in whole societies. While I, for one, would quarrel (if space permitted) with some of his specific findings, I can only applaud his conclusions that "non-dogmatic Marxism will continue to provide insights into the workings of social systems, and enlighten social research generally." I think, however, it would be well to recognize that the continuing importance and appeal of Marx lie not in the soundness of his specific theories which in fundamentals, such as the materialist conception of history, the increasing misery of the proletariat, the nature and role of class struggle, have proved simplistic but because Marxism still raises certain challenging questions, including the comparative abilities of capitalist and socialist economies to maintain high rates of economic growth, create conditions for full and meaningful employment, eliminate poverty, and build free and equal societies.-Samuel Hendel, The City University of New York.

Politics and Social Science. By W. J. M. Macken-ZIE. (Baltimore: Penguin Books, 1967. pp. 392, \$1.95.)

Politics and Social Science, by W. J. M. Mackenzie, is a book in which an effort is made to interpret "political science to the social scientist, and social science to the student of politics." Mackenzie is a British political scientist and is writing for a predominantly British audience. The scope of the book, however, is sufficiently broad for political scientists on either side of the Atlantic. Indeed, the breadth of the book is, itself, one of its major problems, for it purports to present a "complete survey of the incredible diversity of modern political science."

The book is broken into five parts, each dealing with a major area of social or political science: traditional political science, political science in the universities, contemporary theory, politics "without states": and a concluding part on "men and their states." In part one Mackenzie summarizes briefly political science as it has been in the past dealing primarily with the classic writers on politics. Part two introduces the reader to the history and role of political science in the university. This includes proper noting of the teaching and research roles of political scientists, and the impact of American political science on that of England and the world. This part also introduces the reader to behavioral science, although he (rightly I think) avoids the traditionalist/behavioralist controversy in the United States with the hope that "we can avoid this sort of nonsense in Britain."

Part three, which is the first of the two most significant sections of the book, deals with contemporary theory. Mackenzie summarizes the role of theory, especially of "over-arching" or "general" theory, in its traditional context, then moves to a discussion of Easton's "systems theory," and "Parsonian" theory. The "partial" theories of information, games, and welfare economics, are also summarized. Part four is an attempt to deal with empirical study in political and social science, centering on social biology, small groups, tribal societies, community power, organizations, and linguistic analysis.

Although the purpose of the book is admirable, its execution leaves a good bit to be desired. First, with respect to contemporary theory, important as Parsons and Easton are, they are not the only examples of efforts at formulating general theory. Moreover, even though there are distinct differences between Parsons and Easton—as Mackenzie correctly points out—they, along with theorists such as Almond, represent the same "school" in the philosophy of science, namely, functionalism. Thus, using Easton and Parson does not, it would seem, present the reader with very broad scope in contemporary efforts in theory building.

One gains a similar reaction from reading the chapter on "partial" theories. Important as information theory, games theory, and the theories of welfare economics are, they are somewhat less il-

lustrative of major trends in political science than are other empirically-related theory building efforts. On the positive side, however, Mackenzie does make a distinct effort in these chapters to relate the theories he discusses to the study of politics. In this sense he is partially fulfilling his purpose of instructing the discipline.

In part four, "politics without states," Mackenzie seeks to introduce the reader, and perhaps the discipline of political science, to what he considers to be important sources of political data. What results is a very uneven presentation of what seems to be a "hodge-podge" of data collection techniques and orientations. A prime example of the problem is his chapter on small groups, based largely on Verba's summary of the literature in Small Groups and Political Behavior, Inexplicably, the one area in political science which has attempted to make extensive use of small group concepts, (both in technique and theory)-studies of judicial behavior-is nearly ignored. Such pioneers in small group research, such as Moreno. Bales, and Borgatta, are given scant notice, Most importantly, however, Mackenzie does not specifically address himself to the question of how a political scientist can utilize small group theory and technique. I presume he assumes that it should be self-evident from his presentation. That such assumptions of self-evidence are risky was amply illustrated to this reviewer when, after reading a methodological discussion of small group research. another member of the discipline commented that "even if (small group methods) were more widely known (by political scientist), it is unlikely that there would be any interest in using them." The fact that, apart from the judicial behavior articles, only one work (Wayne L. Francis, 56, pp. 953-960), using "legitimate" (Moreno's sociometric choice tests) small group methods, has appeared in the pages of this journal since 1960, also illustrates the apparent inability of political scientists to apply small group techniques. Mackenzie quite rightly emphasizes the study of "communications," "leadership," "group norms," and the like, in small group study, but nowhere is this explicitly related to why these should be studied in small political groups. Moreover, some sections, such as the one on "research problems and methods," are so uneven that the points attempted are hardly made at all.

Finally, on the positive side, it should be said that there is room in the discipline, for such a book as Mackenzie's. Even though the integration of the social sciences has been slowly progressing, political science still tends to be somewhat parochial, although, as Mackenzie notes, this may be more true of American than of British political science. In any event, at least some political scientists do need instruction in what can be gained

from other disciplines in the social and behavioral sciences. As a last note, it should be said that the foregoing criticisms may themselves be indicative of the somewhat parochial character of American political science. As Mackenzie points out, the distinctions between political science on the one hand, and social anthropology, social psychology, and sociology, on the other, have not been as distinct in Britain as in the United States. Hence, for a British audience, some of the points he puts forth may be more self-evident than they are for an American audience.—Thomas Wm. Madron, Western Kentucky University.

Political Theory and The Rights of Man. Edited By D. Raphael. (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1967. Pp. viii, 151. \$5.75.)

This book is a symposium of ten essays which arose out of a section of the Sixth World Congress of the International Political Science Association held at Geneva in September of 1964. The subject chosen then for discussion was that of human rights, and the programme was divided into two parts: one on natural rights in Hobbes and Locke, and the other on modern conceptions of human rights as formulated in the Universal Declaration of 1948. Five of the essays included in the volume are revisions of papers presented at the Congress, the remaining five were written later, four of them specially for this collection and designed to carry further the original discussion by way of rebuttal and elaboration.

For the most part the collection reflects the original two-part symposium. The first three essays are by C. B. Macpherson, Raymond Polin, and J. W. Chapman, all discussions of the rights of man in Hobbes and Locke. Macpherson sums up his well-known views as presented in his book The Political Theory of Possessive Individualism (1962) by way of asking the question whether the concepts of natural rights as found in Hobbes or Locke can be of any use in formulating a concept of human rights today. He believes that they cannot. An acceptable concept of natural rights must, Macpherson believes, meet two requirements: (a) it must provide a certain minimum equality, at least as an equal access to the means of convenient living, and (b) it must include rights of recipience as well as rights of action, that is, there must be an obligation to respect each man's rights. Hobbes's doctrine allows for equality but does not establish rights of recipience; Locke provides for rights of recipience but his natural rights «are extremely unequal in consequence of his arguments for the right of unlimited accumulation. The reason both Hobbes and Locke fail to meet -our present day requirements for a theory of rights lies, in Macpherson's view, in their postu-Tate that there is a permanent conflict between

the interests of separate individuals. But this assumption of natural contentiousness reflects their implicit conception of bourgeois man in a developing capitalist society. Given their place in history, Hobbes and Locke could not have been expected to see things otherwise. From our standpoint, however, we can see that a society of abundance rather than an economy of scarcity is possible, and so the postulate of necessary conflict among men is increasingly wide of the mark. A concept of human rights satisfying the two requisites of an acceptable notion is gradually becoming more realistic and workable.

Polin gives a careful and reasoned discussion of Hobbes and Locke, but his concern is primarily expository. He does not join issue with Macpherson or examine the use of their doctrines for today, although he does remark that for Locke the doctrine of natural rights is identical with that of liberalism, and that to condemn Locke is perhaps to condemn liberalism and the view of human rights expressed by it. But Chapman in his essay questions Macpherson's interpretation of liberalism. Macpherson, he believes, confuses liberalism with utilitarianism, and therefore regards a liberal society as one that maximizes satisfactions at the expense of justice and freedom. Chapman argues to the contrary that Locke's contract doctrine gives priority to justice and freedom, and that he may be interpreted to hold that inequalities are justified only when everyone directly participating in or affected by them may be reasonably presumed to be advantaged. When Locke allows for what Macpherson calls unlimited accumulation he does so subject to the restriction that all must gain, and this shows that he does not countenance a utilitarian theory of justice. Locke does not permit that the gains for some may be so great that they outweigh corresponding losses to others. Chapman maintains that when Locke's doctrine is properly elaborated the principles of justice, the criteria of economic rationality, and the values of liberty may be seen to be theoretically consistent. This alternative conception of liberalism offers, in Chapman's opinion, a plausible basis for human rights at the present time; it is not a morally defective or incoherent doctrine. Macpherson has failed to distinguish between the utilitarian and the contractarian elements in the liberal tradition, and to note the continuing value of the latter.

All but two of the remaining essays in the volume constitute a debate between Maurice Cranston, D. D. Raphael, and Bernard Mayo on the question of the appropriate definition and formulation of human rights in the modern world. Cranston starts off the discussion by maintaining that the philosophically viable concept of human rights has been obscured and muddied by includ-

ing under it specific claims of another type. It is a mistake, he believes, to conflate social and economic rights, such as the right to old-age pensions. unemployment insurance, and medical services, with traditional human rights such as the right to life, liberty, and a fair trial. The philosophical objection to this is that the new theory of human rights is not coherent, and a confused concept of human rights mitigates against the establishment of what are truly human rights. The Universal Declaration of 1948 is faulty in this respect. Cranston proposes three tests for authentic rights: it should be practicable to secure them by legislation, they should be genuinely universal as moral rights, and they should be of paramount importance. The rights to life, liberty, and a fair trial meet these tests; infringing them is never permissible, since certain freedoms should never be violated. Cranston grants that the so-called economic and social rights may be moral rights of some men in certain societies. But this is a matter of extending democracy as social and economic conditions allow. It is not a question of universal rights, and the case for extension is to be argued on other grounds.

Raphael's first paper contains a valuable discussion of the concept of a right on the basis of which he agrees that there is a genuine difference between the rights of liberty on the one hand and political, economic, and social rights on the other. In one case a man has rights simply as a member of the human race, in the other as a member of a particular society. But he disagrees with Cranston in thinking that both sorts of rights may reasonably be included in an international declaration the main purpose of which is to encourage states to grant these rights to their own citizens.

Readers of this journal concerned with political theory will find these essays a useful discussion of the problem of human rights.—John Rawls, Harvard University.

A Theory of Political Integration. By CLAUDE AKE. (Homewood, Illinois: The Dorsey Press, Inc., 1967. Pp. ix, 164. \$5.00.)

Political integration is defined in terms of some of its measures: "A political system is integrated to the extent that the minimal units (individual political actors) develop in the course of political interaction, a pool of commonly accepted norms regarding political behavior and a commitment to the political behavior patterns legitimized by these norms." (P. 3) Seven indicators, each described as scores, are proposed: legitimacy, extraconstitutional behavior, political violence, secessionist demand, alignment pattern, bureaucratic ethos, and authority. How these seven scores are to be validly and reliably obtained across diverse political systems is left to others. Suggestions of

some phenomena to be examined in measuring political integration are offered, and in the cases of legitimacy and bureaucratic ethos, "attitude survey research" is recommended.

The problem of political integration is defined a "... one of developing a political culture and o inducing commitment to it." (P. 1) This problem is expanded in the second chapter largely in the context of engineering political integration in the new states.

Following are four chapters which scan some of the relevant and related literature in classical social theory (Marx, Weber, Durkeim, etc.) and contemporary writing on charismatic leadership (Wallerstein, Apter, Runciman and Horowitz), or elite-mass relationships (largely Shils) and on the role of unipartyism (the scholarly writings of Ashford, Coleman and Rosenberg, and the rhetoric osme single party leaders).

Ake then attempts to pull everything together in the last chapter in a section subtitled "A General Theory." The interaction between the major variables, the basic structure of the theory, is presented first. This theory can be restated: political integration is a function of a mature political culture which is a result of the broadening and intensifying of 'social communications,' which in turn is a function of social mobilization, defined as removing physical barriers between people and increasing the flow of good and services between different parts of the country. This is a statement of process, a causal net, apparently a set of linear relationships starting with social mobilization which can presumably be manipulated.

There remains an obvious difficulty with thisformulation. Too much social mobilization too quickly can lead to political instability. The problem is to maintain a minimum of political stability while political integration develops. There is also the question of "societal change." "Societal change" is cast in structural-functional language. The links between "Political Integration, Societal Change and Political Stability" (the title of this chapter), are not clearly established; but perhaps all that was intended was to express that a theory of political integration must be a process theory.

All this is not new. Major questions remain, such as under what conditions can social mobilization and thus political integration take placewithout creating political instability? Ake focuses on only one set of conditions, the political leadership factor: "Our theory is that the political system undertaking social mobilization maximizes its capacity for carrying out the process and remaining stable despite the potentially disruptive short-run effects of social mobilization if it is authoritarian [the government is large, concentrated and easily mobilized and willing to use powerl, paternal [dominated by a political class willing and

■able to lead], 'identific' [mutual identity between the political class and the governed], and consensual [the solidarity of the political class and no threatening counter-elite]. Ake states that if any one of these "either-or" characteristics of the deadership of a political system is lacking, and if there are no "functionally compensating factors," then the chances of political stability in the face of social mobilization are decreased.

This theory is then briefly tested against "historical experience," the highlights of five cases—the United States (the Federalists), the Soviet Union (Stalinist period), Yugoslavia (Tito), Cuba (Castro), and Nigeria.

Scientists can rely on either of two standards to discipline their verbal theorizing: structured data or formalized statement. This is a verbal statenent of theory, drawn in large part from the literature on political integration. If the relationships between the variables were formalized, perhaps with differential or different equations, account sould have been taken of the process of interacion between the variables over time and precise expression given to the points of interaction where political instability (dis-equilibrium or decay) vould occur. If these relationships were scrutinized with systematic data, then measures, not uggestions of them, would have been provided and perhaps some of the conventional ideas on political integration would have been modified to oring together what is happening in the world vith what political scientists are currently thinkng.—Henry Teune, University of Pennsylvania.

The Political and Social Ideas of St. Augustine.
By Herbert A. Denne. (New York: Columbia University Press, 1966, Pp. xix, 356, \$2.45.)

St. Augustine was not—as Professor Deane says—a "system builder," and not even primarily a heologian. He was an exhorter of and spokesman or the Western church. Thus, most of his writings rere occasional pieces, sermons, and polemics—ather than finished treatises. The great single works—such as The City of God, Confessions, and On Freedom of the Will are a small part of he whole corpus of his writing. For the student of colitical thought they offer, furthermore, not only limited sampling of Augustine's thought, but an adirect route to his social and political ideas.

One announced purpose of this book is to bring better in a single volume most of the important assages in which Augustine discusses human nature, society, and the state. This purpose seems a seful one. And the passages—numerous and hany of them quoted at length—help to complete and balance the perspective that students of political thought are likely to gain by reading, typially, parts of The City of God and commentaries pon Augustine. In particular, the wide range of

quotations provides a counterpart or complement to the mystical and other-earthly aspects of Augustine's thought by illustrating many of the subtleties and tensions in his thought as well as providing some glimpses of his practicality and shrewdness.

The author also discusses Augustine's views of social and political life. These views he characterizes as a "pessimistic realism" about man and society and a "profound awareness of the inevitable limitations of a coercive political order." In broad tendency, this interpretation of Augustine is a familiar one. Its elements are to be found, for example, in Marsiglio of Padua, in Martin Luther, and, recently, in the neo-orthodoxy of Reinhold Niebuhr (Cf., Christian Realism and Political Problems.) The author's contribution does not lie, then, in presenting a novel interpretation of Augustine. He attempts to "organize the material" and "elucidate the general point of view," that supports this particular interpretation. To the author's credit, he does not attempt to import more organization or system into Augustine's thought than he believes there to be. He does not get entrapped by the layers of glosses upon Augustine. And he does not attempt to read into Augustine the wisdom of other or more recent theologians.

The book is primarily intended, the author states, to fill a student need. Scholars and teachers will probably find little that is new to them. Chapter Five—"War and Relations Among States" is of contemporary interest, in this age of "power politics" and "Christian Realism." Chapter Six, "Church, State, and Heresy," is also valuable, showing the complexity of Augustinian doctrine on these subjects.

The author's treatment of Augustine raises a perplexing issue of who is best suited to interpret the political theory of a religious figure: the political scientist or the theologian. Professor Deane attempts an organized and substantially independent treatment of Augustine's political theory. While he goes at length into Augustine's theology, he also separated politics and theology, which is appropriate for him to do as a political scientist. At the same time, Augustine's "political theory" loses that quality of being suffused with theology and dominated by a theological perspective that it has when expcunded by a theologian-for instance, Reinhold Niebuhr. Is the political theory, as a consequence, interpreted more faithfully, or less so? In fairness, it seems an open question, Fr. Figgis's familiar account of Augustine provides a good example of the ways in which theological persuasion can blur political concepts. On the other hand, Professor Deane seems in danger of unduly secularizing Augustine's treatment of politics. He is caught and fascinated, for instance, by the similarities between St. Augustine and Thomas Hobbes, (Hobbes, and not Luther?). Yet are they alike? For Hobbes, there is neither sin nor redemption. And for him, pessimism and realism are not the ground for resignation but for a progressive, secular order than Augustine would have condemned. The political theory of a great church figure is, at best, likely to be treacherous ground for most political scientists, even when negotiated (as here) without major mishap.

Unfortunately, Augustine's lack of system is matched to an extent by a lack of system and economical exposition on the part of the author. The text is wordy. The exposition detours at many points, is hard to follow, and seldom ends with a definite conclusion or summation. Since the present book is a paperback reissue of an earlier edition, an opportunity for editing was lost.—David G. Smith, Swarthmore College.

Private Politics: A Study of Five Political Outlooks. By A. F. Davies. (Carlton: Melbourne University Press 1966. Pp ix, 267. \$13.50.)

This book, like Robert Lane's Political Ideology, is based on information gathered through lengthy psychoanalytical interviews. The similarity, however, ends there, for Davies is interested in the internal "thought system" of individuals as they develop outlooks concerning politics. To obtain his information he interviewed five "second drawer politicos" in Australia. This focus is a crucial flaw in the usefulness of the work for political scientists. There is virtually nothing here about the linkage between this "thought system" and the political system in general (or any subsystem in specific), yet this question of linkage is precisely the problem that troubles so many studies of personality and politics.

In all fairness it should be pointed out that the author did not attempt to discuss the questions of linkage; he is not being criticized for a poor job, or even for doing the wrong job. The point is that the author's focus makes the book more useful in psychology than political science. It is more a work of politics in personality than of personality in politics. A political scientist might well ask

himself if a book titled *Private Religion: A Stude* of *Five Outlooks* might not contain as much ir formation relevant to the general political system

The book is based on interviews with a part organizer, a town planner, a state MP, a publi servant, and a union lawyer. The total time sper interviewing each respondent varied from twelv to thirty hours and was spread over three to fou months. The interviewing was conducted some time after the 1956 Suez crisis (no question sampled reeactions to the event), and the study wa first published as a multilithed edition in 1961 This explains why the book does not draw from Lane and more recent works. The author find that political theories (or "thought systems" abou politics) are integrally tied to personality. Their development is a creative process (similar to the process that led to the theories of the great politi cal writers, though surely a more crude one) guided by the need of the individual to cope with and build armor against his personal world.

How should material gathered from intensive and lengthy interviews be presented? The author chooses to present each respondent's views in a separate chapter, with one concluding chapter Each chapter begins with a section of almost "raw" data from the interviews, followed by a discussion section. After examining this book I am convinced that an author must be responsible for reorganizing and editing material gathered in such studies. There is, however, a dilemma. In a psychological study, the flavor and tone of the responses can be quite important; one risks losing this in any editing.

A glance at this book reveals that it is somewhat out of date, has problems of organization, and does little to really unite the study of psychology and politics. We certainly have not adequately tapped the fund of knowledge in our sister discipline of psychology, but we are not likely to do so fruitfully unless we focus on the connecting links. I wish I could end by saying that a fine index allows the reader to draw these connections for himself through careful digging, but I cannot. There is no index.—Karl Braithwaite, Duke University.

AMERICAN GOVERNMENT AND POLITICS

Every Second Year: Congressional Behavior and the Two-Year Term. By Charles O. Jones. (Washington: The Brookings Institution, 1967. Pp. ix, 118. \$6.00, cloth; \$2.25, paper.)

One of the standard proposals for altering the American Congress, the four-year term for Members of the House enjoyed a brief revival during the first three months of 1966. This time there was

no lack of interest in the idea, nor were Representatives slow to see its advantages to them. The proposal faltered not so much on its substantive merits as on its controversial (and previously unexamined) political consequences—particularly if the terms were to run concurrently with the Presidential term.

One product of the debate is Charles O. Jones'

study, prepared for the Brookings Institution. This brief, tightly written volume presents a thorough review of the pros and cons, along with an inquiry into the possible electoral and policy consequences of longer House terms. Jones has been mindful of the political dimensions of the issue and has avoided the temptations of viewing it through the lenses of a priori standards.

Jones concludes from his examination that no change should now be made in the Congressional term. He appears to believe (as does the reviewer) that, while the four-year term raises fundamental political issues, on other grounds it fails to qualify as a truly fundamental reform. The adverse effects of the present two-year term, as he demonstrates, are by no means obvious. Where effects can be identified at all, they may be welcomed by some and deplored by others. As Jones wisely observes, "One man's problem may be another man's principle." (p. 99) Finally, technical -drawbacks plague some four-year-term proposals -particularly former Representative Frank Chelf's staggered-term version.

Jones' study represents precisely the kind of evaluative, policy-oriented inquiry which should rank high on the agenda of contemporary political science. Political evaluation need not imply a reversion to polemicism or the delineation of academic prejudices—vices which have plagued much traditional writing about Congress. The problems of conventional reformist writing was not, however, that it was reformist; but that its premises were too often unexamined (or unstated) and its arguments too often unresearched. Policy science, as we understand it, must be explicit, systematic, and empirically grounded.

Jones has met these criteria, and in doing so has endered a valuable service to political scientists and citizens interested in the future of our national legislature. He has enumerated the probems to which the four-year term is presumably addressed, inquired into the actual effects of ength-of-term on legislative performance, and dentified alternative values which are brought nto play.

On very many matters, however, empirical mowledge simply fails as yet to permit confident specification of the "problems" of Congress, much ess speculation upon the effects of proposed shanges. Jones has acknowledged this dilemma and has struggled valiantly to cope with it.

For example, longer terms are advocated by some to attract more "qualified" candidates. Yet, so Jones points out, little is known about historial changes in the "qualifications" of Congressmen much less unsuccessful contenders). Others argue plausibly that longer terms will reduce spiralling ampaign costs, but here again knowledge is far rom adequate. Still others maintain that the con-

stant campaigning necessitated by brief terms promotes parochialism and errand-boyism, at the expense of lawmaking. Only recently have we gleaned some insights into the role perceptions and work habits of legislators, but much remains to be learned. Despite decades of careful and often productive research, the knowledge gap remains embarrassingly wide.

Thus, many of Jones' conclusions reveal a necessary tentativeness. Among the new data introduced in the study are results of roundtable conferences of Members. While useful for identifying some of the Members' attitudes and providing interesting quotes, this research technique demands a biased sample and thus yields few findings concerning the distribution of attitudes within the House. A mail questionnaire designed to compensate for this drawback revealed that "... [A]s of 1966, there was very little enthusiasm for a change" (p. 107): none of the various four-year-term proposals was supported by even a simple majority of the sample.

The author and the Brookings Institution have reminded political scientists of the increasingly relevant function of political evaluation and criticism. They have also reminded us, and equally usefully, of the unfinished empirical tasks which confront the discipline.—ROGER H. DAVIDSON, University of California, Santa Barbara.

Contracting For Atoms. By HAROLD ORLANS. (Washington: The Brookings Institution, 1967. Pp. xvii, 242. \$6.00.)

The research and development contract may one day be recognized as having social implications as significant as that legal structure we know as the corporation. Some critics have suggested it as one way in which private business has preempted governmental decision-making. Others have suggested that the effect is just the reverse. Defenders have argued that the R & D contract is a way to maintain the vigor of private enterprise in our technological society, and others have suggested that it is the only way for government to remain flexible and responsive to social needs in a technological age. Polemical evidence is available to support each of these positions; what is needed is clarification of the sort that Orlans provides.

Given the labyrinthine nature of our technological society, and the struggling state of social science theory, case studies such as Contracting For Atoms are of great value to political science. Orlans' study of AEC policy consists of a detailed inquiry into the activities of an agency that is little more than an administrator of R & D contracts. It is an agency with a \$2.5 billion budget in which only 7000 of 120,000 people working in its facilities are directly on its payroll. The AEC, among other things, sponsors basic research, makes

weapons, promotes and governs the nuclear industry, develops new technologies, and does substantially all of this through contracts with "private" industry, universities, and non-profits. This study documents the erosion of that distinction between public and private which Don Price has discussed in more general terms.

As Orlans states it, "The contract is, of course, legally necessary to define the conditions under which public funds may be paid to private persons for a designated purpose, but the document itself is more useful in the event of litigation than in the practical course of day-to-day relations between contractor and government personnel. In a 'hands off' buyer-seller relationship, all of the terms that are necessary to the satisfactory completion of a contractual obligation may, perhaps, be put down on paper . . . But the most significant aspects of research, development, and managerial contracts are precisely those that cannot be satisfactorily reduced to writing. For they involve the quality of effort made to reach not a precise target but goals that must be continually readjusted by mutual agreement; and-beyond gross and obvious limits-the balance of initiative and responsibility, of freedom and control, that should lie in public and private hands is also a shifting one that must be worked out individually for each major contract." (p. 128)

Due in large part to the role universities and university scientists played in the birth of the nuclear age, nearly two-thirds of AEC funds go to universities or non-profits for research or for operating federally owned laboratories. Given the nature of the R & D contract it is not surprising that the AEC has continued to use the same contractors. Two decades after its creation, however, AEC policies are increasingly being questioned. One important reason for this is that the AEC is exhausting its original mission. Another reason is the growing private nuclear industry, interested in the ever-larger profits which loom on the horizon. Orlans investigates in detail the conflicting pressures that have developed with respect to AEC policies.

The first section of the study is concerned with the policy issues faced by the AEC. Of major importance are questions concerning: the choice of operating contractors, the interaction of public and private sectors, the relationship of universities to big science facilities, the role of the AEC's multi-program laboratories, and the growing problems of contract administration as AEC activities and budgets stabilize. These questions are of central concern to the major interest groups which Orlans then investigates. The interest groups are: The Commission, The Joint Committee on Atomic Energy, The Department of Defense, The Scientists, and Industry. In examining the roles and political

styles of those interest groups, the author trace the policy-making process with skill and precision

For those interested in the development and operations of a social system and the rules it designto achieve effective accommodations among rathe divergent political interests, this study has greavalue. For those, like this reviewer, who are im pressed with the difficulty of making effective po icy within the discrete functional segments c technological society, the book is of even greate worth. The problem which faces those making num clear policy is not their inability to accommodat immediate political interests, but the question c how nuclear policy relates to broader public policy issues. Nuclear policy originally evolved around set of technical skills and essentially technical goals. The fundamental question is what happen when these goals are achieved and/or decline i. importance? As Orlans sees it, one specific question in this connection has to do with the futurrole of the major AEC laboratories. They can probably not be dismantled. Should they be fo cused on new social problems? If so, if at all, how can it be done? Another question has to do wit' the role of the AEC in the support of high energy physics. In some senses support for the latter ha been the activity which has filled the vacuum lef by the achievement of other missions. This partic ular development has major implications for the broader questions of how basic research supporshould be allocated and organized. Several or these issues are lucidly presented in the latter parof the study.

At a time when many political scientists are showing a growing concern for policy-oriented studies, this book provides a particularly able ex ample of one type of work which enhances this new perspective.—Don E. Kash, Purdue University.

The American Far Right: A Case Study of Bills James Hargis and Christian Crusade. By John H. Redekop. (Grand Rapids: William B. Eerd mans, 1968. Pp. 232. \$4.50.)

A major weakness of the social movement caller "the extreme right" is its inability to persuade se rious men to take its ideas seriously. This reviewe can recall few instances in which the ideologies philosophies or programmatic pronouncements o individuals connected to the John Birch Society We, The People or the various Christian Crusade have been treated as anything but political lunacy by observers not committed to the goals of thesorganizations.

In The American Far Right, John H. Redeko; very nearly accomplishes that which may actuall; be impossible: the analysis of the ideas of Bill; James Hargis as if they emanated from a minwhich had mastered the processes of logica-

thought or was, at the very least, sensitive to a complex reality. But Hargis' commitment to a peculiarly American version of Christian fundamentalism, untarnished (unlike Billy Graham) by any other intellectual or emotional experience, makes most of his political ideas and opinions sound as mean-spirited and simple-minded, if more traditionally based, as those of Ayn Rand.

As Professor Redekop makes most clear, by the use of extensive quotations, Hargis' vision of a "Christian Conservative" America is not distinguished by any notable respect for facts, logic or —surprising in a persistent traditionalist—history. So, the leader of the Christian Crusade, (legally, Christian Echoes Ministry, Inc.) indicts himself by such fatuities as: "with all United Nations Internationalists, the thought of religion is repugnant"; "it does not make the slightest difference what nine political experts who are called Supreme Justices [sic] say"; "The FCC is actually a gang of federal outlaws, operating with impunity inside the invisible machinery of the Kennedy dictatorship."

While presenting literally hundreds of similar insults to the intelligence, called from who-knows-how-many thousands in his files, Professor Redekop is able to keep his balance almost completely, as he traces the sources of "Hargisism" to Christian fundamentalism, militant Americanism and to various of the troubles of our time, and places his subject in the Christian, conservative and extremist traditions in America.

Men of Hargis' views would have felt very much at home in the nineteenth century, fighting reform even then, but confident in the backing of a huge portion of the population. As the values and expectations of Americans have changed, Hargis has not. The dialectic of "propertarianism," buttressed by a supportive Protestantism, no longer serves so well as before. But the old songs are still sung by some, though with a new pessimism.

In the end, unfortunately, the author fails to justify his conclusion that ". . . Hargis is a believer with an understandable creed fighting a very real foe ... [carrying] on the battle in good faith." I do not doubt that he is a believer and that his foe (Communism) is very real but one can wonder whether the overheated and over-propagandized domestic crusade is evidence of good faith or a "good thing." (Since he is an ardent pro-capitalist, perhaps one ought not object to the Crusade's purchase of a \$44,000 home, complete with servants, and two new autos, the cheaper one a Lincoln, for the traveling evangelist.) More important, and explicit in other portions of Redekop's analysis, is that Hargis does not, and perhaps cannot, distinguish between empirical reality and his personal, but hardly exclusive, fantasies. Hargis' Manichean and conspiritorial world-view leaves no room for any

awareness of the conditions and causes, secular or theological, which motivate men to beliefs or behavior displeasing to him and, he will surely insist, to his God.

The author has done his homework well, intelligently interpolating material from diverse sources, and he deserves much credit for his willingness to peruse reams of the dullest polemics imaginable without public protest. Although his own lack of sympathy with Hargis' crusade and the ideas which motivate it is apparent, the utter fairness of Redekop's analysis must be commended.

The volume would have been more valuable had the author attempted to explain Hargis' relative success at a "trade" whose practitioners are never in short supply. In addition, the reader may wonder just what kind of people are so clearly, if willingly, victimized when Hargis passes the hat, and whether his audiences are loyal over time or replenishing.

Although The American Far Right (an exaggerated title) is not quite definitive in its analysis of Hargis, I would not suggest that anyone else undertake the task. Although the sources of and stimuli to radical right behavior warrant continued examination, the intellectual quality of the beliefs of the leaders of the movement do not merit the skilled effort so heroically expended by Professor Redekop. To the left of Galbraith and Moynihan are Harrington and Marcuse; to the right of Friedman and Burnham is a swamp.—ROBERT A. SCHOENBERGER, The University of Michigan.

Trial Courts in Urban Politics: State Court Policy Impact and Functions in a Local Political System. By Kenneth M. Dolbeare. (New York: John Wiley & Sons, Inc., 1967. pp. xi, 137. \$6.95.)

Basing his study on a functional analysis of the operation and policy-related outputs of the trial courts of a county of over 1,000,000 residents near New York City, encompassing varied governmental structures, and reflecting the pressures of rapid urbanization, Professor Dolbeare argues "that trial courts are significant in various ways so that their analysis is vital to full understanding of the judicial process and to an accurate conception of a local political system" (page 8). He demonstrates that the impact of trial court decisionsunlike those found at the appellate level-is "narrow, specialized, . . . distinctively individualistic" (page 104) and, oftentimes, final. These decisions are conditioned by the recruitment process—here. a judgeship is a reward for loyal party serviceand by the role conceptions held by trial court judges as well as by rules governing access to the courts and by the substantive law with its bias toward private property. The decisions influence the political process interstitially by providing a delaying or veto role, denying particular policy alternatives but not compelling positive plans of action. Courts, however, have substantial impact in the field of zoning and land use, areas of grave urban concern where progressive programs are needed. "The problems of the cities require dramatic and innovative responses in which the general interest is projected into the future, but these are just the kinds of public action which are likely to receive the coldest response when challenged in court by those whose economic interests are best served by the status quo" (pages 127-128).

The courts staffed by dominant community interests, are most likely to be used by those who are more politically isolated in this system. These are suburban homeowners and businessmen, motivated by the drives of status-seeking and the desire to maximize private profit. Dolbeare calls this "the little man's means of veto and assertion of property rights within the local community" (page 118). These litigants find solace in the easily accessible trial courts whose judges are sympathetic to their aims and for whom the substantive law is favorable. Therefore, these courts perform an "economic rights" function by which the discredited doctrine of substantive due process is effectively enforced at this level against local decision-makers.

Another major function which the courts perform is that of insuring procedural fairness in the political process. Although this benefits minorities—for example, Dolbeare found this to be an asset to the developing county Democratic Party, some benefit more than others and these beneficiaries are most often defenders of the economic status quo who are asserting "minority" claims within the political process. A third function of the trial courts is to referee the allocation of powers among other governmental structures—E. "natural" function of the courts in the American political context.

The fact that urban trial courts are defenders of the status quo in areas where forward-looking policies are needed augers poorly for evaluation of the courts as instruments of change. Their import for urban politics suggests that urban decision-makers must circumvent the courts, perhaps by relying on other levels of government to help solve their problems, thereby minimizing the role of this level of courts while also forfeiting a measure of urban autonomy. Likewise, the relative independence of the courts in most fields makes their relationship with appellate courts essentially non-hierarchial and "voluntary" in nature thus precluding here a possible source of restraining influence.

Dolbeare's effort to integrate court structure and functions into a working concept of the local political system is theoretically refreshing in a field where there is a relatively small, but growing,

body of research. His methodological contribution lies in careful and creative application and extension of tried methods. His research was extensive, covering a sixteen-year period, and utilizing many data sources—especially the outputs of the trial courts in question. His analysis is rigorous; his interpretations apply the empirical findings to the larger questions at hand.

Dolbeare may, however, be criticized on several points. First, it is unclear if the conclusions drawn here from an essentially suburban-oriented political culture are also applicable for the center-city portions of large urban areas as Dolbeare suggests. He attempts to meet this by stating that he has isolated general functions which are probably similar in form but perhaps not in substance; however, at some point, substance defines form. Likewise, attempts to apply the findings deduced here to a larger political system can be brought into question on similar grounds; at what point are these data reflective of a specialized political culture, distinctive political rules, and the vagaries of a specific recruitment process.

Overall, the book is a worthwhile addition to work on judicial process and its relations with urban politics. Its focus probably makes it of greater interest to a student of judicial politics than to a student of urban affairs; however, it is to be commended as a scholarly endeavor of significant importance.—IRVIN H. BROMALL, Ohio University.

The Democrats And Labor In Rhode Island, 1952–1962: Changes In the Old Alliance. By JAY S. GOODMAN. (Providence: Brown University Press, 1967. Pp. xi, 154. \$5.00.)

Readers who pick up this volume expecting either a systematic case study or a detailed historical account of relations between a political party and an interest group will be disappointed with the results of Jay S. Goodman's treatment of the Democratic party and organized labor in Rhode Island between 1952 and 1962.

Goodman's objective is to test or rather to argue the hypothesis that the relationship between the Democratic party and organized labor in Rhode Island has undergone a fundamental change in the direction of lessened labor influence. Three corollary propositions are: (1) major elements in the party have come to feel that they can achieve their goals without depending upon labor's support; (2) organized labor has become dissatisfied with the prospects of obtaining what it wants through the party; (3) labor has sought to establish its independence from the old, automatic alliance (pp. 12–13).

The author's major source of data—besides the public record—are interviews with 27 labor executive board members, 15 rank-and-file Democratic

state legislators, 15 "labor" legislators (those who "obtained a livelihood from blue-collar work, held union office, or listed membership in a union"). 7. legislative leaders, 3 labor executives and 2 former Governors of Rhode Island. Goodman examines the "perceptions" of these respondents by asking basically similar fixed-alternative questions about labor's political activities, the "effectiveness" of these activities, the "satisfactoriness" of the relationship between Democrats and labor within the party, and any changes over the decade in the latter three areas. He accepts "expressed dissatisfaction," "perceived conflict," and, more generally, differences in perceptions of "political reality" between labor and party members as evidence supporting his hypothesis.

Goodman proceeds in straightforward fashion (1) to summarize, year-by-year, the public record, and (2) to summarize his interviews—sometimes in tabular form, more often in narrative style—with the various participants. In his final chapter, he concludes that his hypothesis and its corollaries have been supported by the data, adds a few more years to his account of Rhode Island politics, and then speculates about labor-Democratic party relations on the national level.

There are many difficulties with this effort. Perhaps the most important is the absence of a theoretical or operational definition of "influence." All the reader has before him are statements by some (and by no means all) respondents that labor's "influence" was greater before 1958 than after. (Of course, Goodman assumes that some respondents' perceptions are more accurate than others, and thus is able to dismiss contradictory evidence.) One does not even know, however, if all respondents interpreted "influence" in the same way.

Goodman does not clearly define the dimensions of the "relationship" between the Democratic party and organized labor which are significant in terms of labor's "influence." One result of this is that the chapters presenting the interview data are rather disjointed affairs in which responses about labor's electioneering activities are put side-by-side with data about perceptions of labor-party relations in Rhode Island and no effort is made to connect the two in a meaningful way.

This lack of theoretical clarity seems strange in light of Goodman's promising discussion of aspects of Truman's group theory (especially the variables related to a group's "external influence"), Eldersveld's "stratarchy," and Dahl and Lindblom's "bargaining process." Unfortunately, the "framework" of which these are parts disappeared entirely after page 12.

Goodman presents his interviews in sufficient detail, although he has the bothersome habit of presenting only raw figures in his tables and then using percentages in the text. Moreover, his data is suspect because he never confronts the problem of recall. Why should a labor leader or a state legislator interviewed in 1965 accurately recall what hapened in 1962, much less a decade before that?

Despite all this, Goodman's book makes a substantial contribution to the study of state politics. He has some of the best material to be found on the relationship in a state legislature between the rank-and-file on the one hand and the party leadership (including the Governor) and interest groups on the other. His data support the notion that a legislative role predominates over an interest group role. Chapter IV should be read closely by all students of the legislative process.—Vernon M. Goetcheus, Columbia College.

Knowledge and Power: Essays on Science and Government. Ed. by Sanford A. Lakoff. (New York: The Free Press, 1966. Pp. x, 502. \$10.95.)

Just during the last fifteen years, as a result primarily of social and political pressures and not of basic intellectual innovations, there has emerged in the United States a new specialty in the field of political science, the study of the politics of science. Like all other specialized sciences and disciplines, this one has no absolute beginning to its history: did not Plato and Aristotle discuss the problem of the social and political role of the "wise" man, the proto-scientists? Or, to mention only one more among a multitude of precursors, more recently, in the 1930's, did not the British "scientific humanist," J. D. Bernal, discuss "Science as Power"? The political role of knowledge and science has always been important enough to have received some attention from political scientists and their prototypes.

But the history of the politics of science presents a notable turning-point with the publication in 1954 of Government and Science by Don Price, to whom the anthology under review is most appropriately dedicated. His was the first book devoted entirely, seriously, and systematically to the analysis of the politics of science. It was the first book in the field by a trained, professional political scientist. And it was the first book that tried to be primarily scientific rather than ideological.

Since 1954, rather slowly for a few years, and more rapidly since Sputnik, the field has been taking on the full set of characteristics of an academic specialty. Price has set up and directed the productive efforts of the Science and Public Policy Seminar at Harvard. A variety of somewhat similar academic efforts have been started elsewhere: at last count, there were at least forty different colleges and universities where anything from a course to a program in the politics of science was offered. [Like much else of contemporary social and political science, this field has been predominantly an American development. Recently, when

the Committee of Experts of the O.E.C.D. gave their evaluation of science policy in the United States, they explicitly stated that here, as nowhere else, their views could be almost entirely based on the existing American science policy studies.]

In addition to courses and programs, this field now has its full-time specialists and "authorities." Price, of course, is pre-eminent, and his second book, The Scientific Estate (1965), is an important contribution to general political science. Sanford Lakoff, the editor of the volume under review, was trained by Price and is now a mature full-time worker in this vineyard. So also is Robert Gilpin, who has written American Scientists and Nuclear Weapons Policy (1962), co-edited (with Christopher Wright) the valuable collection of essays, Scientists and National Policy Making (1964), and whose new book France in the Age of the Scientific State, is just published (1968). Some other professional specialists in the field are Bruce L. R. Smith (The Rand Corporation, 1966), Eugene B. Skolnikoff (Science, Technology, and American Foreign Policy, 1967), and Harold Orlans (Contracting for Atoms, 1967). Besides the academic specialists, there have been major efforts by such civil servants and scientists as James L. McCamy (Science and Public Administration, 1960) and Alvin Weinberg (Reflections on Big Science, 1967). Beyond books, there have been important contributions in one or more essays by professional political scientists like Robert Wood, Wallace Sayre, Warner Schilling, and Bernard Brodie and by others such as Albert Wohlstetter, Harvey Brooks, Robert Kreidler, and McGeorge Bundy. Finally, the field has been most fortunate in having a brilliant journalist specializing in it, Daniel S. Greenberg of SCIENCE, whose weekly reports are indispensable, and whose recent book The Politics of Pure Science (1967), gives him a valid claim to be counted a peer among the professional political scientists.

Altogether, then, the existing corpus of work in the politics of science is now impressive both in its quality and quantity. Only one important feature of the "newer" political science seems to be missing: systematic survey research data, either specially collected for the purpose or brought under "secondary analysis" when collected for other purposes. So far, nearly all of the work in this field has been of the "case history" type, with important admixtures of census-type statistical data. As the field matures further, as it takes its initiative more from its own autonomous intellectual base and less from the pressures of political events and exigencies, then it will formulate its own hypotheses and collect its own survey data to these those hypotheses.

The reader that Sanford Lakoff has put together represents fairly well what this new field is like. His own introductory essay, "The Third Culture," is a survey of "science in social thought" from Bacon to Bagehot. Part 1 includes "cases and controversies" on the trial of Robert Oppenheimer (by Lakoff), on the Mohole fiasco (by Daniel Greenberg, though this version is analytically not nearly so good as the one in his book cite above), on the nuclear test ban treaty (by Cecil H. Uvehara), on the establishment of NASA (by Enid Curtis Bok Schoettle, in what is really a small monograph that deserved separate publication as a book), on Comsat (by Roger Kvam), and on smoking and health (by Stanley Reiser). Part 2 is on the governing of science and includes a profile of the President's Scientific Advisory Committee (by Carl William Fischer), a discussion of scientific advice for Congress (by Eilene Galloway), and an overview on the place of the scientific establishment in a pluralistic American political structure (by Lakoff). Finally, Part 3 moves a little away from the earlier professionalism of the collection and offers Alan T. Waterman on federal support of science, Alvin Weinberg on criteria for scientific choice, McGeorge Bundy on the role of the scientist in forming national policy, Harvey Brooks on the needs for support of basic research, and Philip H. Abelson, in an upbeat, ideological statement chiefly on "science in the service of society."

Specialists in this field might have made different selections that did Lakoff, they might have included more of the "classics," but Lakoff's choice will serve any political scientist well who wishes to introduce himself or his students to this field which is now of considerable intellectual as well as policy interest. And the politics of science specialists will be grateful for the several solid pieces of work which are published here for the first time. A number of these are products of Price's Harvard Seminar.—Bernard Barber, Barnard College, Columbia University.

Congress and the Constitution: A Study of Responsibility. Donald G. Morgan. (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1966). Pp. xv, 465. \$8.95.)

This volume can be approached from three aspects: first, in terms of the problem the author is concerned with and his convictions on that topic. Second, in terms of a research project presenting his data and the conclusions derived from them. And, third, his prescriptions of reforms to deal with the problem. Although his informed concern and detailed scholarship are evident throughout, he is not equally successful with all three aspects of his work.

His main thesis, which he presents with vigor and conviction, is that in the modern world considerations of policy and constitutionality have been divorced; they are now considered distinct topics to be dealt with by separate branches of government. As technical questions, matters of constitutionality are supposed to fall within the province of specialists possessing expert training and operating under special procedures. (Or in other words, the judiciary.) Congress, lacking these qualifications and procedures is supposed to deal with questions of policy, but in matters of constitutionality should defer to the pronouncements of the courts.

Vigorously attacking this "judicial monopoly" position, Morgan argues persuasively for a "tripartite theory" of responsibility for the consideration of constitutional questions. Congress, like the other two branches, will inevitably confront such questions in the normal course of their duty and must not, in Morgan's view, eschew such a confrontation as a matter of basic responsibility. Congress also brings to such deliberations some advantages which the courts lack, such as greater ability to reflect and, perhaps, create a community consensus, the basic for compliance with and acceptance of constitutional settlements. There are also issues which because of their special character (so-called "political questions") may never reach the courts and where congressional pronouncements have an air of finality.

Morgan contends there is an increased willingness in Congress to defer to the courts-to embrace the "judicial monopoly" theory-with the mid-1930's representing a turning point in that direction. Here he adduces his research to support this contention. But it is at this point that he is less persuasive, although still vigorous in his assertions. He relies primarily on a series of case studies largely drawn from the written record, some of which are very tedious. They range from a 1789 controversy over the presidential removal power and the Sedition Act of 1798, to more modern issues such as the Communist Control Act of 1954 and the Civil Rights Act of 1964. But the criteria by which some controversies are included and others excluded are never made explicit. For example, why not include the still-relevant question of federal aid to church-related schools? Thus a reviewer can not be certain how representative the cases presented are as pictures of congressional consideration of constitutional questions. Particularly, if as the author contends, the 1930's are a turning point, why does he largely ignore developments between the Sherman Act of 1890 and the Bituminous Coal Conservation Act of 1935?

At times he presents data, such as the length of tenure for congressmen participating in a debate, which apparently supports a point he is making. Yet in numerous instances his point is not really clear or the data is more erratic than his conclusion suggests. At other times, he makes judgments

without supplying any supporting evidence. Thus one learns (page 315) without being told how or why, that the major impetus to detached consideration of the 1964 Civil Rights Act came from Congressman Howard Smith of Virginia. Perhaps, I am too cynical or partisan, but this thought simply dazzles my mind. At other times his conclusion seems only one of a number of plausible interpretations of what happened yet these other possibilities are either ignored or given short shrift in his discussion.

The author also relies (mainly in an appendix) on a written questionnaire submitted to members of the 86th Congress, yet its usefulness is very limited. Personal interviews would have proven more informative, especially since respondents' statements could be checked against over behaveior such as voting. And a questionnaire, if submitted to a number of congresses, would have been less static in character than one used only in the 86th.

In his concluding section, Professor Morgan prescribes a set of reforms. For he is convinced that when Congress deals with constitutional issues, it is ill-equipped in terms of internal machinery, procedural rules and expert sources of advice. His reforms, such as providing more experts or occasionally relying on a national commission of inquiry, seem reasonable. But the alleged defects-haste, lack of full deliberation, and partial and partisan information-are not wholly confined to constitutional questions but may be characteristic of modern legislatures. Certainly his reforms, no matter how well intended, are not panaceas. For example, the providing of additional experts does not guarantee the absence of disagreements among the experts or prevent the skewing of their views in the direction of the views of the appointing authorities. Finally, Congress operates in a highly political context-the target of various pressures and demands -which inevitably color and influence its judgements. But this character of congressional deliberations receives, at least to this reviewer, insufficient consideration in Morgan's indictment of Congress and his prescriptions for reform.

In conclusion, Morgan's work succeeds more on the level of a polemic from a concerned and dedicated scholar than it does as a piece of empirical research. And for the reader the volume is, perhaps, overly long and at times, somewhat tedious.

—Dale Vinyard, Wayne State University.

The Politics of Provincialism: The Democratic Party in Transition, 1918-1932. By David Burner. (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1968. Pp. xiii, Pp. 293. \$6.95.)

Those who read the *Historical Methods News-letter* or other internal channels of communication realize that history is becoming more behavioral.

David Burner's study of the Democratic party is primarily old style historiography, but it does contain one example of what the new research may be able to contribute.

For most of his book Burner uses standard sources, primarily newspapers, magazines, memoirs, and collections of private papers from the era, in a conventional manner. He develops a "theme," namely that the 1918-1932 Democrats were "provincial." Their provincialism, in Burner's view, consisted in the determination of two contending internal factions to emphasize the differences in their values rather than to seek a unifying set of national goals. The native, rural, dry Protestants led by McAdoo and the immigrant, urban, wet Catholics led by Smith chose to fight each other, demonstrating "provincial" behavior. Burner's format is largely descriptive and chronological. He traces the origin of each faction, the temporary coalition under Wilson, the gradual disintegration of the early 1920's, the disastrous 1924 Convention and election, Roosevelt's subsequent efforts to build a national party apparatus, and the 1928 Smith campaign.

The descriptive chapters suffer from two difficulties. First, there is an absence of conceptualization about parties, voting, or elections. Although Burner's footnotes and bibliography indicate familiarity with the political science literature on these subjects, he makes minimal use of it. Things just happen; events roll on. Burner lacks the theoretical sophistication of the superb original essays on historical party development in the Chambers and Burnham volume, The American Party Systems. Where individual voting choices are concerned, Burner is literary, observing that (p. 222) his "... inquiry must be tentative, for in the final analysis the motives of an electorate are hidden-perhaps even from itself." He does not even treat Republican victories in the widely familiar framework of maintaining elections.

Second, Burner is reluctant to use hard data in his chronological sections. In a very thorough description of the values of each faction, he does not indicate adequately what offices in what states each side held. His long chapter on the 1924 Convention omits analysis of the roll call votes except for a table showing simple counts of candidate strengths on different ballots. Burner relegates to a footnote Bain's correlation analysis of the anti-Klan resolution and McAdoo's support, and quotes instead The New York Times' impressionistic report that there was some connection between the two. He does not utilize previous quantitative analyses of sectional voting at that convention or produce his own.

There are, however, several chapters where Burner departs from his descriptive approach. In Chapter Six he analyzes the behavior of the

Congressional wing of the Democratic party; in Chapter Eight he introduces original data to indicate the impact of Smith's candidacy on different ethnic and religious voting blocs. In his treatment of the legislative party, Burner knows what he wants to do-show the bloc patterns of intraparty behavior. Unfortunately, his methodology is limited to taking one vote at a time. He reports and interprets individual and party behavior vote by vote rather than analyzing sets of votes in any of the accepted and widely used ways-indices of cohesion, scaling, cluster-bloc or factor analysis. Other historians, for example Thomas B. Alexander in his treatment of roll calls and sectionalism in the House between 1836 and 1860, have learned to do much better.

In Chapter Eight, Burner finally makes an original and impressive contribution. He has uncovered special welfare surveys of so-called "sanitary districts" taken during the era in New York, Chicago, and Boston. These surveys identified the ethnic compositions of the populations. Then Burner has used election districts which lay wholly within homogeneous German, Irish, Italian, Jewish, or Polish sanitary districts as a basis for analyzing group voting between 1916 and 1932. For each group, Burner is able to document a marked shift toward increased Democratic support at the election of 1928. For example, in a New York sanitary district with 85% Italian population, the 1924 Democratic vote was 48%, the 1928 Democratic vote 77%. In a predominantly Polish Chicago sanitary district, the 1924 Davis vote was 51%, the 1928 Smith vote 83%, A Chicago sanitary district with a mostly Jewish population votes 37% for Davis, 78% for Smith, Burner thus adds additional evidence to that developed earlier by Key and more recently by Pomper which suggests that the present-day Democratic party began with Al Smith, not Franklin Roosevelt.

Throughout, Burner's writing is interesting and readable. One wishes that he had devoted more effort to material such as the sanitary district data and less to the description of already well-known events.—JAY S. GOODMAN, Wheaton College, (Massachusetts).

Congressional Insurgents and the Party System, 1909-1916. By JAMES HOLT. (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1967. Pp. ix, 188. \$5.50.)

The theme of historian Holt's book is the failure of insurgent Republicans to attain their self-defined goals in Congressional and Presidential politics because of their minority status within their own party and their hesitancy to coalesce with like-minded Democrats on a sustained basis. Mr. Holt makes his case by selecting several "struggles" in which the insurgents were involved between 1909 and 1916, including, among others,

the fight to reduce Speaker Cannon's power, the Payne-Aldrich Act, the Underwood Tariff Act, and American foreign policy prior to activate entry into World War I. In each instance the author examines the insurgents' position, their justification of that position, and their relationship with the regular Republicans and the Democrats. His data consists of personal papers of principal insurgent actors, newspapers, and historical studies related to the period. In each instance the author asserts that the insurgents were divided from regular Republicans by their strong belief in the control or destruction of "trusts," in the extension of popular government (and concomitant hatred for real or imagined political machines which blocked popular government), or their noninterventionist stance on foreign policy. The insurgents were separated from Democrats, Holt argues, more by partisan identification than by ideological or issue disagreement.

Political scientists who hope that historians will do much of the work of examining relationships of factions within and among parties will be disappointed with this study for a number of reasons.

First, there is justification to be dissatisfied both with the thesis that the insurgents failed and with the explanation of why they failed. The author gives no reason why he selected the relatively few cases he used to document the insurgents' failure. It might be just as easy to choose a dozen cases to make the opposite argument. Even if they failed, the author is not successful in explaining why they failed. The insurgents' reluctance to risk their traditional Republican identification during the 1912 and 1916 presidential campaigns by joining other parties is well founded. In each instance the author documents the concern of various insurgents with giving up the loyalty and ballot box votes engendered by the Republican label in their district. However, he is less successful in using the same reasoning for explaining why the insurgents did not coalesce with Democratic congressmen on specific legislative proposals after 1912. Temporary legislative alliances would not have had such far reaching consequences as to bring about a realignment of parties and jeopardize the Republican identification of the insurgents as the author implicitly argues. In American government one does not have to cross the aisle to vote regularly with the opposition, as the records of literally dozens of congressmen attest. The insurgents may have had sufficient reason not to join the Democrats simply because the Democrats might not have been espousing the clearly identified progressive positions the author assumes they were.

Second, the study's methodology generates discontinuities in analysis. It skips from event to event, using information derived from specific personalities involved in each event. For example, the study indicates that Senator Beveridge did something on one issue for certain reasons, Senator LaFollette something else on another issue for certain reasons, and at times certain well-known insurgents voted against their usual allies. There is never an analysis of the collective whole of the insurgent group on a particular position that permits the reader to know their composition and their strength relative to other factions and parties.

Finally, the author does not clearly define the "insurgents." Who were they? What issues divided and united them? Over a wide range of issues, to what extent did they agree with Democrats and regular Republicans? Who were the "hard core" and peripheral members of the group? The author virtually neglects these questions. Obviously, rollcall analysis by identifying clusters of like-minded members of Congress on a wide range of issues could define the membership of the insurgent faction and establish the extent of their cohesiveness. This would designate the range of issues on which they were united and permit identification of this faction in the context of other factions by allowing comparisons along several dimensions. The statement, "Nevertheless the existence of a relatively cohesive insurgent faction within the Republican party in Congress between 1909 and 1916 is indisputable" (p. 2) could have been subjected to empirical test. If the author had tested his hypotheses he would have had a focus for his study. He could then have used this very rich collection of data to go beyond roll-call analysis by explaining the patterns he found, the strategy of the participants, and so on. This procedure would have transformed his relatively diffuse analysis into a focused and intriguing study which political scientists would find useful.—Delmer Dunn, The University of Georgia.

Labor and Liberty: The LaFollette Committee and the New Deal. By JEROLD S. AUERBACH. (Indianapolis: The Bobbs-Merrill Company, Inc., 1966. Pp. ix, 246. \$6.50.)

In view of the rapidly expanding interest, within political science, in Congressional standing committees, it seems surprising that little attention has been devoted to serious study of Congressional investigating committees. This is not to say that our literature omits mention of such investigations—how many times, after all, are we told that such investigations are seldom productive, and very often violate the personal dignity and private liberties of persons and groups subjected to scrutiny?

Jerold Auerbach, an able and articulate historian, has stepped into this void created by professional indifference and suspicion, and has produced a well-written and illuminating account of a

Congressional investigation perhaps less known to contemporary students than the Kefauver or McCarthy serials but nevertheless one which may have had a more profound effect on government policy-The LaFollette Committee, Between 1936 and 1940 this committee conducted exhaustive hearings into violations of labor's civil liberties during the New Deal period. The reports of the committee, Auerbach concludes, made Congress, the Roosevelt administration and the public aware for the first time of widespread and vicious violations of civil liberties by industry and local governments. In rising to protect the civil liberties of laborers, especially in their right to organize and picket, the stage was set for the post-1940 "civil rights revolutions," as the government and society accepted their responsibility to protect citizens from state, local, and private violations of civil liberties.

Auerbach first describes the unrest and violence in industry-labor and farm-tenant relations which led to demands for a Congressional investigation. Then we view the formation of the committee, the men who composed its membership, and its labor-oriented goals. Through the committee reports, we learn of the bloody and desperate industrial warfare of the New Deal period, and of the militant anti-Communist rhetoric of business and local government (not so different from later periods). Auerbach illuminates the Marxist biases built into the committee investigations and reports by its staff, a piece of analysis which is especially interesting and valuable. Finally, Auerbach weighs the successes and failures of the LaFollette investigations.

Any major work such as this inevitably has certain problems. I have never really understood why so many scholars place such great faith in quotations. At so many points, especially in historical research and writing, theses are advanced in a highly definitive fashion and are "proved" with one intriguing quotation from a hard-to-getat paper collection. Auerbach more or less shares this definitely non-systematic approach to data collection. I can only warn that conclusions reached on the basis of such non-systematic, unspecified methods are likely candidates for scholarly coup d'etats by future researchers. One could wish Auerbach and the other historians were more humble about their supporting evidence.

Certainly the major weakness of the book is that—while the author has clearly outlined the role the LaFollete Committee played in public exposure of industrial suppression of civil liberties—Auerbach fails to prove his larger point: that agitation for labor's civil liberties was the major impetus for federal government protection of all civil liberties. While labor certainly played its part, it is important to remember Supreme Court

actions in cases involving such groups as Jehovah's Witnesses or Negro college students. Auerbach barely mentions the Supreme Court, which, I think, must be considered a powerful independent variable in government's growing awareness of deprivations of civil liberties.

I hope other historians and political scientists will examine other Congressional investigating committees. The history and operation of such investigations are likely to provide rich data for our understanding of legislative behavior and of policy formation. Mr. Auerbach has done a great service in opening up this inquiry. And in so doing, he has provided an absorbing picture of the conflicts, torments, and revolutionary fervor in the New Deal years. The similarities and contrasts between New Deal political life and contemporary politics which Auerbach's book helps illuminate are especially valuable for those of us who, amazing as it may seem were born after the LaFollette Committee disbanded.—Douglas Camp Chaffey, University of Montana.

Congressional Ethics: The Conflict of Interest Issue. By ROBERT S. GETZ. (Princeton: D. Van Nostrand Company, Inc., 1966. Pp. vi, 202. \$1.95.)

The disciplinary action taken by the House and Senate against Adam Clayton Powell and Thomas Dodd help make this book timely. The author's essentially reasonable and systematic treatment of conflict of interest on Capitol Hill make it relevant. Although the work was published in 1966, an Epilogue has been added to include events through April 1967.

Professor Getz examines the few formal restraints Congress has imposed upon the conduct of its members; discusses recent efforts to increase these restraints; suggests reasons inherent in the American legislative process to explain why most additional restrictions would be inappropriate; and prescribes financial disclosure as a feasible and justifiable remedy for responding to the intense pressure currently being exerted on Congress by an outraged public.

The book's thesis can be reduced to several essential ingredients. Congress has taken pains to prevent government employees, current or retired, from using positions of public trust for private ends. Efforts to extend conflict of interest restrictions to congressional behavior have been frustrated.

This failure, says Getz, can be traced to the nature of the representative function and the character of legislative employment. The increasingly diverse economic mix of most congressional districts and a rise in the number of matters upon which a legislator may act independently have induced many congressmen to see themselves as "brokers," rather than as "delegates" or "trustees." The bro-

ker orientation, together with the community of interest the legislator shares with constituents and his own diverse economic interests, make the limitations imposed upon other government employees inappropriate to his function. It would be uncreasonable for a farmer-congressman, for example, to disqualify himself from voting on farm bills, or cefuse to serve on the Agriculture Committee, or cefrain from directing an inquiry to the Department of Agriculture on behalf of his constituents.

Moreover, the insecurity of elective office, the extraordinary expenses incurred by the office holders, and the frequency with which congressmen are retired to civilian life make post-employment restrictions on conflict of interest particularly inappropriate.

On the few occasions that each house has been forced to recognize alleged indiscretions, they have been loathe to mete out punishment. According to Getz, they have been content to permit the matter to be resolved in other ways, i.e., through election defeat, resignation, or in the courts. The au-•thor feels that, in light of recent events, the public is increasing the pressure for legislative remedies, and that some action must be taken, even if it is symbolic only. He asserts that financial disclosure =is feasible, capable of being enforced, and consistent with the nature of legislative life. He con--cedes that the proposal has been rejected deci--sively when it has been suggested, but is encour--aged by the intensity with which its advocates have supported it.

The thesis is plausible and imaginative, although some of the strands holding it together are tenuous. It is not altogether clear, for example, why "delegate" and "trustee" representational roles should be any more suitable to the application of conflict of interest restrictions than the "broker" role. While the latter denotes a somewhat different orientation toward legislative decision-making, delegates and trustees are likely to behave in precisely the same fashion as brokers in most of their dealings with the executive branch.

The author relies upon a few of the more recent works on congressional behavior to support his argument, but their findings are sometimes oversimplified. His assumptions about the rationale behind committee selection is a case in point (p. 73). His analysis of voting behavior also leaves something to be desired.

The book leans too heavily on detailed accounts of specific legislative situations, frequently giving more attention to concrete developments than the burden of the argument requires. Many are not entirely relevant and their abbreviation or relegation to the footnotes would have sharpened the presentation.

Finally, the writing is mechanical, occasionally labored, and frequently uninspired. Powell is de-

scribed as "having effectively muddled the outlook on his political fate" when he returned to Bimini (p. 188), and the House is charged with having "opened up a Pandora's Box of problems" when refusing to seat the Harlem Congressman (p. 191).

Nevertheless, Congressional Ethics deals insightfully within a narrow area of inquiry and compares favorably with most accounts which attempt to prescribe the medicine of reform.—IRWIN N. GERTZOG, Yale University.

W. J. Cash: Southern Prophet: A Biography and Reader. By Joseph L. Morrison. (New York: Alfred A. Klopf, 1967. Pp. xiii, 309. \$6.95.)

This biography of the great historian of the southern mind reveals the inward struggles of the man who, probably as much or more than any other American writer, has written best on the origins and development of racial and racist attitudes in the South. Perhaps Cash did not foresee the tortured racial developments to 1968 in all their detail, but since his brilliant book, The Southern Mind will no doubt be read more than ever today, his biography by Joseph L. Morrison will be much welcomed, especially since it throws considerable light on Cash's personality as a social analyst. Cash's gloom, his grief, and obsessive fears of threat and persecution, which eventually led to his suicide by hanging in Mexico, are in some ways reminiscent of Rousseau.

Morrison traces the fascinating background of the man from the cotton mill town of Gaffney who went to an "intellectual awakening" at the Baptist Wake Forest College, during the turbulent presidency of William Lewis Poteat, who taught Darwinism and was under attack throughout the South. We learn of Cash's omnivorous and insatiable reading habits, mercurial temperament, and of his perceptiveness as a Carolina reporter and contributor to the American Mercury. We are carried through the painful and extended authorship of The Mind, faithfully coddled by the sympathy and encouragement of H. L. Mencken and Alfred and Blanche Knopf, Lastly, pages are spent-too many for some-on the final days leading to his death.

The principal merit here is in clarifying that Cash's suicide was not traceable to depression over the South's future—gloomy in Cash's view. Nor was it related to public reaction to The Mind of the South, as has been asserted. On the contrary, Cash's book was well received and reviewed; perhaps the most notable exceptions to this were the Nashville Agrarians—notably John Crowe Ranson, Donald Davidson, and Allen Tate. Cash's overriding prepossession had, in fact, shifted from the gloom about the South to the German aggression and the Nazis, who in his last days, he thought were following him in Mexico. Morrison concludes

that his death was due to "toxic" origins. Morrison's concerns—giving way to belabored attention—seems to be in dispelling any idea that Cash, a neurotic throughout, might have had a diseased mind throughout. His point, even though some of the details might have been in an appendix—is indeed an important one.

The most valuable part of the book is the 24 pages of Chapter VII, entitled "Perspectives." Here Cash's work is related to other writers and groups such as Thomas Wolfe, William Faulkner, James Branch Cabell, Clarence Cason, The Nashville Agrarians, The Chapel Hill Regionalists, and Gunnar Myrdal, Myrdal, by the way, was far more optimistic about the South's future than was Cash. Regrettably, only in the few pages of this chapter are the criticisms of Cash really examined: that he may have ridden his thesis too far. that he overstressed the continuity and essential unity of the southern mind, that his attention to The Southern Mind eclipsed considerations of the Negro mind, that his work is impressionistic and fails to examine areas outside of the Carolina Piedmont, such as the Gulf, the Virginia Tidewater, the East Tennessee Unionist areas, and so forth.

Nowadays, with the civil strife, and the race problem having in part moved from the southland to the great northern cities, the diversity and the contradictions in the southern mind—its very lack of homogeneity—cries out for study. It is significant when Fortune Magazine conducts a survey and finds that Negroes in the South feel, in contrast to Negroes in the North, that the whites there are genuinely trying to find answers to mutual problems, and have less hypocrisy in their efforts. Many of these modern day southern whites are not in the mainstream of Cash's *The Mind*, and Morrison could have done more to examine these shortcomings.

Be this as it may, Morrison appropriately says about his hero: "No professional historian with daring enough to attempt so audacious an intellectual feat had ever come forward with an analysis of the southern mind in its totality." Whatever the shortcomings of The Mind, it is a great achievement. However one may wish Professor Morrison had spent more time in a critical analysis of The Mind, this biography is indeed well done, much needed, and very necessary for a reappraisal of what The Mind missed as well as what it stimulated and achieved.

The collection of Cash's short pieces in the reader section of Morrison's book—newspaper and magazine articles, and his address at the University of Texas shortly before his death—are of value only as a supplement to Cash's great book.

Professor Morrison, who teaches journalism at the University of Carolina, has done a thorough research. He admires Cash intensely, and has produced an important and perhaps essential comparion to Cash's book. Now lacking is a critical analysis of *The Mind.*—David M. Abshire, *George town University*.

Public Management at the Bargaining Table. B. Kenneth O. Warner and Mary L. Henness: (Chicago: Public Personnel Association, 196 Pp. IXV, 490. \$11.95.)

This prescription studded discussion by Warne and Hennessy is designed to appeal more to the practitioner of public personnel administration than to students of political phenomena; as such its value is limited. The currency of the appearand its timely utilitarianism have been dramatize in recent weeks by the troubled labor relations between public management and public employee across the nation.

Warner and Hennessy specify four needs mear to be served by the book: (1) To describe th "current status of employee organizations and th extent of collective bargaining"; (2) To stimulat thought and crystalize ideas among managemer personnel engaged in collective bargaining; (3) To inform public officials not yet involved of the problems of collective bargaining and some conse quences of alternative actions; and (4) To specif; necessary decisions "that must be made if effective management-employee relations are to be maintained through the process of collective bargain ing." To these ends the authors move smoothly and incisively, albeit redundantly (although the redundancy is an admitted and necessary strategy of the authors).

The book is organized in direct relationship to the several intents. Part I, the Dynamics of Col lective Bargaining, analyses definitions, explore history and current status of public employee or ganizations and bargaining in Canada as well as the United States, and presents two case studies that whet one's appetite for what follows. The hors d'oeuvres which constitute Part II are capsulated in Chapter 7 dealing with "Collective Bar gaining from Start to Finish." Covering in sequence preparation for negotiations, techniques of negotiations, and writing and implementing the agreement, the authors structure the subsequenfour chapters around occasionally disparate bu usually incisive opinions from a number of experienced labor relations spokesmen. Dissenting opinions highlight and underscore the author's attempt to disentangle the troubled morass of the public employee collective bargaining issue, but the confusion is also indicative of the growing pains being experienced in this vital area of public management. While somewhat muddled in concept, the authors deftly bring the reader through the attitudes and divergent theories of the practitioners to a fuller appreciation of the problem.

If the reader is befuddled as he emerges from Part II, he can expect to find little solace in the main course: Part II, the Future of Collective Bargaining. The problem here is magnified and personalized, the idea being that public management cannot afford to ignore the collective bargaining movement or to approach the bargaining table with reluctance or animosity. Recognizing the lack of a standardized approach to collective bargaining (other than ostrich-oriented), the authors freely speculate and prescribe. For those unaccustomed to a bargaining situation, measures short of formal negotiations are presented and discussed. To the initiated, chapters are given over to the impact of collective bargaining upon public administration generally and public personnel administration in particular. As to the latter, an interesting discourse revolves about the merit system and its relationship to collective bargaining. In a final "Memo to Management," Warner and Hennessy bring to fruition their underlying intent: a warning against any twenty-five cent panacea. The book closes with an excellent set of appendices and an annotated bibliography, both of which enhance the value of the book to the practitioner.

To those who are interested in public employee collective bargaining as a political phenomenon, the book can be a valuable resource tool and should be taken with that expectation. To the public manager, for whom the book is directly intended, its broad coverage and moderate depth are ideal as a means to isolate issues and pose alternative questions and answers. The warning against a twenty-five cent panacea is well intended to dispel the who-has-change-for-a-quarter management approach.—Donald P. Sprencel, The University of Iowa.

Economic Evaluation Of Urban Renewal: Conceptual Foundation Of Benefit-Cost Analysis.

JEROME ROTHENBERG. (Washington: The Brookings Institution, 1967. Pp. xiii, 277. \$6.75.)

In its first nearly twenty years of existence the federal urban renewal program has aided American cities with some \$6 billion in grants for purposes of eliminating and preventing slums and blight. The political, social and economic impact of the urban renewal program has generated a relatively large volume of scholarly inquiries of varying interest to political scientists. Professor Rothenberg's study will more than likely be received by political scientists with equally varying attention.

This is clearly not a study of the politics of urban renewal. Rather, as one of a score of volumes published in the Studies of Government Finance series by the Brookings Institution, this work presents the dual thrust of a contribution to the extant literature on urban rénewal and vet another formulation in the growing literature on cost-benefit analysis. The most significant achievement of the book is to be found in the formulation of a specific cost-benefit technique by which the urban renewal program may be evaluated in welfare economic terms. In presenting his analytic method of evaluation, Rothenberg discusses at length the problems of constructing "benefit" and "cost" categories and the difficulties in obtaining comparable data to fit those categories. The author's framework for analysis represents a healthy initial contribution for those attempting to evaluate the utility of the urban renewal program when contrasted with alternative methods of renewing American cities.

This study assembles an analytic framework applicable primarily to one of many urban renewal project types—that of residential redevelopment. Rothenberg's concentration on redevelopment projects is guided by the fact that this particular type of renewal program represents the largest and earliest program emphasis of the Urban Renewal Administration. Personally, I do not share the author's sometimes too uncritical view of the residential redevelopment program. For example, at one point Rothenberg concludes,

"In sum, there is recognition that slum removal in the past has imposed undesirably heavy burdens on slum dwellers, and changes are being made to correct this. They can be pushed further within the framework of redevelopment." (p. 226)

In fact, recent federal programmatic changes, resulting at least in part from burdens imposed on slum residents, have emphasized residential rehabilitation, Model Cities, rent supplements, Turnkey projects, etc., etc. These programs depart markedly from the redevelopment projects.

Rothenberg's book is not, nor was it intended to be, for the political scientist who is looking for a compendium of data on the urban renewal program. Only one serious attempt is made by the author, in chapter 11, to numerically illustrate his method of analysis. Five completed residential redevelopment projects in Chicago are probed for data amenable to analysis under the procedure developed in the study. The author explicitly declines to claim meaningful empirical findings here, but rather attempts to indicate how the method would be applied and what problems would have to be overcome in collecting the appropriate data. The variety of categories in Rothenberg's analytic procedure that are not amenable to statistical analysis points to the unresolved difficulties remaining in gathering data appropriate to the schema. In fact, this numerical illustration is of most value precisely in making us aware of the limitations imposed on cost-benefit analysis by the types of data available. Taking the author on his own grounds however, he was not attempting an empirical study. We will have to await further study in the application of the method to available data.

A final reservation needs to be entered on the author's presentation of his cost-benefit procedure. Rothenberg in large part ignores the impact that the introduction of cost-benefit analysis would have on the decision-making process concerning the urban renewal program. That application of the author's analytic method by the ultimate decision makers would affect the direction of public policy is assured. But the questions of "in what direction" and "to what extent" remain unanswered in this presentation. The final two paragraphs of the book, which assess the role of cost-benefit analysis, are here viewed as incomplete.

What saves this volume from becoming a cookbook on "how to do cost-benefit analysis" is Rothenberg's often enlightened discussion of the substantive urban renewal program. In chapters 3 and 4, the author analyzes seven goals attributed to the urban renewal program. He finds the goals of the "mitigation of poverty" and the "provision of decent, safe, and sanitary housing in a suitable environment for all" to be in conflict with the goals of the "revival of downtown business areas of the central cities" and the "achievement and/or maintenance of an adequate middle-income household component in the central city." Later in the book, Rothenberg's introduction of the concept of "neighborhood externalities" elevates his assessment of the total contribution of the redevelopment program. The final two chapters offer an interesting discussion of the major cirticisms of the urban renewal program and an evaluation of some alternatives to the urban renewal program as issues of public policy.

Despite the limitations and omissions of this study, we have here an important first step in conceptualizing a method by which to evaluate a major federal program affecting American cities in a time which begs for such evaluation.—David J. Olson, University of Wisconsin.

Food and Fiber in the Nation's Politics. By Charles M. Hardin. (Washington: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1967. Pp. xi, 236.)

Students of agricultural politics and policy will be interested in this series of essays. Commissioned as a technical paper by the National Advisory Commission on Food and Fiber, they include studies of agriculture and the economic aspects of foreign policy, programs for price supports and allotments, soil conservation, agriculture and political responsibility, and policy for agricultural sciences. Each essay sketches the history of public policy in a particular area of agriculture and joins it with an assessment of the equity of policy outcomes.

The author's thesis is a familiar one in political science. Agricultural policy making is fragmented, each fragment being comprised of administrative elites at the bureau level in USDA, legislative elites at the committee level, and interest group elites. Not only is the system fragmented, it is also highly decentralized with at least one USDA representative in virtually every county in the nation. Under conditions of fragmentation and decentralization, executive control is difficult either at the secretarial or presidential level. Consequently, there is no coherent national agricultural policy, in the author's view.

Some of the results of the operation of decentralized bargaining elites in agriculture are ably described. Overseas programs have been and are still heavily protective of established farm interests. The "farm program" for price supports, storage and allotments serves to provide greater advantages to established and relatively well off farmers than to those less well off and established. The well developed pattern of co-optation through the farmer-committee system and the extension program through land grant colleges, has resulted in a strong grass-roots clientele of better off farmers, and agriculturists. It has also resulted in policy outcomes that favor these interests in much the same way as independent regulatory commissions come to reflect the preferences of the elites of those regulated. Further, the field arm of the "farm program," the Agricultural Stabilization and Conservation Service, remains an important source of legislative patronage all the way from State committeemen to farmer fieldmen. Among the results of this system is the maintenance of discrimination toward Negro farmers and Negro land grant colleges in Southern and Boarder States, and continued strong support for tobacco and peanut interests. Similar patterns of racial discrimination and advantage to "better and more influential farmers" are described in the operations of the Soil Conservation Service.

The characterization of Agriculture as fragmented and decentralized is similar to assessments of other departments, notably Defense, HEW, HUD, and DOT. These findings square with the conclusion that elitism is a fundamental characteristic of large scale government. Although this may be empirically clear, it is painful on normative grounds to those who are concerned about the unequal distribution of advantages and disadvantages associated with democratic elitism. The author takes the normative question as his theme, He insists that fragmented and decentralized policy making by agricultural elites which results in inequities in the distribution of advantages is "unconstitutional" because of the lack of "effective political responsibility and accountability." Al-

though he decries elitism and inequity in a democratic system, he does not wrestle with the fundamental normative questions either in terms of theory or specific policy recommendations.—H. George Frederickson, Syracuse University.

COMPARATIVE GOVERNMENT AND POLITICS

Political Participation in Communist China. By JAMES R. TOWNSEND. (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1967, Pp. x, 233. \$5.50.)

In this admirable study, Professor James R. Townsend examines the ways in which the ordinary workers and peasants, men and women, of contemporary China participate in the political process. Throughout this century, in ever increasing numbers the people of China have become conscious of political developments and active participants in political life. Although the traditional Confucian regime disappeared in the Republican Revolution of 1911, traditional values continued to play their part in forming attitudes toward authority. The CCP was founded several years after the first great popular movement swept through China's cities in the wake of the May Fourth demonstrations of 1919. When the CCP came to power thirty years later, the Chinese revolutionary movement was directed against the "mutant tradition" of a transitional society disorganized by wars, piecemeal economic modernization, and chaotic political change. Wars and revolution made the Chinese masses long for a strong political regime, and the CCP demanded that literally everyone must participate in the regime it established.

Exploring the historical and ideological roots of the revolutionary style of political participation in Communist China, Professor Townsend discovers these roots in traditional Chinese attitudes toward authority, popular reaction to political and economic modernization in this century, the influence of Soviet Marxism, and the experience of the Chinese Communist elite in mobilizing the people for revolutionary and national war before 1949. Then he examines the CCP concept of political participation as it has evolved since 1945: the democratic dictatorship of several classes, party leadership in state organs, mass activism as the means to foster correctly oriented political consciousness, and the theory of non-antagonistic contradictions governing both the relations between leaders and masses and relations between theory and practice. He goes on with a lucid analysis of mass participation in the state structure and in non-governmental organizations.

By 1949, the CCP developed its own theory of

mass mobilization—the Maoist mass line. This theory or line is not based on Western democratic precedents but on traditional Chinese modes. That is, it inculcates values through face-to-face contacts, through small groups meeting in familiar social settings. New techniques such as hsia-fang—giving officials experience working directly with the masses—are intended to narrow the enormous gap between the masses and the modernized urban intellectuals. In actual practice, Professor Townsend asserts, the Maoist mass line may be directly antithetical to administrative modernization.

One of the great virtues of this study is its focus on the degree of conscious voluntary participation by ordinary Chinese in carrying out political decisions made by the party elite. Under the Communist regime, almost all Chinese must take part in political rituals as well as in normally nonpolitical acts (like fly swatting, deep plowing, or stilt dancing) that the party has defined as politically supportive. The notion that guided involvement in implementing political decisions is a meaningful form of political activity runs counter to traditional democratic concepts of genuine political participation. Thus, for a modernizing state such as Communist China, Professor Townsend finds the concepts of political participation derived from democratic theory inadequate. The Chinese masses rarely participate spontaneously in the political process. Morevoer, they have little influence, and certainly no direct impact, on the selection of Central Committeemen or on decisions made by the Politburo. The Chinese people may influence the development and operation of the political system either by cooperating willingly with Party policies or by dragging their feet. If most people readily cooperate, the system will require less compulsion than if some people play stupid and passively resits the implementation of Party policies.

For the purposes of his study, Professor Townsend has defined political participation as "all activities through which individuals consciously become involved in attempts to give a particular direction to the conduct of public affairs, excluding activities of an occupational or compulsory nature." (p. 4.). This definition raises a most interesting and most difficult problem: measuring the

amount of spontaneity, voluntarism, and/or compulsion in the performance of political acts. There is no ready measure of the amount of voluntary participation in the Chinese Communist political system.

However, in Professor Townsend's judgment compulsion does not explain the Party's organizational success. Some of the Chinese masses who participate have a genuine ideological consciousness and commitment, but the voluntarism of the great majority rests on other factors: habitual obedience to authority, commitments to nationalism and progress, desire for personal advancement and social status, and shared interests in satisfying common needs. If popular participation gives a particular direction to the conduct of public affairs, that direction is not always one that the party would choose. Mass participation rarely reaches the level of conscious commitment that the Maoist doctrine of the mass line prescribes. The mass line of the party elite injects strong elements of continuity and predictability into Chinese politics, but its utopian claims have kept all political institutions outside the CCP in a constant state of flux. Mass political mobilizations without political institutionalization, the author suggests, may bring about disintegration and decay rather than development of a modern economy and a powerful state capable of meeting the needs of a developing nation. Distinguished by clarity in presentation, lucid, concise analysis, and broad historical perspectives, this book is a most valuable contribution to the growing body of literature on Communist China.—John E. Ruz, Oakland University.

Colombia: The Political Dimensions of Change. By ROBERT H. DIX. (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1967. Pp. xi, 452, \$10.00.)

Among the lingering curses that traditionally have stultified the growth of a truly democratic politics within the nations of Latin America is the conspicuous absence of a genuinely pluralistic structure of interest groups and associations. In at least one Latin American nation, Colombia, there is cause to hope that tradition is now passing with the stormy vicissitudes of change. Robert H. Dix has shown, with assiduous care, that Colombia is moving toward a pluralistic democratic politics, albeit a planned democracy under the aegis of the Frente Nacional, and in which such traditional bulwarks of the status quo as Army, Church, and privileged oligarchy are showing incipient capacities for change. At the same time, however, he is able to see that the unique sort of consensus embodied in the Frente Nacional, i.e., placing severe constitutional limits upon entry of new power contenders into the political arena, may act conversely to frustrate the popular spirit of reform. The numerous crises that Colombia must solve in the coming decade are still without appropriate institutional channels for the articulation and redress of popular grievances and ills. Not the least of her ills are the violence, the continuing displacement of rural folk into the great cities, and the resultant burgeoning of slums and barries piratas.

To those of us who have studied Colombia in field research situations (that were outside the towering shadow of any professional commitment to the United States' Alliance for Progress investment in that troubled nation) it may naturally appear that Colombia's violence reflects a direct attack upon the established order, its agents and instruments, as well as being symptomatic of the helpless futility of bringing about change by peaceful and rational means. Yet, Mr. Dix tells us "to qualify as genuinely revolutionary, violence must be centralized, and must attack the seats of political and administrative power, as well as the established social order. This the Colombian guerrillas never did." (p. 370) Instead, Dix portrays the violence as a process of catharsis in which sociopolitical-economic-ethnic and a cluttered mosaic of other violent and irreconcilable frustrations are sifted through the polarized conflict mechanism of the two traditional political parties. With the foregoing, this reviewer may disagree (as did later the Mexican journalist Mario Menéndez Rodréguez, editor of Sucesos, who lived during 1967 for one month with the Ejército de Liberación Nacional in Colombia and was subsequently expelled from Colombia and later condemned for his published documentaries on guerrilla actions and goals). Dix tends to see Colombia's most poignant national problem as an inter-elite conflict rather than as a direct popular assault upon the established order itself. In so doing he does not do justice to the basic sociological fact that the violence, as Norman Bailey has argued, produced an accelerated overpoliticization of the peasantry which, in turn, generated a momentum of nihilism and anarchy that outran the capacity of the traditional order to contain that which it had itself nurtured.

I stress what appears to me as a shortcoming constructively and with full recognition of the obvious fact that Dix has produced an excellent work with which there is otherwise really very little to find fault. If he would permit me to indulge in two more observations that are slightly negative, I would say that 1) despite numerous caveats to the contrary Dix comes off sounding mildly like a partisan of the "modernizing elite" which, in Colombia, probably does not merit the honor of his confidence (any more than Rojas Pinilla merited that of Fluharty), and 2) he paints an exces-

sively laudatory picture of the North American influence in terms that would not be shared by the slum pirsoners of "Alpujarra" in Medellín nor by those of "Chambacú" in Cartagena.

The historical, environmental, and theoretic sections of this work are superior. Dix has done a superlative job of bringing contemporary sociopolitical-economic theory to bear upon the ongoing traumata of a developing nation. Although this book may not be as colorful in its description of the ethos of Colombian political change as are the excellent works of Vernon Fluharty and John Martz, the Dix treatise approaches new dimensions of theoretic rigor in its introspection of a given Latin American political system and is an important complement to the foregoing works. Most important, however, Mr. Dix has given us a work that is not only intellectually stimulating but one that is a challenging instrument of pedagogy as well. I have assigned his book to graduate and undergraduate classes. That, of course, is the critical test, and an important one, especially for those struggling academic neophytes whose research funding limitations make Bogotá a place only to be read of .-- KENNETH F. JOHNSON, University of Southern California.

Canadian Legislative Behavior: A Study of the 25th Parliament. By ALLAN KORNBERG. (New York: Holt, Rinehart and Winston, 1967. Pp. vii, 161. \$2.95.)

The central assumption Professor Kornberg brings to this study is that "...legislative behavior is a product of the interaction between the individual legislator, the influence of his society, and the influence of the legislature per se." (p. v) To develop this conception he examines categories consonant with some recent studies of American legislatures. Data relevant to his concerns are gathered by structured interviews with a sample of 165 MPs.

In his early chapters, Professor Kornberg sets out his conceptual scheme, discusses the institutional setting of Parliament, and deals with such matters as social background, socialization, and recruitment. Though generally there is little that is startling in these chapters, his discussions of the role of the party as a recruitment agent and the importance of early political socialization are of some interest. The middle chapters deal with legislative goals and role orientations and their relationship to certain other variables. Goals and role orientations are in turn treated as dependent variables and correlated with a number of independent variables including both those of a preparliamentary and postparliamentary nature. Preparliamentary variables utilized include positions on a French Canadian Index, Political Environ-

ment Index, and Cosmopolitan Index, as well as education, father's occupation, prior political experience, and motives for becoming a candidate. Post-incumbency variables include such matters as party affiliation, urbanism of districts, perceptions of party competition, contact with constituents, and parliamentary experience. Articulated goals and roles are then employed as independent variables and correlated with differences in motives for maintaining a legislative career, differences in contacts with and attitudes toward constituents and interest groups, and attitudinal differences toward contrived conflict situations. In general (though not without exception), correlations that resulted from pre-incumbency variables ranged from minute to modest (the author wisely acknowledge this), those that resulted from post-incumbency variables were better, and those that ensued from using goals and role orientations as independent variables were more substantial. A chapter entitled "The Normativeness of Party," accents the author's findings that there is much ideological agreement within Canadian Parliamentary parties, that party discipline is not perceived by MPs as being unduly restrictive, and that local party organizations loom rather large in the lives of members of Parliament. In an excellent concluding chapter, the author generalizes that the bi-cultural theory of Canadian politics is largely unsubstantiated as it applies to the behavior of MPs, a fascinating conclusion in and of itself. He goes on to attempt to account for the paradox that about three-quarter of the MPs expressed policy aspirations as goals in a system that allows individual members scant opportunity to influence policy outcomes. Again, he attempts to explain why most pre-incumbency variables were not more meaningfully associated with legislative goals and role orientations. This, he suggests, is the influence of party writ large.

Acknowledging the importance of comparable categories to the development of systematic knowledge about legislatures, it is nonetheless to be regretted that professor Kornberg did not focus more sharply on a problem of particular importance to the Canadian Parliament. That is, given the fact that about one-third of the nation is separated sectionally, ethnically, linguistically and religiously, how is it that a body such as Parliament is able to engage in conflict management and yet keep that conflict in bounds? Certainly the author generates information relevant to this problem. The two-party plus national party system and the parliamentary system require that integration on a national scale take place continuously within each of the major parties; the largest proportion of MPs are motivated to keep up legislative careers for personal-instrumental reasons and thus must maintain party and system to maintain their offices; and again, the recruitment and socialization roles of the major parties contribute to party cohesion and minimize the importance of differences in prelegislative experiences.

There is a danger in the area of legislative behavior, also manifested in Kornberg's work, of confusing what is being referred to as "role orientations" (utilized to mean expectations of a single partner in a potential role set) with the concept of "role" defined as mutual expectations. Data about the former result from responses to a few questions which ought to be accepted only provisionally; indeed, established in this way, role orientations may be little more than self-justifications. When conceived as mutual expectations, however, role can be a powerful concept. It can be usefully employed to study interactions in a decisional process, it allows the scholar to distinguish between institutional and personal forces, it directs attention to expectations that are in conflict, and it invites discussions of systemic integration via the notion of role complementarity. It is highly questionable whether the data being gathered under the rubric of role orientation are sufficient to deal with these problems.

Still, Professor Kornberg has accomplished a worthwhile task. He has carried out a quite comprehensive analysis of the Canadian Parliament utilizing categories which facilitate the development of a comparative dimension. His book ought to receive wide use in legislative behavior courses, even in those courses where the focus is primarily on American legislatures.—Dean L. Yarwood, University of Missouri, Columbia.

The Development of Modern Nigeria. OKEI ARIKPO. (Baltimore: Penguin African Library, Pp. 176. \$1.25.)

To Americans, Nigeria resembles the little girl of doggerel fame: "when she was good, she was very very good, and when she was bad, she was horrid." Any current study of Africa's most ethnically complex and populous country faces the dual and seemingly contradictory task of explaining 1) how such a diverse group of peoples could attain independence as a single sovereign state featuring such aspects of Western democracy as multi-party competition and a relatively free press, and 2) why Nigeria should suddenly have turned "horrid," with two military coups, the massacre of some 30,000 Ibos, the secession of its Eastern Region (Biafra), and a tragic civil war occurring within the past two years. The contradiction is only apparent, as Okei Arikpo shows in this little book, for the very diversity of a country can pull it in two quite different directions. On the one

hand, diversity may convince many leading citizens, including the author, of the necessity and desirability of what David Apter has termed a "reconciliation system"; on the other hand it may contribute to the breakdown of the political system itself once the fragile institutions of unity cease in fact to reconcile the interests of major groups within the polity. Although most of the book was written prior to the demise of the First Republic, one is made aware throughout of the dual potential of diversity, and a final chapter and Additional Preface analyze these failures to reconcile ethnic, regional, and generational interests which precipitated the military coups of 1966.

Mr. Arikpo's background enables him to write a well-balanced and objective appraisal of the development of his own country. As a member of an Eastern Minority group, he analyzes events without obviously favoring any of the major contending "nationalities"—Yoruba, Ibo, or Hausa-Fulani, -and he points up the important mediating and centralizing role played by minorities in the political and cultural life of Nigeria. As a one-time politician, the author writes knowingly of the pressures and temptations to which political leaders are subject, and he quite properly emphasizes that the allocation—and withholding—of amenities to particular communities is a central concern of politicians in new states such as Nigeria. As an administrator-he has been Secretary of the National Universities Commission-Mr. Arikpo discusses realistically some of the problems confronting top bureaucrats. How, for example, can educational planners cope with massive unemployment among primary school leavers and with simultaneous shortages of high-level manpower in certain vital fields?

The book is least successful in dealing with the forces of tribal and regional chauvinism, which the author decries as "incompatible with the development of a rising educated populace and an expanding modern economy." (p. 11) Mr. Arikpo fails to point out that such chauvinism is dependent on these very aspects of social mobilization for its emergence and maintenance. In a traditional society "tribalism" scarcely exists, for social relations occur at a face-to-face and/or kinship level. With modernization different ethnic groups converge on the city, where they become acutely aware of what separates them from each otherincluding different opportunities and incentives to modernize-while engaging in a new kind of competition for scarce political and economic resources. And the very involvement of Nigeria's regions in raising per capita income and extending literacy has accentuated conflict among the regions and between them and the federal government. Nigeria is an excellent example of the dual potential of social mobilization for disintegration as well as integration, and this second set of dualities might have been stressed as strongly as the first.—David B. Abernethy, Stanford University.

The Prime Minister's Policy Speech: A Case Study in Televised Politics. By Colin A. Hughes and John S. Western. (Canberra: Australian National University Press, 1966. Pp. xvi, 227. S4.50 (Aust.), paper.)

In November, 1963, the then Australian Prime Minister, Sir Robert Menzies, produced an innovation in Australian politics by opening his party's parliamentary campaign with a televised policy speech to the nation rather than with the customary personal address to a gathering in his own constituency. Hughes and Western's *The Prime Minister's Policy Speech* is a report on their study of the impact of this political stimulus on a sample of Australian television viewers.

The authors attempt to measure this influence through analysis of change in the candidate, party, and issue orientation of their respondents after viewing the speech. The primary dependent variables studied are images of Menzies and his Liberal Party, plus knowledge of and affect toward issues raised in the campaign. Other than exposure to the televised address, the independent variables utilized by Huges and Western consist of respondent characteristics such as educational level, objective and subjective social class, and partisanship. The conceptual framework for the study is provided by cognitive dissonance theory.

In general, the findings presented by Hughes and Western are consistent with prior studies of political perception in that partisanship is found to structure cognition and individuals tend to change their opinions in ways that lead to "cognitive balance." However, the authors attempt to cover a broader range of topics as well, extending from the sources and effects of "radicalism" to causes and consequences of partisanship.

A basic strength of the Hughes and Western examination consists of their effort, both in the construction of instruments and in the analysis of data, to relate their research effort to prior studies on comparable topics. Thus the authors are able to present some interesting semi-replications in a different social setting of prior research by such investigators as Pool, Campbell, Gurin, and Miller, and Steiner.

Weaknesses of the study stem, at least in part, from the problem of inadequate time for prior planning which is typically involved in the study of elections in political systems where the timing of the election is left to the discretion of political leaders, rather than occurring on a fixed, periodic basis. The brief period of time between announce-

ment of the Frime Minister's intention to call an election and the presentation of his policy speech precluded the possibility of pre-testing the questionnaire and thus resulted in several lacunae. In addition, the results of the authors' untried sampling approach were disappointing. Five hundred names were carefully drawn from electoral rolls in Canberra with the assistance of a table of random numbers but, in the end, doubtless due to the small number responding to the invitations, questionnaires of any spouses and interested friends who showed up were tabulated along with those of the selected respondents. A basic N of 262 was thus attained.

That the variable deemed by the authors to be of greatest importance to the study-partisanship -was tapped by so questionable an indicator is particularly regretable. Instead of determining the political orientation of respondents by asking how they intended to vote, their party identification, or their voting record, for this study partisanship was obtained by asking, "If the election were being held today, which party would you want to win?" Unfortunately, this question was not posed to the panel in the initial questionnaire, but only after exposure to the Prime Minister's speech. To attribute primary causal influence to partisanship measured in this way is clearly tautological, as is exemplified by a hypothetical "independent" voter who, due to his favorable reaction to the Prime Minister's speech, subsequently indicates the Liberal Party as the one which he would want to win. In Hughes and Western's study, his "partisanship" would be interpreted as influencing his perception of the speech.

Another weakness of the study derives from an attempt to present more data than the authors are able to properly analyze within the pages they devote to them. Some examples of problems arising from the attempt to cover too much data are the presentation of four rather complex tables sequentially without a word of discussion intervening (pp. 166-169), and a two-sentence "analysis" of a table containing 48 entries (p. 55).

Finally, this study would have benefited from greater attention to details of data analysis. Such occasional errors as percentage breakdowns based on N's as low as four, five, and six respondents, percentages which could not possibly be derived from the bases given, and inexplicable changes in the base N from table to table mar an otherwise sophisticated analysis.

Hughes and Western introduce their report with the not untypical caveat that "our study may best be regarded as a pilot project for larger, more expensive research which could perhaps provide more satisfactory answers." While the book contains findings of undoubted interest to those concerned with mass media influence on public opinion, this judgment by the authors appears to be based not on false modesty, but on a valid appraisal of their effort.—Kenneth H. Thompson, University of Southern Californic.

Parliament Factions and Parties: The First 30 Years of Responsible Government in New South Wales, 1856-1889. By P. Loveday and A. W. Martin. (Melbourne University Press. New York: Cambridge University Press, 1967. Pp. xiii, 207. \$10.50.)

Political Scientists seem to be increasingly realizing that generalizations about politics can—and should—be tested as much by historical data as by data describing present situations. For this reason political scientists interested in the dynamics of party systems should find this book invaluable. It is a scholarly and readable account of politics in New South Wales, Australia, between the granting of responsible government in 1855 and the development of a more or less stable two-party system toward the end of the '80's.

This was a period in which politics was carried on not by the political parties usually associated with parlimentary government but by a fluid faction system that had no basis in the electorate and could usually create only impermanent majorities in Parliament. The factions themselves were composed of small groups of men who shifted freely from faction to faction but frequently stayed together for long periods. The authors trace the development of various factional alignments with admirable clarity, and argue, despite some preconceptions to the contrary, that the faction system was not incompatible with good—that is to say, stable—government.

But the most interesting aspect of this book is the way in which it traces the evolution of the faction system into the subsequent two-party system. Given the situation as it existed between 1856 and 1880, it does not seem that there was anything inevitable about a two-party system. Its important features were a small fragmented electorate, and the absence of any major economic crisis. As Schattschneider suggests is normal, it seems that the factions did seek to gain strength by mobilizing the electorate, but this mobilizing did not or could not take a form of permanent party organization; rather, according to the authors, "they acted covertly, seeking through widespread 'wire pulling' to exploit a variety of local conflicts to promote the election of members likely to support them in Parliament." Under more or less prosperous conditions and given the isolation and localism of the electorate, the bargains developed in this way between members of Parliament and more or less unorganized interests apparently kept both satisfied. Because there were

no great issues cutting across the electorate the incapacity of coalition majorities to enact sustained legislative programs was not of great significance; the faction system could, and did, provide perfectly adequate "housekeeping" legislation for the colony.

The givens of the situation began to change by the end of the '70's. On the one hand, the size of the electorate grew, and its fragmentation declined. On the other hand, various political organizations in the electorate began to develop and search for representation in Parliament. When the boom finally broke a few years later the resistance of the faction system to such demands also collapsed. The authors give a fascinating account of the way in which the demands of these non-Parliamentary groups and the power-seeking of factional leaders adapted to each other in the developing party system.

As all good case studies should be, this one is highly suggestive. Not only does it give a fine description of coalition formation in a situation where the major payoffs seem to have been the unashamed enjoyment of power, but it also shows quite clearly that under some circumstances a parliamentary system can function adequately short of a developed party system. It is a valuable addition to the party literature.—John Orbell, University of Oregon.

The Commonwealth Bureaucracy. By Gerald E. Caiden. (Melbourne University Press. New York: Cambridge University Press, 1967. Pp. xiii, 445. \$16.50.)

Commonwealth Bureaucracy is a comprehensive analysis of personnel administration in the Australian civil service. Caiden is concerned not merely with all administrative agencies comprising the Commonwealth government, but also, though less directly, with the role played by the public bureaucracy in Australian society. Despite this wider interest, Caiden's approach is quite straightforward. He first describes the environment, role, nature, organization, and composition of the public bureaucracy. He then analyzes the variety of personnel authorities and controls. Finally, he examines personnel structure and classification, recruitment, promotion, remuneration, fringe benefits, employee rights and obligations.

As no self-respecting work on public administration would be complete without a full offering of suggested reforms, Caiden closes his study with a series of intelligent and far-reaching proposals for improving the Commonwealth Public Service. Given his extensive interviews with service officials, Caiden's proposals require serious consideration by scholars and administrators alike. He is clearly sympathetic with the recommendations of the Boyer Committee (1958) and expects them to

prove functionally necessary for a bureaucracy capable of serving Australian society in the decades thead. His own recommendations go beyond those of the Boyer Committee, and are guided by both his sense of the hostility to change and his somber observation that "the first point that must be stressed about the Commonwealth Service . . . is That nobody knows how efficient it really is or how capable are the staff." (434) Given these premises, it is no surprise that even Caiden's committee like prose is redolent with a restrained desperation about the need for radical changes. This eneed is underscored by the dynamic role public Dureaucracy is coming to play in Australia. According to Caiden, it is the "most important single organization . . . combining the skill and talents of Australians and utilizing them for tackling future problems." (vii) It is the "national unifier, largest economic force, major socializing influence" (4); the "most important social institution" (27); a "major egalitarian force . . . irrespective of . . . the party or coalition in office" (29); and withal the bearer of "new responsibilities . . . detrimental to democratic political processes." (23) Though these alarming assertions tend to be unargued and somewhat impressionistic, they do lead one to wonder whether it is the Australian future we are headed for.

Despite its late development, the Australian public service displays many of the difficulties of any modern bureaucracy. But its long-term troubles are the product of a developing system searching for its own administrative style. A richer insight into this aspect of the subject is provided by Caiden's earlier and in many ways more interesting study of the history of personnel administration in the Australian Public Service (Career Service, 1965. The Australian system was the product of a fusion of American and British approaches to public administration. This is evident both in its concrete institutional arrangements and practices and in the cultural patterns of Australian society and the public service. Nothing else explains the number (29), vigor, and retrograde outlook of staff associations, i.e., civil service unions. One of the more fascinating elements in the situation, especially in its historical dimensions, is the "mix" of deferential, formal, and class-conscious mores with an informal and egalitarian ethos. Another expression of this has been the general resistance within the service to tougher meritocratic policies in the recruitment, training, and promotion of an administrative elite.

While Commonwealth Bureaucracy occasionally resembles a government organizational manual, there is much in it of interest for students of comparative administration. To an American raised amidst lush theories of developmental change and bureaucracy, the overall value of the book is

marred by a certain lack of theoretical focus. Caiden wavers between employing a strict Weberian model of bureaucracy and utilizing the perspectives established either by the sociology of informal organization or the group theory of administrative pluralism. His tie-in of culture and bureaucracy is suggestive but not systematically explored, while his description of the functional role of the bureaucracy is not wholly supported by empirical evidence. A more explicit theoretical approach might well have provided Caiden with a discriminating cutting-edge for his general analysis. I do not mean to detract from the admirable product of his exhaustive and picneering researches. This is as definitive an examination of Australian personnel administration as we are likely to have for some time. Perhaps Professor Caiden will provide us with a more generalized study of Australian bureaucracy in the future .--HENRY J. STECK, SUNY, Cortland.

Lenin: The Man, The Theorist, The Leader A Reappraisal. Ed. by Leonard Schapiro and Peter Reddaway. (New York: Frederick A. Praeger, 1967. Pp. x. 317. \$7.50.)

Fifty years after the birth of the Soviet state, its founding father has become the subject of a growing body of literature. The large volume of Soviet publications in this case feeds Western scholarship because the former contains many bits and pieces of hitherto unknown or unpublished material; and there still remain sources to be tapped. Some of the contributors of the volume under review make use of selected/ new information. But they do not do so systematically, and in the bibliography even the Soviet works that may have been cited in the text are omitted. Western sources fare better, although here too the list of works consulted is spotty. Most of the contributions themselves fall short of systematic coverage of their topics. They are essays or summaries rather than scholarly monographs. In a book setting out to "reappraise" Lenin this is perfectly justifiable, and my mentioning it does not imply a qualitative judgment.

Still, collective works of this kind are inevitably of uneven quality. Some of the chapters contain brilliant observations or novel statements of great interest to the scholar; I would single out the contributions of Reddaway, Erickson, and Nove in this regard. Some others barely go beyond summarizing materials with which undergraduates in this field are likely to be familiar.

This qualitative unevenness may be related to a strain between two aims motivating the contributors—that of making a scholarly assessment of Lenin's thoughts and activities, as against that of giving an ideological critique of his failures and inadequacies. The tone for this second theme is

struck in the Introduction, where the senior editor contrasts socialist dreams with Lenin's achievements and then proceeds to question Lenin's sanity (at least after 1917). To be sure, it would be impossible and undesirable to make a rigid distinction between scholarly appraisal and ideological critique. But it does seem that those chapters in which the note of indignation and scorn is toned down happen to be the more rewarding ones for the scholar.

On the whole, a negative attitude toward Lenin predominates among the contributors. Yet, almost as if despite their efforts, they manage to convey an image of him that brings out his versatility, depth, and political genius. Victor Frank, in a thoughtful essay, discusses his place within the Russian intelligentsia, which he defines in a highly stimulating fashion. Peter Reddaway quite surprisingly reveals the depth of Lenin's devotion to art, literature, and music. J. C. Rees researches, in fair and balanced fashion, the old scholastic question of whether or not Lenin was a Marxist, John Erickson's brilliant piece on Lenin's crucial and successful role as a civil war leader is a fine contribution. So is Alec Nove's assessment of Lenin's strength and weakness as a political economist (Nove rates him more highly than Western writers have in the past). Henry Willetts points out that his analysis of peasant life was thorough, original, and scholarly, albeit polemical. Had he given up politics in 1900, he argues, Lenin would be remembered as an expert on agrarian Russia. Both Willetts and Nove discuss Lenin's least well-known work the monumental treatise on the development of Russian capitalism, which Willetts dubs the best Marxist book since Das Kapital. Mary Holdsworth's summary of Lenin's views on the national question is thoughtful, but contains no new insights.

I find the chapter on Lenin as a philosopher unimpressive and a bit incoherent, and the appraisal of Lenin as a tactician unconvincing. It overstresses the differences between his machiavellian amoralism and that of other politicians and does so probably because it is based excessively on a conspiratorial interpretation of bolshevism. This in turn results from taking bolshevik delusions about their own ability to plan, manage, and control political events much too seriously. At the same time, and quite inconsistently with his conspiratorial view the essay on Lenin as a tactician underestimates his shrewdness and his political realism. In retrospect, this political horse sense rather than some abstract operational code appear to be the secret of his great successes.

Although the book discusses Lenin from almost every conceivable angle, there are two topics I would have liked to see added. One is Lenin's views on organization and his activities as the master of a political machine. The other is the question concerning his qualities as a charismaticleader; and, needless to say, the combination of charismatic and bureaucratic leadership is so rare and remarkable that, from the point of view of the political scientist, the omission of these two topics is deplorable.—Alfred G. Meyer, The University of Michigan.

Islam in the Soviet Union. By Alexandre Bennigsen and Chantal Lemercier-Quelquejay. (New-York: Frederick A. Prager, 1967. Pp. xiii, 272 \$7.00.)

This book represents a remarkable success in condensation and coverage; seldom has so much-been said so well with such brevity. The sources cited are few, but they include essentially all of the best ones. These authors know their subject thoroughly, and their outstanding competence shows through on every page. Their knowledge of Islam especially adds a depth to this study of twentieth century Soviet Central Asia, and other Muslim areas of the USSR, which is lacking in most other discussion of it.

It falls short of greatness because it lacks a general theory, of the middle or any other range. It offers no theoretical or generalized conclusions or even suggestions about Soviet nationalities policy generally, about the USSR and its government as reflected in the area, about nationalism, or religion, or even Islam-Communism attraction or repulsion. The book is weakest in economics and politics, and strongest in cultural analysis. The handling of nationalism, however, is careful and sophisticated; indeed the whole book possesses these qualities.

The authors deal primarily with the twentieth century, but provide good and solid discussion of pre-1917 as well as of post-1917. Their consideration of the Tatars and Kazan represents a significant addition to the usual limitation of studies of Islam in Russia to Soviet Central Asia. Some references to Muslims outside of Russia appear, but no serious comparative study is attempted. Throughout, there appears a neat and sophisticated balancing of generalization and detail, and indication of what united and what separated the Islamic peoples of Russia. Creative and substantive footnotes add biographical and other information of great interest.

It also is a tribute to Geoffrey Wheeler that he arranged the publication of, and wrote a generous introduction to, a book dealing with "his" subject, a book providing what is probably a better introduction to Soviet Central Asia than his own works.

This small book constitutes a significant contri-

•bution, and its authors deserve high praise.—Robert A. Rupen, University of North Carolina, Chapel Hill.

Resistance: The Political Autobiography of Georges Bidault. By Georges Bidault. trans. by Marianne Sinclair. (New York: Frederick A. Praeger, 1967, Pp. xx, 348 \$6.95.)

"Toute ma vie je me suis fait une certaine idée de la France." So General de Gaulle begins his famous war memoirs. Resistance reveals that Bidault too has a certain vision of France, and the surprising thing is how much it overlaps with his arch antagonist's. Both men have an obsessive notion of a mythical France, the center of civilization; are exasperated by the real France and by flesh-and-blood Frenchmen; and manifest unmentionable contempt for French parliamentarianism, political parties, and public opinion. The one refers to the "plague" of democracy, the other to the "vomit" of party haggling. Both are Christians without much charity for their opponents: show a puritan-like intolerance for human foibles: and would obviously like to substitute order, piety, and a somewhat prudish temperance for the virtues (or vices) that they see currently dominant in the lives of their countrymen. And both, needless to say, are massive egocentrics whose vanity stands out even in a nation whose politicians are not particularly noted for their personal modesty. The fact that both had similar upbringings-rigid bourgeois family; provincial setting; Catholic education with its emphasis on patriotic songs and legends about past French glories-accounts no doubt for much of this overlap.

And yet, of course, there are major differences. Chief among them is that de Gaulle, for all his lofty conceptions and pronouncements, is a superb opportunist who has uncanny ability to detect future developments in any situation and no inhibitions about shifting his position in order to drift along with them. In this he demonstrates consummate political skill; "things being what they are," his favorite catchphrase, is after all only a variant on the timehonored truism that "politics is the art of the possible." The secret of the General's success resides in his mastery of the politics of the possible while disguising this opportunism by means of his carefully cultivated inscrutability and his no less carefully conceived highminded rhetoric. Bidault does not apparently understand this secret. By all odds he should be the supreme political intriguer since he showed such amazing staying power in the unsettled political situation of the Fourth Republic; between 1944 and 1954, he was twice Premier and held the post of either Foreign Minister or Vice-Premier almost without interruption. Yet he turns out on the strength of his book to be hopelessly rigid in his beliefs and quixotically devoted to futile causes. His doctrinal honesty is what has made him so vulnerable to a masterful operator like de Gaulle who plainly used him, not only in 1944, but in 1958 as well. Ironical as it may seem, his downfall derives from the fact that he has the stubborn courage of de Gaulle's convictions.

Take his impenitent colonialism. Many are the reviewers who have contrasted Bidault unfavorably with de Gaulle on this sore; and if a man's actions are to be judged by their consequences rather than by the motives behind them, then the comparison is undoubtedly just. Without question de Gaulle performed a signal service for France in extricating it from its imperial tangles in Africa. But if we ask what the General really aspired after at the time and perhaps continues to believe in? In this case Bidault may have something when he speaks of hypocrisy. At any rate, the General now and then forgets himself and lets the cat out of the bag, as in his April 1961 sneer about "improvised States" dominating the UN General Assembly. There is nothing new in this stratagem of identifying a purely national mission with the greater interests of mankind, especially when that mission aims at increasing the rank and power of one's own nation at the expense of an alleged hegemon; the heavyfooted leaders of Wilhelmian Germany, for instance, found themselves urged to adopt it by liberal imperialists like Hans Delbrueck and Friedrich Naumann. But whereas de Gaulle can readily appreciate such a maneuver, Bidault, the frustrated idealist, cannot. Not only is he an old fashioned colonialist who sees only childlike savages, godless terrorists, and Red troublemakers afoot in the new nations of the third world, but in addition he is absolutely opposed, on principle, to de Gaulle's policy of maintaining French influence there by means of extensive foreign aid.

Bidault must thus be counted an honest man in expressing these views at some length in Resistance. They are clearly the views that have driven him to the desperate course that he took over Algeria. As for the quality of these views—this, obviously, is a different matter. It is a strange process of mental blockage that prevents a former President of the National Council of the French Resistance from grasping that others, too, may desire national freedom. Seen in this light, Bidault's formation of a second National Council in 1962, with its links to the terrorists of the Secret Army Organization, looms as a grisly parody of patriotism grown narrow and idealism gone sour.

Resistance is sub-titled a political autobiography. This is not completely justified by its contents. It is more in the nature of an embittered and combative indictment of the author's enemies, which seem to include nearly everybody active in French politics but especially de Gaulle. But the abuse and egomania that pervade its pages do not make it an effective polemic, and it is decidedly inferior as an assault on Gaullist politics to Paul Reynaud's La Politique Etrangére du Gaullisme. One does not expect a hounded exile to be charitable to his enemies, but \$6.95 seems a lot to pay for a protracted outpouring of invective and regrets.—Michael R. Gordon, University of California, Santa Barbara.

Maxime Weygand and Civil-Military Relations in Modern France. By Philip C. F. Bankwitz. (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1967. Pp. xiii, 445. \$10.00.)

In much of the world, the military coup d'etat and "man-on-horseback" are such pervasive and recurrent phenomena as to constitute almost "natural" features of the political landscape. That the great majority of these more overt forms of military intervention have occurred in non-Western settings sometimes tends to obscure the fact that, even in so-called "developed" industrial societies, military men have not infrequently risen to challenge civilian supremacy. This stark reality is no more better illustrated than in the example of modern France where, twice within the past decade alone, the army has directly intervened in domestic politics. The French deviation from what many would regard as the "normal" Western pattern of an apolitical military has increasingly attracted the interest of social scientists and Philip Bankwitz' study is but the most recent addition to a growing literature on the subject.

In focusing upon the inter-war years, Professor Bankwitz examines a particular period of French civil-military relations which until now had received little scholarly attention. Although one might argue with the author's premise that the army's act of disobedience in 1940 was of decisive import in structuring its later de-stabilizing role in the Fourth and Fifth Republics, there can be little question that it did set an unfortunate precedent fully capable of finding future emulation. Central to the discussion is the personage of General Maxime Weygand and the complex set of psychological, situational, and environmental factors that are seen as contributing to his leading role in June 1940 in toppling the Reynaud government. Widely rumored as the natural son of Leopold II, Weygand is revealed to be of illegitimate Belgian origin, driven throughout his military career by an unconscious search for personal identity. Having entered St. Cyr in 1885, emerging from the Dreyfus affair "never convinced that Drevfus was innocent" (p. 9), and having earned a reputation as a "star to watch" while instructing at Saumur, the future Chief of the General Staff is said to hav found a father figure in Foch while serving as th Marshall's much misunderstood staff officer i World War I. Foch, according to the author, em bodied precisely those qualities of authority an acceptance that Weygand's past had denied hir and in so doing fulfilled "one of [his] . . . greapsychological needs" (p. 14).

But it was with the army itself that Weygand is seen to have found his primary sense of identity and over which he came to exercise an almost pa ternal protectiveness in a post-war France whos governments displayed neither the authority no the apparent "understanding" of the military which Weygand, on the personal level, had found in Foch. Threats to the military interest are described as deriving from a variety of sources during Weygand's tenure as army chief from 1930 to 1935 but those dealt with in most detail are the crises over manpower levels, disarmament, and doctrine. Professor Bankwitz views these as the base factors "poisoning" civil-military rapport in the 1930's and in terms of which Weygand became convinced "that the entire military system was facing annihilation by a historically antimilitaristic enemy" (p. 48).

What little theoretical meat that the book offers is contained largely in Chapter 6 where Professor Bankwitz attempts to weave each of the above variables-i.e. psychological, situational, and environmental-into a coherent explanatory framework. The result is somewhat disappointing and involves a rather disorganized and inconclusive effort to establish a linkage between these and the transformation of Weygand (and much of the army command) from a mood of unconditional to conditional obedience to the government. What emerges out of all this is the hardly original conclusion that: "Guardians of the besieged Army, many high officers were becoming protectors of the harassed country as well. They no longer felt themselves to be the instrument of the Government's policy but rather the true representatives of the nation itself." (p. 240.) How often have we been offered virtually the same explanation of an identification between the military's institutional interests and those of the "nation" with reference to civil-military relations in other contexts?

The only really novel twist involves the author's persistent though fleeting references to an alleged relationship between Weygand's inner needs and his ultimate actions. The closest that Professor Bankwitz comes to articulating this is on page 232 where he describes the army as "Weygand's only 'real' family" after a "harsh and empty childhood." Throughout, Weygand is portrayed sympathetically as a political novice having little or no conception of the changing balance of power between the military and government

that developed in the waning days of the Third Republic. Thus, we are told in the conclusion that the "General's very professionalism—the totalization of his life in the service of the Army which had made him into a man—was responsible for the interlocking series of illusions and defenses which robbed him of self-awareness, deprived him of an accurate view of the world, and blinded him to the true significance of his most important acts." (p. 379). However, with the evidence presented, one could just as easily take the opposite and equally popular point of view—namely, that there was a deliberate effort by Weygand and the army command between the wars to undermine civilian authority.

Balanced against these negative comments, is the fact that Professor Bankwitz has produced a substantial and impressively researched work of history and it is highly recommended to students having an interest in contemporary French politics. Unfortunately, for those of us with a more far-ranging commitment to the general study of civil-military relations, it provides few new insights.—John N. Colas, The American University.

The Social Programs of Sweden, A Search for Security in a Free Society. By Albert H. Rosenthal. With a Foreword by Marquis Childs. (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1967. Pp. xvi, 193. \$6.00.)

With his subtitle, A Search for Security in a Free Society, Rosenthal proffers an interesting and potentially useful approach to the rather old, fundamental, and unsolved conflict between individual needs and social responsibility. It is an approach which has particular political address to a community of under-developed public philosophy in which political ideas are more concerned with eighteenth century civil rights and protection of the individual against supposed tyranny, than with looking forward to government being a useful means to solving hard-pressing common problems. Security versus freedom is, however, a very ambitious concept and difficult to realize as a fundamental feature in a rather limited research project.

According to Rosenthal, "Politicians are applauded when they object to increased governmental activity—especially at the federal level. Most Americans rarely think of the over-all question of the role of government or consider it in philosophical terms" (p. ix). "... many...look at government as an 'enemy' rather than as a 'servant'... take from you your money and your good old-fashioned rights....[identify] the growing national government as the paramount threat to our way of life" (p. 170).

As pointed out by Marquis Childs in the Foreword, "There has been a great deal of emotional writing in this area . . . now comes an author ideally equipped to appraise . . . by reason of his background" (p. vi f.). Childs may well be right, but Rosenthal succumbs to attributing the common antagonism toward the role of the growing national government to a basic question, giving his book doubtful political and partisan overtones.

The Preface, and also the concluding chapter, Chapter 8-Freedom in a Secure Society-are mainly concerned with the problem of balancing basic social needs with maximum personal freedom. There is no attempt at a systematic theoretical analysis-neither an outline of the general concept nor a statement of the criteria and premises of the study. The phenomena are merely presented and loosely described as they are observed, without any relationship to patterns of political theory. Not even the two main terms, security and freedom, are given operational definitions, and this despite the fact that the theme has been a matter of ideological and political controversy for more than 200 years. Nor do the theoretical components seem to have any function for the body of the book, apart from being a kind of reminder of interesting comments and footnotes, to the empirical description.

The main part of the book, however, lives up to its title and the author's statement in the Preface: "This book was undertaken on the premise that a description of the major Swedish social programs would be of value to Americans and others seeking to improve the social programs in their countries" (p. xi). Those who are seeking insight into a highly integrated social and political system will undoubtedly benefit from studying this book about the Swedish experiment. The growth and kinds of social programs are briefly described in Chapters 1 to 5: Growth of Social Programs; The Social Security Programs; Health Insurance; Public Health; and Welfare and Related Programs. The author has to a great extent achieved accurate descriptions free from evaluations.

Chapter 6 is devoted to the relationship between-The Government and the Individual. Rosenthal introduces the chapter with: "An understanding of the administration of the social programs in Sweden requires some knowledge of basic concepts, structure, and operation of the government. Most important, this understanding must include a comprehension of the confidence the citizen has in, and his relationship to, the government" (p. 92). It is probably true that confidence or support and structure of a political system are expected to be mutual variables in over-all decision-making, but the description of the public institutions involved, although accurate, does not add much light to the complicated and fundamental relationships mentioned. The lack of a theoretical approach is obvious.

Chapter 7 deals with: A Program—Comparisons

Between Sweden and the United States. Rosenthal finds that "examination of the similar social programs in the two countries indicates a striking... similarity in both stated objectives and accomplishments" (p. 137). "Comparative statistics must be reviewed in the light of the differing classifications of welfare programs used in the two countries as well as the federal-state character of the major programs in the United States" (p. 152). It is a moot question, however, how fruitful it is to directly compare statistics from two such different countries, particularly in relation to a freedom-security approach.

Finally, as previously mentioned, Chapter 8 is devoted to Rosenthal's basic concern-freedom versus security. He presumes that Sweden is almost a "secure society" and attempts to discuss whether this has brought serious reductions in individual liberty and free enterprise. In his examination of individual liberty, role of government, free enterprise, loss of incentive, cost of social programs, and moral standards, he does not find any serious threats to the freedom of individuals. Individual rights, so far as they have any isolated meaning, seem to be taken care of through mechanisms strongly integrated in the system. This is not at all surprising in such a highly developed and stable political system, but it may calm some of the more fanatic and fearful proclaimers against ultimate freedom.

Rosenthal's book presents a worthwhile collection of data and an excellent description of a highly developed social security system and its related political system. He has undoubtedly made many correct and important observations and hopefully will soon follow them up with an effort at systematic theory. In the meantime, this book will serve as an introduction both for politicians and political science students.—Arne J. Stokke, University of Oslo.

The Kingdom of Quito in the Seventeenth Century. By John Leddy Phelan. (Madison: University of Wisconsin Press, 1967. Pp. xvi, 415. \$10.)

Not everyone has heard of the Kingdom of Quito, which never existed. The subject of the book is the Audiencia of Quito, a division of the viceroyalty of Lima and ancestor of the state of Ecuador (although the map in the text gratuitously excludes modern Ecuador from the territory of the audiencia). An audiencia was also called a "reino," which usually meant kingdom; hence the title

Why a longish book on a relatively minor subdivision of the Spanish empire, of no great economic or political importance, during a period when nothing of outstanding significance occurred? For one thing, the author ranges without

obvious scruples for relevance over the whole of the Spanish American empire and beyond and through the entire period of its existence and after, bringing in many facts, from the world-wide conflict of Spain and the Netherlands to the contemporary boundary dispute of Peru and Ecuador. and the incidence of measles in modern Chile. For another, Prof. Phelan, by diligent work in archives, especially in Madrid, garnered a large amount of information, especially from reports of an inquisitorial inspection of the Audiencia of Quito from 1624 to 1637, which washed publicly a lot of very dirty linen. He has woven his facts into an unusual and fairly readable book, and he has demonstrated again that North American scholarship can devote far more intellectual energy to the study of Latin American nations than these devote to themselves. However, he apparently felt that laboriously mined details must never be thrown away, and he generously gives us all of them.

One can here, consequently, learn much of a section of the Spanish empire, its population, its primitive economy, its society and government. The picture is not pretty: sweat shops of chained Indians; class divisions and antagonisms, and an extraordinary amount of factionalism among the elite; immorality, with much detail of who was whose mistress for how long; omnipresent venality and corruption; a Church given to ritual, splendor, and corporate self-seeking, as the Spanish clegy refused to dilute the lucrative priesthood by opening it to Indians; and a complicated and inefficient administrative system, designed, one gathers, to keep maximum authority in the hands of men in Madrid who were unable to govern effectively because of distance and their own confusion. These are all familiar from other studies of Spanish colonial rule, but it is well to have them further documented.

In areas of interest to political scientists, however, Prof. Phelan does not have much to offer. He makes much of the fact that the king, although he was theoretically absolute and the only source of law, was little more than a final arbiter and did not decide very much of himself: kings never do unless they are strong personalities, and seventeenth century Spanish Hapsburgs were a very poor lot. His principal specific finding is that the "basic cause of graft at all levels was inadequacy of salaries" and believes this evil could have been simply cured in a fundamentally rotten society by better feeding (with unavailable funds) insatiable appetites. The administrators are several times discussed in terms of Plato's guardians. an ideal of which they might better be called the caricature.

Finally, in a more ambitious concluding chapter, the author finds in the Spanish imperial bureau-

cracy elements of charismatic rule (feeble); feudal traits, as in the real weakness of central control local powers staked out de facto fiefs, law was privilege, society was divided into exclusive classes, and the elite was imbued with an exaggerated sense of formal honor; patrimonial elements, in that all in theory were absolutely subject to the king, who employed the usual checking devices of absolute rulers; and legal elements, as some fixed norms were essential to make the creaky system function as well as it did, although a common response was, "I obey but do not execute." But the same thing can be said of any large closed empire. This labelling process deepens comprehension of imperial rule in the same way that understanding of stomach pains is improved by attributing them to gastritis.—ROBERT G. WESSON, University of California, Santa Barbara.

The Genesis of German Conservatism. By Klaus Epstein. (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1966. Pp. xiv, 733. \$17.50.)

In this detailed and readable history of German thought and politics between 1770 and 1806, the late Klaus Epstein divides the Conservative "movement" into three main species: Defenders of the Status Quo, Reactionaries, and Reform Conservatives. His sympathy with the Reform Conservative position is explicit (p. viii), reflected in his distribution of praise and criticism, and related to his conception of history. The typical Defender of the Status Quo is "ahistorical" in outlook, while the Reactionary romanticizes the past at the cost of "historical accuracy." The Reform Conservative, on the other hand, "has an understanding of the course of historical development and sees the inevitability of certain changes"; accordingly, he acts to maximize continuity by adapting the old order to "modern needs." Small wonder that the Reform Conservative, suspect to his contemporaries, is apt to receive the acclaim of "historians," (Pp. 7-11.)

Epstein's book itself is cast in the Reform Conservative mold, mediating between a radical challenge and an older order of scholarship. The traditional view was that "German political thinking... is the child of the French Revolution" (G. P. Gooch). This was challenged by Fritz Valjavec, who attempted to show that liberal, democratic, and conservative "tendencies" in Germany began before 1789. Specifically, "Central European Conservatism first arose not as a response to a political event, the Revolution, but as a response to an intellectual tendency, the Enlightenment, although only the events after 1789 led to its development." (Die Entstehung der politischen Strömungen in Deutschland, 1770–1815, München, 1951, p. 5.)

In Part One (1770-1790) Epstein follows the

general lead of Valjavec. He discusses Aufklärung and the secret societies formed to propagate and oppose it, surveys the religious, social, and political controversies provoked by the impact of Außklärung (controversies over toleration, serfdom, absolutism, etc.), and concludes with a "portrait of a prerevolutionary Conservative," Justus Möser, the administrator and historian of Osnabrück, who still stands where Karl Mannheim left him. "at the threshold between an unreflective traditionalism and a self-conscious Conservatism" (p. 335). Part One aims "to establish the general theme that Germany possessed a well-articulated Conservative movement before, and therefore independent of [the French Revolution]" (p. 23), but issues in the more moderate conclusions that (a) the time was ripe only for ad hoc responses to ad hoc criticisms, and (b) "the elements for future Conservative systematization were all present in [Möser's] work" (pp. 335f.). The latter conclusion is dubious for two reasons. First, Möser lacked altogether the kind of historical perspective essential to Reform Conservatism. Second, neither in Möser nor in any of the others discussed do we find seeds of the dialectical worldview that was to become so prominent with the great Conservative theorists Müller and Hegel (who are not treated within the limits set by Epstein for this volume). Their fusion of politics with speculative philosophy grew out of the tension between Aufklärung and traditional faith, to be sure, politicized by the Revolution, but Epstein has discussed the impact of Aufklärung primarily as manifested in pamphlets on matters of policy and in controversies over Masons, Illuminati, and Rosicrucians. The deeper intellectual and emotional crisis-still largely underground, but documentable from manuscripts, letters, and even published writings—is not treated in this

Part Two (1790-1806) sets the stage with chapters surveying the political situation in Prussia and the Hapsburg monarchy and ends with chapters chronicling the disintegration of the Empire. At times the focus blurs and the book takes on the appearance of "a general history of Germany" (p. vii), which it is not. The core of Part Two. however, consists of chapters on "the challenge of the French Revolution," "the conspiracy theory of the Revolution," and the life and thought of August Rehberg, the Hannoverian statesman and publicist sometimes called the German Burke and presented here as "a good example of the Reform Conservative." Along the way, Epstein redresses the emphasis of Part One: "there is obviously a core of truth in the traditional view, for the French Revolution did have a great impact upon political development"; and Valjavec's book is rebuked as "unfortunately not without the exaggerations too often characteristic of 'revisionist' historiography." (P. 434.) Thus is rough justice meted out to old and new: judicious scholarship, like judicious statesmanship, lies in taking a middle path.

A less detailedly descriptive, more analytic treatment of these issues would make more of certain distinctions: e.g., between a pre-existing nonpolitical conservatism that was politicized by the Revolution (as in Rehberg's case) and a conversion to conservatism prompted by the excesses of the Revolution. (This seriously affects the issue of continuity between Parts One and Two.) There is also a question of the quality of political thinking. The world reconstructed by Epstein is a culturally "democratic" world of journalism and pamphleteering, in which we encounter an occasional insight (e.g., Möser on the psychological cost of a merit system, p. 326). But all the German political thought worth reading today for other than antiquarian purposes—with the exception of an essay by Kant-appeared after 1789, and most of it appeared during the Romantic and Napoleonic period after 1800. The question of chronology and of preconditions thus depends on the level of thinking, as well as on how political it is. Continual reliance on terms like "tendency" and "movement" (neither of which is critically explored) does not conduce to clarity of comprehension.

Finally, there is the problem of "the specificity of . . . Conservatism," which concededly makes a history of European Conservatism more difficult than a history of European Liberalism. (Pp. 6f.) Given the variety of social conditions and regimes in the German states of the late 18th century, however, does it make sense even to speak of "German Conservatism?" How meaningful is it to treat under the same heading a defender of the semi-medieval Ständestaat and a defender of enlightened absolutism, even though each could appear as a Defender of the Status Quo in some part of "Germany"? It may be that the focus on "German Conservatism" obscures the more basic political dilemma of the time; too often "progress" and absolutism seemed to go hand in hand, while constitutionalism seemed linked with a discredited social order. In this and in certain other respects, the German states were the first "backward" societies responding to the intellectual and political imperialism of Western Europe. The pattern of responses and, in particular, the fortunes of the varied strategies of compromise termed by Epstein "Reform Conservatism"—whose problematic "triumph" in theory and practice after 1807 would apparently have been discussed in the next volume of this history—are therefore of some enduring interest.-John Rodman, Pitzer College and The Claremont Graduate School.

The Foundations of Indian Federalism By K. R. Bombwall. (New York: Asia Publishing House, 1967. Pp. xiii, 348., \$6.50.) Distributed by Taplinger Publishing Company, Inc., New York.

Professor Bombwall has analysed the social, constitutional, and political forces and factors that have helped shape the present-day federal system in India. The book contains four main hypotheses: 1) Due to the size of the Indian subcontinent and its regional diversities, a federal structure of government was not only unavoidable, but inevitable: 2) Federalism was a logical development of the British decision to introduce responsible government in India: 3) Rising Nationalism on one hand and the British encouraged separatist demands, communal as well as feudal, on the other, could only be reconciled through the promotion of "national unity within regional diversity"; and 4) India's experience with federalism has been successful and the system has come of age.

The author examines these hypotheses in detail and relies heavily on information generally available in public documents and a number of partial studies on the subject. His method understandably is historical and more than two-thirds of the book is devoted to an analysis of the developments before the constitution of free India came into force in 1950. New insights, however, are readily visible throughout the discussion which help the reader gain a better understanding of the past developments. For instance, it has been generally believed that until the Montford Reforms of 1919 when "Dyarchy" was introduced in the Provinces, the British rule symbolized the epitomy of Central authority in India. Professor Bombwall's insightful discussion of the developments points toward an opposite direction, that a significant delegation of power to the Provinces started as early as 1861 with the enactment of Indian Councils Act (pp 57-93).

The obvious stepstones to Indian Federalism, of course, began with the Montford Reforms (Supra) and The Government of India Act of 1935 when "Provincial Autonomy" was introduced. The author expresses the view, shared by many, that if the federal structure envisaged in the 1935 Act had come to fruition and if Indian leaders had not failed in resolving the Hindu-Muslim question the partition of the country could have been avoided through a federal system of government. (After all, though the diversity of Indian subcontinent is readily visible, its unity is much deeper. It is a single geographical and economic unit and did maintain political unity for prolonged periods of time).

The partition of the country changed the social and political setting radically. Gone were the restraints of communal demands and feudal and princely obstructionist devices receded into background. A new concept of federalism with a strong center came into being. Here again, Professor Bombwall convincingly counters the general belief that India with its "federal structure and unitary spirit" is not a "true" federation. He points out that the framers of Indian Constitution realized rather early in the game the nature of modern federal governments where Central authority inevitably comes to assume a policy-making role for the entire nation and also recognized the dual problem of the emergent polity-the maintenance and consolidation of Indian national unity along with rapid economic development through national planning. In this sense, Indian federalism is not only a more accurate reflection of current practice, but also is more functional in terms of its contemporary needs (p. 296).

Finally, discussing the experience since independence, the author maintains that despite a further growth in the powers of the Central government, mainly due to national planning and a virtually monopolistic dominance of a single political party at the Center and the States for twenty years, a new political "balance of power" has begun to emerge. And with the 1967 elections we can look forward to the establishment of a true partnership between the Center and the States.

This is an "old fashioned" book—no tables, charts or graphs, yet it is systematic, detailed, and scholarly. Professor Bombwall has made a needed and valuable contribution to our understanding of the Indian experience with federalism.—Baljit Singh, Michigan State University.

Laissez-faire-Pluralismus: Demokratie und Wirtschaft des gegenwärtigen Zeitalters. Ed. by Goetz Briefs. (Berlin: Duncker and Humblot, 1966, Pp. xiv, 532. 59.60 DM.)

The West German economic recession of 1966-1967 has demonstrated that even the muchheralded "economic miracle" created by the former minister of economics and chancellor Ludwig Erhard could not last forever. Since December 1966 the coalition cabinet composed of Christian Democrats and Social Democrats has veered away from the Erhard neo-liberal model of encouraging a competitive social-market economy to a Keynesian model of engaging in a massive pump priming program whenever necessary. Under the skillful touch of Minister of Economics Karl Schiller, a Social Democrat, and Minister of Finance Franz-Josef Strauss, chief of the Christian Social Union, the recession is ebbing, as government expenditures are cut and deficit financing and public investment programs are embarded upon.

Since this book, edited and primarily authored

by Professor Goetz Briefs, was published before the West German recession had gained momentum, one can only surmise what position the chief author would take presently. Professor Briefs, teaching at Georgetown University and at the Technical University at Berlin, obviously has sympathies for the classical liberal system of the nineteenth century, but realizes that such a system could not be operative in a modern industrial system. Thus in the context of the contemporary period he seems to be supporting those neo-liberals who advocate a mix of a free enterprise system with some government regulation, if only interest associations were to refrain from putting governments under excessive pressure.

As he surveys the relationship of interest associations to governments in the nineteenth century, he finds those situations ideal where associations representing labor and peasants were weak and where they served primarily to correct existing inequalities. But as he surveys the contemporary neo-liberal or semi-planned economies not only of the Federal Republic of Germany but also of Western Europe and the United States he concludes that the interest associations have become so powerful in a pluralistic environment that they constitute a threat to the existing order.

Thus, he is especially highly critical of trade unions, such as the American longshoremen's unions which have the power to paralyze shipping along the entire eastern or western seaboard for weeks on time. Briefs claims: "The democratic process hangs on one thread when mighty trade union leaders have it in their power through strike threats to bring it to a standstill" (p. 287). The threat is even graver, he maintains, when a strong labor party is allied with trade unions, hence combining political and extra-political weapons, such as a mass strike.

But what Briefs forgets in this sharp indictment is that none other but the German trade unions called a mass strike in 1920 at the time of the right wing Kapp Putsch when the very existence of the democratic Weimar regime was threatened. And if the trade unions had called a mass strike in July 1932 when Chancellor von Papen ousted the legitimate Prussian coalition government headed by Social Democrats then perhaps the Nazi seizure of power might have been averted. Thus the trade unions might often act as the champions of democracy rather than its killers. In addition, as shown in Great Britain, Scandinavia, and recently in the Federal Republic of Germany, when socialists are in or share power, they tend to restrain exorbitant wage demands made by organized labor.

Moreover, Briefs fails to equate the power of business with that of labor. In many democratic countries conservative business interests wield much political, economic, and financial power, and are prone to support non-democratic movements. Thus, a certain balance is missing in his indictment of the power of interest groups in modern democratic systems.

Of course the author raises significant questions to which contemporary societies have not yet found satisfactory answers. As interest groups become increasingly powerful, can the state be more than a broker of their claims? Will the groups be able to undermine the fabric of government, and reduce further the role of the individual in society? The author is most pessimistic when looking into the crystal ball. He sees associations determining price, wage and taxation policy, even in planned economies. He sees the danger of welfare states turning to absolutism and totalitarianism under the flag of democracy. He sees democracies losing their "moral and metaphysical" foundations.

What remedies does the author suggest to prevent these trends? The supremacy of the state to promote the general welfare must be established, while the interest groups must be relegated to the "societal space." This can be accomplished if the activities of interest groups are limited to legitimate economic tasks now taken over by the state.

But, we may ask, will not a powerful state lead to new dangers? And who will determine the nature and content of general welfare? Given these problems and given the dynamics of political and economic movements will the advocates of a modified laissez-faire pluralism win out in the end? The weakness of liberal parties in Great Britain and on the continent would suggest that their academic supporters face many obstacles in gaining converts to their cause.

In addition to this thought-provoking essay (317 pages long), three other authors contribute shorter pieces on the state, law, and welfare (Dr. Bernd Bender); inflationary forces in a pluralistic free economy (Professor Cyril Zebot); and wage and profit policy in an industrial society (Professor Hanss-Joachim Rustow).—Gerard Braunthal, University of Massachusetts.

An Essay on Marxian Economics. By Joan Robinson. (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1966. Pp. xxiv. 104, \$3.50.).

Aims and Methods of Soviet Planning. By Mik-HAIL BOR. (New York: International Publishers, 1967. Pp. 255. \$6.95.)

It is a pleasure to welcome and to highly recommend to the reader the revised text, with an added new introduction, of Professor Joan Robinson's enduring classic, first published a quarter of a century ago. This book deservedly achieved its reputation as probably the hest critical introduction to Marxian economics, written by one of the

leading economists of our time—remarkably versed in modern economic theory to which she so much contributed.

"The purpose of this essay is to compare the economic analysis of Marx's Capital with current academic teaching" we read in a foreword to the first edition. The book is also an assault on and a searching criticism of "traditional orthodox economics," expressing Mrs. Robinson's profound discontent with the state of economic science. What finally emerges is an admirably lucid, succinct, critical, and searching, but very sympathetic commentary on the three volumes of Capital. Mrs. Robinson stresses the crucial contribution of Marx and evaluates the differentia specifica of the Marxian approach to economic problems. Since Capital is representative of the "nineteenth-century metaphysical habits of thought . . . alien to a generation brought up to inquire into the meaning of meaning," Mrs. Robinson "tried to translate Marx's concepts into language that an academic could understand. This puzzled and angered the professed Marxists, to whom the metaphysic is precious for its own sake." (vii-viii) There is no need to turn Marx, "as many seek to do, into an inspired prophet. He regarded himself as a serious thinker, and it is as a serious thinker that I have endeavoured to treat him." (5)

Mrs. Robinson maintains that Marx was a precursor of the modern theory of effective demand. There is a germ of truth in a joke that Marx was "a little-known forerunner" of Kalecki and Keynes. (vi) Marx was predominantly concerned with explaining the genesis, development, and structure of a capitalist economy. In his analytical scheme the theory of exploitation—theory of distribution of industry's net product between wages and profit-emanated from the theory of value (relative prices). The unfortunate association of the two concepts has been a "plentiful source of confusion." (vii) Mrs. Robinson remarks: "The concept of value seems to me to be a remarkable example of how a metaphysical notion can inspire original thought, though in itself it is quite devoid of operational meaning." (xi) According to the third volume of Capital, under developed capitalism, value is modified into the price of production and commodities produced with dissimilarly constituted capital. Under competition the conversion of surplus value into an average rate of profit expresses the principle of equal profit on equal capital, and is the essence of the transformation of value into the price of production. I would be inclined to join Mrs. Robinson in her argument that "the transformation is from prices into values, not the other way." (xi)

I can only allude here to Mrs. Robinson's illuminating discussion of value under socialism. No doubt, "no system of prices based upon costs will

prove practicable," and the recent debates in the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe attest to it. Moreover, it is the marginal cost, rather than the average as reckoned by Marx, that, in most cases, is relevant for decision-making.

Mrs. Robinson notes the new trends in economic thought: "Nowadays the academics are impatient of static analysis; the classical problems of growth and development have come back into fashion, reviving interest in the classical economists and Marx amongst them." (vi) On the other hand, there is a discernible trend among Marxists to separate ideology from analytical tools of economics and to apply these tools to real problems. It is difficult to disagree with her comment that "on both sides a radical rethinking of the theory of prices is evidently required." (xxi)

Professor Bor's book emerged from a report prepared for the United Nations. It is presented with an interesting introduction by Maurice Dobb. The stated aim is "to tell readers how national economic planning developed in the U.S.S.R. and what methods it now adopts." (8) Professor Bor is one of the leading Soviet authorities on planning. He is particularly known for his refinements of the material balances techniques and as an advocate of the need for an integrated (over-all balance) approach to economic planning. His book constitutes a notable effort to rationalize planning as practices in the U.S.S.R. He also devotes some space to changes in the approach to planning techniques. In the final chapter of his book he contrasts Soviet planning with indicative planning, with more partiality than could be desired, as witnessed by his comment that "far from introducing any essential changes in the capitalist mode of production, programming only accentuates the class contradictions in it." (246)

Before turning to a Western evaluation of Soviet planning the interested reader will undoubtedly wish to refer to a first hand account by a Soviet scholar who for over a quarter of a century participated in shaping the planning techniques. However, it should be noted that Professor Bor does not belong in the ranks of the new school of Soviet planometrics. There is much that is traditional in his thinking.

When reading his work one should keep in mind that the Soviet planning system was primarily designed for swift, massive, and expedient redirection of resources for forced and rapid industrialization, relying primarily on extensive use of resources and nonmarket instruments. It is a moot question whether with a different growth strategy and alternative working arrangements the results would have been better. Be it as it may, it seems that at the present stage, with the necessary shift to intensive use of resources, a radical changeover in plan construction and working arrangements is

mandatory. But what is the nature and optimum combination of the plan and the market, what is the objective function of the economy, and what are the necessary and sufficient conditions for the success of the alterations—are all vital, fascinating, complex, and yet unresolved questions.—George R. Feiwel, The University of Tennessee.

The Politics of Conformity in Latin America. Ed. By Claudio Veliz. (London: Oxford University Press, 1967. Pp. x, 291. \$7.00.)

The editor states this book was to have been entitled, "The Politics of Change in Latin America," focussing on the ideas and activities of those groups "most obviously and efficiently determined to bring about profound changes in the institutional structures of Latin American society." But the forthcoming contributions instead revealed these groups as primarily seeking to gain a higher position in the existing social structure, and to protect the structure by preventing fundamental change. A reading of the contributions indicates, however, that the present title is somewhat misleading, since one finds analyses of deviant and innovative as well as conformist political behavior.

E. J. Hobsbawm documents the massive migration of the rural poor to the cities since the 1930's, and the consequences of this demographic transition for the emergence of populist political parties. He suggests that while there is a temporary lull in urban mass politics, we can anticipate demands for radical transformation from the urban proletariat in the future. In a careful analysis of the Mexican ejido, Francois Chevalier points out that the achievements of the Mexican Revolution, especially under Cardenas, in the extension and preservation of communal and private small landholdings, is threatened by over-population and the growth of a younger urban and rural generation for whom these achievements are not likely to be considered sufficient. Conformity in the sense of preserving the achievements of the past will not assure future political stability in Mexico.

Alistair Hennessy's wide-ranging dissussion of university students does not support the editor's assertion that they are essentially conformist. While social mobility is a major individual motive for university attendance, collective student protest constitutes a continuing pressure on governments for major reform, while former student leaders are seeking to modernize their societies in Venezuela, Cuba, Chile and elsewhere. Collective student conformism is best exemplified in resistance to university modernization, leading to government attempts to depoliticize the university through both repression and reorganization.

In the major theoretical contribution of the book, José Nun argues persuasively that the military coup represents the interests of the middle class, compensating for its inability to achieve hegemony, rather than constituting a threat to the middle class or serving the interests of national development. Hugh Thomas disputes the thesis that the Cuban Revolution was a middle-class protest movement betrayed, arguing instead that the absence of liberal institutions and the compromise of business with the Batista regime left responsible middle-class politicos in a weak position from which to oppose Castro's radical program.

Papers by Oscar Cornblit and Emauel de Kadt discuss respectively the suppression of immigrant industrialist interests by Argentine political parties, and the role of the Church as both conservative and innovative political force in Brazilian political change. Finally, Richard N. Adams discusses the relations among social class, power and prestige without locating his analysis within specified political and social systems, and without proposing answers to clearly defined theoretical or

substantive problems, virtues present in most of the other papers.

To summarize, this collection constitutes on the whole a valuable contribution to the growing literature on Latin American politics, especially where the authors confront prevailing interpretations with well-reasoned and documented alternative analyses. One might prefer, however, that such a collection would produce a better payoff for the reader, and a better contribution to Latin American studies, were it to focus on the analysis of a single phenomenon, such as the distribution of power, class structure and relationships, or the rural proletariat, viewed from a shared theoretical perspective, and focussing on this phenomenon comparatively in each of several Latin American societies. But this is perhaps a personal preference, and if it points to a weakness in this book, it is one shared by many others in the field.—Ken-NETH N. WALKER, University of Toronto.

INTERNATIONAL POLITICS, LAW, AND ORGANIZATION

Force, Order and Justice. By ROBERT E. OSGOOD AND ROBERT W. TUCKER. (Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins Press, 1967. Pp. viii, 374. \$10.00.)

This is a difficult book to discuss. It is divided into two parts, each by a different author, which are meant to arrive at the same goal by different paths. The two parts do not really fit together, however, and they are also of strikingly different quality. Professor Osgood's section, an historical discussion of changes in the means of international violence, the role of violence, and strategic thinking about its use over the last two centuries, is disappointing, often unoriginal, and unsatisfactory; Professor Tucker's essay, addressed strictly to normative concerns, is stimulating, original, and valuable.

Osgood's introductory chapter, on the insuperability of obstacles to international order, is a good summary which, as he acknowledges, owes much to Rousseau, Aron, Waltz, Hoffman and others. (It also states a viewpoint that Tucker relies on later, and thus represents the only problem discussed about which one can be certain the authors are in agreement). Osgood then proceeds to give a good brief history of modern warfare up to the nuclear era, demonstrating the failure of both "laissez-faire" (e.g., balance-of-power) and "systemic" (e.g., general disarmament) theories about the control of international violence. In a chapter titled "The Control of Force" he continues with an account of developments since the end of World War II, in which the problems and prospects of nuclear arms control receive an informed

and speculative (though not often original) discussion.

Osgood's history is marred, however, by the virtual absence of any consideration of political factors in the expansion and control of force. His emphasis is entirely on developments in weaponry and strategic thinking, and on the gradual breakdown of European alliance systems. Taken in conjunction these factors are said to account for the drastically increased scope and intensity of violence in the last century. But of the political roots of international disorder, the underlying processes -nationalism, imperialism, revolution and the emergence of mass-based governments-which determined that the developments Osgood discusses would have such catastrophic results, almost no mention is made. His preference for regulatory (as opposed to laissez-faire or systemic) controls on force remains merely a prejudice, therefore. The "professional" managers of conflict who are expected to accomplish such regulation seem to be the same kind of people whose strategic thinking is earlier described as having once been so disastrous. Nor are Osgood's assurances that "they" have learned the lessons of the past satisfactory. for it is not the state of decision-makers' intellects but the political forces operating on them which are decisive in setting the direction of their behavior.

For what purposes do the professionals—the theorists and practitioners of nuclear deterrence today—manage force? Cui bono? Professor Osgood's few references to such questions are not

reassuring for here, when he does discuss the political dimension of violence, he betrays an often unalloyed cold-war nationalism, as evidenced by the following remarks: ". . . military deterrence in Asia must depend far more than in Europe on local non-nuclear fighting capabilities. Yet no military deterrent can prevent wars that capitalize on the vulnerability of the Third World to insurgency, except by the demonstration through military resistance that such wars will fail or involve too great a risk of disadvantageous escalation." The "Third World" is a concept from the realm of propaganda, not social science; and the theory here put forth is one not of "deterrence" or "regulation" but rather of expansive American power. Osgood rather precisely describes where such thinking has led in the past, but apparently fails to see any connection, and this is discouraging since he is presumably a professional manager of force himself.

Professor Tucker's contribution, a discussion of the philosophy of force developing contemporaneously with the events Osgood describes, is of a different order altogether. His is a lucid, often brilliant treatment of normative judgments and their empirical roots and consequences: still the sort of thing that political science does best. Among the propositions for which he offers persuasive argument the following are the most challenging: 1) The perceived aversion to force in modern times is unfortunately accompanied by a ready ability to justify its excessive use, 2) The "moral economy" of force depends largely on its quantitative effects, and the development of nuclear weapons therefore heightens all preexisting dilemmas about the use of force. 3) Rules for the restraint of force are in practice completely fragile as long as the rightfulness of any degree of force thought requisite for preservation of the state in extremis is accepted; the theory of nuclear deterrence, which proposes to police "limited" wars with the underlying threat of utter destruction, is the ultimate expression of this essential incompatibility between the idea of limits and the idea that national self-protection is necessary for the preservation of individual and communal happiness.

Tucker's own view of the role of force is ambiguous, since he recognizes both the sometime validity of the argument from necessity and the perverse uses to which it is often put. (Indeed, his discussion of the intellectual and physical crimes committed in the name of raison d'état is both trenchant, and happily free of Osgood's nationalism). He offers a qualified "optimism" about the prospects for successful deterrence and "crisis management" regulation. This solution to the problem of force is also Osgood's, and here Tucker's analysis is like Osgood's in being not political

enough: his idea of a "new beginning" seems at the moment to be wishful thinking (though that is surely preferable to nationalist bias). After his previous comments, this conclusion is surprising. At the end, however, he does note the extent of the disaster that will occur if his optimism proves unjustified, and asserts that we must somehow go "beyond deterrence" eventually (which is the point that Osgood ignores). Having pointed out the critical need for some world order, and the presently insuperable obstacles to it, he has taken his analysis as far as it can go. The result, in any event, is an essay well worth reading and rereading.—Philip Green, Smith College.

The Trial of the Germans. By EUGENE DAVIDSON. (New York: The Macmillan Co., 1967. Pp. vii, 636. \$12.50.)

Yet another book on the Nazi Era—could well be ones first reaction to the title of Eugene Davidson's The Trial of the Germans. That reaction could be followed by a second one, upon reading the sub-title "An Account of the Twenty-two Defendants Before the International Military Tribunal at Nuremberg": Why rehash the Nuremberg Trials more than twenty years after they occurred?

After reading Mr. Davidson's voluminous account and perusing his twenty-two page bibliography which is a painstaking collection of Allied and German primary and secondary sources, both contemporary and historical, and covers the entire period of the Third Reich as well as much of the material of the Trials, I submit that this book be ranked the definitive one volume study on Nuremberg.

It is not only a very scholarly volume, but it raises the questions of the Nuremberg Trials—the legal as well as the moral ones—in a manner and at a time that make this book a major addition to the bookshelf of the historian, the political scientist, the international lawyer, the legal scholar, but above all, the political decision-maker in the age of nuclear weapons, total war, and such "undeclared" warfare as Vietnam.

The leaders of National Socialism and the architects of the Thousand Year Reich come to life again in the book the twenty-four originally named the twenty-two who stood trial of whom eleven were sentenced to "death by hanging"; those who would be tried later; and those who did not have the courage to face the consequences of their actions which resulted in the deaths of millions of innocent people, and escaped trial by suicide.

Grouped into the major political, social and economic institutions which were the pillars of the Third Reich, the reader encounters once more Ju-

lius Streicher, at the "Core of the Conspiracy": "The Number-Two Man," Hermann Goering; Bormann, Hess (the only man still in Spandau Prison and probably the only one of the defendants who should have been committed to a mental hospital) and Rosenberg representing the NSDAP in "Action and Theory." "The Diplomats," Ribbentrop, Neurath, and Papen; Schacht and Funk for "the Party and Big Business": Frick "The Law" and "Youthleader" Baldur von Schirach: "Party, Police, and Army" are tried in the persons of Kaltenbrunner, Keitel and Jodl; and Grandadmirals Raeder and Doenitz representing "The Navy." The final chapters of the book deal with "The Proconsults," Frank and Seyss-Inquart: Speer and Sauckel, who were charged with "Building the War Plant" on "Forced Labor," and the "Propagandist" Hans Fritzsche making a poor substitute for Goebbels who had taken his own life.

Each one of the men and his ambitions, his rise to power, his weaknesses and vices in many cases, his strengths in some instances, as well as their pettiness and rivalries, their visions and blindness are portrayed with painstaking accuracy, based on thorough examination of memoirs, documents, records of interrogations, and on what friends, rivals and foes said about the defendants. Their behavior during the various stages of power in their lives and while they stood in the dock as accused is described and analyzed. If most of them emerge as a weak, sick and sorry lot, it is because that is what they were-not of what the author made them. By the same token, the Tribunal, the Prosecutors, and the Defense appear as they must have been-and in the sober light of hindsight some of their actions are as petty and sorry and as motivated by blind zealousness and political overeagerness as most of the defendant's actions had been in earlier days.

In his meticulous examination of the Trial records and his fair narration Eugene Davidson presents all facets of the drama at Nuremberg: the arguments of judges and prosecutors, the struggle of the defense lawyers to obtain evidence on behalf of their clients, the ideological orientations of the justices representing the Allied powers, and the attitudes of the defendants towards their former superiors, who had escaped the trial by suicide, and their behavior towards each other as well as their responses to their charges. The greatest merit of the book, however, is the re-examination by its author of the moral and legal questions raised by Nuremberg, the complex issues of "war guilt," "crimes against humanity," and "preparations to wage war." These issues have been confronting mankind since the beginning of time, but they have taken on new, vast dimensions with the systematic extermination programs of innocent peoples devised by the National Socialists as well as the large-scale killing of soldiers and civilians in total warfare.

Davidson concludes his first chapter with the observation that the Nuremberg Trials served as "catharsis of the pent-up emotions of millions of people" which had to be provided, and as a "record of what had taken place duly preserved for whatever use later generations would make of it." "The record would not completely document the infamy in the twentieth century, but it would reveal one vast concentration of evil that could be exorcised."

The final chapter, an evaluation "Two Decades Later," defends Nuremberg as a "political event," "if not as a court." In it, the Nuremberg Tribunal is assessed as of doubtful legal validity, but once more its role in pinpointing the moral issues confronting mankind in our age of kill and overkill is stressed. The book presents an autopsy of an era, but the author goes one step further, he does what a true scholar should do—once the facts have been presented as accurately as possible, he tries to relate them to the norms and values which must be our concern in this age of ideology and total warfare.—Elke Frank, Hunter College, City University of New York.

The Years of Opportunity: The League of Nations, 1920-1926. By Byeon Dexter. (New York: Viking Press, 1967. Pp. xxiii, 264. \$8.50.)

Politics and Diplomacy of Peacemaking: Containment and Counterrevolution at Versailles, 1918-1919. By Arno J. Mayer. (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1967. Pp. viii, 918. xx. \$15.00.)

New perspectives on the Versailles settlements and the early history of the League of Nations, such as those suggested by the titles of these works, are overdue. Neither book, however, provides convincing explanation of the interpretive thesis which its title suggests. Neither faces up to the task of explicitly relating the historical record to an appraisal of the possible and the probable. The gap between what is asserted or assumed and what is demonstrated is partially closed by argument in Dexter's book, but one wishes for more evidence; in Mayer's lengthy work, citation abound, but no sustained attempt is made to show just what it is that they prove.

Byron Dexter, the long-time managing editor of Foreign Affairs, has written an interpretive essation "the general reader." The book is padded by discursive background commentary and by the texts of the Covenant and the Charter, leaving only about 120 pages which deal with the first seven years of the League. It provides a mellow resume which is not inaccurate (except for the assertion that Japan did not submit reports on in

mandate in the Pacific) but which immerses events in atmospherics so deeply that they lose outline. Discussion of the Mosul opinion of the Permanent Court, for example, which could hardly have been less incisive, is followed by the comment: "It was a very interesting judicial opinion, following a line of reasoning along curves that caused eyebrows to be raised among lawyers."

The principal thesis, however, is clearly set forth and is worthy of attention, for it contrasts both with an orthodoxy which has long prevailed and with the assumptions of the Mayer book. The "opportunity" which Dexter sees was to make use of the League as the instrument of Britain and France in maintaining a settlement which, on the whole, was fair and moderate. The crisis for the League was the attempt to maintain an effective guarantee of the territorial provisions of Versailles as an essential condition for disarmament and the reconstruction of Germany, through the Draft Treaty of Mutual Assistance and the Geneva Protocol. "The pacifist illusions of the time," however, gave Stresemann the opportunity through adroit appeal to deprive the League of the "core of organized power" which was needed for collective security and to turn it into an instrument of appeasement through the Locarno agreements. While Locarno "did not itself produce Hitler," it "guaranteed the success of his strategy."

Mayer's work, in contrast, is a major feat of historical scholarship. Following his *Political Origins* of the New Diplomacy, 1917-1918 by eight years, it represents an exhaustive exploration of available sources in many countries. At the very least, it is a vast compendium of contemporary comment. Unfortunately, it is not much more than that.

It is clear that the author has brought to his work a viewpoint based on conviction. In the preface, he deplores the tendency "either to avoid crucial controversial issues or to treat them in terms consonant with the current conventional wisdom" and gives credit to several "fellow internal exiles" for having "fortified" his "critical outlook." Already his work has been hailed by the New Left for having identified the origins of what it sees as the main theme of American diplomacy: "Containment and Counterrevolution." But nowhere in a very long work is there more than a sketchy statement of the interpretative thesis or an attempt to weight its merits in comparison with other viewpoints or emphases. In part, it is because the present work is a sequel that one feels a lack of orientation. The main categories are established in the earlier book and the various strands of political and social movements in the several countries are identified. But one looks in vain there also for an appraisal of options which justifies the categories.

In Mayer's approach, "the forces of order" confront "the forces of movement." In "this first round of the international civil war of the twentieth century," the European Right undertook the "twin assignment of stabilizing governments throughout Europe and of containing if not destroying the Russian Revolution." They used the "spuriously inflated bogy of Bolshevism" in calculated efforts both to advance foreign policy goals and to fortify political positions at home. It might appear that "the clamor for a punitive peace" was not the best approach to these objectives. In Mayer's view, however, this "was stirred up as part of a vast political design" the purpose of which was not to fend off the revolutionary Left but "to rout and destroy the very core of the forces of change, . . . pre-emptively" before it could rally around Wilson and make gains toward "the forty-eight hour week, collective bargaining, graduated income taxes, and social welfare measures." Wilson and Lloyd George, who correctly, Mayer points out, "rejected the conspiratorial view of the Russian Revolution," fell victim, it would seem, to this counter-conspiracy of the Right.

Ultimately, it is a matter of taste and of philosophy whether one accepts a conspiratorial (or a counter-conspiratorial) view of history. Neither proof nor disproof is likely to be convincing. It must be pointed out, however, that a thesis may gain currency and prestige from the apparent substance of narrative and citation to which it is related. It is almost an earmark of revisionist history to mobilize detail and disregard proportion: one thinks of Tansill and of Beard. In my opinion, the mass of evidence which Mayer sets forth does not support his view. It is an extended catalog of folly rather than a telling collection of clews. It shows the blindness and despair of men overwhelmed both from within and from without by forces not comprehended, and taking refuge in nationalism, rather than conspiratorial calculation. It induces renewed respect for Wilson and even engenders sympathy for Lloyd George. In this new time of turmoil, it is poignant reading indeed.

One matter of revisionism in style should be noted. Mayer has succumbed to two expressions which are dear to undergraduates but which have rarely if ever appeared in serious writing. Neither was used in his earlier work. In the belief that they constitute linguistic decay rather than linguistic development, I have woven them into a concluding assessment: While I am "not about to" deny the value of this work as documentation of popular and political responses to a turbulence which swept across national boundaries, it is "not all that" valuable as an interpretation of the moves and the motives of the men at Versailles.—Whitney T. Perkins, Brown University.

The Functioning of the International Political System. By Andrew M. Scott. (New York: The Macmillan Company, 1967. Pp. x, 244. \$3.95.)

Professor Scott seeks in this essay to apply systems theory to the field of international politics. He is inspired to do so by his disenchantment with the persistent vogue of the "view of world politics that has been dominant for generations." Founded on the "obsolete" concepts of equilibrium and balance of power this traditional view is unable to cope with new realities, fails to avail itself of modern empirical techniques and is of little use in the practical exercise of problem-solving and policy formation. Yet the "new approaches" which treat today's problems with today's techniques have failed to make this old approach the relic it deserves to be. No one has as yet gathered these new approaches together and presented them in an ordered fashion.

What is needed is a new method. The author proposes to use systems analysis which has the capability of integrating these new yet disparate approaches into a coherent whole. The integrating mechanism is the "vocabulary" of systems analysis which "makes possible the conversion of separate currencies into a common currency" linking together "observations relating to nationalism, loyalty, ideology, capabilities, statecraft, collaboration, conflict, escalation, deterrence, negotiation, decison-making, communication, community formation and so on" (p. 9).

His second point is a promise not to clutter his model with normative assumptions. He admits that systems theory is no freer from involvement with normative elements than the theories of yesterday, but he does not propose to substitute a new set for the old. He explicitly rejects models such as Easton's "authoritative allocation of values" and anthropomorphic and teleological "baggage" such as "systems maintenance" and pursuit of goals. To be effective, he claims, the systems approach must produce a value-free framework "hospitable to many types of supporting analysis."

Professor Scott then uses the vocabulary of systems analysis to describe the "new approaches." International relations, the nation-states, governments and politicians are replaced by such terminology as systems, subsystems, actors and decision-makers. The language stresses the interrelationship of the "individuals, organizations and nation-states" that make up the international system. It also succeeds in dividing the new approaches into two categories—one dealing with activities occurring within a system, the other with activities occurring between or among systems. Creation of images, ideology, communication and decision-making are examples of intrasystemic

phenomena; they are either attributes of specific systems, as would be the case of ideology, or are specific functional systems in themselves, such as communication. Intersystemic activities may be exemplified by negotiation, deterrence, threats, conflict and collaboration. The latter category clearly demands a plurality of systems. To sum up, the first category presupposes interaction among disparate functions within a unified whole. The second presupposes interaction between or among unified wholes. The point is that both intrasystemic and intersystemic activities and the approaches which analyze them deal with aspects or parts or a larger whole but not with the whole itself. Thus the new approaches emerge as applicable to elements of the whole international system. but not to the system itself.

What is this total system? The application of systems language to the new approaches suggests that the model of a system at a subordinate level is a self-contained unit composed of complementary interrelated parts. It follows that the maximal system—in this case the international system -should be structurally similar. But the picture of the international system which emerges bit by bit as one makes his way through the book turns out to be a different type. One is first told that the international system is a "conflict" system. Then it is asserted that the system is evolutionary. And finally, in a burst of candid prescriptive rhetoric, the reader is apprised that the defects of the international system stem from a characteristically unsystemic lack of capability to provide direction and purpose. The system "has been seriously deficient in rules, norms, and institutions to facilitate collaboration and to regulate conflict" which "can be remedied only by the development of supplementary forms of (transnational) authority" (p. 230f). The Hobbesian world of nation-eat-nation will evolve contractually into one that will in the end produce a world sovereign. It is evident that until such time as the miracle is wrought, normative assumptions which appear not uncongenial to the lesser constellations would be inapplicable to a "system" that has yet to arrive at systemic coherence. Once achieved, however, one is left to wonder if such an ideal world polity, alone and unchallenged by anything but environment, could justifiably be considered a system.

Professor Scott's target appears to be the undergraduate classroom. He has made an interesting contribution by applying systems analysis to the "new approaches" in order to bring them together in a single volume. In attempting to give them place in one all-inclusive theory, however, he has stretched the analytical framework beyond its capability.—Frederic Wurzburg, University of New Hampshire.

The Politics of the Third World. By J. D. B. MILLER. (New York: Oxford University Press, 1967. Pp. xiv, 126. \$3.75.)

This brief, readable volume begins with the observation that "the Third World [is] a cant phrase, derived from the French tiers monde and used to describe those countries which are plainly neither Communist nor Western." It ends with the conclusion that "A Third World characterized by unity, purpose, and effective tactics is . . . a chimera." In the intervening pages, the author struggles to demonstrate the existence of something resembling that cant phrase while at the same time denying its vitality if not its validity.

Despite the concept's ephemeral nature, however, the author identifies the states that comprise the Third World, analyzes the well-springs of national interest that often undergird their policy determinations, discusses their roles in the United Nations and regional groups, and evaluates their relations with the major powers. Finally, in a chapter entitled "Vulgar Errors," the author attacks what he somewhat patronizingly refers to as "certain illusions about the Third World." This endeavor more so than the rest of the book seems to depend almost wholly on the author's judgments of what motivates Third World states, what exactly they are striving to do, and why. After describing the first "vulgar error" as one of viewing the states as a bloc or harmonious group, the author proceeds to commit what often appears to be the same error by treating them as a unified group in foreign policy attitudes and actions. Yet, his analyses, taken individually, usually make sense to this reviewer. In their demands for trade liberalization without reciprocity, for example, the author asserts that Third World states are not seeking to despoil the advanced countries but to give impetus to an increase in trade that can only serve to enrich both sides. The widely shared myth that the poor countries of the world, like the poor of the American ghettoes, can improve their lot only at the expense of richer states or citizens is one of the most durable and devastating fables. It must be exposed and discarded if some semblance of real stability is ever to be achieved.

Throughout this book, Professor Miller develops interesting if not unique observations concerning the special attributes and needs that characterize the political life of Third World states. Their leaders, he notes, began as agitators for independence who promised great changes once the imperial yoke was removed. Their failure to achieve these kinds of changes has produced a "decaying national movement" in many, and it has become clear (at least to Professor Miller) that two groups are now indispensable: one, the Europeaneducated people in commercial, professional, and

administrative posts who are the only ones who can run the government and the economy effectively; and, two, the army, which is the only group that combines discipline, modernization, and opportunity to coerce. The author provides a few examples of military-governed states—Egypt, Nigeria, Burma, Ghana, Pakistan, and Indonesia—but he suggests no evidence that might support a conclusion of indispensability. Although the case for greater "efficiency" is an obvious one, whether a class of technocrats aided by a military elite can evoke the national spirit and call forth the sacrifices of the masses to support a successful modernization effort remains an unresolved question.

Times have also changed in terms of the foreign policy imperatives of Third World states, according to Professor Miller. The early flambovant militancy of the independence movements and the efforts to stay clear of entangling alliances with the East or West established a common bond among them that led to the holding of the Bandung Conference of 1955 and the enunciation of the "Bandung spirit." The abortive effort to hold a "second Bandung" in Algiers in 1965-described appropriately by the author as a "non-event"-leads him to the conclusion that "there is little future for Afro-Asianism as such." Yet, much of the book tends to belie such a sweeping conclusion. More positive bases for developing unity and cooperation than the older anti-colonialism and anti-Westernism are emerging in such fields as trade, aid, development, and United Nations politics. Although the author avoids discussion of human rights, here in particular Afro-Asianism has found a rallying cause that can support a unanimous Third World condemnation of South Africa and Rhodesia as the worst offenders. The efforts of Afro-Asian states to spur the world community into taking effective action against these two major transgressors have, in fact, been far more productive of Afro-Asian unity than of changing policies within the two states. In addition, the terrible destruction that has been visited upon Viet Nam to "protect" it has tended to rekindle a common abhorrence of military alignments that may have been weakened prior to 1965 and the massive American involvement.

The author, who is Professor of International Relations at the Australian National University, has done a generally first-rate job of discussing and interpreting the politics that characterize many Third World states. The book, however, contributes little to scholarly inquiry in the field that is essentially new or helpful to a deeper understanding of the Third World states. One can hardly expect a penetrating, definitive piece of work on such a complex, motley group of entities in little over one hundred pages. But, in spite of

this drawback (or conceivably because of it), the book is one that can be highly recommended as a supplement to the introductory international politics course. It should have a stimulating and challenging impact on the student who is in the process of being initiated into the rather nebulous world of international politics because its central themes are developed from a different frame of reference than those found in most textbooks on international politics. Thus, it can supply the student with a new perspective for analyzing and evaluating world politics.—Jack C. Plano, Western Michigan University.

The Intermediaries: Third Parties in International Crises. By Oran R. Young. (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1967. Pp. viii, 427. \$10.00.)

The author in this volume on third-party intervention in crises asserts that his purpose is to break new ground in generating hypotheses about the management of conflict. He further states that the study is chiefly "an hypothesis-raising" rather than "an hypothesis-testing" effort. The central goal of the various lines of enquiry—six in number—is to outline at least the rudiments of general theory of third-party intervention.

But the theoretical material and apparatus which the author develops, he feels, is not sufficient. To add clarity and relevance to the theoretical material and apparatus, it is necessary to engage in testing of theory by applying it to pragmatic situations. He singles out the peace-keeping effort of the UN as the concrete situation to test, and points out that this form of third-party intervention is currently under the doctrines developed during the Hammarskjöld regime, which "take a dim view of the possibility of constructive United Nations intervention in superpower crises."

Since the international system is changing rapidly (what the author means by "system" is not explained), he advances the proposition that "the overall framework of the international system" including "the more specific relationships between the Soviet Union and the United States, have been moving in directions which place the notion of constructive United Nations intervention in future Soviet-American crises clearly and definitely within the realm of the possible."

While the Hammarskjöld concept of the limits of the United Nations intervention in conflicts between power blocs still prevails today and is likely to remain so in the foreseeable future, the author asserts that the propositions he advances in this volume "are more nearly a set of supplementary ideas than the basis of an alternative to the present theory. . . . In fact, they constitute," in the author's opinion, "a response to the broad spectrum of international crises to which the prevailing theory does not address itself."

These "supplementary ideas" derive from an analysis of the rapid and substantial changes that are presently taking place on a number of fronts. The author observes that there is a decline of bipolarity and a trend toward a pluralistic arrangement of power centers. He describes the developments in this area as focusing on four themes: "1) polycentrism within the established blocs: 2) the declining efficacy of major alliance systems; 3) the rise in the numbers and salience of extrabloc actors; and 4) the emergence (or indicated emergence) of several new 'great' powers." The analysis of these four themes, predicated on a number of possible variables, is highly speculative. However, the speculations appear to be educated ones and require the thoughtful and concentrated attention of the reader.

How then will all this affect the prospects for third-party intervention by which the author, if the reviewer understands him correctly, means the United Nations? Is it likely to reduce or enhance the prospects for third-party intervention? The author continues his speculation, and engages in a somewhat tortuous description of "a full-blown version of a modified balance-of-power" where "the United Nations could come to act more nearly as a concert mechanism than as an independent opinion factor." This, however, the author avers might be a temporary phase since it would very likely be highly unstable. He concludes that "the possibilities of third-party intervention in various situations would almost certainly become salient again." Whether the author's "supplementary ideas," based on predictions such as the "hard shelled" territorial state is declining and that the sense of international community is growing, thanks to the advent of nuclear weapons, will indeed supplement the Hammarskjöld concept, this reviewer can not predict. The author manifests no hesitation in answering the question affirmatively.

The review's conclusion about this book is that the hypothetically minded student of international relations might possibly find the analysis stimulating even if somewhat discursive, and the pragmatically minded, unrealistic and difficult to follow.—David W. Wainhouse, Johns Hopkins University.

French Foreign Policy Under de Gaulle. By Alfred Grosser. (Boston: Little, Brown, & Co., 1967. Pp. xiv, 175. \$5.00, \$2.50 paper.)

Professor Grosser first presented this sensible, perceptive guide to contemporary French foreign policy as a lecture course at the Institute of Political Studies in Paris in 1964. The Club Jean Moulin sponsored its publication in France and now it has survived the difficult trans-Atlantic passage. Despite the lapse of time in the fast-moving world of diplomacy, the book holds up well.

Professor Grosser begins with the proposition that foreign policy may be evaluated on the basis of the extent to which it has "attained the goals for which it was intended." His concluding chapter, using that criterion contends that de Gaulle's "positive record is short, and the negative record very long." In between, chapters examine that record with respect to Algeria, tropical Africa, Franco-German relations, Europe, defense, and East-West relations and NATO, Prefatory chapters deal with the record of the Fourth Republic and de Gaulle's foreign policy conceptions. An epilogue carries the account forward from 1965 to 1967. Professor Stanley Hoffmann of Harvard University wrote a special foreword and the author revised the epilogue for the American editions and Lois Ames Pattison made the very competent translation.

The author does not apply his criterion to de Gaulle systematically, nor does the material lend itself to such application consistently. Often, de Gaulle's goals are not defined publicly or are so ill defined as to be useless in attempting to evaluate his success.

Take Algeria, for instance. What goal did de Gaulle have in Algeria in 1958? Integration? Independence? Autonomy? One may argue very plausibly that he had no goal except to end the war as soon as possible while preserving as much of French influence and interests as possible. If so did he succeed? No one can say. No one knows what was possible. Grosser believes that "de Gaulle did not, from the beginning, desire the policy that he adopted in the end," that he wanted Algeria to have "a sort of internal autonomy," rather than full independence. If so he failed. By Grosser's criterion, de Gaulle also failed in tropical Africa, His "community on a federal model" collapsed within two years and de Gaulle was compelled to improvise another facade behind which French control might be maintained. So, too, with his policies toward the western alliance. Neither NATO nor Britain nor West Germany nor Spain has become a suitable weapon in his assault on the United States. Grosser sees "the most important aspect of other European countries have not yet become aware of that role." He may, indeed, be playing that role as he sees it, but as long as "his five European partners are in fundamental disagreement with him," he cannot play it very well. Is that success?

Grosser is especially severe in evaluating de Gaulle's military policy. He believes that conventional forces would be more effective for French defense, especially as de Gaulle's nuclear force lacks that essential element of deterrence-credibility. But, is defense de Gaulle's goal? If so, only conjecture can measure its success until-or-unlesshis force fails to deter. If not, what is his goal? In

either case, the problem of evaluation by Grosser's criterion is very difficult.

Quite apart from problems of application, moreover, one is obliged to ask whether the author's criterion is adequate. De Gaulle suggested another criterion himself in *The Edge of the Sword*: "men are remembered less for the usefulness of what they have achieved than for the sweep of their endeavors"

By that criterion, de Gaulle fares well. The restoration of France to great power status, the use of NATO to control American foreign policy globally, the elevation of balance-of-power politics to a global plane, the organization of a bloc of neutral nations behind France, and the replacement of American influence in Latin America are sweeping endeavors, indeed. But, is the amount of remembrance as important as the cause? Is de Gaulle to be remembered as the greatest showman since Barnum or as a great statesman who maximized French power and influence.

To answer that question one must adopt different criteria than either Grosser or de Gaulle. Does not "the usefulness of what they have achieved" evaluate statesmanships? Should not de Gaulle be judged by the extent to which he has served the enlightened self-interest of France than by the glamor of his performance or his ability to achieve such goals as he chooses?

Grosser's selection of criteria and his failure to apply them systematically detract from the value of this essay. Nevertheless, it deserves the attention of serious students of French and international affairs. The author is an astute, perceptive Gaullogist who sheds much light on his subject. We will be much in his debt when he writes for the Fifth Republic as systematic and scholarly a study as his La Quatrieme République et sa politique extérieure.—William G. Andrews, State University of New York, Brockport.

The Sea in Modern Strategy. By L. W. MARTIN. (New York: Frederick A. Praeger, 1967. Pp. 190, \$5.00.)

There is hardly any question that the grand concepts of war at sea as developed primarily by Alfred T. Mahan have lost their glorious individuality. The reasons for this are at least three-fold. First, the nuclear weapon sits perched above all considerations of war, and, despite much talk about "firebreaks" and the "tradition of non-use," the super-powers can hardly envisage a major war between themselves in which there is little danger of nuclear weapons being used. One of the results of this circumstance is that it inhibits conceiving of a war which is both on a grand scale and prolonged, which is the kind of war that makes the classical naval strategy come to life. Second, with sea forces able to throw inland and land forces

able to hurl out to sea missiles or aircraft capable easily of three thousand miles range, the previously sharp distinction between the dominion of the sea and that of land has become exceedingly blurred. Third, we live in a world in which, at least so far as surface and naval air power are concerned, there is really only one great sea power, the United States. The Soviet Union has a formidable submarine fleet, and, after some backtracking, is now adding substantially to her surface fleet. Nevertheless, despite its tremendous advances in performance since World War II, the submarine (where it is not a strategic weapons launcher) is still mostly an instrument for challenging maritime control rather than establishing it, and the Soviet surface fleet is not the kind of challenge to U.S. naval power that we have observed in naval races of the past.

One might also add that insofar as naval operations like those conducted in 1950-1953 around Korea and since 1964 around Vietnam need to be described in strategic terms, the conceptions handed down by Mahan and others still do well enough. At least, our present author seems to think so, and I believe he is right. This situation very much affects what is left to write about.

On the other hand, large sums of money are being spent on naval armaments, in which there have been very great changes since the end of World War II. These changes, as well as comparably drastic changes, which have occurred also in the political climate, call for continuing clarification of the appropriate character and functioning of modern naval arms under those various sets of circumstances that appear sufficiently probable to warrant the kind of anticipation which costs money.

Hardly more than two years ago we had the work by Admiral Sir Peter Gretton, *Maritime Strategy*: but Professor Martin has justified the assumption of himself and of the Institute for Strategic Studies, under whose auspices he produced the present book, that there was room for yet another approach. Admiral Gretton's book and this one are, after all, the only new books of their kind that have been available for some time, and the market has therefore hardly been surfeited.

Professor Martin first examines the nature of modern naval forces. He has done his homework well, and the disposition to do so is usually an excellent substitute for a high security clearance—without entailing the disabilities often clinging to the latter. Professor Martin then moves on to consider such things as the use of sea power in "wars of intervention" characterized by Korea and Vietnam, and "occasions for limited war at sea" where he discusses among other things the curious view originally put forward by Mr. Paul Nitze and apparently embraced also by Mr. Robert S.

McNamara (although neither is mentioned in this connection in the book) that naval power acting by itself may on occasion serve an important role in restraining enemy aggression, thereby presumably making it unnecessary for troops to become involved in the mud and jungles of another Vietnam. I think the generally negative attitude which Professor Martin shows to this idea is entirely correct. Other chapters, among the total of eight, bear titles like "Cost and the Naval Balance" and "Sea Power and Non-Belligerent Action," which adequately describe their content.

This is an honest book, and it contains a good deal of useful information. It is also intelligently organized. I wish it were possible for me to be more enthusiastic about it. The reasons I cannot, lie in the tone of the book, both stylistically and intellectually. The writing is clear enough, but exceedingly and everlasting bland, lacking the occasional penetrating and skillfully executed phrase which makes the person reading it content at the moment not to be doing something else. No doubt more important is the equally bland quality of the thinking, reflected in the author's disinclination really to struggle with an idea or insight, whether his own or someone else's.

Professor Martin often expresses a preference for one view over another, but it is rarely other than a mild and tentative preference. He observes that contemporary admirals seem not to grapple with the really critical questions of future naval war, but neither, beyond pointing this out, does he. A significant question to which he draws notice he dismisses with the comment that it "might perhaps be debated"—but the debating he leaves to others. On what is among the most crucial of relevant issues, the effects of nuclear deterrence in determining levels of engagement or combat, he gives to the somewhat exceptional views of a colleague the accolade that his argument "is by no means implausible," but that is the end of it.

All this gives one the sense of non-involvement, and how is the reader to become involved when the author is not?—Bernard Brodle, *University of California*, Los Angeles.

The European Common Market and the World. By Werner Feld. (Englewood Cliffs. Prentice-Hall, Inc., 1967. Pp. vii, 184. \$4.95.)

This is a valuable little book, which is almost monographic in nature. It seems to be one of several studies of the European Economic Community commissioned by Prentice-Hall. Professor Werner Feld, Chairman of the Department of Government at Louisiana State University, has examined the relationships, internal and external, that have grown up with the existence of the European Economic Community.

The EEC is a political entity whose chief worth

is economic. Its inception created the third great economic union. These economic unities—American, Soviet and European—create a host of problems and prospects. They cannot be ignored; they must be accommodated.

The formation of the EEC was no simple process. It had predecessors of limited purpose and value. Its members were involved in organizations as various as NATO, OEEC (OECD), and GATT. The possibility of conflicting allegiances was serious. Most nations brought with them a baggage train—special relationships with former colonies, monetary zones, and settled trade patterns.

Reconciling these conflicting interests and obligations was no easy task, and the first decade of the EEC was devoted to this delicate, often exasperating task of internal harmonization. The coming years must be devoted increasingly to a reconciliation of conflicts with the rest of the world, the theme of Feld's work.

The relationship of the EEC to the American common market has been one of efforts to accommodation marred by irritating incidents like the "war of the frozen chickens." The connections with the Communist bloc has been one of growing intercourse with surprisingly minimum frictions. The EFTA nations are an especial difficulty, for this is a rival bloc of-like nations with common associations. The most crucial matter could be the special relationships with the developing societies, most of whom are former colonies. These prideful nations-so jealous of their nationhood and their economic independence—have practically demanded and received a special association with the EEC from their former metropolis. With this privileged position goes inevitably the peril of economic dependence, the handmaiden of political dependence.

The EEC is no monolith; it is beset by strains and fissures. Vital interests must be protected. The sheltering of French agricultural inefficiency has aggravated the more efficient agricultural nations of the market. The privileged arrangement for the many and diverse French client-states caused no small exacerbation within the walls. The strength of the German industrial complex constitutes a source of discomfort, raising faintly the specter of the Zollverein. The French veto of the British application caused a trauma among certain quarters within the EEC. Moreover, there is a fundamental disharmony in the Common Market along the lines of the ancient American experience—the suspicion and conflict between the large and the small states. The Benelux powers fear and resist the transformation of the entity into a Gallic or Teutonic economic community.

The political and economic power of the Common Market is quietly and steadily growing, and its existence creates certain problems for the world

economy. Any such markey is a form of economic regionalism with its protectiveness, provincialism, and discrimination. It has begotten other such regional corporations—the Latin American Free Trade Association and the Central American Common Market. This economic regionalism can produce distortions in the trade patterns of the world economy. The common markets and customs unions promote intramural trade at the expense of international trade. More and more, trade may be between the blocs, not among the nations. High tariffs may decline among the nations only to reappear among the blocs. True international trade may suffer with the proliferation of these markets.

The greatest prospect for the EEC lies in the political arena. The original conception envisaged the growth of political unity, possibly a supranational European state. Already, the embryonic structure exists in the form of extranational parties, interest groups, parliaments, courts, and councils of ministers. Certain practices and rituals of the Eurocrats approached diplomatic intercourse and vaguely hinted of sovereignty. De Gaulle complained that Commission President Walter Hallstein was assuming the prerogatives of a "chief of state." Moreover, present French policy resists political integration while basking in the benefits of economic union. De Gaulle seeks instead a l'Europe des patries-united in certain political and economic matters but separate in their nationhood and sovereignty.

Professor Feld has ably considered the place of the EEC in the politics and economics of the world. The work is written with a husbandry of words and a care of expression that is admirable. It is comprehensible to the informed layman without losing its value to the specialist. The treatise avoids the pitfalls-common to such works of political economy-of inundating the reader with charts and statistics. Detail and statistical illustrations are abundant and useful, but the book is not burdened by them. The excellence of the work is slightly lessened by the absence of a bibliography. The EEC literature is growing rapidly, and such a compilation would have been helpful. However, this omission is partially compensated by complete references in footnotes.—Vernon C. War-REN, JR., Austin Peay State University.

The Foreign Aid Programs of the Soviet Bloc and Communist China: An Analysis. By Kurt Mul-Ler. (New York, Walker and Co. 1967. Pp. xiii, 331. \$15.00.)

The translation of Kurt Muller's book only proves that you can not tell a book by its outside cover. Only if the reader happens to look inside the title page will he discover that originally Muller's book was entitled *Uber Kalkutta nach*

Paris? The title change in the translated version therefore gives the impression that it is completely devoted to a discussion of communist foreign aid. Although the original title is sexier than the actual product, it is nonetheless a more accurate reflection of the scope of the book, Unfortunately the discussion of foreign aid makes up less than one half of material covered and much of what is devoted to foreign aid is simply a listing of foreign aid and trade agreements. Because of the mislabeling, the reader sits with the expectation that there will be more analysis of communist foreign aid than there actually is and therefore he is disappointed when he does not find it. Much of the other material in the book if taken on its own terms would be interesting in itself, but since the appetite is whetted for a discussion of foreign aid, one sits and waits for the main course only to see it flit by without feeling really satisfied.

As for what is actually in the book, it is fair to say that Muller has brought together a good deal of useful information about Soviet relations and ambitions in the less developed world. Thus this could be a handy reference source. Unfortunately there are numerous shortcomings in this volume which prevent the realization of this prospect.

One of the major problems is that Muller's book was originally written in 1963 and subsequently revised for its translation into English. Since communist policies in the developing countries have changed so rapidly, it is not enough to make an alteration or two in the old manuscript in the expectation that the book will then reflect the current state of events. In several cases the entire context has changed. For example on p. 73, Muller attempts to show how the communists attempt to subvert a country through the use of communist trained functionaries in the schools, cadres, and publishing houses etc. As an illustration he cites the Ghanian weekly paper. The Spark. But as Muller himself recognizes, since the German version was published, Nkrumah has been overthrown. Since this is the best example that Muller seems to be able to find, it would appear that this particular case if it proves anything, proves the opposite. That is, such endeavors have not been ultimately successful from the communist point of view. His example of communist support for Oginga Odinga in Kenya is similarly inappropriate.

Because of the day to day gyrations in Cuban foreign policy, Muller finds himself with all kinds of inconsistencies in his handling of Soviet and Chinese relations with Cuba. On p. 56, he talks of the Russian desire to create Cuban-style bridgeheads all over the world. Subsequently he describes China's anger because Cuba has opted to follow Russian foreign policy. At this writing at least, the Russians would be quite surprised to

hear that the Cubans have been classified as loyal followers of the Moscow line.

The changes over time may also explain why Muller's long lists of reasons and explanations always fail to provide a complete answer to the problem he is trying to analyze. This happens on p. 62 and again on p. 92. It often seems that new paragraphs which have been added to bring the book up to date disprove the analysis so one is left wondering why the analysis was made in the first place.

The effect of such incidents creates a very disjointed book. Perhaps this can be blamed on poor editing. This unsettling feeling is made worse by the fact that the last two-thirds of the book consists of 200 pages divided up into 28 chapters; that is an average of 7 pages per chapter. To say the least, it is uncommon to read chapters that are only 3 to 4 pages long in a book devoted to the social sciences. Moreover the book's editors apparently made no effort to tone down some of the intemperate political language. The communists or their sympathizers are almost always referred to in such terms as "hacks" or worse.

The book also contains numerous small mistakes. On p. 26, Muller says that communist countries provided sizeable loans only after 1956 whereas on p. 240 he acknowledges that the Czechs were an exception and started lending in-1954. He omits a Soviet loan of \$45 million worth of sugar to China in 1961. He is also wrong on p 96 when he states that India does not extend foreign aid. Similarly he is incorrect when he claims that the other communist countries are incapable of building a complete plant without Russian support or supplies. There are important exceptions such as the Rumanian oil refinery at Gauhati India and the Czech tool works at Ranchi, India On occasion, it is the Russians who find themselves forced to rely on outside help as in Nepa where they have had to call in the Czechs to provide equipment for the Russian sponsored sugar mill and cigarette factory. Muller is also wrons when he says that Soviet statistics do not reflec technical services provided by Soviet technicians.

There are some larger questions as well tha Muller never confronts. Have the Russians eve thought through the consequences of their foreign aid program? If their aid is successful, and economic development in fact takes place, will this lead to communism as Muller seems to think of to an economically viable and independent government?

Lest the reviewer be misunderstood, there ar many redeeming sections in this book. Mulle finds traces of Sino-Soviet animosity as early as 1956. He also shows how the Russians start with an adverse foreign trade balance in their dealing with less developed countries and generally en

up with strongly favorable balances of trade. Only Malaysia seems to have avoided this hazard. He also explains how the Russians have managed to provide themselves with a loophole for the legal reselling of commodities purchased from the developing countries. Also Muller has gathered fairly complete lists of loan agreements extended by both the Russians and the Chinese. But as if Muller were destined to have a difficult time with this translation, even that which is valuable may be of no use for the researcher. For some reason, the translators have neglected to include either an index or bibliography. This makes much of the material irretrievable and therefore of limited use.—Marshall I. Goldman, Wellesley College.

Insurgent Era: New Patterns of Political, Economic and Social Revolution. By RICHARD H. SANGER. (Washington: Potomac Books, 1967. Pp. 231. \$5.95.)

One category of books on international politics is that of the interpretive report by the diplomat or journalist who does not pretend to be a social scientist and who may be pleased that he is not. In the 1920-40 period books of this sort were especially numerous and influential in shaping popular images of such things as conditions in the Ukaraine or the exploits of Abd-el-Krim. Too few of them were written by shrewd diplomats. Some went beyond personal involvement to discuss events they did not know immediately. This book falls into the latter sub-class. Written by a former American F.S.O. with experience in the Middle East and Africa, it is representative of a category which has declined in numbers during an age of higher levels of knowledge and new methods.

The author undertakes to sketch the history of eight cases of unrest since 1917. He uses "societal revolutions" as the frame for Communist struggles in Russia and China, the Egyptian Revolution of 1952 and Cuba's 26th of July Movement. Distillation creates unsatisfactory generalizations, e.g., the account of the Bolshevik seizure of power (pp. 29-31). Problems of analysis are also apparent. The chapter on Egypt begins with the statement that "The Egyptians are not Arabs. . . ." They might not be, but their recent leaders have thought that they were with significant political results. Glibness is not absent. Mohammed Ali is described as a "son-of-a-Macedonian-tobacco-merchant-turned-Pasha" and his importance in mod-

ern Egyptian history passed over lightly. Few of the book's historical summaries are creative. The best one of them is about Cuba.

Under the heading of "Independence Rebellions" Mr. Sanger discusses Indo-China, concentrating on the emergence of Ho Chi Minh and the military events up to the Geneva Conference. Subsequently, Vietnam from 1954-1967 is discussed under the third main part of the book, "Cold War Conflicts," a section which also includes chapters on Magsaysay and the Huks, and the Congo. The author adopts the view that communism is largely responsible for Vietnam's troubles. He did not make use of Douglas Pike's study of the Viet Cong. Against the liberal tide, his interpretation of Diem is sympathetic without being unbalanced. Included under "Independence Rebellions" is Gandhi's nonviolent nationalism. More might have been said about the inclusion of the Indian leader and satyagraha. Apparently it was the author's intention to illustrate that protest takes many forms and to suggest that the study of insurgency should not be limited to political violence.

What principles were used for inclusion of some struggles but not others? No clear explanation is given. Is there a theory to tie together the cases selected? The reviewer could not discover any other than what is found in the statement that "no man need settle for a dirt floor merely because his father did." Some men, of course, will settle for a dirt floor if they can get rid of foreigners, a point indirectly recognized by the discussion of India. A "Life Cycle of A Revolt" is presented in Chapter 1. The model includes the elements of the leader, popular cause, support for the party of revolt, outside help, use of mobs, and others. All the cases selected do not fit the model. Is there any larger pattern to these upheavals? The author speaks of seven waves of unrest since 1648, the most recent beginning about twenty years ago. In an appendix he offers an uneven listing of violent events for 1945-1966. Yet there is no suggestion about the meanings of these waves and events other than the implied teaching that change is permanent.

Perhaps the main disappointments about the book are the lack of definitions to help tell one conflict from another, and the fact that the insights of the diplomatist were withheld in his efforts to photograph epic landscapes.—Paul F. Power, University of Cincinnati.

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
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
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
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
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
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
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
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
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
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
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The Recruitment of Candidates for the Canadian House of Commons	٠.
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A Note of Caution in Causal Modelling Hugh Donald Forbes and Edward R. Tufte	1258
A Note on Censorship Gordon Tullock	1265
Communications to the Editor	1268
Book Reviews and Notes Richard F. Fenno (ed.)	1274
Announcements	1408
Index to Volume LXII Nancy B. Edgerton and Mary H. Grossman	1410

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Current issues are priced at \$3.75 per copy; for back issues prior to 1963 address Johnson Reprint Corp., 111 5th Ave., New York, N.Y. 10003; subsequent to 1963 send request directly to the American Political Science Association.

Applications for membership, orders for the Review, and remittances should be addressed to the Executive Director, The American Political Science Association, 1527 New Hampshire Ave., N.W., Washington, D.C. 20036. Notices of change of address should be received in the Washington office by the 25th day of the month before publication.

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Articles and notes appearing in the Review before the June, 1953 issue were indexed in *The Reader's Guide to Periodical Literature*. The International Political Science Abstracts and the International Index to Periodicals index current issues. Microfilm of the Review, beginning with Volume 1, may be obtained from University Microfilms. 313 North First Street, Ann Arbor, Michigan. A Cumulative Index of the Review, Volumes 1-57: 1906-1963, may be obtained from Northwestern University Press, 1735 Benson, Evanston, Illinois.

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
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Second class postage paid at Menasha, Wisconsin. Acceptance for mailing at special rate of postage provided for in Section 1103, Act of October 3, 1917, authorized May 12, 1926.

Printed in the United States of America by George Banta Company, Inc., Menasha, Wisconsin.

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The American Political Science Review

VOL. LXII

DECEMBER, 1968

NO. 4

SOME REFLECTIONS ON SOVIET-AMERICAN RELATIONS*

MERLE FAINSOD

Harvard University

As World War II drew to a close, the leaders of the anti-Hitler coalition-Roosevelt, Stalin, and Churchill—assembled at Yalta to ponder the future. Already, sharp clashes at the conference table over the future fate of Poland and Eastern Europe cast a sombre spell over the proceedings. But the necessities of the alliance still served to suppress differences and to emphasize a search for consensus. At a tripartite dinner meeting on 8 February 1945, President Roosevelt, ever hopeful, described the relations of the Soviet Union, Great Britain, and the United States "as that of a ■family" and spoke of a future in which their common objectives would be "to give to every man, woman, and child on this earth the possibility of security and well-being." Marshal Stalin, perhaps more realistic, "remarked that it was not so difficult to keep unity in time of war since there was a joint aim to defeat the common enemy which was clear to everyone. .. the difficult task came after the war when liverse interests tended to divide the allies."2 Nevertheless, he expressed himself as "conident that the present alliance would meet this est also and that it was our duty to see that it vould, and that our relations in peacetime hould be as strong as they had been in war." rime Minister Churchill somewhat grandiloquently spoke of "standing on the crest of a hill 7ith the glories of future possibilities stretching efore us. He said that in the modern world the aunction of leadership was to lead the people

* Presidential address delivered at the Annual Ieeting of the American Political Science Association, Washington, D.C., September 5, 1968.

ut from the forests into the broad sunlit plains

f peace and happiness. He felt this prize was

¹ U. S. Department of State, Foreign Relations "the United States: The Conferences at Malta and alta, 1945 (Washington, 1955) p. 798:

² Ibid.

nearer our grasp than any time before in history and it would be a tragedy for which history would never forgive us if we let this prize slip from our grasp through inertia or carelessness."³

In retrospect, it is almost too easy to dismiss the pronouncements of Roosevelt as naïve, the declarations of Stalin as misleading, and the effusions of Churchill as meaningless banquet oratory. Yet, harsh as history's judgment may turn out to be on the aftermath of Yalta, there remains a sense of a great opportunity tragically lost, of statesmen not unaware of their responsibilities, but denied the possibilities of fulfilling them because of the very different visions of national interest and world order which guided their thoughts and actions.

On the American side two sharply contrasting views of post-war relations with the Soviet Union emerged as the time approached for peace-making. The more sanguine school envisaged no insuperable barriers to a satisfactory post-war relationship with the Soviet Union. Indeed, it assumed that American willingness to recognize Soviet security interests in Eastern Europe and to provide aid in Soviet post-war reconstruction would disarm Soviet suspicions, change the attitudes of its leaders toward collaboration with the West, and build the basis of a permanent peace. On the other hand, those who prided themselves on their realism saw the expansion of Soviet power in the postwar world as a force which had to be checked and restrained. Persuaded, as George Kennan

³ *Ibid*, pp. 798–799.

⁴ Whatever may have been Stalin's long range goals, his actions in the closing days of the war and the immediate post-war period clearly revealed that he was determined to assume a dominant position in Eastern Europe and to regain the Far Eastern Tsarist territories lost in the Russo-Japanese War. But his claims were even

was later to put it, that the Kremlin's "main concern is to make sure that it has filled every nook and cranny available to it in the basin of world power," the conclusion followed that "the main element of any United States policy toward the Soviet Union must be that of a long

more far-reaching. They included a demand for a military base on the Turkish Straits which would enable the Soviet Union to control access to the Black Sea, trusteeship of one of the former Italian North African colonies which would establish the Soviet Union as a Mediterranean power, participation in control of the Ruhr as well as unilateral control of the East Zone of Germany, and an insistence on prolonging Soviet occupation of Iranian territory. It could be, and indeed was, argued that none of these actions directly affected American interests. But, as Harriman put it in a wartime dispatch (September 20, 1944) to the Secretary of State, "What frightens me however is that when a country begins to extend its influence by strong arm methods beyond its borders under the guise of security it is difficult to see how a line can be drawn. If the policy is accepted that the Soviet Union has a right to penetrate her immediate neighbors for security, penetration of the next immediate neighbors becomes at a certain time equally logical." It was out of the fear of further penetration that the policy of containment was born.

In theory, at least, Stalin might have pursued an alternative course which would have eased the task of post-war collaboration with his wartime allies. Had he limited his expansionist claims and permitted regimes based on local preferences to emerge in Eastern Europe, the way might have been opened for a large American post-war reconstruction loan to aid in the rebuilding of the Soviet economy. Yet to state an option in this form is to fail to come to grips with Stalin's commitments and calculations. Deeply suspicious of his capitalist partners, he could not even conceive of entrusting his future security to their goodwill or good nature. As his Politburo associate, Mikhaiel Kalinin put it in an August 1945 address to a conference of party propagandists: "Even now after the greatest victory known to history we cannot for one minute forget the basic fact that our country remains the one socialist state in the world The victory achieved does not mean that all dangers to our state structure and social order have disappeared. Only the more concrete, most immediate danger, which threatened us from Hitlerite Germany, has disappeared. In order that the danger of war may really disappear for a long time, it is necessary to consolidate our victory."

To consolidate the victory meant installing

term, patient but firm and vigilant containment of Russian expansive tendencies." This doctrine of containment, which was to be adopted as the basis of American policy toward the Soviet Union in the post-war period, clearly meant that the United States would "regard the Soviet Union as a rival, not a partner, in the political arena." While the existence of this rivalry did not exclude an uneasy coexis-

"friendly" regimes wherever the writ of Soviet power ran, and in the last analysis the only "friendly" regimes that could be fully trusted were Communist-dominated ones. As Stalin stated in an unusual moment of frankness, "A freely elected government in any of these countries would be anti-Soviet, and that we cannot allow." Assured by Roosevelt at the Yalta Conference that there would be no American troops left in Europe two years after the war, he counted on the dissipation of American military forces to open up new opportunities for the Soviet Union as the dominant continental military power. At the same time he did not overestimate his strength and sought to avoid direct challenges which maximized the risk of war. Urged by Tito to help drive the Anglo-Americans out of Trieste, he gave the Yugoslavs diplomatic support, but stopped short of military action. In a revealing exchange with the Yugoslavs, he declared: "Since all other methods were exhausted, the Soviet Union had only one other method left for gaining Trieste for Yugoslavia-to start war with the Anglo-Americans over Trieste and take it by force. The Yugoslav comrades could not fail to realize that after such a hard war the USSR could not enter another." Nor did Stalin at first believe that the policies which he was espousing necessarily meant that he would have to forego Western aid in-Soviet post-war reconstruction. Convinced that the United States faced the prospect of large scale unemployment and a major economic crisis at the end of the war, he apparently calculated that the Americans would be driven to extend sizable credits on favorable terms by their need to find outlets for their exports. In this, as in othe appraisals of American reactions, Stalin turned out to be mistaken. The result was to force hin back on his own resources, to lead him to exploi to the utmost such war booty and reparations a were available to him and to launch a new in dustrialization drive at home with its attendan sacrifice of living standards to guarantee th "homeland . . . against all possible accidents."

⁵ George F. Kennan, "The Sources of Sovic Conduct," reprinted in A Foreign Affairs Reade—Philip E. Mosely, (ed.), *The Soviet Union 1922*-1962, (New York, Praeger, 1963), pp. 177-178.

⁶ Ibid, p. 183.

tence of the two systems, its effect was necessarily to increase the strains of the Soviet-American relationship and to open up the prospect of a series of dangerous confrontations wherever Soviet and American interests impinged or collided.

From the beginning, the doctrine of containment had its critics. Voices on the right denounced it for its passivity and lack of aggressiveness. They argued that containment was essentially a negative and static policy, that it left the initiative with the Soviet Union, and that the main object of American policy ought to be to roll back the Soviet advance and liberate areas captured by the Communists. Perhaps the most articulate spokesman for this point of view was John Foster Dulles, though once ensconced in power as Secretary of State he did more than any one else to demonstrate that it was empty rhetoric. Put to the test of responding to the East German rising of 1953, the Hungarian revolution of 1956, and repeated calls to unleash Chiang-Kai-Shek, he proved it was easier to condemn containment than to abandon it.

On the other hand, there were some like Walter Lippmann who criticized the doctrine of containment from a different vantage point. Writing in 1947, Lippmann saw containment as implying "unending intervention in all the countries that are supposed to contain the Soviet Union" and feared that it would involve the United States in commitments which would strain its resources to the breaking point. Lippmann refused to accept the then prevalent view that the Soviet Union was bent on world domination. Arguing that Soviet obejectives were limited and amenable to comporomise, Lippmann called for an effort to ease the tensions of the Cold War by neutralizing Germany and withdrawing Soviet and Western orces from Central Europe. George Kennan, the father of the doctrine of containment, shared many of Lippmann's misgivings about the way in which containment was being interpreted by American officialdom.8 Because he believed that American policy makers were ver-emphasizing the military threat from the Joviet Union, Kennan regarded military assisance to nations such as Turkey, which bor-Mered on the Soviet Union, as unduly provocawive. Because he believed that American foreign policy should only be concerned with areas vital to American security, he also objected to open-ended commitments to oppose Communism anywhere and everywhere. Nor, in Kennan's view, did containment exclude efforts to lessen tension between the United States and the Soviet Union. In the post-Stalinist period Kennan became an ardent advocate of Lippmann's proposals for the neutralization of Germany and disengagement in Central Europe.

As post-war relations between the Soviet Union and the United States deteriorated, the warnings and pleas of the Lippmanns and Kennans went unheeded. The lessons of the first Berlin crisis and the Korean War were read as dictating a policy of building American positions of military strength wherever a threat of Communist aggression presented itself. The results were predictable. A stalemate of sorts was achieved. But meanwhile both sides embarked on a desperate arms race. Both sides sought to strengthen and solidify their own systems of alliances while probing for weaknesses in the camps of their antagonists. Both sides sought to exploit the power vacuum created by decolonization to carve out new areas of support and influence. And both sides on occasion tested each other's resolution by acts of brinksmanship that threatened to set the whole world on fire. The Cuban missile crisis epitomized the dangers of confrontation in a thermonuclear age. Surely no one who endured that week with its eerie sense of a doomsday clock ticking relentlessly away will ever forget that the rivalry of the two most powerful nations on earth had reached a point where there was a serious possibility of their mutual extinction. Nor was the lesson lost on Moscow. Khrushchev summed it up in a memorable sentence: "There was a smell of burning in the air."9

We have reason to be profoundly grateful that this and other crises in Soviet-American relations have thus far been surmounted without a nuclear catastrophe. We have been compelled in recent years to learn a great deal about the art of crisis management; perhaps the time has come to address ourselves to the art of crisis prevention.

The question which I should like to pose this evening is whether we and the Soviet Union stand condemned to behave, in J. Robert Oppenheimer's metaphor, like two deadly scorpions in a bottle, "each capable of killing ing the other, but only at the risk of his own life," or whether we can find a basis for living

⁷ Quoted in Walter Lafeber, America, Russia, nd the Cold War, 1945-1966 (New York: John √Viley and Sons, 1967), p. 55.

⁸ George F. Kennan, Memoirs, 1925-1950
Boston: Atlantic, Little, Brown, 1967), pp. 354-67.

⁹ Pravda, December 13, 1962.

together peacefully by a joint recognition that our survival depends on the prevention of total war.

Let me begin, where foreign policy begins, with the two political systems and cultures that we are considering. In a much-quoted passage in *Democracy in America*, Alexis de Tocqueville wrote in 1835:

"There are, at the present time, two great nations in the world which seem to tend towards the same end, although they started from different points: I allude to the Russians and the Americans. Both of them have grown up unnoticed; and whilst the attention of mankind was directed elsewhere, they have suddenly assumed a most prominent place among the nations..."

"All other nations seem to have nearly reached their natural limits, and only to be charged with the maintenance of their power; but these are still in the act of growth; all the others are stopped, or continue to advance with great difficulty; these are proceeding with ease and with celerity along a path to which the human eye can assign no term. The American struggles against the natural obstacles which oppose him; the adversaries of the Russian are men; the former combats the wilderness and savage life; the latter, civilization with all its weapons and its arts; the conquests of the one are therefore gained by the ploughshare; those of the other by the sword. The Anglo-American relies upon personal interest to accomplish his ends, and gives free scope to the unguided exertions and common sense of the citizens; the Russian centres all the authority of society in a single arm; the principal instrument of the former is freedom; of the latter servitude. Their starting point is different, and their courses are not the same; yet each of them seems to be marked by the will of Heaven to sway the destinies of half the globe."11

I cite this passage not because I subscribe to de Tocqueville's catalogue of American virtues and Russian vices, but because in an almost uncanny way, de Tocqueville more than a century ago, not only caught the dynamic quality of the two societies but pointed up the antithesis between a pluralist and an authority-dominated culture which present-day proponents of the theory of convergence tend to obscure. Because industrial societies tend to be alike in many respects, it does not follow that

they will be alike in all respects. Political ideas and movements have a vitality all their own; their development is not unilaterally determined by the discipline of the assembly line.

The Soviet political system is the outgrowth and projection of an authority-dominated culture: its ruling party elite arrogates to itself the right to determine the policies and programs which guide the destinies of the state. Its primary domestic objective has been rapid industrialization: indeed its historic achievement has been the transformation of a relatively backward society into an industrial and military super-power by authoritarian means. It has given priority to the development of heavy industry, science, and armaments while stinting on investments in agriculture, housing, and consumer goods. Its most fundamental concern has been its own survival and security, and it has based its security on a monopoly of political power and the building of industrial and military strength. Its suspicion and distrust of the so-called capitalist world have strong ideological roots in Marxism-Leninism; these have in turn been reinforced by the experiences of the Allied intervention and blockade during the Civil War, the Nazi invasion, and the Cold War. Its Leninist legacy had been a messianic dream of the triumph of Communism on a world scale, though messianism has waned as Soviet national interests have come to the forefront and met resistance from both Communist and non-Communist states. The imperial domain inherited from the Czars has become the focal point of a new Soviet patriotism; the Soviet leaders, like the Czars before them, have manifested a special interest in expanding Russian influence in Eastern Europe, the Balkans, the Straits, the Middle East, Central Asia, and the Mongolian and Manchuriar borderlands.

At the same time a half century of Soviet rule has produced changes in Soviet society. that impose brakes and restraints on the forward thrust of Soviet foreign policy. Revo lutions have their own natural history. Over time they exhaust their revolutionary driveand demands set in for normalization. The social changes which revolutions effect congesinto vested interests in the post-revolutionary status quo. The result in the Soviet Union ha been to create a highly bureaucratized and stratified society resistant to change. Whil the economy is still capable of reasonably rapid growth, technological progress in suc new industrial fields as automation, computers petro-chemicals, and industrial research and development has lagged behind the Unite

¹⁰ J. Robert Oppenheimer, "Atomic Weapons and American Policy," Foreign Affairs, Vol. 31, No. 4, July 1953, p. 529.

¹¹ Alexis de Tocqueville, *Democracy in America*, trans. Henry Reeve (New York: Colonial Press, 1899), Vol. 1, pp. 441-442.

States, and problems of planning and industrial management have become increasingly intricate and difficult. The appetite for bourgeois amenities has never been sharper. After decades of deprivation and sacrifice under Stalin, the Soviet leadership is under increasing pressure to raise the living standards of its own people and to invest more heavily in its relatively backward agricultural sector. The generations that have come to maturity since Stalin's death can no longer be put off with promises of a future Utopia; they look for benefits in the here and now. And some among the scientific and creative intelligentsia have expressed open dissatisfaction with the policy of arrested de-Stalinization which the current leadership is following. They call for an end to literary trials and judicial arbitrariness, for a lifting of censorship, for a greater exchange of information on an international scale, for the right to travel abroad, and for a larger role in the shaping of their own destinies. "Today," in the words of the distinguished Soviet physicist Andrei D. Sakharov, "the key to a progressive restructuring of the system of government in the interests of mankind lies in intellectual freedom."12 These demands arouse no enthusiasm in high Soviet party circles; they see the call for more freedom as a threat to their own power. Indeed, one of the primary reasons behind the decision of the Soviet Union and its client states to invade Czechoslovakia was the fear that the contagion of progressive liberalization would spread, not merely to neighboring Communist states, but to the Soviet Union itself. In the wake of events in Czechoslovakia one can only anticipate that the Soviet leadership will put even greater stress on the dangers from without in order to justify the suppression of the threat within.

The problems and dilemmas of the Soviet regime are not limited to domestic policy. As the historic leader and most powerful nation in what used to be called the Communist camp, the Soviet Union has proved powerless to arrest its crumbling structure. Yugoslavia asserted its independence early. China and Albania can now be counted Soviet enemies. Rumania has declared her economic independence and oriented much of her trade westwards. Czechoslovakia's valiant struggle to regain her freedom in both domestic and

¹² See his essay, "Thoughts on Progress, Peaceful Co-existence, and Intellectual Freedom," The New York Times, July 22, 1968. This is one of many such statements which are denied publication in the Soviet Union, but which nevertheless circulate privately among the intelligentsia.

foreign affairs could only be suppressed by brute force. Cuba is committed to its own brand of revolutionary guerrilla strategy. North Korea and North Vietnam represent arenas of combat in which both the Soviet and the Chinese leadership contend for influence. Only Bulgaria, Hungary, Poland, and East Germany can still be numbered among the Soviet faithful, and in the case of Hungary and Poland at least, the events of the year 1956 serve as a reminder of the tenuousness of their loyalty. Meanwhile, Communist parties throughout the world, from the largest to the smallest, have been emboldened to find their own voices and have not hesitated to disassociate themselves from Soviet policies when to do so served their own interest. The result is that world Communism is a house divided. There are no longer one, but many Communist truths. Nationalism has proved a corrosive force in eroding unity among Communist nations and parties. It should, perhaps, come as no great surprise that so powerful a force as nationalism should reappear in a Communist guise, but for those who have taken professions of brotherhood among Communist nations at face value, it has nevertheless come as a profound shock.

These developments have had two contradictory consequences for Soviet policy. They have left the Soviet Union with the problem of legitimizing its credentials as a revolutionary power; the aid extended to Cuba and North Vietnam serve this purpose. At a more fundamental level, they have exposed the brittleness of Bloc solidarity and thrown the Soviet Union back on its own resources. Its rhetoric continues to invoke the revolutionary phraseology of Marxism-Leninism. Its actual behavior is increasingly indistinguishable from that of any other Great Power.

As a Great Power its interests are world-wide, but its basic concerns focus on Europe, the Middle East, and the Far East, and more particularly the areas bordering on the Soviet Union. The border states of Eastern Europe are deemed a vital part of the Soviet defense zone. Here the Soviet leadership insists on a tier of "friendly"—that is, Communist—states joined in a defense pact with the Soviet Union. It is opposed to any form of Western "bridge-building" to Eastern Europe which seeks to drive a wedge between the Soviet Union and its East European allies.

The so-called Bonn-Washington axis is seen as the greatest threat to Soviet interests in Europe. With vivid memories of the massive destruction wrought on Russian soil by German armies in both World Wars, the Soviet

Union is prepared to do everything in its power to keep Germany divided, to press for the general recognition of East Germany's sovereignty, to isolate West Germany, and to deny it nuclear weapons. Its constant stress on the strength of revanchist forces in West Germany is designed to serve as a reminder to its East European allies that their true interests lie in relying on Soviet protection. The Soviet attitude toward the American presence in Europe has an element of ambiguity. The dominant line is to call for the withdrawal of American troops from West Germany, the dissolution of NATO and the Warsaw Pact, and the adoption of a new European security arrangement from which the United States would be excluded and in which Soviet influence would be paramount. But there are also occasional indications of grudging acceptance of the American presence and intimations that it may even play a stabilizing role in restraining Bonn's revanchist ambitions. The flirtation with de Gaulle provides an opportunity to weaken American influence in Europe, to disrupt NATO, and to isolate West Germany. But de Gaulle's Grand Design for a powerful French-led European Third Force arouses no enthusiasm in Moscow, which suspects with some reason that it may be directed equally against the Soviet Union and the United States.

Soviet policy in the Middle East is aimed at turning the flank of NATO and CENTO and becoming the dominant protector of Arab interests in the region. Turkey, Iran, and Pakistan, one-time American client states, are being wooed with offers of both economic and military aid in the hope of inducing them to adopt a more friendly orientation toward the Soviet Union. The Soviet alignment with the Arab states, also cemented by extensive military as well as economic aid, is directed, not merely at Israel, but even more at the elimination of Western influence in the area.

On its Far Eastern and Central Asian borders, the Soviet Union confronts China, still relatively weak in military and economic terms, but nevertheless a power which has already demonstrated a nuclear weapons potential, which has placed its irredentist claims against the Soviet Union on record, and which, over the longer term, may develop into a formidable antagonist. Although hopes for the restoration of Sino-Soviet friendship after the passing of Mao are still expressed by the Soviet press, they are not asserted with much conviction. There is no disposition to underplay the threat from China. In language which would do our own Right-Wingers proud,

an authoritative Soviet commentator, writing under the pseudonym of "Ernst Henry." recently outlined what he called the "Mao plan" for world domination. Said this commentator, "Mao proposes to include in his Reich—in addition to China itself—Korea, the Mongolian People's Republic, Vietnam, Cambodia, Laos, Indonesia, Malaysia, Burma, and several other countries in the area. In the second stage of 'the storm from the East,' expansion is planned in the direction of the Indian subcontinent, Soviet Central Asia, the Soviet Far East and the Near East. What is anticipated on paper for the third stage is not vet clear. But the plan is not restricted to the 'Maoization of Asia.' We shall gaze proudly upon five continents, one of Mao-tse-tung's myrmidons declares."13

Faced with these vaulting ambitions, the Soviet Union has adopted a policy which we can readily recognize as our old friend, containment. It has strengthened its military units along the borders of the Soviet Far East. Central Asia, and Outer Mongolia, and it has provided military aid to India as well as aid to Pakistan to counter Chinese influence. Indeed, even the extensive military and economic aid which it has supplied to North Vietnam may be viewed, not merely as a demonstration of its willingness to come to the assistance of a brother Communist state in order to help it expel the American "imperialists," but also as an effort to decrease the North Vietnamese dependence on China and to reinforce historic Vietnamese resistance to Chinese domination.

Compared to the Soviet involvement in Europe, the Middle East, and the Far East, Soviet interests in other areas may be described as secondary. Like the United States, it has used trade, military and economic aid, technical assistance and cultural penetration in order to heighten its influence in the underdeveloped world, but in contrast to the diffuse American aid effort, the Soviet program has focused heavily on selected target countries. In the interest of improving relations with nationalist leaders in the new states, it has discouraged premature revolutionary bids for power by local Communists and concentrated instead on building up support within the ruling nationalist movements. It has sought to channel its aid to promote national democratic regimes—that is to say, regimes which stress a socialist path of development and can be

¹² Ernst Henry (pseud.), "The View from the Pamirs," *Literaturnaya Gazeta*, September 27 and October 4, 1967.

counted on to support Soviet foreign policy objectives. But, like the United States, it has discovered that even very large scale military and economic aid can yield disappointing political results, and its experience in Indonesia and Ghana has been particularly disenchanting. Together with the United States, it has also discovered that most of the leaders of the new nations treasure their own independence above all other values, and that they welcome Soviet-American competition in aid-giving primarily as an opportunity to broaden their field of maneuver in order to promote their own interests.

Thus, the Soviet Union finds itself in a position well described by Maxim Litvinov, for many years Soviet Commissar of Foreign Affairs, in his 1929 report to the Soviet Central Executive Committee:

"Unlike other Commissariats, the Commissariat for Foreign Affairs cannot, unfortunately, put forward a five-year plan of work, a plan for the development of foreign policy In . . . drawing up the plan of economic development we start from our own aspirations and wishes, from a calculation of our potentialities, and from the firm principles of our entire policy, but in examining the development of foreign policy we have to deal with a number of factors that are scarcely subject to calculation, with a number of elements outside our control and the scope of our action. International affairs are composed not only of our own aspirations and actions, but of those of a large number of countries . . . pursuing other aims than ours, and using other means to achieve those aims than we allow."14

Like the United States, the Soviet Union must contend with a world in flux moving in directions which it may hope to influence, but which it cannot fully anticipate nor control. The solid, monolithic Communist bloc of Stalin's dream is no more; national communisms are on the rise, and the largest of these, China, is a sworn antagonist of the Soviet Union. The interests of the Soviet Union collide with the United States on many fronts, but where the containment of China is involved, they also run parallel and merge. The equation of Soviet-American relations has become infinitely more complex than it

¹⁴ From the report by Maxim Litvinov, Vice Commissar for Foreign Affairs, to the Central Executive Committee, December 4, 1929, translated in Jane Degras, Soviet Documents in Foreign Policy (London: Oxford University Press, 1952), Vol. 2, p. 408.

gave the appearance of being in the simple days of a birolar world.

The question for both the United States and the Soviet Union is not merely whether they can recognize these new complexities, but whether they can make constructive use of them to achieve a more satisfactory relationship. Recent events in Czechoslovakia do not create a propitious climate for such an effort. Nor can it be said that the American electorate is currently much interested in grappling with the problem. There is a widespread feeling of frustration growing out of America's multiple foreign involvements, a sense that the United States is over-committed abroad and undercommitted at home. Racial conflict, ricts and burnings in the black ghettos, the decay of the inner cities, the long-neglected demands of the black community and other minority groups for improved treatment, and the shockingly high incidence of poverty, crime, and violence have persuaded many Americans that the time has come for the United States to set its own house in order. The morass of Vietnam has significantly sharpened the feeling that America is over-extended. Balance-of-payment difficulties, disarray in NATO, the belief that allies are not carrying their fair share of the common burden, and disillusionment with foreign aid programs all contribute to a new mood of neo-isolationism. Its results are visible in cutbacks in foreign aid appropriations, in demands for the withdrawal of American troops from West Germany, and above all, in a widespread insistence that the Vietnamese war be brought to a quick end.

Meanwhile, American commitments continue to be global in scope. In Latin America the United States is a party to a hemispheric collective self-defense treaty and joint defense arrangements, though President Johnson's effort in the wake of the 1965 Dominican crisis to proclaim a new doctrine of unilateral American intervention to prevent the spread of Communism in the Western hemisphere, while approved by the House, was not accepted by the Senate. Under the terms of the NATO pact the United States is pledged to come to the aid of its NATO partners in the event of an armed attack against any one of them. Its responsibilities in Germany include the defense of West Berlin and a pledge to work for German unification. In the Middle East the United States has agreed to furnish military equipment to Israel, as well as to "moderate" Arab states; under the Eisenhower doctrine proclaimed in 1957 and approved by the Congress the President may send military forces to any nation in the Middle East which requests help in preserving "its independence and integrity." The United States is not a party to CENTO, but in effect it provides backstop support for that organization through its bilateral military aid treaties with Turkey, Iran, and Pakistan. In Southeast Asia the SEATO pact provides a basis for American intervention to resist armed aggrèssion and counter subversive activities in the Philippines and Thailand, as well as South Vietnam, Laos, and Cambodia. provided that the threatened government approves. The American Seventh Fleet stands guard in the Formosa Straits to assure the security of Taiwan and the Pescadores under the terms of a mutual defense pact with Chiang-Kai-Shek. Japan is bound to the United States by a mutual security pact which provides for the continuation of American military bases on Japanese soil, and a similar treaty commits the United States to the defense of South Korea. Under the terms of the so-called ANZUS Treaty the United States guarantees the security of both Australia and New Zealand.

These wide-ranging commitments, inspired variously by fear of aggression from the Soviet Union, Communist China, and local subversive Communist movements, place a heavy burden on Americans which many appear increasingly disinclined to bear. They note a spiralling defense budget of more than 80 billion dollars imposing sharp limits on the resources which are made available to solve America's own social problems, while the pressing needs of the poor nations of the world also suffer neglect. They see the casualty figures from Vietnam, not as abstract statistics but as the dead, the maimed, and the missing in their own families and neighborhoods. They watch with apprehension as those dear to them are called up for military service, and they fear that their country's self-appointed role as a world policeman may involve them in conflicts that will make Vietnam look like a minor skirmish. Some ask whether the United States cannot limit its commitments without endangering its vital interests and whether even the shocking Soviet intervention in Czechoslovakia should be permitted to deter efforts to find terms of accommodation with the Soviet Union and other Communist

But such sentiments are by no means universally shared by Americans. Thus former President Eisenhower in his message to the 1968 Republican National Convention warned against a "growing disposition" toward "wishful thinking" which expressed itself in a search for "surface accommodations" with the Com-

munists. In Eisenhower's words, "Abroad, in every major sector, we confront a formidable foe—an expansionist tyranny which respects only toughness and strength. Today the Communists reach ruthlessly for domination over Southeast Asia. . . . In the Middle East, month by month they move closer to testing our resolution. The same is true in Korea. Constantly they stir new troubles in every area of weakness they can ferret out in Eastern Europe, in Africa and Latin America . . . they continue to expand their military power." And the tocsin which he sounded was no retreat.

Meanwhile, a number of steps have been taken which move in the direction of a Soviet-American detente. In the wake of the Cuban missile crisis arrangements were made for a direct line between Moscow and Washington, in order as President Kennedy put it, "to avoid on each side the dangerous delays, misunderstandings, and misreadings of the other's actions which might occur at a time of crisis."16 This action was followed by the conclusion of a treaty outlawing nuclear tests in the atmosphere, outer space, and under water, but leaving the parties free to conduct underground tests. In 1967 an Outer Space Treaty was approved prohibiting, among other things, the stationing of nuclear weapons in orbit. The very important non-proliferation treaty signed this year is accompanied by assurances from both the Soviet Union and the United States that they will come to the aid of any signatory non-nuclear weapon state that is threatened with nuclear aggression, an action which would presumably give India the assurance of protection against a Chinese nuclear attack. Explorations are under way to impose mutually agreed limits on the production of both offensive and anti-ballistic missiles. During the course of the past year both countries also reached an agreement to assist astronauts downed in either country, signed a consular treaty, inaugurated direct flights between New York and Moscow, and, after some delay, renewed their cultural exchange agreement.

Opinions will differ as to whether these are more than "surface accommodations." Certainly large and important issues continue to separate the United States from the Soviet Union. But these agreements do suggest that

¹⁵ New York Times, August 6, 1968.

¹⁶ President John F. Kennedy, "Toward a Strategy of Peace," (Commencement Address at American University, Washington, D. C., June 10, 1963), reprinted in Council on Foreign Relations, Richard P. Stebbins (ed.), Documents on American Foreign Relations, 1963 (New York: Harper & Row, 1964), p. 121.

there are shared interests as well as great differences. The question is whether the interests that we hold in common provide a sufficient basis for a continuing search for a detente. The pursuit of such a goal is not likely to be easy. For however great may be the resistance of the Russians, a part of the trouble lies within ourselves. We are a nation torn by conflicting pressures, wavering between hopes for peace and fear of Communism, weary of foreign entanglements and yet fearful of abandoning them, more confident in our means than clear about our purposes, sure of our good intentions and frustrated when others do not recognize them, accustomed to victory and feeling betraved when we must settle for less, believing that every problem must have a solution and baffled when none is forthcoming, impatient with long drawn-out negotiations yet compelled to learn how to make creative use of them if we wish to survive.

What then are the common interests of the Soviet Union and the United States on which we can build? The most basic is that neither of us would survive a nuclear conflict between us. President Kennedy summed it up well in his American University speech: "Today. should total war break out again-no matter how-our two countries would become the primary targets. It is an ironical but accurate fact that the two strongest powers are the two in the most danger of devastation. All we have built, all we have worked for, would be destroyed in the first 24 hours."17 Nor does Moscow dissent from this appraisal. As Khrushchev put it in an address to the East German Party Congress: "There is no doubt that if a thermonuclear war were unleashed by the imperialist maniacs, the capitalist system that gave rise to the war would perish in it. But would the socialist countries and the cause of the struggle for socialism throughout the world gain from a world thermonuclear catastrophe? Only people who deliberately close their eyes to the facts can think this. As far as Marxist-Leninists are concerned, they cannot think in terms of a Communist civilization built upon the ruin of the world's cultural centers, on ravaged earth contaminated by thermonuclear fallout. This is not to mention the fact that for many people there would be no socialism at all, since they would have been removed from the face of our planet."18

At the same time, both of the thermonuclear super powers are under great pressure to find, if they can, a solution to the problem of defense

17 Ibid, p. 119.

against thermonuclear striking power. Both are seeking and will be seeking in areas of science still unknown and unexplored the secret of their future security. Given the dynamic quality of military technology in the last decades, it would be a rash prophet indeed who would predict that the world has seen the end of innovation in weaponry. Yet there appears to be a widespread consensus in both the Soviet and American scientific-technical communities that the technology and tactics of nuclear attack have so far outstripped the technology of defense that the obstacles to an effective missile defense, at the present time, are virtually insurmountable. Some military theoreticians may still dream of a situation in which a combination of overwhelming superiority in attack weapons and an effective missile defense may enable one or the other side to launch a preemptive attack with impunity. But most American experts would agree with the Soviet academician, A. D. Sakharov, who recently observed. "Fortunately for the stability of the world, the difference between the technical-economic potentials of the Soviet Union and the United States is not so great that one of the sides could undertake a 'preventive aggression' without an almost inevitable risk of a destructive retaliatory blow. This situation would not be changed by a broadening of the arms race through the development of anti-missile defenses."19

If these propositions are accepted as valid, they would suggest that the United States and the Soviet Union have a mutual interest in adopting a moratorium on the construction of anti-missile systems, in limiting the arms race in offensive weapons, and in seeking to "avert those confrontations which bring an adversary to a choice of either a humiliating retreat or a nuclear war." ²⁰

The Soviet Union and the United States also share a common concern about Chinese nuclear developments and territorial ambitions. This concern has already led to parallel actions providing both military and economic support to India at the time of the Sino-Indian border conflict, to efforts independently pursued to ease Indian-Pakistani rivalry and to counter Chinese penetration in Pakistan, and, as has already been indicated, to joint guarantees under the non-proliferation treaty designed to prevent a nuclear power like China from directing its nuclear force against its non-nuclear neighbors. These actions do not necessarily mean, as Peking has charged, that

¹⁶ New York Times, July 22, 1968.

¹⁸ Pravda, January 17, 1963.

²⁰ President John F. Kennedy, op. cit., p. 120.

a Soviet-American alliance is in the making. When two rivals join to ward off a threat from a third who menaces them both, their differences do not automatically disappear. They may submerge their differences in the interests of common action, but each may still hope to emerge as the ultimate victor.

Yet it is precisely because there can be no victor in a thermonuclear war that we must find new ways of muting the frictions and tensions that have characterized the Soviet-American relationship. As we look round the world from West Berlin and Germany through the Middle East to Southeast Asia, we see crises and confrontations looming before us in every direction. Is it beyond the wit of man to find ways of dealing with them before they burst upon us? I hope that I will not be misunderstood as suggesting that the United States and the Soviet Union can between them solve all the world's problems or that they can once and for all achieve a grand settlement of their differences. In a world of movement and change, where power configurations within and among nations shift over time, and the ambitions of sovereign nations clash, it is utopian to expect that conflicts can be eliminated. What is at issue is whether they can be moderated. Are there fresh initiatives which can be taken now which will avert future Soviet-American confrontations?

Let us look briefly at a few of the world's danger points. Clearly one of the most troublesome issues is presented by the problem of German unification and the future of West Berlin. Equally clearly, no progress is likely to be made in resolving this issue as long as the Soviet Union continues to adhere to a policy of two Germanys and regards Western proposals for unification through free elections as ill-disguised attempts to liquidate the Communist regime of East Germany and to tie the whole of Germany to the West. Are there other approaches to the problem of German unification, which can win both Soviet and Western acceptance, as well as the approval of the two existing German regimes? Is it too late to reconsider proposals for the neutralization of Germany as a condition of unification? Can a basis be laid for unification by an agreed mutual withdrawal of troops? Can unification be made acceptable within the context of a European community, free of both Soviet and American domination? I fully realize that each of these questions raises a host of problems, and indeed that the most formidable obstacle to unification is the fact that the two parts of Germany embody such diametrically opposed political systems. It may be that unification will come only when the evolution of social

and political forces in both East and West Germany prepares the way for it. I would only urge that where old formulas have brought us to a dead end the time may be ripe for fresh initiatives.

When we turn to the Middle East, the sense of an impending and almost unavoidable collision of Soviet and American power is heavy upon us. The decision of the Soviet Union after the six-day war to rearm its Arab clients has been met, if not matched, by American military aid to Israel. Efforts to reach agreement on a limitation of arms shipments to the area have thus far enjoyed no success. Soviet military personnel in increasing numbers are training Arab military forces, the Soviet Mediterranean fleet has been enlarged, naval bases have been established in Arab ports, the Soviet air lift capacity has been improved. and the possibility of direct Soviet military intervention in the area cannot be disregarded. Hopes of achieving a peace settlement between the Arabs and Israelis have centered on a resolution unanimously adopted by the United Nations Security Council on November 22, 1967 which laid down certain principles to be accepted by both sides, including the withdrawal of Israeli armed forces from occupied territories, the termination of all claims of belligerency, the right of freedom of navigation, a just settlement of the refugee problem, and the guarantee of the territorial inviolability and political independence of every state in the area. Thus far the efforts of Ambassador Jarring, the United Nations Special Representative, to obtain agreement on a settlement in accordance with the resolution have not borne fruit. Arab terrorism and Israeli reprisal raids continue. The Israelis call for direct negotiations and a formal peace treaty with the Arabs. Leaders of the Arab cause refuse to recognize Israel and talk of reopening a holy war to put an end to the State of Israel.

Are there initiatives which the United States can still take in negotiations with the Soviet Union to prevent the Middle Eastern crisis from flaring up into a major confrontation? Is it too late to renew efforts to impose agreed limits on arms shipments to the rival parties? Can a joint arrangement be reached to refrain from direct military intervention in the area? Is there sufficient common interest in avoiding a major confrontation in the Middle East to provide a basis for joint pressure on both the Arabs and the Israelis to moderate their most extreme positions in the interest of a workable settlement? Again, I repeat that I am under no illusions about the difficulties which stand in the way of the success of such efforts. I can only plead that not to try at all is a sure guarantee of failure.

Finally, let us turn to Southeast Asia. It is commonly assumed, and I believe correctly, that the termination of the war in Vietnam and the withdrawal of American troops would contribute to an easing of Soviet-American relations. But we would still be left with the problem of defining our future role in Southeast Asia and our obligations, such as they may be, to Laos, Cambodia, and Thailand, not to mention Malaysia, Singapore, Indonesia, and the Philippines. Would we, for example, dispatch troops to Laos to prevent a complete Pathet Lao take-over or send large military contingents to Thailand to help suppress a growing guerrilla movement? After our experience in Vietnam, it would appear most unlikely. Our proclaimed purpose in Southeast Asia is to assist nations whose self-determination is threatened and who want to help themselves. In practice this has meant providing help to non-Communist governments endangered by internal or external Communist subversion. In Vietnam this policy collided with the determination of both the Soviet Union and Communist China to help North Vietnam and the Viet Cong to overthrow the Saigon government and expel the Americans. Clearly, there can be no basis for a common Soviet-American policy in Southeast Asia as long as the United States is ready to suppress any bid to expand Communist power and the Soviet Union is prepared to assist so-called national liberation movements which the United States regards as thin veneers for Communist take-overs. Short of a mutual agreement to refrain from such intervention, perhaps the most that can be hoped for in the way of concerted policy is that the United States and the Soviet Union will take parallel actions in areas accessible to each of them to counter an expansion of Chinese power and influence in the region.

So far I have spoken mainly of conflicts and how they might be muted. But there are also opportunities for cooperation which have only begun to be explored. A start has been made in collaborative endeavor in Antarctica, in agreements for exchanges in scientific, technical, educational, cultural, and other fields, and in attendance and exchange of views by Soviet and American scientists and scholars at both national and international scientific conferences. But there are many other substantive fields in which collaboration would serve the interests of both nations. They include the exploration of space and of the ocean floor, attacks on the pollution of the environment, work on irrigation and the desalting of water, the establishment of a global satellite communications system, weather forecasting, medicine, population control, increasing food supplies, and many others. The scientific community in both nations would eagerly welcome such cooperation.

Meanwhile, Soviet-American relations are still entangled in a complex web of rival ambitions and shared concerns. Both Soviet and American policy makers have been made vividly aware of the suicidal implications of a thermonuclear conflict; the result has been to increase pressure on both sides to behave with restraint in major confrontations of power. Both the Soviet Union and the United States feel threatened by the long-term potential of Communist China; the result has been to force them to think of themselves as possible allies as well as rivals.

With these developments in mind, it would be pleasant to end this discussion on the note that a war between the United States and the Soviet Union is now unthinkable. Moscow is more cautious. Its formulation is that war is not fatalistically inevitable. But even that is progress. For it opens the way to action directed at the prevention of conflict rather than to its passive acceptance. As the philosopher Karl Jaspers once wisely put it: "Anyone who regards an impending war as certain is helping on its occurrence, precisely through his certainty. Any one who regards peace as certain grows carefree and unintentionally impels us into war. Only he who sees the peril, and does not for one instant forget it, is able to behave in a rational fashion and to do what is possible to exorcise it."

"It is of crucial significance for the course of events whether the individual can endure to remain in suspense; or whether he flees into certainties... The most compelling element in our lives is the fact that we do not know the future, but contribute toward its realization and see it loom before us incalculable in its entirety."²¹

Let me conclude in the words of President Kennedy: "There is no single, simple key to... peace, no grand or magic formula to be adopted by one or two powers. Genuine peace must be the product of many nations, the sum of many acts. It must be dynamic, not static, changing to meet the challenge of each new generation. For peace is a process, a way of solving problems."²²

²¹ Karl Jaspers, *The Origin and Goal of History* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1953), p. 151.

²² President John F. Kennedy, op. cit., p. 118.

A CAUSAL MODEL OF CIVIL STRIFE: A COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS USING NEW INDICES¹

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This article describes some results of a successful attempt to assess and refine a causal model of the general conditions of several forms of civil strife, using cross-sectional analyses of data collected for 114 polities. The theoretical argument, which is discussed in detail elsewhere, stipulates a set of variables said to determine the likelihood and magnitude of civil strife.2 Considerable effort was given here to devising indices that represent the theoretical variables more closely than the readily-available aggregate indices often used in quantitative cross-national research. One consequence is an unusually high degree of statistical explanation: measures of five independent variables jointly account for twothirds of the variance among nations in magnitude of civil strife (R = .80, R^2 = .64).

It should be noted at the outset that this study does not attempt to isolate the set of conditions that leads specifically to "revolution," nor to assess the social or political impact of any given act of strife except as that impact is reflected in measures of "magnitude" of strife. The relevance of this kind of research to the classic concern of political scholarship with revolution is its attempt at identification

¹ This is a revised version of a paper read at the 1967 Annual Meeting of the American Political Science Association, Chicago, September 5-9 The research was supported in part by the Center for Research in Social Systems (formerly SORO), The American University, and by the Advanced Research Projects Agency of the Department of Defense. This support implies neither sponsor approval of this article and its conclusions nor the author's approval of policies of the U.S. government toward civil strife. The assistance of Charles Ruttenberg throughout the process of research design, data collection, and analysis is gratefully acknowledged. Substantial portions of the data were collected by Joel Prager and Lois Wasserspring. The author owes special thanks to Harry Eckstein for his advice and encouragement. Bruce M. Russett and Raymond Tanter provided useful criticisms of the paper in draft form. Research was carried out at the Center of International Studies, Princeton University.


² Ted Gurr, "Psychological Factors in Civil Violence," World Politics, 20 (January 1968), 245-278.

and systematic analysis of conditions that dispose men to strife generally, revolution included.

I. THEORETICAL CONSIDERATIONS

The basic theoretical proposition is that a psychological variable, relative deprivation, is the basic precondition for civil strife of any kind, and that the more widespread and intense deprivation is among members of a population, the greater is the magnitude of strife in one or another form. Relative deprivation is defined as actors' perceptions of discrepancy between their value expectations (the goods and conditions of the life to which they believe they are justifiably entitled) and their value capabilities (the amounts of those goods and conditions that they think they are able to get and keep). The underlying causal mechanism is derived from psychological theory and evidence to the effect that one innate response to perceived deprivation is discontent or anger, and that anger is a motivating state for which aggression is an inherently satisfying response. The term relative deprivation is used below to denote the perceived discrepancy, discontent to denote the motivating state which is the postulated response to it. The relationship between discontent and participation in strife is however mediated by a number of intervening social conditions. The initial theoretical model stipulated three such societal variables that are explored here, namely coercive potential, institutionalization, and social facilitation.3 Results of a previous attempt to operationalize

3 Coercive potential is labelled "retribution" in *ibid*. The theoretical model also stipulates a set of variables that determines the intensity of deprivation. In the research reported in the present article, deprivation was operationalized directly rather than by reference to its component variables. The causal mechanism of the theory is the frustration-aggression relationship, which the author has attempted to modify and apply to collective strife in the light of recent empirical and theoretical work, e.g., Leonard Berkowitz, Aggression: A Social Psychological Analysis (New York: McGraw-Hill, 1962), and Aubrey J. Yates, Frustration and Conflict (New York: Wiley, 1962).



some of these variables and relate them to strife suggested that a fourth variable whose effects should be controlled is the legitimacy of the political regime in which strife occurs.⁴

The initial model, sketched in simplified form in Figure 1, specified no hierarchical or causal interactions among the mediating variables. Each was assumed to have an independent effect on the fundamental relationship between deprivation and strife. The theoretical arguments with reference to each variable are briefly stated here.

Great importance is attributed in psychological theory and equally, in theoretical and empirical studies of revolutionary behavior, to the inhibiting effects of punishment or coercion, actual or threatened, on the outcome of deprivation. The relationship is not necessarily a linear one whereby increasing levels of coercion are associated with declining levels of violence. Psychological evidence suggests that if an aggressive response to deprivation is thwarted by fear of punishment, this interference is itself a deprivation and increases the instigation to aggression. Comparative studies of civil strife suggest a curvilinear relationship whereby medium levels of coercion, indexed for example by military participation ratios or ratings of regime repressiveness, are associated with the highest magnitudes of strife. Only very high levels of coercion appear to limit effectively the extent of strife. No systematic comparative study has examined

⁴ Ted Gurr with Charles Ruttenberg, *The Conditions of Civil Violence: First Tests of a Causal Model* (Princeton: Center of International Studies, Princeton University, Research Monograph No. 28, April 1967).

⁶ See Douglas Bwy, "Governmental Instability in Latin America: The Preliminary Test of a Causal Model of the Impulse to 'Extra-Legal' Change," paper read at the American Psychological Association Annual Convention, New York, September 2-6, 1966; Jennifer Walton, "Correlates of Coerciveness and Permissiveness of National Political Systems: A Cross-National Study," (M.A. thesis, San Diego State College, 1965); Gurr and Ruttenberg, The Conditions of Civil Violence . . . , 81-84.

whether the curvilinear relationship also holds for levels of coercion actually applied. Comparative studies have, however, emphasized the importance of the loyalty of coercive forces to the regime as a factor of equal or greater importance than the size of those forces in deterring strife, and this relationship is almost certainly linear, i.e., the greater the loyalty of coercive forces, the more effective they are, ceteris paribus, in deterring strife.6 Two measures of coercion are used in this study: coercive force size, which is hypothesized to vary curvilinearly with levels of strife, and coercive force size weighted for the degree of loyalty of coercive forces to the regime, referred to throughout as coercive potential, which is expected to have a linear relationship with strife.

The second intervening variable is institutionalization, i.e., the extent to which societal structures beyond the primary level are broad in scope, command substantial resources and/ or personnel, and are stable and persisting. Representative of the diverse arguments about the role of associational structures in minimizing strife are Huntington on the necessity of political institutionalization for political stability, Kornhauser on the need for structures intervening between mass and elite to minimize mass movements, and a variety of authors on the long-range tendencies of labor organizations to minimize violent economically-based conflict.7 Two underlying psychological processes are likely to affect the intensity of and responses to discontent. One is that the existence of such structures increases men's value opportunities, i.e., their repertory of alternative ways to attain value satisfaction. A complementary function is that of displacement: labor unions, political parties, and a range of other associations may provide the discontented with routinized and typically non-violent means for expressing their discontents.8 The proposed relationship is linear: the greater the institutionalization, the lower the magnitude of strife is likely to be.

⁶ See, for example, Chalmers Johnson, Revolution and the Social System (Stanford: The Hoover Institution on War, Revolution and Peace, 1964), pp. 14–22.

⁷ Samuel P. Huntington, "Political Development and Political Decay," World Politics, 17 (April 1965), 386-430; William Kornhauser, The Politics of Mass Society (New York: The Free Press, 1959); and Arthur M. Ross and George W. Hartmann, Changing Patterns of Industrial Conflict (New York: Wiley, 1960), among others.

8 Gurr, "Psychological Factors. . ."

Given the existence of widespread discontent in a population, a great number of social and environmental conditions may be present that facilitate the outbreak and persistence of strife. They may be categorized according to their inferred psychological effects, for example, according to whether they facilitate interaction among the discontented, or provide the discontented with a sense that violent responses to deprivation are justified, or give them the means to make such responses with maximum effect, or shelter them from retribution.9 Two aspects of facilitation are treated separately in this study: past levels of civil strife and social and structural facilitation per se. The theoretical basis for the first of these variables is that populations in which strife is chronic tend to develop, by an interaction process, a set of beliefs justifying violent responses to deprivation; the French tradition of urban "revolution" is a striking example. Social and structural facilitation (referred to below as "facilitation") comprises aspects of organizational and environmental facilitation of strife, and the provision of external assistance. The operational hypotheses are that the greater the levels of past strife, and of social and structural facilitation, the greater is the magnitude of strife.

Two considerations suggested the incorporation of the fourth intervening variable examined in this study, legitimacy of the regime. A study of strife for the years 1961-1963 identified a number of nations that had less strife than might be expected on the basis of characteristics they shared with more strife-ridden polities.10 One apparent common denominator among them was a high degree of popular support for the regime. This appeared consistent with Merelman's recently-proposed learning-theory rationale for legitimacy, to the effect that people comply with cirectives of the regime in order to gain both the symbolic rewards of governmental action and the actual rewards with which government first associated itself, an argument that applies equally well to acceptance of deprivation and is compatible with experimental findings, in work on the frustration-aggression relationship, that people are less aggressive when they perceive frustration to be reasonable or justifiable.11

9 Ibid.

The proposed relationship of legitimacy as an intervening variable is linear: the greater is regime legitimacy at a given level of deprivation, the less the magnitude of consequent strife.

II. OPERATIONAL MEASURES

The universe of analysis chosen for evaluating the model comprised 114 distinct national and colonial political entities, each of which had a population of one million or more in 1962. Data on civil strife were collected for 1961 through 1965. Cross-sectional multiple and partial correlation techniques were used. The use of product-moment correlation coefficients was justified on grounds of their necessity for multiple regression, although not all the indicators formally meet the order-of-measurement requirements of the techniques used.

Because of the very considerable difficulties of operationalizing a number of the variables, and the fact that most of the indicators constructed are new, this article gives relatively close attention to the data collection and scal-

ing procedures.

With the exception of magnitude of strife and its components, the underlying variables examined in this study are unmeasured and must be inferred from indicators. In most instances they are in fact unmeasureable by aggregate data, since they relate in the instance of deprivation-induced discontent to a state of mind, and in the case of the intervening variables to conditions that have their effect only insofar as the discontented perceive them, and moreover perceive them as relevant to their response to deprivation. Following Blalock's recommendation that "when dealing with unmeasured variables it will usually be advisable to make use of more than one indicator for each underlying variable," each of the summary measures used in this study is derived by combining two to seven indicators of the underlying variable. This procedure has not only the advantage Blalock attributes to it, namely of minimizing the effects of confounding variables, but also facilitates incorporation of various empirically-discrete conditions that have theoretically-identical effects.13

¹² Five polities meeting these criteria were excluded: Laos on grounds that at no time in the 1960's did it have even the forms of a unified regime, and Albania, Mongolia, North Korea, and North Vietnam for lack of sufficient reliable data. The universe nonetheless includes polities with more than 98 percent of the world's population.

¹³ Hubert M. Blalock, Jr., Causal Inferences in Nonexperimental Research (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1964), pp. 166-167, italicized in original.

¹⁰ Gurr and Ruttenberg, The Conditions of Civil Violence . . . , 100-106.

¹¹ Richard M. Merelman, "Learning and Legitimacy," this Review, 60 (September 1966); see also the work of Pastore and of Kregarman and Worchel, reviewed in Berkowitz, op. cit., passim.

Magnitude of Civil Strife

The dependent variable of the theoretical model is magnitude of civil strife. Civil strife is defined as all collective, nongovernmental attacks on persons or property that occur within the boundaries of an autonomous or colonial political unit. By "nongovernmental" is meant acts by subjects and citizens who are not employees or agents of the regime, as well as acts of such employees or agents contrary to role norms, such as mutinies and coups d'état. Operationally the definition is qualified by the inclusion of symbolic demonstrative attacks on political persons or policies, e.g., political demonstrations, and by the exclusion of turmoil and internal war events in which less than 100 persons take part.

A three-fold typology of civil strife is also employed, based on an empirical typology of civil strife events identified by Rummel, Tanter, and others in a series of factor analyses. The general categories, and representative subcategories, are

- Turmoil: relatively spontaneous, unstructured mass strife, including demonstrations, political strikes, riots, political clashes, and localized rebellions.
- (2) Conspiracy: intensively organized, relatively small-scale civil strife, including political assassinations, small-scale terrorism, small-scale guerrilla wars, coups, mutinies, and plots and purges, the last two on grounds that they are evidence of planned strife.
- (3) Internal war: large-scale, organized, focused civil strife, almost always accompanied by extensive violence, including large-scale terrorism and guerrilla wars, civil wars, private wars, and large-scale revolts.¹⁴

¹⁴ In each of a number of analyses by Rummel and others a set of "domestic conflict" measures was factor analyzed. Turmoil, indexed by riots and demonstrations, is found to be a distinct limension in all the analyses; two other factors, abelled by Rummel "revolution" and "subeversion," are in some cases separate and in others combined. Principal components of the "revolution" dimension are coups, palace revolutions, plots, and purges; the category is labelled here conspiracy. Guerrilla war and terrorism are major components of the "subversion" dimension, here abelled internal war. See Rudolph J. Rummel. 'A Field Theory of Social Action With Applicaion to Conflict Within Nations," Yearbook of the Society for General Systems Research, X (1965), ■89-195; and Raymond Tanter, "Dimensions of Conflict Behavior Within Nations, 1955-1960:

Various measures of the relative extent of civil strife have been used in recent literature, among them counts by country of number of strife events of various types, factor scores derived from such typologies, number of deaths from violent strife, man-days of participation in strife, and scaling procedures that take account of both number of events and their severity.15 One can infer from frustrationaggression theory that no single measure of magnitude of aggression, individual or collective, is likely to be sufficient. It is likely that high levels of discontent may be expressed either in intense, short-lived violence or in more protracted but less severe strife. Moreover, the proportion of a collectivity that participates in civil strife ought to vary with the modal intensity of discontent: mild discontent will motivate few to participate, whereas rage is likely to galvanize large segments of a collectivity into action.

Three aspects of civil strife thus ought to be taken into account in specifying its magnitude:

- (1) Pervasiveness: the extent of participation by the affected population, operationally defined for this study as the sum of the estimated number of participants in all acts of strife as a proportion of the total population of each polity, expressed in terms of participants per 100,000 population.
- (2) Duration: the persistence of strife, indexed here by the sum of the spans of time of all strife events in each polity, whatever the relative scale of the events, expressed in days.
- (3) Intensity: the human cost of strife, indexed here by the total estimated casualties, dead and injured, in all strife events in each

Turmoil and Internal War," Peace Research Society Papers, III (1965), 159-183. The subcategories used here are adapted, with their operational definitions, from Rummel, "Dimensions of Conflict Behavior Within and Between Nations," Yearbook of the Society for General Systems Research, VIII (1963), 25-26.

¹⁵ See, for example, Rummel, op. cit.; Tanter, op. cit.; Bruce M. Russett, "Inequality and Instability: The Relation of Land Tenure to Politics," World Politics, 16 (April 1964), 442-454; Charles Tilly and James Rule, Measuring Political Upheaval (Princeton: Center of International Studies, Princeton University, 1965); and Ivo K. and Rosalind L. Feierabend, "Aggressive Behaviors Within Polities, 1948-1962: A Cross-National Study," Journal of Conflict Resolution, 10 (September 1966), 249-271.

polity as a proportion of the total population, expressed as casualties per 10,000,000 population.

To approximate these requirements an extensive data-collection and -estimation effort was undertaken. Coding sheets and a coding manual were devised for recording a variety of information about any strife event, and a large number of sources scanned and coded to get as full as possible a representation of the strife events that occurred in the 114 polities in the 1961-1965 period. Three sources were systematically searched for data: the New York Times (via its Index), Newsyear (the annual volumes of Facts on File), and Africa Digest. This information was supplemented from a variety of other sources, among them The Annual Register of World Events, Africa Diary: Weekly Record of Events in Africa, Hispanic-American Report, and country and case studies. Some 1100 strife events were thus identified, coded, and the data punched onto IBM cards.16 Many small-scale strife events, and some larger ones, probably went unreported in these sources and hence are not included in this civil strife data bank. Moreover, much reported and estimated data is in varying degrees inaccurate. However, neither random nor systematic error seem sufficient to affect in any substantial way the analyses or conclusions reported here; the data are adequate for the purposes to which they are put.17

16 Information coded, in addition to that required for the three measures specified, included the socio-economic class(es) of the initiators, the social context in which they acted, the category of events, the targets and apparent motives of action, the number and role of coercive forces, and the extent and types of external support for initiators and regime, if any. Although no formal reliability tests were undertaken, the four coders did extensive practice coding on the same set of materials prior to coding and reviewed points of disagreement, and the author reviewed all coding sheets for internal consistency and, where necessary, recoding or search for additional information. It should be noted that the 1100 "events" include many cumulated reports, e.g., civil rights demonstrations in the U.S. were treated as a single set of events, all European-OAS terrorism in Algeria as a single event, etc.

17 It has been suggested that strife in countries with press restrictions is under-reported. As a check on this type of systematic error a nine-point measure of press freedom was incorporated in initial analyses; the measure is from Raymond B. Nixon, "Freedom in the World's Press: A Fresh Appraisal With New Data," Journalism Quar-

Data estimation procedures were used to circumvent the substantial missing-data problem. Methods for determining number of initiators serve as examples. The coding sheet itself contained two "number of initiator" scales. The first was a modified geometric progression of two used to record proximate estimates of initiators, its first interval being 1 to 40, its highest 55,001 to 110,000; for purposes of summing such estimates to obtain total number of initiators, the midpoint of each interval was used. The second scale was used for recording rough estimates, sometimes coder estimates, of number of initiators, ranging from "less than 100" (set equal to 40 for purposes of computing totals) to "10,001 to 100.000" (set equal to 40.000). Data for events for which no estimate could be made were supplied by calculating and inserting means for the appropriate subcategory of event, e.g., if a riot was coded "no basis for judging" for number of initiators, it was assigned the average number of initiators of all riots for which estimates were available.

"Duration" posed little difficulty, being coded on a geometric progression whose first two intervals were "one-half day or less" and "one-half to one day," and whose upper intervals were four to nine months, nine to fifteen months, etc. No event was assigned a duration of more than five years, though some began before and/or persisted after the 1961–1965 period.

Casualties were coded similarly to number of initiators, the principal missing-data component being estimates of injuries. The ratio of injuries to deaths was calculated for all events of each subcategory for which both data were available—the general ratio for all well-reported strife being 12:1—and was used to estimate injuries for all such events for which "deaths" but not injuries estimates were given. 18

terly (Winter 1965), 3-14. The correlations of this measure, in which high scores reflect low press freedom, with some measures of strife are: Duration, +19; Intensity, +17; Pervasiveness, -16 Total magnitude of strife, +11. The first two are significant at the .05 level, the third at .10. Ir effect, more strife tends to be reported from polities with low press freedom, not less, as might be expected. The results almost certainly reflect the association of high levels of economic development and press freedom in the Western nations which tend to have less strife than the developingmations.

¹⁸ The missing-data procedures gave implausi bly-high estimates for initiators and casualties fo

Strife events occurred in 104 of the 114 polities during the 1961-65 period. Pervasiveness, Duration, and Intensity scores were calculated separately, following the guidelines specified above, for turmoil, conspiracy, and internal war for each country, and for all strife taken together for each polity. All the distributions were highly skewed, hence were subjected to a log (X+1) transformation. To obtain combined magnitude scores for turmoil, conspiracy, internal war, and all strife, the three component logged scores were added, divided by eight to obtain their eighth root, and the anti-log used as the polity magnitudeof-strife score. The distributions remained skewed, but substantially so only in the case of internal war, which by our definitions occurred in only 25 of the 114 polities.19

Measures of Deprivation

A very large number of conditions are likely to impose some degree of relative deprivation on some proportion of a nation's citizens. Similarly, all men are likely to be discontented about some of their conditions of life at some point in time. On the basis of prior theoretical and empirical work, however, it was possible to construct, and subsequently to combine, a set of cross-nationally comparable indices of conditions that by inference cause pervasive

and intense types of deprivation, relying in part on aggregate data and in part on indices constructed by coding narrative and historical material. In the initial stages of data collection a large number of measures were constructed. some of them representing short-term and some persisting conditions, some of each relating to economic, political, and sociocultural deprivation. Whenever possible, separate measures were included of the intensity of inferred deprivation and of its pervasiveness, i.e., of the proportion of population presumably affected, plus a third measure combining the two elements. A correlation matrix for 48 such measures and a variety of strife measures was generated, and 13 representative deprivation measures selected for combination.20 The general rationale for the two general types of measures, short-term and persisting deprivation, and the measures finally selected, are summarized below.

Persisting Deprivation: In the very long run men's expectations about the goods and conditions of life to which they are entitled tend to adjust to what they are capable of attaining. In the shorter span, however, some groups may persistently demand and expect values, such as greater economic opportunity, political autonomy, or freedom of religious expression, that their societies will not or cannot provide.

- (1) Economic discrimination is defined as systematic exclusion of social groups from higher economic value positions on ascriptive bases. For each polity the proportion of population so discriminated against, if any, was specified to the nearest .05, and the intensity of deprivation coded on a four-point scale (see below). The proportion and the intensity score were multiplied to obtain a polity score.
- (2) Political discrimination is similarly defined in terms of systematic limitation in form, norm, or practice of social groups' opportunities to participate in political activities or to attain elite positions on the basis of ascribed characteristics. Proportionality and intensity scores were determined and combined in the same manner as economic discrimination scores. The "intensity" scales were defined as follows:

Intensity

Score

Economic Discrimination

Political Discrimination

1 Most higher economic value positions, or some specific classes of economic activity, are closed to the group. Some significant political elite positions are closed to the group, or some participatory activities (party membership, voting, etc.).

number of events. In subsequent and comparble analysis it seems advisable to rely on estinates of deaths alone, rather than casualties, and ninsert means derived from comparable events in mparable countries rather than such events in ll countries.

Tables are available on request from the uthor listing the 114 countries, their strife scores,
 the summary measures of deprivation and me-

diating conditions discussed below, and the data sources.

²⁰ The 48 deprivation measures, with only one statistically significant exception, were positively associated with strife, most of them at a relatively low level. The thirteen were selected with regard to their representativeness, relatively high correlations with the dependent variables, and low intercorrelations.

Intensity Score	Economic Discrimination
2	Most higher and some medium economic value positions are closed, or many specific
	classes of economic activity.
3	Most higher and most medium economic value positions are closed.

Almost all higher, medium, and some lower Most or all political elite positions and most 4

economic value positions are closed.

Political Discrimination

Most or all political elite positions are closed or most participatory activities, or some of both.

Most or all political elite positions and some participatory activities are closed.

or all participatory activities are closed.

(3) Potential separatism was indexed by multiplying the proportional size of historically-separatist regional or ethnic groups by a four-point intensity measure.21 The intensity of separatist deprivation was scored as follows:

Intensity Score

Type of Inferred Separatism

- The separatist region or group was incorporated in the polity by its own request or 1 mutual agreement.
- 2 The separatist region or group was assigned to the polity by international agreement or by fiat of a former colonial or governing power, except when (3) or (4) below holds.
- The separatist region or group was forcibly assimilated into the polity prior to the 3 twentieth century, or was forcibly conquered by a former colonial power prior to the twentieth century.
- The separatist region or group was forcibly assimilated into the polity during the twen-4 tieth century, or was forcibly reassimilated in the twentieth century after a period of autonomy due to rebellion or other circumstance.
- (4) Dependence on private foreign capital, indexed by negative net factor payments abroad as a percentage of Gross Domestic Product in the late 1950's, is assumed to be a chronic source of dissatisfaction in an era characterized by economic nationalism. The greater the proportion of national product that accrues to foreign suppliers of goods or capital, the greater the inferred intensity of deprivation; the extent of such deprivation was assumed equal to the proportion of population engaged in the monetary economy. The polity score is the extent score × the intensity score.22
- (5) Religious cleavages are a chronic source of deprivation-inducing conflict. The scale for intensity of religious cleavage takes account both of number of organized religious groups with two percent or more of total population (the major Christian and Muslim subdivisions are counted as separate groups) and of the duration of their coexistence, the greater that duration the less the inferred intensity. The extent measure is the proportion of the population belonging to any organized religious group. The polity score is the product of the two scores.
- (6) Lack of educational opportunity was indexed, in proportionality terms only, by subtracting primary plus secondary school enrollment ratios ca. 1960 from 100. Education is so widely regarded as an essential first step for individual socio-economic advancement that one can infer deprivation among the uneducated, and among the parents of children who cannot attend school if not ye among the children themselves.

Six indicators of persisting deprivation were combined to obtain a single long-run deprivation measure.

These six measures all had distributions approaching normality, and correlations with

21 Coding judgments for both discrimination indices and for separatism were made on the basis of country studies. The proportionality measures are versions of indices reported in Ted Gurr, New Error-Compensated Measures for Comparing Nations (Princeton: Center of International Studies, Princeton University, 1966), 67-90.

²² A crude measure of the proportion of each polity's population engaged in the monetary economy, to the nearest .10, was constructed for the purpose of weighting this and some other measures. The measure was based primarily on labor census data.

several strife measures ranging from .09 to .27 To combine them they were weighted to bring their means into approximate correspondence and each polity's scores added and the averaged to circumvent the missing dat problem.

Short-Term Deprivation: Any sharp increas in peoples' expectations that is unaccompanie by the perception of an increase in value capabilities, or any abrupt limitation on what the have or can hope to obtain, constitute relativ deprivation. We inferred that short-term, rela tive declines in system economic and politica performance were likely to be perceived aincreased deprivation for substantial number of people. Indices were devised of five kinds (short-term economic deprivation and two political deprivation.

- (1) Short-term trends in trade value, 1957-60 compared with 1950-57: The percentage change of trade value, exports +imports, for 1957-60 was compared with the rate for 1950-1957, and any relative decrease in the later period was treated as an indicator of short-term economic deprivation. Decreases were scaled so that polities with lower rates of increase in the earlier period received greater deprivation scores than those with high rates.
- (2) Short-term trends in trade value, 1960-63 compared with 1950-60: Procedures identical with (1), above, were used. Both measures were incorporated in the final analysis because both were markedly correlated with strife measures but had a relatively low intercorrelation of :18.23
- (3) Inflation 1960-63 compared with 1958-61: Data on cost-of-living indices were scaled and combined in such a way that the highest deprivation scores were assigned to polities with substantial and worsening inflation in the 1958-63 period, the lowest scores (0) to polities with stable or declining costs-oi-living throughout the period.
- (4) 1960-63 GNP growth rates compared with 1950's growth rate; Economic growth rate data were scaled so that polities having low rates in the 1950's and even lower rates in the early 1960's received the highest deprivation scores; those with moderate rates in the 1950's but substantial relative decline in the early 1960's received somewhat lower deprivation scores; and those with steadily high, or moderate but steadily increasing, rates received zero deprivation scores.
- (5) Adverse economic conditions 1960-63: To supplement aggregate data indicators of economic deprivation, several summary news sources were searched for evaluative statements about adverse internal economic conditions such as crop failures, unemployment, export market slumps, drought, etc. Each such description was coded on the following intensity and extent scales:

"Severity" (Intensity) Scores

"Proportion Affected" (Extent) Scores

Moderate One region or city, or a small economic sec-=0.2Substantial, or moderate and persisting for Several regions or cities, or several economic =2more than one year =0.5sectors Severe, or substantial and persisting for more Much of country, or several major or one =3=0.7than one year dominant economic sector Whole country, or all economic sectors Severe and persisting for more than one year =4=1.0

The score for each such condition is the product of the extent and intensity scores; the score for each polity for each year is the sum of the "condition" scores; and the score used for the summary index is the sum of annual scores for 1960 through 1963. The sources used were *Hispanic-American Report* for Latin America and the *Annual Register* for other polities.²⁴

- (6) New restrictions on political participation and representation by the regime were coded from the same sources for the same years. Seventeen types of action were defined on a priori grounds as value-depriving political restrictions, including harrassment and banning of parties of various sizes, banning of political activity, and improper dismissal of elected assemblies and executives. These were ranked on a nine-point intensity scale.²⁵ The extent measure was the politically-participatory proportion of the population, crudely estimated to the nearest .10 on the basis of voting participa-
- ²³ The two measures will be used in subsequent analyses to examine time-lag relationships between short-term economic deprivation and strife. The trade data, obtained primarily from United Nations sources, was converted to U.S. currency when necessary to maintain comparability over time.
- ²⁴ The *Hispanic-American Report* is much more comprehensive a source, hence the mean deprivation scores for Latin America were much higher than those for other polities. As a crude adjustment, the Latin American polity scores were divided by a constant so that their mean approximated that of other polities. The same procedure was followed for indices 6 and 7, below. Analyses of regional clusters of polities, not reported here, provide a check on the adequacy of the procedure.
- ²⁵ Types of restrictive actions, and their scale values, are as follows:

- 1 Amalgamation of splinter party with larger party
- 1 Restriction or harrassment of splinter party
- 2 Banning of splinter party
- 2 Amalgamation of minority party with larger party
- 2 Restriction or harrassment of minority party
- 3 Banning of minority party
- 3 Amalgamation of a major party with another major party.
- 3 Restriction or harrassment of major party
- 4 Banning of major party
- 4 Improper dismissal of regional representative body
- 4 Improper dismissal of elected regional executive
- 5 Ban on party activities, parties allowed to continue their organizational existence
- 5 Improper dismissal of national legislature, with provision for calling new one within a year
- 5 Improper dismissal of elected chief executive, with provision for replacement within a year
- 6 Dissolution of all parties, ban on all political activity
- 6 Improper dismissal of national legislature, no short-term provision for reestablishment
- 6 Improper dismissal of elected chief executive, no short term provision for reelection

tion levels and, in lieu of voting data, on the basis of urbanization and literacy levels. The score for each action identified is the product of the intensity and extent scores; the annual polity score the sum of "action" scores; and the summary index the sum of annual scores for 1960–63.

(7) New value-depriving policies of governments 1960-63 were defined as any new programs or actions that appeared to take away some significant proportion of attained values from a numerically or socially significant group, for example land reform, tax increases, restrictions on trade, limitations of civil liberties, restrictive actions against ethnic, religious, or economic groups, and so forth. Two aspects of such policies were taken into account in scaling for intensity: the degree of deprivation imposed, and their equality of application. The "degree of deprivation" scale values are: small = 1, moderate = 2, substantial = 3, most or all = 4. The "equality of application" scale values are: uniform = 1, discriminatory = 2. The intensity score is the product of values on these two scales. The most intensely depriving policies are assumed to be those intentionally discriminatory and designed to deprive the affected group of most or all the relevant value, e.g. seizure of all property of absentee landlords without compensation (score = 8). Deprivation is inferred to be least intense if the policy is uniformly applicable to all the affected class of citizens and deprives them of only a small part of the value, e.g. a five percent increase in corporation tax rates (score = 1). The extent measure is a crude estimate of the proportion of the adult population likely to be directly affected, the permissible values being .01, .02, .05, .10, .20, .40, .60, .80 and 1.00. The score for each policy identified is the product of the intensity and extent scores; the annual polity score the sum of "policy" scores; and the summary index the sum of annual scores for 1960-63. The sources are the same as for (6) and (7).26

Three summary short-term deprivation scores were calculated for each polity from these seven indices. The five economic variables were multiplied by constants so that their means were approximately equal and averaged to circumvent the missing-data problem. This is the "short-term economic deprivation" index referred to below. The summary measures of politically-related deprivation were similarly combined to obtain a summary "short-term political deprivation" measure. The two measures were then added to comprise a single "short-term deprivation" measure for the purposes of some subsequent analyses.

Measures of the Mediating Variables

Coercive Potential and Size of Coercive Forces: A composite index was constructed to take into account four aspects of the regime's apparent potential for controlling strife. Two of the component indices represent the manpower resources available to the regime, namely military and internal security forces participation ratios, i.e., military personnel per 10,000 adults ca. 1960 (n=112), and internal security forces per 10,000 adults (n=102). The two distributions were normalized and their means brought into correspondence by rescaling them using 10-interval geometric progressions. The other two component indices deal respectively with the degree of past loyalty of coercive forces to the regime, and the extent of illicit

²⁶ The annual scores for (5), (6), and (7) are being used in a series of time-lagged and crosspanel correlation analyses, not reported here, in further tests of causal relationships.

coercive-force participation in strife in the 1960-65 period.

The rationale for the five-point coerciveforce loyalty scale, below, is that the more recently coercive forces had attacked the regime, the less efficacious they would be perceived to be by those who might initiate strife—and the more likely they might be to do so again themselves. Countries were scored on the basis of information from a variety of historical sources.

Loyalty Score Regime Status and Military Attempts to Seize Control of the Regime

- 5 As of 1960 the polity or its metropolitan power had been autonomous for 25 years or more and had experienced no military intervention since 1910.
- As of 1960 the polity or its metropolitan power had been autonomous for 5 to 24 years and had experienced no military intervention during that period; or had been autonomous for a longer period but experienced military intervention between 1910 and 1934.
- The polity last experienced military intervention between 1935 and 1950, inclusive.
- The polity last experienced military intervention between 1951 and 1957, inclusive.
- 1 The polity last experienced military intervention between 1958 and 1960, inclusive.

For 28 polities that became independent after 1957 no "loyalty" score was assigned unless the military or police did in fact intervene between independence and the end of 1960. For purposes of calculating the summary score, below, a military loyalty score for these polities was derived from the "legitimacy" score.

Insofar as the military or police themselves illicitly initiated strife in the 1961-65 period, they lost all deterrent effect. To quantify the extent of such involvement, all military or police participation in strife was determined from the data bank of 1100 events and for each polity a "coercive forces strife participation" score calculated, by weighting each involvement in a mutiny or a turmoil event as one and each involvement in any other event (typically coups and civil wars) as two, and summing for each country.

All four of the "coercive potential" measures were correlated in the predicted direction with several preliminary measures of strife levels. The participation ratios had low but consistently negative correlations with strife; the "loyalty" and "strife participation" indices had correlations of the order of -40 and +40with strife respectively.27 The composite "coercive potential" score was calculated by the following formula:

Coercive potential =
$$10 \cdot \sqrt{\frac{L[2(HiR) + 1(loR)]}{1 + P}}$$

where

L="loyalty" score:

HiR = the higher of the scaled military and security forces participation ratios:28

loR = the lower of the participation ratios;

P="coercive forces strife participation" score.

The effect of the formula is to give the highest coercive potential scores to countries with large coercive forces characterized by both historical and concurrent loyalty to the regime. The more recently and extensively such

²⁷ These are product-moment correlation coefficients, the strife measures including measures of duration, pervasiveness, intensity, and total magnitude of strife for 1961-65. The last two strife measures are defined differently from those employed in the present analysis, but are derived from the same 1100-event data bank.

28 If one or the other ratio was missing, it was assumed equal to the known ratio. Internal security force ratios for 94 polities are reported in Gurr, New Error-Compensated Measures for Comparing Nations, 111-126.

forces have been involved in strife, however. the lower their coercive potential score.

A second coercion measure was included in the final analysis to permit a further test of the curvilinearity hypothesis. The measure used is the expression in brackets in the coercive potential formula above, i.e., a weighted measure of the relative sizes of military and internal security forces (coercive force size).

Institutionalization: Indices of institutional strength and stability which I found in previous analyses to be negatively associated with strife are the ratio of labor union membership to nonagricultural employment, central government budgeted expenditure as a percentage of Gross Domestic Product, ca. 1962, and the stability of the political party system.29 A ten-interval geometric progression was used to normalize the first of these indices, the second was multiplied by 100 and rounded to the nearest 10. To index characteristics of party systems two scales were used, one relating to the number of parties, the other to party system stability per se:

No. of parties score Characteristics

0	no parties, or all parties illegal or ineffective
1	one or several parties, mem- bership sharply restricted on ascriptive bases (typi- cally along ethnic lines) to less than twenty percent of the population
2	one party with no formal or substantial informal re- strictions on memberships
3	one party dominant
4	two-party (reasonable ex- pectation of party rota- tion)
5	multi-party

Party system

stability score Party System Characteristics

no parties, or membership restricted on ascriptive bases to less than twenty percent of population

1 unstable

29 The first two indices are reported in ibid., 33-66, 91-110. Correlations among all three and strife measures are reported in Gurr and Ruttenberg, The Conditions of Civil Violence, passim. The party characteristics are recoded from Arthur S. Banks and Robert B. Textor. A Cross-Polity Survey (Cambridge: MIT Press, 1963), raw characteristics 41 and 43.

Party system stability score	Party System Characteristics
2	all parties relatively new (founder after 1945), long-range stability not yet ascertainable
3	moderately stable

Scores on these two scales were combined on an 8-point scale using party stability as the primary indicator of institutionalization but giving highest scores at each stability level to systems with larger numbers of party structures.

The summary institutionalization measure was constructed using this formula:

Institutionalization = 3 (hiI) + 2 (midI) + loI,

where hiI=the highest of the three institutionalization scores, etc. This procedure gives greatest weight to the most institutionalized sector of society on the assumption that high institutionalization in one sector compensates for lower levels in others. The highest scores are attained by the Eastern European Communist states while the scores of the Western European democracies are slightly lower. The lowest-scoring polities are Ethiopia, Haiti, Nepal, and Yemen.

Facilitation: Two aspects of facilitation were indexed separately: past levels of civil strife and "social and structural facilitation" per se. The "past levels of strife" measure was derived from the Eckstein data on frequency of internal wars of various types in the period 1946-59; although its reliability is only moderate it covers a longer period and a larger number of polities than other available data.30 Data were collected for those of the 114 polities not included in the Eckstein tabulation, using the same procedure, a New York Times Index count, and recollected for a few others. Weights were assigned to events in various categories, e.g. riots=1, coups=5, and a summary score for each polity calculated. The distribution was normalized with a log (X+1) transformation.

The terrain and transportation network of a country constitute a basic structural limitation on the capabilities of insurgents for maintaining a durable insurrection. A complex "inaccessibility" index was constructed taking account of the extent of transportation net-

²⁰ Harry Eckstein, "Internal War: The Problem of Anticipation," in Ithiel de Sola Pool et al., Social Science Research and National Security (Washington, D.C.: Smithsonian Institution, March 5, 1963).

works related to area, population density, and the extent of waste, forest, and mountainous terrain; the highest inaccessibility scores were received by polities like Bolivia, Sudan, and Yemen, which have limited transportation networks and large portions of rugged terrain.³¹

A crucial "social" variable that facilitates strife is the extent to which the discontented can and do organize for collective action. The relative strength of Communist Party organizations was used as a partial index, taking into account both the number of party members per 10,000 population and the status of the party. Unfortunately no comparable data could be obtained for extremist parties of the right. Party-membership ratios were rescaled to an 11-point scale based on a geometric progression of 2. The party status scale, below, is based on the premise that illegal parties are more facilitative of strife because their membership is likely, because of the exigencies of repression, to be more dedicated, better organized, and committed to the more violent forms of conflict. Factionalized parties are assumed to be more facilitative because they offer more numerous organizational foci for action.

Score Communist party status and characteristics

- 0 In power or nonexistent.
- Out of power; no serious factionalization or multiple organization; party permitted to participate in electoral activities.
- 2 Out of power; multiple factions or organizations; party permitted to participate in electoral activities.
- 3 Out of power; party excluded from electoral activities but other party activities tolerated.
- 4 Out of power; no serious factionalization or multiple organization; party illegal and/or actively suppressed.
- 5 Out of power; multiple factions or organizations; party illegal and/or actively suppressed.

The score for each polity is the scaled membership ratio times the party status score.

The third measure of facilitation is the extent of external support for initiators of strife in the 1961-65 period. Each strife event in the 1100-event data bank was coded for the degree of support for initiators (if any) and for the

³¹ Inaccessibility appears to be an almost-butnot-quite necessary condition for protracted internal wars. With one exception all such internal wars in the post-1945 period occurred in polities with high or very high scores on this index; the exception, a notable one, is Cuba.

number of nations supporting the initiators in any of these ways. The scale points for "degree of support" are provision of arms and supplies (=1), refuge (=2), facilities and training (=3), military advisors and mercenaries (=4), and large (1,000+) military units (=5). The event support score is the "degree" score times the "number of nations" score. these scores then being summed for all events for each polity to obtain a polity score. This measure alone has a relatively high correlation with strife level measures, ranging from .3 to .4; its two extreme outliers, South Vietnam and the Congo, are also among the three extreme outliers on the total magnitude of strife distribution.

The three social and structural facilitation measures were weighted to bring their means into approximate correspondence, several missing-data items estimated, and the weighted measures added to obtain the composite index.

Legitimacy: The legitimacy of a regime can be defined behaviorally in terms of popular compliance, and psychologically by reference to the extent to which its directives are regarded by its citizens as properly made and worthy of obedience. In lieu of evidence on compliance or allegiance necessary to operationalize the concept directly, I combined one indicator of an inferred cause of legitimacy, the circumstances under which the regime attained its present form, with an indicator of an inferred effect, the durability of the regime. The "character" of the regime was scored on a seven-point scale:

Character Score Origins of national political institutions

- 7 Institutions are wholly or primarily accretive and autochthinous; reformations, if any, had indigenous roots (although limited foreign elements may have been assimilated into indigenous institutions).
- 6 Institutions are a mixture of substantial autochthinous and foreign elements, e.g. polities with externally-derived parliamentary and/or bureaucratic systems grafted to a traditional monarchy.
- 5 Institutions are primarily foreign in origin, were deliberately chosen by indigenous leaders, and have been adapted over time to indigenous political conditions. (By adaptation is meant either the

Character Score Origins of national political institutions

> modification of regime institutions themselves or development of intermediate institutions to incorporate politically the bulk of the population.)

- 4 Institutions are primarily foreign in origin, have been
 adapted over time to indigenous political conditions, but
 were inculcated under the
 tutelage of a foreign power
 rather than chosen by indigenous leaders of their own
 volition.
- 3 Institutions are primarily foreign in origin, were deliberately chosen by indigenous leaders, but have *not* been adapted over time to indigenous political conditions.
- 2 Institutions are primarily foreign in origin, were inculcated under the tutelage of a foreign power, and have not been adapted to indigenous political conditions.
- Institutions are imposed by, and maintained under threat of sanctions by, foreign powers (including polities under colonial rule as of 1965).

A similar scale, based on the number of generations the regime had persisted as of 1960 without substantial, abrupt reformation, was constructed for durability:

Durability Score Last major reformation of institutions before 1960

7	More	than	eight	generations
	befo	re 196	0 (bef	ore 1800).

- 6 Four to eight generations (1801-1880).
- 5 Two to four generations (1881–1920).
- 4 One to two generations (1921–1940).
- 3 One-half to one generation (1941-1950).
- 2 One-quarter to one-half generation (1951-1955).
- 1 Institutions originated between 1956 and 1960, or were in 1960 in the process of transition.

Examples of coding decisions about "major reformations" are that France experienced such a change in 1957; that most French tropical African polities date their basic institutional structures from the 1946 reforms, not the year of formal independence; that the Canadian regime dates from 1867, when dominion status was attained; and that many Latin American regimes, despite performance of musical chairs at the executive level, attained their basic institutional structures at various (historically specified and coded) points in the mid- or late nineteenth century.

The summary legitimacy index was constructed by summing and rescaling the "character" and "durability" scores.³²

III. RESULTS OF CORRELATION AND REGRESSION ANALYSIS

The results of four multiple regression analyses are discussed in this paper, one of them in detail. The dependent variables in the four analyses are, respectively, total magnitude of civil strife, magnitude of conspiracy, magnitude of internal war, and magnitude of turmoil. The correlations between the ten summary independent variables and these four strife measures are given in Table I. The independent variables all correlate with the dependent variables in the predicted direction, with the exception of coercive force size. The r's for the remaining nine independent variables are significant at the .01 level except for four correlates of internal war, three of which are significant at the .05 level.

The hypothetical curvilinear relationship between coercive force size and total magnitude of strife (TMCS) is examined graphically in Figures 2 and 3, each of which is a smoothed curve of deciles of the independent variable plotted against TMCS. Figure 2, based on all 114 polities, suggests an apparent tendency, among countries with relatively small forces, for strife to increase with the size of those forces, and also a slight increase in TMCS at very high levels of coercive forces.³³ It is quite

32 The following rescaling was used, the sum of the "durability" and "character" scores being given on the upper line, the final legitimacy score on the lower:

Sum: 3,4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13,14 Legitimacy: 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9

33 The S-shape of this relationship is considerably more pronounced when coercive-force size is related to total magnitude of turmoil; see Ted Gurr, "Why Urban Disorder? Perspectives from the Comparative Study of Civil Strife," American Behavioral Scientist, 10 (March-April 1968).

likely that countries with protracted political violence expand their coercive forces to meet it. It also seems likely that armies in countries facing foreign threats cause less dissatisfaction—by their presence or actions—than armies in states not significantly involved in international conflict. Both factors might contaminate the proposed curvilinear relationship, so countries with either or both characteristics were removed and the relationship plotted for the remaining 69 countries; the results, in Figure 3, show curvilinearity even more distinctly. Figure 4 indicates that the measure of coercive force potential, in which size is weighted for military loyalty to the regime, is essentially linear, as predicted. The latter measure is used in the multiple regression analyses, below.

Eight of the ten independent variables (excluding coercive force size and short-term deprivation, the sum of the two specific shortterm deprivation measures) are included in the multiple regression analyses summarized in Table 2. The variables yield considerable and significant multiple correlation coefficients (R), including a high R of .806 for total magnitude of strife ($R^2 = .650$); a moderately high R for conspiracy of .630 ($R^2 = .397$); a similar R for internal war of .648 ($R^2 = .420$); and a somewhat lower R for turmoil of .533 ($R^2 = .284$).³⁴ There are several possible explanations for the finding that total magnitude of strife is accounted for nearly twice as well as the several forms of strife. One technical factor is that all the class-of-strife measures have greater distributional irregularities than does TMCS.

34 Significant computational errors in internal war and TMCS scores of several countries were identified and corrected after completion of the analyses reported here. Robert van den Helm of Princeton University has analyzed the corrected data, using the combined short-term deprivation measure in lieu of the two separate measures, with these multiple regression results: for TMCS. $R^2 = .638$; conspiracy, $R^2 = .391$; internal war, $R^2 = .472$; and turmoil, $R^2 = .284$. The significant increase in the degree of explanation for internal war is the result of increased correlations between magnitude of internal war and short-term deprivation (from .28 in Table 1 to .34); facilitation (from .57 to .61); and legitimacy (from -.23 to -.26). The r between magnitudes of turmoil and internal war increases from .17 to .23, the r between TMCS and internal war from .79 to .86. No other results of the analyses reported here are significantly affected by the reanalysis. The actual TMCS scores shown in Table 3 are corrected ones.

TABLE 1. CORRELATES OF CIVIL STRIFE²

												_			_
Variable ^b	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	11	12	13	14	
1 Economic deprivation (+)		48	83	-02	-17	-16	- 36	-09	<u>26</u>	32	34	31	25	44	
2 Political			88	08	-18	03	-37	-20	. 33	27	44	18	30	38	
deprivation (+) 3 Short-term				04	-20	-07	-42	-17	34	34	46	28	32	48	
deprivation (+)° 4 Persisting							14			17	29	26	27	36	
deprivation $(+)$ 5 Legitimacy $(-)$						25	48	02	-05	-15	-29	-23	-29	-37	
6 Coercive force size ((±))					53	27	31	04	-23	-11	-01	-14	
7 Coercive potential ((-))						41	-14	-37	-44	-39	-35	- 51	
8 Institutionalization	(-	-)							-19	<u>-40</u>	İ		-26		
9 Past strife levels (-	+)									41	24	16	30	30	
10 Facilitation (+)											42	57	30	67	
11 Magnitude of consp	nira	LCX										30	32	59]
11 Magmidae of comp	,,,,,,	ooy.										-			
12 Magnitude of inter	nal	war		•									17	79	
13 Magnitude of turm	oil													61	
14 Total magnitude of	f st	rife													

^a Product moment correlation coefficients, multiplied by 100. Underlined r's are significant, for n=114, at the .01 level. Correlations between 18 and 23, inclusive, are significant at the .05 level.

hence TMCS should be somewhat better explained. It is also possible that the categorization employed has less empirical merit than other work has suggested, i.e., that conspiracy, internal war, and turmoil are not sharply distinct forms of civil strife. To qualify this possibility, the correlation matrix in Table 1 suggests that the forms of strife are only weakly related in magnitude—the highest r among the three is .32—but it may still be that they are more strongly related in likelihood, and hence that the universe of strife is more homogenous than the typology suggests. The least-predicted class of strife—turmoil—might be better accounted for if turmoil events in the context

of internal wars, e.g., riots and localized rebellions in such polities as the Congo and South Vietnam, were categorized as aspects of the internal wars in these countries rather than turmoil per se. The most likely substantive interpretation of the relatively low predictability of turmoil, however, is that much turmoil is a response to a variety of locally-incident deprivations and social conditions of a sort not represented in the indices used in this study.

The multiple regression equation for total magnitude of strife was used to calculate predicted magnitude of strife scores. Only ten polities have predicted scores that differ from

^b The proposed relationships between the independent variables, nos. 1 to 10, and the strife measures are shown in parentheses, the \pm for coercive force size signifying a proposed curvilinear relationship. Examination of the r's between the independent and dependent variables, in the box, shows that all are in the predicted direction with the anticipated exception of coercive force size, and that all but one are significant at the .05 level.

[•] Short-term deprivation is the sum of scores on the short-term economic and short-term political deprivation measures. The separate short-term deprivation measures were used in the regression analyses reported below; the summary measure was used in the causal inference analysis.




Fig. 2. Magnitude of civil strife and coercive force size, 114 polities.

their actual scores by more than one standard deviation (7.70 units of TMCS). These polities, and three others that have discrepancies approaching one standard deviation, are listed in Table 3.

In five of the thirteen polities—the Congo. Indonesia, Zambia, Rwanda, and Yementhere is probably systematic error from dataestimation procedures. All of these countries had intense but inadequately-reported civil violence for which only rough and quite possibly exaggerated estimates of deaths were available. When estimates of "wounded" were added to deaths estimates, using a ratio of about twelve to one based on better-reported but smallerscale events (see above), the result was almost certainly a gross inflation of actual casualties, and hence inflation of TMCS scores. The high actual TMCS score for Israel is the result of a questionable coding judgment about the extent and duration of extremist Orthodox religious conflict. More substantive questions are raised by some of the countries. Paraguay, Argentina, Ecuador, and Volta all could be argued to have had an unrealized potential for




Fig. 3. Magnitude of civil strife and coercive force size, 69 low-conflict polities.

strife: in fact both Argentina and Ecuador experienced coups in the mid-1960's that according to their initiators were preventive or protective in nature, and early in 1966 the government of Volta succumbed to rioting followed by a coup. In the Dominican Republic, the Congo, and Rwanda the unexpectedly high levels of violence followed the collapse of rigid, authoritarian regimes; one can infer a time-lag effect from the deprivation incurred under the old regimes. These are special explanations rather than general ones however. The lack of apparent substantive similarities among the thirteen poorly-predicted polities suggests that the analysis has included measures of most if not all the general determinants of magnitudes of civil strife.

IV. A REVISED CAUSAL MODEL

One striking result of the regression analyses is that the partial correlations of several of the variables tend to disappear when the other variables are introduced (see Table 2). The short-term deprivation measures consistently decline in consequence, in most instances falling below the .05 level of significance. Institutionalization is in all analyses controlled for by




Fig. 4. Magnitude of civil strife and coercive potential.

Note: The vertical axes in Figures 2, 3 and 4 give the average magnitude of civil strife scores for deciles of countries with coercive forces of increasing size (Figures 2 and 3) and for deciles of countries with increasingly large coercive forces relative to their loyalty. The range of TMCS scores for the 114 polities is 0.0 to 48.7, their mean 9.0, and their standard deviation 7.7. Units on the horizontal axes represent numbers of cases, not proportional increases in force size/loyalty; the figures represent the scores of the extreme cases. Eleven rather than ten groupings of cases were used in computations for Figures 2 and 4; the curves of all three figures were smoothed by averaging successive pairs of decile scores.

TABLE 2. MULTIPLE LINEAR REGRES	SSION RESULTS:
SIMPLE CORRELATIONS, PARTIAL CORRELATIONS	, AND STANDARD WEIGHTS

Dependent	Independent Variables											
Variables	Econ. Dep.	Pol. Dep.	Per. Dep.	Coerce	Instit.	Past CS	SS Facil.	Legit.	R, R2			
Total Magnitude												
of Strife:	44		36] -	33	30	-67	-37				
Simple r's Partial r's	24	(09)	39	-51 -17	(07)	(04)	55	-37 -26	R = .806			
Constant	- 3.11	(09)	09	-17	(07)	(04)	95		R ==.800			
Weights	.177	.066	.271	140	.056	.024	.481	184	R= =.650			
Magnitude of	•											
Conspiracy:		1					į					
Simple r's	34	44	29	-44	-35	24	42	-29				
Partial r's	(10)	24	22	(-11)	(-09)	(03)	19	(-15)	R = .630			
Constant	1.10											
Weights	.094	.238	.194	120	088	.026	.181	135	$R^2 = .397$			
Magnitude of In-												
ternal War:	Ì											
Simple r's	31	18	26	-39	-23	16	57	-23				
Partial r's	(14)	(-08)	22	-17	(11)	(-07)	48	(-07)	R = .648			
Constant	- 3.66											
Weights	.128	073	.186	179	. 102	066	.513	063	R= .420			
Magnitude of												
Turmoil:						Ì						
Simple r's	25	30	27	-35	-26	30	30	-29				
Partial r's	(07)	(08)	23	(-09)	(05)	21	(04)	-19	R = .533			
Constant	1.37	`=-/			,,		` ′	1	_			
Weights	.072	.085	.223	102	056	.205	.043	192	R2 = .284			

a Simple correlations from Table 1 are repeated here to facilitate comparisons. Partial correlations in parentheses have standard (beta) weights that are significant at less than the .05 level, using the one-tailed T test with n =114. Since this analysis is concerned with what is, effectively, the entire universe of polities, all the correlations are in one sense "significant," but those in parentheses are of substantially less consequence than the others. The weights are reported to facilitate comparisons of the relative importance of the independent variables; because of the use of a variety of scaling and combination procedures for both independent and dependent variables, the weights do not permit direct interpretations, for example, of the effects of a one-unit decrease in intensity of economic discrimination on extent of turmoil.

the other variables. One or the other of the two facilitation variables declines to zero in each analysis, "past levels of strife" vanishing in three of the four. Coercive potential and legitimacy also decline in their relation to strife rather sharply. The only variable that is consistently unaffected by the introduction of the control variables specified by the model is persisting deprivation. A preliminary analysis of the behavior of first- and second-order partials suggests what causal interactions and sequences may be involved in these results. The causal path analysis is concerned principally with the sources of the total magnitude of strife, examining the causal sequences of the the specific forms of strife only when they appear to deviate from that of all strife.

A basic supposition for the evaluation of causal models is that, if X_1 is an indirect cause of X_3 whose effects are mediated by an intervening variable X_2 , then if X_2 's effects are controlled the resulting partial correlation between X_1 and X_3 should be approximately

zero. Similarly, if several intervening variables are specified, controlling for all of them or for the last in a causal chain should, if the causal model is not to be falsified, result in a partial correlation not significantly different from zero.³⁵

The initial model of the causes of civil strife (Figure 1) postulated that all the mediating

about causal inference are well summarized in Blalock, Causal Inferences..., Chapters 2 and 3. A partial correlation coefficient can be most easily regarded as the correlation between X and Z after the portions of X and Z that are accounted for by Y are removed, or held constant. The results discussed below are based on the use of only one of a variety of related causal inference techniques and are open to further, more refined analysis and interpretation. For other applicable approaches see, for example, Hayward R. Alker, Jr., Mathematics and Politics (New York: Macmillan, 1965), Chapters 5 and 6.

variables intervened separately and simultaneously between deprivation and strife. The results indicate that this supposition is only partly correct: none of the mediating variables appear to affect the relationship between persisting deprivation and strife, i.e., there is a certain inevitability about the association between such deprivation and strife. Persisting deprivation is moreover equally potent as a source of conspiracy, internal war, and turmoil. With the partial and weak exception of institutionalization, no patterns of societal arrangements nor coercive potential that are included in the model have any consistent effect on its impact.

The effects of short-term deprivation on strife are substantially different—and, it should be added, uncorrelated with persisting deprivation. The intervening variables do tend to control for short-term deprivation's effects. To determine which one or ones exercise primary control, first-order partials were calculated for the several postulated intervening variables, with these results.

- The simple r between short-term deprivation and strife = .48³⁶
- 2) The partial r between short term able is: deprivation and strife is:

.46	Institutionalization
.45	Legitimacy
.42	Past strife
.36	Facilitation
.34	Coercive potential

Only the last two constitute a significant reduction, and moreover when they are combined, the second-order partial, $r_{ds} \cdot f_{cs} = .27$, i.e., coercive potential and facilitation are the only consequential intervening variables affecting the outcome of short-term deprivation. Short-term deprivation taken alone accounts for $(.48)^2 = .23$ of the magnitude of strife; controlling for coercive potential and facilitation reduces the proportion of strife directly accounted for to $(.27)^2 = .07$, a relatively small but still significant amount.

The same controlling effects of coercive potential and facilitation on short-term deprivation occur among the three generic forms of strife. It is worth noting that when the mediating variables are controlled, short-term economic deprivation still accounts directly for a

³⁶ To simplify evaluation of the effects of the control variables, the summary short-term deprivation variable was employed rather than its economic and political components separately.

portion of strife, internal war in particular, while political deprivation contributes significantly to conspiracy. These relationships may reflect contamination of the independent and dependent variables because of their partial temporal overlap. Some short-term economic deprivation in the early 1960's may be attributable to protracted internal wars, and successful conspirators may impose politically-depriving policies once they are in power. The relationship between short-term deprivation of both types and the magnitude of turmoil, however, is effectively mediated or controlled by characteristics of the society and its response to strife.

The relationships among the mediating variables remain to be examined. Institutionalization has no significant relation to any measure of strife when the other variables are controlled, and in the case of magnitude of total strife and of internal war a weak positive relationship emerges, i.e., there is a slight though not statistically significant tendency for high institutionalization to be associated with higher levels of strife. A computation of partials between institutionalization and the other three mediating variables indicates that institutionalization has a preceding or causal relationship both to coercive potential and to the facilitation variables, as shown in the

TABLE 3. POLITIES WITH LEAST-PREDICTED TOTAL MAGNITUDE OF CIVIL STRIFE^a

***************************************			A-100.
Polity	Predicted TMCS	Actual TMCS ^b	Residual
Congo-			
Kinshasa	31.6	48.7	+17.1
Rwanda	12.7	28.2	+15.5
Yemen	9.4	23.6	+14.2
Indonesia	23.8	33.7	+9.9
Dominican			
Republic	12.1	21.9	+ 9.8
Italy	3.1	12.3	+9.2
Belgium	2.4	10.5	+ 8.1
Zambia	8.1	15.5	+7.4
Israel	6.9	14.0	+ 7.1
Argentina	20.5	13.2	-7.3
Ecuador	18.6	10.1	-8.5
Volta	9.3	0.0	-9.3
Paraguay	17.2	5.0	-12.2

^a See text. A negative residual indicates that a polity had less strife than would be predicted on the basis of the characteristics it shares with other polities; a positive residual indicates more than predicted strife.

^b Corrected scores. See footnote 34.

revised model in Figure 3. Polities with high Mevels of institutionalization tend to have high coercive potential and to have few of the conditions that facilitate strife.

Legitimacy apparently has a causal relationship with strife independent either of deprivation or the other intervening variables. About half of the initial correlation between legitinacy and strife is accounted for by the apparent causal relation between legitimacy and coercive potential, i.e., legitmate regimes tend to have large and, most importantly, loyal nilitary and police establishments. Separately rom this, however, high legitimacy is signifieantly associated with low levels of strife, a inding consistent with the postulate that political legitimacy itself is a desired value, one whose absence constitutes a deprivation that ncites men to take violent action against their egimes. The relationship is relatively strongst for total magnitude of strife, less so for urmoil and conspiracy, and inconsequential or internal war.

Coercive potential appears in several repects to be a crucial variable in the revised ausal model: it is evidently attributable in art to both levels of institutionalization and f legitimacy, and has a major mediating effect n short-term deprivation. Nonetheless, when Il variables are controlled (see Table 2), the artial r between coercive potential and strife sharply reduced, in two instances below the)5 level of significance. This is in part due to he effects of legitimacy, which is causally nked to both strife and coercive potential.³⁷ he other major intervening variable is faciliution $(r_{cs} = -.52; r_{cs-f} = -.40, \text{ where } c =$ percive potential, s=strife, and f=social and ructural facilitation), i.e., whether or not -cilitative conditions exist for civil strife is artly dependent upon the coercive potential the regime, and thus indirectly dependent oon legitimacy as well. (The relationship is ridently between coercive potential on the

Analysis of the correlation coefficients does of indicate definitively that legitimacy contriites to coercive potential rather than vice versa; or would it be impossible to argue, on the basis of e partial r's alone, that short-term deprivation a weak intervening variable between coercive of on the other. It is the plausibility of the eoretical arguments, in each case, that gives reciding force to the interpretation proposed. For comparable argument see Hugh Donald Forbes id Edward R. Tufte, "A Note of Caution in ausal Modelling," elsewhere in this issue of this




Fig. 5. Revised causal model of the determinants of magnitude of civil strife. The proportion at the top of each cell is the simple r² between the variable and civil strife, i.e. the proportion of strife accounted for by each variable separately. The percentages are the proportion of explained variance accounted for by each variable when the effects of all others are controlled, determined by squaring each partial r, summing the squares, and expressing each as a percentage of the sum. The explained variance, R², is .65.

one hand and the "Communist party status" and the "external support for initiators" components of facilitation on the other; coercive potential cannot have any consequential effects on "physical inaccessibility.")

This completes the revision of the causal model with the exception of the second component of facilitation, past strife levels. This variable has a consistently lower relationship with strife than other variables, with the exception of the turmoil analysis. Moreover its partial correlation is reduced to zero in these analyses, with the same exception, the sole significant controlling variable being social and structural facilitation. Among the causes of turmoil, however, social and structural facilitation is controlled for by several variablesprincipally past strife, coercive potential, and institutionalization-whereas past strife remains significant when other effects are partialled out. Both findings support the theoretical argument that suggested the "past strife" measure: a history of chronic strife apparently reflects, and contributes to, attitudes that directly facilitate future turmoil, and indirectly acts to facilitate general levels of strife.

The revised model, with proportional weights inserted, is sketched in Figure 5. The most proximate and potent variable is social and structural facilitation, which accounts for nearly half the explained variance. The deprivation variables account directly for over one-third the magnitude of strife, legitimacy and

institutionalization for one-eighth. But these proportions refer only to direct effects, and in the case of both coercive potential and facilitation part of that direct effect, i.e., the illicit participation of the military in strife and the provision of foreign support for initiators, can be determined only from the characteristics of strife itself.38 The more remote causes of strife, namely deprivation, institutionalization, legitimacy, and prior strife, are the more fundamental and persisting ones. Some additional regression analyses provide some comparisons. Four of the independent variables relate to inferred states of mind: the two short-term deprivation measures, persisting deprivation, and legitimacy. The R based on these variables is .65, compared with .81 when the remaining four variables are added. The R based on the three deprivation variables alone is .60. These analyses show that all "states-of-mind" conditions contribute significantly to magnitude of strife, but that long-term deprivation has a partial controlling effect on political deprivation. The inference is that short-term political deprivation, as indexed in this study, is most likely to lead to strife if it summates with conditions of persisting deprivation.

We can also ask, and answer, the question, To what extent do the remaining four mediating conditions alone account for magnitude of strife? The variables coercive potential, facilitation, institutionalization, and past strife give a multiple R of .73, with almost all the explained variance accounted for by the first two variables. This result should provide aid and comfort to those concerned with "levels of analysis" problems: research of this sort can focus on aggregative, societal characteristicswhich the mediating variables represent—and the (inferred) psychological level can be ignored with relatively little loss of statistical explanatory power. Why these variables are strongly operative and others, like levels of development and type of political system, are relatively weak still needs answering; the answer may be to treat psychological variables

³⁸ Tanter has examined time-lag effects between a number of measures of foreign economic and military assistance for the regime and magnitude of civil violence in 1961-63 for Latin American nations and finds generally weak relationships. The only consequential positive relationship, an indirect one, is between levels of U.S. military assistance and subsequent strife. Raymond Tanter, "Toward A Theory of Conflict Behavior in Latin America." (Paper read to the International Political Science Association, Brussels, September, 1967).

as unoperationalized assumptions, or to replace them with variables whose rationale is strictly in terms of effects of social structure or processes on stability.

A further problem is identification of the set of variables that provides the most parsimonious account of magnitude of civil strife As one approach to the answer, Figure ! implies that three variables can be eliminated coercive potential, institutionalization, and past strife, all of which have no consequentia direct effects on TMCS. The remaining five variables—the "state of mind" variables and facilitation-give an R of .80 and R2 of .64 results almost identical to those obtained whe all eight variables are included.39 Four of the five variables included contribute substantiall to the regression equation; as expected, th effects of short-term deprivation, politicadeprivation in particular, are partially controlled. One important observation is than social and structural facilitation, though it is substantially the strongest explanatory vari able,40 has here, as in Figure 5, only a moderat direct controlling effect on short-term depr. vation. One interpretation is that some of the effects of facilitation on TMCS are indeper dent of deprivation. Two of its three con ponent measures, Communist Party statu and external support for initiators, have is common a "tactical" element, i.e., one cainfer that underlying them are calculation about gains to be achieved through the er ployment of strife. This tactical element is no wholly independent of deprivation, ina much as three of the four correlations betwee facilitation and deprivation measures a significant, ranging from .17 to .34 (see Tab 1). The basic proposition of this study, the relative deprivation is a necessary precondition for strife, is not challenged by these obse vations. They do, however, suggest th tactical motives for civil strife are of sufficie: importance that they deserve separate ope ational attention comparable to the co ceptual attention given them by confli theorists.41

³⁹ In a reanalysis using corrected data (ε footnote 34), four variables—the combined shower deprivation measure, persisting deprivation legitimacy, and facilitation—given an R² of .62

⁴⁰ The partial r's for these five variables as economic deprivation, .27; political deprivation.13; persisting deprivation, .39; legitimacy, .3 facilitation, .61.

41 For example Kenneth E. Boulding, Confi and Defense: A General Theory (New York: H.» per and Row, 1962); Lewis Coser, The Function A number of additional causal inference analyses can be made which might lead to modifications of these conclusions, and of the causal model in Figure 5. Other articles will report the results of causal analyses of various subsets of the universe of polities, and of the causal sequences that can be identified for the several forms of strife.⁴²

V. SUMMARY AND CONCLUSION

Quantitative comparative research cannot flourish in a theoretical vacuum, even if it makes use of an armamentarium of techniques of causal inference. This article may not be proof of that assertion, but it should suggest the usefulness of beginning with a theoretical model based on previous substantive work. The theoretical model of the causes of civil strife employed here dictated the construction of a number of aggregate indicators of noteasily-operationalized variables for 114 polities. Eight summary indicators proved to account mointly for two-thirds the variance among nations in relative magnitudes of civil strife luring 1961-65 ($R^2 = .65$). Of greater theoetical consequence, the initial analysis of partial correlation coefficients makes possible a number of more precise statements about the causal interactions among the theoretical rariables.

The fundamental proposition that strife aries directly in magnitude with the inensity of relative deprivation is strongly upported; the three deprivation variables Ione provide an R of .60 ($R^2 = .36$), and when . fourth state-of-mind variable, legitimacy, is dded the R2 increases to .43. One criticism of is research, and of other cross-national budies of strife that make inferences about *ollective manifestations of psychological ariables, is that the results are not a "direct" est of the relevance of such variables, since ie indices of psychological variables are erived from aggregate data rather than being btained, for example, from cross-national sureys. It is unquestionably necessary to test all ypotheses, including psychological ones, in a ariety of ways, for example to determine

whether the inferentially-deprived groups are those most likely to engage in strife, and to ask highly frustrated individuals whether they would, or have, taken part in collective violence. No scientific proposition is ever directly confirmed or disconfirmed, but some tests are less indirect than others. However, there is only one scientifically acceptable alternative to regarding the results reported here as strong indirect evidence for the psychological propositions relating deprivation and legitimacy to civil violence. That is to provide some reasonably parsimonious, alternative explanations (substantive or technical) of the fact that indices of inferred collective states of mind account for two-thirds of the explained variance (43 percent compared with 65 percent for all variables) in total magnitude of strife.

The effects of the intervening or mediating variables on the disposition to civil violence proved considerably more complex than those of the deprivation variables. Regime legitimacy apparently has no consequential mediating effect on deprivation but acts much as deprivation itself does: low levels of legitimacy, or by inference feelings of illegitimacy, apparently motivate men to collective violence. Levels of institutionalization, as reflected in high levels of unionization, party system stability, and large public sectors, have no direct mediating effect on deprivation; they are however important determinants of coercive potential and of social facilitation, variables which in turn crucially affect the outcome of short-term deprivation. Social and structural facilitation is the most potent of the intervening variables and appears to have some independent effect on magnitudes of strife. One inference is that the index of this variable reflects tactical decisions to engage in strife as a means of goal attainment. The measure of past levels of strife, 1946-1959, provides a partial test of what might be called the null hypotheses of human conflict, that the best predictor of future conflict is the level of past conflict.43 The measure has relatively weak relationships with magnitude of strife measures for 1961-65 and is an important mediating variable only among the causes of turmoil.

One striking finding is that nations' levels of persisting deprivation are consistently and directly related to their levels of strife. Depri-

⁴³ The test is less than precise because the measures are not comparable; the past strife measure is based on an arbitrary weighting of counts of number of events, whereas the magnitude of strife measures reflect levels of participation, duration, and intensity.

Social Conflict (New York: The Free Press,)56); and Thomas C. Schelling, The Strategy of conflict (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University ress, 1960).

⁴² See Gurr, "Why Urban Disorder?" for a susal inference analysis of the sources of turmoil. ■he turmoil model differs principally in that past strife levels" has the primary mediating le that facilitation has in the TMCS model.

vation attributable to such conditions as discrimination, political separatism, economic dependence, and religious cleavages tends to contribute at a relatively moderate but constant rate to civil strife whatever may be done to encourage, deter, or divert it, short only of removing its underlying conditions. One other result has important implications for theory, and also for policy, if it is supported by further research. The relation between coercive force size (the relative size of military and internal security forces) and the magnitude of civil violence is distinctly curvilinear: as the level of resources devoted to coercive

forces increases, the magnitude of violence also tends to increase up to a certain point, and only at relatively high levels of coercive force does strife tend to decline. Moreover at the outer limit the relationship again tends to change direction: countries with the very largest coercive forces tend to have more strife than those with somewhat smaller forces. When one eliminates from analysis the countries that have experienced protracted internal or external conflict, the basic curvilinear relationship remains. The adage that force solves nothing seems supported; in fact force may make things worse.

MEASURING SOCIAL AND POLITICAL REQUIREMENTS FOR SYSTEM STABILITY IN LATIN AMERICA*

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This article considers the social and political factors that influence the stability/instability of the political system and attempts to measure some of these factors in the political systems of Latin America.

I. INTRODUCTION

The world-wide trends of urbanization. industrialization, and increased communiecations impel all political systems to change. whatever their level of development or the state of their institutions. A stable political system may be defined as one which can manage change within its structures. In a stable system, the pattern of interactions is not subject to large or radical change, and the political actors can depend upon certain prosedures and relationships, which adjust to the changing requirements of the society. Stapility results, on the one hand, from the views that the population have of their political system and, on the other hand, from the trength of the system itself. In a stable politcal system, the members of the system consider t to be both legitimate and effective, and the ystem, in turn, must have the power and bility to meet the demands and needs of the ociety as well as the flexibility to adjust to hanging circumstances. An unstable political vstem is simply the converse of the stable ystem. It has difficulties in managing change, nd when instability becomes extreme, it is ubject to profound and radical changes in its tructures. Instability is brought about by a opulation that considers the political system o be illegitimate and/or ineffective, and by olitical institutions which cannot meet the eeds and demands of the society and which ick the capacity to adjust.

Stability/instability is a condition of the olitical system at a particular time which lay manifest itself differently in different

systems. Stability is manifested simply by the absence of those interesting events that are reported by the news media. Instability may be reflected in increased repression by the authorities, by violent or non-violent demonstrations, by runaway inflation, by coups d'etat, by civil war, or ultimately by social revolution. The nature of the manifestation depends on the political culture, the peculiar balance of political forces, the sequence of events, and the decisions of key actors. Violent social revolution is the most definite and unambiguous manifestation of system instability, but it is an event which has occurred in few countries. The precise meaning of other manifestations in terms of system instability is less clear. A coup d'etat will take place in Ecuador, with its tradition of military intervention, under less provocation than it will in Colombia. Instability produces pressures which in a democracy will be met by a policy that gives in to all demands and leads to inflation while in a dictatorship the demands are suppressed, coming to the surface only in the form of anomic demonstrations. On other occasions instability may remain latent or unexpressed. The criteria for and manifestations of political stability/instability in democratic and authoritarian systems are shown in Table 1.

The degree of system stability/instability changes continuously over time, but the manifestations of instability move discontinuously. That is to say the various manifestations will erupt for a period and then die down. A country may be apparently quiet when in fact it is ripe for revolution. Nevertheless a society cannot bear a state of violence for very long before it exhausts itself and calms down—even though it may remain basically unstable because the dissatisfactions and incapacities remain. It is important to know whether a country has manifested its instability, whether it contains more instability than it has manifested, or whether it is, in fact,

Two examples from recent Latin American history demonstrate the value of an estimation of the basic stability/instability present in a political system. The Dominican Republic

^{*} This article is a by-product of cooperation of ne authors in the Rockefeller Foundation Uniersity Development Program at the Universidad et Valle, Cali, Colombia in 1966-1967.

¹ Seymour Martin Lipset, *Political Man* (New ork: Doubleday and Co., 1959), Chapter 3.

TABLE 1. CRITERIA FOR AND MANIFESTATIONS OF SYSTEM STABILITY/INSTABILITY

Stable									
Criteria	Manifestations								
Welfare > Social Mobilization. High rate of economic growth. Equal income distribution. High political capability. Broad-based institutionalized political parties.	Democracy Continue as democracy.	Dictatorship No increase in coercion, with option available for evolution to democratic system							
	Unstable								
Criteria	Manifes	stations							
Welfare < Social Mobilization. Low rate of economic growth. Unequal income distribution. Low political capability. Narrow personalistic political parties.	Democracy Inflation. Personnel changes. Increasing support of extremist solutions. Decentralized violence. Military intervention. Guerrilla warfare. Social Revolution.	Dictatorship Inflation. Increase in level of coercion. Decentralized violence. Coup d'etat. Guerrilla warfare. Social Revolution.							

manifested little instability for thirty years under the dictatorship of Rafael Trujillo. His assassination led to a succession crisis because the procedures and institutions for promoting new leadership were undeveloped. In April, 1965, after a number of coups, fighting broke out between rival military factions. Under such chaotic conditions a small organized group could easily take control and make a social revolution if the conditions were ripe for revolution. The United States intervened to prevent such a possibility on the assumption that a social revolution adverse to the national interests of the United States was a definite possiblity. The evidence developed in this article indicates that the conditions of stability/instability in the Dominican Republic in 1965 were entirely different than they were in Cuba in 1958 and there was little danger that the small conflict would escalate.

Panama underwent a succession crisis in 1968 due to peculiar personality circumstances, and at one time commentators were making some dire predictions about the future course of events in that country. In the end, Panama settled its crisis with little violence which never went out of control. Similar circumstances in other countries might have brought an explosion. The seriousness of these crises depends upon the instability present in the system, and knowledge of this condition will

allow one to predict the probable seriousness of future manifestations and to understand past manifestations.

An analysis of political stability/instability requires two types of data: the attitudes of the population and the capabilities of the political system. The capabilities of the political systemcan be estimated from the public information about the actions of the system. The attitudes of the population present a more difficult problem. Both the theory and the empirica data are lacking. When the theory is developed it will still be a Herculean task to carry ou the empirical investigation in a large number o' countries.2 However, we can assume that the attitudes result from real social condition that we do have knowledge of, and by mea suring these conditions we can have a rough estimate of these attitudes. We have nsophisticated psychological theory but wirely on the simple proposition that if peopl

² In addition to the work involved, politicaresistance may prevent survey work. See Irvin L. Horowitz, "The Life and Death of Projec Camelot," and Kalman H. Silvert, "America Academic Ethics and Social Research Abroad, both reprinted in U.S. Congress, House of Representatives, 89th Cong. 2nd Sess., International Education: Past, Present, Problems, and Prospective (Washington: GPO, 1967).

want something and cannot obtain it, they become dissatisfied.3

The demands that the population places on its political system are of two types: political-political for a form of political system that fits their ideas of authority and allows them the type and amount of participation desired, and political-economic for goods and services to be delivered by the political system and more general welfare conditions for which they hold the political system responsible.

The demands for a legitimate form of government and participation are most difficult to ascertain. Although democratic forms have been considered legitimate in Latin America for more than a century and a half by many intellectual leaders, it is not altogether certain that the uneducated majorities really desired these forms. Furthermore, the liberal democratic model has received challenges from both the left and the right. In no cases are the desires uniform within a country and the divisions are as important as the majority desires. The correspondence between demands and the forms of the political system is a question that we will not be able to explore empirically in the latter part of this article because our ignorance is still too great on these matters. The later analysis will therefore focus on more readily quantifiable -aspects.

Information on economic conditions, although still inexact and incomplete, is more readily available than information on political conditions. Both political and economic factors are important in determining system stability, but in Latin America the economic problems are futher from being resolved than are the political, and therefore are more crucial in the stability/instability equation. The purely poitical factors are not ignored completely, lowever, as they are an important part of political capabilities, which will be discussed. Nevertheless, we admit to a materialistic bias n this essay, which is due to two causes: our belief that economic factors are most important a Latin America today, and the absence of aformation on political-political demands.

A developed economic system manages to atisfy the material demands of the population hereby lessening the number and intensity of lemands directed against the political system. Development also allows the political system

³ Our proposition finds considerable justification in the discussion of Ted Gurr in "Psychologial Factors in Civil Violence," World Politics, 20 Jan., 1968), 245–278. See also his article in the resent issue of this REVIEW.

to obtain additional resources from the society to enable it to respond to demands. As the political system meets more of the material demands placed upon it, it develops supports within the society. The logic of this simple proposition is such that one would expect not only a strong correlation between the level of economic development and system stability, but a perfect correlation. This is not, however, the case in developing systems.4 In Latin America, for example, Cuba, Argentina, and Venezuela are among the leaders in economic development, but both their history of democratic government and political stability leave much to be desired. The reason for this imperfect correlation is that the economic development thesis can only be applied ceteris paribus.

The most important reason why economic development sometimes fails to produce political stability is that while the economy is making it possible for the political and economic systems to satisfy the demands of the population, it is also raising the level of expectations. As men pass from the traditional society they come widely to believe that the external world is sytematically capable of productive manipulation.5 Not only do they learn to control their material environment, but they also learn to control their social and political environment. With economic growth and the passing of the traditional society both the objective needs and the population's consciousness of these needs increase. The process that brings this increase in the level of political demands is called social mobilization.6 Both the increase in societal welfare and in social mobilization move in the same direction, but they often increase at different rates. It is important to measure them separately and to attempt to measure the relative development of each. The higher the level of societal welfare the better the prospects for political stability, while the higher the level of social mobilization (and consequently of

⁴ The correlation is much better on a world-wide basis. See Lipset, op. cit., Chapter 2; Bruce M. Russett, Trends in World Politics (New York: Macmillan Co., 1965), Chapter 8; and Gabriel Almond and James C. Coleman, Politics of the Developing Areas (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1959).

⁶ Walt W. Rostow, *The Stages of Economic Growth* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1960), pp. 4-6.

⁶ Karl W. Deutsch, "Social Mobilization and Political Development," this Review, 55 (Sept., 1961), 493-514. demands upon the political system), the poorer the prospects for political stability. Therefore, one of the probabilistic determinants of political stability within a political system will be the disparity between the level of societal welfare and social mobilization.

Social mobilization continues at a steady pace while the rate of growth of societal welfare fluctuates and may even be negative. Thus a sustained and substantial rate of economic growth is necessary in order to keep societal welfare ahead of social mobilization. The economic growth rate also has some directly political connotations. Whether or not a political system is responsible for economic growth, people in the post-World War II world have decided that lack of economic growth is the fault of the government. Stagnation or recession thus increases the demands on the government but does not increase the resources available to meet those demands. On the other hand, a dynamic economy leads to higher employment, greater economic mobility, new opportunities for the ambitious within the economic system and lower demands on the political system. Moreover, since government revenues expand roughly in proportion to economic growth, the government in a growing economy has increasing resources to perform services and make investments.

A relatively equal distribution of income also tends to promote political stability. The poor provide the potential for extraordinary political instability. As they have no commitments to any of the society's institutions, they make excellent potential followers for those who would overthrow the system. The size of this "culture of poverty," then, is an indication of the stability/instability of the system. Disparity of income among those who more fully participate in the society may also generate dissatisfaction with the performance of the political system.

The relative difference of a society's wealth and political mobilization, the distribution of the wealth, and the rate of change in the economy establish the environmental limits within which the political system operates. Never-

7 Oscar Lewis, "The Culture of Poverty," Scientific American, 215 (Oct., 1966), 19-26. The "culture of poverty," in the terms of our discussion, is the culture belonging to the uprooted and poor population in a socially mobilized society. The participants in this culture, while themselves only partially mobilized, can be swept quickly into political movements that appeal to their objective and psychological needs.

theless, the political system has its own sphere of autonomy and can respond to the environment in a variety of ways. The ways in which it reacts depend upon its political capabilities, while at the same time an effective party system and capable leadership are also important in organizing demands, eliciting supports, and generating loyalty to the system. Each of these factors results from a long history of political interaction and requires a concentrated effort of many years to change.

The taxing power of the government is a key factor in measuring system stability. It indicates, on one hand, the level of material support being received by the political systems, while on the other hand, it indicates the extent of resources available to the system for the satisfaction of demands. Today the developing countries can also turn to the international environment for material resources in the form of public loans and grants. A system that can extract at a high level from both the domestic and international environments can buy support with benefits and jobs, give more general services to the population, and maintain police and military forces which give credence to its authority.9

The way in which a government distributes its services is also important. A government that spends a large proportion of its budget oneducation, health, and housing for the general population develops long-range support of the society while investing in human resources which is probably the best way to promote sustained economic development.10 The extractive and distributive capabilities of the political systems must, therefore, also be included in any measurement of system stability The regulative, symbolic, and responsive capabilities of a political system are also im portant, but they are more difficult to measure In the analysis of Latin American politics. systems that follows, we assume that the ex tractive and distributive capabilities reflec the general range of the total capability of th political systems.

The most important political structur

⁸ Gabriel Almond, "A Developmental Approac to Political Systems," World Politics, 18 (Jan 1965), 183-214.

⁹ Russett, op. cit., pp. 121-135.

¹⁰ Theodore W. Schultz, The Economic Value of Education (New York: Columbia Universit Press, 1963). A discussion of the importance of education in the economic development of Certral America is presented in John F. McCaman Development Assistance in Central America (New York: Praeger, 1968), Chapter 7.

outside of the formal institutions of government that may influence the level of system stability is the political party. In the developing countries many political parties are little more than the campaign organization of presidential aspirants. Even when the leader has great popular appeal, it cannot be said that such a political party has a stabilizing effect. To produce this effect, a political party must be institutionalized—that is, have a life independent of its leader-and must be capable of integrating different sectors of the population.11 Although it is most difficult to quantify these characteristics, they are as real as any of the measurable items discussed earlier. Samuel P. Huntington suggests the following criteria to test the extent of institutionalization of an organization: adaptability, complexity, autonomy, and coherency.12 Additionally, parties which serve as instruments of national integration can be identified through a study of their ideology and organization, as well as an examination of their past -record in this area.

The institutionalized party of national integration serves a number of functions important to the stability of the system. The party organizes and reinforces the commitment of individuals to the political process. The leaders soon develop a vested interest in ■the system through the perquisites that they obtain from the system as representatives of a moditical party. In turn, the leaders devote considerable energy and time to maintain a ollowing, and in so doing develop satisfying symbols and provide opportunities for expression of demands and complaints. An institutionalized party also recruits membership and searches for competent and attractive eadership. At the same time the institutionalzed party is continuously developing and lefining policy alternatives that will be enlorsed by its following and attract new supporters. In an operative democratic system, the commitment to the party overflows into a commitment to the system in which the party ias a stake. In a non-democratic system the ffect holds only for the party or parties that hare the power of the government.

Thus, far, the relationship of political tability/instability to the balance between ocietal welfare and social mobilization, in-

come distribution, economic growth, system capabilities and political organization has been presented with no attempt to implement the theory. It should be possible, however, to utilize available social, political, and economic indicators to predict, on a comparative basis, the prospects for political stability of a group of political systems. In order to demonstrate the theory, while at the same time demonstrating the facility and practicability of this type of political measurement we propose to measure the relative prospects for political stability of nineteen Latin American political systems. Although a precise measure of the Cuban situation is not possible because of missing data, the relative stability of the political system in 1958 is also considered.

II. METHODOLOGY

No attempt has been made to find an absolute value of probability of system stability. Rather, the analysis is limited to measuring the relationship of the Latin American political systems with each other. In order to compare and combine the position of each country within the different criteria, it is necessary to establish a common index or scale for the various statistics used. Then it is necessary to make some decisions as to the importance of each factor within each combined index and in the final score of relative system stability.

The information available allows us to do more than simply establish the rank of each country within each factor; it allows us to establish the interval between countries. One method of putting all the statistics on a common scale would be to give the highest statistic within each factor a score of one hundred, the lowest zero, and give each other

13 It is usual at this point to make an apology for Latin American statistics. Without a doubt the statistics used in this essay are not entirely reliable, but they have been gathered through standardized procedures developed by the Organization of American States and the United Nations Economic Commission for Latin America and other United Nation Agencies. The emphasis on planning since 1960 has given considerable impulse to the improvement of the statistical procedures. Therefore we think that whatever inaccuracies exist are not of such magnitude as to discredit their use. For a fuller discussion of the use of aggregate data see, Ronald V. McGranahan, "Comparative Social Research in the United Nations," in Richard L. Merritt and Stein Rokkan (eds.), Comparing Nations (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1966).

¹¹ Joseph LaPalombara and Myron Weiner, ² olitical Parties and Political Development (Prince-on: Princeton University Press, 1966).

¹² Samuel P. Huntington, "Political Development and Political Decay," World Politics, 18 April, 1965), 386-430.

statistic the score of its relative position between one hundred and zero. The principle weakness of this method is that the length of the interval between country scores is completely determined by the two extremes. If one country were extremely low in one factor. all the other countries would have a high score, whereas, if one country were extremely high, it would depress the score of all the others. If there were both high and low scores, the interval between the other would be small, and and the extreme positions would not be reflected in the score because no score could surpass one hundred or be less than zero. Therefore, we decided to use a more complicated mathematical method that would avoid these distortions. On each factor, the Latin American mean and the average variation measured in standard deviation were found, and the score given to each country was its distance, either negative or positive, from the mean measured in number of standard deviations.14

After the statistics in each factor were translated into the common index of standard deviations from the Latin American mean, it was still necessary to determine the importance of each factor in the combined indexes and in the final score of sytem stability. No mathematical solution would help solve this methodological problem. 15 It was necessary to make more or less arbitrary decisions based on our judgment. In the combined indexes of social mobilization and societal welfare, the decisions were not overly crucial as all the factors were highly correlated with each other, and the weight of each or even the exclusion of one would not make a great deal of difference. In combining the various indexes into the final score, the decisions were all important because

¹⁴ The population standard deviation was used in preference to the sample standard deviation. The formula for the mean is:

$$M = \Sigma \times i/N$$

The formula for the standard deviation is:

$$s\sqrt{=\Sigma(Xi-M)^2/N}$$

¹⁵ A multiple regression analysis could be made if there were available system stability scores arrived at independently of the analysis here. Unfortunately none are available, and even if a multiple regression were possible it would not identify the real causal relationships. At this point, one can only judge whether the correct weight has been given the factors by whether the final score fits the historical qualitative data on Latin American politics.

the score of a country differed greatly from one criterion to the next. For instance, Uruguay has a better-than-average record on the collection of taxes but it has had a very poor economic growth record in recent years. How much is domestic extractive capability worth relevant to economic growth in the determination of system stability? The authors decided that the political capabilities should be given equal weight to the environment scores. The societal welfare minus social mobilization score was given twice the weight of the score on recent economic growth. The formula for the final score is:

System Stability =
$$\frac{4x_1 + 2x_2 + 3x_3 + 3x_4}{12}$$

where: System Stability is given as an average number of standard deviations from the Latin American mean;

- x₁ is societal welfare minus social mobilization:
- x2 is recent economic growth;
- x₃ is extractive capability measured in per cent of GDP collected in taxes plus foreign grants and loans measured in percentage of GDP;
- x₄ is distributive capability measured by percentage of GDP spent on public education.

Two of the factors discussed in the previous section, income distribution and institutionalized parties, could not be given quantitative scores, and therefore could not be included in the final system stability score. These factors however, are discussed and used in the political system profiles.

III. APPLICATION TO LATIN AMERICA

Effects of Environment on the Political System
The authors selected as indexes for the level of societal welfare within the nineteen societies. The following: gross domestic product percapita for 1965, a combined index representing the level of health services, a combined index representing the level of educational opportunities, and a combined index representing the level of nutrition for the society. Per capit GDP was chosen and given a weight of fifty per cent on the combined welfare scale because it, more than any other single figure, representate level of goods and services available for distribution within a society. 16

In view of some of the limitations in translating GDP measured in respective nations currencies into a common international star

¹⁶ Russett, op. cit., pp. 112-114.

dard and because the GDP does not measure the distribution of the goods and services throughout a society, the welfare index also includes components which measure the extent to which the society fulfills some more basic human needs. First, the level of health services has been measured by medical doctors per 10,000 inhabitants and hospital beds per 1,000 inhabitants. Second, the level of educational opportunities and services was measured by the percentage of population fifteen years and older classified as literate and the percentage of population between the ages of thirteen and nineteen enrolled in secondary schools. The secondary school figure was chosen because of its close relation with figures for university education and because primary education figures are, in many cases, distorted by inclusion of adult education, vocational education,

and the like. The final modifier of the GDP scale is the nutrition index, composed of daily calorie intake per capita and average daily protein intake per capita. Each of these non-GDP indexes was given a weight of sixteen and two-thirds of the total welfare index, thus making their combined weight equal to that of the GDP index. The results of the societal welfare measurement are shown in Table 2. After the indexes were combined, the result was again converted to the standard deviation scale.

The social mobilization index was constructed in a similar manner, utilizing data considered to be sound, converting this data to a standard deviation scale, and then combining the various indexes into one. The combined index is composed of three factors: Exposure to mass media (itself composed of three fac-

TABLE 2. SOCIETAL WELFARE

Country	Gross domestic product per capita (U. S. \$)	Per cent of Literacy ^a	Per cent of Popu- lation aged 13-18 in school	Daily calories per capita	Daily proteins per capita (grams)	Doctors per 10,000 persons	Hospital beds per 10,000 persons	score in
Argentina	\$645	91.4	40	2,660	77.2	14.6	6.4	1.95
Uruguay	560	90.3	39	2,970	94.5	11.9	6.7	1.85
Venezuela	835	79.3	28	2,360	58.2	8.1	3.2	1.68
Chile	410	83.6	33	2,370	79.4	7.3	4.5	.70
Panama	495	80.3	33	2,270	59.3	5.0	3.8	.63
Mexico	435	72.1	17	2,640	73.4	6.9	2.2	.44
Costa Rica	405	84.0	$^{\cdot}25$	2,460	53.8	4.7	4.5	.39
Brazil	220	61.5	22	2,850	68.6	4.5	3.0	20
Paraguay	205	77.0	15	2,580	66.0	5.2	2.2	35
Nicaragua	305	49.7	12	2,325	62.0	3.8	2.2	37
Dominican								
Republic	300	60.0	11	2.040	49.7	5.2	2.9	 , 43
Colombia	265	62.3	22	2,130	48.6	4.0	2.7	 . 46
Peru	285	60.2	23	2,240	57.1	4.4	2.4	- . 53
Guatemala	315	38.0	9	2,160	58.0	1.5	2.6	55
El Salvador	260	44.0	16	2,120	58.0	2.7	2.3	66
Ecuador	215	67.5	15	1,890	48.5	2.7	2.3	78
Honduras	215	44.6	7	2,070	53.0	1.6	2.0	93
Bolivia	145	37.0	18	1,810	47.3	3.0	2.4	-1.12
Haiti	63	20.0	5	1,875		0.7	0.6	-1.78
Mean ≺Standard	346	63.9	21	2,306	61.8	5.2	3.1	
Deviation	186	19.7	10	321	12.3	3.1	1.3	

Sources:

Inter-American Development Bank. Socio-Economic Progress in Latin America. Social Progress Trust Fund: Sixth Annual Report, 1966. Washington, D. C., 1967. Calorie intake figures for Haiti and Nicaragua: Progreso '67. Vision, Incorporated. New York, 1967.

^a Year varies from 1960 to 1965, depending on year of latest census.

tors), membership in labor unions as a percentage of economically active population, and percentage of population living in urban areas. The combined mass media index registers the number of daily newspapers delivered per 1,000 inhabitants, radio receivers per 1,000 inhabitants, and television receivers per 1,000 inhabitants. Our aim was to develop separate indexes of welfare and social mobilization and we restricted the two indexes as far as possible to criteria that were distinct. Even so the correlation coefficient between the two indexes is

.92. Table 3 shows the data and the index of social mobilization.

A measurement of the difference between the society's position on the two indexes produces the basic measurement of the effects in terms of prospective political stability. The results of this measurement are shown in Figure 1. Costa Rica stands alone with by far the greatest positive differential, and therefore a greater probability of political stability. In descending order the countries with a positive measure are: Panama, Paraguay, Guatemala,

TABLE 3. SOCIAL MOBILIZATION

Country	Newspapers delivered per 1,000 persons	Radio receivers per 1,000 persons	T.V. receivers per 1,000 persons	% Economically active population in labor unions	% Urbani- zation	Social Mobilization score in standard deviations
Venezuela	78ª	196	70	67°	67	2.07
Uruguay	314	309	65	21°	73	1.94
Argentina	146a	282	68	34	72	1.82
Chile	1184	187	7	21	68	.81
Mexico	112	184	33	20	55	.61
Peru	47	169	15	19°	47	.10
Panama	75ª	198	41	5	47	.07
Brazil	54	95	29	11	50	02
Colombia	52	183	17	7°	53	10
El Salvador	47 ^b	140	11	5⁰	39	45
Bolivia	26	137	0	14°	35	49
Costa Rica	77a	89	25	7	34	50
Ecuador	52	104	2	7°	38	55
Nicaragua Dominican	4 9ª	63	6	4 º	42	56
Republic	27	40	6	23	30	57
Guatemala	31	54	12	1	34	85
Paraguay	12	86	0	40	33	87
Honduras	19ª	58	š	40	26	-1.09
Haiti	6	13	1	õ	16	-1.52
Mean Standard	71	131	22	14	45	
deviation	66	80	22	20	16	

Sources:

- 1. Newspapers delivered, radio receivers, and TV receivers. United Nations, Economic Commission for Latin America, Statistical Bulletin for Latin America, New York: September, 1966.
- 2. Labor union membership: Latin American Center, University of California at Los Angeles Statistical Abstract of Latin America: 1964. Los Angeles: 1965.
- 3. Urbanization: Inter-American Development Bank. Socio-Economic Progress in Latin America Washington, D. C.: 1967.
- · Partial data.
- ^b Provisional data.
- Economically active population estimated for 1960 from figure reported at latest census on assumption that economically active population changed in proportion to change in total population.




Fig. 1. Societal welfare-social mobilization differential

Nicaragua, Honduras, Dominican Republic, and Argentina. Countries where social mobilization is relatively higher than societal welfare and hence have a negative measure are: Uruguay, Chile, Mexico, Brazil, El Salvador, Haiti, Ecuador, Colombia, Venezuela, Peru, and Bolivia. The differentials were converted into a standard deviation scale to be combined with the other criteria.

A necessary modification of environmental effects was introduced through the construction of an index of economic growth over the last ten years. In the index the growth during the period 1961-1966 was given twice the weight of the period 1955-1960 as the more recent period will produce greater results in terms of dissatisfaction or satisfaction with the performance of the society, increase the ability of the government to respond to demands and ultimately ameliorate the destabilizing effects of any disequilibrium between social mobilization and societal welfare. The results of the comparison of rates of recent economic growth are shown in Table 4. Panama, Mexico, Chile, El Salvador, Peru and Nicaragua, according to the weighted average, have grown at more than the 2.5 per cent per capita called for by the Alliance for Progress. Brazil, Venezuela, Guatemala, Costa Rica and Bolivia have all achieved a higher than 2.0 per cent growth rate, similarly weighted. At the other extreme, Paraguay has had zero per capita growth, and Uruguay and Haiti have had negative rates.

Unfortunately, the data on income distribution are not sufficiently complete to allow us to include them in the numerical indexes on system stability. The information available is presented here and will be used in the stability profiles given in the conclusion, as omission of the factor entirely would leave a valuable piece of information unexploited. The best measure of income distribution is the percentage of persons, ordered in income groups, and this information has been estimated for six countries.

Table 5 presents the data on the six countries in order of their relative equality of income distribution. The range of inequality is great. According to the data, Ecuador has the most equitable distribution of income, with the richest five-per cent of the population receiving only ten times as much income, on the average, as the lowest fifty per cent. Argentina, Chile, and Colombia have almost identical distribution profiles. Mexico and Venezuela appear to have very inequitable income distributions.

Characteristics of the Political System. "The extractive capability of a political system refers to the range of system performance in drawing material and human resources from the domestic and international environment." Our interest is in capability which means potential as well as actual performance. The potential for drawing human resources from the environment is essentially untested because the Latin American states have not been

¹⁷ Gabriel Almond and Bingham Powell, Comparative Politics: A Developmental Approach (New York: Little, Brown and Co., 1966), p. 195.

TABLE 4. ECONOMIC GROWTH

Country	Annual increase in per cap- ita GDP: 1955-1960 (%)	Annual increase in per capita GDP: 1961– 1966 (%) (double weight)	Economic growth score in standard deviations
Panama	1.7	4.8	1.21
Mexico	3.0	2.8	.72
Chile	1.9	3.1	.63
El Salvador	1.3	3.4	.63
Peru	2.1	3.0	.63
Nicaragua	-1.2	4.4	.54
Brazil	2.8	2.2^{a}	.47
Venezuela	2.8	2.0	.40
Guatemala	2.4	2.2	.39
Costa Rica	1.5	2.6	.38
Bolivia	-2.5	4.4	.31
Honduras	1.4	1.8	.07
Ecuador	1.4	1.6	.00
Argentina	0.9	1.6	- .09
Colombia	1.2	1.2	→ .18
Dominican			
Republic	-0.4	0.7	→ .65
Paraguay	-0.3	0.2	- .79
Uruguay	-1.3	-0.3	-1.17
Haiti	0.6^{b}	-7.7	-3.50

Sources:

- 1955-1960 economic growth. Naciones Unidas. Comision Economica para America Latina. La Economia de America Latina en 1965.
- 1961-1966 economic growth. Inter-American Development Bank. Socio-Economic Progress in Latin America. Washington, D. C.: 1968
- * 1960-1965 growth rate from Naciones Unidas, Estudio Economico de America Latina: 1965.
- ^b Data not available. Estimate of Caribbean area growth from Economic Comission for Latin America, Economic Development of Latin America in the Post-War Period.

involved in any situation where general mobilization was required to defend the state. On the other hand, each government has pushed close to its political limits in the extraction of material resources from the domestic environment. Present performance in taxation, then, is a good estimate of the domestic extractive capability. The same is true concerning the international extractive capability; the present level of economic cooperation is as high as the present international political system will support.

Precise data on tax revenues is obtainable only for the central governments, but that figure considerably distorts the total because the Latin American countries vary greatly in the taxation powers each leaves to the regional and municipal governments. Therefore, rougher estimates of total tax revenue are better reflections of extractive capability than are more exact reports of central government tax revenue. Fortunately, the Inter American Development Bank's report, Socio-Economic Progress in Latin America, makes estimates or provides the information from which estimates can be made in order to obtain the percentage of total revenue in gross domestic product for 1966. Brazil with its strong state governments has the largest percentage of tax revenue outside of the central government. Non-central government entities in Ecuador possess thirty per cent of that country's domestic extractive capability. Regional and local governments in Argentina and Colombia also have sizeable taxation powers. The federal system in Mexico, on the other hand, leaves only ten per cent of the extractive capability to other than the central government.

TABLE 5. DISTRIBUTION OF INCOME

Country	Per cent of Income to Population Sectors			Ratio of Upper Range Income to Lower
	50%	45%	5%	Range Income
Ecuador	24	51	25	10.0
Argentina	20	49	31	15.5
Chile	16	59	25	15.6
Colombia	18	53	29	16.0
Mexico	16	47	37	23.0
Venezuela	11	59	30	27.0

Sources:

- Per cent of national income received by population sectors; Venezuela, Ecuador, Chile, Mexico. United Nations, The Economic Development of Latin America in the Post-War Period, New York, 1964.
- Per cent of income received by population sectors; Argentina. Naciones Unidas, Boletin Economico de America Latina. Vol. XI, No. 1, April, 1966. New York.
- 3. Per cent of income received by population sectors; Colombia. Joint Tax Program of the Organization of American States and the Inter-American Development Bank. Fiscal Survey of Colombia. Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins Press, 1965.

The results of the statistics on taxation as a percentage of gross domestic product found in Table 6 show a group of countries—Chile, Brazil, Ecuador, Dominican Republic, and Uruguay with a relatively high domestic extractive capability from 20.2 per cent to 14.0 per cent, and then break to Venezuela at 12.5 per cent. The second group of countries is spaced evenly down to Guatemala which manages to extract only 8.3 per cent of the production of the country in taxes. It is difficult to find any societal conditions that can explain

TABLE 6. GOVERNMENT EXTRACTIVE CAPABILITY

Country	Total taxes col- lected by all govern- ment lev- els 1966, as % GDP	Average annual grants and loans from U.S. and International Agencies 1962–1966 as % of 1965 GDP	and inter- national extractive	in
Chile	20.2ª	5.3	25.5	2.44
Dominican		5.5	-5.5	
Republic	$14.5^{ m b}$	6.1	20.6	1.27
Ecuador	15.8e	4.2	20.0	1.12
Brazil	17.4 ^d	2.2	19.6	1.02
Bolivia	8.8ª	10.7	19.5	1.00
Costa Rica	11.2°	4.9	16.1	.19
Nicaragua	11.5°	4.6	16.1	. 19
Panama	11.4ª	4.3	15.7	.10
Uruguay	14.0^{a}	1.5	15.5	.05
Peru	12.3ª	3.0	15.3	.00
Paraguay	9.3	5.3	14.6	17
Venezuela	12.5^{a}	1.3	13.8	36
Colombia	10.0°	3.7	13.7	38
El Salvador	9.8^{a}	3.5	13.3	48
Honduras	9.9^{a}	3.2	13.1	53
Argentina	11.0 ^f	0.7	11.7	86
Mexico	8.9°	1.7	10.6	-1.12
Guatemala	8.3^{c}	1.1	9.4	-1.41
Haiti	5.9ª	1.4	7.3	-1.91

Sources:

- Domestic extractive capability. Inter-American Development Bank. Socio-Economic Progress in Latin America. Washington, 1968.
- International extractive capability. U. S. Agency for International Development. Statistics and Reports Division.
 U. S. Overseas Loans and Grants and Assistance from International Organizations. Washington, 1967.
- a Central government tax revenue only. Other tax revenue known to be small.
- ^b 1966 central government revenue plus 2.1 per cent estimated as municipal taxes.
- ^c Reported total revenue for 1965 with change in central government revenue in 1966.
 - ^d Total government revenue for 1964.
- ^e Central government revenue increased by percentage of local and departmental taxes reported for 1960 in Joint Tax Program of the Organization of American States and the Inter-American Development Bank. Fiscal Survey of Colombia. Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins Press, 1965.
- f Estimated from 1966 central government tax revenue with adjustment for proportion of other tax revenue reported for 1964.

the distribution. The top of the list includes both rich and poor countries, countries with local autonomy, Brazil and Ecuador, and countries highly centralized. Chile. Uruguay, and the Dominican Republic. The distribution seems to reflect purely political phenomena: certain countries have developed a higher degree of governmental authority than have others. Brazil and Ecuador have used the authority of state and local governments to increase the authority of the whole political system. Chile and Uruguay have developed their authority through a long tradition of responding to the wishes and needs of their citizens. The Dominican Republic has a record of strong authoritarian government backed by a unified military.

At the low end of the range are the two extremely poor countries, Haiti and Bolivia, which undoubtedly find economic as well as political limits to their taxation power because such a large proportion of their population is near subsistence level. Honduras, Paraguay, and Guatemala are less poor, but are low in their level of political mobilization. However, Guatemala holds on to its low position by virtue of a totally disorganized and divided body politic, which is the result of partial revolution and counter revolution. The position of Mexico seems inexplicable on the basis of its reputation.

The Latin American nations have found another source of material resources in the last fifteen years which has significantly altered their total extractive capability. Nowhere is this better exemplified than in Bolivia, where the government extracts only 8.8 per cent of its gross domestic product in taxes, but extracts from the international environment a sum equivalent to 10.7 per cent of its gross domestic product. The data from which this international extractive capability is calculated is the annual average loans and grants from public United States and international economic and military assistance programs between fiscal years 1962 and 1966. This sum represents the material resources which the government can draw upon in the short run to augment the domestic material resources at its disposal.

As the international extractive capability does not correlate with the domestic capability, it has the affect of reordering the ranking considerably. Bolivia rises from the rank of of seventeenth to fifth. Ecuador, Chile, and the Dominican Republic have high scores on both categories. Argentina, Mexico, and Guatemala with low scores on both accounts are pushed further to the bottom. In the Central Ameri-

TABLE 7. GOVERNMENT DISTRIBUTIVE CAPABILITY

Country	Total Govern- ment Expendi- tures on Educa- tion as per cent of national income	Distributive Capability in Standard Deviations
Peru	4.9	1.90
Panama	4.7	1.70
Costa Rica	4.6	1.60
Venezuela	4.3	1.30
Chile	3.5	. 50
Colombia	3.3	.30
Argentina	3.3	.30
Uruguay	3.1	.10
Dominican		
Republic	3.1	.10
Brazil	3.0	.00
El Salvador	2.9	- .10
Mexico	2.8	20
Paraguay	2.4	60
Ecuador	2.4	60
Honduras	2.3	70
Bolivia	2.2	80
Nicaragua	1.8	-1.20
Guatemala	1.6	-1.40
Haiti	1.1	-1.90
Mean	3.0	
Standard Deviation	1.0	

Source: United Nations. UNESCO. UNESCO Statistical Yearbook 1965. New York, 1966.

can countries and Paraguay a strong international extractive capability compensates for a mediocre domestic capability.

The distributive capability of the government lends itself much less easily to a quantitative formulation than does the extractive capability. The extractive capability limits the size of the distributive capability, but we are interested in further information on how the funds that the government obtains are used in the society.

Education is a public service which is rendered more widely than any other service except the police service. It is an investment with a high economic return, and tends to equalize opportunities. Thus expenditures on public education as a percentage of national income seem to be the single best index of the capability of the government to distribute benefits widely and in a manner that will pro-

mote economic development and a more equal distribution of income.

It is necessary to find more than central government statistics here too because education is often a local responsibility. UNESCO reports the total expenditures on public education at all levels as a percentage of national income, and this is used as the index of governmental distributive capability. It is important to note that educational expenditures are not highly correlated with extractive capability. Countries that bring in the highest percentage in taxes do not necessarily spend a larger percertage of the national product on education. Thus, the index chosen for distributive capability measures something quite distinct from the measure chosen for extractive capability even though both are given as a percentage of the society's production or income.

The index on the distributive capability is found in Table 7. Peru, Panama, Costa Rica and Venezuela are spending more than four per cent of their national income on public education. At the other end of the scale are Paraguay, Ecuador, Honduras, Bolivia, Nicaragua, Guatemala, and Haiti which are spending half as much or less. All countries are spending close to twice the percentage in the 1930's than they did a decade before. There is a higher correlation between this index and societal welfare than was the case in extractive capability, but the correlation is still low. Political characteristics seem more important than economic. All of the countries with some tradition in democratic government are near the top of the scale and those with a tradition of dictatorship are toward the bottom. The Dominican Republic in ninth position and Mexico in twelfth position are a partial exception to this rule.

Peru and Panama, the two countries that are spending most on education in relation to their income, present an interesting question to students of Latin American politics because both are countries where the established oligarchy purportedly still plays an important role in politics, and where well organized reformist parties have yet to take power. Parties are frankly personalist in both countries. However, the oligarchy is competing openly and vigorously for the votes of the population. Education appears to be a policy which all classes favor and also one that is a popular votegetter.

Great differences in political party development exist among the political systems of Latin America, and to fail to give consideration to this factor would greatly distort our conclusions. However, the matter is too complex to present in any detail in this article, and our observations are limited by the lack of detailed research. Latin American political party systems are classified in Table 8.

The political systems of Mexico, Venezuela, and Costa Rica clearly have produced institutionalized parties of the first rank which are capable of integrating the major sectors of the population. One or several parties in each country have proved adaptable, complex. autonomous, coherent, and capable of producing regenerative political leadership. The Party of the Institutional Revolution in Mexico has the oldest history, proving its adaptability, but it is less autonomous than the others, being very closely tied on one hand to peasant and industrial labor groups and on the other to the formal institutions of government. The two principal parties in Costa Rica, the Party of National Liberation and the National Union Party are less complex in their organization, but are more autonomous. The Democratic Action Party and COPEI in Venezuela are both well organized, but they both have yet to prove that they can bring on new generations of leaders.

The parties in Chile, Uruguay, Colombia, and Peru are in a second echelon because of various weaknesses. Chile until very recently lacked a party that could effectively integrate the nation, but the ascendance of the Christian Democratic Party has filled this gap. When the Christian Democratic Party proves its adaptability in changing leadership, Chile will pass into the first rank. Uruguay has two old institutionalized parties in the *Colorados* and the *Blancos*, but the peculiar constitutional arrangements of Uruguay have encouraged

TABLE 8. POLITICAL PARTY ORGANIZATION IN LATIN AMERICA

Group I.

Institutionalized Parties of National

Integration A. Mexico, Costa Rica, Venezuela B. Uruguay, Chile, Colombia, Peru Group II. Parties Weak in Complexity, Autonomy, Adaptability or Integration Traditional: Honduras, Nicaragua, Paraguay Army Oriented: El Salvador, Brazil, Bolivia No Integration: Argentina Group III. No Institutionalized Parties Guatemala, Dominican Republic, Ecuador, Panama, Haiti

party splintering into personalist factions. If the constitutional changes of December, 1966. bring about greater coherence in these two parties, Uruguay, too, will have to be placed at the top. Colombia also has two old and durable parties in the Liberal Party and the Conservative Party. Both, however, are split into factions, again in part due to a peculiar constitutional arrangement, and at the local level organization is more personalist than institutional. Peru lacks traditional parties, but APRA must certainly be considered an institutional party and the Popular Action of Belaunde and the Christian Democrats seem to be on their way to developing as institutional parties. Nevertheless, Peru must still be placed in the second rank because of the tendency of parties to be organized around their leaders, rather than for leaders to be brought up within the party.

Bolivia, Brazil, El Salvador, Honduras, Paraguay, Nicaragua, and Argentina fall in the middle ranks, but it is difficult to order them. Each suffers from its own particular difficulties, and one cannot say which difficulty is the more serious. Argentina, for instance, has had institutionalized parties for half a century until they were dissolved by decree in 1966, but no party had been able to integrate the major sectors of the country; and today the Peronist labor groups remain as much out of the system as they did before Peron organized them. In Paraguay, Honduras, and Nicaragua, the traditional parties of the 19th century still exist but tend to be dominated by caudillos. Bolivia, since 1952, has been dominated by one institutionalized party which has integrated major groups in the country, but it is now split and the labor groups are outside the fold. The feuding of the original leaders has torn the seams of the party, and it is yet to be seen if new leaders will rise from within the party to mend the tears or whether it will fall apart. Parties in Brazil and El Salvador have never become institutionalized, and each now has a leadership of military officers who have established official parties.

In all of the above countries at least a semblance of party structure exists, but in the Dominican Republic, Guatemala, Ecuador, Panama, and Haiti, political parties are yet to organize the struggle for power. The Dominican Republic has had feuding leftist, moderate, and rightist factions, which are only beginning to coalesce into permanently organized groups. Guatemala may have emerged from a chaotic situation in the elections of 1966, when Julio Cesar Mendes Montenegro came to power under the banner of the Revolutionary Party.

Ecuador and Panama at the moment have nothing but personalist groupings. However, certain potential for organization exists in these two countries, which is not true in Haiti, where thugs and mystics group themselves around the person of François Duvalier and destroy all potential opposition.

IV. SYSTEM STABILITY PROFILES

The following system stability profiles are presented in the order of their quantitative measurements shown in Table 9. The non-quantifiable factors—the distribution of income within each society and the political party system—have not been used to reorder the final standings. However, where a country's ranking might be affected by a particularly high or low score in both of these factors, it is so indicated in the text.

1. Costa Rica

Score: With a final score of 1.28 s.d. above the Latin American mean, Costa Rica is more stable than all other political systems. Its institutionalized political parties would place it even further above its only rival, Panama. Except for a mediocre score on domestic extractive capability, Costa Rica is strongly positive on all indexes.

Manifestations: Since 1949 the Costa Rican government has changed hands four times through free elections. The country has little

TABLE 9. SYSTEM STABILITY SCORES⁸

Factor Weigh	nt 4	2	3	3	
Country	Welfare Minus Social Mo- bilization	Eco- nomic Growth	Extrac- tive Capa- bility	Distrib- utive Capa- bility	System Sta- bility
Costa Rica	+2.30	+ .38	+ .19	+1.60	+1.28
Panama	+1.45	+1.21	+ .10	+1.70	+1.13
Chile	28	+ .63	+2.44	+ .50	+ .75
Dominican					
Republic	+ .36	65	+1.27	+ .10	+ .35
Brazil	46	+ .47	+1.02	.00	+ .18
Paraguay	+1.34	79	17	60	+ .12
Peru	-1.63	+ .63	.00	+1.90	+ .04
Nicaragua	+ .49	+ .54	+ .19	-1.20	+ .01
Venezuela	-1.01	+ .40	- :36	+1.30	— .03
Argentina	+ .34	09	- 186	+ .30	04
Ecuador	59	.00	-1.12	60	07
Honduras	+ .41	+ .07	53	`70	16
El Salvador	54	+ .63	- :48	10	22
Uruguay	23	-1.17	+ .05	+ .10	23
Mexico	44	+.72	-1.12	20	36
Colombia	93	18	36	+ .30	36
Guatemala	+ .77	+ .39	-1.41	-1.40	38
Bolivia	-1.63	+ .31	+1.00	80	44
Haiti	67	-3.50	-1.91	-1.90	-1.76

^a All scores given in standard deviations.

inflation, and few strikes or political demonstrations. Even the university students show no animosity toward North Americans.

Prediction: Continued democratic stability.

2. Panama

Score: Panama's score of .15 s.d. below Costa Rica is due to Panama's relatively greater social mobilization. A moderate extractive capability is balanced by the distribution of large sums on education. The lack of institutionalized political parties is Panama's greatest weakness.

Manifestations: Students have shown some signs of alienation and have expressed their discontent through anti-United States demonstrations. Political freedom has been continuously maintained, however, and power has changed hands through free, if somewhat turbulent, elections. No inflation.

Prediction: Continued democratic stability with minor difficulties until the development of institutionalized political parties.

3. Chile

Score: Chile scores .38 s.d. below Panama, primarily because its social mobilization is greater than its societal welfare. Recent per capita economic growth has been satisfactory, and combined domestic and international extractive capability is considerably higher than that of all other Latin American countries. Institutionalized parties integrate various sectors of the population.

Manifestations: Political freedom and free elections enjoy a long tradition in Chile, and the system has instituted reforms through its democratic structures. Chile has thus far experienced little of the rural and urban violence endemic to some other Latin American countries, but it has had a high rate of inflation.

Prediction: Continued democratic stability with inflation and electoral strength of extreme left wing parties lessening if rapid economic growth continues.

4. Dominican Republic

Score: Both the welfare and the social mobilization indexes are somewhat below the Latin American mean, but welfare is slightly ahead of mobilization. The overall index is plus .35 s.d. primarily because of high domestic and international extractive capabilities, which allow the government to maintain a large, well-trained army and still provide funds for social welfare projects. Political parties are relatively disorganized.

Manifestations: A long period of dictatorial stability came to an end in 1961, and the sys-

tem has only begun to restabilize itself under a new order, partly because it lacks institutionalized means of changing and maintaining power. Civil war broke out in 1965, but participation in it was concentrated in the capital. Election of a president who has links with the past dictatorship indicates that dissatisfactions do not run deep.

Prediction: The surface manifestations of discontent of 1965 will diminish. The military will continue to play a large political role but without need for extensive repression of political freedoms.

5. Brazil

Score: Brazil's plus .18 score stems primarily from an extremely strong domestic extractive capability. Other items appear to be average, except for a low international extractive capability. The political party system in Brazil is weak.

Manifestations: Democratic government took an intermission in 1964 when the political party system proved incapable of ordering democratic choices. Little blood was shed, however, and it was possible to take away some political freedom without resorting to large scale repression. Inflation has been very high, but is decreasing.

Prediction: A semi-democratic system should be able to survive the minor manifestations of discontent, with future stability depending in large part upon development of broad-based institutionalized political parties.

6. Paraguay

Score: Paraguay is a poor country, but it is even less mobilized, which gives it a positive environmental score. Its political capabilities are below average.

Manifestations: The population shows little manifest discontent under the strong rule of General Alfredo Stoessner. Dissatisfaction is expressed by high rates of emigration and inflation, which now seem to be under control. The system's capacity for reform is reflected in a large improvement in extractive capability, and continued political liberalization.

Prediction: If the progress of the last few years continues, and economic growth accelerates, there should be no increase in coercion, and the option of peaceful evolution toward a democratic system should present itself.

7. Peru

Score: Radios and labor unions have produced social mobilization at a rate faster than increases in welfare, and the result is a potentially tense social situation. The score on the

environmental indexes is offset by the highest score on distributive capability of any Latin American government. New institutionalized parties seem to be taking hold.

Manifestations: Guerrilla activity has been brought under control. Moderate inflation continues. In 1962 a military takeover proved to be of short duration, and democratic government has been re-established.

Prediction: Continued democratic government with a strong probability of lessening military interference if present high rate of economic growth is maintained.

8. Nicaragua

Score: Environment indexes are fifth highest in the area, due to a relatively low level of social mobilization; but political capabilities are low, primarily because of low distributive capability. A high international extractive capability makes up for some of the deficiencies.

Manifestations: The Liberal party under the leadership of the Somoza family has dominated the system for thirty years. Suspicion of electoral manipulation exists, but some observers claim that the Liberal Party could win free elections. The spring 1967 elections were marked by several outbreaks of violence.

Prediction: The situation will remain uneasy, but improvements in political capabilities and continued economic growth should make it unnecessary to increase the present level of coercion.

9. Venezuela

Score: Although Venezuela's welfare is third highest in Latin America, its social mobilization is highest, primarily because of the almost total organization of labor. Extractive capability is low because the national population resists taxation, but the distributive capability is high. A negative factor not recorded in Venezuela's final score is a poor distribution of income, but an important positive factor, also not recorded, is the existence of institutionalized political parties.

Manifestations: After one hundred years of military rule and dictatorship, democratic government appears to have been finally established, but it has been subjected to attempted coups and guerrilla activity. These uses of violence to influence the political system have, however, been declining. Venezuela has experienced little inflation.

Prediction: Continued decline of violence and continuance of an uneasy democratic system. If economic growth slows to a point where social mobility diminishes, inequality of income will cause difficulties for the system.

10. Argentina

Score: Argentina is less mobilized than the otherwise similar society of Uruguay and enjoys a higher level of welfare. Recent economic growth has been low. The political capabilities of Argentina are low, especially in the collection of taxes. The final score is .04 s.d. below the Latin American mean. The lack of any political party which integrates organized labor into the political system, plus a worsening distribution of income would lower Argentina's score.

Manifestations: Since 1930 the Argentina political system has been subject to repeated military intervention and suppression of political liberties. The present situation is similar to that of thirty years ago, except that labor is better organized and is more persistent in asking for a voice in government. The latest military intervention seems to be increasing the amount of coercion in the system.

Prediction: Continued instability without deteriorating into a revolutionary situation.

11. Ecuador

Score: The one mitigating factor in an otherwise difficult situation in Ecuador is the system's high extractive capability. Ecuador is low on every other index, and without this high capability, which brings its average to minus .07 s.d., it would have placed below Mexico. The political party situation, not included in the final score, is quite poor. On the other hand, the distribution of income is quite a bit better than in most other Latin American countries.

Manifestations: Ecuador seems to be maintaining its historical record of governmental instability. More than any other country of Latin America, Ecuador seems to have institutionalized the coup d'etat as a means of changing government, and perhaps a coup in Ecuador is less an indication of political instability than in some other countries. Civil violence has been minimal.

Prediction: A continuation of institutionalized instability.

12. Honduras

Score: A moderate level of economic growth, coupled with a low level of mobilization, produces a positive environment index in Honduras despite a low level of welfare. Low political capabilities give Honduras a score of minus .16 s.d. The distribution of income in Honduras is probably better than average, and would raise the score somewhat if it were included.

Manifestations: After one change of political parties in power through free elections in 1958,

Honduras reverted to its more traditional form of change by coup d'etat in 1963 and it appears that the level of coercion is increasing. Little inflation.

Prediction: System instability will continue to be expressed in an occasional coup d'etat with subsequent exile and repression of opposition groups.

13. El Salvador

Score: The population of El Salvador is more highly mobilized than the rest of Central America, but its welfare is lower than any of its neighbors except Honduras. The result is more tension within the society. Although its political capabilities are better than those of all its neighbors except Costa Rica, it comes out .22 s.d. below the Latin American mean. A recent rapid increase in educational expenditures has not, however, been counted in this score.

Manifestations: Political freedom has been restricted in El Salvador and leftist groups can operate only within limits. The military has been the strongest force in controlled but progressive developments since 1932. Coups d'etat alternate with electoral methods to bring about turnovers in military leadership. Little inflation.

Prediction: A limited amount of coercion must be applied in order to prevent latent instability from manifesting itself. If progressive governments continue with the modifications of recent years, it may be possible to lower the level of coercion in the future.

14. Uruguay

Score: The Uruguayan population is more highly urbanized and has a greater exposure to mass media than that of any other Latin American country, but although nutrition, health, and education services are high the national production of goods and services has stagnated. Per capita production has actually declined over the past ten years. A fairly capable political system does not compensate for the low environment score, and Uruguay's final score is .23 s.d. below the Latin American mean.

Manifestations: Instability has thus far been expressed through strikes, demonstrations, and inflation rather than through subversion. In December of 1966, Uruguay demonstrated the continued vitality of its political system by adopting a radical constitutional change using democratic procedures.

Prediction: Until the rate of economic growth improves, the solid democratic tradition of Uruguay will encounter increasing manifesta-

tions of instability in the form of a rising level of protest.

15. Mexico

Score: Even a high rate of economic growth has not overcome the excess of social mobilization over societal welfare in Mexico. Mexico's low political capabilities bring its final score down to minus .36. Mexico's distribution of income is also unequal—probably very similar to the situation in Guatemala—but Mexico has an institutionalized party of national integration, which makes it more stable than Guatemala. In the last few years Mexico has made some progress in improving its low level of political capabilities.

Manifestations: The situation seems to remain under control in Mexico in spite of what seems to be a potentially unstable situation. An important reason for this under-manifestation of instability is undoubtedly pride in the Mexican Revolution. 18 There are increasing outbreaks of decentralized violence.

Prediction: Instability, under-manifested in the past, would break out if the delicate political equilibrium were disturbed through an increase in opposition power or a breakdown in the unity of the government party.

16. Colombia

Score: Colombia's high level of urbanization is the primary factor which upsets the equilibrium between welfare and social mobilization. A low score on the environment index indicates a number of severe problems which the government must face, and unfortunately the political system does not have sufficient capability to deal with this difficult situation. Although Colombia is ahead of the Latin American mean on education expenditures, it is behind on taxation. Colombia has strong institutionalized parties but, unlike Mexico, it lacks the myth of the Revolution.

Manifestations: Colombia has been racked by rural violence for nearly twenty years. A military dictatorship ruled from 1953 to 1957. Rural violence although declining continues, and leftist groups appear to be attempting to exploit the situation. Colombia has experienced a moderate amount of inflation.

18 This was brought out in Gabriel Almond and Sidney Verba, The Civic Culture (New York: Little, Brown and Co., 1965), pp. 66-67. Almond and Verba found "... a pattern of high system affect coupled with a rejection of actual performance of the government," and that, "Mexican pride in nation, thus, does seem to depend to some extent on the continuing symbolic identification with the Mexican Revolution."

Prediction: Continued difficulties for the democratic system, but the system has presently exhausted its capacity for civil violence, and the party coalition has taken advantage of the situation to introduce reforms, which should reduce future instability.

17. Guatemala

Score: Guatemala is prosperous compared to its neighbors. This, coupled with a good rate of economic growth, gives it a mark of plus .64 s.d. on the societal index. However, the political capabilities of Guatemala are almost as low as those of Haiti. The unequal distribution of income would further lower its average score of minus .38 if it were included. The political party system is chaotic.

Manifestations: Since the overthrow of the Arbenz government in 1954, leftist groups have been suppressed, and the coup d'etat has been the most common means of choosing governors. A new government was elected in 1966, but it is faced with rightist pressures, the strongest guerrilla movement in Latin America, and an outbreak of political assassinations.

Prediction: Unless government capabilities improve (and there are some signs in that direction) and economic growth continues, the Guatemalan government will continue to face the choice of applying increased amounts of coercion or being overthrown. The situation is unstable.

18. Bolivia

Score: Bolivia is above the Latin American mean both in number of radios and percentage of economically active population in labor unions, but it is far below the mean in societal welfare. Only Bolivia's large international extractive capability prevents a much lower score. The ruling party has been unable to increase political capabilities to any great degree.

Manifestations: Bolivia has experienced all the indicators of system instability: revolution in 1952, runaway inflation, breakdown in the governing coalition, takeover by military in a coup d'etat, a guerrilla movement, and a large number of deaths from civil violence.

Prediction: The situation is so difficult that any government will be forced to chocse between coercion and intense demonstrations of dissatisfaction. If the high level of development assistance were to drop, the situation would become even more more serious.

19. Haiti

Score: Social mobilization has increased over welfare less rapidly than in Peru or Bolivia, but Haiti is last on every other index. It has suffered both natural and man-made economic disasters that have drastically reduced its already low standard of living.

Manifestations: Rule is by coercion. All political opposition is either in exile, imprisoned, or has been killed. Nevertheless, new revolts continue to erupt.

Prediction: A revolutionary situation exists in Haiti.

20. Cuba in 1958

The Cuban government of the 1950's kept worse statistics than any other Latin American government with the possible exception of Haiti, and it is impossible to develop a complete index on the Cuban situation of 1958. However, Cuba presented such an extreme situation that it is possible to come to some firm conclusions about its degree of system instability. Cuba's welfare index was higher than most other Latin American countries. A welfare index that takes into account all but nutrition gives Cuba in 1958 a score of +.29 s.d. or about the same level of societal welfare as Costa Rica in 1965.19 However, its social mobilization was much higher than that of most other countries. Sixty per cent of the economically active population was organized into labor unions, an extreme situation found in very few countries of the world and rivalled only by Venezuela in Latin America. Exposure to public media was also very high; but urbanization was low, a factor perhaps offset by a heavy concentration of the rural population close to urban areas. When put in terms of our indexes, these circumstances mean that the difference between societal welfare and social mobilization was negative by a sum of minus 1.11, twice the difference of Bolivia, which gives a score in standard deviations of minus 3.42, an extreme deviation not found in any other instance in Latin America. Reliable data on economic growth are not available, but estimates indicate that growth was in the range of 2.5 per cent annually during the 1950's at about the same rate as population increase. In 1958 the gross national product actually declined.

The very serious tensions produced by societal conditions were reinforced by a poor situation in the political system. Again, much data is unavailable. Bank of Cuba figures indicate that total central government revenues were about 13 per cent of GDP, but

¹⁹ Data taken from same sources as for Tables 2 and 3 except that per capita gross domestic product was figured from data in *United Nations Statistical Yearbook 1963*.

data is not available to show how much of this was tax revenue.²⁰ In the period prior to 1959, international extractive capability was negligible. Reports that illiteracy was increasing and that fewer children of primary age were in school than before indicate a low distributive capability.²¹ The personalist political parties of the 1930's and 1940's had been destroyed by Batista, and he had developed nothing to replace them.

All of the evidence, then, forces us to the conclusion that the situation in Cuba in 1958 would have produced a final score in system stability somewhat lower than Haiti's. Our prediction, then, would be extreme system instability; in short, revolution.

V. CONCLUSION

No independent numerical index of the manifestations of system stability/instability exists with which to compare the system stability score, and therefore it is not possible to test the theory developed here. However, some indicators do exist. Social revolution, the clearest manifestation of severe system instability, has occurred in three Latin American countries-Mexico, Bolivia, and Cuba-all of which appear very low in the system stability scores. Mexico must have had a much lower score when it experienced its revolution because it has enjoyed the best economic growth record in Latin America since 1930. At the other extreme, Costa Rica with the highest system stability score in Latin America is the one country which all commentators agree has no chance of undergoing a social revolution.

Generally, the qualitative discussion of manifestations developed in the country profiles indicate that the system stability scores do measure a condition that is expressed in manifestations of one kind or another. Two obvious deviations exist—the Dominican Republic and Mexico—which have been interpreted to mean that the Dominican Republic has in recent years overmanifested its degree of instability and will settle down in the future, and Mexico has undermanifested its degree of instability and will become more unsettled in the future.

Other authors have developed indexes of some of the manifestations of instability. For

^{2•} José M. Illán, Cuba-Datos sobre una Economia en Ruinas (Florida, 1963, privately published).

² For a fuller description see Dudley Seers et al., Cuba: The Economic and Social Revolution (Chapel Hill, N.C.: University of North Carolina Press, 1964).

instance. Charles Ruttenberg has developed an index of the total magnitude of civil violence, which measures the duration, pervasiveness, intensity and amplitude of civil violence of nearly all non-communist countries of the world for the years 1961-1963.22 The short time period plus the underreporting in some countries places severe limitations on the index. A rank correlation analysis between Ruttenberg's index of civil violence and the system stability score produces a correlation of only .12. Bruce M. Russett and associates have calculated the number of deaths from group violence per million population which covers a wider time span, 1950 to 1962,23 and which has a higher correlation with the system stability score with a coefficient of .26. Indexes of inflation show no correlation with the system stability score because the countries which

²² Charles Ruttenberg, "Measures of Civil Violence," in Ted Gurr, *The Conditions of Civil Violence: First Tests of a Causal Model* (Princeton: Center of International Studies, 1967).

²³ Bruce M. Russett, et al., World Handbook of Political and Social Indicators (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1964).

appear low in system stability are also the ones most likely to suppress popular demands. Until more complete evidence is available on all the manifestations of system instability, the theory presented here must be considered neither invalidated nor supported by independent measures of manifestations.

The concept of system stability/instability does appear to be useful in understanding political systems. It is independent of the democratic-authoritarian dimension of the system but affects the direction of change of the political structures. Only a relatively stable system can control its structural change. At least in Latin America where a system can control its structural change, it will move toward a democratic system because the predominant political values support personal liberty. On the other hand, an unstable system is caught in difficult circumstances in which it loses its freedom of choice. External assistance can help these countries, but they lack the domestic resources to make gradual and controlled changes. Recognition and knowledge of this dimension of stability/instability thus adds to the understanding of the unfolding of events within a political system.

PROTEST AS A POLITICAL RESOURCE*

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The frequent resort to protest activity by relatively powerless groups in recent American politics suggests that protest represents an important aspect of minority group and low income group politics. At the same time that Negro civil rights strategists have recognized the problem of using protest as a meaningful

* This article is an attempt to develop and explore the implications of a conceptual scheme for analyzing protest activity. It is based upon my studies of protest organizations in New York City, Washington, D.C., Chicago, San Francisco, and Mississippi, as well as extensive examination of written accounts of protest among low-income and Negro civil rights groups. I am grateful to Kenneth Dolbeare, Murray Edelman, and Rodney Stiefbold for their insightful comments on an earlier draft. This paper was developed while the author was a Staff Associate of the Institute for Research on Poverty at the University of Wisconsin. I appreciate the assistance obtained during various phases of my research from the Rabinowitz Foundation, the New York State Legislative Internship Program, and the Brookings Institution.

1 "Relatively powerless groups" may be defined as those groups which, relatively speaking, are lacking in conventional political resources. For the purposes of community studies. Robert Dahl has compiled a useful comprehensive list. See Dahl, "The Analysis of Influence in Local Communities," Social Science and Community Action. Charles R. Adrian, ed. (East Lansing, Michigan, 1960), p. 32. The difficulty in studying such groups is that relative powerlessness only becomes apparent under certain conditions. Extremely powerless groups not only lack political resources. but are also characterized by a minimal sense of political efficacy, upon which in part successful political organization depends. For reviews of the literature linking orientations of political efficacy to socioeconomic status, see Robert Lane, Political Life (New York, 1959), ch. 16; and Lester Milbrath, Political Participation (Chicago, 1965), ch. 5. Further, to the extent that group cohesion is recognized as a necessary requisite for organized political action, then extremely powerless groups, lacking cohesion, will not even appear for observation. Hence the necessity of selecting for intensive study a protest movement where there can be some confidence that observable processes and results can be analyzed. Thus, if one conceives of a continuum on which political groups are placed according to their relative command of political instrument,² groups associated with the "war on poverty" have increasingly received publicity for protest activity. Saul Alinsky's Industrial Areas Foundation, for example, continues to receive invitations to help organize low income communities because of its ability to mobilize poor people around the tactic of protest.³ The riots which dominated urban affairs in the summer of 1967 appear not to have diminished the dependence of some groups on protest as a mode of political activity.

This article provides a theoretical perspective on protest activity as a political resource. The discussion is concentrated on the limitations inherent in protest which occur because of the need of protest leaders to appeal to four constituencies at the same time. As the concept of protest is developed here, it will be argued that protest leaders must nurture and sustain an organization comprised of people with whom they may or may not share common values. They must articulate goals and choose strategies so as to maximize their public exposure through communications media. They must maximize the impact of third parties in the political conflict. Finally, they must try to maximize chances of success among those capable of granting goals. The tensions inherent in manipulating these four constituencies at the same time form the basis of this discussion of protest as a political process. It is intended to place aspects of the civil rights movement in a framework which suggests links between protest organizations and the general political processes in which such organizations operate.

I. "PROTEST" CONCEPTUALIZED

Protest activity as it has been adopted by elements of the civil rights movement and others has not been studied extensively by

resources, the focus of this essay is on those groups which are near, but not at, the pole of powerlessness.

- ² See, e.g., Bayard Rustin, "From Protest to Politics: The Future of the Civil Rights Movement," Commentary (February, 1965), 25-31; and Stokely Carmichael, "Toward Black Liberation," The Massachusetts Review (Autumn, 1966.)
- ³ On Alinsky's philosophy of community organization, see his *Reveille for Radicals* (Chicago, 1945); and Charles Silberman, *Crisis in Black and White* (New York, 1964), ch. 10.

social scientists. Some of the most suggestive writings have been done as case studies of protest movements in single southern cities.4 These works generally lack a framework or theoretical focus which would encourage generalization from the cases. More systematic efforts have been attempted in approaching the dynamics of biracial committees in the South.5 and comprehensively assessing the efficacy of Negro political involvement in Durham, N.C. and Philadelphia, Pa.⁶ In their excellent assessment of Negro politics in the South. Matthews and Prothro have presented a thorough profile of Southern Negro students and their participation in civil rights activities.7 Protest is also discussed in passing in recent explorations of the social-psychological dimensions of Negro ghetto politics8 and the still highly suggestive, although pre-1960's. work on Negro political leadership by James Q. Wilson. These and other less systematic works on contemporary Negro politics, 10 for all of their intuitive insights and valuable documentation, offer no theoretical formula-

⁴ See, e.g., Jack L. Walker, "Protest and Negotiation: A Case Study of Negro Leadership in Atlanta, Georgia," Midwest Journal of Political Science, 7 (May, 1963), 99-124; Jack L. Walker, Sit-Ins in Atlanta: A Study in the Negro Protest, Eagleton Institute Case Studies, No. 34 (New York, 1964); John Ehle, The Free Men (New York, 1965) [Chapel Hill]; Daniel C. Thompson, The Negro Leadership Class (Englewood Cliffs, N.J., 1963) [New Orleans]; M. Elaine Burgess, Negro Leadership in a Southern City (Chapel Hill, N.C., 1962) [Durham].

⁵ Lewis Killian and Charles Grigg, Racial Crisis in America: Leadership in Conflict (Englewood Cliffs, N.J., 1964).

⁶ William Keech, "The Negro Vote as a Political Resource: The Case of Durham," (unpublished Ph.D. Dissertation, University of Wisconsin, 1966); John H. Strange, "The Negro in Philadelphia Politics 1963-65," (unpublished Ph.D. Dissertation, Princeton University, 1966).

⁷ Donald Matthews and James Prothro, Negroes and the New Southern Politics (New York, 1966). Considerable insight on these data is provided in John Orbell, "Protest Participation among Southern Negro College Students," this Review, 61 (June, 1967), 446–456.

- ⁸ Kenneth Clark, Dark Ghetto (New York, 1965).
 - 9 Negro Politics (New York, 1960).
- ¹⁰ A complete list would be voluminous. See, e.g., Nat Hentoff, *The New Equality* (New York, 1964); Arthur Waskow, *From Race Riot to Sit-in* (New York, 1966).

tions which encourage conceptualization about the interaction between recent Negro political activity and the political process.

Heretofore the best attempt to place Negro protest activity in a framework which would generate additional insights has been that of James Q. Wilson. Wilson has suggested that protest activity be conceived as a problem of bargaining in which the basic problem is that Negro groups lack political resources to exchange. Wilson called this "the problem of the powerless." 12

While many of Wilson's insights remain valid, his approach is limited in applicability because it defines protest in terms of mass action or response and as utilizing exclusively negative inducements in the bargaining process. Negative inducements are defined as inducements which are not absolutely preferred but are preferred over alternative possibilities.¹³ Yet it might be argued that protest designed to appeal to groups which oppose suffering and exploitation, for example, might be offering positive inducements in bargaining. A few Negro students sitting at a lunch counter might be engaged in what would be called protest, and by their actions might be trying to appeal to other groups in the system with positive inducements. Additionally, Wilson's concentration on Negro civic action, and his exclusive interest in exploring the protest process to explain Negro civic action, tend to obscure comparison with protest activity which does not necessarily arise within the Negro community.

Assuming a somewhat different focus, protest activity is defined as a mode of political action oriented toward objection to one or more policies or conditions, characterized by showmanship or display of an unconventional nature, and undertaken to obtain rewards from political or economic systems while working within the systems. The "problem of the powerless" in protest activity is to activate "third parties" to enter the implicit or explicit bargaining arena in ways favorable to the protesters. This is one of the few ways in which they can "create" bargaining resources. It is intuitively uncon-

¹¹ "The Strategy of Protest: Problems of Negro Civic Action," Journal of Conflict Resolution, 3 (September, 1961), 291-303. The reader will recognize the author's debt to this highly suggestive article, not least Wilson's recognition of the utility of the bargaining framework for examining protest activity.

¹² Ibid., p. 291.

¹³ Ibid., p. 291-292.

vincing to suggest that fifteen people sitting uninvited in the Mayor's office have the power to move City Hall. A better formulation would suggest that the people sitting in may be able to appeal to a wider public to which the city administration is sensitive. Thus in successful protest activity the reference publics of protest targets may be conceived as explicitly or implicitly reacting to protest in such a way that target groups or individuals respond in ways favorable to the protesters.¹⁴

It should be emphasized that the focus here is on protest by relatively powerless groups. Illustrations can be summoned, for example, of activity designated as "protest" involving high status pressure groups or hundreds of thousands of people. While such instances may share some of the characteristics of protest activity, they may not represent examples of developing political resources by relatively powerless groups because the protesting groups may already command political resources by virtue of status, numbers or cohesion.

It is appropriate also to distinguish between the relatively restricted use of the concept of protest adopted here and closely related political strategies which are often designated as "protest" in popular usage. Where groups already possess sufficient resources with which to bargain, as in the case of some economic boycotts and labor strikes, they may be said to engage in "direct confrontation." Similarly, protest which represents efforts to "activate reference publics" should be distinguished from "alliance formation," where third parties are induced to join the conflict, but where the value orientations of third parties are sufficiently similar to those of the protesting group

¹⁴ See E. E. Schattschneider's discussion of expanding the scope of the conflict, *The Semisovereign People* (New York, 1960). Another way in which bargaining resources may be "created" is to increase the relative cohesion of groups, or to increase the perception of group solidarity as a precondition to greater cohesion. This appears to be the primary goal of political activity which is generally designated "community organization." Negro activists appear to recognize the utility of this strategy in their advocacy of "black power." In some instances protest activity may be designed in part to accomplish this goal in addition to activating reference publics.

¹⁵ For an example of "direct confrontation," one might study the three-month Negro boycott of white merchants in Natchez, Miss., which resulted in capitulation to boycott demands by city government leaders. See *The New York Times*, December 4, 1965, p. 1.

that concerted or coordinated action is possible. Alliance formation is particularly desirable for relatively powerless groups if they seek to join the decision-making process as participants.

The distinction between activating reference publics and alliance formation is made on the assumption that where goal orientations among protest groups and the reference publics of target groups are similar, the political dynamics of petitioning target groups are different than when such goal orientations are relatively divergent. Clearly the more similar the goal orientations, the greater the likelihood of protest success, other things being equal. This discussion is intended to highlight, however, those instances where goal orientations of reference publics depart significantly, in direction or intensity, from the goals of protest groups.

Say that to protest some situation. A would like to enter a bargaining situation with B. But A has nothing B wants, and thus cannot bargain. A then attempts to create political rescurces by activating other groups to enter the conflict. A then organizes to take action against B with respect to certain goals. Information concerning these goals must be conveyed through communications media (C. D. and E) to F. G. and H. which are B's reference publics. In response to the reactions of F, G, and H, or in anticipation of their reactions, B responds, in some way, to the protesters' demands. This formulation requires the conceptualization of procest activity when undertaken to create bargaining resources as a political process which requires communication and is characterized by a multiplicity of constituencies for protest leadership.

A schematic representation of the process of protest as utilized by relatively powerless groups is presented in Figure 1. In contrast to a simplistic pressure group model which would posit a direct relationship between pressure group and pressured, the following discussion is guided by the assumption (derived from observation) that protest is a highly indirect process in which communications media and the reference publics of protest targets play critical roles. It is also a process characterized by reciprocal relations, in which protest leaders frame strategies according to their perception of the needs of (many) other actors.

In this view protest constituents limit the options of protest leaders at the same time that the protest leader influences their perception of the strategies and rhetoric which they will support. Protest activity is filtered through




Fig. 1. Schematic representation of the process of protest by relatively powerless groups.

the communications media in influencing the perceptions of the reference publics of protest targets. To the extent that the influence of reference publics is supportive of protest goals, target groups will dispense symbolic or material rewards. Material rewards are communicated directly to protest constituents. Symbolic rewards are communicated in part to protest constituents, but primarily are communicated to the reference publics of target groups, who provide the major stimuli for public policy pronouncements.

The study of protest as adopted by relatively powerless groups should provide insights into the structure and behavior of groups involved in civil rights politics and associated with the "war on poverty." It should direct attention toward the ways in which administrative agencies respond to "crises." Additionally, the study of protest as a political resource should influence some general conceptualizations of American political pluralism. Robert Dahl, for example, describes the "normal American political process" as one in which there is a high probability that an active and legitimate group in the population can

make itself heard effectively at some crucial stage in the process of decision.¹⁶

Although he agrees that control over decisions is unevenly divided in the population, Dahl writes:

When I say that a group is heard "effectively" I mean more than the simple fact that it makes a noise; I mean that one or more officials are not only ready to listen to the noise, but expect to suffer in some significant way if they do not placate the group, its leaders, or its most vociferous members. To satisfy the group may require one or more of a great variety of actions by the responsive leader: pressure for substantive policies, appointments, graft, respect, expression of the appropriate emotions, or the right combination of reciprocal noises.¹⁷

These statements, which in some ways resemble David Truman's discussion of the

¹⁶ A Preface to Democratic Theory (Chicago, 1956), pp. 145-146.

¹⁷ Ibid.

power of "potential groups," 18 can be illuminated by the study of protest activity in three ways. First, what are the probabilities that relatively powerless groups can make themselves heard effectively? In what ways will such groups be heard or "steadily appeased"? Concentration on the process of protest activity may reveal the extent to which, and the conditions under which, relatively powerless groups are likely to prove effective. Protest undertaken to obstruct policy decisions, for example, may enjoy greater success probabilities than protest undertaken in an effort to evoke constructive policy innovations. 20

Second, does it make sense to suggest that all groups which make noises will receive responses from public officials? Perhaps the groups which make noises do not have to be satisfied at all, but it is other groups which receive assurances or recognition. Third, what are the probabilities that groups which make noises will receive tangible rewards, rather than symbolic assurances?²¹ Dahl lumps these rewards together in the same paragraph, but dispensation of tangible rewards clearly has a different impact upon groups than the dispensation of symbolic rewards. Dahl is undoubtedly correct when he suggests that the relative fluidity of American politics is a critical characteristic of the American political system.22 But he is less precise and less convincing when it comes to analyzing the extent to which the system is indeed responsive to the relatively powerless groups of the "average citizen."23

¹⁸ The Governmental Process (New York, 1951), p. 104.

 19 See Dahl, A Preface to Democratic Theory, p. 146.

²⁰ Observations that all groups can influence public policy at some stage of the political process are frequently made about the role of "veto groups" in American politics. See *Ibid.*, pp. 104 ff. See also David Reisman, *The Lonely Crowd* (New Haven, 1950), pp. 211 ff., for an earlier discussion of veto-group politics. Yet protest should be evaluated when it is adopted to obtain assertive as well as defensive goals.

²¹ See Murray Edelman, The Symbolic Uses of Politics (Urbana, Ill., 1964), ch. 2.

²² See Dahl, Who Governs? (New Haven, 1961), pp. 305 ff.

²³ In a recent formulation, Dahl reiterates the theme of wide dispersion of influence. "More than other systems, [democracies]... try to disperse influence widely to their citizens by means of the suffrage, elections, freedom of speech, press, and

The following sections are an attempt to demonstrate the utility of the conceptualization of the protest process presented above. This will be done by exploring the problems encountered and the strains generated by protest leaders in interacting with four constituencies. It will be useful to concentrate attention on the maintenance and enhancement needs not only of the large formal organizations which dominate city politics,24 but also of the ad hoc protest groups which engage them in civic controversy. It will also prove rewarding to examine the role requirements of individuals in leadership positions as they perceive the problems of constituency manipulation. In concluding remarks some implications of the study of protest for the pluralist description of American politics will be suggested.25

II. PROTEST LEADERSHIP AND ORGANIZATIONAL BASE

The organizational maintenance needs of relatively powerless, low income, ad hoc protest groups center around the tension generated by the need for leadership to offer symbolic and intangible inducements to protest participation when immediate, material rewards cannot be anticipated, and the need to provide at least the promise of material rewards. Protest leaders must try to evoke responses from other actors in the political process, at the same time that they pay attention to participant organizational needs. Thus relatively de-

assembly, the right of opponents to criticize the conduct of government, the right to organize political parties, and in other ways." Pluralist Democracy in the United States (Chicago, 1967), p. 373. Here, however, he concentrates more on the availability of options to all groups in the system, rather than on the relative probabilities that all groups in fact have access to the political process. See pp. 372 ff.

²⁴ See Edward Banfield, *Political Influence* (New York, 1961), p. 263. The analysis of organisational incentive structure which heavily influences Banfield's formulation is Chester Barnard, *The Functions of the Executive* (Cambridge, Mass., 1938).

²⁶ In the following attempt to develop the implications of this conceptualization of protest activity, I have drawn upon extensive field observations and bibliographical research. Undoubtedly, however, individual assertions, while representing my best judgment concerning the available evidence, in the future may require modification as the result of further empirical research.

prived groups in the political system not only receive symbolic reassurance while material rewards from the system are withheld, 26 but protest leaders have a stake in perpetuating the notion that relatively powerless groups retain political efficacy despite what in many cases is obvious evidence to the contrary.

The tension embraced by protest leaders over the nature of inducements toward protest participation accounts in part for the style adopted and goals selected by protest leaders. Groups which seek psychological gratification from politics, but cannot or do not anticipate material political rewards, may be attracted to militant protest leaders. To these groups, angry rhetoric may prove a desirable quality in the short run. Where groups depend upon the political system for tangible benefits, or where participation in the system provides intangible benefits, moderate leadership is likely to prevail. Wilson has observed similar tendencies among Negro leaders of large, formal organizations.27 It is no less true for leadership of protest groups. Groups whose members derive tangible satisfactions from political participation will not condone leaders who are stubborn in compromise or appear to question the foundations of the system. This coincides with Truman's observation:

Violation of the "rules of the game" normally will weaken a group's cohesion, reduce its status in the community, and expose it to the claims of other groups.²⁸

On the other hand, the cohesion of relatively powerless groups may be strengthened by militant, ideological leadership which questions the rules of the game and challenges their legitimacy.

Cohesion is particularly important when protest leaders bargain directly with target groups. In that situation, leaders' ability to control protest constituents and guarantee their behavior represents a bargaining strength.²⁹ For this reason Wilson stressed the bargaining difficulties of Negro leaders who cannot guarantee constituent behavior, and pointed out the significance of the strategy of projecting the image of group solidarity when the reality of cohesion is a fiction.³⁰ Cohesion is less significant at other times. Divided

leadership may prove productive by bargaining in tandem,³¹ or by minimizing strain among groups in the protest process. Further, community divisions may prove less detrimental to protest aims when strong third parties have entered the dispute originally generated by protest organizations.

The intangible rewards of assuming certain postures toward the political system may not be sufficient to sustain an organizational base. It may be necessary to renew constantly the intangible rewards of participation. And to the extent that people participate in order to achieve tangible benefits, their interest in a protest organization may depend upon the crganization's relative material success. Frotest leaders may have to tailor their style to present participants with tangible successes, or with the appearance of success. Leaders may have to define the issues with concern for increasing their ability to sustain organizations. The potential for protest among protest group members may have to be manipulated by leadership if the group is to be sustained.32

The participants in protest organizations limit the flexibility of protest leadership. This obtains for two reasons. They restrict public actions by leaders who must continue to solicit active participant support, and they place restraints on the kinds of activities which can be considered appropriate for protest purposes. Poor participants cannot commonly be asked to engage in protest requiring air transportation. Participants may have anxieties related to their environment or historical situation which discourages engagement in some activities.

³¹ This is suggested by Wilson, "The Strategy of Protest," p. 298; St. Clair Drake and Horace Cayton, Black Metropolis (New York, 1962, rev. ed.), p. 731; Walker, "Protest and Negotiation," p. 122. Authors who argue that divided leadership is dysfunctional have been Clark, p. 156; and Tilman Cothran, "The Negro Protest Against Segregation in the South," The Annals, 357 (January, 1965), p. 72.

32 This observation is confirmed by a student of the Southern civil rights movement:

Negroes demand of protest leaders constant progress. The combination of long-standing discontent and a new-found belief in the possibility of change produces a constant state of tension and aggressiveness in the Negro community. But this discontent is vague and diffuse, not specific; the masses do not define the issues around which action shall revolve. This the leader must do.

Lewis Killian, "Leadership in the Desegregation Crises: An Institutional Analysis," in Muzafer Sherif (ed.), Intergroup Relations and Leadership (New York; 1962), p. 159.

²⁶ As Edelman suggests, cited previously.

²⁷ Negro Politics, p. 290.

²⁸ The Governmental Process, p. 513.

²⁰ But cf. Thomas Schelling's discussion of "binding oneself," *The Strategy of Conflict* (Cambridge, Mass., 1960), pp. 22 ff.

^{30 &}quot;The Strategy of Protest," p. 297.

They may be afraid of job losses, beatings by the police, or summary evictions. Negro protest in the Deep South has been inhibited by realistic expectations of retribution.³³ Protests over slum housing conditions are undermined by tenants who expect landlord retaliation for engaging in tenant organizing activity.³⁴ Political or ethical mores may conflict with a proposed course of action, diminishing participation.³⁵

On the other hand, to the extent that fears are real, or that the larger community perceives protest participants as subject to these fears, protest may actually be strengthened. Communications media and potential allies will consider more soberly the complaints of people who are understood to be placing themselves in jeopardy. When young children and their parents made the arduous bus trip from Mississippi to Washington, D.C. to protest the jeopardizing of Head Start funds, the courage and expense represented by their effort created a respect and visibility for their position which might not have been achieved by local protest efforts.³⁶

Protest activity may be undertaken by organizations with established relationship patterns, behavior norms, and role expectations. These organizations are likely to have greater access to other groups in the political system, and a demonstrated capacity to maintain themselves. Other protest groups, however, may be ad hoc arrangements without demonstrated internal or external relationship pat-

³³ Significantly, southern Negro students who actively participated in the early phases of the sit-in movement "tended to be unusually optimistic about race relations and tolerant of whites [when compared with inactive Negro students]. They not only were better off, objectively speaking, than other Negroes but felt better off." Matthews and Prothro, op. cit., p. 424.

³⁴ This is particularly the case in cities such as Washington, D.C., where landlord-tenant laws offer little protection against retaliatory eviction. See, e.g., Robert Schoshinski, "Remedies of the Indigent Tenant: Proposal for Change," Georgetown Law Journal, 54 (Winter, 1966), 541 ff.

Wilson regarded this as a chief reason for lack of protest activity in 1961. He wrote: "... some of the goals now being sought by Negroes are least applicable to those groups of Negroes most suited to protest action. Protest action involving such tactics as mass meetings, picketing, boycotts, and strikes rarely find enthusiastic participants among upper-income and higher status individuals": "The Strategy of Protest," p. 296.

³⁶ See The New York Times, February 12, 1966, p. 56.

terns. These groups will have different organizational problems, in response to which it is necessary to engage in different kinds of protest activity.

The scarcity of organizational resources also places limits upon the ability of relatively powerless groups to maintain the foundations upon which protest organizations develop. Relatively powerless groups, to engage in political activity of any kind, must command at least some resources. This is not tautological. Referring again to a continuum on which political groups are placed according to their relative command of resources, one may draw a line somewhere along the continuum representing a "threshold of civic group political participation." Clearly some groups along the continuum will possess some political resources (enough, say, to emerge for inspection) but not enough to exercise influence in civic affairs. Relatively powerless groups, to be influential, must cross the "threshold" to engage in politics. Although the availability of group resources is a critical consideration at all stages of the protest process, it is particularly important in explaining why some groups seem to "surface" with sufficient strength to command attention. The following discussion of some critical organizational resources should illuminate this point.

Skilled professionals frequently must be available to protest organizations. Lawyers, for example, play extremely important roles in enabling protest groups to utilize the judicial process and avail themselves of adequate preparation of court cases. Organizational reputation may depend upon a combination of ability to threaten the conventional political system and of exercising statutory rights in court. Availability of lawyers depends upon ability to pay fees and/or the attractiveness to lawyers of participation in protest group activity. Volunteer professional assistance may not prove adequate. One night a week volunteered by an aspiring politician in a housing clinic cannot satisfy the needs of a chaotic political movement.37 The need for skilled professionals is not restricted to lawyers. For example, a group seeking to protest an urban renewal

²⁷ On housing clinic services provided by political clubs, see James Q. Wilson, *The Amateur Democrat: Club Politics in Three Cities* (Chicago, 1962), pp. 63-64, 176. On the need for lawyers among low income people, see e.g., *The Extension of Legal Services to the Poor*, Conference Proceedings (Washington, D.C., n.d.), esp. pp. 51-60; and "Neighborhood Law Offices: The New Wave in Legal Services for the Poor," *Harvard Law Review*, 80 (February, 1967), 805-850.

policy might require the services of architects and city planners in order to present a viable alternative to a city proposal.

Financial resources not only purchase legal assistance, but enable relatively powerless groups to conduct minimum programs of political activities. To the extent that constituents are unable or unwilling to pay even small membership dues, then financing the cost of mimeographing flyers, purchasing supplies, maintaining telephone service, paying rent, and meeting a modest payroll become major organizational problems. And to the extent that group finances are supplied by outside individual contributions or government or foundation grants, the long-term options of the group are sharply constrained by the necessity of orienting group goals and tactics to anticipate the potential objections of financial supporters.

Some dependence upon even minimal financial resources can be waived if organizations evoke passionate support from constituents. Secretarial help and block organizers will come forward to work without compensation if they support the cause of neighborhood organizations or gain intangible benefits based upon association with the group. Protest organizations may also depend upon skilled non-professionals, such as college students, whose access to people and political and economic institutions often assist protest groups in cutting across income lines to seek support. Experience with ad hoc political groups, however, suggests that this assistance is sporadic and undependable. Transient assistance is particularly typical of skilled, educated, and employable volunteers whose abilities can be applied widely. The die-hards of ad hoc political groups are often those people who have no place else to go, nothing else to do.

Constituent support will be affected by the nature of the protest target and whether protest activity is directed toward defensive or assertive goals. Obstructing specific public policies may be easier than successfully recommending constructive policy changes. Orientations toward defensive goals may require less constituent energy, and less command over resources of money, expertise and status.³⁸

III. PROTEST LEADERSHIP AND COMMUNICATIONS MEDIA

The communications media are extremely powerful in city politics. In granting or withholding publicity, in determining what in-

³⁸ An illustration of low income group protest organization mobilized for veto purposes is provided by Dahl in "The Case of the Metal Houses." See Who Governs?, pp. 192 ff.

formation most people will have on most issues, and what alternatives they will consider in response to issues, the media truly, as Norton Long has put it, "set... the civic agenda." To the extent that successful protest activity depends upon appealing to, and/or threatening, other groups in the community, the communications media set the limits of protest action. If protest tactics are not considered significant by the media, or if newspapers and television reporters or editors decide to overlook protest tactics, protest organizations will not succeed. Like the tree falling unheard in the forest, there is no protest unless protest is perceived and projected.

A number of writers have noticed that the success of protest activity seems directly related to the amount of publicity it receives outside the immediate arena in which protest takes place. This view has not been stated systematically, but hints can be found in many sources. In the literature on civil rights politics, the relevance of publicity represents one of the few hypotheses available concerning the dynamics of successful protest activity.⁴⁰

When protest tactics do receive coverage in the communications media, the way in which they are presented will influence all other actors in the system, including the protesters themselves. Conformity to standards of newsworthiness in political style, and knowledge of the prejudices and desires of the individuals who determine media coverage in political skills, represent crucial determinants of leadership effectiveness.

The organizational behavior of newspapers can partly be understood by examining the maintenance and enhancement needs which direct them toward projects of civic betterment and impressions of accomplishment.⁴¹ But insight may also be gained by analyzing the role requirements of reporters, editors, and others

³⁹ Norton Long, "The Local Community as an Ecology of Games," in Long, The Polity, Charles Press, ed. (Chicago, 1962), p. 153. See pp. 152–154. See also Roscoe C. Martin, Frank J. Munger, et al., Decisions in Syracuse: A Metropolitan Action Study (Garden City, N.Y., 1965) (originally published: 1961), pp. 326–327.

⁴⁰ See, e.g., Thompson, op. cit., p. 134, and passim; Martin Oppenheimer, "The Southern Student Movement: Year I," Journal of Negro Education, 33 (Fall, 1964), p. 397; Cothran, op. cit., p. 72; Pauli Murray, "Protest Against the Legal Status of the Negro," The Annals, 357 (January, 1965), p. 63; Allan P. Sindler, "Protest Against the Political Status of the Negroes," The Annals, 357 (January, 1965), p. 50.

41 See Banfield, op. cit., p. 275.

who determine newspaper policy. Reporters, for example, are frequently motivated by the desire to contribute to civic affairs by their "objective" reporting of significant events; by the premium they place on accuracy; and by the credit which they receive for sensationalism and "scoops."

These requirements may be difficult to accommodate at the same time. Reporters demand newsworthiness of their subjects in the short run, but also require reliability and verifiability in the longer run. Factual accuracy may dampen newsworthiness. Sensationalism, attractive to some newspaper editors, may be inconsistent with reliable, verifiable narration of events. Newspapers at first may be attracted to sensationalism, and later demand verifiability in the interests of community harmony (and adherence to professional journalistic standards).

Most big city newspapers have reporters whose assignments permit them to cover aspects of city politics with some regularity. These reporters, whose "beats" may consist of "civil rights" or "poverty," sometimes develop close relationships with their news subjects. These relationships may develop symbiotic overtones because of the mutuality of interest between the reporter and the news subject. Reporters require fresh information on protest developments, while protest leaders have a vital interest in obtaining as much press coverage as possible.

Inflated reports of protest success may be understood in part by examining this relationship between reporter and protest leader. Both have role-oriented interests in projecting images of protest strength and threat. In circumstances of great excitement, when competition from other news media representatives is high, a reporter may find that he is less governed by the role requirement of verification and reliability than he is by his editor's demand for "scoops" and news with high audience appeal.⁴²

On the other hand, the demands of the media may conflict with the needs of protest group maintenance. Consider the leader whose con-

⁴² For a case study of the interaction between protest leaders and newspaper reporters, see Michael Lipsky, "Rent Strikes in New York City: Protest Politics and the Power of the Poor," (unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, Princeton University, 1967), pp. 139–49. Bernard Cohen has analyzed the impact of the press on foreign policy from the perspective of reporters' role requirements: see his *The Press and Foreign Policy* (Princeton, N.J., 1963), esp. chs. 2–3.

stituents are attracted solely by pragmatic statements not exceeding what they consider political "good taste." He is constrained from making militant demands which would isolate him from constituents. This constraint may cost him appeal in the press.⁴³ However, the leader whose organizing appeal requires militant rhetoric may obtain eager press coverage only to find that his inflamatory statements lead to alienation of potential allies and exclusion from the explicit bargaining process.⁴⁴

News media do not report events in the same way. Television may select for broadcast only thirty seconds of a half-hour news conference. This coverage will probably focus on immediate events, without background or explanatory material. Newspapers may give more complete accounts of the same event. The most complete account may appear in the weekly edition of a neighborhood or ethnic newspaper. Differential coverage by news media, and differential news media habits in the general population, 45 are significant factors in permitting protest leaders to juggle conflicting demands of groups in the protest process.

Similar tensions exist in the leader's relationships with protest targets. Ideological postures may gain press coverage and con-

⁴³ An example of a protest conducted by middle-class women engaged in pragmatic protest over salvaging park space is provided in John B. Keeley, *Moses on the Green*, Inter-University Case Program, No. 45 (University, Ala., 1959).

44 This was the complaint of Floyd McKissick, National Director of the Congress of Racial Equality, when he charged that "... there are only two kinds of statements a black man can make and expect that the white press will report.... First ... is an attack on another black man. . . . The second is a statement that sounds radical, violent, extreme—the verbal equivalent of a riot. . . . [T]he Negro is being rewarded by the public media only if he turns on another Negro and uses his tongue as a switchblade, or only if he sounds outlandish, extremist or psychotic." Statement at the Convention of the American Society of Newspaper Editors, April 20, 1967, Washington, D.C., as reported in The New York Times, April 21, 1967, p. 22. See also the remarks of journalist Ted Poston, ibid., April 26, 1965, p. 26.

⁴⁵ Matthews and Prothro found, for example, that in their south-wide Negro population sample, 38 percent read Negro-oriented magazines and 17 percent read newspapers written for Negroes. These media treat news of interest to Negroes more completely and sympathetically than do the general media. See pp. 248 ff.

stituency approval, but may alienate target groups with whom it would be desirable to bargain explicitly. Exclusion from the councils of decision-making may have important consequences, since the results of target group deliberations may satisfy activated reference publics without responding to protest goals. If activated reference publics are required to increase the bargaining position of the protest group, protest efforts thereafter will have diminished chances of success.

IV. PROTEST LEADERSHIP AND "THIRD PARTIES"

I have argued that the essence of political protest consists of activating third parties to participate in controversy in ways favorable to protest goals. In previous sections I have attempted to analyze some of the tensions which result from protest leaders' attempts to activate reference publics of protest targets at the same time that they must retain the interest and support of protest organization participants. This phenomenon is in evidence when Negro leaders, recognized as such by public officials, find their support eroded in the Negro community because they have engaged in explicit bargaining situations with politicians. Negro leaders are thus faced with the dilemma that when they behave like other ethnic group representatives they are faced with loss of support from those whose intense activism has been aroused in the Negro community, yet whose support is vital if they are to remain credible as leaders to public officials.

The tensions resulting from conflicting maintenance needs of protest organizations and activated third parties present difficulties for protest leaders. One way in which these tensions can be minimized is by dividing leadership responsibilities. If more than one group is engaged in protest activity, protest leaders can, in effect, divide up public roles so as to reduce as much as possible the gap between the implicit demands of different groups for appropriate rhetoric, and what in fact is said. Thus divided leadership may perform the latent function of minimizing tensions among elements in the protest process by permitting different groups to listen selectively to protest spokesmen.46

Another way in which strain among different groups can be minimized is through successful public relations. Minimization of strain may depend upon ambiguity of action or statement, deception, or upon effective inter-group communication. Failure to clarify meaning, or fal-

sification, may increase protest effectiveness. Effective intragroup communication may increase the likelihood that protest constituents will "understand" that ambiguous or false public statements have "special meaning" and need not be taken seriously. The Machiavellian circle is complete when we observe that although lying may be prudent, the appearance of integrity and forthrightness is desirable for public relations, since these values are widely shared.

It has been observed that "[t]he militant displays an unwillingness to perform those administrative tasks which are necessary to operate an organization. Probably the skills of the agitator and the skills of the administrator . . . are not incompatible, but few men can do both well."47 These skills may or may not be incompatible as personality traits, but they indeed represent conflicting role demands on protest leadership. When a protest leader exhausts time and energy conducting frequent press conferences, arranging for politicians and celebrities to appear at rallies, delivering speeches to sympathetic local groups, college symposia and other forums, constantly picketing for publicity and generally making "contacts," he is unable to pursue the direction of office routine, clerical tasks, research and analysis, and other chores.

The difficulties of delegating routine tasks are probably directly related to the skill levels and previous administrative experiences of group members. In addition, to the extent that involvement in protest organizations is a function of rewards received or expected by individuals because of the excitement or entertainment value of participation, then the difficulties of delegating routine, relatively uninteresting chores to group members will be increased. Yet attention to such details affects the perception of protest groups by organizations whose support or assistance may be desired in the future. These considerations add to the protest leader's problem of risking alienation of protest participants because of potentially unpopular cooperation with the "power structure."

In the protest paradigm developed here, "third parties" refers both to the reference publics of target groups and, more narrowly, to the interest groups whose regular interaction with protest targets tends to develop into patterns of influence. We have already discussed some of the problems associated with activat-

⁴⁸ See footnote 31 above.

⁴⁷ Wilson, Negro Politics, p. 225.

⁴⁸ See Wallace Sayre and Herbert Kaufman, Governing New York City (New York, 1960), pp. 257 ff. Also see Banfield, op. cit., p. 267.

ing the reference publics of target groups. In discussing the constraints placed upon protest, attention may be focused upon the likelihood that groups seeking to create political resources through protest will be included in the explicit bargaining process with other pressure groups. For protest groups, these constraints are those which occur because of class and political style, status, and organizational resources.

The established civic groups most likely to be concerned with the problems raised by relatively powerless groups are those devoted to service in the public welfare and those "liberally" oriented groups whose potential constituents are either drawn from the same class as the protest groups (such as some trade unions), or whose potential constituents are attracted to policies which appear to serve the interest of the lower class or minority groups (such as some reform political clubs).49 These civic groups have frequently cultivated clientele relationships with city agencies over long periods. Their efforts have been reciprocated by agency officials anxious to develop constituencies to support and defend agency administrative and budgetary policies. In addition, clientele groups are expected to endorse and legitimize agency aggrandizement. These relationships have been developed by agency officials and civic groups for mutual benefit, and cannot be destroyed, abridged or avoided without cost.

Protest groups may well be able to raise the saliency of issues on the civic agenda through utilization of communications media and successful appeals or threats to wider publics, but admission to policy-making councils is frequently barred because of the angry, militant rhetorical style adopted by protest leaders. People in power do not like to sit down with rogues. Protest leaders are likely to have phrased demands in ways unacceptable to lawyers and other civic activists whose cautious attitude toward public policy may reflect not only their good intentions but their concern for property rights, due process, pragmatic legislating or judicial precedent.

Relatively powerless groups lack participation of individuals with high status whose endorsement of specific proposals lend them increased legitimacy. Good causes may always attract the support of high status individuals. But such individuals' willingness to devote

⁴⁹ See Wilson, *The Amateur Democrats*, previously cited. These groups are most likely to be characterized by broad scope of political interest and frequent intervention in politics. See Sayre and Kaufman, *op. cit.*, p. 79.

time to the promotion of specific proposals is less likely than the one-shot endorsements which these people distribute more readily.

Similarly, protest organizations often lack the resources on which entry into the policymaking process depends. These resources include maintenance of a staff with expertise and experience in the policy area. This expertise may be in the areas of the law, planning and architecture, proposal writing, accounting, educational policy, federal grantsmanship or publicity. Combining experience with expertise is one way to create status in issue areas. The dispensing of information by interest groups has been widely noted as a major source of influence. Over time the experts develop status in their areas of competence somewhat independent of the influence which adheres to them as information-providers. Groups which cannot or do not engage lawvers to assist in proposing legislation, and do not engage in collecting reliable data, cannot participate in policy deliberations or consult in these matters. Protest oriented groups, whose primary talents are in dramatizing issues, cannot credibly attempt to present data considered "objective" or suggestions considered "responsible" by public officials. Few can be convincing as both advocate and arbiter at the same time.

V. PROTEST LEADERSHIP AND TARGET GROUPS

The probability of protest success may be approached by examining the maintenance needs of organizations likely to be designated as target groups.⁵⁰ For the sake of clarity, and because protest activity increasingly is directed toward government, I shall refer in the following paragraphs exclusively to government

⁵⁴ Another approach, persuasively presented by Wilson, concentrates on protest success as a function of the relative unity and vulnerability of targets. See "The Strategy of Protest," pp. 293 ff. This insight helps explain, for example, why protest against housing segregation commonly takes the form of action directed against government (a unified target) rather than against individual homeowners (who present a dispersed target). One problem with this approach is that it tends to obscure the possibility that targets, as collections of individuals, may be divided in evaluation of and sympathy for protest demands. Indeed, city agency administrators under some circumstances act as partisans in protest conflicts. As such, they frequently appear ambivalent toward protest goals: sympathetic to the ends while concerned that the means employed in protest reflect negatively on their agencies.

agencies at the municipal level. The assumption is retained, however, that the following generalizations are applicable to other potential target groups.

Some of the constraints placed on protest leadership in influencing target groups have already been mentioned in preceding sections. The lack of status and resources that inhibit protest groups from participating in policymaking conferences, for example, also helps prevent explicit bargaining between protest leaders and city officials. The strain between rhetoric which appeals to protest participants and public statements to which communications media and "third parties" respond favorably also exists with reference to target groups.

Yet there is a distinguishing feature of the maintenance needs and strategies of city agencies which specifically constrains protest organizations. This is the agency director's need to protect "the jurisdiction and income of his organization [by]...[m]anipulation of the external environment." In so doing he may satisfy his reference groups without responding to protest group demands. At least six tactics are available to protest targets who are motivated to respond in some way to protest activity but seek primarily to satisfy their reference publics. These tactics may be employed whether or not target groups are "sincere" in responding to protest demands.

1. Target groups may dispense symbolic satisfactions. Appearances of activity and commitment to problems substitute for, or supplement, resource allocation and policy innovations which would constitute tangible responses to protest activity. If symbolic responses supplement tangible pay-offs, they are frequently coincidental, rather than intimately linked, to projection of response by protest targets. Typical in city politics of the symbolic response is the ribbon cutting, street corner ceremony or the walking tour press conference. These occasions are utilized not only to build agency constituencies,52 but to satisfy agency reference publics that attention is being directed to problems of civic concern. In this sense publicist tactics may be seen as defensive maneuvers. Symbolic aspects of the actions of public officials can also be recognized in the commissioning of expensive studies and the rhetorical flourishes with which "massive attacks," "comprehensive programs," and "coordinated planning" are frequently promoted.

City agencies establish distinct apparatus and procedures for dealing with crises which

may be provoked by protest groups. Housingrelated departments in New York City may be cited for illustration. It is usually the case in these agencies that the Commissioner or a chief deputy, a press secretary and one or two other officials devote whatever time is necessary to collect information, determine policy and respond quickly to reports of "crises." This is functional for tenants, who, if they can generate enough concern, may be able to obtain shortcuts through lengthy agency procedures. It is also functional for officials who want to project images of action rather than merely receiving complaints. Concentrating attention on the maintenance needs of city politicians during protest crises suggests that pronouncements of public officials serve purposes independent of their dedication to alleviation of slum conditions.53

Independent of dispensation of tangible benefits to protest groups, public officials continue to respond primarily to their own reference publics. Murray Edelman has suggested that:

Tangible resources and benefits are frequently not distributed to unorganized political group interests as promised in regulatory statutes and the propaganda attending their enactment.⁵⁴

His analysis may be supplemented by suggesting that symbolic dispensations may not only serve to reassure unorganized political group interests, but may also contribute to reducing the anxiety level of organized interests and wider publics which are only tangentially involved in the issues.

2. Target groups may dispense token material satisfactions. When city agencies respond, with much publicity, to cases brought to their attention representing examples of the needs dramatized by protest organizations, they may appear to respond to protest demands while in fact only responding on a case basis, instead of a general basis. For the protesters served by agencies in this fashion it is of considerable advantage that agencies can be influenced by protest action. Yet it should not be ignored that in handling the "crisis" cases, public officials give the appearance of response

⁵¹ Sayre and Kaufman, op. cit., p. 253.

⁵² See *ibid.*, pp. 253 ff.

⁵³ See Lipsky, op. cit., chs. 5-6. The appearance of responsiveness may be given by city officials in anticipation of protest activity. This seems to have been the strategy of Mayor Richard Daley in his reaction to the announcement of Martin Luther King's plans to focus civil rights efforts on Chicago. See The New York Times, February 1, 1966, p. 11.

⁵⁴ See Edelman, op. cit., p. 23.

to their reference publics, while mitigating demands for an expensive, complex general assault on problems represented by the cases to which responses are given. Token responses, whether or not accompanied by more general responses, are particularly attractive to reporters and television news directors, who are able to dramatize individual cases convincingly, but who may be unable to "capture" the essence of general deprivation or of general efforts to alleviate conditions of deprivation.

3. Target groups may organize and innovate internally in order to blunt the impetus of protest efforts. This tactic is closely related to No. 2 (above). If target groups can act constructively in the worst cases, they will then be able to pre-empt protest efforts by responding to the cases which best dramatize protest demands. Alternatively, they may designate all efforts which jeopardize agency reputations as "worst" cases, and devote extensive resources to these cases. In some ways extraordinary city efforts are precisely consistent with protest goals. At the same time extraordinary efforts in the most heavily dramatized cases or the most extreme cases effectively wear down the "cuttingedges" of protest efforts.

Many New York City agencies develop informal "crisis" arrangements not only to project publicity, as previously indicated, but to mobilize energies toward solving "crisis" cases. They may also develop policy innovations which allow them to respond more quickly to "crisis" situations. These innovations may be important to some city residents, for whom the problems of dealing with city bureaucracies can prove insurmountable. It might be said, indeed, that the goals of protest are to influence city agencies to handle every case with the same resources that characterize their dispatch of "crisis" cases. 55

But such policies would demand major revenue inputs. This kind of qualitative policy change is difficult to achieve. Meanwhile, internal reallocation of resources only means that routine services must be neglected so that the "crisis" programs can be enhanced. If all cases are expedited, as in a typical "crisis" response, then none can be. Thus for purposes of general solutions, "crisis" resolving can be self-defeating unless accompanied by significantly greater resource allocation. It is not self-defeating, however, to the extent that the organizational goals of city agencies are to serve a clientele while minimizing negative publicity concerning agency vigilance and responsiveness.

4. Target groups may appear to be con-

strained in their ability to grant protest goals. This may be directed toward making the protesters appear to be unreasonable in their demands, or to be well-meaning individuals who "just don't understand how complex running a city really is." Target groups may extend sympathy but claim that they lack resources, a mandate from constituents, and/or authority to respond to protest demands. Target groups may also evade protest demands by arguing that "If-I-give-it-to-you-I-have-to-give-it-to-everyone."

The tactic of appearing constrained is particularly effective with established civic groups because there is an undeniable element of truth to it. Everyone knows that cities are financially undernourished. Established civic groups expend great energies lobbying for higher levels of funding for their pet city agencies. Thus they recognize the validity of this constraint when posed by city officials. But it is not inconsistent to point out that funds for specific, relatively inexpensive programs, or for the expansion of existing programs, can often be found if pressure is increased. While constraints on city government flexibility may be extensive, they are not absolute. Protest targets nonetheless attempt to diminish the impact of protest demands by claiming relative impotence.

5. Target groups may use their extensive resources to discredit protest leaders and organizations. Utilizing their excellent access to the press, public officials may state or imply that leaders are unreliable, ineffective as leaders ("they don't really have the people behind them"), guilty of criminal behavior, potentially guilty of such behavior, or are some shade of "left-wing." Any of these allegations may serve to diminish the appeal of protest groups to potentially sympathetic third parties. City officials, in their frequent social and informal business interaction with leaders of established civic groups, may also communicate derogatory information concerning protest groups. Discrediting of protest groups may be undertaken by some city officials while others appear (perhaps authentically) to remain sympathetic to protest demands. These tactics may be engaged in by public officials whether or not there is any validity to the allegations.

6. Target groups may postpone action. The effect of postponement, if accompanied by symbolic assurances, is to remove immediate pressure and delay specific commitments to a future date. This familiar tactic is particularly effective in dealing with protest groups because of

⁵⁵ See Lipsky, op. cit., pp. 156, 249 ff.

⁵⁶ On the strategy of appearing constrained, see Schelling, op. cit., pp. 22 ff.

their inherent instability. Protest groups are usually comprised of individuals whose intense political activity cannot be sustained except in rare circumstances. Further, to the extent that protest depends upon activating reference publics through strategies which have some "shock" value, it becomes increasingly difficult to activate these groups. Additionally, protest activity is inherently unstable because of the strains placed upon protest leaders who must attempt to manage four constituencies (as described herein).

The most frequent method of postponing action is to commit a subject to "study." For the many reasons elaborated in these paragraphs, it is not likely that ad hoc protest groups will be around to review the recommendations which emerge from study. The greater the expertise and the greater the status of the group making the study, the less will protest groups be able to influence whatever policy emerges. Protest groups lack the skills and resource personnel to challenge expert recommendations effectively.

Sometimes surveys and special research are undertaken in part to evade immediate pressures. Sometimes not. Research efforts are particularly necessary to secure the support of established civic groups, which place high priority on orderly procedure and policy emerging from independent analysis. Yet it must be recognized that postponing policy commitments has a distinct impact on the nature of the pressures focused on policy-makers.

IV. CONCLUSION

In this analysis I have agreed with James Q. Wilson that protest is correctly conceived as a strategy utilized by relatively powerless groups in order to increase their bargaining ability. As such, I have argued, it is successful to the extent that the reference publics of protest targets can be activated to enter the conflict in ways favorable to protest goals. I have suggested a model of the protest process which may assist in ordering data and indicating the salience for research of a number of aspects of protest. These include the critical role of communications media, the differential impact of material and symbolic rewards on "feedback" in protest activity, and the reciprocal relationships of actors in the protest process.

An estimation of the limits to protest efficacy, I have argued further, can be gained by recognizing the problems encountered by protest leaders who somehow must balance the conflicting maintenance needs of four groups in the protest process. This approach transcends a focus devoted primarily to characterization of

group goals and targets, by suggesting that even in an environment which is relatively favorable to specific protest goals, the tensions which must be embraced by protest leadership may ultimately overwhelm protest activity.

At the outset of this essay, it was held that conceptualizing the American political system as "slack" or "fluid," in the manner of Robert Dahl, appears inadequate because of (1) a vagueness centering on the likelihood that any group can make itself heard: (2) a possible confusion as to which groups tend to receive satisfaction from the rewards dispensed by public officials; and (3) a lumping together as equally relevant rewards which are tangible and those which are symbolic. To the extent that protest is engaged in by relatively powerless groups which must create resources with which to bargain, the analysis here suggests a number of reservations concerning the pluralist conceptualization of the "fluidity" of the American political system.

Relatively powerless groups cannot use protest with a high probability of success. They lack organizational resources, by definition. But even to create bargaining resources through activating third parties, some resources are necessary to sustain organization. More importantly, relatively powerless protest groups are constrained by the unresolvable conflicts which are forced upon protest leaders who must appeal simultaneously to four constituencies which place upon them antithetical demands.

When public officials recognize the legitimacy of protest activity, they may not direct public policy toward protest groups at all. Rather, public officials are likely to aim responses at the reference publics from which they originally take their cues. Edelman has suggested that regulatory policy in practice often consists of reassuring mass publics while at the same time dispensing specific, tangible values to narrow interest groups. It is suggested here that symbolic reassurances are dispensed as much to wide, potentially concerned publics which are not directly affected by regulatory policy, as they are to wide publics comprised of the cowntrodden and the deprived, in whose name policy is often written.

Complementing Edelman, it is proposed here that in the process of protest symbolic reassurances are dispensed in large measure because these are the public policy outcomes and actions desired by the constituencies to which public officials are most responsive. Satisfying these wider publics, city officials can avoid pressures toward other policies placed upon them by protest organizations

Not only should there be some doubt as to

which groups receive the symbolic recognitions which Dahl describes, but in failing to distinguish between the kinds of rewards dispensed to groups in the political system, Dahl avoids a fundamental question. It is literally fundamental because the kinds of rewards which can be obtained from politics, one might hypothesize, will have an impact upon the realistic appraisal of the efficacy of political activity. If among the groups least capable of organizing for political activity there is a history of organizing for protest, and if that activity, once engaged in, is rewarded primarily by the dispensation of symbolic gestures without perceptible changes in material conditions, then rational behavior might lead to expressions of apathy and lack of interest in politics or a rejection of conventional political channels as a meaningful arena of activity. In this sense this discussion of protest politics is consistent with Kenneth Clark's observations that the image of power, unaccompanied by material and observable rewards, leads to impressions of helplessness and reinforces political apathy in the ghetto.57

Recent commentary by political scientists and others regarding riots in American cities seems to focus in part on the extent to which relatively deprived groups may seek redress of

⁵⁷ Clark, op. cit., pp. 154 ff.

legitimate grievances. Future research should continue assessment of the relationship betweer riots and the conditions under which access to the political system has been limited. In such research assessment of the ways in which access to public officials is obtained by relatively powerless groups through the protest process might be one important research focus.

The instability of protest activity outlined in this article also should inform contemporary. political strategies. If the arguments presented here are persuasive, civil rights leaders who insist that protest activity is a shallow foundation on which to seek long-term, concrete gains may be judged essentially correct. But the arguments concerning the fickleness of the white liberal, or the ease of changing discriminatory laws relative to changing discriminatory institutions, only in part explain the instability of protest movements. An explanation which derives its strength from analysis of the political process suggests concentration on the problems of managing protest constituencies. Accordingly, Alinsky is probably on the soundest ground when he prescribes protest for the purpose of building organization. Ultimately, relatively powerless groups in most instances cannot depend upon activating other actors in the politica process. Long-run success will depend upon the acquisition of stable political resources which do not rely for their use on third parties.

MOTIVATION, INCENTIVE SYSTEMS, AND THE POLITICAL PARTY ORGANIZATION*

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I. MODELS OF LOCAL PARTY ORGANIZATION

Several different models of local political party organization can be found in the accumulating studies of American local politics. One model is typified by the research of Forthal, Gosnell, Kent, and Salter, and presents a picture of the party organization as attracting and disciplining workers through material incentives, non-ideological in its appeals, and oriented toward obtaining votes for securing or maintaining the party in political control of the government. An alternative model has been described in more recent research by Wilson, Hirschfield. and Carney.2 They portray the party activist as being more ideologically oriented, responding to ideological rather than material incentives, and seeking governmental reform or im-

* Acknowledged are the financial support of the Computer Science Center, University of Maryland, the contributions of students in a survey research course to one of the studies on which this is based, and the assistance of Fran Feigert. Also acknowledged are the financial support provided to the senior author by the General Research Board of the Graduate School, University of Maryland, and to the junior author from the Faculty Research Fund of Knox College. The cooperation of the county chairmen and precinct chairmen of the two counties is appreciated by the

¹ Sonya Forthal, Cogwheels of Democracy: A Study of the Precinct Captain (New York: William-Frederick Press, 1946); Harold F. Gosnell, Machine Politics: Chicago Model (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1937); Frank R. Kent, The Great Game of Politics (New York: Doubleday Doran, 1923); J. T. Salter, Boss Rule: Portraits in City Politics (New York: McGraw-Hill, 1935).

² James Q. Wilson, The Amateur Democrat: Club Politics in Three Cities (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1962); Robert S. Hirshfield, Bert E. Swanson, and Blanche D. Blank, "A Profile of Political Activists in Manhattan," Western Political Quarterly, 15 (September, 1962), 489-506; Francis Carney, The Rise of the Democratic Clubs in California, Eagleton Foundation Case Studies in Practical Politics (New York: Henry Holt and Company, Inc., 1958).

proved governmental services. Changes in the environment have been identified as the causal forces for this change in political party organizational style. For example, Greenstein points out that urban party machines developed to provide required services for which demand was generated by rapid urbanization, disorganized governmental structures, and the needs of recent immigrants.3 The research describing the material-incentive-motivated political chines was produced primarily during the 1920's and 1930's when the need for accommodation to urban problems of the type described existed to a greater degree than at present.

The social characteristics of the activists as well as the political style of the two types of party organizations described in the professional and amateur models also differ. The professional model presents a party organization whose members are male, oriented toward material rewards or a career in government, and exhibit little concern for issues. The amateur model presents a pattern of workers who are not oriented toward material rewards, tend to be of higher status in occupation, income, education, and life style, and who participate in politics in large part as a response to concern for particular issues.4 Women are much more likely to be active in the amateur style party organization.5

Wilson suggests that over a period of time amateurs may assimilate the political style and motivational patterns of professionals.6 Evidence of this is present in other studies. Eldersveld found in his study of Detroit party organizations that 74 per cent of the Democratic and 85 per cent of the Republican precinct committeemen began their party activity with impersonal or purposive motivations of moral, philosophical, or ideological satisfactions. However, only 7 per cent of the Democrats and 20 per cent of the Republicans reported those satisfac-

- 3 Fred I. Greenstein, The American Party System and the American People (Englewood Cliffs, N.J.; Prentice-Hall, 1963), pp. 39-41.
 - 4 Wilson, op. cit., pp. 2-16.
- ⁵ *Ibid.*, pp. 62-63.
- 6 Ibid., p. 5.

tions as being currently derived from party activity. The predominant satisfaction had become that derived from social contacts.

Wilson argues that the sharp distinction between professionals and amateurs is continued through the amateur clubs, with additional evidence for his assertion being presented in Carnev's study of the Democratic clubs in California and Blaisdell's study of the liberal reform movement in New York City.8 One can argue that a particular environment might contribute to the retention of the amateur style in politics within the formal party organization. Party politics in an affluent community might tend toward an issue-oriented style of politics attractive to the amateur, with this style being maintained within the organization and retained by the organization worker over a considerable period of time.

Clark and Wilson, in an examination of the incentives available to organizations, indicate three types are possible: material or monetary; solidary, deriving from the act of participation itself through the conferring of status, prestige, etc.; and purposive, attained through achievement of organizational goals. The type of incentive used by a party organization has implications for the internal functioning of the organization itself, for the relationship between the political party and the political system of which it is a part, and the interactions between the political system and the general social system.

Joseph Schlesinger has pointed out that a party organization using material incentives has the greatest flexibility both in establishing goals to be sought by the organization and in selecting the means to attain them. ¹⁰ As an organization moves from material to solidary to purposive incentives, it reduces flexibility in goal definition and strategy. Inflexibility within the organization due to the rigid adherence of organizational members to particular issue stands limits the ability of the political party to

- ⁷ Samuel J. Eldersveld, *Political Parties: A Behavioral Analysis* (Chicago: Rand McNally, 1964), pp. 277–292.
- ⁸ Carney, op. cit.; Donald C. Blaisdell, The Riverside Democrats, Eagleton Institute Cases in Practical Politics (New York: McGraw-Hill, 1960).
- ⁹ Peter B. Clark and James Q. Wilson, "Incentive Systems: A Theory of Organizations," Administrative Science Quarterly, 6 (September, 1961), 134-137.
- ¹⁰ Joseph A. Schlesinger, "Political Party Organization," in James G. March (ed.), Handbook of Organizations (Chicago: Rand McNally, 1965), p. 768.

perform its functions within the political system¹¹ or act in its interactive role with the environmental social system.

A third model of party organization has been summarized by Schlesinger.12 He argues that the basic unit of party organization is that evolving around a collective effort to capture a single public office; in other words, party organization at the local level often means an organization formed around a candidate for public office. The predominant orientation of the organization is seizing control of public office at some time, however far distant in the future that might be. Contributions to the nucleus may not be openly identifiable as organizational activity, and may be of a minimal (i.e., absolutely essential) or connective nature, such as the provision of leadership, issue formulation, communications functions, recruitment to party work and nomination for office, provisions of technical services, and the securing of funds. Whether effective party leadership is exercised by the public office holder or organizational leader is viewed by Schlesinger as a function of the degree of interparty competition and formal or traditional restraints on leadership. However, Schlesinger does not indicate the relationship between the locational focus of effective party leadership and the incentive which predominates in the party system of a locality. In what type of system are those who surround a potential candidate and form the nucleus of the party organization more likely to be motivated by material, solidary, or purposive incentives?

One may easily conceive of these three broad models of party organization as counterpoised, in effect, to the major orientations of the voter. Campbell et al. have repeatedly stressed that voters are oriented in three veins, toward the party, toward issues, and toward candidates.13 While some voters are "pure types," most may be thought of as being somewhat mixed in their orientations. Similarly, the material, issue (purposive), and office-oriented organizations are "pure types," but in the typological sense only. Hence, when we specify a label for either a voter or a party organization we do not insist on a single orientation which necessarily excludes all others. Rather, we are speaking of the dominant tendency of that voter or organization. The interaction of the organizational and voter

- ¹¹ For a discussion of party functions, see, for example, Neil A. McDonald, *The Study of Political Parties* (New York: Random House, 1955), pp. 22–26.
 - ¹² Schlesinger, loc. cit., pp. 767-769, 774-786.
- ¹³ Angus Campbell, Gerald Gurin, and Warren E. Miller, *The Voter Decides* (Evanston, Ill.: Row, Peterson and Company, 1954), pp. 88-143.

typologies remains a rich field for further exploration.¹⁴

Several recent studies have examined the social and behavioral characteristics of party activists. Robert Salisbury, in a study of six clubs in St. Louis and St. Louis County, found that neither the professional nor amateur model fits his sample. 15 In social characteristics, club members interviewed more approximated the professional type, while in terms of primary group membership those interviewed fit neither the amateur nor the professional model. Club members tended to specialize in politics rather than being members of a number of organizations. Stimulus to participation was party related, of an habitual nature, and deriving perhaps from family socialization. Althoff and Patterson in a study of rural, Southern Illinois precinct committeemen found a pattern more in consonance with the professional than amateur in terms of occupational status, education, and income.16 The precinct committeemen also had a high level of political aspirations. Motivations to party work were ignored, however, in an attempt to derive prevailing orientations of committeemen. These were found to be of either the campaign or organization type.

Another study of precinct committeemen conducted by Bowman and Boynton in selected non-metropolitan communities examined the political and social characteristics of the party officials. They found that party workers in the communities studied tended to come from white collar occupations, and forty per cent had a college education.¹⁷ In terms of reasons for becoming active in politics, from 20 to 30 per cent of the individuals in their four sub-samples indicated purposive motivations.¹⁸

In his study of political party officials in Detroit, Eldersveld found distinct differences between the two parties in the social characteristics of precinct leaders. Republicans tended

¹⁴ See, for example, Murray B. Levin and Murray Eden, "Political Strategy for the Alienated Voter," *Public Opinion Quarterly*, 26 (Spring, 1962), 47-62.

¹⁵ Robert H. Salisbury, "The Urban Party Oraganization Member," Public Opinion Quarterly, 29 (Winter, 1965–1966), 553–561.

¹⁶ Phillip Althoff and Samuel C. Patterson, "Political Activism in a Rural County," *Midwest Journal of Political Science*, 10 (February, 1966), 80. 42.

¹⁷ Lewis Bowman and G. R. Boynton, "Recruitment Patterns Among Local Party Officials: A Model and Some Preliminary Findings in Selected Locales," this REVIEW, 60 (September, K966), 670-71.

18 Ibid., p. 674.

to draw precinct leadership from white collar occupations while the Democrats were more likely to be craftsmen or blue collar workers. However, the Detroit parties were relatively open and clientele-oriented, with attempts made to recruit persons from groups predominantly within the opposition party's coalition to serve as party precinct leaders. This was done through both conscious party effort and informal extra-party activity, although much induction to party activity was self-generated. 20

Which, if any, of these three models of party organization is appropriate? We shall concentrate on analyzing the conditions under which activists with particular patterns of social characteristics and motivations are to be found in the party organization at the precinct leader level.

What variables might account for differences in the personal characteristics of precinct leaders and in organizational style as they are reflected in the incentive systems to which party activists respond? Several can be suggested. One would anticipate that in a predominantly suburban, middle class area the incentive to political activity would not be solidary or material but would tend more toward purposive rewards. In an area with a less prosperous socioeconomic base, one might anticipate greater emphasis on material and also on solidary incentives for initial party activity. In other words, we hypothesize that the amateur style in politics tends to predominate in a particular type of social system, with both greater initial entry for purposive reasons and greater retention of initial purposive motivation among activists in the more affluent environment. This contrasts with Wilson's hypothesis that the activists entering the party for purposive satisfactions generally experience a decline in this incentive and an increase in the importance of solidary and material incentives.21

Another variable influencing differential patterns of incentives and personal characteristics might be the normal majority or minority status of the party within the effective political unit. The majority party would be more likely to be staffed with persons entering party activity for material reasons. Access to state patronage through being a member of the normally dominant party in a state might also result in differential degrees of the importance of material incentives within a county's political parties.

Eldersveld found a much greater emphasis on purposive reasons for originally becoming active in politics than did Bowman and Boynton.

¹⁹ Eldersveld, op. cit., pp. 54, 58.

²⁰ Ibid., pp. 59-72.

²¹ Wilson, op. cit., pp. 4-5.

Perhaps size or population density of the political unit is in some way related to the reasons for becoming active in politics; the increased size and complexity of the modern party organization in metropolitan areas may obscure the opportunities for material and solidary rewards. Another variable may be the degree to which non-partisan elections are used for the election of local officials, and, if they are used, the type of non-partisan system which exists. Use of the non-partisan system may inhibit recognition of opportunities for material reward or reduce access to this type of incentive.

II. THE DATA

We examine the hypothesized differences in personal characteristics and patterns of incentives by using survey data collected in two quite different political units, one an agricultural and industrial county located in northwest Illinois, the other a large suburban county outside Washington, D. C. populated primarily by commuters to the national capital and by workers in the research and development organizations located in the area. The survey of Montgomery County, Maryland, leaders was conducted during May, 1966; a response rate of 64 per cent was obtained. The Knox County study was conducted in the period from mid-April to mid-May, 1967, with a response rate of 62 per cent.22 The research instrument included questions on social background, political socialization, recruitment to political activity, motivations, and role definition was well as a series of ideological and personality inventory questions.

Knox County, Illinois, is traditionally overwhelmingly Republican in its voting behavior, but also has a recently energized Democratic party organization. Scandinavian descendents have acquired a position of preeminence in local Republican politics. Republicans tend to be oriented toward a concern with local politics, while Democrats, with little hope of gaining local elective offices, concentrate on state, congressional, and other federal offices. In 1959 the

²² The Montgomery County leaders were personally interviewed; the Knox County leaders responded to the same research instrument administered as mail questionnaires. Two problems generally exist in the use of mail questionnaires, these being the obtaining of an adequate response rate and the obtaining of a representative sample. The response rate for the Knox County leaders was sufficient and examination of the pattern of returned questionnaires indicated that representativeness in terms of party affiliation, socio-economic characteristics, and residential patterns was obtained.

median family income of Knox County was \$5755, below the state median of \$6566.

Montgomery County, Maryland, formerly was dominated by the Democratic party, and while voter registration still heavily favors the Democrats, the Republicans have had control of the county council since 1962, although they do not present a united stand in council votes on major issues. The Democrats traditionally have elected a majority of the county's legislative delegation. The primaries of both parties have had well organized and ideologically structured factions engaging in battle for nomination to local and state offices in recent years. In 1959 the county had the highest median family income in the United States, with a very high level of educational attainment and a preponderance of professional and other white collar occupations among its residents. In 1959 the the median family income in the county was \$9317, compared with a state median of \$6309. The two counties appear well suited for a test of the various models of party organization, for we can compare social characteristics and motivations to see if any consistent differences exist between party organizations operating in different environmental contexts.

III. FINDINGS

The amateur type in politics has been descriped as varying from the professional in his social characteristics as well as in his motivational drives. Table 1 indicates that the social characteristics of party precinct leaders are different in the two counties. A statistical test was used to assess the degree of association between type of county and each social characteristic of precinct leaders and between party affiliation within each county and each social characteristic.23 Comparing the two counties, precinct chairmen differ in income, age, occupation, sex, and educational characteristics but not in race. Knox County activists are more likely to be affiliated with lower status religious denominations, to be older, to have lower income, to have considerably less education, and to be males than precinct leaders in Montgomery County. The precinct leaders differ in their occupational composition with far more in Montgomery County being professional men, employed asmanagers, officials, or proprietors of business

The statistical measure of association used is Kendall's tau. For a discussion of tau, see M. G. Kendall, Rank Correlation Methods (London Charles Griffin and Company, 1955). In the analysis of social characteristics, Episcopal, Presbyterian and Congregational faiths are classified as high-status Protestant religions; all other Protestant religions are classified as low-status

TABLE 1. DEMOGRAPHIC CHARACTERISTICS OF PRECINCT CHAIRMEN, BY PARTY AND COUNTY

	$\mathbf{Montgom}$	ery County	Knox County			
Characteristic	Democrat	Republican	Democrat	Republican		
Marital Status	1 1 2 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1					
Married	95.0%	89.4%	87.1%	86.4%		
Single	5.0	4.6	5.1	5.5		
Widowed	-	3.0	3.7	8.1		
Divorced		3.0	5.1	_		
	100.007	100.000	100.007	100.00		
Religion	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%		
Jewish	20.0%	1 5 07	2.6%			
	, ,	1.5%				
Catholic	8.3	18.2	28.2	5.4%		
Protestant:	10.0	4 PP - A	18 0	10.0		
High Status	18.3	47.0	17.9	16.2		
Low Status	33.3	27.3	43.6	78.4		
Other or None	20.0	6.1	7.7			
	99.92%	100.1 %	100.0%	100.0%		
Age	• •	, ,	• •			
21-30	1.7%	9.1%	5.1%	5.4%		
31-40	26.7	36.4	12.8	2.7		
41-50	38.3	28.8	30.8	21.6		
51-65	31.7	19.7	48.7	62.2		
Over 65	1.7	6.1	2.6	8.1		
	100.1°%	100.10%	100.0%	100.0%		
	$\tau = .179$	$\tau = .317$	$\tau = .223$	100.0%		
Income						
Under \$3,000		1.5%	2.6%	10.8%		
\$ 3,000- 4,999	5.1%	1.5	2.6	10.8		
\$ 5,000-6,999	1.7	13.6	12.8	8.1		
\$ 7,000- 9,999	15.3	27.3	35.9	32.4		
\$10,000-14,999	33.9	31.8	28.2	32.4		
\$15,000-19,999	37.3	19.7	7.7	2.7		
\$20,000 and over	6.8	1.5	10.3	2.7		
	0.0		10.9	4.1		
No response		3.0				
	100.1°%	99.92%	100.1 %	99.90%		
	$\tau =290$	$\tau =294$	$\tau =199$			
Education						
Less than 8th	1 50	4 200	0.07	w 407		
grade Eighth grade	1.7%	4.5%	2.6%	5.4%		
completed	********	1.5	10.3	2.7		
Some high school		1.5	12.8	24.3		
	8.5			40.5		
Completed h.s.		6.1	41.0			
Some college	11.9	25.8	12.8	13.5		
Completed college Work on advanced	30.5	37.9	10.3	10.8		
degree	11.9	4.5	2.6	2.7		
Completed advanced degree	35.6	18.2	7.7			
advamou wegice			-	00.0.0		
	$100.1^{a}\%$ $\tau =284$	100.0% $\tau =629$	$100.1^{\circ}\%$ $\tau =083$	99.9*%		

TABLE 1—(Continued)

	Montgome	ery County	Knox (County
Characteristic	Democrat	Republican	Democrat	Republican
Occupation	A CONTRACTOR OF THE CONTRACTOR			
Professional	41.7%	36.4%	12.8%	5.4%
Farmers		1.5	7.7	16.2
Managers, Officials				
or Proprietors	8.3	10.7	2.6	2.7
Clerical	5.0	4.5	5.1	10.8
Sales	8.3	9.1	5.1	27.0
Craftsmen, Fore-	•			
men and kindred	1.7	1.5	38.5	2.7
Operatives	*******	3.0	10.3	2.7
Private household				
workers				
Service workers	-		_	8.1
Farm laborers				
and Foremen	1.7	_		2.7
Laborers	6.7	1.5	12.8	
Students	3.3	1.5		2.7
Housewives	20.0	16.7	2.6	5.4
Retired or				
Unemployed	3.3	9.1	2.6	5.4
Not reported	QUANTITION	4.5	-	8.1
	100.0%	100.0%	100.10%	99.9 %
	$\tau = .0846$	$\tau = .122$	$\tau = .105$, -
Sex				
Male	60.0%	68.1%	89.8%	87.2%
Female	40.0	32.9	10.2	12.8
	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%
Race	,0	, .	,	
White	96.7%	98.5%	100.0%	97.3%
Negro	3.3	1.5		2.7
	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%
N	60	66	39	37

a Totals in all tables may not equal 100.0% because of rounding.

enterprises, or unemployed housewives. Certainly, in their socio-economic characteristics, the composition of the precinct leaders in Montgomery County approximates the amateur model, and we conclude that the county with the stronger economic base does more closely approximate this model.

Assuredly, differences do exist between the two parties in each county. Within Knox County, Republican and Democratic activists differ in religious affiliation and age but not in other characteristics examined. In Montgomery County, Republican and Democratic activists differ in age, income level, and educational development. While both parties have precinct chairmen drawn from relatively high income

families, the Democrats appear to constitute a more affluent group than the Republicans. In both counties, activists in the traditional minority party tend to be younger than their counterparts in the majority party.

Several questions were asked which make it possible to evaluate the motivations perceived by the precinct leaders themselves as effective stimuli at various key points in their political careers. The activists were asked questions about their motivations for initial entry into political activity and for becoming a precinct committeeman. Each was also asked what satisfactions he believed the average precinct leader derived from his role and what he himself would miss most if he quit his post as a precinct

TABLE 2. REASON WHICH BEST EXPLAINS WHY BECAME ACTIVE IN POLITICS

	Montgome	ery County	Knox County			
Reason	Democrat	Republican	Democrat	Republican		
Personal Friendship for a						
Candidate	6.6%	1.5%	10.3%	10.8%		
Way of Life	11.7	4.5	20.5	8.1		
Attachment to Party	10.0	16.7	23.1	18.9		
Enjoyment of Social						
Contacts			2.6	10.8		
Enjoyment of Campaign						
Excitement	1.7		_	8.1		
Build Personal Position						
in Politics			2.6			
Influence Policies	30.0	42.4	17.9	16.2		
Be Close to People Doing			-	-		
Important Things			2.6	2.7		
Business Contacts		1.5				
Community Recognition		4.5				
Civic Duty	40.0	28.8	20.5	16.2		
No Response		_		8.1		

	100.0%	99.9%	100.1%	99.9%		
N	60	66	39	37		
	$\tau = .089$	$\tau = .281$	$\tau = .011$			

chairman. From these questions we can evaluate the activist's motivations for political activity at three key points in his political career, these three being initial entry, accepting the post of precinct leader, and current or on-going satisfactions. In this manner we can evaluate if in fact the leaders in two different socio-economic environments differ in their motivations at these three career stages.

The data in Table 2 indicate some interesting differences in the motivational patterns for initial entry into political work between precinct leaders in the two counties. Attachment to party, personal friendship with a candidate, and enjoyment of social contacts are cited by more activists in the rural county. Politics being regarded as part of a way of life is more likely to be given by Democrats as a reason for political activity, and more frequently in the rural county. However, the key differences are in the frequency with which the activists cited civic duty and desire to influence governmental policies as the principal reasons for their becoming politically active, with suburban county activists more frequently citing these reasons for initial party activity. Grouping explanations cited as most important into the motivational categories of ideological, other impersonal, social contacts, and other personal reasons, we find the distribution of major types of motivation for the best explanations of the activists' initial entry into politics as presented in Table 3.24 Ranking the party organizations in terms of the frequency with which ideological and other impersonal reasons are given, the rankings are as follows:

Suburban County Republicans 87.9% Suburban County Democrats 80.0% Rural County Democrats 61.5% Rural County Republicans 41.3%

24 Social contacts consist of positive responses to desire to be close to people doing important things, friendship for a candidate, community recognition, enjoyment of campaign excitement. and enjoyment of social contacts. Other personal includes desire to build a personal position in politics, business contacts, and politics as a part of the respondent's way of life. Ideological consists of desire to influence governmental policy, and other impersonal consists of desire to fulfill civic responsibility and attachment to one's political party. Ideological and other impersonal satisfactions are roughly equivalent with Clark and Wilson's purposive category and social contacts with the solidary category. Other impersonal is loosely equivalent to material rewards, although building a personal position in politics undoubtedly includes ego-satisfying rewards as well as material rewards to be derived from the eventually attained political position.

TABLE 3. TYPE	OF	MOTTVATTON	CITED BO	TATOTAT	POLITICAL.	A CONTRITORY
TADDE O. TIPE	Ur	MOTIAVITON	CITED BO	TO THATTACE	LODITIONE	ACTIVITI

	Montgome	ery County	Knox County			
Motivation	Democrat	Republican	Democrat	Republican		
Ideological	30.0%	42.4%	17.9%	16.2%		
Other Impersonal	50.0	45.4	43.6	35.1		
Social Contacts	8.3	6.1	15.5	32.4		
Other Personal	11.7	6.1	23.1	8.1		
Not Ascertained				8.1		
	100.0%	100.0%	100.1%	99.9%		
Ň	60	66	39	37		
	$\tau =156$	$\tau = .305$	$\tau \stackrel{\sim}{=} .021$			

If the party is an organization formed around a candidate with members motivated by the purpose of electing the actual or potential candidate to office, we would expect to find a sizable number of party activists stating this as a principal reason for becoming active in politics. However, as Table 2 indicates, this factor appears minimal; approximately 11 per cent of the activists in Knox County indicated this was the principal reason for their becoming active in politics. Even fewer cited it in Montgomery County.

We cannot, for the two counties studied, reject the hypothesis that the set of motivations for initial entry into political party work is far more likely to be ideological or impersonal in nature in an affluent community. In the rural county, motives for initial political entry tend more to be purposive among leaders of the party which is traditionally subordinate electorally in the county but competitive in the state-wide contests. Further, both rural parties' activists are far more likely to have been stimulated in their original entry into party work by solidary or material motives than are the suburban activists. This may be due in part to the strong patronage powers available within the state. Illinois is second only to Pennsylvania in terms of this factor, as the gubernatorial party may have up to 21,000 positions available for appointment.25 As a consequence, the Knox Democrats, although a decided minority at the polls, can "distribute" jobs among a broad variety of state agencies within the county.

The second stage of the precinct leaders' po-

²⁵ Austin Ranney, *Illinois Politics* (New York: New York University Press, prepared under the auspices of the Citizenship Clearing House, 1960), pp. 33-34; Frank J. Sorauf, "State Patronage in a Rural County," this Review, 50 (December, 1956), 1046-1056.

litical career for which motivations to political activity was queried was reasons for accepting the post of precinct leader. Precinct committeemen from the two counties could be said to differ to a degree. In both counties they tended to give heavy emphasis to the same reasons, namely, concern with issues, desire to elect a particular candidate, or a generalized response of fulfilling citizen responsibilities. The one exception to this is the Knox County Republicans, where the third most frequently cited reason for activity was the prompting of friends. Table 4 indicates the per cent responding in each category. In each party in both counties, the most frequently cited reason for taking the precinct leader's post is civic duty. One must question whether or not this might be a rationalization of other motives. In all four sets of precinct leaders, the second most frequent response is a concern with issues, with approximately onethird of the Knox County leaders in both parties and the Democrats in the suburban county giving this response. For only one-fifth of the Republicans in Montgomery County is this the most important reason.

At the second stage in the precinct leaders' political careers for which we have information about motives, we find once again an indication of the inadequacy of the model viewing the party organization as a candidate-oriented social system. While for three of the four sets of leaders it is the third most frequently stated reason for accepting the post, the proportion citing it ranged from only one-twelfth to one-fifth. As a stimulus for taking the precinct leader post, cancidate orientation appears to be a minor factor when viewed in relation to other stimuli.

Groups in the community have the opportunity to contribute to the recruitment process by initiating the idea of seeking the precinct chairman's office or supporting an alreadymade decision by an individual. We can inquire

TABLE 4. SINGLE FACTOR MOST IMPORTANT IN THE DECISION TO BECOME A PRECINCT CHAIRMAN

77 - 4 - 11	$\mathbf{Montgome}$	ery County	Knox County			
Factor —	Democrat	Republican	Democrat	Republican		
Concern with Issues	30.0%	18.2%	30.8%	32.4%		
Elect a Candidate	13.3	16.7	20.5	8.1		
Family Influence	1.7	3.0	2.6	2.7		
Friends' Influence	*******	3.0	2.6	16.2		
Employer's Influence		3.0	2.6			
Union Influence		manure	2.6			
Civic Duty	45.0	50.0	33.3	40.5		
Don't Know	********	**************************************	5.1			
Not Ascertained	6.7	6.1	Q enterator			
	100.0%	100.0%	100.1%	99.9%		
N	60	66	39	37		
	$\tau = .085$	$\tau = .128$	$\tau = .003$			

if the individual's perception of group support in his seeking the post was related in any way to his major motivation for becoming a precinct leader. As Table 5 indicates, in Knox County those who report seeking the post because of a sense of civic duty are somewhat less likely to report the influence of party faction than those who indicate seeking the post for other reasons.

TABLE 5. RELATION OF REASON FOR ACCEPTING PRECINCT POST TO GROUP SUPPORT FOR ACCEPTING POST

					710 21003							
					Type o	of Grou	ıp Support					
Why Accepted		Mo	ntgomery	County				К	nox Co	unty		
Precinct Post	Party Faction	Friends	Other	None	Total	N	Party Faction	Friends	Other	None	Total	N
7	1		(per cent)						(per c	ent)		
Republicans Issues Elect a Candidate Family Influence Friends' Influence Employer Influence Union Influence Union Influence Civic Responsibility Don't Know Not Ascertained	75.0 90.9 50.0 50.0 50.0 	8.3 50.0 ——————————————————————————————————	12.1	16.7 9.1 — 50.0 50.0 — 9.1	100 100 100 100 100 100	12 11 2 2 2 2 0 33 0 4 —	46.6 ———————————————————————————————————	15.4 — 40.0 — 14.3 —	7.1	38.0 100.0 100.0 20.0 — 42.9 —	100 100 100 100 — — 100 —	13 3 1 6 0 0 14 0 0 -
Democrats Issues Elect a Candidate Family Influence Friends' Influence Employer Influence Union Influence Civic Responsibility Don't Know Not Ascertained	64.7 62.5 	5.9 100.0 50.0 — 11.1		29.4 37.5 — — — — 18.5	100 100 100 100 ———————————————————————	18 8 1 2 0 0 27 0 4	33.3 62.5 100.0 			66.7 37.5 — 100.0 — 61.5 —	100 100 100 100 100 100 100	12 8 1 1 1 1 13 2
Total			-			60						39

TABLE	6.	TAHW	${\tt WOULD}$	MISS	MOST	IF	QUIT	PRECINCT	CHAIRMAN	POST,
				BY CO	TINTY	AI	ND PA	RTY		

Factor	Montgom	ery County	Knox County			
	Democrat	Republican	Democrat	Republicar		
Ideological	10.0%	6.1%	23.1%	21.6%		
Other Impersonal	6.7	3.1	2.6	10.8		
Social Contact	31.6	42.3	56.4	43.2		
Other Personal	29.9	34.7	12.8	10.8		
None	8.3	6.1	2.6	5.4		
Not Ascertained	13.3	7.6	2.6	8.1		
Total	99.8%	99.9%	100.1%	99.9%		
N	$60 \\ \tau = .038$	66 $\tau = .211$	39 $\tau = .063$	37		

In contrast, in Montgomery County party factional support is indicated to a somewhat greater degree among those citing civic duty as their reason for accepting the precinct post than tends to be given by persons becoming precinct leaders for some other reason.

The activists were asked what they would miss most if they were to relinquish their precinct post; through this we can obtain an assessment of the rewards they perceive themselves to be receiving from their political office. In Montgomery County, the two parties are similar in their responses, with approximately twothirds of the Democrats and three-fourths of the Republicans citing social contacts or other personal satisfactions as those which would be missed most if they were to quit their precinct post. The Democrats in Knox County show a similar response pattern, with the Republicans tending slightly more to cite ideological or impersonal factors. However, precinct leaders in the two counties do exhibit somewhat different patterns of current satisfactions. Three times as many in the suburban county as in the rural county indicate that other personal satisfactions, including business contacts and building a personal position in politics, would be missed most. Other research has indicated that the precinct post is a stepping stone to running for elective office in the suburban county.26 In both counties, social contacts are cited as the satisfaction which would be missed most frequently by all parties, but especially by the minority party.

²⁶ A recent study indicates that a very large proportion of both parties' candidates for the Maryland legislature in 1966 had previously served as precinct chairmen. Allen J. Cigler, unpublished research, University of Maryland, 1967.

It must be pointed out that the high level of disillusionment with party precinct work found by Eldersveld in Detroit does not exist in any of the four party organizations studied. In Detroit, 15 per cent of the Democratic leaders and 22 per cent of the Republicans stated that they currently received no satisfactions from their work in the party.27 In Knox County, 5.4 per cent of the Republicans and 2.6 per cent of the Democrats took a similar position; in Montgomery County 8.3 per cent of the Democrats and 6.1 per cent of the Republicans also state that no rewards are being received from their current party work. Why would the proportion of precinct leaders receiving no rewards from party work be so much lower in the two counties studied than in Detroit? It may be a function of the size of the political unit, with the rewards of a social nature being more within reach in the smaller unit.

Our hypothesis states that precinct leaders in the more affluent county who enter party work for ideological or other impersonal reasons will be better able to maintain this orientation than those who enter for solidary or material reasons. Eldersveld, in his study of Detroit precinct leaders, found that 68 per cent of the Democratic leaders and 57 per cent of the Republicans who entered political work with impersonal motivations changed to personalized motivations while 20 per cent of the Democrats and 21 per cent of the Republicans became disillusioned and indicated no current satisfactions received from their party work.28 Political analysts have frequently indicated that the so-called reformers are unable to maintain their idealistic zeal, hence the eventual downfall of reform move-

²⁷ Eldersveld, op. cit., p. 278.

²⁸ Ibid., p. 287.

TABLE 7. RELATION OF WHAT WOULD MISS MOST IF QUIT PRECINCT POST TO REASON WHY FIRST BECAME ACTIVE IN POLITICS

						Why	Wou	ld M	iss M	lost :	If Qu	ıit	,			
·			Mon	tgom	ery (Coun	ty				F	Cnox	Cou	nty		
Why First Became Active in Political Work	Ideological	Other Impersonal	Social Contacts	Other Personal	Nothing	N.A.	Total	N	Ideological	Other Impersonal	Social Contacts	Other Personal	Nothing	N.A.	Total	N
				'-	cent	,						**	cent	,		
T. 1 . 1	00		00		ocra		101	10	00		-0		iocra		0.0	-
Ideological	22	11	28	28	6	6	101	18	28		53	14		14	99	7
Other Impersonal	7	7	23	30	13	20	100	30	18	12	52	12	6		100	17
Social Contacts Other Personal			$\frac{40}{72}$	40 28		20	100 100	5 7	34 22	16	34 78	16	*******	-	100 100	6 9
Not Ascertained			12	40			100	0.	22	_	10				100	0
Not Ascertained							_	· · · · ·		_						
						7	otal	60				•		Г	otal	39
			i	Repu	blica [,]	ns					i	Repu	blica	ns		
Ideological	11	7	35	35	3	7	100	28	16	—	34		16	34	100	6
Other Impersonal	3		46	40	3	7	99	30	15	23	54			8	100	13
Social Contacts	—		.25	25	50	_	100	4	33	8	50	8			99	12
Other Personal	_		75		_	25	100	4	33	— ,		33	33		99	3
Not Ascertained			*******		_			0		_	_	33	66		99	3
						r	otal	66						Г	otal	

ments.²³ Table 7 presents the findings for the precinct leaders studies; a considerable change between original satisfactions and current perceived rewards occurred among the activists whose initial activity was motivated by purposive reasons.

In all four organizations approximately twothirds or more of the precinct chairmen who entered for purposive reasons report that the satisfactions which would be missed most are other than purposive. The evolution away from purposive motivation is perhaps of greater importance to the functioning of the parties in Montgomery County, because a larger proportion of those entering party work did so for purposive reasons. Table 8 indicates the degree to which purposive motives originally stimulated political activity, the percentage in each party who

²⁹ The most colorful statement along these lines ("reformers only morning glories") is contained in William L. Riordon, *Plunkitt of Tammany Hall* (New York: E. P. Dutton and Co., Inc., 1963), pp. 17–20.

declare purposive satisfactions to be their preeminent current reward for precinct leader activities, and the proportion of those who originally entered for purposive reasons and would miss most that type of incentive if they were to resign their post. Contrary to our hypothesis, the party leaders in the affluent county are less retentive of their initial purposive motivational pattern. Taking both ideological and other impersonal reasons for initial entry into political work, we find the lowest retention in the affluent county, and particularly in the traditional minority party in that county.

Several differences are apparent in the patterns of perceived satisfactions of other precinct chairmen, as presented in Table 9. The chairmen from the two counties differ to a considerable degree in their pattern of perceptions of the satisfactions derived by others from precinct work. Within Montgomery County, but not in Knox County, Republican and Democratic precinct leaders differ significantly in their perceptions of the satisfactions obtained by others from their political party office. In the

TABLE 8. RELATIVE IMPORTANCE OF PURPOSIVE MOTIVATIONS OVER TIME²

	Purposive Single Most Important Reason for Initial Activity	Would Miss Purposive Most if Quit	Initial Purposive Minus Current Purposive Satisfaction	Entered for Pur- posive Reason and Would Miss Pur- posive Most
		(per	cent)	
Montgomery County				
Democrats	80.0	16.7	63.3	20.9
Republicans	87.9	9.1	78.8	12.5
Knox County				
Democrats	,61.5	32.4	29.1	29.1
Republicans	51.3	25.9	25.4	34.6

^a Purposive is identified as being ideological and other impersonal.

suburban Maryland county, precinct leaders of the two parties are slightly more similar in their evaluation of the degree to which their colleagues were stimulated to serve in the precinct organization as a result of ideological or other impersonal concerns, with 61.6 per cent of the Democrats and 43.8 per cent of the Republicans so perceiving their fellow precinct captains. However, Democrats much less frequently than Republicans concluded that social contacts were a primary motivation of their colleagues, and Republicans three times as frequently cite other personal satisfactions.

In Knox County, 62.1 per cent of the Democrats and only 36.3 per cent of the Republicans perceive other precinct leaders as being motivated by ideological or other impersonal drives.

One can explain this in part as a result of the minority party position of the Democrats; material rewards in terms of patronage are not available from local politics and have just recently become more available as a reward for the county organization's increased effectiveness in state electoral contests. Why are the Democrats more likely to cite ideological factors or satisfactions? In Montgomery County one explanation could be the higher degree of largely ideologically-based factionalism within the Democratic party, which managed to produce three highly organized and ideologicallyoriented slates for local and state offices during the 1966 primary. In Knox County, the scarcity of local as contrasted with state patronage could reduce the incidence of citing other personal satisfactions by a Democrat.

Eldersveld pointed out that two types of psychological processes may be found in the evaluation of others' satisfactions. One is projection, ascribing to others one's own satisfactions. The second is incorporation, whereby the individual takes as his own the perceived satisfactions of others. Eldersveld found minimal projection and incorporation, with leaders not tending to misperceive why others were in politics.³⁰ The pattern found in Detroit was a tendency to ascribe to others a greater degree of ideological motivation and commitment, with a pluralism of motivation actually existing. The same pluralism was found in the two sets of party organizations examined in this study.

A comparison can be made between the individual's motivation and his assessment of the motivations of others by comparing what the precinct leader states he would miss most if he

TABLE 9. PRECINCT LEADERS' PERCEPTIONS OF SATISFACTIONS DERIVED FROM PRECINCT WORK BY OTHER PRECINCT LEADERS

Satisfactions Derived by Other		ved By ery County	Perceived By Knox County			
Precinct Leaders	Democrat	Republican	Democrat	Republican		
Ideological	36.6%	27.2%	48.6%	33.7%		
Other Impersonal	25.0	16.6	13.5	2.6		
Social Contacts	13.4	9.1	21.6	40.4		
Other Personal	25,0	42.3	8.1	20.7		
None		1.5	8.1	2.6		
Not Ascertained		3.0		_		
Total	100.0%	99.7%	99.9%	100.0%		
N	$60 \\ \tau =243$	66 $\tau =138$	39 $\tau =166$	37		

¹⁰ Eldersveld, op. cit., pp. 281-283.

TABLE 10. RELATION OF PERCEIVED SATISFACTIONS OF AVERAGE PRECINCT LEADER TO WHAT WOULD MISS MOST IF QUIT PARTY PRECINCT POST

	Perceived Satisfactions of Other Leaders															
•	Montgomery County							Knox County								
What Would Miss Most if Gave Up Precinct Post	Ideological	Other Impersonal	Social Contacts	Other Personal	None	N.A.	Total	N	Ideological	Other Impersonal	Social Contacts	Other Personal	None	N.A.	Total	N
	(per cent)						(per cent) Democrats									
T	67	16	16	Den	ocra	ts	99	6	67	11	11	Den 11	iocra	ts	100	9
Ideological	50	25	25	_			100	4	0.	67	33				100	3
Other Impersonal Social Contacts	26	31	21	21	_		99	19	23		59	14		4	100	21
Other Personal	44	28	6	22	_		100	18	25		25	50	_	_	100	4
None	20	40	_	40			100	5	100		_		-	_	100	1
Not Ascertained	25		25	50			100	8				100	_	_	100	1
																-
						7	otal	60						7	otal	39
I	Republicans						Republicans									
Ideological	100		_	_			100	4	100		_	_	_	_	100	8
Other Impersonal				100			100	2	25	25	25	_		25	100	4
Social Contacts	21	21	14	43	_	_	99	28	38	12	44	6	—	_	100	16
Other Personal	26	13	9	47		4	99	23	25	25	_	50		_	100	4
None		25	_	50	25	20	100 100	4	50 33	50		_	_	67	100 100	2 3
Not Ascertained	40	20	_	20		20	100	5	35			_		01	100	. 3
•						r	otal	66						r	otal	37

resigned his position with what he perceives the satisfactions of others to be. In Knox County,

- the Republicans who would miss most ideological or impersonal satisfactions tend to perceive others as enjoying most these same rewards. However, half of those Knox Republicans en-
- mioying social or other personal rewards perceive others as motivated by the drive for purposive rewards. Knox County Democrats are much more likely to perceive others as deriving the same type of satisfactions from politics as the perceiver.

In Montgomery County, among the Democrats, the same pattern exists as among Knox Republicans. Those who would themselves nost miss purposive rewards tend to perceive others as deriving this type of satisfaction from party work, while those who would miss most ocial or other personal rewards tend to perceive others as being motivated by ideological or other impersonal drives. Approximately two-shirds of those stimulated by social or other per-

sonal rewards perceive the satisfactions of the average precinct chairman to be ideological.

The Democrats in both counties indicate a high degree of projection. Examining Table 10 inversely in order to determine what proportion of those who thought other leaders are motivated by a particular satisfaction and who also themselves respond that they would miss most that particular satisfaction, we also find incorporation occurring. Examining the left-to-right diagonals in Table 10, this process of incorporation appears more prevalent among Knox County activists, particularly among the Democrats.

Only one precinct leader perceives the average leader as deriving no satisfactions from his party activities, and twelve state they would miss no satisfactions if they would quit their party post. Three from Knox County are so disillusioned with party work; all three perceive the average precinct leader's satisfactions to be purposive. Among the Montgomery County

leaders who state that they would lose no rewards by leaving their precinct post, five are Democrats and four are Republicans. Three of the five Democrats and one of the four Republicans perceive the average precinct leader as deriving ideological or other impersonal satisfactions from his party work.

IV. CONCLUSION

We can draw several conclusions from this examination of motivations. Ideological motivation is significantly more frequently cited as being the most important reason for entry into political activity among both parties' precinct chairmen in the more affluent community, and less frequently cited by activists of the rural county party almost invincible in local elections. In the rural county, the initial motivation is more likely to be the purposive ideological or other impersonal types among the Democratic party activists who are less likely to capture local offices.

The reason for accepting the precinct post tends to be predominantly purposive among all four sets of precinct leaders. At least 45 per cent of the responses by each party group indicate ideological or other purposive satisfactions are perceived to be the principal rewards of other precinct leaders, but the leaders in the two counties, when grouped by county, do differ significantly in the patterns of explanations given as the single most important reason for their taking the precinct post.

In terms of what they would miss most if they quit the precinct chairmanship, the rural county activists are most likely to respond with ideological or other impersonal rewards. The response patterns indicate that sustaining motivations do differ significantly between precinct chairmen in the two counties; however, for all except the rural county Republicans, approximately two-thirds or more of the responses to the question of what they would miss most if the post were given up are of the personal, social, or material nature.

We conclude that the affluent community is more likely in both socio-economic characteristics and initial motivational patterns to approximate the amateur model. In terms of reasons for accepting the precinct post, there is a slight tendency for precinct leaders of the traditional majority party in each county to cite more frequently a purposive reason as being the single most important factor in the decision to accept the precinct office. Significant differences do exist in the pattern of sustaining motivations as measured by what the leaders state they would miss most if they resigned the precinct chairmanship. However, rural county leaders are

more likely to cite ideological or other impersonal motivations, which is contrary to the hypothesized difference.

The hypothesis that the traditional majority party in the locality tends more toward initial and sustaining motivations of a solidary or material type is not confirmed by the comparisons between majority and minority parties. In both counties, the majority party activists indicate somewhat greater current satisfactions of a purposive type than do the minority party activists in the respective county.

Schlesinger expressed concern that purposive motivations inhibit the flexibility of the party organization and argued that material rewards which can be given to or withheld from individuals are more useful in inducing specific actions from workers to attain desired goals and also allow the party decision-makers the greatest flexibility in selecting party goals.31 Sorauf has argued that parties in recent times have found it necessary to be more concerned with programs.32 Our data indicate that programmatic appeals are a major basis for inducing initial entry into political activity, but ideological or other impersonal appeals generally do not sustain activists in their performance of the party precinct leader role.

Our findings lead us to reject the notion of a candidate-based party. This does not detract from the idea of the party as an organization with at least one of its major goals the election of candidates to party office. The function of electing a particular candidate can exist and workers can be motivated by presentation of rewards and sanctions even though the rewards most sought are not derived in terms of deliberately entering or continuing party work in order to elect a particular candidate.

In Montgomery County, Maryland, a very sizable shift from deriving purposive to social and material satisfactions is found to have occurred. We have argued that this increases the flexibility of the formal party organization in choice both of goals and of methods to be used to attain the goals. However, this should not be interpreted as leaving the party unbounded in the type of policies it may pursue or the candidates it may nominate.

Wilson argues that "the principal reward of politics to the amateur is the sense of having satisfied a felt obligation to participate ," while "the principal reward to the professional is to be found in the extrinsic satisfactions of

³¹ Schlesinger, op. cit., pp. 769-772.

³² Frank J. Sorauf, *Political Parties in the American System* (Boston: Little, Brown and Company, 1964), pp. 85, 151.

participation—power, income, status, or the fun of the game."33 The leaders of the amateur clubs must appear to be motivated by a desire for purposive satisfactions even if this type of motivation has been supplanted by others. In the long run, the amateur either loses interest or plays the game by professional rules.34 Wilson suggests that the same process of change in motivational structure occurred among club members, with the initial motivation for joining being replaced by a secondary or supplementary motivation.35 He suggests that amateur club members originally enter politics out of a sense of civic duty and then evolve toward the derivation of satisfactions from influencing policy or enjoyment of the political game. We suggest that there is no parallel in the motivations of precinct leaders. The range in the proportion of activists who state that the best explanation for their originally entering political work was their sense of civic obligation varied from 40.5 per cent among Montgomery County Democrats to 16.2 per cent among Knox Republicans. It does rank as the most frequently cited best explanation among Montgomery County Democratic activists, and civic duty was cited with great frequency as being very important in the decision to enter politics by the other sets of leaders. However, Knox County Democrats stated that attachment to party or other basic attachment to political activity was more important for their originally becoming active in party work. Republicans in Knox County more often respond that attachment to party was the basic or major factor in stimulating party activity. Among Montgomery County Republicans an interest in influencing governmental policies was more important than civic duty. We must conclude that while civic duty is cited with some frequency as the primary motivation for originally becoming politically active, a preponderant majority of the party activists in the counties studied do not enter politics for that reason. Wilson suggests that the shift in motivation is away from civic duty toward a desire to influence policy or enjoyment of the political game. We have found instead an initial emphasis in the suburban county on a desire to influence governmental policy and a shift to a wish for social or other impersonal rewards, with enjoyment of the political game, per se, only one of several types of social or personal rewards.

We find that the amateur model is more appropriate to the suburban county in describing the social characteristics and initial motivations of precinct leaders, but the model does not hold for sustaining motivations. Majority-minority status and the relative degree of competition appear useful for accounting for some motivational differences, particularly in the rural county. Although the factor has not been examined in this study, the nature of the party organization's top leadership may also contribute to the relative degree to which purposive satisfactions sustain precinct leaders' political activity.

³³ Wilson, op. cit., p. 4.

³⁴ *Ibid.*, p. 5.

³⁵ Ibid., p. 171.

COALITION POLITICS IN NORTH INDIA*

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The years 1964 and 1967 stand as two crucial landmarks in the democratic development of India's political systems both at the center and in the several states. In the three years since Nehru's death in May, 1964, Indian politics entered fully into a major test of legitimacy.1 Since 1964, the national leadership of the Indian National Congress has three times demonstrated its ability to handle smoothly the first stage of India's process of legitimizing democratic political authority—that of transferring power from a charismatic leader to his successors within the dominant party.2 After the 1967 General Elections, Indian politics moved to a second stage to confront the problems of transferring power from the previously dominant Congress to diverse parties and party coalitions in more than half the Indian states.3

* This paper is part of a larger project, on which the writer is presently engaged, on party systems and policy making in Bihar, Uttar Pradesh, and Puniab. Research for the paper and the project as a whole was carried out in India during 1966-67 under grants from the American Institute of Indian Studies, the American Council of Learned Societies, and the University of Washington, An earlier draft of the paper was presented at the Punjab Studies Conference in East Lansing in February, 1968 and a later version at the APSA meetings in September. I have also benefited from comments on the paper by Mr. Harry Blair and by Professors Bruce Graham, Morris Morris and W. H. Morris-Jones. Frances Svensson assisted in the research.

¹ The analysis here has been influenced by Joseph La Palombara and Myron Weiner (eds.), *Political Parties and Political Development* (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1966), esp. pp. 407-412.

² The successions have been amply documented by Michael Brecher in *Nehru's Mantle: The Politics of Succession in India* (New York: Frederick A. Praeger, 1966) and in "Succession in India 1967: The Routinization of Political Change," *Asian Survey*, 7 (July, 1967), 423-443.

³ A transfer of power at the state level took place as early as 1957 in Kerala. However, Kerala has always been considered an exceptional state and its politics have been considered an aberration in a general pattern of Congress dominance. The change in 1967 is far more massive and is widely believed in India to presage the defeat of the Congress at the center. When and if this oc-

The purpose of this paper is to examine the implications for party development in India of the ways in which power has been transferred from the Congress to multi-group coalitions in the three north Indian states of Bihar, Uttar Pradesh, and Punjab. Specifically, I am concerned with the structural characteristics of thedeveloping party systems in the three states; with the roles played in the systems by parties, factions, and individuals; and with the impact of the ways in which the systems function upon government formation and stability. I will argue that north Indian political parties operatein systems in which inter-party ideological divisions are less decisive in the formation and breakup of governments than intra-party divisions. Under these conditions, opportunities. exist for independents and party defectors tohold the balance and dictate terms to the established parties. The activities of such political entrepreneurs impart fluidity and flexibility to party politics in north India. They also raise the question whether the minimum conditions of stable government provided by the Congress in the first two decades of independent government in India can be provided in multi-party systems in which the Congress monopoly of power is broken.

I. NORTH INDIAN PARTY SYSTEMS

Until now, the predominant model used todescribe the Indian party system has been that of one-party dominance. The model, developed by Rajni Kothari and W. H. Morris-Jones had two prominent features. The first was that the system provided inter-party competition but no alternation of power. The second was that the usual functions of opposition parties in a

curs, Indian democracy will enter its third test, that of transfer of power at the center.

⁴ Rajni Kothari, "The Congress 'System' in India," Asian Survey, 4 (December, 1964), 1161-1173.

⁶ Morris-Jones' views on the one-party dominant system are presented most systematically in his "Dominance and Dissent: Their Inter-relations in the Indian Party System," Government and Opposition 1 (August, 1966), 451-466. See also his Government and Politics of India (London: Hutchinson University Library, 1964), ch. V, and "Parliament and the Dominant Party," Parliamentary Affairs, 17 (Summer, 1964), 296-307.

democracy were in India shared between opposition parties and groups within the Congress. That is, opposition parties acted essentially as catalysts for groups within the Congress to articulate discontent and bring about leadership changes in the dominant party.

All models are simplifications of reality, which emphasize the factors considered to be determining forces in a system. The dominant party model emphasized the amorphousness of the Congress and its absorptive capacity. It paid less attention to contrary patterns of political behavior which have now become decisive. Before 1967, the alternations in power which had occurred in P.E.P.S.U. and in Kerala and the coalition governments which had existed in Orissa and in Andhra Pradesh might have been viewed as deviant cases. After 1967, transfers of power to non-Congress parties or coalitions occurred in more than half the Indian states.

Second, the model properly emphasized the importance of patterns of communication and interpenetration between the Congress and non-Congress organizations, which continue to exist in important respects. However, there have been two important features of those patterns of communication which now work against the maintenance of Congress dominance. First, inter-party communication has always been a two-way process. Factions in the Congress have sometimes capitalized upon issues raised by opposition parties to gain advantage in struggles for power within Congress. However, factional rivalry has often been sufficiently intense within the Congress and party loyalties so weak that opposing factions have been willing to carry their conflicts to the point of defeating the Congress organization or defecting from it.6 Second, some opposition parties have been serious about taking power from the Congress and have been unwilling to act only by applying pressure on the "margin" of Congress power. During and after the 1967 elections, the opportunity came in many states for dissident factions in the Congress to win power outside the Congress by joining with opposition parties which were making a determined bid for power.

Third, the Congress "system" was never a single one-party dominant system. Rather, it consisted of a national party system with links to the states and seventeen regional multiparty systems in which the Congress was dominant. Each multi-party system had its own distinctive features, despite a common pattern

⁶ See Paul R. Brass, Factional Politics in an Indian State: The Congress Party in Uttar Pradesh (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1965). of Congress dominance. In Kerala, Congress "dominance" existed only in the sense that the Congress continued to poll the largest number of votes in the state.

Finally, all the systems have contained not only parties and factions within parties, but significant non-party elements—both independents and individuals who have passed from one party to another in search of individual power and prestige.

In the aftermath of the 1967 elections, the Congress-dominated multi-party systems have been replaced in north India by highly complex systems in which parties, factions, and individuals all play important roles. The kinds of coalitions which emerged after the 1967 elections and which are likely to emerge in future depend upon the interactions of these three kinds of forces, which do not act in a random fashion, but according to the logic inherent in the particular balance of forces which exists at a given moment. The ability of the Congress to form a government now depends on its own internal cohesion and factional structure at the moment of opportunity, as well as upon the cohesion of the forces arrayed against it. Similarly, the ability of a non-Congress coalition to form a government depends upon the willingness of the parties to compromise their differences and to maintain greater cohesion than Congress. Finally, independents and defectors come into prominence whenever the balance between the Congress and alternative coalitions is close.

Congress Factions. After the elections, the Congress was reduced to a minority in the legislatures of the three north Indian states. Nevertheless, as the largest single party in each of the three states (see Table 1), it was open to the Congress to attempt either to form a minority government or to form a government with the support of independents or other parties. A brief review of the structure of factional conflict in the Congress in these three states at the time will show how variations in patterns of factional organization influenced the ability of the Congress to form a government.

In all three states, the Congress was affected by a continuing decline in organizational coherence and an intensification of internal factional strife. In the Punjab, the Congress organization was in complete disarray, still struggling to reacquire some organizational coherence in the aftermath of the dismissal in 1964 of a strong leader, Pratap Singh Kairon. The party was so fragmented that it could not select a leader before the opposition coalition was formed and had selected its leader. In a very delicately balanced house, where the first to act had the advantage, a diverse inter-party coali-

TABLE 1: PERCENTAGES OF TOTAL VALID VOTES AND SEATS WON BY PARTY IN THE 1967 ELECTIONS FOR THE LEGISLATIVE ASSEMBLIES IN BIHAR, UTTAR PRADESH, AND PUNJAB

Party	Bih	ar	Uttar P	radesh	Punjab		
	Votes %	Seats No.	Votes	Seats No.	Votes %	Seats No.	
C.P.I. (M)	1.28	4	1.27	1	3.19	3	
C.P.I.	6.91	24	3.23	13	5.27	5	
S.S.P.	17.62	68	9.97	44	.72	1	
P.S.P.	6.96	18	4.09	11	. 51	0	
CONGRESS	33.08	128	32.20	199	36.56	47	
Swantantra	2.33	3	4.73	12	. 51	0	
Jan Sangh	10.42	26	21.67	98	9.84	9	
Regional Parties							
J.K.D.ª	3.33	13		_	_	_	
Akali Dal (Sant)			-		04 605	24	
Akali Dal (Master)					24.68b	2	
Republican	0.18	1	4.14	10	1.79	3	
Independents	17.88	33ª	18.69	37	16.94	10	
Total	99.99	318	99.99	425	100.01	104	

Source: India, Election Commission. Report on the Fourth General Elections in India, 1967, Vol. II (Statistical).

tion was able to move faster and form a government before the Congress could muster its forces for an attempt.

In Bihar, there were four Congress leaders who reputedly hoped to become chief minister after the 1967 elections by defeating during the elections as many as possible of the Congress candidates supporting their rivals. After the elections, a contest for the leadership of the Congress Legislature Party was held between two of the "big four," Mahesh Prasad Sinha and Binodanand Jha, in which the latter was defeated by one vote. Although the Congress was relatively far from power in Bihar, with only 128 seats out of 318, Pandit Jha and 34 other Congress legislators made it clear in a statement released to the press that even if Mahesh Prasad Sinha had any idea of making an attempt to form a government, they would not support him.7

In Uttar Pradesh, in addition to the two long-standing, rival Gupta and Tripathi groups contending against each other, a third group of ostensible supporters of the outgoing chief minister, Mrs. Kripalani, had been formed. How-

ever, the outgoing chief minister was "exiled" to Delhi, Kamalapathi Tripathi was defeated in the general elections, and C. B. Gupta was left as the clear choice for Leader. A situation of tri-group conflict had been transformed into single-group dominance, which made possible the unanimous election of C. B. Gupta as Leader of the Legislature party. Gupta, with what he thought was the backing of the whole party, succeeded in outwitting and outbidding an opposition coalition in gaining the support of the independents and in forming a government. However, that government was brought down within less than three weeks by a major defection from Congress ranks and was replaced by a non-Congress government.

groups in Uttar Pradesh, see Brass, op. cit., ch. III, and Bruce Graham, "The Succession of Factional Systems in the Uttar Pradesh Congress, 1937–1967," (unpublished paper). For Bihar and Punjab, see Ramashray Roy, "Intra-Party Conflict in the Bihar Congress," Asian Survey, 6 (December, 1966), 706–715 and Paul Wallace, "The Political Party System of Punjab State (India): A Study of Factionalism," (unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, University of California, Berkeley, 1966).

[•] Thirteen independents in Bihar were actually associated with the J.K.D. so that the strength of the J.K.D. in the Bihar Assembly immediately after the elections was 26.

b Approximately 20% of the vote for the two Akali parties was won by the Sant Akali Dal.

⁷ Indian Nation, March 5 and 7, 1967.

⁸ On the origin and development of Congress

Thus, the patterns of internal competition in the Congress varied significantly in the three states. In Punjab, the pattern was one of multigroup competition so chaotic as to prevent early election of a leader. In Bihar, multi-group competition coalesced into a temporary evenly-balanced polarity which made the election of a leader possible, but prevented him from leading the party effectively. In Uttar Pradesh, one group emerged dominant after the election, a leader was unanimously elected, who acted skillfully in forming a government, but then could not maintain cohesion in his own party to provide stable support for the government.

Inter-Party Competition. The one-party dominant system covered a wide variety of regional variations in the structure and features of inter-party competition. In the three north Indian states, the one-party dominant system has now been replaced by multi-party systems. The practical and theoretical question now raised by the rise of multi-party systems in north India is whether the developmental tendencies are toward immobilism or fluidity in the systems. There is a superficial resemblance between the north Indian party systems and Giovanni Sartori's model of a polarized, multipolar, and centrifugal party system,9 but patterns of inter-party competition and coalition deviate significantly from what should be expected on the basis of the European precedents. Table 1 shows the 1967 election results for the legislative assemblies in north India. The Table, arranged loosely from Left to Right in the upper portion, with the CPI (Marxist) representing the extreme Left and Swatantra and Jan Sangh the extreme Right, shows that there is both extreme pluralism and a high degree of polarity (that is, in Sartori's use of the term "polarity," there is a very wide spectrum of

⁹ Giovanni Sartori, "European Political Parties: The Case of Polarized Pluralism," in La Palombara and Weiner, op. cit., ch. V. Sartori's model is derived from the party systems of contemporary Italy, the French Fourth Republic, and Weimar Germany. These systems are characterized by a "lack of basic consensus in which the distribution of opinion covers the maximum conceivable distance" (polarization), multiple lines of cleavage (multipolarity), and "growing radicalization" (centrifugal tendencies); see pp. 138-139. Sartori is not always clear and consis-Ment in his definitions, but the model is far more suseful than the conventional descriptions of European multiparty systems and is especially suseful for purposes of comparison of and distinction among multiparty systems, which may vary considerably from one political system to another.

opinion reflected among the legislative parties). The systems share with their European counterparts also the existence of a massive center, occupied by the Congress, and multiple lines of cleavage. The party system in each state is cleft by combinations of divisions of varying importance in each case along the following dimensions—socialism and conservatism, secularism and communalism, national orientation and regional orientation, pro-system and antisystem.

In all three north Indian states, the Congress occupies the center position which, from an ideological point of view, can be described as moderate nationalism, national unity, constitutionalism, planned development, and secularism. On either side of the Congress are more or less strong tendencies towards aggressive nationalism (Jan Sangh), regional autonomy (Akali Dal [Master]), anti-constitutionalism (CPI [M]), laissez-faire liberalism (Swatantra), and communalism (Jan Sangh and the Akali parties). Moreover, the electoral trend has been towards radicalization. The strength of the center has decreased and that of the extremes has increased over the four general elections. 10

Despite the superficial resemblance of the north Indian party systems to the center-based European party systems, there are three distinctive features which differentiate them from their European counterparts. One is the absence of anti-system challenges from the Right and the decline of anti-system tendencies on the Left. There are no monarchical parties in north India nor can either Jan Sangh or the Akali Dal be considered fascist parties in the European sense. On the Left, the tendency in recent years has been towards increasing commitment of the CPI to the parliamentary system. Second, the formation of diverse multiparty coalition governments against the Con-

¹⁰ From 1952 to 1967, the Congress share of the popular vote has declined from 41.47% to 33.1% in Bihar, while the combined Communist vote has gone from 1.1% to 8.2% and the Jan Sangh has increased from 1.2% to 10.4%. In Uttar Pradesh, Congress has declined from 47.9% to 32.2% while the Communist vote has gone from .9% to 4.5%and that of the Jan Sangh from 6.4% to 2.7%. In Punjab, Congress secured 34.8% of the vote in 1952, rose to a high of 47.5% in 1957, and declined to 36.6% in the reorganized Punjab. The Communist vote has been transmuted since 1952 in the Punjab from 5.3% to 8.5% while that of Jan Sangh has gone from 5.0% to 9.8%. Figures from India, Election Commission, Report on the First General Elections in India, 1951-52 and Report on the Fourth General Elections in India, 1967.

gress after the elections distinguishes the north Indian party systems from the European systems, which have contained ideological rigidities limiting possible party coalitions. In the European systems described by Sartori, the extreme parties have been traditionally excluded from government while coalitions based on a dominant center party have enjoyed a monopoly of power. In north India, the extremes have been included and the center party at least temporarily excluded. Third, the north Indian party systems are characterized not only by extreme pluralism but by a very strong element of non-party voting for independents.

Independents and Defectors. Table 1 shows that 33 independents were elected to the Bihar Assembly and that independents polled 17.9% of the total vote, more than any other single party except Congress and the Samyukta Socialist Party (SSP). Even this figure does not accurately reflect the extent of independent voting and the number of independents elected in Bihar, for the Jan Kranti Dal (JKD) was a party composed of independents supported by the Raja of Ramgarh and Congress defectors who left the party before the election. The JKD has since then broken up. In Uttar Pradesh and Punjab, independents play a similarly large role in the political systems. Thirtyseven independents were elected in Uttar Pradesh and ten in Punjab, with the total independent vote in the two states reaching 18.7% and 16.9% respectively. In Uttar Pradesh, the independent vote was larger than that for all parties except Congress and Jan Sangh. In Punjab, it was larger than the vote for all parties except Congress and the Akali Dal. After the elections, the fluidity of the systems was increased further by party defections from the SSP in Bihar, from the Congress and other parties in Uttar Pradesh, and from Congress and the Akali Dal in Punjab.

Clearly, neither the one-party dominant system model nor the European-derived model of a center-based multi-party system applies to the complex and fluid systems which exist in north India. The one-party dominant system model no longer applies because the era of Congress dominance has ended. The model of a polarized multipolar party system does not apply because ideology does not play the same rigidifying role which it plays in Europe and because opportunists in the shape of independents and party defectors play a decisive balancing role in the systems. In the remainder of this paper, the roles played by ideology and opportunism in the north Indian party systems will be demonstrated as they affected the formation and breakup of the non-Congress governments in the three states.

II. THE FORMATION OF THE NON-CONGRESS GOVERNMENTS: THE EXCLUSION OF IDEOLOGY

The ways in which the non-Congress governments were formed differed significantly in the three states in terms of the parties forming the coalitions and the weight of particular parties in each coalition, in terms of the roles played by independents, and in terms of the extent to which defections from Congress to the opposed coalitions were involved. However, the three initial non-Congress governments had in common the fact that diverse party coalitions were put together covering the entire political spectrum. There is no doubt that, at least in terms of the principles expressed in party manifestoes, many of the parties which formed these coalitions are incompatible partners. Moreover, some of the parties hesitated, for ideological reasons, before entering the coalitions. Yet, ultimately all non-Congress parties joined in all three states, if not in the government itself, in the legislature parties formed to provide support to the government.

In all three states, the procedure followed was similar. In the week following the announcement of the election results, united legislature parties were formed, comprising all non-Congress parties and some of the independents. Minimum common programs were framed, comprising 33 points in Bihar and Uttar Pradesh and 11 points in Punjab. The united legislature parties also elected leaders, who then began talks with the governors of their states preparatory to the formation of governments. In the meantime, the party leaders comprising the coalitions met together to discuss issues and problems as they arose and to negotiate on the distribution of portfolios. In all three states, "coordination committees" were formed which included the prominent organizational as well as legislative leaders of the various parties to coordinate both the views of the parties making up the coalitions and the views of the parliamentary and organizational wings of the mass parties.

The formation of diverse inter-party coalitions, involving in some cases alliances among parties which had till yesterday refused to cooperate against the Congress for ideological reasons, required some symbolic justification. Only the SSP leadership required no justification for their actions since they had consistently called for such alliances to defeat and remove the Congress from power both before and

after the elections. The cynical view for the post-election alliances was simply that the "lure for office" had proved irresistible. However, there were many party leaders who were reluctant to join the coalitions for ideological and other reasons even after the elections. Discussions and interviews with party leaders and ministers in the three states and in Delhi indicated that, in addition to the desire for office, there were four main considerations and tendencies which influenced the decisions of the parties to coalesce-popular demand for such coalitions, the ability of the parties to formulate minimum common programs, pragmatic and accommodative tendencies in the parties, and the recognition of the necessity for adjustment to regional conditions.

Popular Demand. One of the most common reasons given by men from all parties in the three states for the formation of non-Congress coalition governments was that public opinion demanded it. While there can be legitimate grounds for skepticism about references to public opinion to justify party practices in an overwhelmingly rural and illiterate society, it is true that there was marked discontent against the Congress among articulate segments of public opinion in cities and towns throughout north India. There was, for example, widespread feeling among the middle classes that development programs had not proceeded at a sufficiently rapid pace during the twenty years of Congress rule and that corruption, fostered by venal Congress ministers, had become widespread in government and society. There were also more specific grievances—especially discontent over price increases on the part of students, teachers. and government employees; discontent among Muslims over their failure to achieve their demand for recognition of Urdu as the second official language in Uttar Pradesh and Bihar; and discontent among both Hindus and Sikhs in the Punjab over the reorganization of the state and the way in which it was implemented. In addition, the elections took place at a time of major crisis or transformation in all three states—the worst famine in a century in Bihar; an unprecedented strike of half a million government employees in Uttar Pradesh; the reorganization of the Punjab and its trifurcation among three states.

The combination of all these factors produced a marked atmosphere of antagonism towards the Congress in the cities and towns and a desire for an alternative government. It was not simply that opposition party leaders felt impelled toward unity by the demand for change, but that once it became clear that an

alternative to the Congress was possible, many party leaders felt it would have been politically dangerous to oppose such a change.¹¹

The Common Programs. Although the party leaders, therefore, found a ready sanction in public opinion for the formation of non-Congress governments, they had still to face charges levelled by Congressmen and others that these coalitions represented unprincipled alliances among parties whose ideologies were incompatible. To such charges, the most frequent answer was that no compromise of basic principles was involved in the formation of the non-Congress governments because all parties had agreed upon minimum common programs which did not affect the ideologies of the parties. For example, ministers from the two most sharply opposed parties in the coalitions, Jan Sangh and the Communists, made comments such as the following in response to the question as to how such opposed parties could work together.

People wanted an alternative to Congress. We prepared an agreed minimum program. Keeping our respective ideologies apart, we decided to implement the program. [Bihar Jan Sangh minister]¹²

On many major issues, we differ, but that is the concern of the central government—foreign policy, socialism. So, I don't think for many years to come, there will be very big differences between Jan Sangh and Communists. [Uttar Pradesh Communist minister]¹³

¹¹ For example, an SSP minister commented upon the delay in the PSP's decision to join the non-Congress government in Bihar and their ultimate decision to do so in this way: "They [the PSP leaders! thought they would be nowhere if they went against the wishes of the people, who wanted non-Congress governments." A Jan Sangh minister in Bihar, asked how long he thought the non-Congress government would last, gave a reply which indicated a similar attitude towards public opinion: "I think it will last because we all are afraid of this public opinion. . . No party will dare to take the blame of deserting this government." A Jan Sangh minister in Punjab, asked why a non-Congress government had been formed instead of a coalition with the Congress, replied: "Everybody was opposed to Congress. The general swing is not with the Congress. If we go with the Congress, we are also doomed." Citations from interview documents BG 29: 13; BG 35: 27; PG 17: 3.

- ¹² Interview document BG 32: 5.
- 13 Interview document UPII 30: 1.

The programs varied in the three states in terms of the number of points and the emphasis given to problems specific to each state, but the points can be classified into a number of categories: 1) concessions to various interest groups -students, teachers, government employees, supporters of Urdu; 2) rectifications of alleged Congress misdeeds—release of political prisoners, institution of judicial enquiries into charges of corruption against Congress ministers and into police firings under the Congress regime; 3) withdrawal of unpopular measures and taxes -grain procurement orders, previous increases in taxation, the land revenue: 4) provision of various agricultural benefits; 5) promises to provide efficient administration, eliminate corruption, and check rising prices. There is very little in programs such as these which affects the basic ideological viewpoints of the parties and, in fact, with the exception of one point in the Uttar Pradesh and Bihar programs, no substantial disagreements arose initially on any of these issues.

On only one issue, that of recognizing Urdu as the second official language of Uttar Pradesh and Bihar, was there a stalemate. Several parties in the coalitions felt themselves committed by their previous statements to include this point in the common programs. Although the Jan Sangh joined the coalitions in these two states, the party refused to commit itself to this point and submitted a note of dissent. It is clear that this question touches Jan Sangh ideology and sentiment on a vital point, that of its view of national unity and integrity and its attitude toward the Muslim minority. Jan Sangh insistence on the issue supports the view long held of it that the party is more dogmatic on or at least more concerned with cultural and communal issues than with economic issues. Although Jan Sangh leaders indicated willingness to make specific concessions toward the encouragement of the Urdu language, they were not willing to provide the symbolic satisfaction to the Muslim minority of having Urdu declared as a second official language. Inter-party divergence on the issue also indicates the continued importance in north Indian politics of a major ideological cleavage between Jan Sangh and other parties. At the same time, the inclusion of the point on Urdu in the programs did not prevent the Jan Sangh from joining the coalitions nor did it prevent other parties from joining with the Jan Sangh even though this meant that the point could not be implemented by the coalition governments.

Pragmatic and Accommodative Tendencies in the Parties. Insofar as the parties joined together only because of popular demand and only on the basis of rather limited common programs, it is possible that the non-Congress governments may represent only a brief transition which may be followed by an ultimate ideological polarization. However, interviews with the ministers revealed pragmatic and accommodative strains in the parties which make it equally likely that future coalitional politics will retain their present fluidity. These strains were revealed both on specific policy issues confronting the state governments and in the general attitudes of party leaders toward accommodation with other parties. A Communist minister in Uttar Pradesh questioned about his views on state trading in foodgrains—a major plank in the Communist party platform replied: "There is no other way but state trading but none of us want to hasten our theories. Let's experiment even with free open market for two years; but, if we fail, let's try state trading."14 A Jan Sangh minister in Bihar commented on the formation of the non-Congress government in Bihar and the attitude of Jan Sangh toward it in the following way: "So, all right and left have come together. We [Jan Sanghl are neither right nor left. We approach the problem straightaway."15 In Punjab, where politics have tended toward communal polarization between Hindus and Sikhs during the last twenty years, the leader of the Akali opposition in the Punjab Assembly, who became chief minister of the state after the 1967 elections, remarked in October, 1966, that even if the Akalis were in a position to form an exclusively Akali government after the election, he would not favor it. Asked why not, he replied:

Well, you see, to begin with, . . . the leaders in the center have already prejudiced people against the Akalis in spite of the fact that their behavior has been commendable throughout agitations, most non-violent. But still we would like to tell people in Punjab that we do not wish to form one-community government. Let everybody be satisfied with the government. . . so that we can unitedly work for prosperity of the state. 10

Statements such as these were made by many other ministers interviewed. They suggest the possibility that ideological differences among parties in north Indian politics occur in the context of a political culture in which tendencies toward ideological rigidification are softened by pragmatism and mitigated by desires for accommodation.

Adjustment to Regional Multi-Party Systems. In addition to the influence of pragmatic and accommodative tendencies mitigating ideologi-

¹⁴ Interview document UPII 30: 8.

¹⁵ Interview document BG 35: 25.

¹⁶ Interview document PG 6: 50.

cal differences, many party leaders saw a necessity for putting aside national principles and national ambitions to adjust to local conditions For example, the Jan Sangh opposed the reorganization of the Punjab and continues to oppose in principle the existence of linguistic states in India. Yet, on the issue of the disposition of the predominantly Hindu, but Punjabispeaking city of Chandigarh, which remained a matter of serious controversy between Punjab and Hariana and among people in Chandigarh itself,17 the Jan Sangh adjusted to local sentiment in each area. The Jan Sangh in Punjab does not oppose the inclusion of Chandigarh in Punjab; the Jan Sangh in Chandigarh favors the continuance of a separate status for the -city; the Jan Sangh in Hariana favors its inclusion in Hariana.

One of the most thoughtful statements of the need to adjust to local conditions was provided by a PSP minister in Bihar, whose party engaged in considerable soul-searching and delay before entering the state party coalitions. The minister commented on the PSP decision to join in the following manner:

If the PSP thinks, as it thought in past years, where a day will come and it will sweep off the Congress rule from a state or states or the whole reaction, it would be wrong. No set formula in the iast-developing political situation can be applied throughout India. In the situations of Bihar and Bengal and also U.P. now, what is the picture? No one single party is able to gain a stable government. Monopoly of power enjoyed by the Congress is broken. A kind of power vacuum exists and Communists are very much on the scene. As we know the Communist party of either variety, t would not be a happy spectacle to see that the ool of administration is utilized to subvert democacy or national freedom. There are risks in oining a government run by so many parties pullng in different directions, but the PSP had to take these risks. It would be all right to take a purist stand, speak to the people about the party creed and programs and all that. But, according so me, this purism would be synonymous with pusillanimity and escape.18

This statement is noteworthy in three respects.

17 Under the reorganization, the old Punjab state was divided into four segments. A new dindi-speaking, predominantly Hindu state of Hariana was created; the capital city of Chandigarh was made into a union territory; the hill treas of the old state were transferred to Himschal Pradesh; and, the remaining Punjabispeaking, predominantly Sikh areas became the residual state of Punjab.

¹⁸ Interview document BG 33: 10.

It recognizes that an era has ended and that Indian politics are undergoing great changes whose ultimate direction is not clear and that the PSP as a party must play a role in the directing of those changes. There is, second, the presence of a strongly articulated ideological antagonism towards Communists. Third, despite this strong opposition to one party in the coalition, there is the reluctant recognition that the PSP is but one party among many, forced to operate in multi-party situations which vary from state to state.

Ideology and Party Politics in North India. There is no justification for concluding, on the basis of the rationales given by party leaders in north India for their participation in multiparty coalitions, that ideology is an insignificant force in north Indian politics. There is continued evidence of major ideological cleavages among the parties. Moreover, some of the parties believed that they would be able to implement portions of their programs even in the coalition governments and issue conflict between the parties played an important role after the formation of the non-Congress governments. The basic argument of this paper, however, is that political parties and party politicians showed a willingness either to ignore or to compromise on issues of principle, which they did not demonstrate on issues of power.

In the functioning of the non-Congress governments, two kinds of issues arose—those which divided parties and groups consistently over time on an intelligible basis, and those on which the lines of conflict were not entirely clear, but were proximately related to shifts of alignment affecting the fates of governments. The first category included such conflicts as those over the status of Urdu, over procurement of foodgrains, and over the abolition of the land revenue.

The Urdu issue continued to divide and distinguish the parties in the coalitions during the functioning of the non-Congress governments. The left parties, particularly, pressed for concessions to Urdu, including the declaration of Urdu as the second language in both Uttar Pradesh and Bihar. Reports in the press referred to a crisis in the Bihar cabinet in August 1967 on the Urdu issue. However, the Jan Sangh remained firmly opposed to the declaration of Urdu as a second language, while permitting certain concessions to be made, such as the printing of important government notices in Urdu. No defections of parties or significant groups from the governments occurred on the issue in either Uttar Pradesh or Bihar.

Another issue which early appeared to threaten the survival of the Uttar Pradesh government occurred over the decision of the cabinet

to procure 500,000 tons of foodgrains. Two separate threats to the stability of the Uttar Pradesh government arose on this issue—one from the organizational wing of the Jan Sangh, the predominant party in the coalition, and the second from an ad hoc legislative inter-party interest group of big farmer members of the legislative Assembly and Council. The Jan Sangh ministers maintained cabinet responsibility on the issue and succeeded in persuading members of their organizational wing to refrain from making public announcements opposing procurement. However, the objections of the interparty legislative group, which itself included many Jan Sangh members, were satisfied only by a compromise whose effect was to reduce the amount of foodgrains to be procured from 500,000 tons to 200,000 tons. Again, however, no major defections from the government or from government supporters in the Assembly occurred on this issue.

The most serious and prolonged issue of this type, which divided the parties on clear lines, occurred again in Uttar Pradesh on the land revenue issue. The demand for land revenue abolition was a major public commitment of the SSP especially and one to which all other parties had committed themselves in the formation of the common programs. In Punjab, land revenue was not a serious issue. In Bihar, the land revenue was remitted without prolonged controversy in the government. In Uttar Pradesh, however, the chief minister, Charan Singh, was a man who had well-formed views on the issues of both land revenue and state financial resources in general. He refused to agree to abolish the land revenue completely until alternative resources could be found. The result was a stalemate and crisis in the Uttar Pradesh government which threatened to bring the government down. An initial decision on the issue was taken by the Uttar Pradesh government in July, by which it was agreed that 50% of the land revenue would be abolished on holdings up to 6.25 acres, beginning after the current kharif crop. Internal divisions in the SSP on the issue developed, however, and the SSP continued to insist on further concessions. The crisis in the government continued for several months, leading ultimately to an SSP-CPI alliance on the issue and their joint resignations from the government. Again, however, on the land revenue issue, as on the procurement issue, a compromise was reached which permitted the return of the two parties to the government at the end of October, 1967.

The resolution of these three crises in Bihar and Uttar Pradesh suggest again that there are differences of principle between the major par-

ties. For the new system of coalition politics to function effectively, some issues, such as that over recognition of Urdu, must be sidestepped, whereas others must be compromised. In the first two years of coalition politics in north India, these methods of dealing with principled inter-party divisions were used frequently and effectively to resolve cabinet crises.

Issues which were not so easily resolved, however, were those which were connected with intra-party factional divisions and personal conflicts and which affected the interrelationship of groups within the parties and their position in the governments. Such issues frequently arose only after a split in one of the parties or in government had occurred and they provided a basis for building support to bring a government down rather than a cause for internal government division. Even more difficult tc resolve were those conflicts in which no discernible issue of principle could be detected, inwhich opportunists and political entrepreneurstraded their votes openly for ministerial office. In fact, the formation and fall of the non-Congress governments depended primarily on suchissues and forces.

III. THE FORMATION AND FALL OF THE NON-CONGRESS GOVERNMENTS: PROBLEMS OF OPPORTUNISM, INTRA-PARTY DIVI-SIONS. AND LOCAL POWER¹⁹

From the 1967 elections up to July, 1968. eight governments had been formed, and seven had fallen in the three north Indian states. Although the details of each cabinet crisis varied and the fall of the Charan Singh government ir Uttar Pradesh was uniquely complex, a fairly typical pattern of cabinet crisis developed After the formation of each government, it be came known that a prominent individual belonging to a faction in the Congress or in a non-Congress party was disaffected with the government because he was not satisfied with his place in the government or was not given a position in it. The disaffected leader then began to gather supporters, while criticizing the government in general terms for "corruption" or for failure to implement portions of the common program rapidly enough. Finally a prominen public event occurred or an issue was found which provided the leader with an immediatcause for defection with his loyal supporters

The defecting leader was then given the opportunity to form a government, which in the

19 Except where otherwise cited, the information in this section has been derived from the Statesman, the Searchlight, the National Herald and the Tribune (Ambala).

last two years was either a non-Congress coalition or a minority government with Congress support. In either event, the defecting leader became the new chief minister, many of those who defected with him received ministerial office, and a new crisis soon began. In the interim between two governments, the opposing forces in the legislature continually bargained for the support of independents and potential party defectors. The game came to an end in Uttar Pradesh and in Bihar when the governors became convinced that no stable coalitions were possible and that the Assembly should be dissolved and new elections should be called.

Patterns of conflict and alliance which developed in the legislatures of the three north Indian states revealed three distinctive features affecting the stability of governments—the key roles of independents and individual poarty defectors, the importance of intra-party divisions and cross-party alliances of factions, and the significance of inter-party conflicts over local power outside the legislature in the districts. These patterns can best be illustrated by reference to specific cabinet crises.

Bihar. The first non-Congress government in Bihar came to power with greater ease and -more promise than its counterparts in either Uttar Pradesh or Punjab. It was an exclusively party coalition in which independents played no role and were not needed for support. Moreover the Congress was in a clear minority position with only 40% of the seats in the louse and was badly divided. The non-Congress government had a relatively sound maority of 169 in a house of 318 and functioned with little open disagreement on issues of prinsiple. Yet the government was brought down ov a no-confidence motion on January 26, 1968 and was replaced on February 1 by a minority lefectors' government with the support of the Congress. This ministry lasted until March 20 when it was replaced by a new non-Congress oalition government strengthened by the adition of 17 defectors from the Congress. This ast government fell on June 25, 1968, after a najor defection, and President's Rule was delared in the state.

All three cabinet crises were brought about "y large-scale defections, the first two involving the atra-party splits and the third involving the defection of an entire party from the government. In all three cases the precipitating causes f the crises were either non-principled factional divisions or questions of personal power and ambition. However, the three cases also eveal the diversity of social forces and cleaves which exist in the Bihar Assembly and round which factional groups can be built.

The first cabinet crisis involved a conflict between personal power and party interest in the SSP in which an attempt by the national party leadership to insist upon party interest failed against personal ambition and caste sentiment. The crisis arose when Bindeshwari Prasad Mandal, a prominent state SSP leader from a "backward caste," elected to the national parliament but not to the state Assembly, accepted a portfolio in the Bihar government. In order to remain in the ministry, Bindeshwari Prasad would have had to resign his parliamentary seat, which would then have had to be recontested by the SSP in a bye-election. When the induction of Bindeshwari Prasad Mandal into the Bihar cabinet came to his attention, it immediately annoyed the leader of the SSP, Dr. Rammanohar Lohia, who put the matter bluntly and publicly that Bindeshwari Prasad's action "amounted to using the party machinery to climb the ladder of power. 220

In response to Dr. Lohia's accusation, Bindeshwari Prasad went to Delhi, was sworn in as a member of Parliament, had a long conversation with Dr. Lohia (who advised him to resign from the Bihar cabinet),21 and then went back to Patna, where he showed no inclination whatsoever to resign his ministry. Moreover, his supporters from his own caste began sending telegrams to Dr. Lohia protesting the prospect of Bindeshwari Prasad's resignation and, privately, they informed the party leadership that there would be a split in the party on the part of Bindeshwari Prasad's supporters if he was forced to resign from the government.22 Ultimately, the latter happened. On August 28, 1967, Bindeshwari Prasac finally resigned, but claimed to be taking with him 25 defectors from the united legislature party (SVD), including 18 from the SSP, and he succeeded in forming an alliance between his newly-formed Soshit Dal and the Congress by means of which the government was ultimately brought down. In the end, Bindeshwari Prasad transformed a personal discomfiture into ultimate victory in state politics when he was sworn in as chief minister of the state on February 1, 1968.

In justifying his original resignation and in building the support necessary to bring down and replace the united front government, Bindeshwari Prasad emphasized caste and community issues, thereby turning SSP party policy against itself. He charged, as Dr. Lohia also had done, that the state SSP had not followed party policy in failing to see to it that 60% of

²⁰ Indian Nation, March 12, 1967.

²¹ Interview document BG 31: 11.

²² Indian Nation, March 20, 1967.

the cabinet positions were provided for backward classes, scheduled castes, Muslims, tribals and women. The charge was true, but it is important to note that the question of Bindeshwari Prasad's political morality was raised before the representation issue and that there was nothing in SSP party policy which required that Bindeshwari Prasad himself should be in the cabinet.

The Bindeshwari Prasad Mandal ministry was short-lived. It depended for its majority on the support of the Congress. However, the formation of the Mandal government and Congress support for it immediately became an issue in internal Congress politics. The dominant factions in the Bihar Congress, especially the followers of the previous chief minister, K. B. Sahay, supported the Mandal ministry, while several minority Congress factions, especially that of former chief minister Pandit Binodanand Jha, opposed. On March 19, with the defection of seventeen prominent Congress MLAs, the Mandal ministry was defeated. Bhola Paswan Shastri acted as the spokesman for the Congress defectors, was elected the new leader of the SVD on the following day, and formed a new SVD government on March 21.

The fall of the two Bihar governments have in common their close association with inner party divisions, in the SSP and in the Congress. The fall of the Paswan ministry occurred in a somewhat different manner and was related to the interests of a cohesive "party" in the Assembly, whose interests were identical with the interests of one man, the Raja of Ramgarh. The latter had been one of the greatest zamindars in Bihar before zamindari abolition. He and his family had played an active role in Bihar politics since independence, leading a group of personal followers which varied in number in the Assembly from 17 or 18 to nearly 50. His closest family members and dependents followed the Raja from his original Janata party into the Swatantra party for a time, then into the Congress, from Congress to the JKD and into the first non-Congress government, from the JKD/ BKD to the Janata party again and into the Paswan ministry, and finally into opposition against the Paswan ministry causing its downfall.

The consistent bases of the Raja's actions in Bihar politics have been to maintain his group of personal followers and to find a position of prominence for himself in order to protect his interests and those of his family. Those interests include extensive mining properties and forest lands, the need for protection against the state government, which has long been prosecuting several cases against him in court on var-

ious charges, notably default of payments of his bills, for which the Raja is famous. In the first non-Congress government, the Raja insisted that he and his brother be given the portfolios of mines and minerals and forests. His demand was resisted by several parties in the coalition, but was ultimately conceded. The Paswan ministry accepted him into the cabinet but refused to give him Mines and Minerals On June 16, the Raja resigned from the ministry "on grounds of health," but the chief minister, who resigned ten days later, claimed that the issue was demands made by the Raja against the public interest which he as chief minister could not accept.

The ways in which the three Bihar governments fell indicate that there were three decisive factors affecting the stabilitity of cabinets—the personal ambitions of frustrated ministers, internal party divisions, and cross-party or single-party legislative interests, such as those of the middle castes or those of a great landlord-industrialist and his personal dependents. It is important to note that, on several occasions, the PSP and the SSP in Bihar resigned from government or refused to participate in governments until certain issues were agreed upon. However, none of the three cabinet crises could be attributed to the defection of a party on an issue of principle.

The importance of inner party divisions and legislative interest groups in the Bihar Assembly are reflected in the changes in party allegiance and the formation of new groups which occurred between March, 1967 and June, 1968, as shown below (Table 2).

The general tendency of the shifts is clear. Movement was predominantly from the established, relatively stable parties and from the independents to new legislative groups or revived parties such as Jharkhand (which had previously merged with Congress) and Janata (which had been the dominant force in the BKD). The legislative groups are either factional splinters from larger parties, united on appersonal or personal-cum-interest basis, or parties representing particular interests, such as Janata or Jharkhand (a party of tribals).

It is premature to draw any conclusions about the comparative cohesion of the larger parties. At one extreme, the two Communist parties lost no members, whereas the Congress lost 18% of its membership. The percentage losses for the SSP, the Jan Sangh, and the PSF were 16%, 12%, and 11% respectively. More important for purposes of my argument is the very significant fluidity in the house revealed by the total number of defections. Altogether 87 members in a house of 318 or more than 27%

of the membership changed their affiliation in a little more than a year.

Uttar Pradesh. In Bihar, the first non-Congress coalition was brought down after the defection of a minister frustrated in his attempts to achieve personal power. In Uttar Pradesh, the non-Congress coalition was made possible only by a major defection from the Congress by a prominent Congressman of forty years' standing in the party who went over to the opposition with sixteen of his followers on April 1, 1967. Charan Singh had been known in Uttar Pradesh Congress politics for the previous twenty years as a man of considerable political skill, but also of integrity and principle. It was generally recognized that Charan Singh had well-formed views, which he expressed with intellectual clarity on most public issues, especially those affecting agriculture. He was also known to have been politically and intellectually dissatisfied with his colleagues in the Congress for many years, especially with the leader of the party, C. B. Gupta, for whom he had no respect.

Charan Singh's defection falls into the category of defections which arise out of inner party conflicts and are related to issues in a diffuse way, but very specifically to questions of power. The proximate cause of Charan Singh's defection was the failure of negotiations between him and C. B. Gupta on the composition of the Gupta ministry. The sources of conflict between Charan Singh and C. B. Gupta go back ten years and more. The justification for the defection was the alleged corruption and -administrative incompetence of the previous Congress regime and some of its members. The immediate consequence of the defection was to place Charan Singh and his closest followers in the seat of state power. Charan Singh and six **-**(of 16) of his supporters were taken into the **—cabinet.** The defectors were heavily overrepresented in the non-Congress government installed on April 5, 1967. Out of 28 ministers and leputy ministers, the 7 defectors who were taken into the ministry comprised 40% of the original defectors and 25% of the ministry compared, for example, to 8 Jan Sangh ministers representing only 8% of Jan Sangh strength in

Neither the Congress nor the SVD government in Uttar Pradesh ever had a safe majority. Both governments depended from the beginning not only on party defections but on the shifting allegiances of independents. Initially, the Congress by itself had 198 seats compared to 188 seats for the combined opposition parties, with 37 independents holding the balance. In the week preceding the formation of

TABLE 2. CHANGES IN PARTY AFFILIATION IN THE BIHAR ASSEMBLY FROM MARCH, 1967 TO JUNE, 1968

	Party Membershi		
	March, 1967	June, 1968	
Established Parties			
Congress	128	105	
SSP	68	57	
Jan Sangh	26	23	
CPI	. 24	24	
CPM	4	. 4	
PSP	18	16	
Swatantra	3	1	
RPI	1	1	
New Parties and Legislative Groups			
BKD (formerly JKD)	26	2	
Soshit Dal	0	38	
Lok Congress Dal	0	22	
Janata	0	18	
Independents	21	5	
Jharkhanda	9	2	

SOURCE: Statesman June 30, 1968.

^a In March, 1967, the Jharkhand party members were in the Congress party so that the 9 members listed then were actually at the time included in the Congress strength of 128.

the Congress government, there were hectic negotiations between the Congress and the SVD for the allegiances of the independents who frequently promised their support to both sides. Ultimately, the Governor determined through personal interrogation of party leaders and independents and through demands for clear indications from the independents of where they stood that the Congress had the better claim. Once the decision was made that the Congress would form the government, almost all the independents fell into line. In the first division in the Uttar Pradesh Assembly on March 17 on the election of the Speaker, the Congress secured 226 votes to 188 for the opposition, indicating either that 36 out of 37 independents had voted with the Congress or that the Congress had gained some votes from the opposition parties directly. The tables were, of course, turned on April 1 when Charan Singh crossed the floor with 16 of his supporters from the Congress. When the figures for independents and party defectors are added together, the extent of the fluidity revealed in the Uttar Pradesh Assembly up to that date comes to 54

members in a house of 424, not counting 5 defectors claimed at one stage by the Congress from the opposition.

Charan Singh's SVD government revealed a greater variety of internal stresses than any of the other governments discussed in this paper. There were issue conflicts over Urdu, procurement and the land revenue There were problems of intra-party cohesion within the large parties making up the coalition and there were inter-party conflicts over questions of local power, of party-building in the districts. In fact it is difficult to identify unequivocally the decisive factors which led to the fall of the Uttar Pradesh government both because of the variety of internal strains and because Charan Singh ultimately resigned without a vote of noconfidence.

Between the months of November 1967 and February 1968 a three-way split developed among the parties in the cabinet. Charan Singh continued to be supported primarily by the group of defectors who had crossed the floor with him and by the smaller parties and independents in the coalition. The leadership of the chief minister was, however, increasingly opposed and thwarted by the actions of the CPI and the SSP on the one hand and by the Jan Sangh on the other hand. The disaffection of the three large parties with the chief minister was closely interwoven with intra-party divisions in the SSP and with an inter-party struggle for power between the Jan Sangh and all other components of the SVD.

A central source of strain arose out of attempts by the Jan Sangh ministers to use their portfolios particularly those of the cooperation, local self-government, and education departments, to nominate members of the Jan Sangh party to powerful district cooperative, local government and educational institutions. Open dissatisfaction with the actions of the Jan Sangh ministers was expressed on several occasions by members of all parties in the SVD. A second source of strain related to the efforts of a faction in the SSP led by Raj Narain, a member of parliament, to assert a dominant role in state SSP politics and in the SVD government. In these efforts, the SSP adopted agitational tactics to pressure the SVD government while continuing to support the government in the legis-

The sequence of events which ultimately led to the resignation of Charan Singh began with the resignation of the CPI ministers on November 20, ostensibly because of differences with the chief minister on issues related to the use of the police in political agitations and the release of government employees and others who had been jailed for their activities in various agita tions in the past. Although the CPI minister withdrew from the government, they continued to support the government in the Assembly The SSP contingent continued in the government until January 6, but increasingly oriented its activities toward public agitations on the land revenue issue, on the release of government employees held in detention, and on the demand for elimination of English from use for government purposes.

On January 6, the SSP ministers also re signed on these issues, but like the CPI continued to vote with the SVD in the Assembly. Although both the CPI and the SSP related their withdrawels to public issues, one persuasive interpretation of their motives was that the public issues were secondary and that the primary factor was "the discomfiture of the two parties" which "arose from the fear that the Jan Sangh by exploiting the portfolios in its control was worsting them in the struggle for political influence at the district and lower levels."23 Under the circumstances, there was little profit for the two parties to remain in the government. Nom could they incur public displeasure and precipitate an undesired general election by bringing down the government. The only alternative therefore, was to continue to support the gov ernment, but to build their party strength and public appeal by agitational methods. The withdrawal of two of the three large parties in the cabinet was followed within a few days by a split between Charan Singh and the Jan Sangh The break came when the chief minister re shuffled the Jan Sangh portfolios without the consent of the party leaders, taking away from them both cooperation and local self-government, and replacing them with relatively lespowerful and more innocuous portfolios, such apublic works and animal husbandry. The Ja-Sangh accepted the reshuffling without with drawing from the government, but the part leaders now joined with some of the SSP leader in calling for the resignation of Charan Sing and his replacement by a new leader.

The demand for a new leader intensified bot inter-party and intra-party differences. Swetantra, the Republicans, the BKD, and the ir dependents continued to support Chara Singh, while the Jan Sangh insisted upon his replacement. The SSP, the PSP, and the CPI divided on the issue. Charan Sangh resigned o Fabruary 18 and President's Rule was declare on February 26. Attempts by the SVD and the

²³ "Charan Singh's Shrewd Politics," *Economa and Political Weekly*, 3 (January 20, 1968), 183

184.

Congress to build internal cohesion and win the support of a majority in the Assembly were made over the next two months, but the Governor ultimately decided that no stable government was possible and dissolved the Assembly on April 16.

Three factors seem to have been predominant in the resignation of Charan Singh—the disaffection of the three large parties with Charan Singh personally, conflict between the Jan Sangh and all other forces in the government over local power, and the adoption by a faction in the SSP of an agitational role in state politics. In his letter of resignation, Charan Singh stressed his dissatisfaction with the faction in the SSP led by Raj Narain and his right as chief minister to reshuffle portfolios. Issues of principle between the parties played only a secondary role in the disintegration of the SVD coalition. The SVD coalition lost its cohesion primarily through personal conflicts over the leadership; through intra-party divisions on the leadership question which affected most of the parties in the coalition; and through inter-party conflict for power, outside the cabinet and the Assembly, in the districts where local party activists maintain a continuing struggle for local power.

Punjab. The formation of the first non-Congress government in Punjab, its fall, and the strains affecting the stability of the minority defector's government which replaced it with Congress support illustrate sharply the key roles played by independents, individual defectors, and intra-party divisions in the major parties. In Punjab, the initial balance between the Congress and the united front coalition was so close that even independents had to be rewarded with government posts to win their support. The non-congress front was able to elect a lead--er faster than the Congress and, simultaneously, to win over the support of five independents to give it a majority of 53 members in a house of 104. In order to insure the allegiance of the in--dependents, four out of five were given ministerial positions. Even so, the majority of the -united front remained tenuous and was contin-·ually threatened by the efforts of the Congress to win over independents, by the efforts of the Maharaja of Patiala to form a third alternative government under his own leadership, and by the threat of defections from within the Akali Dal, the leading party in the front. To ward off the threat of a defeat, the united front ministry ielt obliged to offer a ministerial position to inyone willing to defect from the Congress. Six new supporters were acquired from the Congress in this way. In the process, two Akali legslators who were not taken in the ministry revolted and left the Akali Dal. Thus, the front leadership was caught in the position of being forced to offer ministries to independents and defectors from the Congress to maintain its majority, while it simultaneously lost the loyalty of party members who had not been similarly rewarded.

The early Akali defections proved to be a prelude to a more serious defection from within the government itself by the seniormost Akali minister in the cabinet after the chief minister. Lachhman Singh Gill had been a rival of Gurnam Singh, the chief minister, for leadership in the Akali party and was known to be dissatisfied with his own position and with the fact that his personal supporters had not received offices in the government. During the months from August through November, the united front government was affected by a variety of strains, including inter-party differences on policy issues as well as personal differences over portfolios. Inter-party conflict occurred on policies for scheduled castes, on the language issue, and on government policy toward labor agitations. The Republican party leaders expressed discontent on government policy toward scheduled castes, the Gill group in the Akali party demanded the elimination of Hindi from official use by the state government whereas the Jan Sangh favored continued use of Hindi, and the Communist party demanded a liberal policy toward labor agitations.

On November 23, Lachhman Singh Gill succeeded in combining a variety of discontented elements and in leading fifteen legislators out of the United Front, including five Sant Akalis, one Master Akali party member, six independents, and three Republicans. The Gill-led defection, therefore, combined the discontent of two minor parties, Republicans and Master Akalis, with discontent arising out of intra-party divisions and the personal discontent of independents. The decisive weight in the defection was, however, clearly with the dissident Akali faction and the independents, including among the latter several Congressmen who had previously defected from the Congress to the united front.

Gill combined his Akali and independent followers into a new legislative party, winning the support of the Congress for a new government under his leadership, and was sworn in as chief minister on November 26 with the support of the Congress, but without its participation in the government. The creation of the Gill government led to a new and complex division in the Punjab Assembly into four distinct groupings. The Gill ministry constituted one bloc in the Assembly and the remnant of the united front its bitter opponent. The Congress, how-

ever, divided internally into two inner party subcoalitions based on pre-existing groups in the party, now divided on the issue of support for the Gill ministry. Gian Singh Rarewala, the leader of the Congress legislative party and some of his allies and supporters began to express opposition to the Gill ministry. Rumors became increasingly common that the Rarewala group was interested in forming a Congress government with the support of some or all of the anti-Gill Akalis. However, a subcoalition in the Puniab Congress opposed to the leadership of the Gian Singh Rarewala group insisted upon continued support for the Gill ministry. In other words, the situation in the Puniab Congress was now similar to the position in the Bihar Congress at an earlier point. with a dissident group in the Congress opposed to a move toward power led by an opposing group in the party. In the middle of June 1968 the coalition pattern in the Punjab Assembly remained as described here, with the Gill ministry in an increasingly untenable position and division in the Congress moving toward a climax with a request by 23 out of 43 Congress MLAs to the Congress President for permission to remove Gian Singh Rarewala from his leadership of the Congress legislative party because of his moves to withdraw support from the Lachhman Singh Gill ministry.

Patterns of Coalition Politics in North India. The first two years of coalition politics in north India have revealed a complexity of patterns of conflict and alliance and a considerable diversity of political forces and interests in the legislative assemblies. There are, first, the large, organized parties which sought for the most part to provide stable governments in north India by putting aside their ideological differences. There were three main impediments which frustrated the attempts of the larger parties to dominate the assemblies. One was the limitation on the possible inter-party alliances imposed by the primary division in the assemblies between the Congress and the non-Congress parties. A second limitation followed from the first. The limitation of inter-party alliances to the non-Congress parties gave disproportionate weight in the governments to the newly formed legislative groups, which then sought to limit the dominance of the larger parties. Thus, in Utter Pradesh, Charan Singh and his Jan Congress came into conflict with the Jan Sangh in a struggle over portfolios, which finally contributed to the fall of the non-Congress government. The third impediment to the dominance of the large parties was the decisive importance of intra-party divisions, which affected coalition patterns in two ways. First, intra-party divisions frequently led to defections, most notably from the Congress, the SSP and the Akali Dal which brought down the Congress government in Uttar Pradesh and the initial non-Congress governments in Bihar and Punjab. Second intra-party divisions twice prevented the Congress from attempting to form coalition governments in Bihar and Punjab.

Thus, both inter-party and intra-party divisions placed limits on the possible coalitions which could be formed in the assemblies. It is worth stressing, however, that these limitations are variable. They are not the kinds of limitations which permanently restricted coalitions in the unstable party systems of Fourth Republic France, Weimar Germany, or contemporary Italy. Access to government power is open to all parties and groups in the Assembly provided the right barrains can be struck.

In addition to the large, organized parties, there is a wide variety of small parties and legislative groups in the assemblies of north India. Some of these smaller parties reflect social divisions, others reflect traditional bases of power, and still others are personal groups based upon factional association. In the first category of parties reflecting social divisions are parties such as Jharkhand in Bihar, representing the tribal peoples of Chota Nagpur, and the Republican party, which seeks to represent the low caste groups of north India. The best example of a party based on traditional influence is the Janata party of the Raja of Ramgarh in Bihar.

Then too, there are the ad hoc legislative groups of independents and party defectors, which are sometimes based on caste sentiment or on leader-follower ties or on alliances of mutual convenience. Under the regime of Congress dominance, the tendency in the assemblies was towards absorption of such groups into the Congress. In the new system of coalition politics, the tendency is towards proliferation of such groups, which are now in a position to bargain for portfolios with potential alliance partners among the bigger parties.

Finally, there are the independents and individual party defectors who are either local notables with ties only to their supporters in the constituencies or are men of little or no influence and stature who have nothing to lose and everything to gain by offering their votes in a closely balanced legislature in exchange for a minor portfolio in government. For such men, the stakes of political bargaining have also risen. When the Congress dominated the assemblies, independents might move into the Congress in order to receive the patronage of a faction leader in the party who might possibly provide benefits for his constituents and hopefully a Con-

gress ticket for the next election. Now it is possible for any man in the assembly to become a minister.

In general, a comparison of the roles played by the large parties, on the one hand, and intraparty factions, small parties, and opportunists. on the other hand, suggests that the predominant influence of the large parties is toward stability whereas the predominant influence of intra-party and non-party forces is toward instability. In short, the stability of north Indian politics, parties, and governments is not threatened by ideological rigidities in the party systems but by looseness in the systems caused by the existence of large numbers of independents and the relative absence of strong party identifications. In any closely balanced legislature in north India, there will always be some independents or some party members who will be willing to change lovalties whether it be for the sake of principle, for the sake of a ministry or. in some cases, as one respondent put it, for the sake of a license to ply a truck.

IV. CONCLUSION

Many of the features of coalition politics which emerged in the aftermath of the decline of the Congress from its dominant position in north Indian politics existed during the hevday of Congress dominance. Intra-party divisions, party defections, shifting allegiances of independents, conflicts among Congress factions for local power through the control of key government departments, and the formation of legislative interest groups in the Assembly all occurred when Congress exercised a monopoly of power. Moreover, these kinds of strains frequently led to the toppling of Congress governments by dissident factions in the Congress. The difference then was that the arena of conflict and the diversity of interests and personal ambitions that could be expressed were limited to the Congress. Power at the state level was available only within the Congress. Movement into opposition was movement outside the arena of power. The arena has now become as broad as the legislative Assembly as a whole. The key change is now that all parties, groups, and organized interests have acquired access to power.

If we assume, as I believe we must, that the decline of the Congress is only partly reversible and that the return of Congress dominance throughout the Indian Union is the remotest of the possibilities to be considered for the future development of politics in India, then we are in need of new perspectives to deal meaningfully both with the complexity of the developing systems of coalition politics and with the variabili-

ty of developing party systems in the Indian states generally. The pattern of coalition politics described here is simply too complex to be contained within the dominant party system model. Moreover, neither the patterns described here nor the dominant party system model are valid for some of the other Indian states, most notably Madras, where a single cohesive party, the DMK, has successfully replaced the Congress and where the development of a classic two-party system is a reasonable possibility. In brief, I am arguing that the Indian states provide a vast field for comparative studies of developing party systems, of which there are already a considerable variety in existence, and which can be compared both with each other and with party systems in other parts of the world. In this paper, I have attempted to describe the predominant tendencies and patterns of coalition politics in the developing party systems of north India. My argument can be summarized in the following points:

(1) Before the 1967 elections, the political regimes which dominated north Indian politics were best described as multi-party systems with one party, the Congress, dominant. Now that the Congress monopoly of power has been broken, the model of the one-party dominant system is no longer useful.²⁴ The formation of party coalitions and the stability of state party systems and state governments in north India have depended in the past two years and are likely to continue to depend in the immediate future upon the factional structure of the Congress, intra-party divisions in the other large parties, the relations among the parties, and the roles played by independents and party defectors.

Although north Indian state party systems resemble certain of the historical and contemporary European multi-party systems, they do not suffer from the rigidities of those systems. The predominant tendencies in the developing north Indian party systems are toward openness, fluidity, and inclusiveness. No parties have been excluded from the system or from government.

(2) The absence of rigidities in the systems does not mean that there are no anti-system parties in the states nor does it mean that ideology plays no role in party politics in these

²⁴ For the contrary view that "the dominant party system is . . . only modified by fresh forms of competition, not replaced," see W. H. Morris-Jones, "From Monopoly to Competition in India's Politics," Asian Review, I 1 (November, 1967), 1–12.


states. Ideological differences exist among the parties and each state party system varies in its ideological emphasis. However, ideology has not so far prevented the functioning of the systems. Ideological polarization in the state party systems cannot be ruled out in the long run, but the predominating tendencies do not lie in that direction at the moment. Inter-party conflicts on matters of principle were more easily reconciled in the past two years than inter-party conflicts which related to party power in the government and in the districts.

(3) Far from suffering from ideological rigidity, the systems display a high degree of looseness and fluidity. In Sartori's terms, these are "structured party systems,"25 but the dominance of parties and party policies in the systems is limited by the key importance of nonprincipled intra-party divisions and by the presence of atomizing tendencies in the shape of large numbers of independents and political entrepreneurs. Until 1967, the Congress benefitted exclusively from the existence of such forces, which operated on the fringes of Congress power and were sometimes absorbed or used by factions in the Congress against each other. In the aftermath of the 1967 elections, the Congress is, as it were, suffering for its sins in this respect since the opportunists and entrepreneurs now have a wider field for maneuver and greater opportunities for achieving power.

The ways in which the north Indian party

²⁵ Sartori distinguishes between a "structured party system" in which "at least one or two of the existing parties have acquired . . . a national platform, a unified symbol, and some stable organization also at the local level, so that they are perceived by the country at large as the natural foci and channels of the political system" and a system in which there is "party atomization," that is, "a highly fragmented pattern in which parties are mostly a facade covering loose and shifting coalitions of notables. In this stage the party system is still evanescent qua system: parties have no real platform, hardly a national spread, no centralized or coordinated organization, and even less anything resembling a stable organization." Sartori, op. cit., pp. 167-168. What makes Indian party systems so interesting from a developmental point of view is that there are both structuring and tendencies toward atomization. My argument is that party development in India requires the consolidation of the predominance of the parties and the elimination of atomizing tendencies or at least the control of such tendencies so that they do not prevent the creation of conditions for stable and effective government.

systems functioned in the past two years can be represented conveniently in the form of the following diagram.



The diagram brings out the central role played in the contemporary north Indian party systems by independents and potential party defectors, whose activities affect all parties. Indeed, even groups within the Congress are affected; for, although an entire group may leave the Congress to find opportunities elsewhere, a Congress group is itself a loose structure, from which individuals may detach themselves. The model also recognizes the continued importance of the Congress in the system as a whole and the fact that the Congress contains within it sub-groups, which may vary in number and in the extent of their mutual antipathies. The arrows on the outer ring of both sides of the circle represent the tensions among groups in the Congress and among parties in the non-Congress coalitions. In general, the arrows in the diagram are meant to reflect the fluidity of the system and the fact that independents and defectors, Congress groups and non-Congress parties, may at any time change sides.

The diagram also leaves open two other possible patterns of coalition politics which did not occur in the past two years, but are likely to become feasible when the pariah status of the Congress wears off. One is that the Congress may decide to play the role of a European center party and attempt to reestablish a relative monopoly of power by bringing into coalition smaller parties with narrow interests or similar ideology. The other possibility is that Congress may be forced to accept a position as only one party among many and adopt a strategy of

openness to all or most parties. In fact, it is possible that the first development may occur in some states, the second development in other states, depending upon the relative strength of the Congress and the ideological balance in individual party systems. The return of the Congress to power is, in fact, a real possibility in all three states, but it is highly unlikely that the Congress will ever again be able to dominate the systems in the same way as in the past either throughout the Indian Union or in any single state in north India.

The north Indian party systems which have replaced the Congress-dominant systems have proved incapable of providing stable, effective government in the first two years of coalition politics. The persistence of instability in the systems works against the interests of all the large parties and threatens to replace political leadership over policy making with bureaucrat-

ic rule. An alternative to chronic political instability and bureaucratic rule can arise only through the more effective organization of the large parties and increased coherence within them. Such a development is within the realm of possibility, but it is likely to be a labor of decades. The DMK in Madras has demonstrated that it is possible to build a disciplined, cohesive party organization in a developing society capable of taking power from the dominant party and ruling effectively. The nature and diversity of social divisions in north India make it unlikely that a single party will be able to emulate that feat. However, if the patterns of coalition politics which have been described in this paper are reliable guides to future political patterns in north India, then an increase in party organization and party ideology provides more likely conditions for government stability than a politics of power and personal ambition.

SOURCES OF LOCAL POLITICAL INVOLVEMENT

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Despite the legal norm of universal adult citizenship in the United States, and thus the legitimacy of participation by all strata of society, the actual level of political involvement in local communities is not high and differs greatly from group to group. Our task here is to spell out some of the conditions of group membership which contribute to local political involvement. Our broader purpose is to argue the need to re-expand the theoretical framework for analysis of political participation and thus to correct the present imbalanced focus upon participation as an individual act.¹

Thus we shall examine some structural, rather than psychological, conditions of local political involvement. In this we shall occasionally use some measures previously reported in other studies and conventionally regarded as tapping psychological attributes of individuals; but these we shall regard as defining sets of role-expectations or as locating categories of persons placed within a certain range of normative obli-

¹ The theoretical discussion of political participation from the viewpoint of an individual act may be seen in Angus Campbell et al., The American Voter (New York: John Wiley and Sons, 1960); Robert A. Dahl, Who Governs? (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1961); and in the useful summary of the literture in Lester Milbrath, Political Participation (Chicago: Rand McNally and Company, 1965). The emphasis upon individual motivation is illustrated by Dahl's insistence (page 279) that "Instead of seeking to explain why citizens are not interested, concerned, and active, the task is to explain why a few citizens are." (His emphasis.) It is perhaps more fully illustrated by Milbrath's approach (e.g., page 6) where he states that "taking any political action generally requires two decisions: one must decide to act or not to act; and one must also decide the direction of his action." Milbrath then discusses people "making up their minds," making "choices," their "understanding," and other social-psychological aspects of political action. Given this orientation, level of information, degree of opinionatedness, intensity of feeling, rationality and quality of deliberation, consistency of ideological orientation, and other pyschological concomitants of participation become the primary focus of analysis.

gations; and, more importantly, we shall systematically compare the net effect (upon local political involvement) of such variables with that of the more conventionally defined structural variables.

I. DATA, ASSUMPTIONS, METHODS

Our data are drawn from an April, 1962 survey of the adult electorates of four middle-sized cities in Wisconsin. The overall response rate was 86 per cent; in no city did it fall below 83 per cent. Here we shall ignore inter-city differences and instead aggregate the four separate samples into a composite sample (technically defined as a probability sample of the electorate of middle-sized cities in Wisconsin in 1962).

From the survey responses to questions on local political interest, local political information, public-meeting attendance, and local electoral turnout, we have constructed an index of local political involvement and this is our dependent variable. But before discussing that index in further detail, it is necessary first to state the theoretical assumptions entailed in using the index and also to identify certain important research questions which we cannot treat here.

First, construction of an index of local political involvement is based on the assumption that one may usefully treat the "local community" as if it were a single political system. We admit that individual citizens may perceive otherwise, that such differential perceptions may importantly influence political behaviors, etc., but that raises different questions (from the ones here) to be treated elsewhere. Second, we shall ignore variations in the four components of our index of involvement. It would be possible and useful to create and explore typologies (e.g., Apathetics, or uninterested nonvoters, Ritualists, or uninterested voters, and so on) but that again raises different research questions for the future. Thirdly, we shall not be able to treat here the question of prime interest to Dahl and other pluralists, of the situational context with-

² Further details of the study may be found in Robert R. Alford and Harry M. Scoble, "Community Leadership, Education and Political Behavior," American Sociological Review, 33 (April 1968), 259-272.

in which a specific individual is active/influential in a particular decision or an apparently apathetic individual suddenly emerges as a "meteor," in Wildavsky's term. Finally, our concern here is with the sources of differential local involvement and we must reserve for the future questions of policy or systemic consequences. Thus, for present purposes, we assume only that it is empirically possible and theoretically useful to distinguish the generally highly involved from the generally uninvolved. Furthermore, since the dependent variable is based upon fourteen separate items (several of which involve reports of political behavior ranging over the lifetime, since maturity, of the individual), we assume we have isolated a category or "political stratum" of individuals more or less consistently involved and active in local affairs (i.e., we doubt we have misclassified many individuals because of situational peculiaritiesto them—at the time of interview).

The composite index of local political involvement was constructed as follows. First, four separate indices were created: (1) an index of local political interest, evenly dividing the sample into "high" and "low" interest; (2) an index of local political information, again evenly dividing the sample into high/low; (3) an index of public-meeting attendance, dichotomized into "high" (25 per cent of the sample) and "low" (remainder); and (4) an index of local election turnout, also dichotomized into "high" (about 60 per cent of the sample) and "low" (remainder). Then these were combined

² See Aaron Wildavsky, *Leadership in a Small Town* (Totowa: The Bedminster Press, 1964).

4 To save space, the verbatim form of the items making up each index will not be presented here. (They may be obtained from the Wisconsin Survey Research Laboratory or from the authors.) Briefly, the index of local political interest is based on five items asking: general interest in city politics; perception of major local problem(s); number of these; interest in decision(s) by city government or school board "in the past year;" and number of these. The index of local political information is based on four items asking: correct names of mayor, city clerk, school superintenddent, and Republican Party (or Democratic Party) county chairman. The index of attendance is based on three questions asking, "within the past two years," if respondent had attended a public-issue discussion meeting, a political party meeting, and a city council (or school board) meeting. And the index of local electoral turnout is based on two items requesting reported frequency of voting in local general and in local primary elections "since you have qualified for voting . . . (and) wherever you have lived. . . . "

into five types: Mobilized (high on all four indices); Potentially Mobilized (high on interest, information and turnout, but low on attendance); Moderate (a residual catch-all for all cases not defined by the other four combinations); Ritualistic (low on all except voting); and Apathetic (low on all four). The percentage distribution of the 1,635 cases is: 9, 18, 48, 12, and 12 per cents respectively. For convenience in analysis, we have collapsed the five types into a trichotomy and have focused on the extremes of "high" (Mobilized and Potentially Mobilized, 28 per cent of the sample) and "low" (Ritualistic and Apathetic, 24 per cent) in local political involvement.

Six categories of factors have been thought to be the principal sources of local political involvement: social status, organizational activity, community attachment, religion and ethnicity (relatively little studied independently of social status), political motivations or predispositions, and the sociopolitical environment within which one lives (which has also received little systematic attention). These are our independent variables, concerning which it is important to note that none logically reduces to another (although one may be caused by another and thus have no independent effect).

For each independent variable, employing either the survey data or electoral and census statistics for city blocks and wards, at least two different indicators have been selected (with the single, obvious exception of religion) as follows: for social status: income, education, occupation; organizational activity: memberships and activity in voluntary associations, local party membership; community attachment: home ownership, length of residence, geographic mobility, a composite index measuring respondent's objective stake in the community, and an index measuring subjective attachment to the community; religion and ethnicity: reli-

⁵ Assumptions underlying the types are, for example, that an uninterested, uninformed voter is not a conspicuous local participant, whereas a non-attender who is nonetheless highly interested, informed, etc., is likely to leap quickly into action if he perceives an issue of concern.

⁶ For a general survey of the literature using, with some terminological differences, these same six categories, see Milbrath, op. cit. In the analysis sections which follow, for reasons of space we cannot fully cite the literature (especially where repetitively replicative); we will, however, attempt to cite literature of both a complementary and a contradictory sort on the lesser-researched independent variables, especially social mobility, community attachment, religion and ethnicity, and political environment.

gion, original nationality, father's birthplace, and generation(s) in the United States; political predisposition: indices of sense of local civic duty, political efficacy, and political alienation; and sociopolitical environment: presidential and local voting turnout and home ownership and housing quality rates for the ward in which respondent lived. Each indicator is more specifically defined in its appropriate table; also, since cutting points on all variables, including involvement, are arbitrary, it should be remembered that the percentages to reported have only relative—and not absolute—meaning.

Finally, a brief description of our steps of procedure and mode of analysis is necessary. First, we computed the basic association between each indicator of each independent variable and the dependent variable (percentage high in local political involvement). These zero-order associations are familiar to all political scientists and are reported, serially, in the first six tables below.

Next, we made use of multivariate analysis (in part because we wished to avoid assumptions of normality and linearity normally required by more elaborate correlation and regression statistics) and for this we followed procedures recommended by James S. Coleman with regard to computation of "effect parameters." Thus, while we have computed multivariate contingency tables, we need not reproduce them here because we can economically verbalize them in terms of several different effect-parameter summaries which we will employ in two different ways. The effect parameters to be used are termed gross effect, net effect, and joint (also maximum or extreme) effect. The gross effect is simply the percentage difference observable in the dependent variable prior to introduction of a second or third independent variable; it is similar (but not always identical) to the original zero-order association.8 The net effect, defined as the mean dif-

⁷ See James S. Coleman, Introduction to Mathematical Sociology (New York: The Free Press of Glencoe, 1964), pp. 189–203. One reason Coleman advanced his alternative method may be simply stated: contingency tables, by the time one introduces three independent variables, become visually cumbersome, consume much space, and often elicit excessively subjective interpretation. An "effect parameter"—of the types defined and illustrated in our text—is a single, quantitative summary designed to avoid all three, interrelated problems.

⁸ It is only similar (not identical) because of the frequent need to change cutting points of the same indicator when moving from zero- to higher-order analysis.

ference obtaining among all relevant comparisons among all identical sub-categories created by intersections of two or more independent variables, is of greater theoretical importance because it is a measure of whether -and, if so, in what direction and by how much—the assumed "independent" variable indeed has an independent effect when simultaneously controlling for the effect(s) of one or more other independent variables. (But a "net effect" statistic is not "self-interpreting" for, as in any quantitative measure, "significance" has to be attributed in terms of more or less arbitrary conventions; ours—as "decision rules"-are stated below.) To illustrate with a concrete example, and to anticipate examination of social status indicators next, having demonstrated the obvious—that each is associated with the dependent variable—the question next arises as to mutual effects, of intercorrelation versus independence, of the indicators. The net-effect parameter is an aid for answering the question, when interpreted in terms of the following decision rules. First, if the direction of association (gross or net effect) is as expected, it is indicated by a plus sign. Second, if gross effect is greater than 15 percentage points but reduces, when controlled, to a net of five or less, we shall assume that the second or third factor accounts for the apparent influence of the first. Third, if signs are evenly split (positive and negative) and net effects are between zero and five, we shall assume there is no relation between the factors. Fourth, if one component difference is negative, but another has a magnitude of at least 20, we shall infer some kind of cancelling-out effect. And, finally, our basic rule: to assume that an indicator has an independent effect, the component differences must all be in the same (positive) direction and average to 10 or more percentage points. Used in accordance with these rules, gross- and especially net-effect parameters permit us to judge the relative importance of two or more indicators of the same independent variable (or of one or more indicators of two or more different variables).9

⁹ Because the dependent variable was trichotomized (into "high," "moderate," and "low" local political involvement) rather than dichotomized, the use or arbitrary cutting points might unduly influence the relative association of independent variables with involvement. To check on precisely this, all multivariate analyses were run twice, using first "high" and then "low" involvement as the dependent variable. To save space in the text, effect parameters for "high" involvement only are reported—but in no case where these are "significant" (as defined) are they not also con-

Coleman's method also yields a third summary, termed joint (or maximum or extreme) effect. For example, in a four-variable table (with three independent variables), joint effect is measured by subtracting the "amount" of the dependent variable observed in the low-low-low cell from that in the high-high-high cell;but note that this is the logical extreme—if the maximum mathematical difference does not also occur between these two cells, then the method is inappropriate because the independent variables are not working in the presumed, cumulative fashion. Concretely, if one is interested in the relative importance of all motivational indicators compared with all social status indicators, joint effect is a simple, convenient yardstick for making such judgment; thus this measure will be employed later, in Table 7, when treating combined effects of indicators of the same and of different independent variables.

II. FINDINGS

Social Status

The expected, positive association of each of three indicators of social status with local political involvement is demonstrated in Table 1. To verbalize the obvious should be unnecessary, other than to point out that changes in the magnitude of the dependent variable in this table are among the very highest observed in our data; indeed two—those for occupation and especially education—rank among the three highest basic associations observed.

As computed from the multivariate analysis, gross effect parameters were: education +26, occupation +19, and income +12, and net effect parameters were: education +18, occupation +12, and income +14, That is, because of intercorrelations among the three status indicators, the basic association of each with involvement is reduced somewhat when controlled for the others; but none is wiped out or even substantially reduced. And, as indicated by the net effects interpreted with our rules, each indicator has an independent effect upon the dependent behavior.

Most striking in this multivariate analysis is the increasing importance of each status indicator as more of them are high. That is, there is

firmed by effect parameters computed for 'low' involvement.

TABLE 1. LOCAL POLITICAL INVOLVEMENT AND SOCIAL STATUS

Per cent l	nigh in lo	cal politi	cal involve	ement
Education:	Eleven or less years Hig Grad ate		Some College or More	Total
	13% (608)	23 % (596)	43 % (377)	24% (1581)
Occupation:	Manual Non- manual			Total
			7% 35)	25% (1478)
Income:	th	.an	,000 or Core	Total
			2% 79)	24% (1522)

Education is based on report of highest grade of school or year of college completed. Those reporting some vocational training in addition to high school are classed with high school graduates, even if they did not graduate from high school.

Occupation is that of head of household. Non-manual includes: professional, technical and kindred workers, post-high school students, managers, officials, and proprietors, clerical and kindred workers, and sales workers. Manual includes: craftsmen, foremen, operatives, laborers, and private household and service workers.

Income is estimated total family income from all sources "last year" (1961) and "high" income was defined as that exceeding the median family income for Wisconsin in 1960 (\$6,000).

much less difference in political involvement among persons low in any two aspects than among those high in any two; and the greatest gap of all occurs between those with college education and nonmanual occupation and high income compared with persons in any other (two-high-only) category. This may indicate that both advantages and disadvantages conferred by social status are cumulative—"adding up" in combined effects on involvement. An alternative possibility is that as one "refines" crude survey analysis by defining variables by three indicators rather than one, he approaches much closer to the reality of status groups with established expectations of political participation for

¹⁰ The net effect of income actually increases slightly over gross effect, due to concentration of the population in low education and manual occupation categories (a sub-total of 840 cases) plus the relatively small positive influence of having a high income if the other two aspects of social status are both low.

their members. Particularly in minority "categories" (e.g., 13 per cent of the sample falls into the highest status category), one may be delineating actual social groups, members of which are guided by norms of political behavior, not just statistical aggregates.

This possibility, that we are dealing with a status group with some historical continuity of socialization into political participation, raises the question of the influence of social mobility upon involvement. The multivariate analysis was rerun, now substituting father's occupation (nonmanual, manual, and farming) for the income indicator. Gross and net effects of education and present occupation remained as above; those for father's occupation were +5 and -1, respectively,11 indicating no consistent, independent influence on involvement. But introduction of "farming" into considerations of an industrial phenomenon obscures more than it clarifies. If attention is restricted to inter-generational mobility defined solely in terms of modern (blue and white collar) occupations, then social mobility has both a modest yet differential effect on political behavior. That is, controlling for both education and present occupation, the political involvement of downward mobiles is the same as that of the stratum to which they have descended (and, of course, greatly less than that of the level left); whereas the level of political involvement of upward mobiles is higher (a partial "net effect" of +5) than that of the level left yet still lower (a partial "net effect" of -8) than that of the highstationary stratum to which they are ascending. In a crude comparative sense, the political behavioral consequences of downward mobility are immediate and full (they have traversed 100 per cent of the "political distance" down); those of upward mobility are delayed and partial (for upward mobiles have climbed only about 40 per cent of the distance up). More theoretically, yet highly tentatively, we might infer two different processes at work: for downward mobiles, early adult resocialization effectively contradicts still earlier ("pro-participation") familial socialization; but for upward mobiles, earlier ("antiparticipation") familial socialization tends more to carry over into adult life and to retard new learning in the acquisition of political roles more appropriate to new social status.12

¹¹ Net effect was here calculated on the assumption that farming is lower in status than the manual category; if one reverses the assumption the net effect parameter is +2.

¹² Unfortunately, this is not the first time that inquiry into social mobility has yielded somewhat unsatisfactory results. Since World War II,

But, howevermuch the social mobility findings are in the expected directions, we wish to stress that they are small and of considerably

analysts have been interested in the political consequences of vertical social mobility. Research results have been highly variable and often conflicting, in part because of great variation in operational definitions of "mobility" and probably also because geographical mobility, often thought to accompany social mobility, has rarely been separated out of the inquiry. (Early conflicting results, including his own, may be found in V. O. Key, Jr., Public Opinion and American Democracy [New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1961]. pp. 145-148). It is also relevant to note that early inquiries focused primarily on direction, or ideological content, of political opinion as the dependent variable, whereas we are here concerned with the more neutral amount of political activity and involvement.

On what might be termed a para-political subject similar to ours, research has produced further confusion if not contradiction. On the one hand. socially mobile persons were found to be not as socially active as stationaries in studies by Gerhard E. Lenski, "Social Participation and Status Crystallization," American Sociological Review, 21 (Aug., 1956), 458-464, and by Peter M. Blau, "Social Mobility and Interpersonal Relations." American Sociological Review, 21 (June, 1956), 290-295. On the other hand, a third inquiry found no such relationship, for which see Richard Curtis, "Occupational Mobility and Membership in Voluntary Organizations: A Note on Research," American Sociological Review, 24 (Dec., 1959), 846-848.

More recently, we have found partial confirmation of our findings in the work of Jane H. Bayes. who made use of interview, mailed questionnaire, and aggregate electoral and census data on residents of Los Angeles County. (Bayes never explicitly specifies direction-including downward-of social mobility in her data; but because of the special demographic characteristics of the Los Angeles population, we assume that the greatest proportion of her cases of socially mobiles are upwardly mobile and thus that her findings lend support to that relevant portion of our data.) Having first established that socially active persons are also politically active, Bayes then demonstrated that: (1) in general, social mobility had no significant effect on organizational activity; (2) but when analysis was restricted to nongeographically-mobile residents, who had been raised in the county, then the social mobiles were significantly less active in organizations; (3) yet finally geographic mobility—alternatively defined by interstate movement, by intra-county resless importance than our replication of the well-established linkage between social status and political involvement independently for each of the three present-day indicators of status—a point to which we return in a later section.

Organizational Activity

Two of our measures of organizational activity (claimed number of voluntary memberships and reported levels of activity therein) are conventional, but the third measure is both unconventional and inherently ambiguous, because of the highly variable meanings of both "membership" and "local" party in American politics. Thus we claim for the latter only that it serves as an additional, specifically political measure either of organizational activity or at least of predisposition to identify oneself in organizational terms. See Table 2: as expected, each indicator initially exhibits quite a strong association with political involvement.

Multivariate analysis (involving dichotomizing both organizational memberships and activity) produced gross effect parameters of organizational activity +21, organizational membership +20, and party member +18; net effects-somewhat reduced as anticipated-were +12, +10, and +13 respectively. Again, each indicator had an important independent effect on political involvement. Moreover, persons organizationally active in two or more regards were considerably more highly involved than those less active—but this opens up discussion of joint effect, and comparisons among these, which we must defer until we have completed a a review of the six basic categories of independent variables. We will also defer to a subsequent section consideration of questions, which the reader may already have raised, as to whether social status, especially indicated by education, may not wholly account for organizational activity (whether sociologically or psychologically measured).

Community Attachment

We conceived of community attachment as having both objective and subjective dimensions. Home ownership, long residence in the community (and/or geographic mobility), or

idential mobility, and by length of residence—" is more destructive to previous social and civic obligations than is social or occupational movement within one geographic area." (Page 164; emphasis added.) See Jane H. Bayes, "Political Participation and Geographic Mobility" (unpublished doctoral dissertation, Department of Political Science, UCLA, 1967), especially chapters 6 and 7.

TABLE 2. LOCAL POLITICAL INVOLVEMENT AND ORGANIZATIONAL ACTIVITY

Memberships:	13010	Medium	111R11	Total
	13%		32%	
	(697)	(371)	(515)	(1583)
Organizational Activity:	Low	Medium	High	Total
	10%	21%	47%	25%
	(487)	(659)	(409)	(1555)
Local Party		***************************************		
Member:	N	o Y	Yes	Total

Organizational memberships are based on the question, "Which clubs and organizations like those on this card do you belong to?" (A flash-card was shown, listing eleven subject-matter categories plus a residual "other".) One (or no) membership was scored "low"; two as "medium"; and three or more as "high".

Organizational activity is based on reported frequency of attending meetings of each group belonged to (above); response categories were "usually, seldom, or never" (scored 2, 1, or 0 respectively); scores were summed; and "low" activity was defined as 1 or 0 (including no membership initially); "medium" was 2-4; and "high" activity a score of 5 or more.

Local Party Membership is from the question, "Do you consider yourself a member of a local political party?" (As noted in the text, this question is inherently ambiguous in at least two senses.)

having friends and relatives in the immediate area are considered objective indicators of community attachment, or integration. Their association with political involvement is shown in Table 3. It is evident that home ownership is the most unambiguously related to involvement. Length of residence exhibits a curvilinear relationship (to be anticipated because of the probable concealed correlation of age at the "high" end of the continuum). The combined index labelled "objective stake in the community" shows the expected effect in only modest amount and that of geographic mobility is even less.

TABLE 3. LOCAL POLITICAL INVOLVEMENT AND COMMUNITY ATTACHMENT

Per cent high in local political involvement						
Home Ownership:	:	No	Yes		Total	
•	- (13% (524)	30% (1019)		24% (1543)	
Length of Residence:	Less than 14 years	15 to 29 years	30 to 49 years	More than 50 years	Total	
	15% (523)	26% (330)	33% (523)	23% (217)	24% (1593)	
Objective Stake in Community:		Low	Medium	High	Total	
		21% (559)	22% (452)	29% (493)	24% (1504)	
Geo- graphic Mobility:	Born and brought up outside Wiscon- sin	Born or brought up in Wiscon- sin	All life in Wiscon- sin	All life in city	Total	
	23% (427)	32% (88)	24% (590)	26% (461)	25% (1566)	

Home ownership is based on "Do you own, are you buying, or do you rent this house you are living in?

Length of residence is based on "How long have you lived in this city?"

Objective stake in community is based on five questions (one of which repeats home-ownership above, it should be noted). Respondents were given a score of 1 each if they had close relatives living within 25 miles of them, had one or more "best friends" living in the community, owned their house, owned any (other) property in the city, and if their spouse had any relatives in the area. A "low" score was 0 to 2, "medium" was 3, and "high" 4 or 5.

Geographic mobility is based on two questions, "Where were you born?" and "Where did you live most of the time between the ages of 5 and 15?"

These findings may seem somewhat surprising because one traditional hypothesis concerning sources of local political involvement focused on just such community attachment or social integration. But available data for testing have been somewhat limited. 13 However, before

18 Early findings of general relevance may be seen in Gresham Sykes, "The Differential Distribution of Community Knowledge," Social Forces, 29 (May, 1951), 376–382. The population was white, male wage-earners in Plainfield, New Jersey. The dependent variable was knowledge of local community affairs. Among the hypothesized independent variables having positive effect were home-ownership, geographic mobility, and length of residence. One of the earliest theoretical gen-

concluding that community attachment (other than home-ownership) plays very little role in producing involvement, we examined the associations of Table 3 more closely, selecting geographic mobility and length of residence for multivariate comparison. In the resulting table, internal relationships were small in size and inconsistent in direction, yielding low effect parameters (net effects of -2 and +3, respectively), indicating no independent impact on involvement.

We then devised an index of subjective attachment to the community, '4' on the possibility that it might be more important for local political involvement. The effects of both subjective attachment and objective stake were than compared by multivariate analysis, but both net effect parameters, while positive, were small (+4 and +3, respectively) and the result of internal inconsistencies. Again,

eralizations of such community-attachment findings to explicitly political behavior may be found in Chapter 30, "The Psychology of Voting," by Seymour M. Lipset et al, in Gardner Lindzey (ed.), The Handbook of Social Psychology (Cambridge: Addison-Wesley Company, 1954). And Bayes, op. cit., more recently demonstrated that geographic mobility itself, regardless of length of residence, was the most destructive for social and political participation of all factors she surveyed. (In thinking about the far smaller impact of inter-state geographic mobility in our data than in Bayes', we note that two-thirds of our respondents had lived all their lives in Wisconsin whereas more than 60 per cent of the Los Angeles population had been born outside California, suggesting that the local political system may be able to absorb without much change small amounts of geographic mobility. Future research of a comparative sort thus might usefully focus on whether there is a threshold effect or a "critical mass" factor involved.)

14 The index of subjective attachment was based on three items: "In general, this is a very good community to live in," "I can hardly imagine myself moving out of this community at any time in the future," and "I could be just about as satisfied with life in another community as I am here." Agreements to the first two questions and disagreement to the third were each scored 1, producing an index ranging from 0 to 3 (high subjective attachment). The items were originally devised by Martin A. Trow for study of communication flows in Bennington, Vermont, and were based upon the discussion of "locals" and "cosmopolitans" in Robert K. Merton, Social Theory and Social Structure (Glencoe: The Free Press, 1957 edition).

TABLE 4. LOCAL POLITICAL INVOLVEMENT, RELIGION AND ETHNICITY

Per cent high in local political involvement								
Religion		Catl	holic Prot	estant		Total		
	· · · · · · ·	22 (656	, .	6% 2)	-	24% (1551)		
Original Nationality:	Mediterr. Europe	Eastern Europe	Central Europe	Northwest Europe	Great Britain	Total		
	21% (67)	30% (166)	22% (492)	22 % (364)	33 % (383)	25% (1512		
Father's Birthplace:	Mediterr. Europe	Eastern Europe	Central Europe	Northwest Europe	Great Britain	Total		
	20 % . (65)	35% (113)	20% (141)	25% (122)	45% (33)	26% (499)		
Generation in United States:	First	Second	Third	Fourth		Total		
	20% (123)	28% (457)	27 % (543)	19% (369)		25% (1492)		

Religion is based on "What is your religious preference or membership?"

Original Nationality is based on "What is the original nationality of your family on your father's side?" (If the answer was "American," this was probed—"What country did your family come from originally?")

Father's Birthplace is based on "Where was your father born?" (and this portion of the table excludes US-born fathers). For both original nationality and father's birthplace, "Mediterranean Europe" is defined by Italy, Portugal, Spain, and Greece; "Eastern Europe" includes Poland, Russia, and any other country east of Germany; "Central Europe" includes Germany, Austria, and Switzerland; "Northwest Europe" includes France, Belgium, Holland, and the Scandanavian countries; while "Great Britain" includes Ireland. Persons of mixed British and Northwest European background were classified as British. The few "other" countries of origin have been excluded from this table.

Generation in United States was determined by responses to questions about birthplace of the respondent, his parents, and all grandparents. "First generation" means all were foreign born, "second generation" that respondent was US-born but one or both parents foreign born, etc. Ninety persons were unclassifiable because they could not answer one or more questions.

by our test, neither variable demonstrated independent influence.

We conclude that—except for home owner-ship—neither subjective nor objective attachment to the community plays an important role in creating local political involvement. Whether this is a new historical development, to be expected in modern mass societies in which "attachment" as a social phenomenon has little general influence, is a question we cannot answer.

Religion and Ethnicity

Religion, nationality, and nativity are three aspects of the cultural origins of a population which may be related to local political involve-

ment which have been little studied. Table 4 presents four basic associations in the context. Protestants are only slightly more likely to be involved than Catholics and the difference is not significant. Persons whose original nationality is British or whose father was born in Great Britain are slightly more likely to be highly involved than persons with other ethnic origins (with East Europeans an unexplainable exception). And the number of generations in the United States interestingly appears curvilinear, making no consistent difference in involvement.

Religion and original nationality were then examined in combination. In three of the four

TABLE 5. LOCAL POLITICAL INVOLVEMENT AND POLITICAL PREDISPOSITIONS

Per cent hig	h in loc	al political	l involve	ment
Local Political				
Efficacy:	Low	Medium	High	Total
·	24%	23%	33%	25%
	(514)	(664)	(295)	(1473)
Local Political				
Alienation:	High	Medium	Low	Total
	15%	20%	32%	26%
	(114)	(597)	(781)	(1492)
Local Civic				
Duty:	Low	Medium	High	Total
	12%	22%	32%	. 25%
	(224)	(672)	(649)	(1545)

Local Political Efficacy is based on three statements, "I don't think public officials in this city care much what people like me think," "I get as much satisfaction out of my political activity as I do from my other community activities," and "The way people vote is the main thing that decides how things are run in this city." Disagreement with the first statement and agreement with the second two were considered indicators of a high sense of local political efficacy, scored 1 each and summed. "Low" in this table is 0 or 1, "medium" is 2, and "high" is 3.

Local Political Alienation is based on two statements, "In most local elections there usually isn't enough information available for me to make an intelligent choice" and "To succeed in politics around here, a man has to be dishonest." Agreement with either was considered evidence of local political alienation and was scored 1. "High" in this table means 2, "medium" 1, and "low" 0 total score.

Local Civic Duty is based on two statements, "A good many local elections aren't important enough to bother with" and "If a person doesn't care how a local election comes out, he shouldn't vote in it." Disagreement in both cases was considered evidence of high local civic duty, scored 1 each, and summed. "Low" here is 0, "medium" is 1, and "high" a score of 2.

nationality groups with enough cases for comparison, Protestants were slightly more likely than Catholics to be highly involved in local politics. Also, persons originally from Britain were slightly more highly involved than persons

from Northwest, Central, and Mediterranean Europe, whether Catholic or Protestant. But the patterns were not completely consistent, and it was evident from Table 4 that neither ethnicity nor religion is as strongly related to local political involvement as other independent variables previously examined. Furthermore, whatever apparent effect ethno-religious groupings exhibit might well be the effect of social status differences. And this was then exammined, using education as the indicator. Education retains a relatively large influence (net effect +14) but original nationality exhibits no independent influence when controlled (net effect +1).

In short, while there may be a special affinity for politics among particular ethno-religious groupings, this factor is probably not strong enough to offset the major effects of social status and organizational activity. When education and organizational activity are taken into account, we have probably controlled for the major part of the variation in involvement which might initially appear due to ethno-religious origins.¹⁵

Political Predispositions

Political predispositions have repeatedly been found to be associated with voting turnout and other forms of psychological or behavioral involvement in politics, especially in national studies.¹⁶ Here we present three different com-

15 See two M.A. theses based on the same data reported here for more detailed analyses of the religious bases of political behavior in the four Wisconsin cities: Patricia D. Cousens, "Religion and Class and Predictors of Political Involvement" (unpublished Master's Thesis, Department of Sociology, University of Wisconsin, 1964) and Luther B. Otto, "Catholic and Lutheran Folitical Cultures in Medium Sized Wisconsin Cities" (unpublished Master's Thesis, Department of Sociology, University of Wisconsin, 1963). The first study found that "with class controlled, there are no differences between Protestants and Catholics in levels of political involvement in the local community," although distinct religious differences remained in party identification and voting. The second study produced a similar finding for Lutherans and Catholics.

¹⁶ See Campbell, op. cit., pp. 103-107 for motivational factors involved in the 1956 presidential election. The original scales are presented in Angus Campbell, Gerald Gurin, and Warren E. E. Miller, The Voter Decides (Evanston: Row, Peterson and Company, 1954), pp. 187-199, which we have adapted with specifically local referents.

posite measures of a positive or negative predisposition to be involved in local politics: local political efficacy, civic duty, and political aliention. As indicated in Table 5 there is indeed a positive relationship between each indicator of political motivation and local political involvement, yet we note that the associations tend to be smaller than those of social status or organizational activity with involvement.

The three motivational measures were then combined, on the assumption that a stronger relationship might result if persons were scored on seven separate items (rather than only two or three) and that there might be something internally inconsistent about the items, in the context of local politics, which might account for the relatively weak relationship of these social-psychological attributes with local involvement. Such is not the case. Agreement on local political efficacy items has no independent effect (net effect +1) on local political involvement; local civic duty or political alienation retains almost exactly the same effect on involvement whether considered separately or simultaneously (that is, the gross and net effect parameters are both +12 and +11); and the explanatory power of all three together is clearly not substantially more than that of any one of the three separately.

We shall see later whether and how social status and home-ownership are related to the sense of local civic duty, selecting this measure of political predisposition for special analysis.

Political Environment

The concept of political environment or milieu has existed in the literature some forty years, dating from the Chicago social scientists' concerns with "urbanism as a way of life"; but political analysts have made less extensive use of the concept in their research than have social-area analysts. In this section, we are con-

17 The concept of political environment or milieu is essentially that of a subnational areal (e.g., "neighborhood") political culture persisting through time and social space. Five representative political studies making use of the concept are: (1) Harold F. Gosnell, Machine Politics: Chicago Model (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1939), pp. 91-125, where the author used electoral and census data on Chicago subcommunities to determine types of voter-support for Franklin D. Roosevelt and also to compare 1928-1936 voting consistency; (2) a study similar to Gosnell's by Bartelmann, as reported in R. C. Tryon, Identification of Social Areas by Cluster Analysis; A General Method with an Application to the San Francisco Bay Area, vol. 8,

cerned with a limited aspect of political environment (in terms of its effect on amount of political behavior, rather than more traditional concern with effect on direction). Thus we are asking whether individual political involvement in the local community is associated with residence in a ward with a high level of voting turnout, housing quality, and/or home-ownership? The basic associations of these environmental indicators with the dependent variable are presented in Table 6, showing that there is indeed a slight positive association between local and presidential voting turnout in the ward and between housing quality and level of homeownership of the ward and the level of local political involvement. (But reversals occur with respect to both local turnout and home-ownership.)

The multivariate procedures previously described were than employed. The two aggre-

No. 1 (University of California Publications in Psychology, 1955), pp. 1-100, in which the author compared the 1940 Roosevelt vote with the 1947 Congressional vote for Havenner (an FDR-Truman supporter), showing that the neighborhood distribution of the vote was practically the same in the two elections in San Francisco; (3) Walter C. Kaufman and Scott Greer, "Voting in a Metropolitan Community: An Application of Social Area Analysis," Social Forces, 38 (Mar., 1960), 196-204, comparing 1952 presidential vote with a 1954 local referendum (to establish a Metropolitan St. Louis Sewer District) in terms of both direction of voting and level of turnout and by reference to census tracts classified by Shevky's indices of social rank, urbanization, and minority segregation; (4) Heinz Eulau, Betty H. Zisk, and Kenneth Prewitt, "Latent Partisanship in Non-partisan Elections: Effects of Political Milieu and Mobilication," in M. Kent Jennings and L. Harmon Zeigler (eds.), The Electoral Process (Englewood Cliffs: Prentice-Hall Inc., 1966), pp. 208-237, in which the researchers classified the city-wide partisan milieu-predominantly Democratic, competitive, or predominantly Republican, as defined by party registration data-of formally nonpartisan California cities and then demonstrated milieu effects on individual behavior (characteristics, perceptions, campaign activities, career expectations, etc., of incumbent councilmen); and (5) Bayes, op cit., chapter 8, in which Bayes arrayed Los Angeles County census tracts according to whether they were nationally-oriented in voting, state-local oriented, or mixed, and then demonstrated that the observable effect of political milieu was upon the behavior of the non-college educated respondents in her samples.

TABLE 6. LOCAL POLITICAL INVOLVEMENT AND WARD CHARACTERISTICS

Per cent high in local political involvement					
West Control of the C	Low	Medium Low	Medium High	High	Total
Presidential Vote Turnout:	21%	23%	26%	27%	24%
,	(337)	(352)	(435)	(471)	(1595)
Local Vote Turnout:	19%	23%	28%	26%	24%
	(340)	(381)	(413)	(461)	(1595)
Housing Quality:	13%	16%	25%	27%	24%
**************************************	(149)	(162)	(438)	(863)	(1592)
Home Ownership:	16%	24%	28%	24%	24%
	(204)	(478)	(473)	(437)	(1592)

Presidential Vote Turnout is based on the percentage of voters in the spring presidential primary of 1960. City election statistics were employed. Each of the 78 werds in the four cities was ranked, separately for each city, and then divided into four approximately equal groups. Cutting points thus differed for each city, because the overall turnout levels of the cities differed.

Local Vote Turnout is based on the aldermanic elections of 1961 or 1962 (and procedures similar to the above were used). Two successive years were necessary because of staggered elections in Wisconsin municipalities.

Housing Quality refers to the proportion of dilapidated housing units in each ward in 1960 and Home Ovenership to the proportion of housing units owned by their residents in 1960, again by wards. Both of the latter measures were derived from the block data of the 1960 Census of Housing. For further details on construction and interrelationships of these measures of ward characteristics, see Robert R. Alford, in collaboration with Harry M. Seoble, Bureaueracy and Mobilization in Urban Politics (Chicago: Rand McNally and Company, forthcoming), Chapters 8 and 9.

gate social characteristics of the wards were compared, but the net-effect parameters (of ownership +2 and of housing quality +4) indicated that neither had an independent effect on involvement when controlled for the other. The two political characteristics of the wards were then compared, with similar evidence of lack of impact (net effect +2 for both presidential and local voting turnout). From these two tests, it seemed entirely possible that the small, positive initial associations (in Table 6) were entirely the result of the status composition of the wards—that when individual characteristics of respondents were controlled the apparent contextual effects of wards would entirely disappear. Thus two further multivariate tests were conducted, to examine the mutual effects of social status-measured first by education alone

and then by a combined index based on education, occupation, and income-and ward characteristics upon local political involvement. That is, in each test, a status characteristic of the respondent was combined with two ward characteristics—one social, one political—in order to produce two separate tests of the possible independence of ward influences upon involvement. The results of the first test were net-effect parameters as follows: ward home-ownership +3, ward local voting turnout +7, and combined social status +27. The results of the second (again net effects) were: ward presidential turnout +3, ward housing quality +4, and education +16. In short, no ward characteristic exhibited an independent effect (by our definition) on local political involvement; but social status (by both measures) retained a uniformly positive and high association with involvement, regardless of the political or social characteristic of the ward and regardless of which ward indicator was employed.

Contrary to earlier findings, the political environment—defined here in terms of the ward election district—does not exhibit independent influence upon political behavior. Whether a different (smaller or larger areal) definition of the political milieu might yield different (and positive) results is a question we cannot answer.

III. THE COMBINED EFFECTS OF VARIOUS FACTORS

Before summarizing findings and conclusions, we wish to examine the combined effects of various indicators, approaching this subject through the question (earlier deferred) of the joint or individual effects of education and organizational activity upon local political involvement. Does organizational activity account for the influence of education on involvement? There are at least three possibilities, two plausible and one implausible. First, if the path of recruitment to organizations is primarily through education (and organizational-belonging is class-related in this sense) and if local political involvement is primarily a function of social status, then organizational activity should prove an intervening variable which, when controlled, would eliminate the apparent influence of education on involvement (i.e., similarly active persons should be similarly involved in local politics, regardless of education). The contrary is implausible, that education is the primary determinant and organizational activity only incidental, for then college-educated persons should have the same level of local involvement whether belonging to four organizations or none. But, third, education and organizational activity

may both independently influence involvement, not only because of the assumption that the local political system is accessible through various channels of participation but also because involvement (as defined) does not require that a person be active in organizations. The components of involvement do not depend upon membership or activity in associations of any kind; while such "unmediated" involvement may be of quite a different nature than that derived from organizational activity, it certainly need not be considered "lesser" in any sense. And home ownership may be another intervening variable, mediating both organizational activity and local involvement.

These possibilities were examined by multivariate analysis, first comparing education, individual home-ownership, and sense of local civic duty. The net effect parameters were: education +21, ownership +25, and civic duty +7. The independent influences of both education and home-ownership on involvement are clear and strong, regardless of each other or of civic duty. Civic duty, on the other hand, has small impact when controlled. Indeed, among renters, there was no relationship between high sense of civic duty and local involvement. among either highly or relatively less educated respondents. In this sense, a sense of civic duty simply does not "compensate" for not owning a home or not having a college education. Alternatively, home ownership may imply crossing a threshold of community attachment at which point local elections assume enough meaning that one's personal predispositions become engaged and influence one's involvement; but below that threshold, local politics apparently has little meaning and civic-duty questions may tap general ideological assumptions-but, whatever, these bear no relation to (low) local political involvement.

Therefore we turned to the three indicators of different independent variables which Tables 1-6 had indicated as having greatest impact on local political involvement: education, organizational activity, and home-ownership. In multivariate comparison, the respective net effect parameters of these three were: +17, +16, and +16. No one of these accounts for the "apparent" influence of the others; each retains a strong independent effect on involvement when simultaneously controlled for the other two.

What does it mean that home-ownership or organizational activity is a source of local political involvement independent of education? Home ownership apparently is a form of politically-relevant group membership, vesting the individual with tangible interests perceived as impinged upon by local politics quite apart

from more conventional interests of high social status. So for organizational activity: persons become politically involved through channels other than that provided by elite social position. For membership and activity in a church, Rotary club, labor union, or recreational association brings one into contact with local affairs in ways exposing one to information, arousing interest, provoking attendance at meetings and voting in local elections whether or not one had the initial predisposition to repond to political stimuli implied by relatively high education.

Earlier, we referred to Coleman's "joint effect" parameter as a useful summary statistic by which one may readily judge whether, for example, the combined effects of three indicators of one independent variable are more or less than those of the indicators of another independent variable (or judge the relative importance of "mixed" indicators of two or more independent variables). Thus, in Table 7, we have summarized the major joint effects observed in the previous (unreproduced) multivariate tables. (We have ignored the indicators of community attachment-other than home-ownership-and of religion and ethnicity, for obvious reasons.) Another way to state the purpose of Table 7 is to say that it isolates categories of combinations exhibiting least-to-most probability of being associated with local political involvement.

Thus, personal predispositions to participate (senses of local political efficacy, civic duty, or lack of political alienation) had least combined influence on local political involvement, as defined here.

Political environmental indicators, even when "mixed" with social status indicators, had only intermediate effect.

Organizational activity and social status had approximately equal "maximum effects," when all three indicators of each were taken into account simultaneously in the extreme cells.

And when the joint effects of several different independent variables were taken into account, the degree of explanatory power of all indicators/variables was increased slightly. For example, 60 per cent of all persons of high education, owning their homes, and having high sense of civic duty were high in local political involvement, compared with only 8 per cent of those low in education, renters, and low in civic duty—leaving (as indicated in Table 7, sixth row) a net joint-effect of +52.

Table 8 shows even more graphically the structural sources of local political involvement, by classifying persons on the three most important indicators of different independent variables: home-ownership, organizational activity, and education. Table 8 presents three

TABLE 7. SUMMARY OF MAJOR JOINT EFFECTS
OF INDICATORS ASSOCIATED WITH HIGH
LOCAL POLITICAL INVOLVEMENT

· •	Joint Effect
Political Motivation Indicators:	
Local political efficacy, civic duty,	
political alienation	+23
Political Environment and Social Status	
Indicators (Mixed):	
Combined social status, ward home- ownership, ward local voting turn-	
out.	+28
040	T20
Education, ward housing quality,	1.90
ward presidential voting turnout	+36
Organizational Activity Indicators:	
Organizational memberships, organi-	
zational activity, local party mem-	
bership	+39
Social Status Indicators:	
Education, occupation, income	+42
Joint Effects of Mixed Indicators:	
Education, individual home-owner-	
ship, sense of civic duty	+52
Education, organizational activity,	
individual home-ownership	+47

This table summarizes joint (maximum, extreme, or net) effect parameters for the extreme cells of the multivariate tables previously described in the text (but unreproduced). In each row of this table, the "joint effect" represents the maximum percentage-point difference between the two cells "highest" and "lowest" in each individual table with respect to their potential influence upon local political involvement. Thus, in row five of the table above, we summarize the fact that we found 55 per cent of those with some college education, a nonmanual occupation, and an income of more than \$6,000 a year were highly involved in local politics, whereas only 13 per cent of those with less than college education, a manual occupation, and an income of less than \$6,000 a year were highly involved. The difference between these two figures is +42, entered in row five in this table.

sets of related figures (from left to right): the proportion highly involved of each category (following "condition of involvement"), then the proportion each such category is of the total population, and finally the distribution of highly involved persons in each of the eight categories. For example, at one extreme, home owning, organizationally active, high-status persons constitute 22 per cent of the population; half

are active, yet these constitute 44 per cent of all highly involved persons. At the other, 13 per cent rents, are inactive organizationally, low-status, and only 3 per cent are highly involved, constituting only 2 per cent of the total number of highly involved persons.

We divided the aggregate sample into four main groups, based on home ownership, organizational activity, education, and local political involvement. Of those high on the first three factors, half are involved—and probably from this group of stable middle-class activists is drawn most of the civic/political leadership of the communities. In the second (lower) category, the main group is that of organizationally-active home-owners with low education, constituting 29 per cent of the total population and 30 per cent of the "highly involved" population.

Finally, we may lump together as relatively uninvolved those persons lacking any two or more structual conditions for involvement—for these constitute a combined 39 per cent of the total population, but only roughly one-seventh of those highly involved in local politics.

In short, Table 8 isolates four different categories of persons defined by four main variables: home ownership, organizational activity, education, and local political involvement. (The first three are the key structural conditions leading to involvement itself.) The important fact is the high degree of correlation of these characteristics, illustrated by the fact that we have been able to classify fully 85 per cent of the total population. To state it differently, relatively few persons own a home, have high education, but are not also organizationally active; nor are there many who rent, are organizationally inactive, but also have high education. This shorthand summary of results is a verbal means of providing a quasi-demographic description of the "involvement composition" of the Wisconsin sample. But we must reserve to the future examination of variations in actual political roles played by persons with differing combinations of these attributes.

IV. SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS

The above tables indicate that only some of the several factors presumably related to local political involvement are independently important and that some are much more important than others. Social status and organizational activity, not surprisingly, proved the most important personal characteristics associated with local political involvement. Local political predispositions—measured by indices of civic duty, political efficacy, and political alienation—are relatively less important. Local polit

TABLE 8. STRUCTURAL SOURCES OF LOCAL POLITICAL INVOLVEMENT

(Condition of Involvement		Per cent		Proportion	Proportion category is		
Home Owner- ship	Organizational Activity	Educa- tion	Highly Involved		Highly		category is of total population	of all highly involved persons
		**************************************	%	(N)	%	<u>,</u> %		
	ALL THREE HIGH			·		•		
High	\mathbf{High}	High	50%	(309)	22%	44%		
	ANY TWO HIGH							
\mathbf{High}	\mathbf{Low}	\mathbf{High}	31%	(51)	4).	5		
Low	High	High	28%	(85)	6}39	7 42		
High	\mathbf{High}	\mathbf{Low}	26%	(406)	29	30)		
	ANY TWO LOW							
Low	High	Low	13%	(164)	11)	. 6		
High	$_{ m Low}$	Low	11%	(184)	13 26	$6 \} 12$		
Low	\mathbf{Low}	\mathbf{High}	10%	(21)	2)	— ј		
	ALL THREE LOW				·			
Low	Low	Low	3%	(178)	13	2		
	TOTAL		25%	(1378)	100 <i>%</i> (1378)	100% (349)		

The left-hand set of figures in this table simply rearranges those of tables previously reported (but unreproduced); the right-hand set takes these same figures and (1) presents the proportion each category (High, High, etc.) is of the total sample and (2) presents the proportion it is of the total of "highly involved" persons. (All measures here are based on dichotomies.) For example, in the first row above, 50 per cent of those 309 persons who owned homes, were organizationally active, and had high education were highly involved in local politics. These same 309 persons constituted 22 per cent of the total sample (aggregated across the four cities) but they also constituted 44 per cent of the 349 persons (in that total sample) who were scored as highly involved in local politics.

ical environment (as measured by the social status and voting turnout levels of the ward of residence) was even less important. Geographic mobility, length of residence, and subjective attachment to the community had no importance—but home-ownership was strongly related to local involvement. And evidence concerning religion, ethnicity, and nativity was inconclusive, at best.

What can one infer from such diverse findings? We feel both the positive and negative findings are important. The fact that neither mobility, residence, nor subjective attachment is significantly related to local involvement (whereas organizational activity and homeownership are) suggests that "traditional" ties to the community have lost whatever significance they might once have had. Rather, only concrete memberships in local groups and specific interests at stake produce high local involvement. Similarly, the trivial role played by neighborhood socio-political environment indicates that people "carry around" with them their predispositions to participate, and are not

significantly influenced by "immediate" sociopolitical milieu. "Local" influences such as ward social-status level or turnout level no longer—if ever—have strong influence on involvement, apart from personal characteristics of individuals living in the ward. Religion, ethnicity, nativity seem similar: characteristics people "carry around" and perhaps more stable than influences deriving from geography and location (e.g., ward, residence, and/or mobility)—but we do not have space to examine these factors further.

It is surprising that the predispositional factors—efficacy, civic duty, alienation—do not exhibit greater influence than they do, in light of the considerable social-psychological literature stressing individual decision and choice in political behavior. Since we are unprepared to argue that the four Wisconsin cities are different from other communities as data sources, we suggest that previous studies have not taken into account a wide enough range of structural conditions affecting voting and political involvement.

It is formally possible for any person to become involved (as defined); but the fact that high-status, home-owning, organizationally-active persons provide half of all highly involved persons suggests that politics in American cities is probably disproportionately influenced by the norms and values characteristic of that group—if it is a group with distinctive norms and values.

The advantage of restricting inquiry to relatively "hard" structural conditions (such as the three prime indicators here) is that one avoids the easy assumption that "anyone can become involved if he wants to," that politics is a matter of will-power-entirely up to the individual to acquire or not. This assumption—a myth of "equal political opportunity" as it were-is analogous to that in economics: that involvement is merely a matter of desire and that any one who wishes to, by dint of hard labor, can become a fully participating member of the economic system. The difficulties with this view are perhaps more apparent with respect to the economy than the polity, but it can reasonably be argued that structural parriers to involvement are similar in both spheres.

Those persons drawn into organizational activity, having a certain stability of residence in the community, and having high status provide the bulk of those actively involved in local government and politics. These conditions, in turn, may be highly correlated with a sense of political confidence or efficacy, but surely primarily as causes, not consequences. Individual voting acts in particular elections constitute true "decisions" in the sense usually meant, but involvement rates are more than aggregates of decisions, to the extent that they are systematically correlated with the social structuring of group memberships, attachments, and stratification. If political involvement is thus linked with social structure, involvement rates are undoubtedly linked to the political role-structure of the society. To be specific, when we find that better-educated persons vote more frequently than less-educated, we have not explained this by asserting that better-educated people are more likely to "decide" to vote than less well educated. The level of explanation or understanding more appropriate to the empirical finding is to look to the definitions of appropriate behavior for particular categories of persons in the society, i.e., the norms governing political participation and involvement.

Political involvement may be a characteristic of a political "stratum" which, in a society like the United States, has much the same character as the social stratification system. High status (political or social) is formally accessible to all, but limited in fact—by background, training, and selection. Political involvement is an attribute of a politically-organized stratum which—like social class strata—need not be cohesive, but may be internally divided and represent only partially consistent interests and values.

Political involvement may thus be usefully conceived as a social role, with attached normative expectations for self and others, varying with group and community membership, containing the possibility of role conflict, role sets, and role change. Involvement thus is connected with social and political structures through processes of role definition and learning. (One asks, how do people come to see themselves as related to politics? How and when is political role fixed? How does it change? How is it related to other roles?) Viewing involvement thus, we attempt to avoid reifying a classification of individuals, something hard to do when analyzing survey data from one point in time. High level of involvement is not assumed to be a permanent characteristic of an individual, but only partial. segmentary, subject to pressures for change either for intensification or abandonment. When a political role becomes permanent and central, we normally refer to the "professional politician"-but this is not the central role for most persons and, therefore, the structural conditions under which political roles are played become important.

That there are several independent sources of local political involvement means that one can neither explain nor understand the course of controversial issues with reference to a single underlying dimension. Interest, information, meeting-attendance, voting turnout—these arise from a number of independently varying causes which cannot be reduced to a single origin.

¹⁸ Our article cited in footnote 2 above treats the formal leadership of the four Wisconsin cities as such a political stratum.

MALAPPORTIONMENT PARTY COMPETITION, AND THE FUNCTIONAL DISTRIBUTION OF GOVERNMENTAL EXPENDITURES*

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I. INTRODUCTION

Most students of American politics traditionally have argued that it is desirable that legislative apportionment systems conform as closely as possible to an ideal of numerical equality, and that it is desirable that major political parties actively compete for elective office. Admittedly this argument has been in

- * Some of the research reported in this paper was done while both authors were staff members of the Community Service Seminar and Research Program at Texas A&M University, an activity jointly funded by the Department of Health, Education, and Welfare under Title One of the Higher Education Act of 1965 and the Coordinating Board of the Texas College and University System. The authors would like to acknowledge the assistance of this program in the preparation of their research. We would also like to acknowledge the helpful comments of Claude A. Bitner, Jr. of the University of Houston, Claude Davis of Texas A&M University, Neil Wallace of the University of Minnesota and a referee on earlier drafts of this paper.
- ¹ Numerical equality is, of course, merely one ideal, and it is certainly an ideal which is neither very confining nor demanding. It is in no way necessarily related to other characteristics which are normally considered to be desirable in a system of representation. Gerrymandering, for example, does not necessarily require deviations from numerical equality, and, given certain characteristics of the geographical distribution of the electorate, gerrymandering itself may be a force tending to produce numerical equality.
- ² We realize that competition between major political parties is not the only form of political competition which is important in the United States. Clearly in many states competition within one or the other of the major political parties is much more important than that between parties. A study with more ambitious objectives than ours would have to explore the influence of this and other types of political competition. Our investigation should be viewed as an attempt merely to explore the influence of strength of competition between the two major parties upon state and local expenditure patterns.

large part only implicit, but, since most theoretical argument in political science has been implicit,³ this does not imply that apportionment or party competition have not been considered to be important by students of politics. Indeed several recent articles in professional journals have been published which seem to derive at least a portion of their appeal and raison d'être from a "demonstration" that students of politics have been guilty of the sin of credulity by holding these implicit beliefs.

The tone of much of this work is aptly expressed by the title of a popularizing article by David Brady and Douglas Edmonds, "One Man, One Vote-So What?"4 Brady and Edmonds-after some extensive, but, unfornately not very discriminating statistical computations-concluded "that the whole Pandora's box of evil consequences which supposedly result from malapportionment—from right-towork laws to not spending enough on school children-really has little to do with malapportionment."5 Although somewhat more cautious in his approach, Thomas R. Dye reached the similar conclusion that "on the whole, the policy choices of malapportioned legislatures are not noticeably different from policy choices of well-apportioned legislatures." And Richard I. Hofferbert also concluded a non-parametric analysis in the same sceptical vein by writing, "structural characteristics and, if one prefers to give partisan variables a separate berth, the nature of the party system and its operation do not seem to go very far toward explaining the kind of politics produced in the states."7

- ³ For an excellent discussion of implicit theorizing in political science see Charles E. Lindblom's "In Praise of Political Science" World Politics, 24 (Jan., 1958).
 - 4 Trans-action, 4 (March, 1967), 41-46.
 - ⁵ Ibid., p. 46.
- 6 "Malapportionment and Public Policy in the States," Journal of Politics, 27 (August, 1965), 500
- 7 "The Relation Between Public Policy and Some Structural and Environmental Variables in the American States," this Review, 60 (March, 1966), 82.

The purpose of this paper is to attempt to furnish a grain of scholarly salt for assertions of this type. Rather than attempting to accomplish this objective by engaging in the necessarily tedious process of immanent criticism, we will present the results of a study which indicate that malapportionment and party competition are associated with policy choices in a statistically significant manner.

Specifically, this study has three principal objectives. They are:

- 1. To formulate some consistent, but only exploratory, hypotheses about the possible relationship between differences in the apportionment patterns and levels of major party competition among the American States and differences in per capita expenditure levels in these states for some selected governmental functions.
- 2. To organize these hypotheses in a manner which will allow multivariate statistical techniques to be used legitimately to test the explanatory usefulness of these hypotheses.
- 3. To statistically test these hypotheses and discuss some of the implications and limitations of these tests and their results.

II. THE CONSTRUCTION AND INTERPRETATION OF THE HYPOTHESES

The formulation of the Hypotheses. The hypotheses concerning the influence of malapportionment and party competition are formulated in the following manner.

Hypothesis I.—The greater the degree of apportionment in a state, the *lower* the level of per capita expenditure will tend to be *for the governmental function in question*.

We interpret this hypothesis to be consistent with the following two premises:

Premise I.1.—The greater the degree of malapportionment in a state, the greater will tend to be the divergence between the actual results of the political decision-making process and the "true" preferences of the electorate for the category of governmental expenditures in question.

Premise I.2.—The "true" preferences of the electorate call for a higher level of expenditure on the function in question than the actual level produced by the political decision-making process

We wish to postulate these two premises for two reasons. The first is that they make explicit how we will interpret an empirical affirmation of the validity of Hypothesis I. The second is that these premises will be used in our analysis of the second major hypothesis to insure consistency in our testing procedure.

The second hypothesis we wish to test concerns the influence of competition between the two major political parties within a state and expenditure levels within that state for the goverr mental functions which we have selected for study. This hypothesis is formulated in the following manner.

Hypothesis II.—The greater the degree of party competition in a state, the higher the level of per capita expenditures will tend to be for the governmental function in question.

We interpret this hypothesis to be consistent with the following two premises.

Premise II.1—The greater the degree of party competition in a state, the greater will be the degree of conformity between the actual results of the political decision-making process and the "true" preferences of the electorate for the governmental expenditure classification in quastion.

Premise II.2.—The "true" preferences of the electorate call for a higher level of expenditure on the function in question than the actual level produced by the political decision-making process.

The Procedure for Testing the Hypotheses. The procedure which we have used to test these two hypotheses can be outlined as follows. For each of the selected expenditure categories:

- 1. We test Hypothesis I using standard statisfical techniques.
- 2. If the criteria of these tests allow us to accept Hypothesis I, then we proceed to test Hypothesis II using the same techniques.
- 3. If Hypothesis II satisfies the criteria of the test it is accepted, if it does not it is rejected.
- 4. However, if the criteria of the tests used do not allow us to accept Hypothesis I we make no attempt to test Hypothesis II.

Although somewhat complex, this procedure is necessary if we wish to assign internally consistent and unambiguous meaning to the results of the statistical tests of our two hypotheses. Premises I.1 and I.2 make explicit how we wish to interpret Hypothesis I, and, likewise, Premises II.1 and II.2 indicate our interpretation of Hypothesis II; but, clearly, there are also many other sets of premises which are also consistent with these two hypotheses. We cannot directly test the validity of these premises by statistical methods, but, to us, the premises seem reasonable. We can, however, insure that our interpretation of our statistical tests is consistent with our premises. This is what our testing procedure is designed to do.

The design of our testing procedure incorporates the test of Hypothesis I as a necessary condition (to use mathematical terms) for the testing of Hypothesis II. There are two reasons we designed the procedure in this way. One is basically a value judgement that we have made and the other concerns the statistical relationships

inherent in the data available to test the hypotheses. The value judgement is that, to us, the first hypothesis seems to be the simpler and more widely accepted of the two hypotheses. It should be emphasized, however, that this "judgement" is largely an intuitive affirmation, on our part, since, frankly, we do not feel that the a priori theoretical analysis devoted to either hypothesis has been adequate to warrant much confidence. The statistical reason for using Hypothesis I as a necessary condition in our procedure is that the measure we have used to quantitatively approximate the concept of malapportionment is much less highly correlated with the other independent variables in our regression equations than is our measure of inter-party competition. As will be explained later, when independent variables are highly correlated with one another a statistical problem called multicollinearity is created which causes some difficulty in interpreting results. In other words, we are slightly more confident about our measurement of the relationship between malapportionment and expenditure levels than we are about our measurement of the relationship between inter-party competition and expenditure levels.

Operationally, our use of the test of Hypothesis I as a necessary condition for accepting or rejecting Hypothesis II involves the following. If we reject Hypothesis I our testing procedure stops. We make no attempt to interpret the test of Hypothesis II for that expenditure category. We feel that if we attempted to do so we would introduce ambiguity into our analysis. The premises which we have assigned, a priori, to the two hypotheses indicates our interpretation of them. We feel more confident that our test of Hypothesis I is adequate, therefore, if we reject Hypothesis I we are, in effect, saying that for -that expenditure category Premise I.2 is subject to question. We are less confident that our test of Hypothesis II is adequate, and since Premise II.2 is identical to Premise I.2, we feel ■that it would be inconsistent to accept Hypothesis II if we have rejected Hypothesis I. If Hypothesis I is accepted, however, our procedure loes allow us to either accept or reject Hypothesis II as indicated by the results of our statistical tests.

The objective of our testing procedure is not to attempt to verify the hypotheses we have postulated for all or even most of the functional expenditure categories of state and local governments. They are not statements that we a priori expect to be universally descriptive of poitical processes. It would be naive to interpret

⁸ We do, of course, have a priori reasons for beieving apportionment patterns and party comour statistical tests as in any sense a rigorous test of the hypotheses which we have formulated or the familiar political concepts upon which these hypotheses rest. The procedure was designed merely to find those expenditure functions which are consistent with these hypotheses as we have interpreted them.

For those expenditure categories which are not empirically compatible with the hypotheses our method is inconclusive. In other words, our procedure will not divide the functions which we have selected for study into two mutually exclusive sets, one set composed of those functions which are compatible with the hypotheses and the other set composed of those which are not compatible with the hypotheses. The procedure only demonstrates that some functions are compatible. It is not powerful enough to demonstrate that (1) these are the only functions which are compatible or (2) that all the other functions are not compatible; i.e., the procedure only locates some members of the "compatible set," and some members of the "not compatible set."

III. VARIABLES SELECTED TO TEST THE HYPOTHESES

Dependent and Independent Variables. We have selected two groups of variables in order to explore the explanatory usefulness of our hypotheses. The first group are assumed to be the dependent variables, i.e., variables which react passively to changes in other variables. The dependent variables which we have chosen were selected from the categories of state and local expenditures as given in the 1962 Census of Governments. The full variable names and the reference abbreviations of the dependent variables selected are given in Table 1.

In order to explore the relationship between differences in per capita expenditures on the functions listed in Table 1 and differences in apportionment patterns and the degree of interparty competition, we will use two single equation regression models. The first model is:

petitiveness might influence the pattern of expenditures or we would not have undertaken this study. Two examples of the type of a priori argument which led us to believe that this is so are Anthony Downs' An Economic Theory of Democracy (New York: Harper and Row, 1957), especially pp. 21–74 and 114–141, and William Riker's, The Theory of Political Coalitions (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1962).

⁹ U. S. Bureau of the Census, Census of Governments: 1962, Vol. IV, No. 4, Compendium of Government Finances (Washington, D. C.: U. S. Government Printing Office, 1964), pp. 57-58.

TABLE 1. FULL VARIABLE NAME AND REFERENCE ABBREVIATION FOR DEPENDENT VARIABLES^a

Full Variable Name	Reference Abbreviation
1. Total General Expenditure of State and Local Governmental Units	1. Total Expenditure
2. Total Expenditure for Education	2. Total Education
2a. Expenditure for Institutions of Higher Education	2a. Higher Education
2b. Expenditure for Local Schools	2b. Elementary and Secondary
3. Total Expenditure for Public Welfare	3. Total Public Welfare
3a. Public Welfare Expenditure for Categorical Programs ^b	3a. Categorical Programs
3b. Public Welfare Expenditure for Other Cash Assistance Programs ^o	3b. Cash Assistance
3c. Other Public Welfare Expenditured	3c. Other Public Welfare
4. Expenditure for Hospitals and Health	4. Hospitals and Health
5. Expenditure for Highway Construction and Maintenance	5. Highways
 Expenditure for Police and Local Fire Protection^o 	6. Police and Fire
 Expenditure for Sewage and Other Sanitation^e 	7. Sanitation
8. Expenditure for Local Parks, Recreation	8. Recreation and
and Natural Resources	Resources
9. Expenditure for Housing and Urban Renewal	9. Housing and Urban

^a All dependent variables are measured in per capita terms.

$$\frac{E}{P}=b_0+b_1\frac{Y}{P}+\epsilon,$$

where E stands for the expenditure category under consideration, P for total population, Y for total personal income received in the state, b_0 and b_1 are constants to be statistically estimated, and ϵ is the error term. The model posits a relationship between per capita personal income in a state and that state's per capita expenditure for the function in question. There are two reasons why one would expect that this posited relationship exists. In his pioneering work on inter-state variation in the functional distribution of expenditures Solomon Fabricant concluded that differences in per capita personal income was the most important factor

"causing" differences in expenditure levels.\"
Later writers have affirmed Fabricant's conclusion.\"
This is certainly not surprising. Casua-

¹⁰ Solomon Fabricant, The Trend of Government Activity in the United States Since 1900, (Nev York: National Bureau of Economic Research—Inc., 1952), Chapter 6.

¹¹ See, Glenn W. Fisher, "Interstate Variatior in State and Local Government," National Ta: Journal, 17 (March, 1964), 55-74; Seymour Sack and Robert Harris, "The Determinants of Stat and Local Government Expenditure and Inter Governmental Flow of Funds," National Ta: Journal, 17 (March, 1964), 75-85; Ray W. Bahler, and Robert J. Saunders, "Determinants of Change in State and Local Government Ex

b Includes total expenditure for the programs of Olc Age Assistance, (OAA); Aid to the Blind, (AB) Aid to the Permanently and Totally Disabled, (APTD); and Aid to Families with Dependent Children, (AFDC). Although these are jointly financial programs of the Federal, State, and Local Governments, the total per capita amount spent is the figure used in this study.

^c Cash assistance includes general relief payments made to those not qualifying for categorica programs and are wholly financed by state and local governmental units.

^d The category, "Other Public Welfare," is composed of expenditures for vendor payments, institutional care of the needy and welfare administration.

e Items consolidated from categories reported separately in the Census of Governments.

TABLE 2. SOCIAL VARIABLES INCLUDED IN REGRESSION EQUATION FOR EACH OF THE DEPENDENT VARIABLES¹²

		Social Va	riables		
Dependent Variable	Population Density	Per Cent Population in Urban Areas	Per Cent Population Over 65	Per Cent Population Less Than 17	
1. Total Expenditure	Included				
2. Total Education	Included	*******			
2a. Higher Education	Included				
2b. Elementary and		,	•		
Secondary	Included		· 	Included	
3. Total Public Welfare	Included	·······	Included	Included	
3a. Categorical Programs	Included		Included	Included	
3b. Cash Assistance	Included		Included	Included	
3c. Other Public Welfare	Included		Included,	Included	
4. Hospitals and Health	Included	Included			
5. Highways	Included	Included			
6. Police and Fire	Included	Included	_		
7. Sanitation	Included	Included	_		
8. Recreation and Resources	Included	********			
9. Housing and Urban	Included	Included	_		

inspection of Table 1 leads one to the commonsense conclusion that most of the expenditure categories listed are closely related to general consumption activity. And hence, just as differences in income levels is the major factor which an income levels is the major factor which and the expect that these differences also would be a major factor influencing inter-state variation in expenditures in the categories in question.

This first model serves as a reference point.

We use it to ascertain how much of the variation which we observe in inter-state patterns of expenditure is due merely to differences in noome levels alone. We will then compare the

enditures," National Tax Journal, 18 (March, .965), 50-57; and Elliot R. Morse, "Some 'houghts on the Determinants of State and Local Expenditures," National Tax Journal, 19 March, 1966), 95-103. Morse's article includes n excellent discussion of the problems involved in he selection of independent variables to "exlain" interstate variations in expenditure levels. 12 The social variables, as well as the per capita ersonal income figure, are taken from U.S. ■ureau of the Census, Statistical Abstract of the Inited States, 1964 (85th edition; Washington, 9. C.: U. S. Government Printing Office, 1964), . 11 and p. 329. Alaska and Hawaii are omitted om the analysis because data upon which the olitical variables are based are not available.

results obtained from fitting this model to the data with the results obtained with the second model which we postulate. This second model incorporates additional "social variables" which we would also expect to influence expenditure levels plus "political variables" which attempt to quantitatively approximate the concepts of apportionment and party competition contained in our hypotheses.

Formally, this second model is:

$$\frac{E}{P}=a_0+a_1\frac{Y}{P}+a_2Z+\epsilon^*,$$

where E, P, and Y are defined as in the first model, and a_0 and a_1 are constants to be statistically estimated, Z is the transpose of a l-by-m vector of social and political variables, a_2 is a 1-by-m vector of constants to be estimated and ϵ^* is the error term.

Verbally, this second regression model is simply the first model plus some social variables, which we also expect to be related to various expenditure categories, and the political variables whose influence, if any, we are seeking to ascertain. This model may be thought of as an attempt to "hold constant" income levels and some other social factors which might reasonably be expected to influence expenditure levels in order to explore the influence the political variables have upon expenditure levels. In other words, our method allows us to attempt to verify the hypotheses stated in section one while accounting for the influence of other fac-

tors which could also reasonably be expected to influence expenditure levels. If these other influences are not accounted for, one would, in effect be arguing that differences in political structure and process dominate all other factors which influence governmental expenditure levels. This is an argument which we would not like to make.

The Selection of Social Variables. The term "social variable" is used here to refer to a group of demographic measures which are used as independent variables in the second model postulated. The social variables which were incorporated into the second model for each of the selected expenditure categories are summarized in Table 2.

The selection of the particular set of social variables for each of the expenditure categories was the result of a compromise between two desires. The first was the desire to include in the analysis measures which would be capable of distinguishing different types of population structures and distributions among the states. The second was the desire to avoid statistical difficulties arising from the nature of the available data that would make the results of even a tentative and exploratory analysis, such as ours, difficult to interpret.

It is desirable to include in the analysis measures which would reflect differences in the structure of the population and its geographical distribution, because one would expect that such differences would be associated with differences in the "true" preference patterns of the corresponding electorate. To give an obvious example, the larger the proportion of the population of school-age children, the higher the level of per capita expenditures on education which

tween the independent variables becomes more probable as the number of variables increases.

Multicollinearity is created when the independent variables in a regression equation are highly correlated with each other. When such a situation exists, it is difficult to ascertain the relationship which may exist between the dependent variable and the individual independent variables. If one is interested only in the relationship between the dependent variable and a combined set of independent variables, then multicollinearity causes no difficulties in interpretation. However, to test the hypotheses we have formulated meaningfully, we must be able to ascertain if statistically significant relationships exist between the dependent variables and our measures of political structure. Unfortunately, many of the available demographic measures are highly correlated with both per capita personal income and the political measures which we wish to use. Hence, we have deliberately limited the number of social variables, and tried to use only those social variables which are not highly correlated with other independent variables.13

The Choice of Political Variables. To test the hypotheses described in the first section of this paper, it was necessary to obtain quantitative approximations of the qualitative concepts of apportionment and political competition.

The quantitative measure of apportionment

¹³ We do not intend to imply that our analysis is completely free from multicollinearity difficulties. As can be seen below we still have a few independent variables which are correlated with one another in the same regression equation. These simple correlations are

Independent Variable	1	2	3	4	5	6
1. Income per capita						
2. Per cent Urban	.68	-				
3. Population Density	.45	.58	_			
4. Per cent of Population						
Greater than 65	.12	03	.13			
5. Per cent of Population						
Less than 18	58	54	54	59	eserción de la constante de la	
6. Party Competition	.75	.47	.30	. 19	29	*****
7. Apportionment Score	.11	01	.13	.18	12	.23

the electorate could be expected to desire. To the extent that such factors are not accounted for by our statistical techniques, the tests of the hypotheses become weaker.

If, however, we attempted to strengthen the tests by including a larger and larger number of social variables into the regression model, we would encounter diminishing and, in fact, negative returns quite abruptly. The principal reason that this is so is that multicollinearity be-

As we have previously indicated, the simple correlation which gives us the longest pause for thought is the .75 correlation between persona income per capita and our index of party competition. We do not feel that this level causes serious problems of interpretation although undoubtedly it does dim the clarity of our results. We do not feel that any of the other correlationare of sufficient magnitude to introduce serious multicollinearity problems in our analysis.

chosen was the "apportionment score" constructed by Glendon Schubert and Charles Press. 14 This measure was chosen for the following reasons: (1) It is constructed from standard statistical measures whose characteristics are well known; (2) the political assumptions of the measure were made explicit and seem reasonable; and (3) The data used to construct the index were gathered prior to the decision in Baker v. Carr; hence, the "score" does not reflect the chaos of the aftermath of that decision.

The principal weakness¹⁵ of the measure for our purposes is that it is based upon a single set of cross-section data, i.e., the measure reflects apportionment patterns as they existed at a single point in time. A measure which was influenced by apportionment patterns as they existed in previous periods would be more suitable for our methods and objectives, but, unfortunately, is not yet available.

In an attempt to quantitatively approximate the concept of political competition, a numerical index was constructed from data and measures which Richard Hofferbert had used to construct an ordinal index inter-party competition. To construct his index Hofferbert used the votes cast for each of the two major political party candidates in the presidential, senatorial, and gubernatorial elections during the period 1932 through 1964. Because we were interested only in state and local expenditures we

¹⁴ The concepts upon which this score is based are presented in Glendon Schubert and Charles Press' article, "Measuring Malapportionment," this Review, 57 (June, 1964), 302-327, but the actual score used in this article is taken from a corrected version of their numerical results in "Malapportionment Remeasured," this Review, 57 (December, 1964), 578-580.

15 The measure only relates to the "ideal" of numerical equality, and as we have indicated in note 1, this "ideal" has limited theoretical appeal. We have explored the possibility of constructing a measure of "representativeness" which incorporated measurements of gerrymandering as well as deviations from numerical equality. We have, so far, been thwarted in our attempt to construct such a measure, not by difficulties in empirical measurement, but by inadequate specification by political theorists of what gerrymandering "really is." The statistical problems in measuring gerrymandering do not seem to be too serious, but it is impossible to "measure" something which has not been adequately described.

¹⁶ Richard I. Hofferbert, "Classification of American State Party Systems," *Journal of Politics*, 26 (August, 1964), 562–563. based our index solely upon the gubernatorial elections. Hofferbert used three different measures, based on this data, to construct his index. They were: (1) The "over-all score," (OV), which is simply the percentage of elections won by the party winning the majority of elections during the period; (2) the "cyclical score," (CY), which is simply the percentage of elections in which the party that was in power was defeated by its opposition; and, (3) the "mean percentage of the losing party vote," (\overline{V}) , which is self-explanatory.

Using the gubernatorial data, we combined these measures into a cardinal index of party competition (IPC) of the following form:

IPC =
$$1/3 \left[\left(\frac{100 \text{-OV}}{\text{OV}} \right) + \left(\frac{\text{CY}}{50} \right) \left(+ \right) \frac{\overline{\text{V}}}{50} \right] \right]$$

In this form the components of the index receive equal weight as each varies between zero and an upper limit of one, as does the index itself. The index assumes that the smaller OV (that is, the more closely it approaches its definitional minimum of 50%) and the larger that CY and \overline{V} become (that is the more closely they approach their definitional maximums of 50%) the greater the degree of political competition in the state.

No profound assumptions as to the relationship which may exist between these measures and the operational characteristics of public decision-making bodies form the basis for this index. Its construction is essentially arbitrary. A considerable amount of empirical effort has been expended in attempting to measure political competition, but the theoretical analysis upon which such work must rest is so embryonic as to create a preference, at least in our minds, for naked simplicity. 18

17 Certainly party competition in Presidential and Senatorial campaigns reflects competitiveness, but, we felt that perhaps these elections are more subject to the influence of issues unrelated to state and local spending decisions than was the gubernatorial election. Ideally we would like to use a measure which is influenced by a much wider range of elections at the state level (particularly state legislator elections) and also competition at the local level. The construction of such a measure, however, would be a major task in itself, and one much too heroic to be attempted in a paper with objectives as modest as the present ones.

¹⁸ The best description and criticism of this work is David G. Pfeiffer's article "The Measurement of Inter-Party Competition and Systematic Stability," this Review, 61 (June, 1967), 457–467. Our simple index was fabricated and the cal-

TABLE 3. COEFFICIENTS OF DETERMINATION OF CENSUS CLASSES OF STATE AND LOCAL PER CAPITA EXPENDITURE REGRESSED ON PER CAPITA PERSONAL INCOME AND SELECTED SOCIAL AND POLITICAL VARIABLES

	Regressed on:				
Class of Expenditure Per Capita	(1) Personal Income Per Capita	(2) Personal Income Per Capita and Social and Political Variables			
1. Total Expenditure	0.4148**	0.5815**			
 Total Education Higher Education Elementary and Secondary 	0.2694** 0.0075 0.4690**	0.6230** 0.4938** 0.7318**			
3. Total Public Welfare 3a. Categorical Programs 3b. Cash Assistance 3c. Other Public Welfare	0.0007 0.0896* 0.2838** 0.2026**	0.2579 0.3618** 0.4302** 0.3569**			
4. Hospitals and Health	0.2355**	0.3109**			
5. Highways	0.0059	0.4131**			
6. Police and Fire	0.6480**	0.8335**			
7. Sanitation	0.3314**	0.4498**			
8. Recreation and Resources	0.0593*	0.3379**			
9. Housing and Urban	0.2958**	0.6377**			

^{*} Significant at the 90% level. ** Significant at the 99% level.

The statistical analysis presented in this paper should be viewed as rudimentary and exploratory only. It is not intended to be, nor is it, definitive in any sense of the word. Its purpose is to see if statistically significant associations exist between the measures of malapportionment and party competition which we have described and the expenditure categories which we selected. The results of these tests suggest that some associations do exist.

The Regression Models. The technique which

culations for the paper performed, unfortunately, prior to the appearance of Pfeiffer's article. Our measure does meet some of his objections to previous measures; but, more importantly—Pfeiffer's excellent analysis included—we think our assertion still stands. A theory of political or even party competition is yet to appear, and, until it does, most attempts at measurement are doomed to produce the sort of "ad hoc" results which existing measures do.

we have used is multiple regression analysis. Our analysis consisted of two basic steps. The first was to calculate a set of simple regression equations using the first model which we described above in which each of the selected expenditure categories is assumed to be the dependent variable. The results of this analysis are summarized in Column One of Table 3, which reports the significance level and coefficient of determination of this simple regression equation for each of the selected expenditure categories. Eleven of the fourteen regression equations calculated were significant at the 90 per cent level or greater and nine were significant at the 99 per cent level.

Column Two of Table 3 records the second

TABLE 4. TESTS OF THE SIGNIFICANCE OF THE ADDITION OF SELECTED SOCIAL AND POLITICAL VARIABLES TO THE REGRESSION EQUATION FOR CENSUS CLASSES OF STATE AND LOCAL PER CAPITA EXPENDITURES⁴

Class of Expenditure Per Capita	(1) Variance Ratio	(2) Significance Level		
1. Total Expenditure	5.70	99 per cent		
	(3, 43)			
2. Total Education	13.44	99 per cent		
	(3, 43)	-		
2a. Higher Education	14.02	99 per cent		
	(3, 43)			
2b. Elementary and Secondary	10.28	99 per cent		
	(4, 42)			
3. Total Public Welfare	2.84	95 per cent		
	(5, 41)	-		
Ea. Categorical Programs	3.49	95 per cent		
	(5, 41)			
5b. Cash Assistance	2.10	90 per cent		
	(5, 41)			
Sc. Other Public Welfare	1.96	b		
	(5, 41)			
4. Hospitals and Health	1.15	b		
	(4, 42)			
5. Highways	7.28	99 per cent		
	(4, 42)	•		
6. Police and Fire	11.69	99 per cent		
	(4, 42)			
7. Sanitation	2.25	90 per cent		
,	(4, 42)	•		
8. Recreation and Resources	6.03	99 per cent		
•	(3, 43)			
9. Housing and Urban	9.90	99 per cent		
4.	(4, 42)			

a Figures in parentheses under the variance ratios are the degress of freedom for the numerator and denominator respectively.

t Less than 90 per cent.

IV. THE STATISTICAL TESTS

step of the analysis. This was to calculate another regression equation using the second model which again uses the expenditure categories as the dependent variables but adds the social variables cutlined in Table 2 and the two political measures to form, with personal income, the set of independent variables. The regression equations so calculated were significant at the ninety per cent or higher level for all fourteen of the expenditure categories.

This result in column two is, however, misleading. As is shown in Table 4, if one tests the significance of the addition of the set social and political variables to personal income, for two of the categories, "Other Public Welfare" and "Hospitals and Health," this addition is not statistically significant. The first (expenditure category-personal income) regression model was statistically significant for both of these expenditure categories, and when the vector of social and political variables was added to this simple regression model the coefficient of multiple determination (R2) term did increase. However, this is always the result when additional independent variables are added to a regression equation—the R2 term always increases. Therefore, if one wishes to make any statements about the relationship between the independent variables added to the regression equation and the dependent variable, then one must ascertain whether or not these added variables are significantly related to the dependent variable, i.e., whether or not the increase in the R² term is due merely to chance. Because the addition of these social and political variables was not significant for the two expenditure categories are excluded from further analysis.

The complete regression equations for each of the remaining expenditure categories with which our analysis will be concerned (those expenditure categories for which the addition of the vector of political and social variables was found to be significant) are shown in Table 5.

Significance Levels. Table 6 records the significance levels of each of the individual regression coefficients appearing in the equation in Table 5. Each regression coefficient measures the relationship between the individual independent variable and the dependent variable. The significance level of a regression coefficient can be thought of as the level of probability with which one can stipulate that the relationship which the regression coefficient attempts to measure is not due to chance. In other words, the probability that the true regression coefficient is not equal to zero. To ascertain this probability we, formally, postulate two mutually exclusive statements concerning the regression coefficient. One of these statements postulates that the regression coefficient is not equal to zero and is called the null hypothesis. The other postulates that the regression coefficient is equal to zero and is called the alternative hypothesis.

If the null hypothesis were accepted when in fact the alternative hypothesis is true, this is described as the commission of a "type one error." The significance level is equal to one minus the probability of a type one error.

An important difference in the types of significance levels which are recorded in Table 6 should be noted. For all of the independent variables except the political variables we are merely interested in the probability that the relationship estimated by the regression coefficient exists, i.e., the probability that the coefficient is not equal to zero. However, in formulating the two hypotheses we stipulate not only that a relationship between the dependent variable and respective independent political variables exists, but, also, that this relationship is of a specified type. The hypotheses postulate that the relationship between malapportionment and the dependent variable will be inverse (this means that the coefficient will be less than zero) and that the relationship between party competition and the dependent variable will be direct (this means that the coefficient will be greater than zero).

This stipulation means that the relevant probabilities for testing the hypotheses are: (1) the probability that the coefficient of malapportionment variable exists and is less than zero, and (2) the probability that the coefficient of the party competition variable exists and is greater than zero. Therefore the significance level for these two variables is equal to one minus the probability that we have accepted the null hypotheses that the coefficients of the political variables are either positive or negative when in fact they are not.

In statistical terms this merely means that a "one-tailed" "t" test is appropriate for calculating the significance levels for the two political variables and a "two-tailed" "t" test is the appropriate one for the remaining variables.

Testing Procedure. The statistical criteria we have used in our testing procedure is that the significance of the relevant political variable equal or exceed a predetermined level. The significance level which one wishes to use depends upon the objectives of his study and the probable repercussions of erroneously accepting the hypothesis which he is testing. Since our study is admittedly exploratory and intended to be suggestive rather than definitive, we have used two different significance levels in reporting the results of our testing procedure.

TABLE 5. REGRESSION EQUATIONS FOR FOURTERN CLASSES OF PER CAPITA STATE AND LOCAL EXPENDITURES

				Social V	Social Variables	-	Pol	Political Variables	
Class of Expenditure Per Capita	Constant	Personal Income Per Capita	Per cent Urban	Population Density	Per cent of Population Greater than Sixty-five	Per cent of Population Less than Seventeen	Malappor- tionment	Party Competition	R2
1. Total Expenditure	119.884	91.028	in	-0.123	Ħ	ia	-0.321	0.614	0.582
9 Potel Whinetion	(39.760)	(22.594)	.5	(0.035)	-;		(0.261)	(0.398)	60
z, lotal Education	(15.847)	(9.006)		(0.014)	=	III	-0.148 (0.104)	0.552 (0.159)	0.623
2a. Higher Education	21.649	-0.070	ni	-0.033	ni	n:	-0.076	0.221	0.498
9h Fllementary and	(7.067)	(4.016)		(0.006)			(0.046)	(0.071)	
Secondary	-60.831	30.778	ni	-0.025	ni	2.218	-0.052	0.260	0.732
	(36.511)	(6.294)		(0.00)		(0.784)	(0.063)	(0.100)	
3. Total Public Welfare	160.724	-15.646	ni	-0.010	-0.717	-2.644	-0.102	0.220	0.258
	(53.698)	(6.371)		(0.008)	(1.182)	(1.004)	(0.055)	(0.091)	
3a. Categorical	156.822	-16.741	: II	-0.011	-1.271	-2.486	-0.106	0.152	0.362
Programs	(41.603)	(4.936)		(0.00)	(0.916)	(0.788)	(0.043)	(0.075)	
3k. Cash Assistance	0.390	0.434	n:	0.001	0.017	-0.043	0.011	0.012	0.430
	(5.184)	(0.615)		(0.001)	(0.114)	(0.097)	(0.005)	(00.00)	
3c. Other Public Welfare	0.143	3.553	ii	'ni	ni	ni.	ni	ni	0.203
	(2.351)	(1.039)			•				
4. Hospitals and Health	(4.229)	(1.870)	TT.	TI TI	Ш	Ħ	Ξ	II	0.236
5. Highways	64.308	26.016	-0.976	-0.034	ni	'n.	-0.014	0.179	0.413
	(18.620)	(11.372)	(0.278)	(0.017)			(0.118)	(0.177)	
6. Police and Fire	-10.095	6.832	0.168	0.005	ni	mi	0.011	-0.039	0.834
	(2.404)	(1.468)	(0.036)	(0.002)			(0.015)	(0.023)	
7. Sanitation	-1.149	0.939	0.110	-0.002	ni	ni	-0.006	0.040	0.450
	(2.820)	(1.722)	(0.042)	(0.003)			(0.018)	(0.027)	
8. Recreation and Resources	3.570	4.123	ni	-0.016	'n	n,	-0.021	0.061	0.338
	(4.750)	(2.703)		(0.004)			(0.031)	(0.048)	
9. Housing and Urban	-5.353	4.271	0.029	0.011	n:	'n	-0.023	-0.050	0.638
	(2.616)	(1.589)	(0.039)	(0.002)			(0.017)	(0.025)	
	And the second s	- Landanian - Land	the state of the s						

TABLE 6. SIGNIFICANCE LEVELS OF THE INDIVIDUAL-COEFFICIENTS OF THE REGRESSION EQUATIONS IN TABLE 5.

Class of Expenditure Per Capita	Con- stant*	Personal Income Per Capita*	Social Variables*				Political Variables**	
			Per cent Urban	Popula- tion Density	than	Per cent of Population Less than Seventeen	Malap- portion- ment	Party Competi- tion
1. Total General	99	99	ni	99	ni	ni	85	90
2. Total Educational	99	95	ni	99	ni	ni	90	99.5
2a. Higher Education	99	a,	ní	99	ni	ni	90	99.5
2b. Elementary and Secondary	90	99	ni	99	ni	99	75	99
3. Total Public Welfare	99	98	ni	70	8.	99	95	97.5
3a. Categorical Programs	99	99	ni	80	80	99	99	95
3b. Cash Assistance	8.	a	ni	8.	а	a	8.	85
3c. Other Public Welfare	a	99	ni	ni	ni	ni	ni	ni
4. Hospitals and Health	70	99	ni	ni	ni	ni	ni	ni
5. Highways	99	95	99	90	ni	ni	a	80
6. Police and Fire	99	99	99	95	ni	ni	a	2
7. Sewage and Sanitation	8.	8.	98	a.	ni	ni	а	90
8. Recreation and Resources	a	80	ni	99	${f ni}$	ni	70	85
9. Housing and Urban Renewal	95	99	a	99	ni	ni	90	a

a Less than 70 per cent

Table 7 summarizes the steps in our testing procedure and the results of these tests if a significance level of 80 per cent is used. In Table 8 the same procedure is summarized, but a significance level of 90 per cent is used. Although both of these tables are intended to be self-explanatory, it might be useful to trace some expenditure categories through the tables in order to summarize explicitly the assumptions and criteria of our testing procedure.

Consider expenditure category number one. "Total Expenditure," in Table 7. The second column of this table is taken from Table 4. It records whether of not the addition of the vector of social and political variables to the first simple regression model, (expenditure category-personal income), was significant at a level equal to or greater than 90 per cent. For "Total Expenditure" the addition of this vector was significant. If it had not been, we would not proceed with the testing procedure for this expenditure category because the vector of social and political variables did not increase the explanatory value of the regression model in a statistically significant manner. Column three is the next step in the testing procedure. It is taken from Table 5. It records whether or not the regression coefficient of the malapportionment variable is negative; if it is not the hypothesis is rejected. For "Total Expenditure" this was not the case; hence the analysis proceeds to column four. Column four is taken from Table 6 and records whether or not the significance level of the malapportionment term equals or exceeds 80 per cent. To reiterate, this means that the probability that we have not accepted the statement that the regression coefficient in question is less than zero, when in fact it is equal to or greater than zero equals or exceeds 80 per cent.

Because "Total Expenditure" satisfies each of the criteria described in columns two through four, we "accept" Hypothesis I for this particular expenditure category.

It should be recalled that in our testing procedure we use the test of Hypothesis I as a necessary condition which must be satisfied in order to proceed with the testing of Hypothesis II. Because we accept Hypothesis I for this expenditure category, we are able to continue with our testing procedure for either accepting or rejecting Hypothesis II. If our testing procedure had not permitted us to accept Hypothesis I we would not test Hypothesis II because we would not feel confident in assigning meaning to the empirical tests, for the reasons we have previously outlined.

Moving to columns six and seven in Table 7 we find that for "Total Expenditure" the sign of the inter-party competition coefficient is in the direction postulated by the hypothesis, and that the significance level of the coefficient exceeds 80 per cent. Hence, we also accept the Hypothesis II for this expenditure category.

^{*} Calculated using a "two-tailed" "t" test.

^{**} Calculated using a "one-tailed" "t" test.

ni not included.

Table 7. Summary of procedure and results of testing hypotheses at significance level of $80\,\%$

(1) Expenditure Categories	(2) Addition of Political and Social Variables Signifi- cant (From Table IV)	Negative Sign for Malap- portionment Variable (From Table V)	(4) Significance Level for Malapportionment Variable Equal to or Greater than 80% (From Table		(6) Positive Sign for Party Competition Variable (From Table V)	-	Accept or Reject Hy- pothesis Two, (Columns 5- 7)
•	,		VI)			VI)	
1. Total Expenditure	Yes	Yes	Yes	Accept	Yes	Yes	Accept
2. Total Education 2a. Higher Educa-	Yes	Yes	Yes	Accept	Yes	Yes	Accept
tion	Yes	Yes	Yes	Accept	Yes	Yes	Accept
2b. Elementary and							
Secondary	Yes	Yes	No	Reject	N.A.	N.A.	No Test
3. Total Public Welfare	Yes	Yes	Yes	Accept	Yes	Yes	Accept
3a. Categorical Programs	Yes	Yes	Yes	Accept	Yes	Yes	Accept .
3b. Cash Assis- tance	Yes	No	N.A.	Reject	N.A.	N.A.	No Test
3c. Other Public				•	14,24,		
Welfare	No	N.A.	N.A.	No Test	N.A.	N.A.	No Test
4. Hospitals and Health	No	N.A.	N.A.	No Test	N.A.	N.A.	No Test
5. Highways	Yes	Yes	No	Reject	N.A.	N.A.	No Test
6. Police and Fire	Yes	No	N.A.	Reject	N.A.	N.A.	No Test
7. Sanitation	Yes	Yes	No	Reject	N.A.	N.A.	No Test
8. Recreation and Resources	Yes	Yes	No	Reject	N.A.	N.A.	No Test
9. Housing and Urban	Yes	Yes	Yes	Accept	No	N.A.	Reject

To trace, briefly, an expenditure category for which different conclusions are required, consider the last expenditure category, "Housing and Urban." For this category the criteria described in columns two, three, and four are satisfied and we accept Hypothesis I. Making the same assumptions as before we then proceed to investigate Hypothesis II. In the case of "Housing and Urban," however, the sign of the coefficient for the inter-party competition term is negative. This is sufficient information to reject Hypothesis II without reference to the significance level of the coefficient.

We feel that we are able to reject this hypothesis for "Housing and Urban" because we had previously accepted Hypothesis I which we have interpreted as being consistent with the statement that the "true" preferences of the electorate indicate a higher level of per capita expenditure for "Housing and Urban" than the level actually produced. For those expenditure categories for which Hypothesis I is rejected, as in the case of "Highways" we cannot accept this proposition. As a result, we are unable to test Hypothesis II within the constraints which

we have imposed upon our procedure. But it must be emphasized that in such cases where we are unable to test an hypothesis, there is no inference made about whether or not the hypothesis would have been accepted or rejected if we had been able to test it.

The narrative need not be extended by discussing the results of our tests for each expenditure category separately. At the eighty per cent significance level we accepted Hypothesis I for for six of the fourteen categories. We rejected the hypothesis in six cases and were unable to test the hypothesis for the remaining two expenditure categories. We were able to test Hypothesis II only for the six categories for which we had accepted Hypothesis I. For five of these six categories we were also able to accept Hypothesis II, and for the sixth the hypothesis was rejected. It is interesting to note that the categories for which both hypotheses were accepted comprise some of the more important categories of state and local expenditure, and the acceptance of the hypotheses would seem to suggest that apportionment patterns and levels of political competition are more potent influences

table 8. summary of procedure and results of testing hypotheses at significance level of $90\,\%$

(1) Expenditure Categories	(2) Addition of Political and Social Variables Significant (From Table IV)	(3) Negative Sign for Malap- portionment Variable (From Table V)	(4) Significance Level for Malapportionment Variable Equal to or Greater than 90% (From Table VI)	(5) Accept or Reject Hy- pothesis One, (Columns 2- 4)	Positive Sign for Party Competition Variable (From Table V)	(7) Significance Level for Party Competition Variable Equal to or Greater than 90% (From Table VI)	(8) Accept or Reject Hypothesis Two, (Columns 5-7)
1. Total Expenditure	Yes	Yes	No	Reject	N.A.	N.A.	No Test
2. Total Education 2a. Higher Educa-	Yes	Yes	Yes	Accept	Yes	Yes	. Accept
tion	Yes	Yes	Yes	Accept .	Yes	Yes	Accept
2b. Elementary and Secondary	Yes	Yes	No	Reject	N.A.	Ń.A.	No Test
3. Total Public Welfare 3a. Categorical	Yes	Yes	Yes	Accept	Yes	No	Reject
Programs	Yes	Yes	Yes	Accept	Yes	Yes	Accept
3b. Cash Assis- tance 3c. Other Public	Yes	No	N.A.	Reject	N.A.	N.A.	No'Test
Welfare	No	N.A.	N.A.	No Test	N.A.	N.A.	No Test
4. Hospitals and Health	No	N.A.	N.A.	No Test	Ν.Λ.	N.A.	No Test
5. Highways	Yes	Yes ·	· No	Reject	N.A.	N.A.	No Test
6. Police and Fire	Yes	No	N.A.	Reject	N.A.	. N.A.	No Test
7. Sanitation	Yes	Yes	No	Reject	N.A.	N.A.	No Test
8. Recreation and Resources	Yes	Yes	No	Reject	N.A.	N.A.	No Test
9. Housing and Urban	Yes	Yes	Yes .	Accept	No	N.A.	Reject

than some of the recent literature referred to above would lead one to believe.

In Table 8, where the significance level is increased to the ninety per cent level, Hypothesis I is accepted for five of the expenditure categories and rejected for the other seven categories. Of the five for which the hypothesis was accepted, Hypothesis II also was accepted in three cases and rejected in the remaining two.

v. conclusion

This paper has explored the relationship between malapportionment, party competition and some selected functional categories of governmental expenditures. A logical and statistical methodological procedure has been used to explore this relationship which was designed to be confining. The reasons for using a confining methodological procedure are to make the theoretical and statistical assumption of the analysis as clear and explicit as possible, to emphasize exactly what was and was not done, and to attempt to encourage further investigation by providing some exploratory, but carefully de-

fined, results. It has been shown that within this confining methodological procedure it is possible to accept the hypotheses that malapportionment tends to depress and party competition tends to elevate some of the more important categories of state and local governmental expenditure.

We have tried to emphasize the tentative and exploratory nature of our study. Perhaps we have unduly belabored the point. But we do feel strongly that a study much more ambitious than ours, or than those which have reached conclusions dissimilar to ours, is required before definitive answers to questions such as those we have explored ought to be offered. In our view the principal obstacles which such a study would have to surmount are not statistical but theoretical and conceptual. More complete and disaggregative data would have to be assembled, but, at worst, this is merely an expensive and dull task. Both the data and the techniques of measurement and inference exist, but to be used intelligently the relevant relationships to measure must be stipulated.

AGENCY REQUESTS, GUBERNATORIAL SUPPORT AND BUDGET SUCCESS IN STATE LEGISLATURES*

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This is a study of the budget success of state administrative agencies. Although a number of recent studies provide valuable information about environmental influences on state and local government expenditures, relatively little is known about the factors that affect the budgets of individual administrative units.1 Existing studies typically focus on the state as the unit of analysis, and report findings about the correlates of state (or state plus local) government expenditures in total and by the major fields of education, highways, public welfare, health, hospitals et al. The United States Bureau of the Census provides an invaluable service for this scholarship by collecting state and local government data and ordering it into categories that permit state-to-state comparisons. When political scientists and economists rely exclusively on Census Bureau publications, however, they preclude an attack on certain aspects of the expenditure process. In order to report data by the comparable fields of education, highways, public welfare etc., the Bureau of the Census

* The author wishes to thank the Social Science Research Council's Committee on Governmental and Legal Processes, and the University of Georgia's Office of General Research for their financial assistance; and Patricia Owens for her help in gathering the data.

¹ See, for example, Thomas R. Dye, Politics, Economics and the Public: Policy Outcomes in the American States (Chicago: Rand McNally, 1966); Glenn W. Fisher, "Interstate Variation in State and Local Government Expenditures," National Tax Journal, 17 (March, 1964), 57-64; Seymour Sachs and Robert Harris, "The Determinants of State and Local Government Expenditures and Intergovernmental Flow of Funds," National Tax Journal, 17 (March, 1964), 75-85; Elliott R. Morss, J. Eric Fredland and Saul H. Hymans, "Fluctuations in State Expenditures: An Econometric Analysis," Southern Economic Journal (April, 1967); Richard E. Dawson and James A. Robinson, "Interparty Competition, Economic Variables, and Welfare Politics in the American States," Journal of Politics, 25 (May, 1963), 265-289; and Ira Sharkansky, "Economic and Political Correlates of State Government Expenditures: General Tendencies and Deviant Cases," Midwest Journal of Political Science, 11 (May, 1967), 173-192.

rearranges the expenditures made by individual state agencies.² As a result we know little about the factors that affect the budgets of individual agencies. And because it is the agency's budget that is the focus of budget-making, we have no systematic information about many of the influences that might affect government expenditures. Chief among the unknowns are the influence of each agency's budget request in the expenditure process, and the support given to the agencies by the governor.

Much of the existing literature on government budgeting suggests the importance of incremental decision rules. Officials who review agency requests in the executive and legislative branches are said to have too few resources for a comprehensive examination of each agency's program. Studies of federal budgeting reveal that appropriations committees generally accept each agency's "base" of previous expenditure, and focus their attention on the requests for new funds.3 Congress holds down the growth rate of most agency budgets, typically to within 10 percent of their existing budget.4 The common explanation for incremental budgeting cites the difficulties associated with a comprehensive review of each agancy. Legislatures have much else to do beside reviewing past and present expenditures. To reopen past budget decisions each year would broaden the scope of political controversy. Decision-makers can limit their task by accepting their own past evaluations about each existing program, and by focusing their current inquiries on those items that an agency seeks for the first time, or those which the agency hopes to increase well beyond the limit of past funding.5

- ² Most state governments have several administrative units with educational responsibilities, for example, and their titles and program responsibilities vary considerably from one state to another.
- ³ Otto A. Davis, M.A.H. Dempster, and Aaron Wildavsky, "A Theory of the Budgetary Process," this Review, 60 (September, 1968), 529–547.
- ⁴ Richard F. Fenno, Jr., The Power of the Purse: Appropriations Politics in Congress (Boston: Little Brown, 1966), Chapters 8 and 11.
- ⁵ Charles E. Lindblom "Decision-Making in Taxation and Expenditure," in *Public Finances*:

A principal task of this study is to identify and measure some likely mechanisms of incremental budgeting in state governments. By looking at the requests of 592 agencies in 19 states, the response of the governor to agency requests, and the action of the legislature, it will assess the importance of incremental routines in each of these states. Then it identifies certain characteristics of each state that influence the nature of its budget procedures. The study proceeds at two levels of analysis. It first reports the results of 19 separate within-state analyses that show relationships between measures of agency success in the legislature and measures of budget size, agency acquisitiveness and gubernatorial support. Secondly, it uses these 19 states as the units of analysis, and defines the importance of certain environmental conditions for these relationships among agencies, the governor and the state legislature.

I. TECHNIQUES AND EXPECTATIONS

The complexity and individuality of state government budgets represent formidable barriers to comparative analysis. Because state budgeting proceeds with a variety of separate funds whose labels and components vary from state to state, and because the official documents vary widely in the quality of information they contain, it is necessary to eliminate over half of the state governments from this analysis. The budget documents and financial reports of 19 state governments meet the essential criteria of providing an agency-by-agency record of current expenditures; the agencies' initial requests for the coming budget period; the amount rec-

Needs, Sources and Utilization (Princeton: National Bureau of Economic Research, 1961), pp. 295-333.

6 The states included in this study—and the nature of the findings-may be affected by the requirement of separate indications for the agency's budget request and the governor's recommendation. One tenet of certain administrative reformers prescribes that public agencies not submit their own budget requests to the legislature. Instead, they should submit their requests to the chief executive, who should then review each agency's budget in the light of his whole program, and submit his own recommendations for each agency to the legislature. Presumably the legislature will consider only these budget recommendations of the executive, and thereby force each agency to operate within the budget limits set by the leader of the "administration team." A number of states have adopted these budget procedures, and their budgets show only the governor's recommendation for each agency. Our sample, in ommended by the governor for each agency;⁷ and the sum appropriated by the legislature. The 19 states come from each major section of the country and range in population size from Texas and Illinois to Vermont and Wyoming. They range in economic well-being (measured in per capita personal income) from Illinois and Indiana to West Virginia and South Carolina. For each major agency in these states two measures of budget success are defined. These are the dependent variables for the within-state analysis of agency budgets:⁸

contrast, may be overly representative of states with "unreformed" budget procedures.

The "budget period" employed is the fiscal year or the biennium, depending upon the usage prevailing within each state. Although the use of a single year or a biennium varies from one state to another, this should not have a material effect on the findings insofar as the principal findings grow out of correlation coefficients that are calculated separately for each state. The particular years employed in the analysis of each state are indicated with the name of each state in Table 1. In each case, the most recent budget period was employed for which complete data was available. A small number of additional states publish budgetary information that would qualify them for this type of analysis. They are not included here, however, because the appropriate documents were not available.

⁷ In some cases it is a budget review board, rather than the governor per se, that is directly responsible for the recommendation to the legislature. In each case, however, it is reported by observers native to the state that the governor's role is critical in the recommendations.

8 All of the findings reported below for the within-state analysis of agency budgets reflects data about the "general fund" for those states that segregate the "general" fund from the "total" fund. For most states, the designation of "general" fund pertains to those moneys subject to state legislative appropriation. For those states showing both general and total fund accounts, the correlation analyses were performed twice: once with each account. However, the findings from the two analyses were not so different as to warrant separate reporting here. For each state, agencies requesting at least \$500,000 were included. These are considered the "major" agencies. Supplementary appropriations are excluded from the legislature's appropriation due to lack of data. In the case of one state for which supplementary appropriations were available, the within-state analysis of agencies was run with and without the supplementals; the differences in findings appear inconsequential.

- Y_1 : the percentage of the agency's request for the coming budget period appropriated by the legislature (short-term success)
- Y₂: the percentage of current expenditures appropriated by the legislature for the coming budget period (success in budget expansion)

The first dependent variable is labelled short-term success because of its concern with one budget period. It simply measures the success of each agency in getting from the legislature what it announces as its goals. The second dependent variable measures the willingness of the legislature to provide each agency with an increase over its current budget. Thus, it measures the increment of growth enjoyed by each unit. In most of the states there is not a significant coefficient of simple correlation between the two measures of success, indicating that they are distinct aspects of the budgetary process.

The independent variables for the withinstate analysis of agency budgets are:

- X₁: agency request for the coming budget period (budget size)
- X₂: agency request for the coming budget period as a percentage of current expenditures (agency acquisitiveness)
- X₃: the governor's recommendation for each agency as a percentage of its request (short-term support)
- X4: the governor's recommendation for each agency as a percentage of its current expenditures (support for budget expansion)

Due to the alleged conservatism of governors and legislators who review agency budgets,9 it is expected that measures of budget size and acquisitiveness will show negative relationships with the measures of short-term support and legislative success; incremental budget reviewers should cut budgets that threaten to grow. But because an expansionist request is probably a requirement for an increase in appropriations, there are likely to be positive relationships between the measure of acquisitiveness and gubernatorial support and legislative success in budget expansion; it is probably the agencies that ask for the largest increases that receive the largest increases, even though their final appropriation is reduced substantially below their request. Because state legislators have limited investigatory resources and are poorly prepared by training or background for budget reviews,10

⁹ Cf. Thomas J. Anton, *The Politics of State Expenditure in Illinois* (Urbana: University of Illinois Press, 1966), Chapters 5, 6.

10 Malcolm E. Jewell and Samuel C. Patterson,

it is expected that the governor's recommendation will serve as an important cue for their decisions. The measures of gubernatorial support should therefore relate closely to the measures of legislative appropriations.

Coefficients of simple correlation are computed separately for each of the nineteen states, and provide measures of association between the dependent and independent variables.¹¹ With these correlations, we shall also perform a causal analysis to test for the relative importance of the agencies' requests and the governor's recommendations in the decisions of the legislature.

Once we have correlation coefficients that express the prevailing relationships between agency acquisitiveness, gubernatorial support and budget success for each state, we shall employ these coefficients as dependent variables in another inquiry that focuses on the state as the unit of analysis. There we shall consider several aspects of governmental structure, political characteristics and economic resources as potential influences on relationships between agencies, the governor and the legislature. The independent variables for the state-by-state analysis are:¹²

S₁: Schlesinger's index of the Governor's potential for tenure in office¹³

The Legislative Process in the United States (New York: Random House, 1966), p. 251 ff.

¹¹ The data used in this study meet two of the primary assumptions of correlation analysis: the distribution of each variable approximates normality; and all two-variable relationships are linear

¹² Several other variables were considered, but excluded in this report because of their failure to add anything of importance to the findings reported below. Those excluded are:

- a. Schlesinger's index of the Governor's formal budget powers
- b. Schlesinger's index of the Governor's formal powers of appointment
- c. Schlesinger's aggregate index of the Governor's formal powers
- d. Ranney's measure of Democratic party strength
- e. biennial compensation paid to members of the state Legislature
- f. state expenditures per capita for personal services
- g. total population of the state
- h. rumber of state government departments with elected heads.

¹² Joseph A. Schlesinger, "The Politics of the Executive," in Herbert Jacob and Kenneth N. Vines, *Politics in the American States* (Boston: Little, Brown and Company, 1965), p. 229.

TABLE]	ANNUAL PERCENTAGE CHANGES BY STAGES IN THE BUDGET PROCE	SS
	OF MAJOR AGENCIES, BY STATE	

State, showing years of budget analyzed and number of agencies	Agency request as per cent of current expend- iture	Governor's recommendation as a per cent of agency request	Legislature's appropriation as a per cent of Gov's request	Legislature's appropriation as per cent of agency's current expenditure	Legislature's appropriation as a per cent of agency request
Florida 1965-67, n=39	120	90	93	109	84
Georgia 1965-67, $n = 26$	153	. 86	100	139	87
Idaho 1967–69, $n=23$	119	93	92	109	86
Illinois $1963-65*n=37$	118	83	102	108	85
Indiana 1965-67, $n = 47$	123	83	103	112	86
Kentucky 1966-68, $n = 28$	120	. 90	93	109	. 84
Louisiana 1966-67, n = 32	121	90	101.	110	91
Maine 1965-67, $n = 17$	114	85	108	109	92
Nebraska 1965-67, n=10	122	87	119	124	104
North Carolina 1965-67, $n = 61$	120	84	105	112	87 .
North Dakota 1965-67, $n = 21$	124	74	111	111	82
South Carolina 1966-67, $n = 29$	117	96	104	116	99
South Dakota 1967-68, n = 25	136	82	98	109	80
Texas 1965-67, $n = 41$	128	82	104	. 117	86
Vermont 1965-67, $n = 17$. 121	87	106	115	91
Virginia 1966-68, n=57	120	92	100	114	91
West Virginia 1966-67, $n = 43$	125	88	92	101	81
Wisconsin 1965-67, $n = 26$	115	96	98	111	94
Wyoming 1967-69, $n = 13$	133	69	109	112	75

^{*} The Illinois data comes from the Appendix of Thomas J. Anton's The Politics of State Expenditure in Illinois (Urbana: University of Illinois Press, 1966). All other data come from the official budgets and financial reports of the states.

- S₂: Schlesinger's index of the Governor's veto power¹⁴
- S₃: Ranney's measure of two-party competition¹⁵
- S₄: number of elected state executive officials
- S_5 : percentage of voting-age population casting ballots in a recent state-wide election¹⁶
- S₆: total state government expenditures per capita¹⁷
- S_7 : total state government debt per capita
- S_8 : per capita personal income of state residents

It is expected that a governor with long tenure potential and extensive veto powers will have a relatively strong position vis a vis the agencies and the legislature. Such governors may take a hard line in cutting agency budgets, and succeed in providing the legislature with its

- ¹⁵ Austin Ranney, "Parties in State Politics," in Jacob and Vines, op. cit., p. 65. The measure of competition used here equals the difference between each state's score on Ranney's index of Democratic Party strength and .5000, with the result inverted so that high scores indicate high interparty competition.
- ¹⁶ The data pertain to the 1964 election for U.S. Representative.
- ¹⁷ The figure used is total general state government expenditures per capita in 1966.

major budget cues. Intense party competition and high voter turnout often work in favor of high expenditures.18 Under conditions of high turnout and competition, therefore, acquisitive agencies should be able to elicit the most support from the governor and the legislature. Where there is a large number of separately elected executive officials, it is expected that acquisitive agencies will use them as allies and have a better chance of getting the governor and legislature to approve their budgets. And because independent executives may compete with the governor in supporting agency budgets, the states with numerous elected officials may be those where the governor's recommendations are least potent in the legislature. Where state resources are as-yet uncommitted, agencies may draw on the "slack" for their budgets.19 Therefore, the states with low per capita expenditures and debt, but high per capita personal income should offer the most hospitable environments for acquisitive agencies.

Recall that the dependent variables of the state-by-state analysis will be correlation coefficients determined by the within-state analysis of agency budgets. After describing the re-

¹⁴ Loc. cit

¹⁸ See the works of Dye and Dawson and Robinson, cited in note 1.

¹⁹ The concept of "slack" is explained in Richard M. Cyert and James G. March, A Behavioral Theory of the Firm (Englewood Cliffs: Prentice-Hall, 1963), pp. 36 ff.

TABLE 2. COEFFICIENTS OF SIMPLE CORRELATION BETWEEN MEASURES OF BUDGET-SUCCESS IN THE STATE LEGISLATURE AND INDEPENDENT VARIABLES, BY STATE

	Correlat	ions between s success and:		Correlations between budget expansion and:			
	Budget size	Agency acquisitive- ness	Governor's short-term support	Budget size	Agency acquisitive- ness	Governor's support for expansion	
Florida	.03	63*	.77*	04	.50	.71*	
Georgia	.02	82*	.93*	12	09	.92*	
Idaho	.04	80*	.72*	14	.74*	.79*	
Illinois	.03	51*	.79*	04	.81*	.81*	
Indiana	.04	27	.86*	04	.99*	.99*	
Kentucky	.06	77*	.80*	14	.07	.19	
Louisiana	.00	48 *	.72*	09	.04	.54*	
Maine	.24	.18	.75*	.25	.64*	.74*	
Nebraska	09	. 51	54	06	.79*	.43	
North Carolina	04	20	.99*	05	.93*	.99*	
North Dakota	.17	- .80*	.94*	16	.42	.87*	
South Carolina	.00	17	.36	05	.81*	.75*	
South Dakota	.00	70*	.63*	15	.58*	.48*	
Texas	25	06	.52*	10	.95*	.89*	
Vermont	12	61*	.58*	.24	.37	. 46	
Virginia	.07	27*	. 19	02	.81*	.60*	
West Virginia	.01	65*	.61*	09	.22	.26	
Wisconsin	08	28	.67*	06	10	.16	
Wyoming	18	70*	.94*	13	.18	.92*	

^{*} Significant at the .05 level (see note #20).

sults of the within-state analysis, we shall specify the dependent variables for the second inquiry.

II. FINDINGS: THE CORRELATES . . OF AGENCY BUDGET SUCCESS

Administrative agencies and the governor play more consistent roles than the legislature in the state budget process. In each of the 19 states the major agencies requested a sizable increase (15-53 per cent) over their current appropriations for the coming year, and the governor pared down the increase in his recommendations (by 4-31 per cent). Table 1 shows the percentage changes occurring at each major stage of the budget process by states; it indicates that major agencies requested an average 24 per cent increase over their current budgets, and that the governor's recommendation trimmed an average 14 per cent from their requests. The legislature's final appropriation for these agencies typically remained close to the governor's recommendation, but varied from a cut of 8 per cent below his recommendation to an increase of 19 per cent above his recommendation. Six of the legislatures cut agency budgets below the governor's figure, and 11 appropriated more than the governor asked. In only one case, however, did a legislature (in Nebraska) give more money to the agencies than they had requested themselves. The average legislative grant for the coming period was 13 per cent below the agencies' request, but 13 per cent above the agencies' current budget.

The governor's support appears to be a critical ingredient in the success enjoyed by individual agencies in the Legislature. In 16 states there is a significant positive correlation (shown in Table 2) between the governor's support and short term success, 20 and in 14 of the states there is a similar relationship between the governor's support and success in budget expansior. A contrary finding appears only in the case of Nebraska, where a negative coefficient of .54 links the governor's recommendation with the legislature's appropriation. In 1965, the Ne-

²⁰ A test for significance is not, strictly speaking, applicable because the units of analysis are not chosen at random to represent a larger population. Nevertheless, the tests for significance provide a convenient device to denote relationships that are "sizeable."

braska Legislature was unique in acting consistently in opposition to the recommendations of Governor Frank B. Morrison. A reading of Nebraska newspapers during that period suggests that gubernatorial-legislative antagonism over the budget was part of a larger dispute that grew out of a tax conflict. The conservative Democratic Governor opposed any new taxes. while the Republican leadership of the Legislature sought the establishment of a state income or sales tax. Perhaps in an effort to force the Governor's acceptance of a new tax, the legislators voted more funds than the governor recommended for the major agencies. (see Table 1). The legislature was especially generous with those agencies which had suffered a budget-cut in the Governor's office (see Table 2).

The acquisitiveness of agency requests plays an important role in the budget process. There is a significant negative relationship between acquisitiveness and short-term success in 12 states and a significant positive relationship between acquisitiveness and success in budget expansion in 11 states. The legislature is most likely to trim the budgets of agencies that ask for large increases, but it is only these acquisitive agencies that can hope for a large increase to remain after the legislature has acted. The acquisitiveness of the agencies is also a factor in the governor's recommendation. Table 3 shows

TABLE 3. COEFFICIENTS OF SIMPLE CORRELATION BETWEEN MEASURES OF GUBERNATORIAL SUPPORT AND INDEPENDENT VARIABLES, BY STATE

	aup	short-term oort and elations	expar	Between support for expansion and correlations		
•	Budget size	Agency acquisitive- ness	Budget size	Agency acquisitive- ness		
Florida	.04	80*	03	.22		
Georgia	.08	86*	05	11		
Idaho ·	.45*	−.70*	03	.99*		
Illinois	.07	52	.00	. 85*		
Indiana	.10	.13	04	.99*		
Kentucky	.18	94*	.02	.04		
Louisiana	.12	82*	05	.37*		
Maine	.08	.22	.09	.75*		
Nebraska	23	59	27	.76*		
North Carolina	05	20	06	.94*		
North Dakota	01	84*	34	.39		
South Carolina	.06	30	02	.77*		
South Dakota	02	75*	11	.71*		
Texas	10	63*	04	.93*		
Vermont	16	67*	.36	.85*		
Virginia	.12	56*	05	.71*		
West Virginia	.16	57*	.03	.57*		
Wisconsin	03	- .61*	.07	.88*		
Wyoming	15	82*	09	.28		

^{*} Significant at the .05 level (see note #20).

significant negative relationships between acquisitiveness and the governor's short-term recommendation in 14 states, and significant positive relationships between acquisitiveness and the governor's recommendation for budget expansion in 14 states. Both the governor and the legislature may be using similar decision rules: do not cut the agencies that ask for little or no increase; but do not recommend a budget expansion for those agencies that ask for little or no increase. Short term cuts are made in the budgets of acquisitive agencies, but the acquisitive agencies stand the best chance of enjoying a substantial budget increase.


The absolute size of agency budget requests does not appear to influence the decisions made by the governor or legislature. Tables 2 and 3 show generally weak or inconsistent correlations between budget size and the governor's recommendations or the legislature's appropriations. Budget reviewers in the governor's office and the legislature are using procedures that serve to minimize the increments of budget growth; they are more likely to respond to the increment of change that is requested (i.e., agency acquisitiveness) than to the sheer size of the request.

Because agency acquisitiveness shows similar relationships with both the governor's recommendation and the legislature's appropriation. one is tempted to ask if the legislature responds directly to the agencies' acquisitiveness, or merely to the governor's recommendations. The alternate explanations are conveniently depicted and analyzed with the techniques of causal inference.21 The alternate linkages and the computations associated with them are reported in Figure 1 and Table 4. The results support the inference that the legislature responds more often to the governor's recommendations than directly to agency acquisitiveness. In the case of short-term success, the data support this for Florida, Georgia, Illinois, Louisiana, Nebraska, North Carolina, North Dakota, South


21 The techniques are explained in Hubert M. Blalock, Jr., Causal Inferences in Nonexperimental Research (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1964), pp. 64 ff.; and demonstrated in Donald J. McCrone and Charles F. Cnudde, "Toward a Communications Theory of Democratic Political Development: A Causal Model," this Review, 61 (March, 1967), 72–79. In this causal analysis, the author is following the convention of inferring a linkage to be absent if the difference between expected and actual findings are less than the difference for the alternative model, and if the difference between expected and actual findings is less than .10.

Fig. 1. Alternative causal models for relationships among administrative agencies, the governor and the legislature.


Model 1: No direct link between agency acquisitiveness and Legislature.



Model 2: No direct link between Governor's recommendation and Legislature



Model 3: Links from both agency acquisitiveness and Governor's recommendation to the Legislature Agency acquisitiveness (A)



Carolina and Wyoming. Only in the cases of South Dakota, and Virginia does the legislature seem to respond primarily to agency acquisitiveness. In the remaining states the findings suggest that the legislature is responding to a combination of gubernatorial recommendations and agency acquisitiveness. Similar findings appear in the causal analysis of budget expansion. Georgia, Idaho, Kentucky, Maine, North Carolina, North Dakota, Vermont, West Virginia and Wyoming show legislative reliance primarily on the governor's recommendation, while only South Dakota, Texas and Virginia show legislative response primarily to agency acquisitiveness.

For most of the 19 states, it is a combination of incrementalism and legislative dependence on the governor's recommendation that shapes the budgets of major agencies. Both the governor and the legislature respond to the agencies request for increments above their present expenditures, and their response serves to mini-

mize budget growth. Also, most legislatures weigh the governor's recommendations heavily in their own decisions. Without a favorable recommendation from the governor, an agency is unlikely to enjoy any substantial increase in its appropriation.

III. THE CORRELATES OF AGENCY-GOVERNOR-LEGISLATURE RELATIONSHIPS

An examination of the correlation coefficients in Tables 2 and 3 indicates that states vary in the nature of budget relations among agencies, the governor and the legislature. Although agency acquisitiveness and the governor's recommendations generally show certain correlations with the legislature's appropriation, the strength (and occasionally the direction) of these relationships vary from state to state. By examining these variations it is possible to define the conditions under which the governor is severe or supportive in his review of agency budgets, and the conditions under which the

TABLE 4. DIFFERENCES BETWEEN RELATIONSHIPS EXPECTED ON THE BASIS OF CAUSAL INFERENCES AND ACTUAL RELATIONSHIPS

		Short-terr	n success			Program expansion				
	Expected	Actual	Differ- ence	Model inferred	Expected	Actual	Differ- ence	Model inferred		
Florida			A CONTRACTOR OF THE CONTRACTOR			**************************************				
$r_{AL} = r_{AG}r_{GL}$ $r_{GL} = r_{AG}r_{AL}$	62 $.50$	63 $.77$.01 .27	#1	.16 .11	.50 .71	.34 $.60$	#3		
Georgia					•	•				
$r_{AL} = r_{AG}r_{GL}$	80	82	.02	#1	10	09	.01	#1		
$r_{GL} = r_{AG}r_{AL}$.71	.93	.22		.01	.92	.91			
Idaho	•									
$r_{AL} = r_{AG}r_{GL}$	50	80	.30	#3	.78	.74	.04	#1		
$r_{GL} = r_{AG}r_{AL}$.56	.72	.16		.73	.79	.06			
Illinois										
$r_{AL} = r_{AG}r_{GL}$	41	51	.10	#1	.69	.81	.12	#3		
$r_{GL} = r_{AG}r_{AL}$.41	.79	.38		. 69	.81	.12			
Indiana										
$r_{AL} = r_{AG}r_{GL}$	· - .11	27	.16	#3	.99	.99	.00	indeter-		
$r_{GL} = \tau_{AG} \tau_{AL}$.04	.86	.82		.99	.99	.00	minate		
Kentucký										
$r_{AL} = r_{AG}r_{GL}$	75	77	.02	#1	.01	.07	.06	#1		
$r_{GL} = r_{AG}r_{AL}$.72	.80	.08		.00	.19	.19			
Louisiana		•	,							
$r_{AL} = r_{AG}r_{GL}$	- . 5 9	48	.11	#3	.20	.04	.16	#3		
$r_{GL} = r_{AG}r_{AL}$.39	.72	.33		01	.54	. 53			
Maine										
$r_{AL} = r_{AG}r_{GL}$. 17	.18	.01	#1	. 56	.64	.08	#1		
$r_{GL} = r_{AG}r_{AL}$.04	.75	.71		.48	.74	.26			
Nebraska						•				
$r_{AL} = r_{AG}r_{GL}$.32	. 51	. 19	#3	.33	.79	.46	#3		
$r_{GL} = r_{AG}r_{AL}$	30	50	.20		.60	. 43	.17			
North Carolina										
$r_{AL} = r_{AG}r_{GL}$	20	20	.00	#1	.93	.93	.00	#1		
$r_{GL} = r_{AG}r_{AL}$.04	.99	.95		.87	.79	.12			
North Dakota	•									
$r_{AL} = r_{AG}r_{GL}$	79	80	.01	#1	.34	.42	.08	#1		
$\tau_{GL} = \tau_{AG} \tau_{AL}$. 67	.94	.27		.16	.87	.71			
South Carolina				,		-				
$r_{AL} = r_{AG}r_{GL}$	11	17	.06	#1	.58	.81	.23	#3		
$r_{GL} = r_{AG}r_{AL}$.05	.36	.31		.62	.75	.13			
South Dakota				" ^	•			40		
$r_{AL} = r_{AG}r_{GL}$	47	70	.23	#2 ·	.34	.58	.24	#2		
$r_{GL} = r_{AG}r_{AL}$. 53	.63	.10		.41	.48	.07			

TABLE 4—(Continued)

		Program expansion						
	Expected	Actual	Differ- ence	Model inferred	Expected	Actual	Differ- ence	Model inferred
Texas								adentica esta esta esta esta esta esta esta est
$r_{AL} = r_{AG}r_{GL}$	33	06	.26	#3	.83	.95	.12	#2
$r_{GL} = r_{AG}r_{AL}$.04	.52	.48		.88	.89	.01	
Vermont								
$r_{AL} = r_{AG}r_{GL}$	39	61	.22	#3	.39	.37	.02	#1
$r_{GL} = r_{AG}r_{AL}$.41	.58	.17		.31	.46	.15	
Virginia								
$r_{AL} = r_{AG}r_{GL}$	11	27	.16	#2	.43	.81	.38	#2
$r_{GL} = r_{A\hat{G}}r_{AL}$.15	.19	.04		. 58	.60	.02	
West Virginia								
$r_{AL} = r_{AG}r_{GL}$	35	65	.30	#3	.15	.22	.07	#1
$r_{GL} = r_{AG}r_{AL}$.37	.61	.24		.13	.26	.13	ū
Wisconsin								
$r_{AL} = r_{AG}r_{GL}$	41	28	. 13	#3	09	. 16	.25	#3
$r_{GL} = r_{AG}r_{AL}$.17	. 67	.50		.14	10	.24	
Wyoming								
$r_{AL} = r_{A}br_{GL}$	77	70	.07	#1 .	.26	.18	.08	#1
$r_{GL} = r_{AG}r_{AL}$. 57	.94	.37		.05	.92	.87	

legislature is particularly responsive to agency acquisitiveness and the governor's recommendations. The dependent variables of this inquiry are certain correlation coefficients from Tables 2 and 3:

 $r_{X_2X_3}$: the stronger the negative correlation between agency acquisitiveness and the governor's short-term support, the more the governor appears to be restraining the agencies' budget development

 $r_{X_2X_4}$: the stronger the *positive* correlation between agency acquisitiveness and the governor's support for budget expansion, the more the governor appears to accept agency-initiated budget expansions

 $r_{X_2}v_1$: the stronger the negative correlation between agency acquisitiveness and short-term success in the legislature, the more the legislature appears to be restraining agency budget development

 $r_{X_2Y_2}$: the stronger the *positive* correlation between agency acquisitiveness and budget-expansion in the legislature, the more the legislature appears to accept agency-initiated budget expansions

r_{X₃Y₁}: the stronger the positive correlation between the governor's short-term recommendation and the legislature's short-term appropriation, the greater the gubernatorial-legislative rapport in short-term budget making

 $r_{X_4Y_2}$: the stronger the positive correlation between the governor's budget-expansion recommendation and the legislature's budget-expansion appropriation, the greater the gubernatorial-legislative rapport in budget-expansion

The independent variables for this analysis are introduced above. By examining correlation coefficients between the measures of agency-governor-legislature relationships and the measures of government structure, political characteristics and economic resources, it is possible to define certain state characteristics that support these behaviors.

Findings: The Environment of Agency-Governor-Legislature Budget Relations. The impact of the environment on agency-governor-legislature budget relations does not appear to be strong. Only a few of the correlation coefficients reported in Table 5 are strong enough to pass a test for statistical significance. However, by combining these significant relationships with

TABLE 5.	COEFFICIENTS	OF SIMPLE	CORRELATIO	N BETWEEN	MEASURES	OF AGENCY-
GO.	VERNOR-LEGISL	ATURE REI	ATIONSHIPS	ND INDEPE	NDENT VARI	ABLES

	S ₁ : Governor tenure	S2: Governor veto	S ₃ : party comp	S4: elected execs.	Ss: voter turnout	S6: expend/ capita	S7: debt/ capita	Sa: personal income/ capita
rx.x3: agency acquisitiveness and								
Gov short-term support	. 15	52*	.16	08	.16	34	05	.14
$r_{X_2X_4}$: agency acquisitiveness and								
Gov support for expansion	04	20	.34	.07	.40	22	45	.33
rx, y,: acquisitiveness and Legis								
short-term appropriation	17	21	.07	.34	09	45	21	.15
$r_{X_2}Y_2$: acquisitiveness and Legis		•						
expansion appropriation	.09	27	. 14	.20	.10	51 ×	50*	.24
rx ₃ y ₁ : Gov support and Legis								
short-term appropriation	-,32	05	11	31	.08	.34	.21	06
τχ ₄ γ ₂ : Gov support and Legis								
expansion appropriation	.38	01	17	.18	11	07	45	.14

^{*} Significant at .05 level (see note #20).

those showing a magnitude of at least .30, it is possible to speculate about certain conditions that give some support to certain budget behaviors

Two environmental characteristics associated with the governor's restraint of agency budget development are substantial veto powers and high state government expenditures.22 Perhaps the threat of veto permits the governor to impose a severe review on the agencies when they submit requests to him. And the already-high expenditures may incline the governor against further large increases in state spending. Where the governor accepts agency requests for budget expansion, there tends to be a low state debt, high personal income, relatively intense party competition and high voter turnout.23 Perhaps low debt and high personal income permit the governor to support agency plans for expansion. And in a high participation-competitive party situation he may be inclined to seek electoral and legislative rewards by supporting innovative agencies.

Where the legislature restrains agency budget development there is relatively high state government expenditure and a low incidence of separately elected officials.²⁴ Like the governor,

²² The correlations indicate that high scores on veto power and expenditures correspond with high *negative* relationships between agency acquisitiveness and the governor's short-term support.

²³ The correlations indicate that low scores on debt, but high scores on party competition, voter turnout, and per capita personal income correspond with high *positive* relationships between agency acquisitiveness and the governor's support for budget expansion.

24 The correlations indicate that high state ex-

the legislature appears to resist an acquisitive agency in the face of already high expenditures. And with a scarcity of separately elected executives, agency heads may lack for politically independent allies who can promote their budget through the legislature. Where the legislature accepts agency-initiated budget expansions there tend to be low total state expenditures and state debt.²⁵ Thus, the condition of still-flexible resources seems to permit the legislature (like the governor) to give some support to acquisitive agencies.

Gubernatorial-legislative rapport on short-term success is high where the governor has considerable tenure potential, where there is a scarcity of separately elected executive officials, and where total expenditures are relatively high. ²⁶ With high tenure potential the governor may be able to elicit legislative cooperation on the expectation that he will remain in office for some time to come. The scarcity of separately elected executives may reduce the governor's competition with other power-holders for the legislature's attention. And the already-high expenditures may encourage the legislators to

penditures and a low number of elected officials correspond with high negative relationships between agency acquisitiveness and short-term success in the legislature.

²⁵ The correlations indicate that low expenditures and debt correspond with high *positive* relationships between agency acquisitiveness and budget-expansion success in the legislature.

²⁶ The correlations indicate that high tenure potential and expenditures, but a low number of elected officials correspond with high *positive* relationships between the governor's short-term recommendation and the legislature's short-term appropriation.

accept the governor's cues on the agencies' budgets. Where the governor and legislature show rapport in budget-expansion there is a similar high tenure potential and there tends to be a low state debt.²⁷ Perhaps the low debt constraint permits the governor and legislature to cooperate in the support of agencies that seek to expand their budgets.²⁸

IV. SUMMARY AND DISCUSSION

By means of separate correlation analyses within each of 19 states this article has defined certain relationships between administrative agencies, the governor and the legislature in

²⁷ The correlations indicate that high tenure potential and low debt correspond with high positive relationships between the governor's recommendation and the legislature's appropriation for budget expansion.

 28 An examination of simple correlation coefficients among variables $\rm S_1{--}S_8$ suggests that the relationships which appear most strongly in Table 5 are independent. Except for the expected relationships among turnout, competition and personal income, few of the variables show strong relationships with each other. Thus, the relationships in Table 5 involving the governor's veto, and tenure potential, and total per capita state expenditures and debt are not the product of any of the other independent variables considered in this study. The coefficients of simple correlation among the independent variables are reported here:

state government budgeting. A favorable recommendation from the governor seems essential for agency budget success in the legislature. The agency may influence both the governor's recommendation and the legislature's appropriation by the nature of its request. Acquisitive requests generally receive severe short-run treatment from the governor and the legislature, but an acquisitive strategy appears to be essential for a significant budget expansion. On the basis of separate causal analyses for each of the 19 states, it appears that the governor's recommendation is more directly important for the legislature of more states than is the acquisitiveness of agency requests.

The findings about the interaction of agency, gubernatorial and legislative behavior help to substantiate several observations that have been made previously about executive-legislative relations and the budgetary process in American governments.²⁹ The reluctance of governors and legislators to support an acquisi-

²⁹ See, for example, Arthur MacMahon, "Congressional Oversight of Administration: The Power of the Purse," Political Science Quarterly, 58 (June and September, 1943), 161–190; and 380–414; Warner Schilling, "The Politics of National Defense: Fiscal 1950," in Schilling et al, Strategy, Politics and Defense Budgets (New York: Columbia University Press, 1962), pp. 1–266; Elias Huzar, The Purse and the Sword (Ithaca; Cornell University Press, 1950); Aaron Wildavsky, The Politics of the Budgetary Process (Bos-

	S_1	S_2	S_3	S_4	S_6	S_{θ}	S_7	S_8
S ₁ governor's tenure	1.00	.06	34	32	.13	.19	.08	.30
S ₂ governor's veto		1.00	.20	.22	24	.20	28	.13
S ₃ party competition			1.00	.53*	187*	20	.15	65*
S ₄ # elected executives				1.00	 . 45	32	10	23
S ₅ voter turnout					1.00	.35	19	.50*
S ₆ expenditures/capita						1.00	.08	09
S7 debt/capita				•			1.00	27
Sa personal income/capita								1.00

^{*} Significant at the .05 level (see note #20).

A test with regression analysis lends support to the importance of many elected officials for the legislature's short-term support of acquisitive agencies and the importance of few elected officials for governor-legislative rapport on shortterm appropriations; this independent variable (S₄) shows a regression coefficient of at least 1.5 times the standard error with the appropriate dependent variables, in the presence of all other independent variables. ton: Little, Brown and Company, 1964); Rufus Browning, "Innovative and Non-Innovative Decision Processes in Government Budgeting," a paper delivered at the Annual Meeting of the American Political Science Association, September. 1963; Richard Fenno, The Power of the Purse op. cit.; John P. Crecine, "A Computer Simulation Model of Municipal Resource Allocation," a paper presented at the 1966 Midwest Political Science Association Meeting.

tive agency in the short term reveals the conservative bias that is built into incremental budgeting. Agencies that request little or no increase over their current budget are generally treated well by the governor and the legislature, while those seeking large increases suffer the greatest reductions in their requests. Yet an acquisitive strategy appears to be a prerequisite for a substantial budget increase. It is a rare occurrence for the governor or legislature to provide an agency with a sum larger than that it had requested. In part, this is a function of incremental budgeting. Executive and legislative budget-makers concentrate on the inspection and reduction of increments; they leave the development of increments to the agencies. At its heart, the reluctance of governors and legislators to innovate may reveal the difficult position of the generalists in their relations with agency specialists. The highly trained professional personnel in the agencies are most intimately aware of current programs and the new services that an expanded budget might produce. Chief executives and legislators have surrendered much of their innovative potential for a more limited role as reviewers of administrators' requests. And state legislators seem to have accepted a more limited supervisory role than the governors. The findings of greater importance for the governor's recommendation (rather than the agency's request) in the legislature's decisions indicates the legislature's dependence on the governor's budget cues. Perhaps this reflects the greater staff resources of the governor and the typically amateurish character of state legislatures. When they are compared to the professional analysts in the governor's office, legislators appear to have little experience in public budgeting, no professional training in a relevant discipline, an impossibly brief time to consider agency budgets and inadequate staff and clerical assistance.30 State legislators have a desperate need for cues that will guide their budget performance and the governor's recommendation is usually the best cue available.

 30 See Malcolm E. Jewell and Samuel C. Patterson, $op.\ cit.,\ p.\ 251$ ff.

When the 19 states are examined for the characteristics that support various styles of relationships between agencies, the governor and the legislature, the findings shed some new light on the influence of governmental and political characteristics of the states.31 The veto and tenure powers of the governor help to strengthen his position with both the agencies and the legislature. Because of formal prerogatives, the governor appears to be in a more secure position when he reduces agency requests and makes recommendations to the legislature; the governors that have these powers are more likely to be severe in cutting agency requests and they are more likely to be successful in their recommendations to the legislature. In contrast, the presence of numerous separately elected executives appears to benefit agencies at the governor's expense. In the states where there are many elected officials, agencies are more likely to get their acquisitive requests approved by the legislature, and the governor's recommendation is most likely to be altered in the legislature. Party competition and voter turnout also seem to strengthen the agencies' position. In states with heavy turnout and intense competition the governor is most likely to support the agencies' acquisitive requests, perhaps in an effort to assert his own identity as a program innovator. High levels of state government expenditure and debt work in opposition to agency budget aspirations. Where spending and debt is already high, both the governor and the legislature are severe in reviewing agency requests. This may be an outgrowth of incremental budgeting. The principal reviewers are conservative in their attitudes toward increases in expenditures, and they may be particularly wary of acquisitive agencies when existing state resources are already heavily committed.

³¹ See the works by Dye, Dawson and Robinson and Sharkansky cited in note 1; plus Richard I. Hofferbert, "The Relation between Public Policy and Some Structural and Environmental Variables in the American States," this Review, 60 (March, 1966), 73–82.

THE SOVIET CENTRAL COMMITTEE: AN ELITE ANALYSIS

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This paper is a study of the backgrounds of the members of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union. The purpose of its first part is to present and interpret certain quantitative material concerning the background characteristics of the members of the Central Committee. The conclusion elaborates premises regarding the function of co-optation in the higher Party organs and suggests possible relationships of this function to the education and career experiences of the Central Committee membership as discussed in the first part. To pursue an ideal study of this type, we recognize that extensive interviews and depth exploration of the sociological histories of the members would be desirable. In the case of the Soviet political elite such a course is obviously not possible at the present time. Nevertheless. sufficient data exist to make a modest beginning toward what we hope will help to lay a foundation for more extensive analysis of elites in the Soviet system in the future.

Two basic assumptions underlie our interest in the backgrounds of the Soviet political elite. First, and more important for this paper, is the premise that persons are co-opted into the Central Committee primarily, though not exclusively, as a result of the group associations they have made during the courses of their careers. These associations are largely career associations, and most of the members become part of the elite of important functional groups before they become members of the Party elite. Educational backgrounds, age, Party status, role associations, occupation, and other factors all converge to influence the development of the careers of the members. Our concern is with the general patterns of these and related variables among the total membership of the Central Committee.

A second and corollary premise is that the attitudes and value orientations of individual members are shaped in significant part by these background factors, especially by education, occupation, and role associations. This assumption, of course, opens the Pandora's box of how to determine ideological influence. More to the point here, however, the premise is intended to underscore the belief that many members are co-opted precisely because of their different backgrounds and career associations in order to bring people of varying experience, perceptions, and abilities toward the center of the decisional

processes. This premise is predicated on the view that the Central Committee of the CPSU has become a composite of the representatives of key functional groups and is the principal medium, either through individual members or as a collective, through which the members of the Politburo regularly exchange information with the elites of the major interests in the system. Co-optation is viewed here as a rationl process of attaining group representation in order to facilitate the communications flow between the principal decision-makers and the functional groups of Soviet society and to integrate group elites into the Party-dominated system. Co-optation, therefore, is interpreted as having both representative and regulatory functions. In short, we see the membership selection and function of the Central Committee as an institutionalization of a high level communications network.

I. FINDINGS ON BIOGRAPHICAL CHARACTERISTICS

The empirical portion of this study consists of the examination of background factors of members of the Central Committee elected at the 23rd Congress of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union held in 1966. The data were collected from written sources, primarily from Who's Who in the USSR, other information made available by the institute for the Study of the USSR in Munich, and official Soviet sources.1 Of the 195 full members sufficient information was obtained on 184. Of the 165 candidate members, similar information was available on 125. The basic total population of the sample therefore is 309, although in some categories information was available on a larger number of candidates.

¹ The most accessible source of biographical data is the Who's Who in the USSR, 1965-1966, compiled by the Institute for the Study of the USSR, Munich, Germany, and published by the Scarecrow Press, Inc., 1966. Additional information is available in the files of the Institute. Short but current biographical sketches are published in the Ezhegodnik of the Great Soviet Encyclopedia. Mcre extensive biographies, though sometimes less up-to-date, are found in Biograficheskii slovar', produced at different times by different professional groups (scientists, engineers, etc.) in the USSR.

The data collected on the 309 members were classified into twenty-eight variables. Among the more important were date of birth, level of education, source of education, the learned occupation, the practiced occupation, date of admission to the CPSU, date of admission to the Central Committee, record of Party work, occupational status before and after 1953, and regon of residency. Insufficient data made some variables impossible to use. These were population of place of birth, region of birth, social class of parents and recent technological education or re-tooling. Others, which will be considered later, proved of only limited value. After the data were assembled, frequency distributions were made of all variables and their subdivisions. Then, a correlation matrix was employed in order to ascertain patterns of inter-relationships between pairs of variables.

Age and Sex. Examination of age and sex of the members of the Central Committee (CC) reveals what one might expect. The full members were slightly older than the candidates. but the average age of both groups fell into the 54-60 age category. Thirty-eight and six-tenths per cent of the full members and 22.6% of the candidates were born in the decade 1900-1909. while 45.7% of the former and 52.4% of the latter were born between 1910 and 1919. Only one person in each group was born after 1930, and only 11 of the full members and 7 of the candidates were born before 1900. In 1967, the average age of the full member was 57 and that of the candidate was slightly under 55. These figures indicate that the newly elected members kept the average age at about the same level as it had been for the CC elected in 1961.2 (At that time 58.5% of the total membership had been born in the decade of 1900-1909.) The overwhelming number of both types of members were male. Only five full members and five candidates were women (two of the candidates for whom biographical data were unavailable were also women).

Education. The level of education of the CC membership continued to show a gradual increase as did the tendency to co-opt persons who had basically a specialized higher education. Table 1 indicates the level of education attained by the members. These figures may be compared with those representing the source of

TABLE 1. LEVEL AND TYPES OF EDUCATION

	-	Full mbers	Candidate Members		
University	17	9.3%	11	8.8%	
Party School only	8	4.4	15	12.0	
Military Academy	15	8.1	10	8.0	
Technical*	120	65.2	64	51.2	
Secondary	4	2.2	2	1.6	
Other	1	. 5	0	0.0	
No data/or none reported	19	10.3	23	18.4	
	184	100%	125	100%	

^{*} Technical includes institutes, polytechnical schools, and specialized academies other than military ones.

the highest degree attained by the member (Table 2). These two tables indicate a slight decline in the number of persons educated at universities and military academies from the CC elected in 1961. There was a simultaneous increase in the number that had Party schools as their only source of higher education. In regard to the technically trained, there was an increase both in number and percentage in the ranks of the full members—from 58% to 61%. However, there was a substantial decrease in technical education among the candidates. This number dropped from 83 to 64, while the size of the candidate ranks was being increased. The percentage of those so classified declined from 53.4% to 38.8%. The reasons for this shift among the candidate membership toward more exclusive education in party schools and less technical education was probably to provide compensation to the so-called "reds" or more ideologically oriented members, while the "experts" were being rewarded with full membership.

Occupation. An important aspect of educa-

TABLE 2. SOURCE OF HIGHEST DEGREE

	Full Members		Candidat Member	
University	14	7.6	9	7.2
Party Schools	32	17.4	28	22.4
Military Academy	16	8.7	10	8.0
Technical	100	54.4	49	39.2
Secondary No data/none	4	2.2	2	1.6
received	18	9.7	27	21.6
	184	100%	125	100%

² References to the background characteristics of the Central Committee membership between 1961 and 1966 are based on Michael P. Gehlen, "The Educational Backgrounds and Career Orientations of the Members of the Central Committee of the CPSU," The American Behavioral Scientist, 9 (April, 1966), 11–14.

TABLE 3. LEARNED OCCUPATION

	Full Members	Candi- dates	Total
Engineering	42.1%	30.3%	37.5%
Science &Mathe-			
matics	5.6	3.0	4.7
Agronomy	18.5	16.2	17.5
Military	8.3	14.1	10.6
Arts & Letters Other (mostly	12.7	16.2	14.0
Party training)	12.8	20.2	15.7
	100%	100%	100%

tion is the learned occupation. The frequency of this variable was also tabulated with the related. factor of the occupation practiced by the CC members during the early parts of their careers. Table 3 lists the percentages of the membership in the principal categories of learned occupations. The information in this table corresponds fairly closely with the occupations practiced by the members of the CC in the early parts of their careers. Table 4 provides the latter information, indicating the slightly higher percentage of people drawn immediately into Party work than were specifically educated for that purpose. This practice was quite probably the result of the need to fill Party posts that were associated with some productive function (eg. factory or kolkhoz management) that demanded technical competence.

It is suggestive from the principal occupational lines followed during the bulk of their careers that the "learned" occupations of the CC members were only selectively significant. Scientists had obviously been trained as scientists, for example, but Party workers came from a variety of educational backgrounds. In order

TABLE 4. PRACTICED OCCUPATION

	Full Members	Candi- dates	Total
Engineering Science & Mathe-	38.0%	26.7%	33.6%
matics	4.9	2.8	4.2
Agronomy	16.6	19.4	17.5
Military	9.2	13.2	10.8
Arts & Letters Other (mostly	15.3	16.1	15.6
Party work)	16.0	21.8	18.3
	100%	100%	100%

to ascertain the career orientations pursued by individuals over a longer term period than was indicated in Table 4, occupational status was examined in two parts: first, the career orientation of each member before 1953 and, second, the career orientation after 1953. The year 1953 was chosen as the dividing line between Stalinist and post-Stalinist Russia so that any significant variation in career patterns and in means of mobility might be more accurately assessed. Career orientation was determined by the number of years a CC member had spent in a particular type of occupation. Table 5 presents the data collected on occupational status before 1953 while Table 6 presents the corresponding information for the years 1953-1966.

The most striking difference between the occupational associations of the full members befor∋ and after 1953 is the sharp increase in apparatus assignments from 40.0% to 54.9%. This very strongly suggests the importance of ties with the apparatus for upward mobility in the higher levels of the Party. Since most of those moving into apparatus posts had devoted most of their careers to economic or cultural activities, the increase also underscores the emphasis placed on experience in a relatively broad range of economic and cultural areas as

TABLE 5. OCCUPATIONAL STATUS
OF FULL MEMBERS

Occupation -		pational tatus	Occupational Status	
Occupation -		Before 1953		After 1953
Party apparatchiki	74	40.0%	101	54.9%
High level bureaucrats				
(heavy industry)	25	13.6	23	12.5
(light industry)	1	.5	1	.5
(agriculture)	5	2.7	10	5.4
Low level bureaucrats				
(heavy industry)	15	8.2	0	0.0
(light industry)	1	.5	0	0.0
(agriculture)	11	6.0	0	0.0
Other bureaucrats ¹	5	2.7	12	6.5
Indeterminate ²	3	1.6	5	2.7
Military Officers	15	8.2	14	7.6
Scientists	4	2.2	· 4	2.2
Writers	3	1.6	3	1.6
Journalists	.1	.5	1	.5
Trade Union Officers	4	2.2	6	3.3
Workers	3	1.6	2 .	1.1
Others	2	1.1	2	1.1
Nc data	12	6.5		
_	184	100.0%	184	100.0%

¹ Other bureaucrats include those in the cultural, welfare, planning, and security ministries of the government.

² Indeterminate includes those who spent such equal portions of their careers in both party and state work as to make it impossible to place them in either category.

one condition for the co-optation of non-professional apparatchiki into important apparatus positions. The data indicate that about onethird of the members of the Party apparatus in the 1966 Central Committee had built their earlier careers in the economic or cultural bureaucracy or some related unit of Soviet society. In addition, many of those who had been professional apparatchiki from near the outset of their careers had been intensively trained in economic and technological matters in Party schools. As a consequence of these factors, a substantial proportion of the apparatchiki themselves had acquired some measure of expertise or specialization in one or more areas outside of Party administration. The co-optation of such experienced persons into the apparatus suggests an effort on the part of the apparatchiki to enrich their own numbers with highly competent individuals who have succeeded in careers outside the apparatus and to help assure the loyalty of such experienced persons to the role of the apparatus in the system.

The priority given to continuation of the influence of the Party apparatus and to the development of heavy industry is attested to by the paucity of formal representation accorded persons in light industry and in intermediate

TABLE 6. OCCUPATIONAL STATUS
OF CANDIDATE MEMBERS

Occumation		Occupational Status		Occupational Status	
Occupation -		Before 1953		After 1953	
Party apparatchiki	50	40.0%	63	50.4%	
High level bureaucrats					
(heavy industry)	9	7.2	14	11.2	
(light industry)	· 4	3.2	5	4.0	
(agriculture)	4	3.2	5	4.0	
Low level bureaucrats					
(heavy industry)	4	3.2	0	0.0	
(light industry)	0	0.0	0	0.0	
(agriculture)	4	3.2	1	.8	
Other bureaucrats1	3	2.4	7	5.6	
Indeterminate ²	3	2.4	4	3.2	
Military Officers	11	7.2	11	8.8	
Scientists	3	2.4	3	2.4	
Writers	4	3.2	4	3.2	
Journalists	3	2.4	2	1.6	
Trade Union Officers	1	.8	4	3.2	
Workers	2	1.6	2	1.6	
Others	0	0.0	0	0.0	
No data	20	16.0			
Aces	125	100.0%	125	100.0%	

¹ Other bureaucrats include those in the cultural, welfare, planning, and security ministries of the government.

and lower level bureaucratic positions. The fact that only one full member was associated with light industry both before and after 1953 indicates that careers in that sector of the economy have afforded little opportunity for upward mobility. On the other hand, it should be noted that a small number of the apparatchiki and of those now in the Council of Ministers have developed special competence in the light industry sector.

The same general pattern exists for the candidate membership as for the full members.

Prior Positions. A related point of particular importance is the relationship between the position occupied by an individual and his co-optation into the Central Committee. Examination of the compositions of the Central Committees elected in 1952, 1956, 1961, and 1966 reveals that at least eighty and possibly one hundred of the full members are chosen as a result of their holding particular positions. The figure cannot be more precise, for the size of the Central Committee has tended to increase with each election, thereby making it difficult to ascertain whether the holders of some posts will continue to serve in the CC regardless of their personal identities. In addition to the members of the CPSU Politburo and Secretariat, who are always members of the Central Committee, there are sixty-five or more posts that carry CC membership with them. These include all the first secretaries of the Union Republic Parties, thirty-five or more first secretaries of important provincial Party organizations (Moscow, Leningrad, Kiev, Stalingrad-Volgograd, etc.), and the first secretaries of the Moscow and Leningrad city Party organizations. From the government, the Chairman of the All-Union Council of Ministers, also a member of the Politburo, and at least two first deputy chairmen of the Council are members, along with the Ministers and First Deputy Ministers of Defense and Foreign Affairs. Besides these, the chairmen of the Republic Councils of Ministers of the RSFSR, the Ukraine, Byelorussia, and probably Georgia and Uzbekistan are Central Committee members. From the mass organizations, the first secretary of the Komsomols and the chairman of the Trade Union Council are members. Although supporting data come from a rather limited time span, it can be stated that the editor of Pravda, the president of the Academy of Sciences, and at least one deputy chair-

² Indeterminate includes those who spent such equal portions of their careers in both party and state work as to make it impossible to place them in either category.

³ Compilations of the members and their positions at the time of election to the Central Committee are available in *Current Soviet Policies*, Volumes I-IV, published by Columbia University Press and by Frederick A. Praeger.

man of the Trade Union Council have probably become positions bringing automatic membership in the Central Committee. There have also regularly been other members of the Council of Ministers represented on the Central Committee but they have not been associated with any particular ministry.

As yet, candidate membership appears to have no such strong associations with particular positions, although there are some indications of change in this regard. Perhaps as many as twenty-five provincial Party first secretarial posts have reached the point where they carry with them candidate membership. Some particular types of specialists may consistently be given candidate status but thus far there is no indication that they are chosen as a result of positions already held. In general, the Party leaders may be expected to have more flexibility in the selection of candidates.

The remaining members and candidate members of the Central Committee are not commonly associated with any special positions although the great majority of them also seem to be selected as a result of a combination of their reputations and positions. The co-optation of certain military officers, scientists, literary figures, journalists, economic planners and managers of sovnarkhozy and industrial and agricultural enterprises round out the representative significance of the institution. Some of these may achieve permanent membership. This is a distinct possibility for marshals in command of crucially stationed troops or the admirals of key fleets. It is certainly less likely for less highly institutionalized professional groups, such as writers and scientists.

The association of some positions with CC membership is undoubtedly a major reason for the relative stability of membership in recent years. Whereas there were at least two fairly sharp turnovers on the CC during the 1950's, the membership has been relatively stable since the election of the CC of 1961. In 1966, 79.4% of the 175 full members from the preceding Central Committee were re-elected, although the size was increased to 195 to allow for the cooptation of additional persons. Only 26 living members of the previous Central Committee were not returned. Seventy percent of the full members had never served as candidates, having been drawn directly into voting status. Twenty-two (12%) had served as candidates in the preceding committee. Seventy-eight per cent were elected in 1956 or later, over one-half of these in 1961.

The candidate membership experienced greater changes in 1966 than the full membership. Here it should be remembered that data

were not available on 40 of the 165 candidates. The vast majority of these were new admissions. However, the data referred to in this paragraph consist of references only to 129 candidates for whom information could be collected on those variables dealing with candidate status. Of these, 51 were elected in 1966, 54 in 1961, and 6 in 1956. In short, over 84% of the 129 reached the Central Committee at or after the 20th Party Congress of 1956.

A related matter worthy of attention is that the proportion of apparatchiki and bureaucrats among the full members of the CC of 1966 did not differ significantly from that found in the CC selected in the 22nd Party Congress of 1961. Or the other hand, the number of bureaucrats in the candidate membership decreased from 29.0% to 25.6%, while the proportion of apparatchiki increased over 3%. Both the apparatchiki and bureaucrats who were full members immediately prior to the 23rd Party Congress were sufficiently entrenched to discourage a serious turnover. The pressure from the conservatives, who apparently were still anxious to prevent a resurgence of Khrushchev-type reformism, was felt more keenly in the candidate membership, where the percentage of bureaucrats and technocrats declined due to an increase in apparatchiki.

Occupational Changes. Of particular interest is the question of who changed occupational classifications after 1953. A total of 54 full members, 41 with technical education, changed job classifications in the post-Stalin years. These figures include 12 for whom there were no data for the years before 1953. Of these 12 nine had assumed career associations with the party apparatus after 1953. Sixteen of the others moved from positions in the lower and intermediary levels of the agricultural and industrial bureaucracies into the ranks of the apparatchiki. All but one of these had records of technical education. Six achieved upward mobility in their initial career areas, moving from low level to high level bureaucratic positions. No pattern existed among the remaining 20 full memberswho changed from one job classification to another.

Of the candidate members, 20 changed kinds of positions and another 20 moved from the unclassified (no data) category before 1953 to identifiable posts after that date. Twelve of the unclassified occupied positions in the apparatchik after 1953. Nine others moved from the low or middle level bureaucracy into the party apparatus, eight of these having had technical education. Eleven others changed kinds of positions without a pattern. Of the 40 candidates there was no information on the educational

backgrounds of 19, while 19 others had technical training and two had non-technical higher education.

Of those whose occupational associations changed after 1953, there was a primary movement from specialized bureaucratic positions to the party apparatus and a secondary movement from low level to high level positions in the same general occupational category. The primary movement indicates a tendency of the party to recruit and promote at least partly on the basis of specialized education and experience. The secondary movement of promotion within the ranks of a particular organization is probably typical of non-party institutional processes. The primary movement is undoubtedly more important as a means of providing the apparatus with the intelligence necessary to exert effective control over non-party institutions by giving the apparatus groups of experts with previous or continuing association with those institutions.

Place of Residence. Although the place-of-residence factor did not have a significant correlation with the other variables considered, it does indicate the shifting living habits of the Soviet elite. Seventy-eight per cent of the full members and 63% of the candidates listed their current residences in cities of 500,000 or more. Of the total membership 91% lived in cities of 100,000 or above. Moscow was by far the most widely claimed residence, despite the fact that many who lived there were formally associated with republic Party organizations. Of the full membership, 46% had residencies in Moscow, while 44% of the candidates had the same. Also, 65% of the full members and 62% of the candidates resided in the RSFSR, with the Ukraine and the Central Asian republics following as the next most widely claimed places of residence.

Party Status. The status of each member in the CPSU is another major area of consideration. Factors examined here are date of admission to the CPSU, the tenure of each member in the Central Committee, and the record of service in the central, republic, and regional Party organs. Then attention will be focused on the backgrounds of the members who were newly elected at the 23rd Party Congress.

The record of the dates of admission to Party membership is found in Table 7. The large percentage of candidates for whom there is no information suggests that those individuals were admitted fairly recently (at least, post-war) and that they are probably younger than the members for whom there is information. Assuming this to be the case, well over one-half the candidates were admitted after the great purges of the 1930's. In contrast, about 45% of the full

TABLE 7. DATE OF ADMISSION TO THE CPSU

	Full I	Members	Can	andidates	
Pre-1917	5	3.7%	0	0.0%	
1918-1937	76	41.3	34	27.2	
1938-1945	88	47.8	62	49.6	
1946-1952	4	2.2	6	4.8	
1953 or after	4	2.2	1	.8	
No data	7	3.8	22	17.6	
	184	100%	125	100%	

members attained membership prior to or during the great purges. Nevertheless, the old Bolsheviks have almost entirely vanished, only five members of the CC having joined the Party prior to the revolution.

Another aspect of Party status concerns the records of those who had worked as apparatchiki in the Party before being co-opted into the Central Committee. Tables 8 and 9 indicate the Party status of the CC members before and after 1953. Party status here refers to the level of official positions held in the organs of the CPSU. Well over one-half of both the full members and candidates had no record of regular service in Party organs before 1953. In the post-Stalin period this situation was reversed with the reversal being most sharp among the candidates. This information suggests two important possibilities that tend to enforce the findings on occupational backgrounds presented in Tables 5 and 6. First, many members made themselves accessible to co-optation into the apparatchiki as a means of increasing their upward mobility after having already established themselves in other occupational endeavors. This means that a significant portion of the CC who would now be classified as apparatchiki would not have been so classified during most of their careers. For the most part, they appear to be specialists who demonstrated their abilities as engineers or administrators and were only later drawn into

TABLE 8. PARTY OFFICES HELD BY FULL MEMBERS

	Befo	ore 1953	Aft	er 1953
Central apparatus	6	3.4%	8	4.4%
Central & Republic apparati	1	.5	17	9.2
Republic apparati	13	7.1	16	8.7
Republic & Regional apparati	17	9.2	31	16.8
Regional apparati	42	22.8	43	23.4
All three levels	3	1.6	13	7.1
None	102	55.4	56	30.4
	184	100%	184	100%

TABLE 9. PARTY OFFICES HELD BY CANDIDATE MEMBERS

	Bef	ore 1953	Aft	er 1953
Central apparatus	5	4.0%	11	8.8%
Central & Republic apparati	0	0.0	6	4.8
Republic apparati	4	3.2	21	16.8
Republic & Regional apparati	6	4.8	17	13.6
Regional apparati	34	27.2	36	28.8
All three levels	0	0.0	3	2.4
None	76	60.8	31	24.8
	125	100%	125	100%

TABLE 10. EDUCATIONAL BACKGROUNDS
OF NEW MEMBERS

	Full Members	Candidate Members
Engineering	10	9 .
Agronomy	. 7	• 4
Science	3	2
Military	2	4
Arts & Letters	2	. 7
Party schools only	3	4
No data	11	21
	 ,	******
	38	51

TABLE 11. OCCUPATIONS OF NEW MEMBERS

•	Full Members		Cand Men	******
, i	Before 1953	After 1953	Before 1953	After 1953
Apparatchiki	17	23	16	27 .
High level bureaucrats	6	8	2	10
Low level bureaucrats	5	0	1	. 1
Military Officers	2	2	3	5
Writer	0	.0	1	1
Journalist	0	0	2	1
Scientists	3	3	2	2
Trade Union Officers	0	0	1	4
Indeterminate	0	1	0	0
No data	4	0	23	0
	37	37	51	51

full-time Party work. Second, the turnover in candidate membership in 1966 suggests that some individuals who had been members primarily as a result of their specialization and who had not become apparatchiki were removed from candidacy in favor of those who had given more regular administrative service to Party organs in the past.

New Members. Examination of the backgrounds of the newly elected members can be expected to shed further light on patterns of continuity or change in the membership of the Central Committee. Consequently, the educaticnal backgrounds and careers of the 38 new full members and the 51 new candidates are highlighted in Tables 10 and 11. Of the 89 new members and candidates considered, 50 (56%) had been regularly associated with the Party apparatus after 1953. All but 18 (20%) had hao at least periodic occupational association with the apparatus. This suggests a possible effort or the part of the ruling coalition of the Party to check the influence of the technocrats and to stabilize, if not accelerate, the influence of the apparatchiki in the heirarchy of the CPSU. Au the same time it should be emphasized that this effort had more effect on the candidate membership than on the full membership.

II. CORRELATIONS

Age. Although there were only about three years separating the average ages of the full and candidate members of the Central Committee. age proved to have statistical importance as a factor influencing other variables and demarking differences between the two classes of membership. Date of birth was related both to the level and to the source of education. Despite the small difference in age, the candidates had

	Level of Education	Source of Degree	Learned Occupation
Age of Full	0.1.10	0004	0000
Members Age of	.3149	.3024	.2932
Candidates	.5279	.4742	.3428

had greater access to higher forms of education. The higher correlations for the candidates lead one to assume that a larger number of themwere co-opted into the Central Committee or the basis of their specialized training than was the case with the full members, who were often selected on the basis of their positions. In related areas, date of birth had an expectedly high correlation with date of admission to the CPSU, .5608 for the full members and .4682 for the candidates. The lower correlation for the candidates indicates a wider distribution of age of admission, thereby reducing, to a modest extent, the importance of age as a significant determinant to admission.

Sex. Sex is an obvious influence on the selection of members when one considers that only five of the 184 full members and five of the 125 candidates for whom information was available were women. Elite status in the CPSU is clearly

reserved largely for males. What, then, are the factors that help to create the exceptions? For the full members no definite pattern was observed. However, two factors stood out in regard to the women candidates. All five of the latter had records as active members of the Komsomols, working in the apparatus of that organization, and four of the five had careers as apparatchiki. Two of the full members had the same backgrounds. The single exception among the candidates was the Minister of Social Security, who was associated with the state bureaucracy. Only one of the five was newly elected to the Central Committee. The foregoing factors indicate that those women who were able to overcome the political obstacle created by their sex have done so largely through their records as political activists in youth organizations and their willingness to seek careers in the Party apparatus rather than through specialization in technical areas. Moreover, it should be noted that the women tended to be younger than the male members, for the eldest was 56 and two of the ten were in their thirties.

Education. Level and source of education proved to be of greater significance for candidates than for full members, although it was important for both. Not only did these two fac-

· FU	LL MEMBERS	
	Learned Occupation	Practiced Occupation
Level of Education Source of Highest	.3189	.2101
Degree	.3244	.1897
CAND	IDATE MEMBER	s
	Learned Occupation	Practiced Occupation

	Occupation	Occupation
Level of Education Source of Highest	. 6243	.5848
Degree Degree	.5403	.5370
,	-	

tors have a greater bearing on the learned and practiced occupations of the candidates than of the full members, but the source of the highest degree earned by the candidates had a significance of .3540 with Party office held before 1953. The correlation of the same variables pertaining to full members was only .2820. In addition, a similar positive correlation (.3896) existed between the Party office held by candidates after 1953 and occupational status after

1953. Those patterns suggest rather strongly that the candidates were co-opted more for their degree of specialization than the full members. If such is the case, it can be hypothesized that candidate members in the Central Committee elected at the 23rd Party Congress were selected because they were thought to provide a communications in-put into the higher decision-making centers of the CPSU. It appears that the full members, as distinct from the candidates, became less directly associated with the occupational specialty for which they were educated as they moved to higher positions in the political structure.

Regional Factors. There was a correlation of .3956 between candidate status in the Central Committee and the region of birth. This indicates that candidacy is used more to give recognition to the geographic divisions and ethnic groups of the USSR than full membership, for which the correlation was only .2053. Related to this is the relationship of experience in a large city Party organization to the levels of the Party apparatus in which members of the CC who had such experience worked. These levels were identified by the Party offices that were held in the central, republic, and regional Party organizations. The correlations suggest that work in a city Party organization was more important for the full members than for the candidates in terms of their movement upward in the Party apparatus. It also suggests that the younger full members and most of the candidates had found other means of attaining upward mobility in the system. The days of intense rivalry between the Moscow and Leningrad Party organizations are probably about over, and the importance of association with one or the other has apparently declined despite the increasing tendency to move to the larger cities. This indicator, especially when

•	PARTY O	PARTY OFFICE HELD								
,	Full M	embers	Candidate	Members						
	Before 1953	After 1953	Before 1953	After 1953						
City Party Work	.4937	. 3548	.3018	.3005						

considered in combination with the background of the members in the Party apparatus, bears out the basic contention that factors other than professional association with the apparatus are of considerable significance in determining the co-optation of persons into the Central Committee, even during a period of conservative re-

action to the reformism of the Khrushchev years and even though many of them may be assigned positions in the apparatus after becoming CC members or candidates.

Foreign Travel. Among the other relationships examined only two merit attention, and these may be only of passing interest. There was no apparent difference between the number of awards and decorations bestowed upon the two classes of CC members. What difference existed can probably be accounted for by the slight age difference. On the other hand, one curious differential may be construed as indicating the greater status of the full members in comparison with the candidates. This factor is foreign travel. There is a positive correlation of .3544 between full membership and foreign travel and a slight inverse correlation between candidate membership and foreign travel. This may be interpreted as a distinction in status. although it should be pointed out that the number of full members who had had diplomatic experience may have accounted for part of the difference in correlation.

III. SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS

The evidence presented indicates the importance of education to members of the Soviet political elite both in terms of influencing how they launched their careers and of influencing their status in the CPSU. Most of this educational preparation was specialized rather than general, with the four largest categories being engineering, agronomy, Party, and military in that order. Of our sample, 65% (120) of the full members and 51% (64) of the candidates had a technical education (excluding military officers and scientists). The career patterns of the members included 55% (101) of the full members and 50% (63) of the candidates who had primary associations in the Party apparatus after 1953. In addition, 25% (46) of the full members and 26% (32) of the candidates had primary associations with the state bureaucracy (excluding the military). Of those in the bureaucratic category members attached to the heavy industry segment of the state machinery were clearly predominant, with modest representation being given to agricultural administrators and specialists and only token recognition to those associated with light industry.

Despite the fact of considerable experience in the Party apparatus after 1953, a clear majority of both full and candidate members held no Party posts on the central, republic, or regional levels of the apparatus prior to 1953. This was true of 55% (102) of the full members and 60% (64) of the candidates. It was only after 1953—that is, the period during which in-

creasing emphasis was given to co-opting persons into Party leadership positions who had specialized training and experience in some functional service (economics, agronomy, military technology, etc.)—that many of the members were assigned positions, temporarily or otherwise, in various levels of the Party apparatus. During this period all but 30% (56) of the full members and 24% (30) of the candidates held official posts in Party organs.

The correlation study demonstrated a modest though meaningful relationship between degree earned and Party office and between the Party office held by candidates and their occupational status after 1953. These correlations, especially when considered in the light of the data concerning backgrounds in Party posts, and a general survey of the 1956 and 1961 Central Committees, support the contention that co-optation is developing largely into a rational process and not merely into a device with which to play games of musical chairs. In short, at least a large percentage, though undoubtedly not all, are drawn into the Central Committee as a result of their knowledge, demonstrated abilities, and occupational role associations. Their presence helps to assure an inflow of information from others with whom the members have occupational associations. It is in the sense of accessibility that the members of the Central Committee may be considered representatives, though certainly at this stage of development they are not equal voting deputies.

The role functions of the persons in the Central Committee, especially their representative role, are closely associated with who they are and why they were co-opted. The question of who they are is partially answered by the foregoing empirical study. They are persons with key occupational assignments, most of whom had acquired reputations as successes in their respective career specializations. Most are also associated with an important functional group in the Soviet system. To be sure, the evidence presented here does not deal with the difficult and important question of the degree of group solidarity and the extent to which the persons in the same group share or contest particular values. The situation of the apparatchiki, who constitute such a significant percentage of the membership, is a case in point. The very fact that some of them have joined the apparatus rather late in their careers, that some are in Party posts that require technical training and special skills as well as administrative ability, and that still others have spent their adult lives in Party administration or in propaganda and security organs indicates the range of experiences and attitudes that they may carry

into the Central Committee. The point here is simply that most have been associated with particular functional groups that have particular interests. From these associations and interests they can be expected to have acquired specialized knowledge and abilities that influence their perceptions of systemic goals as well as of their own roles in the system.

The question of why they were co-opted relates to the practice of co-optation and the kind of representation they are able to perform. Philip Selznick has argued that organizations adopt two principal mechanisms of defense as means of enhancing the security of the organization in its relation to the social forces around it.4 These mechanisms are ideology and cooptation. The use of ideology as a device of political socialization in the Soviet system is widely recognized by Western observers. The rational use of co-optation in the system has been noted but not deeply explored. Selznick suggests that there are two types of co-optation: formal and informal. Informal co-optation involves the actual sharing of power by the old elite with the co-opted persons. While this has occurred in the case of the Central Committee in leadership disputes (e.g., the anti-party crisis of 1957), the actual sharing of power is undoubtedly the exception rather than the rule. On the other hand, the concept of formal cooptation appears to have more meaningful application in analyzing why persons are co-opted

⁴ See Philip Selznick, TVA and the Grassroots, University of California Publications in Culture ◆and Society, Vol. III, pp. 259-261. For other -works involving either elite or group analysis see: Bernard M. Bass, Leadership, Psychology, and Organizational Behavior (New York: Harper, =1960); Dorwin Cartwright and Alvin Zander, Froup Dynamics, Research and Theory (Evanston, Cllinois: Row, Peterson, 1960); Lewis J. Edinger, Political Leadership of Industrial Societies (New York: John Wiley and Sons, 1967); Thomas Gorion, Group-Centered Leadership (Boston: Houghon-Mifflin, 1955); Morris Janowitz, The Profesional Soldier (New York: The Free Press of Hencoe, 1960; Harold D. Lasswell, Power and Personality (New York: Viking Press, 1948); Dwaine Marvick, Political Decision-Makers (New Cork: The Free Press of Glencoe, 1961); Robert 'annenbaum, Leadership and Organization: a Beavioral Science Approach (New York: McGraw Mill, 1961). For one of the few indepth analyses of n important segment of the Soviet elite, see John .. Armstrong, The Soviet Bureaucratic Elite (New ork: Praeger, 1959).

into the Central Committee. This mechanism is used to maintain or increase general acceptance of the legitimacy of the Party elite as the highest decision-making authority in the system by establishing definite means of accessibility to key individuals and especially to key groups. This is accomplished by the selection of persons who are part of group elites. Such use of co-optation also consists of selecting persons who are dependable sources of information. The in-flow of knowledge that they bring helps the elite to make more effective operational decisions than they otherwise might make. By coopting persons on the basis of these two factors -accessibility and communications—the ruling elite may have the advantage of increased stability and information without a complementary loss of power.

The sharing of the symbols of authority, however, opens the door to pressure for a transfer of real power to the co-opted parties. The prevention of this development requires some form of control (Selznick contends informal control) over the co-opted elements. These forces—the sharing of symbols of authority and the placement of controls over those with whom authority is seemingly shared—create tension between representation and participation on the one hand and integration and regulation on the other. Such tension is suggested by the addition of apparatus-associated persons to the Central Committee in 1966 (especially among the candidates) and the corresponding decrease in the more diffuse technocratic contingent. The relative stability of the full membership, however, indicates that certain groups and individuals had acquired representation by right and that only a major conflict would overturn the general balance of forces. Candidacy may be a means of giving ostensible authority and recognition to those less firmly entrenched but ambitious to secure recognition to themselves and those with whom they are professionally associated.

These interpretations must, for the present, be tentative, although they are definitely suggested by the history of the Central Committee since 1956 and by the examination of the backgrounds of the members. The paucity of reliable information on informal channels of communications makes the problem of a more comprehensive empirical study virually insurmountable for the time being. However, it is our hope that the methods used and the hypotheses set forth in this study will be suggestive to others of related and more comprehensive projects that might be developed in the future.

THE RECRUITMENT OF CANDIDATES FOR THE CANADIAN HOUSE OF COMMONS

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Systematic empirical research into the process of political leadership recruitment has made substantial progress since World War II with emphasis given to those who occupy formal positions of authority within the political system, specifically, legislators and party activists. Generally such studies have been concerned with delineating (a) who the leaders are, 2 (b) how and why they are where they are, 3

¹ See Dwaine Marvick's essay, "Political Decision-Makers in Contrasting Milieus," in Dwaine Marvick (ed.), Political Decision-Makers: Recruitment and Performance (Glencoe: The Free Press, 1961), pp. 13-27.

² See, for example, Donald R. Matthews, U. S. Senators and Their World (New York: Vintage Books, 1960), pp. 11-67; Mattei Dogan, "Political Ascent in a Class Society: French Deputies 1870-1958," in Dwaine Marvick (ed.), op. cit., pp. 57-90; and Peter G. Richards, Honourable Members (London: Faber & Faber, 1959). A recent study of a non-western elite is Frederick Frey's The Turkish Political Elite (Cambridge: M.I.T. Press, 1965). See, also, comparative studies such as Harold D. Lasswell, The Comparative Study of Elites (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1952) and Donald R. Matthews, The Social Background of Political Decision-Makers (Garden City: Doubleday, 1954).

³ See, for example, Heinz Eulau, "The Legislative Career," in John Wahlke, Heinz Eulau, William Buchanan and Leroy Ferguson, The Legislative System (New York: John Wiley & Sons, 1962), pp. 69-121; Dwaine Marvick and Charles R. Nixon, "Recruitment Contrasts in Rival Campaign Groups," in Dwaine Marvick (ed.), op. cit., pp. 193-217; James D. Barber, The Lawmakers: Recruitment and Adaptation to Legislative Life (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1965); William E. Wright, "Local Party Leadership in West Berlin: SPD and CDU," (Unpublished doctoral dissertation, Vanderbilt University, 1966); and Lewis Bowman and G. R. Boynton, "Recruitment Patterns Among Local Party Officials: A Model and Some Preliminary Findings in Selected Locales," this REVIEW, 60 (1966), 667-676.

and (c) the variables affecting (a) and (b). The most ambitious recent studies, in the sense that they try to deal systematically with all three aspects of recruitment, are those by Samuel J. Eldersveld, Austin Ranney, and Henry Valen. Their research, and the example cited of other scholarship, have yielded a substantial number of propositions. Three which lend themselves to testing with data we have gathered on the recruitment of candidates for the Canadian House of Commons, 1945–65 are:

- The status of individuals recruited by a party in part is a function of the party's competitive positions. (Key, Snowiss).
- ⁴ See, for example, V. O. Key, Southern Politic in State and Nation (New York: Vintage Book Ed.), pp. 386-442, and American State Politic (New York: Alfred Knopf, 1956), pp. 133-196 Feter H. Rossi and Phillips Cutright, "The Impact of Party Organization in an Industria Setting," in Morris Janowitz (ed.), Communit Political Systems (Glencoe: The Free Press, 1961) pp. 81-116; Lester Seligman, "Political Recruit ment and Party Structure," this Review, 5 (1961), 77-86; Stein Rokkan and Henry Valer "The Mobilization of the Periphery: Data o Turnout, Party Membership and Candidate Re cruitment in Norway," Acta Sociologica, 6 (1962) 115-158; and Leo M. Snowiss, "Congressions Recruitment and Representation," this REVIEW 60 (1966), 627-639,
- ⁵ Samuel J. Eldersveld, *Political Parties:* Behavioral Analysis (Chicago: Rand McNally 1964).
- ⁶ Austin Ranney, Pathways to Parliamer (Madison: University of Wisconsin Press, 1965
- ⁷ Henry Valen, "The Recruitment of Parlis mentary Nominees in Norway," Scandinavia-Political Studies, 1 (1966), 121-166.
- 8 V.O. Key, for example, in his study of Sout's ern state parties, found that the favored Democratic parties or (in some instances) factions were able to recruit candidates and workers of rel tively high status. The less favored Republican however, had great difficulty recruiting "respec

- The status of individuals recruited by a party varies with the party's position on an ideological continuum⁹ (Eldersveld, Ranney, Marvick and Nixon, Valen).
- 3) Relative urbanism and the degree of industrialization of communities affect recruitment patterns (Rokkan and Valen, Valen, Snowiss). 10 In the present instance there should be a positive relationship between urbanism and the mean status of candidates.

In testing these propositions we will compare, whenever such comparisons appear appropriate, the data for Canadian parliamentary candidates with findings from some of the previously cited studies and also indicate how, in Canada, multi-partyism is related to the status of recruited candidates. Then we will employ a multiple regression analysis to suggest how in

■able" people. Leo M. Snowiss claimed that the
■characteristics of Congressional candidates in the
■Chicago area varied with inter-party competition.
Thus, in non-competitive districts in which they
■were certain to win, the Democrats recruited
"old-pro" types who were longtime activists in the party organization. In non-competitive districts in which the Republicans were certain to win, however, the Democrats tended to recruit
■younger and, presumably, better-educated ment who most often were lawyers. In marginal districts they frequently recruited candidates with only tenuous links to the party organization ather than the old-line politicians sent to Conscress from their inner-city stronghold.

⁹ Eldersveld, and Marvick and Nixon, in their espective studies of party activists in Detroit and los Angeles, found that the Republican subjects njoyed more prestigious occupations than their Democratic counterparts. Both Austin Ranney and Henry Valen found that the socio-economic tatus of candidates for Parliament in Britain and Norway, respectively, varied with the right-left positions of the parties.

10 Stein Rokkan and Henry Valen demontrated that the proportion of Norwegian women ecruited as party workers increased markedly in rban areas. Valen subsequently found that the roportion of women candidates for the Norwegian Parliament in part was a function of the elative urbanism of constituencies. Lee Snowiss laimed that differences in the backgrounds, the kills, and even the political "styles" of Congressional candidates were associated with relative rbanism (i.e., whether they were seeking office in the core city, the outer city, or the suburban bynships of Chicago).

two pairs of elections the socio-economic status of candidates, the number of candidates in an electoral contest, the relative urbanism, and the competitiveness of constituencies, influence the process of candidate recruitment. The right-left positions of party candidates are not used because we feel this variable does not lend itself to regression analysis when the units sampled and measured are constituencies.

I. PROCEDURES AND DATA SOURCES

The chief data sources are the Report of the Chief Electoral Officer 11 for eight Canadian national elections from 1945–1965 and the Population of Electoral Districts 12 for 1951, 1956, and 1961. The former give the occupations at the time of nomination and votes received by the candidates of the four national parties in the elections of 1945, 1949, 1953, 1957, 1958, 1962, 1963, and 1965. The latter provide a list of all enclaves of population of 5000 or more in each federal constituency.

In this analysis we employed a random sample of 165 of Canada's then 263 federal constituencies. The data for the 1945 election should be viewed with caution. This was a wartime election and a considerable number of candidates were still members of Canada's Armed Forces. This occupation receives a low score in the rating system we employed, so that the socio-economic status of 1945 candidates is somewhat artificially depressed. Further, since there were only 242 constituencies at the time, there are no data for 22 of the sample constituencies.

MEASURES

Urbanism. Our measure of urbanism is based upon the definition of urban employed by the Canadian Census Bureau, that of incorporated

onvenient and reliable source for the occupations of both incumbent and non-incumbent candidates. The Parliamentary Guide has considerable bibliographic information but only for incumbents. In seven instances, when a Report listed the occupation of a candidate as "gentleman" or "retired" we also used the Parliamentary Guide, Who's Who in Canada, and the National Reference Book to ascertain occupations. Although there were not enough cases to significantly affect the analysis, it is still possible that some of the published and "real" occupations of candidates differed.

¹² (Ottawa: Dominion Bureau of Statistics). The data for 1946 are available only for Manitoba, Saskatchewan, and Alberta and hence, have not been employed in the analysis.

	Party 1 (40% of 4 party vote)	Party 2 (30% of 4 party vote)	Party 3 (20% of 4 party vote)	Party 4 (10% of 4 party vote)
Party 1		10	20	30
Party 2	-		10	20
Party 3			_	. 10
Party 4				

Fig. 1. An inter-party competition measure.

cities or towns of 5000 or more.¹³ It is a ratio (expressed in per cent) of all such urban units in a constituency over the total population of the constituency. Scores range from 00 (completely rural) to 99 (constituencies falling wholly within a metropolitan region, such as Toronto or Vancouver).

Inter-Party Competition. Although there are numerous measures of political competition, they are difficult to construct and, therefore, do not please all political scientists all of the time.14 Despite the fact that during the period Canada had single-member constituencies15 and plurality voting, an added difficulty in satisfactorily measuring inter-party competition was the presence of four rather than two national parties.16 Further, all parties did not always contest every constituency and the constituencies which they did contest may have varied from election to election. Since, for the multivariate portion of this analysis, we wish to treat interparty competition as a linear and continuous variable, we have computed the proportion of the total vote (in per cent) obtained by the candidates of the Social Credit, Progressive Conservative, Liberal, and New Democratic parties

¹³ Revised Statutes of Canada, 1952, Chapter 23 (2:38).

¹⁴ See the discussion in Kenneth Janda, *Data Processing* (Evanston: Northwestern University Press, 1965), pp. 174–183.

¹⁵ Except for a two-member constituency in Halifax, Nova Scotia and Queens, Prince Edward Island. The two-member districts were abolished and the number of constituencies was increased to 264 after the 1966 redistribution of seats.

¹⁶ Mark Kesselman has employed an "index of multipartyism" to measure competition in French national and local elections. According to Kesselman, the index does not measure competition but rather the convergence of votes among competing parties. See his "French Local Politics: A Statistical Examination of Grass Roots Consensus," this Review, 60 (1966), 963–973.

for every election in each of the 165 sample constituencies. Votes obtained by Independents or by candidates of splinter parties such as the Labor Progressive (Communist) have been disregarded. Our measure is based upon differences in the proportions of votes cast for the competing candidates of any of the above four parties and increases in magnitude as competition among the parties decreases.¹⁷

Socio-Economic Status. Political scientists are aware that occupation is a discriminating variable that frequently is correlated with sharp differences in behavior. Although, for analytic purposes, occupations are frequently arranged in an ordinal fashion, such data (since they are not interval or ratio) ordinarily do not lend themselves to use in multivariate statistica) analysis. Happily, Otis D. Duncan has beenable to estimate numerical socio-economic status scores for all detailed occupations in the 1960 U.S. Census of Population. 18 Briefly, his score is a composite of information on levels of educational attainment and income of the labor force engaged in the several occupations (as reported in the 1950 Census of Population). The score is so derived as to have a high correlation

17 We cumulated the absolute value of all possible differences among parties and divided this sum by the total number of differences. Since the resultant measure increases with disparity amon, candidates, we have signed it negatively in orde that a larger number represent greater competition. Figure 1 is a schematic representation of situation in which all four parties contest a constituency. The resultant measure is Gini's meadifference. For bibliography concerning this measure see Gerald J. Glasser, "Variance Formulator the Mean Difference and Coefficient of Corcentration," Journal of the American Statistica Association, 59 (1962), 648-654.

¹⁸ The rationale and method for computir these scores are described in Albert J. Reiss *et al.* Occupation and Social Change (Glencoe: The Fre Press, 1961).

with the prestige rating of occupations ranked in a 1947 survey conducted by the National Opinion Research Center. The result is an SES score which is a two digit number ranging from 00 to 96. It may be treated as a continuous variable in a statistical analysis in which a single figure representing occupational socio-economic status is desired. The measure is especially appropriate for the present analysis since the assumption underlying much of the literature on "respectable" candidate recruitment is that their desirability is a function of the prestige ascribed to them by the public. Further, Canadian society is sufficiently similar to the American in the education required, the income derived, and the prestige ascribed to the several occupations, that the use of these scores is valid for the study of 4168 Canadian candidates for Parliament.19 We have two measures of status: "mean status" (\overline{X} SES) which is the cumulated mean scores of candidates over their "N", and "status difference" (A SES).20

19 We did not employ the Canadian occupational class scale developed by Bernard Blishen because, in our view, the Duncan scale was more detailed. However, Blishen in describing his scale said that rank correlations were computed between the ratings of occupational prestige in each of several countries previously studied by Alex Inkeles and Peter Rossi (i.e., U.S.A., Great Britain, New Zealand, Japan, the U.S.S.R., and West Germany). According to Blishen, "The highest ranked correlation, .94, was found between Canada and the U.S." See Bernard Blishen. "The Construction and Use of an Occupational Class Scale," Canadian Journal of Economics and Political Science, 24 (1958), 523. It should be noted that Inkeles and Rossi had found that in any population there was very little variation in the evaluations of occupations by sub-groups. Thus, Inkeles later observed, "Whether a worker or a professor does the rating, both place the doctor, lawyer, and engineer very near the top of the list, the ordinary worker about two-thirds of the way down, the shoe-shine boy or garbage man at the bottom." See Alex Inkeles, "Industrial Man: The Relation of Status to Experience, Perception and Value," American Sociological Review, 66 (1960), 8. The earlier study referred to by Blishen is Alex Inkeles and Peter Rossi, "National Comparisons of Occupational Prestige." American Journal of Sociology, 61 (1956), 329-

²⁰ Like the measure of inter-party competition, status difference is the sum of all absolute value differences in SES scores for the candidates in every constituency over the total number of possible differences. Since we shall call this mea-

	(scores)	A (93)	B (90)	C (64)	D (42)
Α	()		3	29	51
В				26	48
\mathbf{C}					22
D					
Sum	of difference	es = 179); Δ SE	S = 179	=29.8
				6	-

Fig. 2. A measure of status difference.

A number of assumptions underlie the analysis. Three deserve particular comment here. First, in the complex process by which individuals come to assume active political roles, it is essentially the local party organizations that initiate action and proselytize recruits. Second, it is assumed the parties generally can recruit candidates from population pools in which the several social classes are present, although, in different proportions, irrespective of whether they avail themselves of these resources. Third, despite the disagreement on the subject. 22 we

sure "status difference" it has been signed positively. Figure 2 represents a status difference score for four candidates.

²¹ Samuel J. Eldersveld's finding that a considerable proportion of the party activists he studied claimed they generated their own political careers suggests that the relationship between recruiter and recruitee is not a neat asymmetrical one. See Eldersveld, op. cit., p. 128. However, the assumption that candidate recruitment, even in a parliamentary system with disciplined parties, is left largely to the local party organizations is based upon a study of legislative behavior in a Canadian House of Commons. See Allan Kornberg, Canadian Legislative Behavior; A Study of the 25th Parliament (New York: Holt, Rinehart and Winston, 1967), pp. 63-66. See, also, R.M. Dawson and Norman Ward, The Government of Canada, 4th ed., (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1963), pp. 480-486. Ranney's investigations in Great Britain and Valen's research in Norway also point to the important role local party organizations play in the process of candidate recruitment.

²² Both our willingness to accept this ideological continuum and the less-than-complete consensus among observers can be understood by considering the observations of various experts. Some of these follow:

Parliamentary scholar R.M. Dawson has written that historically there have always been differences between Conservatives and Liberals (e.g., "The Conservatives have been the party of

are willing to assume the four Canadian parties currently can be arrayed along a right-left ideological continuum ranging from the Social

free enterprise while the Liberals have taken the lead in public ownership and social legislation"). See R.M. Dawson, The Government of Canada (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1948), p. 506. Data from an empirical study of the 25th Parliament tend to support this point of view. See Allan Kornberg, "Caucus and Cohesion in Canadian Parliamentary Parties," this Review, 60 (1966), 83-92, Also, Robert Alford has described the New Democratic party as a "Social-Democratic-Left" party; the Liberals as a "Center-Left" party; the Conservatives as a "Conservative-Right" party; and the Social Credit party as a "Reactionary-Right" party. See Robert Alford, Party and Society (Chicago: Rand McNally, 1963), p. 13. Somewhat differently, Gad Horowitz sees the Conservatives as the party of the right, the NDP as the left, and the Liberals as the "classless" center party. Further, the electoral success of the Liberals, their "refusal to appear as a class party forces both right and left to mitigate their class appeals and to become themselves, in a sense, centre parties." See Gad Horowitz, "Conservatism, Liberalism and Socialism in Canada; An Interpretation," in Hugh G. Thorburn (ed.), Party Politics in Canada, 2nd ed., (Scarborough: Prentice-Hall of Canada, 1967), pp. 55-74.

On the other hand (and despite the fact that a series of Liberal Administrations have passed most of the social welfare legislation Canadians enjoy) sociologist John Porter has argued there are few, if any, basic differences between the Liberals and Conservatives: both espouse the same conservative values; both parties are oriented toward business; and both perform essentially brokerage functions. See John Porter, The Vertical Mosaic: An Analysis of Social Class and Power in Canada (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1965), pp. 373-379.

As for the two minor parties, the Social Credit and the CCF, both grew out of the short-lived Progressive party. See William L. Morton, The Progressive Party in Canada (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1950). The Social Credit party began as a radical, rural, fundamentalist movement that was pledged to implement extremely unorthodox financial policies. See John Irving, The Social Credit Movement in Alberta (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1959). Over time, electoral success at the provincial level and the quest for respectability seemingly have caused the Western wing of the party to abandon the financial panaceas and radical ideology advocated during the 30's. The Alberta and British Columbia contingent appears to have moved from a popuCredit, through the Conservative and Liberal parties, to the NDP (formerly, the CCF).

list almost neo-fascist party, to a solidly conservative one. In fact, both former national leader Robert Thompson and Mr. Ernest Manning, long-time Premier of Alberta, a number of times have called upon Conservative party supporters to join with their party in a truly conservative coalition against socialist (i.e., Liberal and NDP) forces in Canada. See Mr. Manning's recent book Political Realignment: A Challenge to Thoughtful Canadians (Toronto: McClelland and Stewart Limited, 1967). Mr. Thompson, perhaps because few Conservatives were joining him in the Social Credit party, recently left Social Credit, joined the Conservatives, and won the Conservative nomination for Red Deer, Alberta, in the June, 1968, national election. Spectacular defections such as those by Messrs. Thompson and Olson have seriously undermined Social Credit's claim to be a national party. Certainly, the nomination of candidates in less than a hundred constituencies in the 1968 election suggests that such defections have a deletorious effect on candidate recruitment.

The initial intention of the CCF was to eradicate capitalism in Canada and to replace it with a socialist society. In 1961, the party's close ties with organized labor were formalized in a union from which emerged the New Democratic Party. The CCF-NDP also appears to have lost some of its ideological militancy. The desire for electoral success and, relatedly, the necessity of broadening the base of its middle class support, seemingly, have turned the CCF-NDP from a party advocating a full-blown socialist ideology to a leftist party of moderate reform. See Leo Zakuta, A Protest Movement Becalmed: A Study of Change in the CCF (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1964).

A kind of ideolological convergence seemingly has taken place on the Canadian left. The Liberals, supposedly, under pressure from the CCF-NDP, have moved left while the CCF-NDP, in turn, appears to have moved somewhat to the right. That the Liberal party's drift to the left has not been unopposed, however, is suggested by the recent struggle in the Liberal Cabinet and caucus between the supporters of Messrs. Sharp (the right) and Gordon (the left). In our view, however, the NDP still must be regarded as the party of the left, while the Liberals may be best described as a left-center party.

On the other half of the continuum at least the Western wing of Social Credit has moved from a radical conservative to a traditional conservative position. Still, they are certainly to the right of the Conservatives since the latter party moved somewhat to the left (e.g., they passed legislation

TABLE 1. RELATIONSHIPS BETWEEN OCCUPATIONAL STATUS^a AND RIGHT-LEFT PARTY AFFILIATION
FOR PARTY ACTIVISTS IN LOS ANGELES AND DETROIT AND CANDIDATES FOR THE
BRITISH HOUSE OF COMMONS AND THE NORWEGIAN STORTING

For .	Occupational Status X Right-Left Party Affiliation	For	Occupational Status > Right-Left Party Affiliation		
L. A. Party Acti-		British Candidates for			
vists Detroit Party	$Gamma^b = .47$	Parliament Norwegian Candidates	Gamma = .62		
Activists	Gamma = .53	for Storting	Gamma = .64		

^a The data are derived from: Marvick and Nixon, op. cit., p. 205, Table 8, "Men Only"; Eldersveld, op. cit., p. 52, Table 3.1; Ranney, op. cit., p. 204, Table 7.7 and Valen, p. 141, Table 9. For the American and British studies, we dichotomized occupations into "high" and "low" status. The former include business proprietors, corporate executives and professionals such as lawyers. All others are classified as low status. The data on Norwegian occupations are trichotomized into "high" (i.e., business proprietors, professionals), "medium," (i.e., salaried employees, public and private, farmers and fishermen) and "low" (i.e., manual workers). The candidates of the Christian and Center parties are not included since, in our view, these appeared to be more pressure groups than parties.

^b This is a non-parametric statistic proposed by Leo A. Goodman and William H. Kruskal, "Measures of Association for Cross-Classification," *Journal of the American Statistical Association*, 49 (1954), 732-764.

II. FINDINGS

An overview. As has been indicated, a particularly intriguing aspect of the Eldersveld, Marvick and Nixon, Ranney, and Valen studies is that in all four, the average occupational status levels of parties' recruits vary with party position on an ideological continuum. Thus, all four studies show a rather impressive relationship between occupational status and right-left party postion. (See Table 1).

Our data, however, indicate that over a twenty year period, the Liberals, the party of the left-center, have presented the Canadian public with the most prestigious (as measured by their SES scores) candidates for the House of Commons. They also indicate that over time all parties have managed to recruit candidates of increasingly higher status. Interestingly the SES scores of Social Creditors rose fairly sharply in 1958, the election year in which, because of the unprecedented Conservative victory, they failed to elect a single candidate. An even sharper increase in the SES scores of CCF-NDP candidates occured in 1962, the year after the CCF formally joined with organized labor

which increased farm subsidies and extended benefits paid to old-age pensioners) during the tenure of their recently deposed leader, Mr. John Diefenbaker. Thus, the Social Credit still can be regarded as the Canadian party of the right while the Conservatives can be best described as a center-right party.

to become the New Democratic Party. (See Table 2).

In order to make a more direct comparison with Ranney's data, which included only non-incumbent candidates from 1951-64, for the two major Canadian parties, we isolated losing from winning candidates for the period 1949-64. The occupations of Ranney's subjects were then scored by using the Duncan system. Analysis indicated that: unsuccessful Canadian Conservative party candidates had higher status scores than Liberal losers;²³ unsuccessful candidates of the two major Canadian parties on the whole, enjoyed more prestigious occupations than their counterparts in Great Britain. (See Table 3).

In part, this difference in the prestige scores of the candidates for the British and Canadian House of Commons can be explained by the larger proportion of lawyer-candidates in Canada²⁴ and the fact that lawyers receive a very

²³ However, the status of Canadian candidates still did not vary with their right-left ideological positions since the losing right-wing Social Creditors had mean status scores which were considerably lower than both the unsuccessful Conservatives and Liberals.

²⁴ For the period 1945-65, 28.5% of the candidates of the two major Canadian parties were lawyers. In comparison, Ranney found that 15% of the candidates of the Labor and Conservative parties were lawyers (i.e., barristers and solici-

TABLE 2. SOCIO-ECONOMIC STATUS OF CANDIDATES FOR THE CANADIAN HOUSE OF COMMONS 1945-65, BY RIGET-LEFT PARTY AFFILIATION

Election Year		Parties									
	Social (Credit*	Conservative		Libe	Liberal		CCF-NDP			
	X SES	N =	\overline{X} SES	N =	\overline{X} SES	N =	\overline{X} SES	N =			
1945	46.0	57	52.2	115	61.5	142	47.1	113			
1949	46.1	48	65.6	146	68.4	154	47.1	104			
1953	48.5	42	63.9	156	67.0	165	47.1	103			
1957	49.4	76	66.3	163	70.1	165	49.8	99			
1958	55.4	55	68.5	165	67.7	165	45.0	103			
1962	54.3	152	67.4	165	68.0	164	57.5	133			
1963	56.2	143	62.8	165	69.4	165	55.9	144			
1965	54.0	112	68.6	165	73.8	165	56.9	159			
X SES				`							
1945-65	52.6	685	64.9	1240	68.3	1285	51.6	958			

^{*} Social Credit includes individuals who ran as Ralliement des Creditistes in 1965.

high ranking (93) on the Duncan scale. The high incidence of lawyers in the legislatures of most Western countries usually has been explained in terms of the congruence between politics and law. In Canada, lawyers also would seem to be attractive candidates since the proportion of a party's winners who are lawyers normally exceeds the proportion of its lawyer-candidates. However, one Canadian scholar

tors). Ranney's data support the findings of an earlier study of incumbent British MP's by Barrington and Finer. See H.E. Barrington and S. E. Finer, "The British House of Commons," in Jean Meynaud (ed.), "The Parliamentary Profession," *International Social Science Journal*, 13 (1961), 601-605.

²⁶ See Kornberg, op. cit., p. 44. Dawson and Ward have estimated that approximately a third of the members of the several Canadian Parliaments have been lawyers. See R. M. Dawson and N. Ward, *The Government of Canada*, 4th ed. (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1964), p. 346. Their estimate is supported by data gen-

has gone beyond the congruence-attractiveness thesis and claimed that lawyers serve as a kind of Canadian surrogate for a ruling class.²⁶

erated by Roman R. March in his longitudinal study of the characteristics of Canadian Parliamentarians. See Roman R. March, "An Empirical Test of M. Ostrogorski's Theory of Political Evolution in a British Parliamentary System," (Unpublished doctoral dissertation, Indiana University, 1967).

²⁵ Alexander Brady, "Canada and the Model of Westminister," in William B. Hamilton (ed.), The Transfer of Institutions (Durham, N.C.: Duke University Press, 1964), pp. 59-80. Brady argues, "In the absence of anything like the modern British governing class, the legal profession in both the French and English sections of the country is a partial substitute. From the birth of the federation the role of lawyers in the national Parliament has been conspicuously more important than at Westminister." (p. 74)

However, in his intensive analysis of the distribution of power in Canadian society, John Porter

TABLE 3. A COMPARISON OF THE SES SCORES OF NON-INCUMBENT BRITISH CANDIDATES, 1951-64, WITH UNSUCCESSFUL CANADIAN CANDIDATES, 1949-64 (MAJOR PARTIES ONLY).

Period	Great B	ritain	Period	Canada		
	Conservative \overline{X} SES	Labor X SES		Conservative \overline{X} SES	Liberal \overline{X} SES	
1951–64	63.9 (N = 1311)	55.3 (N = 1431)	1949-64	66.6 $(N = 596)$	63.5 $(N = 499)$	

TABLE 4. A	COMPARISON	OF THE	SES SCORES	OF FRENCH	AND CANADIAN
	PARLIAMENT	TARIANS	FOR THE PE	RIOD 1945-	58.

	Fr	ench Deputies, 1945-5	ĭ8ª	
Far Right	Right	Left-Center	Left	Far Left
Poujadist Unclassified	Moderate, Independent Gaullist	MRP & Radical	Socialist	Communist
₹ SES	\overline{X} SES	\overline{X} SES	\overline{X} SES	\overline{X} SES
62.8 (N = 85)	61.2 $(N = 243)$	63.0 (N = 340)	62.6 (N = 198)	38.3 ($N = 246$)
	Co	ınadian MP's, 1945-	58	
Far Right	Right	Left-Center	Left	Far Left
Social Credit	Conservative	Liberal	NDP	
X SES	X SES	\overline{X} SES	\overline{X} SES	
46.4 (N = 29)	66.3 (N = 282)	72.1 (N=415)	45.6 (N = 69)	

^a Data are derived from Mattei Dogan, "French Deputies 1870-1958," in Dwaine Marvick (ed.), *Political Decision-Makers: Recruitment and Performance* (Glencoe: The Fress Press, 1961), p. 67, Table 3.

Another interesting comparison we were able to make with the use of the Duncan scores was between members of the French Chamber of Deputies, 1945–58, and Canadian Members of Parliament for the same period. One is struck by the remarkably similar status, except for the Communist Deputies, ²⁷ of all French parliamentarians, regardless of party. A second inter-

claims there is an effective Canadian ruling class—the members of the Canadian corporate elite. They have not (generally) bothered to make their way in national politics but have preferred to govern through the political elite. Most frequently the lawyers in the corporate elite have provided the link between the corporate and political worlds. They are the most likely to have overt political affiliations, to hold elected or appointed public office, and to hold top offices in the national and provincial party organizations. See Porter, op. cit., pp. 296–298.

27 Although, as has been indicated, Valen found that the occupational status of candidates for Parliament varied with the right-left positions of Norwegian parties, he also found by far the largest proportion of low status blue collar workers among Communist candidates.

esting finding is the very substantial difference between the status of French Socialist and Canadian New Democratic MP's. At the other end of the political continuum, the "far right" in France apparently has been able to recruit and to elect candidates of a higher occupational status than has the Canadian Social Credit party. 28 On the other hand, the Canadian "center" parties, particularly, the Liberal, compare very favorably with their French counterparts (See Table 4).

It would appear, then, that in a gross sense, the occupational status of Canadian MP's does not vary with the ideological position of their parties but, rather, with how successful the parties have been in national elections. Thus, the Liberal party, which over a twenty-year period has managed to capture 48% of the seats in the House of Commons, also has recruited

²⁸ It could be argued that a comparison between the French "far right" and the Social Credit party is not a particularly appropriate one. It should be noted, however, that the Poujadist element of the French far right and the Quebec Creditistes were both "protest" movements and drew support from relatively similar social groups within their respective electorates.

Table 5. candidates' mean ses scores by order of finish in national elections $1945-65^{\rm a}$

	Position of Candidates in Electoral Contests									
Election Years First Place		Second Place	Third Place	Fourth Place						
-	\overline{X} SES $N =$	\overline{X} SES $N =$	\overline{X} SES $N =$	\overline{X} SES $N =$						
1945-49	65.6 (300)	56.4 (293)	48.3 (241)	47.1 (45)						
1953-57-58	67.6 (495)	64.7 (493)	50.9 (329)	50.6 (140)						
1962-63-65	66.8 (495)	65.8 (495)	61.1 (486)	54.3 (356)						
All, 1945–65	66.8 (1290)	63.2 (1281)	55.0 (1056)	52.8 (541)						

In their present form, these data, from which inferences are drawn as to the relationship between party, candidate status, and order of finish are subject, of course, to the now familiar effects generated by "ecological" correlation.

candidates with the highest SES scores. The Conservative candidates have ranked second to the Liberals, both in status and in terms of the proportion of seats (37%) they have won during that time. Finally, the candidates of the two minor parties, who together over the twenty years have been able to capture only 13% of the House seats, also trailed major party candidates in occupational status by approximately 15 SES points. The best way of illustrating the apparent relationship between the status of a party's recruits and its competitive position would be to show the mean status of all its winning, second, third, and fourth place candidates. Unfortunately, we do not have these data and are confined to merely suggesting the relationship through the table below. Over the years, the two minor parties generally have finished in third or fourth place and the data show that mean status scores vary directly with the order of candidate finish. The dramatic increase in the number of third and fourth place candidates also implies that the electoral ac-

tivity of the minor parties has grown appreciably in the post-war period (See Table 5).

Urbanism, Candidate Numbers and Candidate Status. A cross-tabulation of the relative urbanism of constituencies by the SES of candidates running for office in them indicates that over a twenty-year period the status of candidates has varied directly with the urban nature of the districts they hope to represent (See Table 6).

Table 6 can be interpreted in two ways. First, the data, in part, may reflect the fact that the Canadian population has become more homogeneous over the years. That is, essentially rural areas have become more urban as people leave farming, move into towns and cities, and take up non-farming occupations. Thus, the largest differences in the status of candidates occurred in the 34–66% urban category, wherein we would expect such a transition to have occurred most rapidly. A second and related interpretation of these data is that urbanindustrialized communities are likely to contain larger proportions of individuals with high

TABLE 6. CANDIDATES' SES SCORES BY THE RELATIVE URBANISM OF CONSTITUENCIES

Election Years			Relative Urb	anism (in %)		
	0-	33	34-	-66	67–99	
	\overline{X} SES	N =	\overline{X} SES	N =	\overline{X} SES	N =
1945•–49	51.1	(405)	53.5	(171)	66.3	(303)
1952-57-58	54.4	(630)	61.1	(285)	67.6	(542)
1962-63-65	55.5	(716)	64.7	(380)	68.4	(736)
1945-65	54.1	(1751)	62.2	(836)	67.7	(1581)

a It should be noted that the urban measure for the 1945 election is based on 1951 census data.

TABLE 7. MEAN SES OF CANDIDATES BY NUMBER OF CANDIDATES IN A CONTEST

Election Years	2 Can	didate	Races	3	3 Candidate Races			4 Candidate Races				
	\overline{X} SES 1	\overline{X} SES 2	N =	SES 1	$ar{X}$ SES	\overline{X} SES	N =	\overline{X} SES 1	$rac{\overline{X}}{ ext{SES}}$	\overline{X} _SES 3	\overline{X} SES 4	<i>N</i> =
1945	73.7	45.5	(24)	60.2	52.2	48.1	(85)	56.7	47.4	38.6	51.4	(30)
1949	68.2	56.0	(28)	70.0	63.2	51.6	(111)	54.5	60.7	44.2	38.5	(15)
1953	76.6	63.3	(59)	66.8	61.1	48.5	(73)	56.1	52.6	50.3	50.6	(32)
1957	76.0	.71.5	(55)	65.8	66.4	50.1	(44)	59.4	63.2	55.5	50.0	(65)
1958	71.5	66.2	(50)	66.9	69.5	48.9	(72)	65.0	63.6	52.7	51.6	(43)
1962	(only 9-	2	62.0	67.9	67.3	(40)	65.4	66.0	60.9	52.2	(122)
1963	cand	lidate r	aces	64.7	59.9	56.1	(33)	65.9	64.6	59.6	55.7	(127)
1965	during	g these	years	73.6	68.3	62.5	(57)	67.7	65.9	61.6	55.1	(107)
1945-65	73.9	63.5	(225)	66.6	63.1	52.9	(515)	63.9	63.2	57.1	52.8	(541)

status occupations than are found in rural areas. Since there is a larger pool of high status people from which the parties may draw, we find a positive relationship between relative urbanism and mean candidate status.

Given this relationship, we would expect that candidates for the House of Commons from Ontario constituencies would be a more prestigious group than candidates from other provinces, because Ontario always has been the most urbanized and industrialized province in Canada. This is not the case, however. The data show that Quebec rather than Ontario candidates have the highest average prestige scores. This was true for both winning (75.2 vs. 69.4) and non-winning candidates (63.8 vs. 58.1). We interpret these data as supporting the claim by John Porter regarding the elitist character of Quebec society; a rigid system of social stratification reinforced by an archaic "classical" educational system has had the effect of limiting the political participation of non-elite groups largely to voting. High public and party office positions have been virtually monopolized by a small socio-economic elite who periodically have employed the supposed threat to existing cultural arrangements both to justify and to maintain their dominant position in Quebec society.29

²⁹ See Porter, op. cit., pp. 91-96. See, also, J.A.A. Lovink, "The Politics of Quebec: Provincial Political Parties, 1897-1936," (Unpublished doctoral dissertation, Duke University, 1967). The Creditiste successes in Quebec, particularly in 1962, have been interpreted as a protest against the traditional elite domination of both the Liberal and Conservative parties. See, for example, Hubert Guindon, "Social Unrest,

A more difficult relationship to explain, in the sense that it is not as consistent as that between urbanism and candidate status, is the association between the number of candidates contesting a district and their mean occupational status. Table 7 shows that at certain time periods an increase in the number of candidates contesting a seat was associated with lower SES scores, not only for the third and fourth finishers, but also, for the first and second. An immediate interpretation that is suggested is high status candidates are reluctant to contest districts in which, because there are likely to be more than two candidates in the race, the outcome may be less certain. The problem with such an interpretation is that in the elections of the sixties, the relationship between status and candidate numbers, generally, is attenuated or reversed. We have suggested another interpretation in the multivariate portion of the analy-

To recapitulate, we scored the occupations of over 4000 candidates for the Canadian House of Commons during a twenty year period. The scores take into account the income, education and prestige ascribed to the occupations of individuals and provide a single convenient measure of their occupational socio-economic status. By similarly scoring the occupations of non-incumbent candidates for the British House of Commons, 1951–64, and members of the French Chamber of Deputies, 1945–58, we found that the SES scores of candidates recruited by the two major Canadian parties were even higher than the scores of the candidates of British and French parties with whom

Social Class and Quebec's Bureaucratic Revolution," Queen's Quarterly, 71 (1964), 150-162.

they were compared. With respect to the hypotheses we were testing, examination of the relevant data indicated that the mean status of candidates recruited by the four Canadian parties seemingly did not vary with party position on a right-left ideological continuum. One can speculate that this finding simply reflects a lack of class-based politics in Canada. Both Robert Alford and John Porter have noted the ability of Canadian parties to transform economic and class cleavages into ethnic-religious ones. The result, according to Alford, is that there is less class voting in Canada than in Britain, Australia, or even the U.S.³⁰ This situation may be changing, however.³¹

There was a relationship between the status of a party's candidates and its competitive position vis a vis the other parties. In a gross sense this was illustrated by the fact that over the years the most successful Canadian party, the Liberal, has managed to recruit the most prestigious candidates for Parliament. The candidates of the second major party, the Conservative, have ranked somewhat behind the Liberals in terms of status, but still have been drawn from higher strata than have the candidates of the two minor parties, the Social Credit and the New Democratic. Over the years, the latter two parties have enjoyed approximately the same amount of electoral support and have recruited candidates with virtually the same status.

Finally, the data also have shown that the relative urbanism of the several constituencies and, to a lesser extent, the number of candidates in a particular contest, were associated with differences in the mean SES scores of candidates.

III. AN INTER-ELECTION MODEL

Our next task is to suggest how these variables (other than the right-left ideological positions of the parties) are associated in the recruitment process. To accomplish this we focus

³⁰ See Robert R. Alford, op. cit., pp. 250-286.

³¹ A 1965 survey of four metropolitan areas showed that people voting Conservative tend to follow religious lines, whereas NDP voters follow class lines. Liberal voters appear to be crosspressured, with some following class and others religious lines. Further, religious affiliation would seem to be a more important determinant of voting preference among working class than among middle class voters. See Wallace Gagne and Peter Regenstreif, "Some Aspects of New Democratic Party Urban Support in 1965," Canadian Journal of Economics and Political Science, 23 (1967), 529–550.

on inter-election relationships in a pair of elections in which one election directly follows another. Within the pair of elections we conceive of a rough causal ordering of variables. At the beginning of the recruitment process for the second election, we assume the values of the variables for the first election are known and uninfluenced by subsequent events. Further, we assume the urbanism of a constituency is established by forces outside of or too ponderous to be influenced by the election-to-election recruitment process. We further assume that the outcome of the recruitment process for the second election is represented by three variables: the mean status of candidates in a district; the status difference of candidates in a district; and the number of candidates standing in a district. Because decisions and successes in the recruitment process are thought to be dependent on prior decisions and successes, we assume the value of these outcome variables are, in part, a function of variables pertaining to the prior election. Finally, we assume that the degree of inter-party competition in the second election is that which the recruitment process aims to affect. Consequently, we hold this variable to be subsequent to both the events of the first election and to the recruitment process for the second. Within a pair of elections, then, we assume a causal ordering as in Figure 3.

To begin the construction of such a model, we assume each of the outcome variables may be predicted from a linear function of the initial variable. The parameter of such a linear function may be estimated by the usual least squares technique. We then assume the competitiveness of the outcome of the second election is a linear function of both the initial variables and the outcome variables from the recruitment process.

Although candidate recruitment in each of the several constituencies is intended to influence the outcome of a particular electoral contest, the process also may be affected by the total environment in which the election takesplace; local affairs are rarely insulated fromnational affairs. For example, in an election in which the national outcome is considered certain, candidate recruitment in some constituencies may take on an aspect of experimentation or of providing campaign experience for highly regarded prospects. In such an election the aim of recruitment may be less that of immediate success and more one of long-run party maintenance. Conversely, in a tense election with a doubtful national outcome, the possibility of immediate electoral success may lead the parties to be cautious and conservative in their recruitment practices. Because of the potential




FIG. 3. CAUSAL ORDERING OF VARIABLES IN AN INTER-ELECTION MODEL.

sensitiveness of the recruitment process at the local level to the national political milieu, we have chosen to investigate our model in two pairs of elections; one a safe sustaining pair, the other, two see-saw contests.

The Elections of 1949-53 and 1962-63. In 1949 the Liberal party won a smashing victory at the polls. Although it captured only 49% of the popular vote, it obtained 74% of the seats in the House of Commons, to maintain what, apparently, was an endless hegemony. In 1953, the distribution of the vote was such that, although the Liberal party again captured 49% of the vote, its proportion of seats declined to 64%. The latter election still may be seen as one which comfortably sustained a dominant party in office.

The environment in which the 1962-63 elections took place was drastically different. The Social Credit party, which had lost every member of its parliamentary group on the Conservative landslide of 1958, won thirty seats in 1962 and promised to do even better in 1963. A resurgent New Democratic Party, which by 1962 had come under the dynamic leadership of Mr. T.C. Douglas, posed a threat not only to the Liberals in the urban areas which had long sustained that party, but also to the Conservatives

in the rural constituencies of the West. Although most "responsible" public opinion leaders, including some in his own party, were deeply disturbed by Conservative party leader John Diefenbaker's thinly veiled anti-Americanism, it was apparent from public response to his efforts that he had seized upon an emotional issue which well might return him to office. The Liberals, on the other hand, were hopeful that the continued internecine warfare in the Conservative party and the (supposedly) related loss of public confidence in the Conservative party would be sufficient to bring them back into office after six years in opposition. The 1963 election, then, was a tense contest with a doubtful outcome. The differential impact on candidate recruitment of a safe sustaining pair of elections and two see-saw contests is vividly illustrated in these two pairs of elections.

Let us, then, consider the relationship between outcome variables and initial-state variables. Table 8 presents values of the standardized regression coefficient (B) for each equation in each election. The table also presents standard errors of the coefficients as well as the multiple correlation for the equation. Thus, the first two rows of this table present values for the equations to predict mean status of candi-

TABLE 8. PARAMETERS FOR THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN INITIAL STATE VARIABLES AND VARIABLES WHICH ARE OUTCOMES OF THE RECRUITMENT PROCESS.

Dependent Variable and Elections	Independent Variables										
	$ar{X}$ SES 1		Δ SES 1		CAND 1		Comp 1		Urb. 2		Multiple
	В	SE B	В	SE B	В	SE B	В	SÉ B	В	· SE B	R
Ā SES 2										7	· · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · ·
1949-53	.454	.073	.221	.071	075	.069	120	.071	.058	.075	.598
1962-63	.588	.064	. 185	.059	039	.067	001	.056	.186	.070	.726
SES 2									,		
1949-53	.305	.084	.233	.082	.085	.079	033	.082	101	.087	.384
1962-63	.174	.081	.459	.074	173	.084	054	.070	.011	.088	.496
CAND 2											
1949-53	263	.074	070	.073	.211	.070	.317	.072	.280	.077	615
1962-63	030	.081	.094	.074	.319	.085	.246	.071	.108	.089	.495

dates in the second of each pair of elections. In both pairs of elections the multiple correlation coefficient is respectably high, with the association being greater for the 1962-63 electionsperhaps because of the shorter interval in that pair of elections. One would expect fewer unmeasured inter-election circumstances to develop that would diminish the association between prior and present variables. Thus, the higher multiple correlation for the 1962-63 pair of elections is as expected. This interpretation is strengthened by noting that the Beta value for mean status in Time one is considerably higher in the 1962-63 pair of elections than in the 1949-53 elections. Thus, the inter-election persistence of the mean status of candidates is higher in 1962-63 than in 1949-53. Although the shorter interim seems the most likely explanation of this greater persistence, it may be that its strength also is enhanced by the uncertain outcome of the 1963 election. A conservative approach to the recruitment process might lead the party organizations to offer as candidates in the second election many of the same individuals as were candidates in the first, on the assumption that their past experience would have made them more visible and "electable." The higher Beta for urbanization in the 1962-63 pair of elections appears to be an election-specific effect. The previously mentioned resurgence of the New Democratic Party in urban areas and their ability, since 1962, to recruit higher status candidates (see Table 2) may have led one or more of the other parties in such areas to try to increase their competitive positions by also recruiting higher status candidates, thus raising the mean in urban constituencies.

A greater opportunity for experimentation in the 1949-53 interval is suggested by the somewhat higher Beta values for Time one competition and status differences among candidates. Thus, in the 1949-53 interval, greater Time one competition tended to diminish Time two mean status while greater status differences among candidates in Time one tended to increase mean status in Time two.

Our interpretation of these data is that in 1953 the minor parties tended to enter candidates in constituencies that were competitive in 1949 and tried to avoid entering candidates in constituencies in which the outcome appeared certain to go against them. Such minor party candidates were likely to be individuals of lower status than the candidates of the major parties. Hence, in such constituencies the average status of candidates would be lower in 1953.

On the other hand, the major parties might be encouraged to enter very high status individuals in 1953 in constituencies where, in the last election, there was an obvious status difference among candidates, so as to take greater advantage of this difference. This also would increase the mean. A second and related interpretation is that in 1949, the minor parties probably were reluctant to contest constituencies in which the major parties' candidates were prestigious people, but, if they did, there was likely to be a "status gap" between their candidates and those of the major parties. If these minor party candidates ran poorly in 1949, they, or their constituency parties, may have been unwilling to try again in 1953, thereby reducing the status gap and raising the average status.

We already have pointed out that the outcome of the 1953 election was never in doubt and that this probably encouraged some experimentation with respect to recruitment. We can speculate that parties that had done poorly in certain constituencies had nothing to lose and considerable to gain by: dropping their chronic losing candidates in favor of new and (hopefully) more successful ones; allocating their resources parsimoniously by not contesting districts that appeared hopeless.³²

A dominant national party such as the Liberals also would be likely to feel fewer constraints in this environment. Since it had done well in the past and promised to do even better nationally in 1953, it may have contested constituencies in which it had not entered candidates previously on the assumption that now it might very well be successful.³³ Alternatively, the Liberals may have wished to test the mettle of new but promising recruits in these constituencies. If they did reasonably well, they would have established their claim to serious consideration as future candidates in more congenial districts (to the party) either at the national or provincial level.³⁴

³² In fact, the CCF-NDP entered one candidate less in 1953 than it had in 1949, while the Social Credit party contested six fewer sample constituencies in 1953.

³³ In 1953, the Liberals increased the number of their 1949 candidates by 11. The Conservatives increased their 1949 total of candidates by 10 in ▶ 1953.

³⁴ That this strategy is likely to be employed by parties is suggested by Ranney's study of the recruitment of British MP's. Ranney arrayed British constituencies along a "Winability" continuum and found that previous electoral experience was significantly related to the desirability of the constituencies in which non-incumbents stood. Austin Ranney, op. cit., p. 94. Further, Lec Snowiss reports that in the suburban townships in

Even if they had no real hope of improving their competitive positions, the Liberals and, particularly, the Conservatives, probably had to try to recruit prestigious individuals to contest non-competitive districts in 1953 simply because they felt their images and competitive positions as national parties would suffer if they did not "show the flag" in most constituencies. Although they may have been disadvantaged in these areas, they probably possessed the resources at other levels of government necessary to induce high status, politically ambitious young men to contest apparently hopeless seats.³⁵

Moving to the second panel of Table 8 we note that status difference is not as well predicted in the 1949-53 elections as it is in the 1962-63 pair. The appreciably higher Beta value for ΔSES₁ in the 1962-63 pair of elections is consonant with our interpretation of greater persistence in a shorter time period while the higher positive Beta for \overline{X} SES₁ and Δ SES₂ in 1949-53 strengthens our belief that the 1953 election afforded the parties an opportunity to experiment in their candidate recruitment. As was suggested above, the major parties (especially the Liberals since they appeared to be certain winners) were able to recruit high status people, even in constituencies in which previously they had not done well. This would have had the effect of increasing status differences in 1953. On the other hand, in 1963 they may have had greater difficulty inducing high status candidates to enter contests since the election outcome was uncertain and status less indicative of an opponent's potential strength. Consequently, the 1962-63 correlation is lower.

An election-specific event, the resurgence of the minor parties in the sixties and their ability to recruit higher status candidates, seemingly

which there was no prospect of winning, the Chicago Democratic organization recruited Congressional candidates from among ambitious young lawyers seeking to establish themselves politically and professionally. Here they might be groomed for future more important (i.e., local) public office. See Snowiss, op. cit., pp. 633-635.

as Canadian party organizations have considerable patronage at their disposal if they hold executive office at either the national or provincial mevels. Lawyers, in particular, are likely to benefit by being given substantial legal work by national and/or provincial Administrations. In Chicago, Snowiss reports that the considerable patronage available to the Democratic machine undoubtedly enabled them to recruit candidates and workers in areas in which the party was weak. See Snowiss, bid., pp. 627-639.

is reflected in the fairly high and negative Beta for $CAND_1$ and ΔSES_2 in 1962–63. The negative Beta tells us that increasing the number of candidates in 1962 tended to decrease status differences in 1963. As Table 2 indicates, the Social Credit party ran 97 more candidates and the New Democratic Party 30 more candidates in 1962. These candidates generally were of higher status than these parties heretofore had recruited and, assuming that a substantial number were again candidates in 1963, their addition decreased status differences in 1963.

Moving to the third panel of this table, we find that the number of candidates is better predicted for the 1949-53 elections than for the 1962-63 elections. On the other hand, we find a higher Beta for the number of candidates in Time one in the latter (1962-63) elections, suggesting (as we have argued) that persistence is stronger in a shorter interim. The magnitude of this Beta for 1962-63, however, is somewhat smaller than we would have expected. This fact, plus the lower multiple correlation for these elections again leads us to the interpretation that, in a tight election in which a resurgence of minor party strength is possible, the variables from the immediately past election may be less important in determining the entry of a candidate than are time-sepcific variables unmeasured in our model.

In the 1949–53 elections we find a moderately high Beta for competition in Time one and a somewhat lower but still significant one in 1962-63. Thus, in both 1953 and 1963 there was a greater tendency for parties, particularly the minor ones, to enter candidates in previously competitive districts, although the tendency was less pronounced in 1963. These data also are consistent with out previous finding that increased competition in 1949 depressed average status in 1953 because it encouraged the entry of minor party candidates in certain constituencies. Urbanization is positively related to number of candidates in both elections, with the lower value being in the 1962-63 elections. The latter appears to be yet another electionspecific finding that reflects the increased activity of the Social Credit party in rural areas of Quebec together with the increase in 1963 of opposition to the Conservatives in the rural constituencies of Manitoba, Saskatchewan, and Alberta. Mean status of candidates in Time one is negatively related to the number of candidates in the 1949-53 elections, indicating, as was previously suggested, an unwillingness or inability to recruit new candidates to face competition from high status veteran candidates. That this effect is not apparent in the 1963 election suggests that in such a tense election status may be a less important indicator of a candidate's strength.

Finally, let us turn to the relationship between competition in the second election and the prior variables. Parameters for these relationships are presented in Table 9. For both pairs of elections, the multiple correlation coefficient is fairly high with the value for the 1962-63 elections being somewhat greater. For both pairs of elections, the Beta for competition in Time one is also quite high—again being greater for the 1962-63 pair of elections. Scanning the remaining Beta values for the 1962-63 elections, we find relatively high values for only two independent variables—the number of candidates in Time one and the number in Time two. Candidates in Time one have a positive Beta of .268 and candidates in Time two have a value of -.266. What do these two values, taken together, tell us about the effect of the number of candidates and the change in the number on competition?

TABLE 9. PARAMETERS FOR THE REGRESSION OF COMPETITION IN THE SECOND ELECTION ON PRIOR VARIABLES.

	1949–53		1962-	1962–63	
_	В	SE B	В	SE B	
Δ SES 1	137	.075	+.084	.071	
Δ SES 2	+.055	.072	043	.067	
$\bar{\mathbf{X}}$ SES 1	171	.082	+.057	.083	
$\bar{\mathbf{X}}$ SES 2	+.098	.086	+.011	.084	
Cand 1	+.137	.070	+.268	.063	
Cand 2	259	.079	266	.062	
Comp 1	+.604	.075	+.739	.057	
Multiple R	.609		.744		

The positive value in Time one suggests that, given the Time two number of candidates, the Time one number is positively related to competition. The negative value for Time two says that, given the Time one number of candidates, the Time two number is negatively related to competition. Taken together, they say that a change in the number of candidates is negatively related to competition. That is, an increase in candidates tends to decrease competition in Time two over the value expected from the level of Time one competition. Such a finding is, of course, quite reasonable, Added candidates are not likely to do well and, hence, they reduce competition (as we have

measured it) in the district.

In the 1949-53 elections the Beta value for Time one candidates is lower while the value for Time two candidates is approximately the same as in 1962-63. However, in both pairs of elections the direction of the relationships is the same, indicating that in both instances added candidates did not fare too well.

Finally, for the 1949-53 elections, the mean status of candidates in Time one has a reasonably high and negative Beta value. The Beta value for mean status in Time two is positive and although it is not statistically significant, both correlations taken together at least suggest that in certain districts an increase in the status of candidates in 1953 over what it was in 1949 also led to increased competition therein. The fact that the equivalent correlations are neither significant nor in the same direction in the 1962-63 elections again strengthens our belief that in a tense election in which the national outcome is doubtful, increasing the status of candidates in a district over what it previously was may not produce the desired effect—an increase in partisan competition.

IV. CONCLUSION

In the construction of our inter-election model we have identified a plausible-seeming causal order among the variables available to us and we have investigated the partial relationships of prior with succeeding variables in the model.

We have conceived of the candidate recruitment process as a "black box." Initial-state variables are the input to this black box and our output variables—the mean status of candidates, the number of candidates, and their status difference—are the result of the process. Underlying the model is the assumption that the aim of the process is to select output variables that maximize Time twocompetition in the several constituencies. Given the format of our data, it has been reasonable to use legislative districts as observational units rather than parties within districts. Thus, the logic of the situation which flowed from the format of our data led us to assume anaggregate variable—that is, one at the district level—was the one to be maximized. Such a point of view is useful because, in fact, we might suppose that one party's choice of a candidate is not independent of another's choice. Thus, we are forced to assume that within our black box, a system is in operation in which there is reciprocal interaction. In a future analysis, this reciprocal interaction maybe better investigated by focusing separately on variables for each party's candidate choice within each district.

In the present paper, we also have asserted that differential deviation from the competition-maximizing function of recruitment within the several constituencies can be attributed in great part to the impact of the total electoral environment on recruitment within districts. Thus, we investigated our model in two pairs of elections; one, a sustaining pair in which the second electoral outcome was considered known; the other, a pair in which the second outcome was very doubtful. We further stated that in the former, the object of candidate recruitment in many instances may well be party-maintenance, while in the latter, the outcome of recruitment is intended to be immediate electoral success. However, a complicating factor was the difference in the interelection time gap for each pair of elections we employed. Thus, future investigations will require more analyses of elections with somewhat similar aim-effects but with different time gaps. Assuming, also, that a critical election-specific aim-effect is party maintenance, then, the analysis of a series of more than two elections could be attempted so that decisions whose aims transcend the immediate election might demonstrate their effect.

Again, further attention to measurement of inter-party competition and status difference appears necessary. In other than a multi-party system, for example, Gini measures may not be particularly appropriate.

Finally, it seems likely that we will have to go beyond multiple regression analysis to satisfactorily decompose the recruitment process. Although it is both valuable and important to delineate "net" associations between variables such as, for example, candidate status and inter-party competition, we have seen that this association obviously is mediated by the number of candidates in a contest. Our decomposition of "intervening" variables in this paper largely has been intuitive. The use of a linear causal model of the Simon-Blalock³⁶ or path analysis37 type would appear to be particularly useful in the decomposition of the variables involved in recruitment. Although the problem involved in designing such a model would certainly be complex, the probability of generating some theoretical notions, if not a theory of recruitment, would make the game well worth the candle.

³⁶ For an explication of their technique see Herbert A. Simon, *Models of Man* (New York: John Wiley and Sons, Inc., 1957), chapters I-III; and Hubert M. Blalock, Jr., *Causal Influences in Non-experimental Research* (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1964), chapters I-III.

³⁷ Social scientists were introduced to path analysis by geneticist Sewell Wright in a series of articles dating from the 1920's. See, for example, Sewell Wright, "Correlation and Causation," Journal of Agricultural Research, 20 (1921), 557-585; "The Method of Path Coefficients," Annals of Mathematical Statistics, 5 (1934), 161-215; and "Path Coefficients and Path Regressions: Alternative or Complementary Concepts?" Biometrics, 16 (1960), 189-202.

A NOTE OF CAUTION IN CAUSAL MODELLING

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Many empirical investigations in the behavioral sciences today aim at tracing the causes of variations in some key dependent variable. The search for satisfying causal explanations is difficult because of the complexity of social phenomena, the crudeness of the measures of many important variables, and the prevalence of simultaneous cause and effect relations among variables. Although these difficulties remain, a number of important methodological contributions have clarified the conditions under which causal inferences can be made from non-experimental data. In particular the Simon-Blalock technique has recently gained considerable attention, and has been profitably used by a number of political scientists in their research.2 Examination of some of these applications does, however, reveal the need for a better understanding of the purposes and limitations of the technique.

¹ See Herbert A. Simon, "Causal Ordering and Identifiability," and "Spurious Correlation: A Causal Interpretation," reprinted in *Models of Man* (New York: Wiley, 1957), chs. 1–2; and Paul F. Lazarsfeld, "Evidence and Inference in Social Research," *Daedalus*, 87 (Fall, 1958), 99–130. Blalock's work is reported in Hubert M. Blalock, Jr., Causal Inferences in Nonexperimental Research (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1964).

² Political science applications of causal modelling approaches include Warren E. Miller and Donald E. Stokes, "Constituency Influence in Congress," this Review, 57 (March, 1963), 45-56; Hayward R. Alker, Jr., "Causal Inferences and Political Analysis," in Joseph Bernd (ed.), Mathematical Applications in Political Science (Dallas: Southern Methodist University Press, 1966); and Arthur S. Goldberg, "Discerning a Causal Pattern Among Data on Voting Behavior," this REVIEW, 60 (December, 1966), 913-922. Causal modelling ideas have also been used to clarify the study of power; for example, Herbert A. Simon, "Notes on the Observation and Measurement of Political Power," op. cit., ch. 4; and Robert A. Dahl, "Power," International Encyclopedia of the Social Sciences (Macmillan, 1968), vol. 12, pp. 405-415.

This paper reviews two studies: (1) the reanalysis of the Miller-Stokes data by Chudde and McCrone,3 and (2) the analysis of the determinants of Negro political participation in the South by Matthews and Prothro.4 We shall argue that both these applications have two faults: (1) a failure to distinguish conclusions from assumptions, and (2) an inadequate correspondence between the assumptions made in constructing the mathematical models and our prior knowledge about the phenomena being studied. In addition, we shall use the first study to illustrate a principle of general importance in causal analysis: the investigator should check the possibility that different causal mechanisms occur in different subgroups of his data. And we shall use the second study to illustrate the difficulty of separating the effects of two highly correlated independent variables.

The purpose of these criticisms is not to suggest that causal modelling is an inherently misleading technique. On the contrary, this note should be seen as a defense of the technique against some of its proponents. Causal modelling formalizes and extends the common practice of social scientists in much of their work. Potentially, by making the logic of causal inference clearer and by introducing more powerful procedures, causal modelling can lead to great improvements in data analysis. Misguided applications of the technique, however, not only lend a spurious air of

³ Charles F. Cnudde and Donald J. McCrone, "The Linkage Between Constituency Attitudes and Congressional Voting Behavior: A Causal Model," this Review, 60 (March, 1966), 66-72. More recently the same authors have published an analysis of the causes of democratic political development that suffers from the same faults as their earlier paper. See Donald J. McCrone and Charles F. Cnudde, "Toward a Communications Theory of Democratic Political Development: A Causal Model," this Review, 61 (March, 1967), 72-79.

⁴ Donald R. Matthews and James W. Prothro, Negroes and the New Southern Politics (New York: Harcourt, Brace and World, 1966), ch. 11. certainty to false conclusions; such misapplications can also lead to an unwarranted distrust of the methods which seem to have produced the conclusions.

I. ASSUMPTIONS AND CONCLUSIONS

In any kind of statistical analysis, conclusions about the nature of the world are the result of both the investigator's data and his prior assumptions. A change in assumptions in data analysis may lead to a change in conclusions. For example, a given collection of data may be used to estimate the parameters of many different causal models-models that incorporate different assumptions about the nature of the causal mechanisms that produced the data. The Simon-Blalock technique uses correlation and regression coefficients to test hypotheses about the presence or absence of particular causal links in a given hierarchical model. (Hierarchical models are those in which it is assumed that there is only one-way causation within the whole set of variables being analyzed; simultaneous cause and effect relationships are assumed not to exist, as are feedback loops around several variables.5) The structure of the hierarchical model-including the direction of all possible causal links between variables-must be decided before a test of the existence or nonexistence of any particular link is possible. Given a fair number of variables, a great many different initial assumptions are logically possible, and a large number may often be equally plausible. To choose any one of these possible hierarchical orderings is, in effect, to decide the directions of causal impact among all of the variables. If several initial assumptions about the ordering of the variables are equally plausible, then the Simon-Blalock technique provides no means for deciding between them. Both the applica-

⁵ These models are called "hierarchical" because they assume that all the variables in the analysis can be ordered a priori in a hierarchy of causes and effects. Variables in a model are said to form a causal hierarchy if they can be ranked so that those "higher" in the ranking appear in the equations of the model only as causes, and never as effects, of those variables which are "lower" in the ranking.

6 Moreover it is not true, in general, that we can "infer the most likely [model]" if we "resort to the use of regression coefficients": Cnudde and McCrone, op. cit., p. 68. A given set of data may be used to estimate the parameters of many different models. The basic logic of model building and testing is especially clearly set out in Stefan Valavanis, Econometrics: An Introduction to


tions of causal modelling examined in this paper ignore this important fact.

In their reanalysis of the Miller-Stokes data Cnudde and McCrone fit a hierarchical causal model to a pattern of six correlations and then make a number of inferences about the relationship between Congressmen and their constituents. Their most important conclusions. seemingly disconfirming the results of other research on Congressmen, are (for civil rights issues): "1. The lack of a direct link between Congressmen's attitudes and district attitudes indicates that elite recruitment is not the basis for constituency control. 2. Unlike the private citizen, the Congressmen does not distort his perceptions to coincide with his own attitudes. Because the costs of misperceiving are so high for an elected official, his perceptions are likely to cause him to modify his attitudes to fit his reasonably accurate perceptions.7"

Maximum Likelihood Methods (New York: Mc-Graw-Hill, 1959), ch. 1.

7 Ibid., pp. 71-72. Compare the second proposition with Lewis Anthony Dexter's description of the representative: "A congressman's conception of his district confirms itself, to a considerable extent, and may constitute a sort of selffulfilling prophecy.... A congressman hears most often from those who agree with him. . . . Some men automatically interpret what they hear to support their own viewpoints." See "The Representative and His District," in Robert L. Peabody and Nelson W. Polsby (eds.), New Perspectives on the House of Representatives (Chicago: Rand McNally, 1963), pp. 9f. See also Raymond A. Bauer, Ithiel de Sola Pool, and Lewis Anthony Dexter, American Business and Public Policy (New York: Atherton, 1963), part V. Donald R. Matthews makes the same point with reference to Senators: "Without the most stubborn and conscientious efforts, a senator is almost certain to see and talk mostly with friends and supporters on such a trip [to his constituency]. Since both categories are likely to be in general agreement with him, the image of constituency opinion he brings back to Washington is usually distorted in favor of his own views": Donald R. Matthews, U.S. Senators and Their World (New York: Vintage Books, 1960), p. 229.

The first proposition seems inconsistent with the frequent emphasis on the "localism" of Congressmen; see Samuel P. Huntington, "Congressional Responses to the Twentieth Century," in David B. Truman (ed.), The Congress and America's Future (Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice-Hall, 1965), pp. 5-31, especially Table II, p. 13; also David B. Truman, "Federalism and the Party System," in Arthur W. Macmahon (ed.),



a Data are Miller-Stokes correlations reported in Chudde and McCrone, op. cit., p. 67.

Fig. 1. Intercorrelations of variables pertaining to civil rights—whole district.9

Their report suggests that these conclusions are empirical findings in the ordinary sense: the Miller-Stokes data imply these conclusions and no others (they are said to "emerge" from the analysis of the data). Using the Simon-Blalock technique, however, the second conclusion-about the direction of causation between Congressmen's attitudes and their perceptions of district opinion—can never be more than a (perhaps justified) prior assumption. The first conclusion—about the existence of a causal link between constituency attitudes and Congressmen's attitudes—is contingent upon the assumption that they present as their second conclusion; change the assumption and the opposite conclusion results. In neither case do their manipulations of correlation coefficients constitute empirical tests of their conclusions.

To illustrate this argument, we shall examine three causal models connecting district attitudes with Congressmen's roll call votes. All three models fit the pattern of correlations. Moreover all three models satisfy two additional restrictions: they treat district attitudes as purely an independent variable and they do not require any direct link between district attitudes and roll call votes.

Figure 1 shows the basic pattern of correlations used in this analysis.

Figure 2 shows three different causal models linking district opinion and the votes of Con-

Federalism: Mature and Emergent (Garden City, N.Y.: Doubleday, 1955), pp. 115-136. Even though restricted to the civil rights issue area (in 1958), Cnudde and McCrone's findings, if valid, would be of considerable substantive importance in view of the above literature.

gressmen. Cnudde and McCrone have shown that Model 2(a) fits the data. Model 2(b) also fits: the addition of the link between district opinion and Congressmen's attitudes generates no new prediction equations that distinguish model 2(b) from 2(a). And model 2(c) also fits as Table 1 shows.

How do we choose between these three different models, each of which suggests a different conclusion about the relationship between attitudes and perceptions? It should be apparent that the choice between them must rest (in the absence of additional data) on the investigator's hunch (or assumption) about what causal mechanisms are likely to exist in the real world. The only other imaginable basis for choice is the criterion of parsimony: the fewer the links (or causal paths) in a model, the better. Model 2(a), suggesting that perceptions cause attitudes, might be accepted over 2(b) (which suggests the opposite) since the former contains one less causal link.8 But if we were to take parsimony seriously, then Model 2(c) would seem most acceptable: it has the minimum number of links possible between four variables. Thus this criterion of parsimony leads to the surprising conclusion that there is a correspondence between Congressmen's own attitudes and their perceptions of their district's attitudes only because of their participation in roll call voting. One need not accept this conclusion;

⁸ This seems to be the approach of Cnudde and McCrone; see the reasoning leading to their model III (p. 69) and the comment about parsimony (p. 72).

⁹ Model 2(c) is actually somewhat plausible; it implies that the representative's perceptions of




Fig. 2. Three causal models that fit the intercorrelations of variables pertaining to civil rights.

the criterion of parsimony that leads to it is really irrelevant. There is no reason to believe that parsimony in this sense (a relatively small number of unidirectional causal linkages) is a distinguishing characteristic of valid models of social phenomena.

In this case, then, the choice between the three models is, in itself, a decision about the relationship between the attitudes, perceptions, and votes of Congressmen; it is a decision that is logically prior to looking at the data, and one for which the prescription of parsimony provides no guidance. Similarly it is clear that the first proposition (which suggests that elite recruitment is not relevant to district control of Congressmen) rests on the postulated relationship between attitudes and perceptions. Neither of the assertions made by Cnudde and McCrone are "findings." 11

constituent attitudes have an impact only when mediated by voting in accordance with district opinion, that is, playing the role of agent of the constituency.

¹⁰ In addition, the absence of a direct link between district opinion and Congressmen's attitudes in a single issue area would not seem to be an adequate basis for inferences about "elite recruitment."

11 The three models just discussed are hierarchical models; they force the investigator to decide at the outset, for example, whether attitudes cause perceptions or the other way around. Yet both these alternatives seem excessively strong in the light of research revealing the significant interaction between attitudes and perceptions. Miller and Stokes (op. cit., p. 51) observe: "Out of respect for the processes by which the human actor achieves cognitive congruence we have also drawn arrows between the two intervening factors, since the Congressman probably tends to see his district as having the same opinion as his own and also tends, over time, to bring his own opinion into line with the district's." Lacking adequate theory to justify temporal or psychological

TABLE 1. PREDICTION EQUATIONS AND DEGREE OF FIT FOR MODEL 2(C) OF CONSTITUENCY INFLUENCE^a

Prediction Equations	Predicted	Actual	Differ- ence
rdprprtra = tda	(.738) (.823) (.721)	= .438 .498	.060
rdprpr =rdr	(.738)(.823) = .607	649	.042
rprira = ipa	(.823) (.721) = .493	.543	.050

^a Data are Miller-Stokes correlations reported in Cnudde and McCrone, op. cit., p. 67.

. II. INTERACTION EFFECTS

Applying a single causal model to all the data that an investigator has collected is not always the best way of revealing the structure of the data. To fit a single causal model to a collection of data means, in effect, to assume that the data have been generated by an underlying causal mechanism that is roughly the same for all the units being studied. The structure of the mechanism is represented by the mathematical model, and the data are used to estimate its parameters. But different units can have different causal processes. ¹² In any case, the validity of the mechanism hypothesized for all units in the population is not established by using all the data at once

priority of one variable over another, one will be unable to select between a number of hierarchical models that fit the data.

The assumptions made in a reciprocal model, in contrast to a hierarchical model, allow some variables to be both the cause and effect of each other. Such a model would, in theory at least, help disentangle attitudes and perceptions. Estimation of links in such models is a difficult empirical matter, however. On the problems and requirements in estimating the parameters of reciprocal models, see Valavanis, op. cit., chs. 4 and 6; and J. Johnston, Econometric Methods (New York: McGraw Hill, 1963), ch. 9.

¹² Alker has drawn attention to the importance of this point in inter-nation comparisons. See Hayward R. Alker, Jr., "Regionalism Versus Universalism in Comparing Nations," in Bruce Russett et al., World Handbook of Political and Social Indicators (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1964), pp. 322–340; and also Hubert M. Blalock, Jr., "Theory Building and the Statistical Concept of Interaction," American Sociological Review, 30 (June, 1965), 374–330. In many cases it may be useful to transform the variables to eliminate nonadditive effects. See Joseph B. Kruskal, "Transformations of Data," International Encyclopedia of the Social Sciences (Macmillan, 1968), vol. 16, pp. 182–193.

for a single estimation. Rather the general validity of the model is established by showing that the hypothesized set of relationships holds for various relevant subgroups within the population. This is the familiar notion of controlling for a variable applied to causal modelling; a model ought to be tested within different subgroups of the sample. This method may, indeed, yield interesting results even if a single causal model is inappropriate, since it may be possible to show that different causal processes are operating in different parts of the population. The importance of examining subgroups of the data to establish the wider validity of a causal model is not merely a methodologist's maxim; in this section we shall show the consequences of the failure to test a model among relevant subgroups of the study population.

Miller, in a paper using the Miller-Stokes data on Congressmen, shows that the correlation patterns between district opinion and Congressmen's perceptions, attitudes, and votes vary widely across different types of districts (competitive and noncompetitive) and across three issue areas (social welfare. civil rights, and foreign policy).13 There are, in short, many different types of representation. The model proposed by Cnudde and McCrone would have been more plausible if it had been tested among various subgroups of Congressmen, and in different issue areas—if they had, in effect, controlled for some of the prominent variables suggested by other studies of Congress.

Additional analysis of the Miller-Stokes data sharply illustrates the dangers of accepting a causal model tested only by reference to correlations across the entire sample. Using the data in Miller's paper, we tested the two major propositions for Congressmen from competitive and noncompetitive districts in the civil rights issue area. The basic Cnudde-McCrone model under consideration holds that there is no relationship between district opinion and the attitudes of the Congressmen when preceptions of district opinion by the Congressman are held constant: "...perceptions are likely to cause him [the Congressman] to modify his attitudes to fit his reasonably accurate perceptions."14

¹² Warren E. Miller, "Majority Rule and the Representative System of Government," in Erik Allardt and Yrjo Littunen (eds.), Cleavages, Ideologies, and Party Systems: Contributions to Comparative Political Sociology (Helsinki: Proceedings of the Westermarck Society, 1964), pp. 343–376.

Analysis of the data shows that the model fits for one-party districts but does not fit for competitive districts (Table 2). Furthermore, as we saw earlier, there are many other possible models which would fit the data from one-party districts.¹⁵

TABLE 2. TEST OF THE DISTRICT OPINION—PERCEPTIONS—ATTITUDES MODEL FOR COMPETITIVE AND NONCOMPETITIVE DISTRICTS⁴

Civil Rights	Predicted Correlation		
One-party districts	$\frac{.54}{.78} = .69$	yes	
Competitive districts	$\frac{16}{.23} =70$	no	

^a Data are for majority district opinion from Miller, op. cit., pp. 362-363.

^b The Cnudde-McCrone model implies that $r_{DA} = r_{DP}r_{PA}$. This in turn implies that the ratio r_{DA}/r_{DP} is positive.

III. MULTICOLLINEARITY

In Negroes and the New Southern Politics, Matthews and Prothro propose a causal model to account for variations in Negro political participation. Figure 3 shows the model which leads to the conclusion that:

Community structure... is thus seen to have direct effects on social and economic attributes of individual southern Negroes and on the community political system, but not on Negro attitudes and cogitions or on Negro political participation. Individual socio-economic attributes and the political system have direct effects only on attitudes and cognitions. All effects on political participation are interpreted by Negro attitudes and cognitions. 18


There are two major difficulties in this use of causal modelling that point to more general problems in multivariate analysis. First is a

15 Although Cnudde and McCorne restrict themselves to the civil rights issue area, their hypotheses would, if true, have more general significance. We tested their model for welfare and foreign policy issues in competitive and non-competitive districts (based on the data in Miller, op. cit.). The model failed to fit in all four of these tests.

¹⁶ Matthews and Prothro, op. cit., pp. 323-324, emphasis in the original.

¹⁴ Cnudde and McCrone, op. cit., p. 72.

Fig. 3. Causal model of negro political participation.



Source: Matthews and Prothro, op. cit., pp. 322-323.

difficulty we have already discussed: the reporting of assumptions as conclusions. The causal model of Negro political participation makes dubious assumptions about the relationships between the variables in the model (a good example is the one-way relationship-postulated between characteristics of the political system and political participation by individuals), and, in the end, these assumptions are presented as if they were findings based on the analysis of the data.¹⁷

The second problem, deserving the attention of political scientists using multivariate models, is that of separating out the independent effects of highly correlated independent variables. In the study of Negro political participation, for example, the correlation between the "community structure" variable and the "political system" variable is 0.95. The extremely high correlation immediately raises the question of whether it is possible to disentangle the effects of these two variables, as the model requires, since they are virtually identical. It is, in fact, impossible to assess the independent effects of the "community structure" and the "political system" on Negro political participation in any reliable fashion.18 This is the problem of "multicollinearity": when two or more independent variables are highly correlated, it is difficult to make reliable inferences about their relative contribution to the determination of the dependent variable. As the correlation between two independent variables approaches unity, it becomes literally impossible to tell one variable from the other. As Blalock puts it:

Stated in most simple terms, whenever the correlation between two or more independent variables is high, the sampling error of the partial slopes and partial correlations will be quite large. As a result there will be a number of different combina-

tions of regression coefficients, and hence partial correlations, which give a most equally good fittings to the empirical data. In any given case the method of least squares will usually yield unique solutions, but with slight modifications of the magnitude that could easily be due to sampling or measurement error, one might obtain estimates which differ considerably from the original set.¹⁹

Finally, as a matter of general interest, it should be noted that the difficulties arising from multicollinearity persist regardless of the method of data analysis. In short, multicollinearity not only affects estimates in multiple regression procedures; it also weakens inferences based on cross-tabulations. While occasionally the use of additional information may alleviate the problem, it often happens that when the social scientist must rely on "experiments" performed by nature, he will be unable to obtain the independent variation necessary to assess the independent effects of his explanatory variables.

IV. CONCLUSIONS

This review of two recent applications of causal models to political data suggests the need to stress certain elementary principles of data analysis. As models grow more complex, basic principles may often be lost in the maze of elaborate analyses. We can suggest a number of specific points growing out of the preceding discussion:

- 1. In complicated multivariate models, there are a number of inherent problems of estimation. These often arise in attempts to dis-
- 19 Hubert M. Blalock, Jr., "Correlated Independent Variables: The Problem of Multicollinearity," Social Forces, 62 (December, 1963). p. 233. For more detailed discussions of the problem, see Donald E. Farrar and Robert R. Glauber, "Multicollinearity in Regression Analysis: The Problem Revisited," Review of Economics and Statistics, 49 (February, 1967), 92–107; and Johnston, op. cit., pp. 201–207.

¹⁷ See the reasoning about "direction of causation," *ibid.*, pp. 321-323.

¹⁸ The beta weights included in the analysis (*ibid.*, p. 321) also run contrary to the model.

tinguish the relative impact of different variables that are themselves highly intercorrelated. The accuracy of the estimates degenerates as the intercorrelation between independent variables approaches unity. Indeed, in the case of perfect correlation between two variables, the variance of the estimates of the relative impact is infinite!

- 2. Any investigator, and especially those aiming to give a causal interpretation of their findings, should consider the possibility that different causal processes operate in different subgroups of their data. This may be formally incorporated into the model by using statistical procedures that take interaction effects into account.
 - 3. Complex multivariate models require a

good many assumptions in order to estimate the parameters of the model. These assumptions are often not testable and they do not, of course, "emerge" from the analysis of the data, and should not be reported as empirically grounded conclusions.

The Simon-Blalock technique does not eliminate these problems. The investigator, regardless of his particular data analysis strategy, must face them and avoid the unthinking manipulation of correlation coefficients in an attempt to "eliminate" causal links.

(Editor's Note: For further discussion of these questions, see the Communications by Chudde-McCrone and Forbes-Tufte at pp. 1269-1271.)


A NOTE ON CENSORSHIP

GORDON TULLOCK
Rice University

In Toward a Mathematics of Politics¹ I presented a model of reciprocal interaction between information media and the opinions held by members of the community. It is the purpose of this note to apply a somewhat simplified version of this model to the specific problem of censorship. Testable hypotheses will be deduced and implications which may be of importance for policy will be suggested.

Suppose the population of the country are arrayed on some issue dimension. It makes little difference for our present purposes what the dimension itself represents. It might, for example, indicate the degree of nudity of pictures of women in men's magazines or the strength with which the views of Castro are supported. Let us suppose that the distribution along this issue dimension declines at one, end, as shown in Figure 1. Note that the remainder of the distribution can be any shape; in fact, I have drawn in three dashed lines for three possible distributions.2 If we assume, not unreasonably, that most people who are in the business of producing public information seek to maximize readership, then we would anticipate that in a competitive market the information media would be spread over the possible positions in this line in much the same pattern as the population.3 Put more bluntly, the

- ¹ Toward a Mathematics of Politics (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 1967), pp. 82-99.
- ² Even the requirement that the distribution decline at one end is not necessary. A highly abstract version of the theorems developed below can be presented with any distribution covering a finite interval.
- ³ The relationship between the publication distribution and the distribution of the opinions of the consumers of the publications is complicated by two factors. One is economies of scale, and the second is the poor information held by the operators of the media on public preferences. Working out the implications of these two modifying factors is tedious and difficult. Readers interested in this aspect of the matter should turn to Chapters V and VI (pp. 82-99) of Toward a Mathematics of Politics. For our present purposes, however, an extremely simplified model which ignores these factors is a suitable mapping of the more complex basic model. One aspect of the basic model should be mentioned. Due to the very large economies of scale to be found in the field of media



managers of such organizations as *Time*, *Newsweek*, and CBS go where the customers are.

This competitive situation in a sense is an equilibrium situation. Individuals' tastes would be influenced by things they read and what they read would be affected by their tastes. For any individual there would be some tendency to move along the line, but there is no obvious reason why the general population should be shifted. An individual would normally be reading or looking at some things that are not perfect expressions of his optimum taste. The man who thinks, for example, that Playboy is ridiculously conservative in its photographic standards might nevertheless occasionally read Reader's Digest. Thus, to some extent, insofar as his opinions are affected by the information which he receives he would be subject to some tendency to move to the left on our diagram if increasing nudity is considered to be on the right.

The point of this article, however, is to discuss the effect of censorship. Let us begin by considering what can be called majority or

production, areas where customers are dense are characterized not by many publications, but by a few large, heavily capitalized journals.

conventional censorship. This is the type of censorship we frequently get in democracies. It is an effort by the majority of the population to prevent some minority from obtaining media to its tastes. A classical example, of course, is the law against pornography, but there are other areas in which similar things may be observed. Thus, let us suppose that the government establishes a censorship which, on our issue dimension, simply prohibits publication of anything to the right of what I have labeled the censor line. This immediately means that the media now publishing to the right of that line must cease publication or shift their editorial policy. It also, however, has a sharp effect on the market of those media which are immediately to the left of this line. They are now the closest approximations of the taste of all the people to the right of the line. Thus one could anticipate a rapid expansion of media in this area. Note that this does not necessarily involve an increase in the number of (let us say) magazines published in that area. It could involve, instead, a sharp improvement in circulation and of quality in those magazines. Looked at from the standpoint of the publishers the change in censorship adjusts the tastes of the population insofar as they can be expressed in purchases of journals so that they fit more or less the dotted line in Figure 1.

Here we have a readily testable hypothesis. If the theory is correct, attempts to impose conventional standards on "girlie" magazines would lead to a sharp increase in the number of magazines which just pass the police standards. Given the fact that there is a good deal of variation in the rules imposed by different police forces, a comparative analysis of relative frequencies in different cities should show a high concentration of magazines which just pass the minimum standards in each city.

With this new distribution of publications the individuals in the society will be confronted with somewhat different reading matter than they had before, and this over time should work at least some shift in their tastes or political preferences. For example, the people who previously were reading material to the right of the censorship line are now compelled to read material to the left. It is reasonable to assume that after a while their preferences will shift in that direction. This would, if left entirely to itself, produce a small secondary hump in the normal distribution curve at or near the censor line. This would, I presume, be one of the objectives of people who propose the censorship. There is, however, another objective which is frequently mentioned by people who favor censorship. They very frequently

are not interested in the "depraved" people who directly consume whatever it is they object to. They tend to say that they are interested in the entire population, particularly the younger portion of the population, and therefore their objective in eliminating the extreme portion of the spectrum is not to save people whose tastes are already widely deviant from conventional morality, but to prevent a movement in that direction by the whole population.

If this is the objective of the censorship, it is by no means obvious that it can be achieved. The development of a concentration of fairly high quality media just inside the censor line will change the information available to people who have more conventional tastes, too. Thus, someone who is approximately at the middle of the population and who would be unlikely to read anything banned by the censorship anyway, may find he is much more likely to read something which is just acceptable now that the volume and quality of material published at that point has been so sharply increased. It is thus possible, although not certain, that imposition of censorship will have an effect of shifting the general population distribution to the right on our diagram at the same time it eliminates the extreme tail. It is fairly easy to make sets of detailed assumptions under which this will either occur or will not occur, but there seems no point in doing so here. Clearly, we have a subject for empirical investigation, rather than theoretical speculation. It should be noted, however, that it is clear that this type of censorship may have results which are highly perverse, from the standpoint of the people who recommend

So much for censorship by the majority. Let us now consider its totalitarian equivalent. Figure 2 is like Figure 1, but we assume that some party which holds an extreme position has seized political power. The party has the position shown. Under these circumstances it could, of course, simply take over the press and see to it that everything it published was exactly what the party wishes. This is the early Communist and Nazi technique. If this is done, we would have a fairly simple result with the entire volume of publication represented by that particular point on our horizontal line, and presumably some tendency for the population distribution to shift towards that point.

A great many dictatorships, however, have not followed this technique. Instead, they have simply established a censorship which permits some variance in what the news media will publish. I represented this situation by drawing in the censor line a short distance from the party's own position on Figure 2. Here again, the circulation-maximizing manager of some kind of publication media would find that his opportunities were severely restricted, and it would have the effect upon him very similar to that if the population itself had shifted to the form shown by the dotted line. Thus, we would anticipate a very high concentration of publications which were as close as they could get to the censor line. This would not be because they particularly favored freedom of the press, but simply because they were trying to attract readers. Dictatorships normally do not favor objective research into their policies, but it might be possible to test this hypothesis nevertheless. Even the most monolithic government will change its censorship rules from time to time, and a comparison of the distribution of publications under different rules should show the effect. The effect on the general population of such a concentration of news media at or about the censorship line would presumably be to shift its position to some degree. There is, however, another likely outcome of this concentration. The dictatorial clique or party is now confronted with a very large collection of high quality information media which are almost at its position, but slightly closer to majority opinion. Presumably, the members of this dictatorial clique were able to maintain their opinions against the set of publication media distributed much as the population itself because the publication media which were at a considerable distance from their own position exercised little influence on them. They were convinced that these people were basically wrong. Now, however, confronted with an extremely large concentration of media which are just slightly different from their position, it is likely that the party itself will tend to shift.

This shift (to the left on our diagram) is apt to be accompanied by a similar shift or attrition in the censor line, and hence this




Fig. 2

scheme although it does influence the populace in a way in which the initial founders in the revolutionary regime would approve is apt to influence these founders and their descendants in a way of which they would disapprove. The long gradual attrition of Czarist censorship in the 19th century would appear to be an example of this. It may appear that the conclusions I have drawn from the use of this extremely simple theoretical model are excessive for the reasoning structure which underlines them. In practice, however, it does seem that the assumptions I have made fit the real world, and the conclusions I have drawn also seem to fit. But casual empiricism is only the start of any investigation. Formal tests are clearly called for, and I hope that some of the readers of this note will undertake them.

COMMUNICATIONS

TO THE EDITOR:

Professor Kaplan's amusing conclusion of his review of my World Politics: The Global System (this Review, June, 1968, p. 694) moves me to exonerate the Dorsev Press from his charge "that they could not afford proper critical help to the author . . ." They proferred more critical help-all of it relevant and from highly reputable scholars—than I was

willing to accept.

Mr. Kaplan and I could argue about who misunderstands, and how grossly, the literature on strategic doctrine. Some highly placed practicing strategists have assured me that my understanding and interpretation of it in the book are sound. In any case, the absurdum to which some strategists have reduced their doctrines in the device of the doomsday machine was not presented as a preferred strategy in my book. As for Mr. Kaplan's magistral assertion that "it is not true that nuclear weapons cannot be used to acquire some future good," would it not serve the purposes of the REVIEW—which is one of our profession's "present means to obtain some apparent future good"-if he were to elaborate, corroborate, and engage in a little dialectic?

HERBERT J. SPIRO

University of Pennsylvania

(EDITOR'S NOTE: The Managing Editor regrets that inadequate copy-editing and proofreading allowed this unwarranted statement to appear in the Review, and apologizes to Professor Spiro and the Dorsey Press for any embarrassment it may have caused them.)

TO THE EDITOR:

In his article, "On the Neo-Elitist Critique of Community Power," this REVIEW (1968), pp. 451-60, Richard Merelman is severely critical of our analysis of the nature and process of nondecision-making. Within the limited space permitted us here, we can do no more than point out his major errors.

In Merelman's view, we make the following interrelated points: (a) "non-elites are encased in values foisted on them by the elite"; (b) "non-elites are not even conscious of having major differences' with the elite"; therefore (c) conflict in the community is limited to "unimportant matters which do not threaten the elite." (p. 452.) Given this perception of things, savs Merelman, we must be "neo-elitists."

Worse, our formulation is riddled with logical and empirical problems.

The chief objection to his critique is that it is predicated on a careful misreading of our discussion of nondecision-making. As we see it. the process is at work when the mobilization of bias, created or sustained by its beneficiaries (who may be either elites or non-elites), is sufficiently dominant-not necessarily or even usually omnipotent and all-encompassing, as Merelman contends—to prevent a political issue from reaching the decision-making arena. Obviously, if a particular set of political beliefs was universally embraced in a given community, no one could tell whether the consensus was "false" or genuine. Merelman labors this point; but in concentrating on the limiting case, he ignores all those other, more common situations in which consensus on values is lacking, yet persons and groups shaping and supporting currently dominant beliefs are able to utilize these beliefs as a means to silence the opposition or render it ineffectual.

We deny the contention of our pluralist critics that so-called non-events are beyond the reach of empirical investigation. It is possible to determine, on the one hand, the nature and degree of covert support for critics of the dominant set of values and, on the other. the extent to which those who stand to lose from public airing of an issue use power or its correlates to sustain the beliefs that will keep the issue from being seriously considered. It seems well established, for example, that Senator Joe McCarthy and his supporters engaged in nondecision-making in the early 1950's, when their exploitation of anti-communist sentiments effectively blocked access to the decision-making arena of demands for social reform. Even more interesting is the evidence we have found in Baltimore, where the value of equal opportunity for blacks has lately gained wide acceptance—only to be used by prominent whites to deny Negroes a greater share in the actual making of community decisions. It is immaterial for present purposes whether white leaders consciously adopted a pro-civil-rights posture in order to isolate the advocates of "black power." What is significant is that they exercised authority and influence on the nondecision-making level and did so without creating a communitywide consensus. Need we add that had we relied exclusively on analysis of "concrete" decisions, in the fashion of Merelman and his fellow pluralists, we would have missed this critical aspect of contemporary politics in Baltimore?

From what we have said here and elsewhere, it should be clear that we are not "neo-elitists." We neither presuppose that every community is run by an elite nor that an elite consensus must exist in order for nondecision-making to be operative and effective. We simply reiterate that nondecision-making may be and often is a critical element in the political process and, as such, deserves further theoretical analysis and empirical study. We plan shortly to produce another paper along these lines.

PETER BACHRACH

Temple University

MORTON S. BARATZ

Brun Mawr College

TO THE EDITOR:

Mercifully, the Bachrach-Baratz letter permits me brevity:

- 1. Parts III and IV of my article, which deal with cases of nondecision-making involving power and force, are distinguished from Part II by the fact that while the latter presupposes false consensus the former two do not. Therefore, as Bachrach and Baratz can no doubt see, the power and force sections deal with the class of situations they accuse me of ignoring. In fact, I intended Parts III and IV to absolve me of any suspicion that I was only treating a "limiting case."
- 2. Non-events are, by definition, non-empirical. You cannot observe what has not happened. Therefore, interpretations made about nondecisions are subject to the difficult and peculiar problems of inference I discussed in my article. The fact that you can find evidence supporting your version of why something did not happen in Baltimore, say, does not circumvent the inferential problems I discussed. The situation is analogous to a jury forced to convict on circumstantial evidence. It is always nice to have a corpus delicti around. We must, otherwise, make leaps of faith that are usually too great for most political scientists, as scientists and not as citizens, to at-Mtempt.
- 3. Bachrach and Baratz deny that they are neo-elitists, or that they believe that every community is run by an elite, or that elite consensus is necessary for nondecision-making to operate effectively. Of course, only Part II of my article makes the latter two assumptions, which are specifically limited to the alse consensus case therein discussed. Since, as paragraphs 1 and 2 above indicate, the Bachrach-Baratz letter has not raised any new

issues which dispute my analysis, I will continue to let the article speak for itself. I'm glad we can at least agree that nondecision-making needs more analysis.

RICHARD M. MERELMAN University of California Los Angeles

TO THE EDITOR:

Forbes and Tufte (this issue of the Review) level three charges against our linkage article. They are: (1) that our model is somehow suspect because underlying the nationwide data are different patterns of linkage for competitive and non-competitive districts; (2) that our assumptions are not reasonable given other literature on representation; and (3) that we state one of our assumptions as a conclusion.

The hypothesis that different models are appropriate for competitive and non-competitive constituencies is an attractive one and worth investigating properly. If the hypothesis were supported by appropriate testing, it would be an important and welcome addition to the literature on representation. Unfortunately, Forbes and Tufte utilize an unsound and misleading methodology in their test.

The magnitude of correlation coefficients depends in part upon the variance which is measured in a variable. When we divide a body of data into subgroups, say into competitive and non-competitive districts, we may differentially affect the variance in variables and, therefore, the correlation coefficients. Since the values of those correlation coefficients depend in part on how we divided the data, they are descriptive of the divided data only and should not be used as comparisons with those from the originally undivided set or from the set divided in other ways. It is not surprising, then, that these writers find a model other than ours in one of their subgroups since their analysis utilized correlation coefficients. (Note that our analysis also uses correlation coefficients and therefore describes our data set only, but we do not attempt comparisons with other sets or subsets.) We suggest that if Forbes and Tufte are serious in the testing of their hypothesis, they should use unstandardized regression coefficients in the future. The procedure they utilize was specifically warned against and reliance on unstandardized coefficits was suggested nearly two years ago in this Review (March, 1967) by Blalock. Ironically, Blalock used the Miller-Stokes data as his case study in warning against reliance on correlation coefficients for this type of model analysis.

We should also note, however, that for Forbes and Tufte to utilize unstandardized regression coefficients for subgroup analysis, they will still have to face the major problem of sampling error in the Miller-Stokes data. To use even regression coefficients for subgroup analysis, we must be able to ignore sampling error. With only 116 districts to be divided into competitive and non-competitive districts and very few (average of 15–20) interviews per district, sampling error might produce disparate results even utilizing regression coefficients.

Finally, we would also like to make clear that even if the model were different for competitive and non-competitive districts, this would constitute a specification of the conditions under which our model was operative or inoperative. It would not constitute grounds for rejecting it.

Their second charge that there is "an inadequate correspondence between the assumptions made in constructing the mathematical models and prior knowledge about the phenomena being studied . . ." is indeed weak. Despite their manipulations of the roll-call behavior in their model 2c, we assume that there is no quarrel over considering district attitudes as independent and roll-call vote as the dependent variable. The objection seems to be that it is unreasonable to think that a congressman's attitudes are affected by his perceptions of district attitudes.

What, then, are their grounds for objection? They cite two studies in which the authors stress misperception as descriptive of congressmen. Dexter, in his article and in American Business and Public Policy, for example, sees misperception on fair trade legislation. But is fair trade legislation civil rights legislation? Miller and Stokes find considerable misperception on foreign policy and social welfare, but on civil rights the correlation between perception and district attitude is .74, which is higher than that between his own attitude and his perception (.46). One would expect that if attitudes were causing perceptual distortions the latter correlation would be higher than that between perception and district attitude.

More importantly, however, they fail to make clear, as we did, that two specifying conditions need to be set for accepting the notion that his attitude can be affected by his perceptions. "Because the costs of misperceiving are so high for an elected official, his perceptions are likely to cause him to modify his attitudes to fit his reasonably accurate perceptions." (Italics added). We feel that .74 correlation is reasonably accurate perception. The Hays-Alford case demonstrates the costs of "error" in civil rights.

As to the third criticism, it has some merit.

A pitfall of causal modeling is the ease with which assumptions become conclusions. Their "note of caution" is in order for us and several other practitioners of the art.

In conclusion, we would like to take this opportunity to clear up several misconceptions about our article which we found in Forbes and Turte and in conversations with colleagues. Our model was solely devised as a model of constituency influence on civil rights. We were quite certain that it was not a general model and at no point did we seek to call it one.

Second, when we stated that we accounted for the 88% of the original relationship between district attitude and roll-call vote, many failed to recognize that this original relationship accounts for only 42% of roll-call behavior. In other words, like Miller and Stokes, we dealt only with constituency influence models.

Third, though we argue that perceptions are influential on congressmen's attitudes, we do not mean that they are the sole, or even primary determinant of his attitudes. The magnitude of the correlations leave considerable room for the operation of other influences on Congressmen's attitudes.

CHARLES F. CNUDDE DONALD J. McCRONE

The University of Wisconsin

TO THE EDITOR:

Near the end of their communication, Cnudde and McCrone agree with our main criticism of their paper, that they reported their assumptions as conclusions. Their other points, however, suggest a few additional cautionary remarks.

First, their discussion of subgroup analysis should not discourage anyone from controlling for key variables and testing explanatory models within regions of the data. Subgroups analysis is an essential tool for discovery in the detective kit of the data analyst. In suchanalysis one will face obvious difficulties when the variability within subgroups is small. These difficulties weaken all inferences, not merelythose based on comparisons of correlations coefficients across subgroups. In the case of the Miller-Stokes data, Cnudde and McCrone provide no evidence that the variability is severely reduced in the comparison between competitive and non-competitive districts Miller, of course, has reported a wide range of results for such subgroups of Congressiona districts.

Second, their comments about unstan dardized regression coefficients are quite missleading. Regression coefficients generally pro-

4.

vide a better summary of a linear relationship than a correlation coefficient, although for some data this general rule does not apply. For the Miller-Stokes data, unstandardized regression coefficients are inappropriate because their metrics do not possess the substantive meaning required for the sensible use of such coefficients. Here we would recommend the paper that Blalock somewhat inaccurately cites in his justification of unstandardized coefficients. John Tukey wrote that "correlation coefficients are justified in two and only two circumstances, when they are regression coefficients, or when the measurement of one or both variables on a determinate scale is hopeless. . . . [An] area in which correlation coefficients are prominent includes psychometrics and educational testing in general. This is surely a situation where determinate scales are hopeless." Since this is also the situation for the Miller-Stokes data, the advice of Blalock (seconded by Cnudde and McCrone) is inappropriate.

> HUGH DONALD FORBES EDWARD R. TUFTE

To the Editor:

In an otherwise innocuous review of my book The Politics of the European States (this RE-VIEW, June 1968) Mr. Robert A. Rupen confuses a point of my conclusions. He states that "he (Ionescu) wants to get the superpowers out of Europe, although he clearly recognizes that simple simultaneous withdrawal of the USSR and the U.S. would be unlikely to bring about the democratic pan-Europe he ardently desires." I thought that the real point I was making, although subtler, was clear enough when I wrote (p. 282): "What is suggested here has very little to do with either the theory of the third force, or with that of European neutralism, or with the old fashioned theory of 'disengagement.' The point concerns only the difference in the stimulus of the initiative and the novelty of the results, according to whether they originate from the blocs respectively led by the two superpowers or from the European countries. Whereas, in the former case, the worst coming to the worst, a more correlated, more flexible and yet more lasting status quo could be acceptable, if not recommendable, in the latter it is precisely the status quo of the general relation between Europe and the two superpowers which is questioned." And (p. 283): "What is meant is that it is more probable that, in a situation of double flux, changes recorded in the internal sphere of each country of a 'camp', and of the camp itself, would reverberate more effectively on the process of (European) integration itself."

I believe that the Czechoslovak experience of 1968 confirmed my trend of thinking, if properly understood and fairly presented.

GHITA IONESCU

London School of Economics and Political Science

TO THE EDITOR:

Your recent review of Metropolitan America: Challenge to Federalism (issue of June 1968, pp. 623-4) does little more than register the reviewer's annoyance with this report and with the studies of the Acvisory Commission on Intergovernmental Relations on which it is based. The inaccuracies in Thomas J. Anton's review are too numerous to cover in a brief rejoinder, but a few can be cited as illustrations.

Mr. Anton contends that the report criticizes the fragmentation of government in metropolitan areas but fails to state criteria for determining that problems result from this fragmentation; that the report finds conflicts of interest among governments blocking effective action to deal with metropolitan problems, but fails to state what action should be taken on specific issues. Criteria are, however, presented on pp. 30-32 and in case studies of two areas of governmental responsibility: water supply and sewage disposal, and the relocation of people and businesses displaced by public land-takings. More effective action in these two areas is proposed in considerable detail on pp. 141-154. Mr. Anton may well disagree with the criteria and the proposals, but to claim that no standards are presented and no action indicated is a strange way of registering disagreement.

Mr. Anton's critique of Commission findings as confused and inconsistent derives largely from his own faulty summary Thus he attributes to the Commission the view that "the federal government should retain an essentially advisory role," and then finds contradictory recommendations for federal planning standards as a condition of local grants-in-aid. Far from contending that the federal role should be primarily advisory, Metropolitan America discusses reasons warranting federal action in metropolitan affairs (pp. 119-123), proposes many positive federal measures, and focuses particularly on ways of improving the grantin-aid system. The Commission's recommendations for federal action are certainly fair game for criticism, but dismissing them by manufacturing internal contradictions is not a very high level of criticism.

Finally, Mr. Anton rejects the work of the Commission as "organizational tinkering" inappropriate for the solution of serious urban

"Organizational tinkering" preproblems. sumably refers to proposals for change in the governmental system. But present governmental arrangements have much to do with such problems as poverty and inequality of opportunity. The governmental strategies that the Advisory Commission recommends involve redressing fiscal disparities among local governments, enabling communities where the poor are concentrated to support higher levels of public service, expanding the supply of lowincome housing, enforcing laws against discrimination, increasing state contributions to local welfare assistance, and providing certain educational and employment programs on a metropolitan basis.

These are not the only possible strategies, and continuing analysis and debate may well suggest others. Effective solutions, however, are not likely to have the tightly organized, consistent quality that Mr. Anton wants. Given the complexity of our urban problems as well as of our governmental system, a simplified and therefore highly consistent solution may make for happier speed-reading, but it will not contribute much to public policy.

BERNARD J. FRIEDEN

Massachusetts Institute of Technology

To THE EDITOR:

Presumably, Mr. Frieden would have us frame recommendations that are (1) loosely organized, (2) inconsistent, and (3) complex. Such recommendations, he thinks, would "contribute" to public policy more effectively than tightly organized, consistent and simplified solutions. Maybe so, but as a slow reader, I have my doubts.

Perhaps it is his quest for complexity that leads Mr. Frieden to misstate part of what I wrote: I did not say that criteria for determining the existence of a problem were lacking in his report, but that the expressed criteria were little more than slogans, with neither clarity of meaning nor specificity of application to recommend them. Statements that governments should be large enough to permit economies of scale, should have an area adequate for effective performance, should have the legal and administrative ability to perform assigned services, and the like (pp. 30-32), are quite meaningless unless and until the key terms are given specific content. What defines "adequate" or "effective" performance? What defines legal and administrative "ability"? How large is "large enough" for economies of scale? Stating principles without defining them is rather like proposing marriage without setting a date. In both cases there is reason to suspect the integrity of the proposal.

For the rest, Mr. Frieden seems to me to be playing a semantic game on the issue of what constitutes an "advisory" role for the federal government. He does not, after all, propose that the federal government take over local governments and his report specifically advocates leaving "major reponsibility" for metropolitan problems with State and local governments. (p. 119) And, if Mr. Frieden now thinks that re-structuring urban government will have much impact on poverty or inequality of opportunity, then he is in disagreement not only with me, but with himself, for he expressed the opposite view on pp. 126-127 of Metropolitan America. But let us not play silly academic games. Poverty, prejudice, education, housing, environmental quality, money, violence and just plain decency are some of the most pressing problems we face in our urban areas. Surely, it is these problems we must deal with and solve. If our solutions require changed governmental forms, then let us change those forms. We are not likely to have a good idea of what governmental changes to make, however, unless we know what we want to do in our cities. And knowing what to do, in specific as well as general terms, requires work of a different order than that so far produced by the Commission.

THOMAS J. ANTON

The University of Michigan

TO THE EDITOR:

I am perennially annoyed that a fallacious political myth keeps popping up in introductory government texts from which I have taught, and apparently is in no danger of refutation by the hard-minded empiricists among us.

This myth is that a communist government has never been voted into power in a free election. Although this may not be an earthshaking issue, it is doubly disturbing to me that this bit of folklore is perpetuated by some

¹ Marian D. Irish and James W. Prothro, The Politics of American Democracy (Englewood Cliffs: Prentice-Hall, 1965), p. 74; Lee S. Greene and George S. Parthemos, American Government: Polizies and Functions (New York: Charles Scripner's Sons, 1967), p. 358; Austin Ranney, The Governing of Men, rev. ed. (New York: Holt, Rinehart and Winston, 1966), pp. 178-179; William Ebenstein, C. Herman Pritchett, Henry A. Turner, Dean Mann, American Democracy in World Perspective (New York: Harper and Row, 1967), p. 664.

scholars who are extremely prominent and highly respected in our field.

In texts where this myth is not blatantly stated, it nevertheless is strongly implied, which probably serves to leave the reader with the same belief as if the myth had been stated baldly, such as in the following case:

Indeed, whenever the communists have captured power from within (as contrasted with cases where they imposed a puppet regime through the power of the Red Army), they were successful as conspirators or as guerrillas because they recognized the primacy of politics and turned prevailing discontent to their own advantage.²

This sort of phraseology is common to several other introductory texts, and while I am just as leery of communism as the next person, I believe that we are intellectually committed to give the devil his due. Certainly we are obliged to delete such unnecessary lapses in research as this one:

So far, no communist regime has ever been set up after a free election, and thus President Kennedy's commitment to accept such an election result has never been tested in practice.³

This kind of statement is to be expected from the oddballs on the radical right whose jingoistic patriotism is overshadowed only by their immense lack of gray matter, but not from authors with doctorates in political science who are writing for college students.

In 1945, San Marino became the first country to elect a communist government in free elections. This government continued in power until 1957, when the voters (again, in free elections) turned them out.⁴

In the year that the communist government

- ² Leslie Lipson, The Democratic Civilization (New York: Oxford University Press, 1964,) p. 193. I am surprised to read in a government text-book that there is apparently something unethical about a political party's turning prevailing discontent to its own advantage. Is there a better way to get elected?
- ³ Ebenstein, Pritchett, Turner, and Mann, p.
- ⁴ The story of the communist rule of San Marino is told entertainingly by Donna Shor in "San Marino: Little Land of Liberty," *National Geographic*, 132 (August, 1967), 233-251.

of San Marino was voted out, Kerala, India, became the first state to put a communist government in office in free elections. In 1958, numerous mass demonstrations and strikes occurred in Kerala in opposition to an education bill promoted by the communists which would provide state control of the many church- and caste-run private schools. President Prasad of India declared a state of emergency, new elections were held, and the communists were voted out of office, to be replaced by a coalition of opposing parties.

As a result of the general election in February, 1967, Kerala and West Bengal formed United Front ministries in which the Communist Party was the largest single party. The central government of India ousted the West Bengal United Front in November, 1967, and placed West Bengal under President's rule in February, 1968, but the leader of the communists in Kerala, E.M.S. Namboodiripad, was sworn in as chief minister in 1967 and (so far) is still in office.

The preceding examples are in addition to a number of small towns in Italy where the town's elected Council is composed of communists alone, or in which the communists have an absolute majority or are in a controlling position.

I have found no evidence that the communist governments cited above were a product of communists "seizing control," "overrunning" the government, or "capturing" the government. Granted, these instances are largely inconsequential political units. But that is beside the point. The issue is whether communist governments have been freely voted into power.

I offer a suggestion. From now on, why not phrase the myth more accurately, such as the following: communists have never been freely elected to control an important national government. This should satisfy those whose scholarly objectivity is subject to momentary frenzies of patriotism or fear, like a recurring attack of malaria. But I would much rather we simply admit that, on occasion, communists do win elections honestly. This admission is not only straightforward and honest, but it would also enable us, in my opinion, to argue more effectively the case against revolutionary communism.

DAVID LINDSAY

Central Missouri State College

BOOK REVIEWS AND NOTES

3	OOK REVIEWS	
	Chambers and Burnham, editors, The American Party Systems. A. E. Keir Nash	1275
	Seton-Watson, The Russian Empire 1801-1917. Frederick C. Barghoorn	1276
	Myrdal, Asian Drama: An Inquiry into the Poverty of Nations. Jean Grossholtz	1278
	Rudolph and Rudolph, The Modernity of Tradition: Political Development in India. Robert L. Hardgrave, Jr.	1280
	Tarrow, Peasant Communism in Southern Italy. NORMAN KOGAN	1282
	Hyneman (with Gilbert), Popular Government in America: Foundations and Principles. Neal Riemer.	1284
	Muir, Prayer in the Public Schools: Law and Attitude Change: Johnson, The Dynamics of Compliance: Supreme Court Decision-Making from a New Perspective. Sheldon Goldman	1285
	Lefever, Uncertain Mandate: Weiss, Political Protest in the Congo. Crawford Young	1287
	$Pennock\ and\ Chapman,\ editors,\ Nomos\ X$: Representation. James A. Steintrager	1289
	Plank, editor, Cuba and the United States: Long-Range Perspectives: Zeitlin, Revolutionary Politics and the Cuban Working Class. Richard R. Fagen	1291
	Erdman, The Swatantra Party and Indian Conservatism. Susanne Hoeber Rudolph	1293
	Bernd, editor, Mathematical Applications in Folitical Science III. Herbert F. Weisberg	1294
	Fox and Fox, NATO and the Range of American Choice: Beaufre, NATO and Europe: Cleveland, The Atlantic Idea and Its European Rivals. STUART A. SCHEINGOLD	1296
	Patterson, Congressional Conservatism and the New Deal: The Growth of the Conservative Coalition in Congress, 1933–1939. David R. Mayhew	
	Scalapino, The Japanese Communist Movement, 1920–1966. Solomon B. Levine	
В	OOK NOTES	
	Political Theory, History of Political Thought, and Methodology	1301
	American Government and Politics	
	Foreign Governments and Comparative Politics	
	INTERNATIONAL POLITICS, LAW AND ORGANIZATION	1391

BOOK REVIEWS

The American Party Systems. Ed. BY. WILLIAM NISBET CHAMBERS & WALTER DEAN BURN-HAM. (New York: Oxford University Press, 1967. Pp. 321. \$6.75.)

These ten essays—five by historians and five by political scientists-comprise an unusual symposium: without exception they merit publication. Too often unhappy combinations of publishing profligacy and foundation munificence conspire to produce edited proceedings on American politics whose redundant, optimistic vacuity tempts summary by updating Yeats' The Scholars:

Roll-call minds oblivious of their wives, Pluralist, tenured heads of felt, Edit politics of ghetto knives That young blacks girding garrison belts Wield like urban swords of brute despair To batter Congress' ignorant ear.

All cough consensus into civic ink; All strut convention floors in rational vests; All think the moderate thoughts each other thinks:

All test the happy truths their colleague tests. Lord, what would they say

Had their Kennedys walked that way?

Not so The American Party Systems, which is so much better than the average product of group cogitation that we should direct our attention as much to the source as to the nature of its strength. At least five procedural aspects must have formed the base of its substantive distinction. First, the contributors gathered for four days to discuss early versions of their manuscripts. Second, at those gatherings were seventeen other scholars who came as critics unburdened by impulses to be supportive of fellow-authors in hopes of reciprocation. Third, well before penning final versions the authors not just the editors—were cognizant of the contents of each other's manuscripts. Fourth, by that stage they had evolved sufficient similarity of approach such that the conceptual framework is not relegated to the silly limbo of editorial preludes and post-ludes but rather permeates the fabric throughout. Fifth, the combination of participants seems to have worked a beneficial confrontation of disciplines: the results are essays by historians who venture beyond chronological explanation and essays by political scientists who-though knowing their behavioral tools-do not treat history with the disdain of Henry Ford.

This intimates the book's chief substantive

strength: its coherent and full-bodied exploration of a central theme—that "examination of American party politics over time reveals the existence of not less than five national party systems" (p. 289). In lieu of describing the characteristics which the authors argue informed and distinguished these systems-for only the essays constitute adequate briefs-let me urge some major grounds for taking the argument seriously.

The authors are not only willing to question "accepted wisdom" about the functioning of American parties but also able to offer sophisticated integrations of general explanatory models and historical particulars. In so doing, they build upon each other even as they question their own earlier work. To give two instances: Chambers, McCormick, and Burnham use Hartzian insights to clarify their subjects, while Sorauf and Dawson expand upon an issue first mentioned by Chambers—the question whether party-analysts have tended to exaggerate the independence of American parties from controlling socio-economic conditions. When not being wholly original, they are willing to borrow explanations grand and small in order to analyze historical data. One such instance is Eric McKitrick's amplification of an idea of David Potter's, which McKitrick calls "the most original single idea to emerge from the mass of writings . . . on the Civil War in . . . years" (p. 120). From this nub, Mc-Kitrick develops a compelling argument that the absence of a well-defined party-system in the Confederacy barred from Jefferson Davis —even as its presence in the Union permitted to Abraham Lincoln-a crucial means of channelling and controlling dissent. McKitrick's article is so rewarding an essay in comparative history that I cannot forbear "drawing the moral" that American historians would do we'll to spend more time in this type of enterprise. Just so, I might add, those in political science who are prone to conjure into articles highlevel theories about the political system and leave them vaporizing in the empirical virginity of the "suggestive-model" stratostage, might do well to heed Hays' integration of Toennies' community-society model with the pesky quotidian nitty-gritty of American history from 1865 to 1929. Similarly, both behavioralists contemptuous of yesteryear and normatists prone to rely on Plato for tools with which to pound American politics might profitably examine Stokes' and Lowi's uses of 19th and 20th century voting data—the first to

analyze temporal shifts in the relative imports of local, state, and national electoral forces, and the second to argue in statistical terms a substantive view of American party politics greatly fortified by thus arguing.

We could go on at length limning The American Party Systems' merits, had we but space enough and time. Those lacking, let me rest by pointing to as notable a merit as any otherits fertility in leading to—despite not explicitly tackling-further questions for examination. Given their abundance. I shall have to restrict myself to noting some which are sufficiently stimulating to spur future detailed analysis (see Nash, Party Systems, Ideology, and Development, Holt, Rinehart, & Winston, 1969). Has, possibly, the book's prevalent assumption of a "pragmatic-versus-ideological" conceptual dichotomy in contrasting American and Continental party systems hindered adequate reckoning with conflictual faults in the American system whose dangers events have rendered more clear and more present since the writing of these essays in 1966? (However, note at least partially contra, Hays at 162 and Burnham at 304-07.) Similarly, while "importation" of the concept of political development into the American analysis is here fruitful if only for its consequence that the United States is not seen as wholly unproblematic of development, might not an examination of that concept's evolutionary presuppositions have been wise? (But, for a judicious minority customs-examination of this aboriginal package, see Sorauf at 34 ff.) Is not, indeed, such suspicion warranted by the very similarity between Goodman's characterizations here of certain post-revolutionary State parties and sundry analyses elsewhere of party-functioning a century and a half later? Both systems seem "factional"—in fact, sufficiently so to tempt the historical sociologist to rekindle with American fuel the fire of the Butterfield-Namier-Duverger "faction-versus-party" dispute. And, both systems seem at once so restricted in their problem-solving capacities and so terribly "pragmatic" as to lead to a final range of questions. To what extent has an unconscious ideology of pragmatism produced the very loss of control over the direction of American society and politics which, as Sorauf observes, has befallen "party-bosses" concomitant with the decline of old-style residential and social patterns? Might, in short, a "less American," "more Continental" style of party politics have better retained that control by undertaking not merely—as Dawson argues -to react as a dependent variable to socioeconomic changes, but to act as an independent variable channelling and managing the very

rural-urban-suburban flow which has dated that power? Might not, in sum, the pragmatism of American party decision-makers have turned most unpragmatic?

These are but a few of the many speculative hooks which this book lets neatly dangle. It is a collection distinguished as much for what it does not, as for what it does, explore—a collection frequently original and fruitfully synthetic, and when not that, almost always lucid and graceful of expression.

A. E. Keir Nash University of California, Santa Barbara

The Russian Empire 1801-1917. By Hugh Seton-Watson. (London: Oxford University Press, 1967. Pp. 813. \$10.00.)

Professor Seton-Watson's Russian Empire is a superb historical study, which says much of value for political scientists. Seton-Watson does not permit the concerns of the present to color his analysis of the past. However, in this study, the values and preferences of a sophisticated believer in cultural freedom, civil liberties and parliamentary government have exerted a salutary influence on the selection and interpretation of issues and evidence. The study focuses on certain dominant themes, and especially on the role of the tsardom. Seton-Watson states (p. 10) that "if there is one single factor which dominates the course of Russian history, at any rate since the Tatar conquest, it is the principle of autocracy."

Seton-Watson regards the history of the Russian people and the other peoples, such as the Poles, who were conquered and subjugated by the tsars as an unusually tragic one. It would, however, be unfair to a very objective scholar to suggest that he regards autocracy and other negative patterns of Russian history as permanent attributes of Russian national character or cultural tradition. While he clearly identifies with the West European political tradition, in which "nations were formed in a long struggle between the monarchical power and the social elite," and finds much to deplore in Russian autocracy, he understands that such factors as Russia's lack of defensible frontiers and its relative economic backwardness help to explain, if not to render appealing, the oppressiveness of Russian political life.

Before turning to some observations about the interplay between political absolutism, on the one hand, and the challenges to the stability of this pattern springing from the internal and external environments, on the other, which for this reviewer constitute the most interesting features of this work, it should be noted that *The Russian Empire* is a general history, in which foreign policy, military history, and social, ideological and cultural development. are treated in detail. This reviewer regrets that Seton-Watson did not treat diplomatic and military events very briefly; if he had, he could have dealt more fully with domestic political dynamics, on which he is insightful and innovative. In Part One, the first of six sections, each of about one hundred twenty pages in length, Seton-Watson sketches the geographic, cultural and religious contexts of Russian development. From the outset, with a grasp that is firmly maintained throughout this. enormous eight hundred-page volume, there are delineated the essential structures and the modes of operation of the centralized, militarybureaucratic, inefficient but not ineffective, multi-national empire, the development of which Seton-Watson regards as the prototype of the process of "deliberate modernization" of most countries of the world, a pattern that he contrasts to the more gradual, less coercive modernization of Western Europe and the United States. The excellent organization of the volume makes it easy to follow, from period to period, any particular problem or trend. Although connections are made between external and internal factors, foreign policy is perhaps too often treated as if it were a separate and independent realm. To be sure. Seton-Watson often stresses the baneful effects on internal political stability of unsuccessful or only partly successful foreign wars, such as the Crimean conflict and the Russo-Japanese war. As for World War I, Seton-Watson indicates clearly his belief that the Russian decision to participate in that conflict led to the destruction of the monarchy although he states that in terms of the "conventional wisdom of international diplomacy in 1914, her decision to go to war was fully justified."

One of the outstanding achievements of this book is its presentation of relationships between the dominant Russian nation and the non-Russian peoples, ruled by Russian, or Russianized, civilian, military and police bureaucracies. Of absorbing interest are the descriptions of the aspirations and way of life of various peoples of the Western borderlands, the Caucasus, Central Asia, Siberia and East Asia who were brought under the sway of St. Petersburg as the empire's territories expanded. His honest admissions that with respect to some issues disputed by partisans of various national points of view the outside observer can do little more than to summarize conflicting positions will not be pleasing to extremists. It will, however, furnish reliable guidance to all who seek understanding of one of the most difficult and abiding aspects of Russian history and politics. Seton-Watson is

acutely conscious of the significant interconnections between the external and internal dimensions of Russian nationality problems and policies. He understands the reasons for but demonstrates effectively the dysfunctionality for the multi-national Russian empire of the development of an intelerant Great Russian nationalism. He traces the frustrations, humiliations and deprivations inflicted by Russian chauvinism on Finns, Poles and Ukrainians, and of anti-semitism, the "socialism of the imbecile," on Jews.

The main focus of The Russian Empire is on the ultimately unsuccessful efforts of the autocratic institution to cope with disequilibrating forces. Although Seton-Watson does not present a theory of autocracy, and perhaps could have done more to explore its "psycho-cultural" aspects, he does furnish valuable insights and extraordinarily interesting data regarding a pattern of leadership and decisionmaking which in modern parlance might be categorized as "bureaucratic politics." Within this pattern, in which the emperors themselves were the chief initiators and coordinators of policy, there was much petty intrigue, caprice and self-serving struggle for power. However, policies were often inspired by motives higher and perspectives broader than those dictated merely by concern for preservation of personal or group power and privilege. Talented statesmen such as Speranski, during the early years of the reign of Alexander I, Loris-Melikov, who proposed measures designed to bridge the gap between state and society after the assassination of Alexander II, or Witte and Stolypin, assassinated in 1911, by a killer who was at the same time a police agent and a member of the revolutionary SR party, advocated or instituted policies that might, if they had been wholeheartedly and energetically supported by the monarch, have led to the transformation of autocracy into constitutional monarchy. As Seton-Watson perceives the Russian political dilemma, cultural lag at the highest levels of decision-making made it difficult, and perhaps impossible, for the autocracy to adapt adequately for its survival and that of the political and social strata the destiny of which were linked with that of the tsardom. Seton-Watson emphasizes the deep historical roots of the Russian preference for autocracy to oligarchy. He demonstrates that the upbringing of heirs to the throne reinforced their sensitivity to real or fancied threats to the principle of absolute, individual dictatorial authority.

It is not clear whether Seton-Watson believes that the collapse of the Russian old regime was inevitable. He refuses to commit himself to

either a rigidly deterministic or a looser, more probabilistic interpretation, although he inclines to the latter. Perhaps his illuminating analysis would have been even more successful if he had utilized, in addition to the concept of modernization, the categories for the analysis of political development and revolutionary change employed by some contemporary social scientists. He often seems to say that bolder, more enlightened and rational policies on the part of the tsars and their chief ministers might have "saved" Russia. However, he also presents impressive evidence indicating that these products of an essentially unscientific, authoritarian socialization process, working under conditions of great stress, generated by foreign and domestic resource allocation problems, lack of adequate internal political support, and widespread disaffection, could scarcely have been expected to possess either the inclinations or the capabilities to cope with the challenges by which they were beset, which to a surprising degree resembled those which have been dealt with more successfully, and far more ruthlessly, by the bolshevik successors to a less efficient centralized structure. The two regimes are very different in Weltanschauung, but similar in their "siege-mindedness," exemplified in a propensity to identify dissent with treason.

Seton-Watson's views regarding the social structure of imperial Russia perhaps represent a more original, if more controversial, contribution even than his valuable analysis of the operations of the decision-making agencies of government. Put briefly, he says that there was no genuine bourgeoisie in old Russia; a Western-style bourgeoisie was only beginning to develop in the last thirty-odd years of imperial rule. There were, he believes, three "middle classes," namely, the bureaucrats, intelligentsia and businessmen. They did not share a common ethos and were not committed to such typically bourgeois values and goals as rule of law, private property or parliamentary government. Because of the weakness in Russia of bourgeois values, political liberalism was weak. Liberals, whether in the civil service or in the professions and, in the early twentieth century, in nascent political parties, tended to be ground between the upper and nether millstones of intolerant conservatism or even more intolerant radicalism.

Seton-Watson sees the revolutionary enemies of Russian autocracy as themselves products of the authoritarian milieu. In his view, revolutionaries such as Pestel, Tkachev, and Lenin, were aware that "in matters of dictatorship, the provisional has a way of lasting." Their declared intentions to impose only a temporary dictatorship cannot be taken liter-

ally. On recruitment of revolutionaries, such as the high proportion in their ranks of the children of orthodox priests, he makes insightful observations.

It is difficult, even in a fairly long review. to suggest the richness of this magisterial work. For example, although he does not use the terminology of input-output or structuralfunctional analysis, he is clearly aware of the decisive role of education. One of his major criticisms of the tsarist regime and its ministers of education, is that, by depriving the mass of the population of even elementary education, they fostered a cultural gap between elite and masses which generated frustration and destructive impulses in the ranks of the intelligentsia. In his strictures on imperial Russian educational policy, Seton-Watson contrasts the Russian record unfavorably to that of Japan following 1868. This comparison is one of many relevant and illuminating ones with which the study is interspersed.

As this reviewer hopes he has made clear, Professor Seton-Watson has produced a very important book, full of thoughtful reflection and wisdom, comparative and objective in approach. It is perhaps not "scientific" in a model-building or hypothesis-testing sense. However, especially in the portions concerned with the roles, outlooks and personalities of individual decision-makers and with the political and administrative structures, the book provides stimulating partial theories and comparisons which should be very useful to students of political and administrative structures and processes. However, its greatest value consists in its power to deepen and enrich our understanding of the similarities, and differences, between the political experience of Russia and that of other nations.

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Asian Drama: An Inquiry into the Poverty of Nations. 3 volumes. By Gunnar Myrdal. (New York: Pantheon Books, Twentieth Century Fund, 1968, Pp. 2,284. \$8.50. paper bound.)

Reading these volumes is like jogging around the baseball field. The scenery is familiar, the perseverence required is enormous, and one is easily led to savor the nobility of the effort more than the purpose. But there is more here than a test of endurance for the reader. Professor Myrdal and his colleagues have constructed a "grand theory" of development defining the relationship between all the relevant and significant political, economic and social factors involved. The theory encompasses a set of explicit propositions about the nature of

economic growth in the Asian context and a set of supporting propositions defining the political and social relationships that underlie and react to those economic conditions.

The authors argue that the key to economic growth in the Asian environment lies in the agricultural sector and the central factor in the development of agriculture is the utilization of labor. Myrdal is extremely critical of the application of the "capital/output ratio" to development planning and builds a strong case that it is misleading in the Asian context. Instead he would concentrate on labor and devotes the largest part of the manuscript to defining the economic, political and social forces which impede the effective utilization of labor.

Myrdal argues that work practices in agriculture in Asia are labor intensive and low yields per acre are mainly a consequence of underutilization of the labor force. "Without any innovations and even without any investment other than longer and more efficient work, agricultural yields could be raised very substantially." (1253). Existing work practices are a product not only of economic forces, but of population pressure, health conditions, education, traditional values and status commitments, and even climate. In part, the impediments to effective use of labor are a product of social changes triggered by colonial policies. For example, in response to lowered mortality rates and subsequent population increases, the whole social situation was subtly arranged to "absorb the continual increase in the agricultural labor force." (436). In the same way, colonial education policies strengthened the traditional notion that high status was allocated to those who did not work.

Throughout the book, Myrdal emphasizes that the fundamental problem is a lack of social discipline on the part of the elites and populations of South Asia. The discussions of the use of controls and the weakness of the political systems are likely to be the most interesting to political scientists and they are, unfortunately, the least persuasive.

Professor Myrdal's analysis of the political environment concentrates exclusively on something he labels the elite. The elites of South Asia have adopted the "modernizing ideal" and, partly because of this ideal, are unwilling to use compulsion to force their people to modernize. The modernizing ideal comprises a series of value premises that Myrdal himself holds, and which he says constitute the goals of the elites. The list includes rationality, development and planning, a rise in productivity, rising levels of living, improved institutions and attitudes, national consolidation, national indepen-

dence, political democracy, democracy at the grass roots and social discipline. Myrdal recognizes that these are overlapping and poorly defined but he maintains that, taken together, they represent the goals of the elites. Although alien to Asia, these goals "have come to be indigenous in the sense that they have been adopted and shaped by the intellectual elite, who in turn, have endeavored to diffuse them throughout the population." (73). The dilemma arises, both for the reader and the elites, in that a commitment to these goals is a commitment to change and to intervention in the lives of the population and such intervention conflicts with the elite's notion of democracy. Myrdal calls them "soft states" and argues that: "All these countries, whether or not they have a democratic system of government, have generally placed fewer obligations on their citizens and have enforced these obligations much less effectively, than have the Western democracies." (894).

At some points Myrdal seems to be saying the elites are unwilling to do what is required and at others, that if they simply adopted the right policies, the compulsion would follow. At no time, however, does he attempt to sort out the political environment of the countries concerned and the forces and pressures operating on the political leadership. He does not differentiate between party politicians, administrators, planners or opposition groups, but lumps them all together as the elite. He seems to have a view of a well defined group of people with common goals permanently in office or at least in charge. Perhaps the easiest way to illustrate the difficulties of this analysis is to raise three questions.

First, what does it mean to say the elite is committed to the modernizing ideal? Are there not mutually contradictory and often obscure goals imbedded in the list of values? In Malaysia, for example, the problem of national consolidation often conflicts with the goal of an overall rise in productivity and the Malaysian elite has, to some extent, opted for consolidation at the expense of productivity. In Sukarno's Indonesia, national independence took first place to rationality and rising levels of living.

Professor Myrdal himself appears to have trouble with these conflicts, putting emphasis on rationality to the exclusion of other goals. For example, in his discussion of confrontation (218-19) he assumes no reason or logic to Sukarno's position and ignores the whole question of the value choices made by the political leadership. Again, with respect to the existence of bicameral legislatures in Indian states, Mr. Myrdal calls them a "luxury" without any investigation of what role they might possibly play in

integration or unity. His views on these matters are made clear in his discussion of Myron Weiner's analysis of Indian politics. (291-293). Professor Myrdal asserts that political pragmatism is not compatible with economic growth and the broadening of active political participation but he gives no argument that relates such behavior to his value assertions and goals. Politicians in his view seem to appear in office without any strings, or any need to do anything to remain in power.

Second, why are these states unwilling to use compulsion for output goals when many of them seem quite willing to use compulsion, censorship and, in many cases, extra-legal means to restrict opposition elites? With the exception of the Philippines and India, all the states involved have used implicit or explicit restrictions on the press and on the development of political organizations independent of the ruling group. And certainly the President's rule provision of the Indian Constitution indicates a recognition of the need for compulsion.

If the reason for not using compulsion is a commitment to the democratic ideal, then how is this possible? In addition, Myrdal never investigates the costs and risks of compulsion. Would not the requirements for police or administrative controls be rather heavy expenditures in these fields?

Third, and most important, how can political leadership create social discipline? To what extent does the leadership itself reflect a form of social discipline? In his discussion of controls for example, Myrdal seems to assume the governments will use non-discriminatory controls even though he makes clear such controls can play little role given the social structure and status requirements. The states do not use nondiscriminatory controls because "in the absense of anything like perfect markets, many transactions are not of the market type" and "price incentives are weak." Few people calculate in terms of cost and returns and if they do, their economic behavior is not primarily determined by these calculations. In a footnote, Myrdal cites an Indian scholar's statement that "self interest in the shape of desire of wealth is not absent, but it is not the only, nor principle, motor." (912).

What should people be "compelled" to do to change this attitude? One would assume that the same kind of detailed investigations of the assumptions of Western economists that Myrdal has provided, are required in the arena of value considerations and the response of the population. But what is lacking here is a systematic explanation of who is making the decisions, why they make the ones they do, and what forces influence their decisions.

Although the scope of the study extends from the South Asian states of India, Pakistan and Ceylon to Burma, Thailand, Malaysia and the Philippines, in fact most of the empirical data used to support the theoretical propositions is from the Indian case. This is particularly true of the political sections. When Myrdal refers to the elites of Asia, it appears he has in mind Indian intellectuals and, in fact, at one point he cites Nehru as the "ideal type Asian leader who articulated the position of other leaders. This reviewer would question the validity of the comparison, particularly with such diverse types as Sukarno, Magsaysay, Tunku Abdul Rahman, and Sarit Thanarat.

The depressing and frightening result of reading these volumes is to leave the reader with the knowledge that even with perfect information as to the levels of investment of labor and capital required and the interrelatedness of these with environment and resources, nothing will be accomplished without the active commitment and will of the political leadership, and their ability to understand and mobilize their populations. The failings in this regard are major and we know little of their causes.

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The Modernity of Tradition: Political Development in India. By Lloyd I. Rudolph and Susanne H. Rudolph. (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1967. Pp. 306. \$8.95.)

In the typologies of comparative politics, polar models have served to distinguish and heuristically analyze non-western and western systems, agraria and industria, tradition and modernity. Lloyd and Susanne Rudolph argue, however, that such ideal types, which assume that the components of one must necessarily be absent in the other, may be "serious obstacles to understanding social change and modernization." Modernity and tradition, in a dialectical rather than dichotomous relationship, infiltrate and transform each other; "The assumption that modernity and tradition are radically contradictary rests on a misdiagnosis of tradition as it is found in traditional societies, and a misapprehension of the relationship between them." The Rudolphs seek to accord tradition higher priority in the study of modernization, and, in the analytical gap between tradition and modernity, to explore those sectors of traditional Indian society that contain or express potentialities for change.

The Modernity of Tradition draws together and develops various themes explored by Lloyd and Susanne Rudolph over the past few years. The book contains three parts, each examining

an aspect of political development in India and unified by a concern for the dialectical relationship of modernity and tradition.

Part One, "Traditional Structures and Modern Politics: Caste," examines the changing structure and function of caste, contending that, as a vehicle for an expanding identity horizon, caste provides a link between tradition and modernity. The development of modern communications, the spread of literacy, and rising prosperity has contributed to the horizontal consolidation of caste communities in India and, as soliderity has increased, caste has been politicized and drawn into the political system as a major actor. The role of caste in modern Indian politics has been decried, by scholar and politician alike, as a vestige of "tribalism" and a fissiparous threat to national unity. Against this view, in a highly influential article in 1960, "The Political Role of India's Caste Associations," Lloyd and Susanne Rudolph argued that as a channel of communication, representation, and leadership, caste provides a potential link between the mass electorate and the modern democratic process by making it comprehensible in traditional terms to a population still largely politically illiterate. The argument was developed, and in some ways modified, in the pages of this journal (LIX, December, 1965), in analyzing "the democratic incarnation of caste."

The modernity of Tradition, in an expanded treatment of these earlier themes, analyzes the relationship of caste and politics in terms of three types of political mobilization: vertical, horizontal, and differential. "Vertical mobilization is the marshalling of political support by traditional notables in local societies that are organized and integrated by rank, mutual dependence, and the legitimacy of traditional authority." These vertical relations of authority and cleavage characterized the traditional caste system of the Indian village.

"Horizontal mobilization involves the marshalling of popular political support by class or community leaders and their specialized organizations, · · · introducing a new pattern of cleavage by challenging the vertical solidarities and structures of traditional societies." Horizontal mobilization of caste is reflected in the "paracommunities," formation associations, voluntary associations drawn from the ascriptive reservoir of traditional caste. At this level, the Randolphs argue, tradition and modernity meet and fuse. The caste association becomes the mechanism of equality. "By initiating, managing, and encouraging the efforts of lower castes to become twice-born, to don the sacred thread symbolizing high ritual rank and culture, it in effect if not in intention drains the caste hierarchy of meaning by homogenizing and democratizing it."

"Differential mobilization involves the marshalling of direct and indirect support by political parties and other integrative structures) from viable, but internally differentiated, communities through parallel appeals to ideology, sentiment, and interest." Competitive politics stimulates the formation of the caste association, the democratic incarnation of caste, but at the same time, as the caste differentiates internally, political parties weaken caste organization by articulating and mobilizing the divisions within them. Modern politics paradoxically "appears to be an instrument for both the revival and the supersession of traditional society."

The transformation of caste must also involve "a profound change in the nature of human sensibility." Here the Rudolphs are concerned with the spread of fellow feeling, with the future of equality. The examine the mechanisms of caste mobility and change and conclude that the diffusion of political power, democratization of twice-born culture and status, expansion of ascriptive boundaries, westernization, and secularization have brought Indians "closer to political equality, cultural homogeneity, and structural unity." The test of fellow feeling is untouchability. In the struggle for equality, protective discrimination, as in special benefits and in the reservation of seats for untouchables, has to a degree yielded access to economic opportunity and political power, but, as the Rudolphs admit, most village untouchables remain subject to the traditional forms of domination by the upper castes upon whom they are economically dependent. They argue, however, that continued private commitment to tradition is not incompatible with modernization, but, in fact, may facilitate it, as long as it remains private, by providing adaptive insti-

Part Two, "The Traditional Roots of Charisma: Gandhi," explores, in the life and personality of the nationalist leader, the transformation of traditional ideals for modern political purposes. As in his life, so in his memory, Gandhi most normally evokes extreme reactions-either one of fawning adoration of of jaundiced skepticism. The Rudolphs, with sensitivity and balance, avoid either extreme. He is at once saintly, yet profoundly, foibly human; ethereally idealistic, yet organizationally astute. The Rudolph's deal little with Gandhi's role in the struggle for independence. His most important contribution, they contend, is what he did for Indian character. "Gandhi's leadership, regardless of its objective success or failure, had important subjective consequences, repairing wounds in self-esteem inflicted by generations of imperial subjection, restoring courage and potency, recruiting and mobilizing new constituencies and leaders, helping India acquire national coherence."

Part Three, "Legal Cultures and Social Change: Panchayats, Pandits, and Professionals," analyzes the relationship between the parochial system of customary law, and the national, Anglo-Indian legal system, combining norms of Brahmanical law with the procedure and values of British law.

At a time when India's future seems so unsertain and its problems so overpowering, many scholars may find it difficult to share the basic optimism of the Rudolphs. India has entered "the dangerous decades," but the predictions of national disintegration and the collapse of democracy have not been fulfilled. With all of its difficulties, India continues to manifest remarkable stability. The Rudolph argument suggests that this stability may be due to the relationship between tradition and modernity, to the modernity of tradition, its resiliance and capacity to transform itself. It may be, however, that a perhaps temporary stability has been purchased at the price of failure to achieve the fundamental transformation necessary to sustain a viable and developing nation.

The Rudolphs avoid the dangers of the mutually exclusive bi-polar model of tradition and modernity. Although they never fully conceptualize the two elements of the dialectical process they examine, the book, calls for serious re-examination of the established notions of modernity and provides an incisive and refreshing analysis of the area to which our theoretical lens must move. The Modernity of Tradition, written with sensitivity to that which is unique in India, is guided by a fundamental concern for the process of change and is an important contribution to our understanding of modernization.

Peasant Communism in Southern Italy. By SIDNEY G. TARROW. (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1967. Pp. 389. \$8.75.)

Relating socio-economic patterns to political processes is one of the major problems facing the students of government, especially comparative government. The changes that take place in political parties as they operate in different milieus, particularly parties that have linkages to international movements, create other fascinating issues. This has been especially true of

the international communist movement. In this regard close attention has been paid to the national variations among communist parties, variations often attributed to different national political cultures. But there is no reason to suppose that the same kinds of variations would not be present within a nation if substantially different regional cultures were present. It would be necessary to demonstrate, however, that the political cultures of the regions did indeed differ substantially and that these differences were the product of underlying contrasts in the socio-economic-cultural milieus.

This is precisely what Sidney Tarrow in his extremely interesting, and in some respects fascinating, book on southern Italian communism has tried to do. In addition, he has tried to show that a national strategy developed by the Italian Communist Party at the end of World War II. called the "Italian Way to Socialism," was elaborated and implemented for northern Italy, where it perhaps could be justified, and then imposed by the Party on southern Italy, where substantially different milieu doomed it to failure. At the same time this imposition prevented the southern Party from elaborating a strategy which might have been appropriate to southern conditions.

I remain basically unconvinced of Tarrow's theses. I do not believe the political culture of Italy is so dualistic. Where Tarrow sees a fundamental difference of kind, I see only a difference of degree. Where he sees sharp discontinuities, I see gradations. I agree with the Sicilian writer Sebastiano Aglianò, who points out that the social characteristics of his native island are the characteristics of Italian society in general, but merely more extreme. The statistical data collected by Almond and Verba for The Civic Culture buttress this viewpoint. In many significant categories, political cognition, political efficacy, and administrative efficacy, the differences between north and south are not very wide. Nor are they significant when it comes to measuring the qualities of Italians as political participants or political subjects. In the north and the south the Italians are poor participants and poor subjects. In both parts of the country they are politically alienated.

In making his case Tarrow exaggerates the modernity and rationality of the north and to some extent the extreme backwardness of the south, based on a traditional-ascriptive social order. To do this he overrates the importance of some statistical differences. For example, when discussing the career patterns of national Communist leaders he writes "While an average of 24.8 percent of the [Communist] national leaders from the Center-North had held local CGIL

posts in 1964, 31.6 percent had been CGIL leaders in the South." To me the important information is that in all of Italy over two-thirds of these national leaders had not held local CGIL posts.

The characteristic of cynicism is not peculiar to the South. The Florentines are its historic and present masters. Neither is the furbo-fesso syndrome (the high value placed on being sly and the shame borne by a sucker). The padronedipendente (master domination of dependents) pattern is present in the most advanced parts of the north. Enrico Mattei ran the huge ENI public holding corporation in a personal and autocratic manner; Vittorio Valletta ran Fiat, the largest private Italian firm in the same fashion. The partisan intervention by prefects in the politics and elections in communes and provinces is well known. But it is not confined to the South. It dates back to the days of Cayour in Piedmont after 1848. Tarrow writes that in the North the prefect "is a humble functionary whose duties are performed quietly and apolitically." I doubt that there is a single mayor in northern Italy who would subscribe to that statement, especially the Communist mayors of the red belt.

What I have written is not to reduce the worth of Tarrow's work. On the contrary, I consider it all the more valuable, for many of his acute and penetrating insights have an even wider application than he is willing to grant them. His discussion of "clientelism" in southern politics, a crucial aspect of the political culture, is relevant here. In my opinion the relationship of the Communist leaders of the cooperatives in Emilia-Romagna and Tuscany to their members and employees is essentially clientelistic. Tarrow emphasizes the distinction between the old-style clientelism of the southern notables and the new clientelism of the party bureaucrats. The new style is "Patronage channeled through an organization rather than through a chain of individuals." But to me an organization is a chain of individuals (more tightly or more loosely structured) and the party bureaucrat is a new notable added to the others, whose manipulation of clienteles and patronage is important in all of Italy.

Tarrow tends to waver in his definition of the North. Sometimes he means all of Italy above the regions of Lazio and Abruzzi; on other occasions he is really describing the northwest industrialized triangle of Liguria, Piedmont and western Lombardy. At times he makes the distinctions between northwest, northeast, and center-north clear; at other times he does not. There are political differences between western and eastern Lombardy, and between Emilia-

Romagna and the Veneto. There are also many Souths, and sometimes he is clear about this while othertimes not. Western Sicily is different from eastern Sicily because, if for no other reason, the Mafia is present in the west while it is absent in the east.

I am bothered by two of his positions on the causes and consequences of political modernization. He believes modernization of the South can only come from substantial industrialization. I feel that modernization does not necessarily require this: Denmark is an example of an advanced country based on modern agriculture and commerce, but little industrialization. This is an important issue because the feasibility of the major industrialization of southern Italy is currently being debated by Italian economists and industrialists. Tarrow believes that modernization creates coherent class and group distinctions, simplifying conflicts and providing natural economic and political alignments. I feel the opposite is true; the more modern the society the less clear the social and class identifications. At the theoretical extreme of advancement everybody is middle class.

Tarrow gives us a first-rate analysis of the thought of Antonio Gramsci, the patron saint of Italian communism. He makes a major contribution in showing us how Palmiro Togliatti and his followers departed from Gramsci while claiming to follow in his footsteps. Togliatti's populistic alliance of all social groups and elements, excluding only the large monopolists, is far different from Gramsci's revolutionary alliance between northern workers and southern peasants. Tarrow believes that Togliatti's strategy, imposed from the north onto the south, threw away the revolutionary potential of landless farm laborers and desperately poor share tenants in the south. Instead, it achieved at best, through its emphasis on land reform and the breaking up of the great estates, an increase in Communist votes but also an enlarged class of basically conservative peasant proprietors, many of whom would be added to the clienteles of Christian Democracy. Although the question is academic since the alternative was not attempted, I doubt that a strategy of revolutionary alliance could have worked in the south. National and international forces would have blocked it. It also, would have required a revolutionary working class. But, as the Communist leader Giorgio Amendola has complained, the Italian workers, even those in the Communist-controlled unions, have neither a revolutionary consciousness nor a general political consciousness.

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Popular Government in America: Foundations and Principles. By Charles S. Hyneman with the collaboration of Charles E. Gilbert. (New York: Atherton Press, 1968. Pp. 320. \$8.50.)

In this thoughtful and stimulating book a mature political scientist reexamines some of the basic problems of democratic government. His task is guided by a conscious theoretical commitment: "to prepare the ground for theory making, and perhaps to take a first few steps in proposing theory about democratic government." Hyneman's "concern" is with "a political system in which the people have effective means for expressing expectations and preferences and for inducing compliance with their demands." He seeks to provide an "analysis," and to offer some "perspectives," to help stu-dent and scholar alike clarify "the basic rationale of popular government in the United States " He is particularly concerned with the basic proposition "that the democratic character of a political system is determined by finding answers to a three-part question: How much of the population shares, in how much of the critical decision-making, with how much impact or influence."

The essays in the book—which were pieced together, revised, and supplemented with the help of Charles Gilbert—cover five main topics: I. Democratic Ideals; II. Popular Government; III. The Structure of Authority; IV. Limited Government; and V. Democracy on Trial. Under these headings Hyneman clarifies the social requisites of democratic government in terms of three key concepts: individual and group autonomy, the commitment to equality, and commonality. Autonomy involves free choice for the individual and a pluralist social structure. Equality involves the concept of equity, of fairness, of the opportunity which permits free men to realize their potential and contribute to the common good. Commonality is a term Hyneman employs to emphasize common beliefs, purposes, and methods, and includes the mutual acceptance of the rules of the democratic game. Professor Hyneman also identifies two systems of demand and response which figure importantly in determining how much of the population shares in how much of the critical decisionmaking with how much influence. One of these he calls the group competition thesis or the pluralist demand-response system. The other he calls the equalization of influence thesis or the populist demand-response system. These two theses are used to illuminate varying aspects of popular government throughout the book. Hyneman also stresses the crucial role of

the "critical electorate" and the ways in which various types of voters (e.g., issue oriented, candidate oriented, and party oriented voters) exercise control of government. He is vitally interested in "distributed self-government," his term for the division of power among national, state, and local political communities. He explores key questions concerning the authority, fitness, and answerability of legislative representatives; repeats his earlier professional concern about (indeed, his fear of) Presidential power and an inadequately controlled Administration; probes the ways by which limited government can be made more secure; raises serious questions about the price of free speech and the problems of democratic self-protection; and concludes with an analysis of the Negroes' challenge, the contemporary movement of protest and resistance, and the continuing task of preserving democracy's foundations.

Hyneman argues that the treatment of black men in America constitutes a serious challenge to personal and group autonomy, to equality, and to commonality. Yet although he recognizes the legitimacy of the black man's effort to secure first-class citizenship, his focus is less on the effort required to bring American practice intc accord with American ideals and democratic requisites than it is on the need to probe the bounds of permissible protest and resistance. His operational presumptions are in favor of verbal protest and against refusal to comply with the law. He is very much concerned with identifying the protesters, their objectives, strategies and tactics, and the consequences of their actions. He endorses protest and resistance which will gain for black men and women not only the right to vote but a better life in all aspects; but, although he is willing to accept the sting and inconvenience involved in this protest, he opposes violation of the law or even non-violent action that provokes violence.

In Hyneman's judgment, commonality is in greater jeopardy today than autonomy or equality. As he is more sympathetic to antisubversive legislation to preserve democratic government, so he is less sympathetic to the "communicating elite" whose bias, distortion, and partisanship—he holds—corrode that moderate leadership and that spirit of toleration essential to commonality.

This somewhat selective summary of his thesis and argument does not, alas, do justice to his consistent concern for theory. Throughout the book he employs thoughtful questions, simple models, and reasoned argument to explore how theory may be employed in illuminating democratic government. Throughout Hyneman emphasizes the need to develop and em-

ploy theory to clarify and appraise competing values, to guide empirical research, and to facilitate sound political judgment on troublesome questions of public policy.

Hyneman, himself, is clearly partial to a politics of compromise and toleration, to the equalization of influence thesis (the populist demand-response system), to Congressional (rather than to Presidential) power, to "distributed self-government" (rather than to the concentration of power in Washington), to the legitimacy of careful anti-subversive legislation designed to protect popular government itself, to a more conservative interpretation of the bounds to free speech, and Negro protest and resistance. Yet his more conservative liberalism should not obscure the value of his analysis at key points, his efforts to advance the cause of democratic theory, and his seasoned judgments on many of the controversial problems of popular government. Those to his left politically may challenge his views on free speech and subversion, or on the Negro Revolt, or on current movements of protest and resistance, but-perhaps ironically—they may (in the light of the war in Vietnam and other exercises of power under President Johnson) share his misgivings over the dangers of inadequately controlled Presidential power. In fairness to Professor Hyneman's detached, calm, and non-partisan analysis, I hasten to add, he does not illustrate his fears of Presidential power by reference to Vietnam or President Johnson.

However, whether we agree or disagree with his critique, we can profitably probe democratic theory and practice in many of the ways he suggests. His book constitutes a healthy antidote for much of the uncritical, unhistorical, unphilosophical, and self-righteous propaganda of partisans of the New Left. Their very sound commitment to authentic human beings, to civil rights, to the Negro, to the poor, to enhanced democratic participation in political and social life, to honest institutions, and to a speedy end to the terrible and tragic war in Vietnam, may be served by their greater willingness to explore democratic theory by engaging in a more genuine dialogue nourished by many of the normative, empirical, and prudential considerations that Professor Hyneman raises. Such a dialogue, moreover, would be mutually beneficial.

In such a debate, those on the Left might cogently urge Professor Hyneman to adopt a broader view of the citizen's role in the polity, and not to focus so sharply on voting and other aspects of the formally legal government. They might suggest that his own logic in favor of "participative democracy" should move him

toward a more radical diagnosis of racism in America and ways to overcome it. They might point out that his commitment to the equalization of influence thesis most definitely requires him to ask how the influence of the poor can be enhanced? And can it be enhanced without increased power for the President and the national government? They might also raise the question, "What price commonality?" as Professor Hyneman has raised the questions "What price free speech" and "What price protest and resistance?" They might defend many of the "communicating elite" for challenging unhealthy aspects of the status quo even if this elite's exaggerated rhetoric sometimes violates a gentlemanly ethos.

Hyneman, on the other hand, might underscore the need in a democratic society to balance the preferred and the feasible. He might emphasize the dangers of intolerance. He might note that the unrighteous as well as the righteous may violate the law and resort to violence. He might challenge the power of even the righteous minority. He might emphasize (to their delight) that fundamental policy (e.g., the undeclared war in Vietnam) must be made and changed only with the concurrence of the representative assembly. He might question efforts of some on the "righteous Left" to silence those with whom they passionately disagree or to subvert a lawful institution (e.g., a University) because some of its practices are objectionable to them.

The ensuing debate, if carried on in accord with Hyneman's guide lines (e.g., who protests? what are their objectives? strategy and tactics? what are the consequences of their actions?), might be very productive. It would certainly emphasize dramatically the several tasks that Professor Hyneman sees as cardinal tasks for the political theorist in a democratic society: the clarification of democratic values, meaningful understanding of significant empirical political patterns, and the sharpening of prudential judgment on key issues of public policy.

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Prayer in the Public Schools: Law and Attitude Change. By WILLIAM K. Muir, Jr. (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1967. Pp. 170. \$5.95.)

The Dynamics of Compliance: Supreme Court Decision-Making from a New Perspective. By RICHARD M. JOHNSON. (Evanston: Northwestern University Press, 1967. Pp. 176. \$5.95.)

It is of course a truism for students of public law that Supreme Court policies are generally not self-executing. But only within the last decade has there been much effort to study systematically the impact of Court decisions and the nature of compliance to Court policies. Increasingly such studies have been theoretically oriented and concerned with developing rigorous methodology. This has involved, in part, a concern with attitudes and public opinion and the use of survey techniques. Prayer in the Public Schools by William Muir and The Dynamics of Compliance by Richard Johnson are recent studies of this genre.

Both books are impact/compliance studies of the Supreme Court's 1963 prayer decision (Abington School District v. Schempp) on a local public school system. Both are theoretically oriented and employ survey techniques. And both are welcome additions to the developing literature.

William Muir's principal interest was with certain attitudes of the public educational elite of a medium-size city he calls "Midland" as those attitudes were affected by the policy pronouncement in Schempp and the subsequent voluntary decision of the Midland school board to comply. Muir interviewed his sample of 28 school officials both six months before and about eight months after Schempp. The reinterviews gave Muir the opportunity to compare pre-Schempp attitudes to post-Schempp attitudes and thus to attempt to answer the broad questions "Can law change deep-rooted attitudes?" (p. 1) and "under what circumstances [does] law change them positively?" (p. 3).

In answering these questions Muir heavily relied upon cognitive dissonance theory. For others than those who were "vindicated," Muir hypothesized and then found his respondents' patterns of public and private (attitudinal) response to "the law" as having been one of four types. Muir assumes that the immediate motive for the varying patterns of perceptual and attitudinal response is the reduction of cognitive dissonance which itself is assumed to occur after the individual commits himself to compliance or non-compliance. Muir's task was to explain why his respondents demonstrated one response pattern rather than another. To get at this he examined and classified his respondents pre and post Schempp responses to questions concerning their role perceptions or "self-images" (Muir's term) concerning schoolhouse religion, their specific policy preferences concerning religious practices in the public schools, and their attitudes toward law and the Supreme Court. Muir further relied on "armchair" psychological analyses of his respondents. The findings are many and should be of interest to scholars in this field.

Some mention should be made of Muir's "armchair" analyses. (Muir himself, in a different context, provides a convenient definition of this term: "my intuition about the respondents, an intuition which was tutored equally by their words and by their gestures, facial expressions, and hesitancies, by nonverbal cues that become invisible on the typewritten record" p. 62). Muir goes about this with a novelist's eye and neo-Freudian's gleam. Although these analyses are imaginative and occasionally persuasive, one can perhaps be skeptical of their veracity. Muir purports to have discerned "the mental frames" (p. 35) and "perceptual habits" (p. 31) of his respondents on the basis of two interviews. Of one principal, for example, we are told that the Church "provided her a picture of reality which gave a context to some of her perceptions" (p. 34). Of a Jewish principal who Muir claims (although on what basis it is unclear) "had lost the respect of Jews" (p. 35), we are told "he committed himself to an almost paranoic view of the world in which he was the victim" (p. 35). Lest the reader conclude that the city school system was bursting with neurotics. Muir notes

The majority had its "door open," its "ear to the ground." Its perceptual habits were healthy, not morbid. (p. 35)

At another point we are told that "The Midland staff became angry at the prayer ban" and "took its agression out on the Supreme Court" (p. 118). In short, armchair psychology is one "methodology" which must be cautiously used if it is to be taken seriously. In a few instances (e.g. those cited above) such caution is lacking. Yet it should also be noted that Muir skillfully interweaves the armchair psychology with his more empirically based analyses to provide plausible (if not altogether convincing) answers to his research questions.

Muir, with commendable candor, recognizes methodological limitations of his study. He does this in several places in the text (pp. 47, 62, 73 n. 1) and in a methodological postscript in which he notes his study's "methodological looseness which should challenge the reader to question both the findings and the generalizations" (p. 139). He also frankly reveals "I frequently created and employed a method because its results corroborated conclusions I had previously intuited" (p. 140). Yet he also argues that "methodological makeshift... is justifiable and appropriate in venturing into a field not previously studied" (p. 140) and it is difficult to disagree especially when the "makeshift" is as imaginative as that constructed by Muir.

Muir's emphasis is on the psychology of compliance. Richard Johnson's book although concerned with this is also concerned with the politics of compliance. Indeed, Johnson's purpose is to provide a general framework in which to study compliance and to present a test case of that framework with the issue of schoolhouse religion in a rural Illinois school district comprising the towns he calls "Eastville-Westville."

Utilizing communications theory, Johnson analyzes the Supreme Court as a "message source," the substance of the schoolhouse religion "messages" in terms of the incentives to induce compliance contained within them, and both the formal and extralegal transmission of the "messages." Johnson examines the extralegal transmission to "Eastville-Westville" by way of a content analysis of the area newspapers and other media.

Cognitive balance theory is used to explain individual reactions to the transmitted messages both before ("cognitive imbalance") and after ("cognitive dissonance") the individual selects a course of action. Johnson's research design, unlike Muir's, was not attuned to investigate attitude change but rather the attitudes held by 176 respondents to a mail questionnaire almost a year after Schempp was decided and months after the school superintendent had achieved compliance within the school district. Johnson classified the respondents as to their modes of response and found seven types. Using a factor analysis of questionnaire responses and a scoring method built on it, Johnson further explored the bases of acceptance or rejection of the Court's policy associated with each response type.

One of Johnson's major conclusions is that the legitimacy and expertise bases of Supreme Court power are sufficient to induce compliance by those who acknowledge these bases despite their private disagreement with Court policy. This leads Johnson to advocate the furtherance of The Judicial Myth lest "important bases of Supreme Court power...be seriously undermined" (p. 150). This conclusion, however, may be premature. First it is questionable whether a disbelief in the myth is necessarily incompatible with a belief in the Court's legitimacy and expertise. More refined questions aimed at differentiating attitudes towards and the nature of the Court's systemic role from the myth per se would be desirable. Secondly, Muir's study suggests that those who privately disagreed with the Court's ruling but nevertheless complied with it did so not because of a belief in the myth but because of other reasons e.g. exaggeration of the Court's power and the perception of compulsion, social pressures, a desire to minimize community conflict. Third, one can conclude from both the Johnson and Muir studies that crucial to compliance was a key individual in the school system (the school superintendent in one, a lawyer on the school board in the other) willing to take the initiative in securing compliance because he strongly agreed with the Court's ruling but not necessarily the myth. In brief, the necessity for belief in the myth for compliance has yet to be demonstrated.

Both Muir and Johnson do not question the validity of the theory they utilize. Muir states in his preface "Creation and proof of dissonance theory are the psychologist's job, not the political scientist's" (p. viii). But this begs the question. Whether and to what extent cognitive imbalance existed when the prayer ruling was announced, and whether and to what degree cognitive dissonance existed subsequent to the individual decision to comply or not comply are empirical questions which should be recognized as such. Muir's findings (but not Johnson's) lend some support to cognitive dissonance theory but further research must be done by political scientists if such theory is to be accepted as a component of a compliance model.

It should be understood, however, that both Muir and Johnson through their imaginative research designs and creative use of theory have pushed the study of impact/compliance an important step forward. They have produced major studies which can be expected to have an impact on the field.

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Uncertain Mandate. By Ernest W. Lefever. (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins Press, 1967. Pp. 254. \$7.50.)

Political Protest in the Congo. By HERBERT Weiss. (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1965. Pp. 326. \$8.50.)

Locked in uncomfortable embrace in this review are two quite disparate studies. They share the Congo (Kinshasa) as subject matter, but the similarity ends there. Herbert Weiss places one of the most important of the 1960 generation of Congolese political parties under minute scrutiny, while Ernest Lefever is primarily concerned with the functioning of the United Nations peace-keeping machinery in the Congo from 1960 to 1964.

The Weiss study is by far the more valuable of the two. Between its covers are the results of more than half a decade of painstaking research, begun in 1959 when the author was associated with the M.I.T. Center for Interna-

tional Studies. The major part of his field investigation took place in 1959-1960; he arrived at a particularly strategic moment, and enjoyed an intimacy of access into several of the most important Congolese political movements which is most unlikely to be available again to an overseas scholar. The present study focuses upon the Parti Solidaire Africain (PSA), a militant movement which at its height in late 1959 and the first part of 1960 was beyond doubt a mass single party within the geographical confines of Kwilu District, in southwestern Congo. The Weiss kit of photocopying equipment rarely ceased operation during his Kwilu work and an implausible wealth of party documents were amassed for the study; indeed, as he confesses in the introduction, his collection was in the end better than that of the party itself in many respects.

The central theme which Weiss distills from his vast stores of data is rural radicalism. In the interesting autobiography of the book which is offered by way of introduction, he retraces the evolution of his thinking in this regard. Initially, he shared the then orthodox view that radical nationalism was the artifact of a new, urban-oriented, Western-educated elite group, which drew in its train a reluctant, apathetic rural mass by charisma and cajolery. But his observation of rural organization by the PSA, and other militant parties such as the ABAKO, and Mouvement National Congolais/ Lumumba (MNC/L) suggested that this model needed to be stood upon its head. In Kwilu, in Lower Congo, in Orientale province party organizers were all but submerged by the radical pressures from their rural constituents.

There can be no doubt as to the accuracy of the author's perceptions in the regions where his data was gathered. Further research into the origins of modern nationalism elsewhere in Africa also lend some support to the Weiss arguments, in particular work of a group of historians at Dar es Salaam. Yet nagging doubts remain about the rural radicalism hypothesis. The highly centralized colonial system fashioned by Belgium assured a relative uniformity of experience in different areas of the Congo, yet the Kwilu pattern of response was by no means uniform for the whole country, although it might eventually have become so. There are enormous temporal fluctuations to explain as well; retracing Weiss's footsteps two years later, the reviewer found apathy, disillusion and social demobilization where Weiss had seen effervescent ebullience. The pendulum took another violent swing 18 months later, when the Mulele rebellion swept a portion of the area, and this in turn has been succeeded by renewed quiescent despair. That the tensions of enforced change and oppression have secreted a volatile protest potential is clear. But far more needs to be ascertained about the conditions in which it becomes activated into overt group behavior, the organizational form in which it becomes manifest, and the determinants of the system of values through which frustration is expressed.

But the contribution of the Weiss study goes far beyond the issue of rural radicalism. As a detailed exploration of the birth and growth of a major political party, it is an invaluable case study, made particularly important by the fact that the PSA was not a capital-centered movement. The process of giving organizational form, however shortlived, to the volatile sentiments of the countryside is illuminating. During its brief life as an effective party, the PSA had two election campaigns to confront; in the first, it organized and enforced a boycott, and in the second it had the difficult task of establishing lists for a complex proportional representation system, with both national and provincial seats at stake. The study stops at indepencence; one might have hoped for some account of the phase of disintegration of the PSA rural organization in the months following, or its life as a parliamentary clique in Kinshasa.

Weiss proposes a typology of the major Congolese parties which is of considerable interest and comparative value in its own right. He goes far beyond the mass v. patron dichotomy which dominated early literature on African parties, and suggests ten attributes which may be used to establish a party profile, including style, duration, orbit, sociological base, and nature of leadership.

A companion study on the development of the MNC/Lumumba is promised for the near future. There seems every reason to assume that it will be of the same high quality as the PSA study, and to wish it an accelerated gestation.

The Lefever volume is not in the same class. The author, now a staff member of the Brookings Institution, began his study while in the employ of the Institute for Defense Analyses. There is a substantial overlap between the present work, and an earlier Lefever study, Crisis in the Congo: A U.N. Force in Action (Washington: Brookings Institution, 1965), although Uncertain Mandate does focus more explicitly on the roles of the various national actors. The author has circled the globe in search of material, pursuing prominent participants to the ends of the earth; respondents were bagged from Rome to New Delhi, from Ottawa to Addis Ababa. Curiously, field work in the Congo itself appears to have been very cursory, and Lefever

seems to have interrogated very few Congolese, which perhaps explains the inadequacy of the treatment of Congolese internal politics.

The primary purpose of the study is to investigate the practicality of multi-national peace-keeping forces through the U.N. mechanism. He explores in turn the rule of the General Secretary, the host country, the United States, the Soviet Union, Britain, France, Belgium, and the smaller states in the U.N. operation in the Congo from 1960 to 1964. He has been thorough in his coverage of U.N. official documents, and has interviewed a large percentage of the international personnel associated with ONUC. The official sponsorship of the initial phase of the investigation presumably assured him access to an array of classified American materials. All of these resources ensure the basis for a useful summary of the U.N. operation. Lefever concludes, plausibly, that the Congo experiment clearly demonstrated the limitations of the U.N. mechanism in this type of crisis. The U.N. could and did restrict the capacity of local power contenders, with their international allies, to impose their will by force. Physical force remained a key determinant of outcomes, but its operation was much more subtle than, say, in Nigeria today. But the breathless expectations of 1960 on the East River—that the U.N. could serve a helpless new state as a benevolent colonial surrogate without colonial authority—were utterly disappointed. As Lefever suggests, the U.N. achievement was by no means negligible; for an investment of \$411 million in cash, and the human resources of a large number of highly competent international civil servants, the Congo gained four years of breathing space. While the Congo situation by 1964 may not have been very good, the grisly slaughter in Nigeria suggests how much worse it might have been.

The book would have benefited from a more detached perspective from the author. Lefever seems to have little doubt that United States interests have a special sanctity, and that the best evaluative standard for a multi-national operation is the "goodness of fit" between its performance and U.S. policy. On this score card, the U.N. in the Congo receives high ratings. Lefever confirms the observations of Soviet and radical Afro-Asian commentators that ONUC was dominated by an Americanled coalition. Through this looking-glass, the support for Lumumba by radical African states was "simplistic" (p. 169); African states in using the U.N. to achieve their national objectives are guilty of hypocrisy and a double standard (p. 218), while the U.S. apparently

obeys the dictates of a higher law in doing the same thing; U.N. officials were exhorted to display the "courage to withstand Communist and neutralist pressures" (p. 147), presumably saesoned by the good sense to truckle immediately to Western pressures. A modicum of empathy would have softened many of the harsher judgements, and produced conclusions more persuasive to those outside of the official policy-making community.

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Nomos X: Representation. Edited By J. Ro-LAND PENNOCK AND JOHN W. CHAPMAN. (New York: Atherton Fress, 1968. Pp. 317. \$6.95.)

What happens when 19 diverse intellectuals, representing political science (including two Polish Marxists), law, philosophy and mathematics, write on the concept of representation? Perhaps surprisingly, a rather high degree of consensus emerges. The mandate-independence controversies of the past are rejected, both empirically and normatively. Complex and diverse issues both compel and make it desirable that the representative act with independence. As Marek Sobolewski argues, the Marxist concept of the mandate is inadequate for present political realities. But the representative is not only increasingly independent vis-a-vis his constituency. There has been a decline in party discipline as well. The range of issues makes it difficult for a party to present an integrated program which will hold all of its members on every or almost every issue. Consequently control over the representative is not to be found in specific acts of party discipline or in votes by the electorate, although these continue to have some influence. The representative is both informed of popular desires and controlled in more general ways. A variety of pressure groups and channels of communication exist to transmit the desires of the people to the representative. But he is not strictly determined. He knows what his constituents want, and undoubtedly he will be affected. But he also knows that the interests of that larger constituency, the nation, must be considered and that the prevailing issue-ignorance of the public free him to consider what, in fact, would be good for the country. This responsible responsiveness is reinforced or hindered by the concept of representation held by the representative and by the public. At least to some degree, he is independent if he considers that his role demands independence and responsible if he feels he ought to be responsible. Conversely, he may fail to consider wider interests if, as David Apter suggests, either he or his constituents have an inadequate notion of his role. Roles formed in an industrial setting but transferred to a nonindustrial one may unduly tax the political system. A plunder psychology may develop which demands immediate need-satisfaction where what is required is long-range planning. Or, as Eric Nordlinger argues, the constituents may have a mandate concept of the representative's role and, accordingly, be deeply suspicious of his attempts to act outside his mandate. This suspicion may endanger the legitimacy of his actions and, therewith, the very principle of representation itself.

What emerges, then, from the Tenth Yearbook of the American Society for Legal and Political Philosophy is a pluralistic concept of representation which is admirably summarized in "Political Representation: An Overview" by J. Roland Pennock. It also shows up in the rather startling frequency with which the Supreme Court's reapportionment decisions are criticized. Charles Black, Stuart Brown, Lewis Dexter and Robert Dixon follow diverse approaches and arguments in arriving at the same general conclusion: Reapportionment was necessary but the Court's opinions were careless, thoughtless, and simplistic. As Brown argues, the Court opted for one theory of representation without any sufficient reason and that theory, a radical egalitarianism linked to the concept of a mandate, is precisely the theory rejected throughout the volume. Dixon points out, morevoer, that the Court tried to correct substantive evils with a formalistic egalitarianism. In doing so, the Court embraced an unrestricted majoritarianism which may well endanger minority rights. Only Donald Stokes defends the Court. As he sees it the Court's decision to make one man, one vote the criteria for each house in the states will strengthen party control which is necessary for efficient government which, in turn, is necessary to insure governmental legitimacy. Unfortunately Stokes' arguments sound tired and, in general, do not meet the objections raised by the Court's critics. (The mathematical implications of weighted voting and one man, one vote are also considered in papers by William Riker, Lloyd Shaplev and Robert Nozick, which in general continue the criticisms of the Court.)

It is necessary to express some reservations about this heady consensus over the virtues of pluralism. One finds it disturbing that so much of the discussion should have centered on the Court's reapportionment decisions when so little is said about the more interesting challenges raised by Negro disaffection and alienation from pluralistic democracy. What of the

tendency toward withdrawal into homogeneous communities? More generally, what about the problems implicit in voter ignorance, apathy. and indifference? The issues raised by Black nationalists, by the radical left as well as some on the right, ought really to have received more serious consideration (even granting that the papers are the outgrowth of the Association's 1965 meeting). Very little attention is paid to what ought the represented to want and expect from government. What ought to be the ends pursued by government? One suspects that many of the writers would agree with Sobolewski that class interests, i.e., economic considerations, are the main determinants of voting behavior and the reflection of popular desires. But such crass materialism is not even compatible with Marx's fuller notion of alienation. The problem of what the individual does and ought to want hinges on what one thinks man ought to be. Is politics intended to contribute to the growth of the individual, to the fulfillment of his identity—an identity which includes but transcends merely economic needs? How much of a person's identity ought to be or can be represented? Julius Cohen does touch on these problems and suggests their complexity when he remarks that "there is somehow a social dimension to the identity of the principal ... his identity is not exhausted merely by treating him as Mill once did, as an isolated independent entity." (p. 47) It may be, when all is said and done, that the issues raised by the new left and the Black radicals are only bread and butter economic issues—though one suspects, or hopes, that there is something more to it than that.

One must be fair. Some attention is given to the procedural problems of representation which have been raised by the dissidents. Joseph Witherspoon considers methods of increasing popular participation in the bureaucratic process since the legislative process, in fact, so often begins in the bureaucracy where problems are defined and programs formulated. As he points out, citizen involvement improves the flow of information not only to but from the government, hopefully improving the programs and gaining more acceptance for them. Both the Poles, but especially Witold Zakrzewski, grapple with the manner of increasing citizen involvement through a variety of local governments (though given recent developments in Poland there is a hollow ring to their remarks). The importance of involvement is suggested by Apter's argument that a hierarchy with insufficient participation and a low flow of information increases the likelihood of coercive governmental action since coercion is often a response to uncertainty. But throughout the emphasis tends to be on questions of govermental stability rather than on what the goals of governments and men ought to be. Perhaps only Harvey Mansfield, Jr. fully raises the more general questions. Mansfield argues, contrary to current scholarly opinion, that representative government is a modern innovation, decisively different from premodern government. All premodern government, regardless of the form, was government by divine right. In rejecting divine right, in the name of freedom and toleration, modern political philosophy rejected the political relevance of man's noblest aspirations. "Modern representation requires a representable society consecrated by an undemanding god, a society without aspirations." (p. 73) Unfortunately, the general failure of the other essays to discuss modern representative government in terms of man's nobler aspirations may give support to Mansfield's arguments. There are some, however, who hope that it is not impossible to combine the nobility and the virtues of classical and medieval life and thought with the freedom and diversity of modern representative government.

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Cuba and the United States: Long-Range Perspectives. Edited by John Plank. (Washington: The Brookings Institution, 1967. Pp. 248. \$6.75.)

Revolutionary Politics and the Cuban Working Class. By MAURICE ZEITLIN. (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1967. Pp. 295. \$8.50.)

The literature on the Cuban Revolution, although voluminous, is very thin when viewed from scholarly perspectives. Being generous, no more than a dozen books in Spanish, English, and French combined would go on the "must" reading list. Here are two more candidates for honors; of the two, Zeitlin makes it, Plank does not.

The book edited by Plank is an anthology of ten essays commissioned by the Brookings Institution, submitted to the editor in 1963, 1964, and 1965, and finally published in 1967. The essays are aimed at "the concerned citizen" and in one way or another all of them (with the exception of Robert Smith's contribution on domestic politics) attempt to locate the Revolution in its international settings. Thus there is "A Hemispheric Perspective" by Kalman Silvert, "A European Perspective" by Raymond Aron and Alfred Grosser, "Castro on the Chessboard of the Cold War" by Leon Lipson, and essays of much the

same tone and style by Henry Wriston, Tad Szulc, Raymond Carr, Hanson Baldwin, and others.

A book of this sort about the Cuban Revolution must inevitably miss the mark for two very obvious reasons. First, by the time it reaches the public, it is frightfully out of date. For instance, the imprint of the missile crisis of October, 1962, is still heavy on many of the essays, for this was the most recent major international event involving Cuba at the time that many of the papers were written. Needless to say, much of relevance has happened for and to Cuba since then. Secondly, the audience of "concerned citizens" for whom the volume is intended probably does not exist as an audience that can be "written for." It is composed of harried bureaucrats, educated housewives, preoccupied businessmen, professors and students among others. If this clientele is ever going to learn anything about Cuba, it needs more diverse fare. As it stands, the book is composed of essays that are neither fish nor fowl. They lack the bite, topicality and vividness of first-rate reporting, and none has the data base nor achieves the objectivity, insight and analytical sophistication that we expect of first class scholarship. This is not to say that some are not interesting and intelligent; they are. Aron's essay in particular captures and communicates well the bewilderment of a European intellectual confronted by the tangled history and mad logic of United States policy toward Cuba. But even though a few of the articles rise to this level of insight and sophistication, the bulk of the book is pretty standard stuff, admixed at times with not a little scare-talk, jingoism, and self-congratulation, a style that is most manifest in Bayless Manning's colsing essay, "An Overall Perspective."

Zeitlin's book is of quite another type. It has the distinction of being the only book-length study on the Cuban Revolution in any language that is based on field research on the island. (The Cubans have done some studies of this sort, but they have never been released for publication). This alone elevates Zeitlin's work to the "must" list. There are other books based on a trip or two to the island, documentary sources, and chats with officials, but Zeitlin actually conducted formal interviews during the summer of 1962 with a sample of 202 randomly selected Cuban workers from 21 industrial plants. The study was carried out with the support and approval of the then Cuban Minister of Industries, Ernesto "Che" Guevara. Zeitlin deserves great credit for designing and executing such a study after the break in diplomatic relations between Cuba and the United States. It was no mean feat, and there is little evidence that he compromised his design or scholarly purposes in order to gain access.

With the exception of Chapter Ten in which the author dichotomizes his sample into those who support free speech for opponents of the revolution and those who would suppress it, the main dependent variable of the study is the worker's attitude toward the revolution. This was measured by a well-constructed six point Guttman scale which Zeitlin collapsed into the trichotomy "favorable," "indecisive," and "hostile" for purposes of analysis. He also makes considerable use of the variable 'attitude toward the Communists before the revolution," measured in a much less satisfactory manner by a single retrospective question. In Chapters Two through Nine he analyzes variations in these two attitudinal dimensions (toward the revolution and toward the Communists) in the light of workers' economic insecurities, race, level of skill, sex and marital status (in a chapter delightfully mistitled "Sex and the Single Worker"), social mobility, plant relations, alienation from their work, and the political generations to which they belong. Chapter Ten, as suggested above, analyzes the determinants or at least the concomitants of more as opposed to less liberal attitudes of workers toward those who would criticize the revolution. The eleventh and final chapter is an overview of the "meanings" for members of the working class of the recent history of Cuba and workers' perceptions of their role and place in the revolutionary process.

In a short review, it is not possible even to suggest much less to discuss the bulk of Zeitlin's findings, but his work on political generations does deserve special mention. Whereas the other analyses in the book depend on fairly standard sociological variables combed out of the questionnaire materials, the chapter on political generations is more imaginative. Zeitlin divides his sample into five generations, taking as his chronological cutting points historical events deemed relevant to the working class. He then predicts a rank-ordering by generation of support for the Communists and another of support for the revolution. Particularly in the case of support for the revolution, his predictions are not at all "obvious," deriving as they do from expectations about the consequences of national events for individual political socialization. His predictions are almost completely borne out by the data, including his expectation

that the youngest generation (those from 21 to 27 years old at the time of the study) would be one of the two groups least favorable to the revolution (actually they were the least favorable). This chapter stands as an impressive demonstration of the manner in which data on individuals can be made much more meaningful through being embedded in the context of national events. More importantly, it is also a powerful argument in favor of viewing relevant political attitudes and postures—at least when studying developing countries—as deeply affected by adult socialization experiences rather than as predominantly determined in family or school settings.

Just as Revolutionary Politics and the Cuban Working Class is a book worth reading, it is also a book worth criticising. Zeitlin created for himself a magnificent opportunity to write a classic about the Cuban Revolution. His book falls significantly short of this potential achievement for a number of reasons—two of which will be mentioned here: First, many of the questions which he set out to answer derive from, are shaped by, and are cast in a vocabulary taken from 19th and early 20th Century Marxism and anarchosyndicalism. If we grant that as philosophical and organizational traditions these had some importance in the evolution of the Cuban labor movement. this does not justify dragging them in to shape the sociological analysis of revolutionary Cuba. The smoke of old battles drifts across the pages and footnotes of this book, and the ghosts of old European warriors come to haunt and confuse our understanding of Castro's Cuba. There is even a more modern aspect of all this extraneous and sometimes antiquated theorizing. Working with data on the political beliefs and "tolerance" of Cuban workers. Zeitlin attacks Lipset's thesis on working-class authoritarianism. Lipset probably deserves all the knocks that Zeitlin gives him, but if so, it is a case of the right battle fought at the wrong time, in the wrong book, and with the wrong data. Let me make perfectly clear that I do not object to either the undertones or overtones of political radicalism and sociological revisionism that run through the book. I would simply argue that there are more modern weapons than anarchosyndicalist thought and more powerful intellectual allies than Friedrich Engels for one who wishes to do battle against midcle-class Yankee sociology while at the same time analyzing the Cuban Revolution. In Zeitlin's case, both his politics and his sociology are weakened by his allegiance to these particular reference groups.

In the second place, the data generated by

Zeitlin's field work are unevenly and incompletely analyzed. Such is almost always the case with survey research, but in this instance the shortcomings are acute and the consequences perhaps more unfortunate than usual. His field questionnaire contained 92 items: perhaps less than half of the data generated by these questions found their way into the analyses presented in the book. One suspects that the author himself was embarrassed by the amount of data that did not get analyzed and reported, for Revolutionary Politics and the Cuban Working Class does not contain either the original Spanish of the English version of the austionnaire. To read Zeitlin's questionnaire one must go to his Ph.D. dissertation, which is, to say the least, an inconvenience. Especially after reading the full interview schedule, one comes away from the book with a sense of opportunities missed. But even confining the critique to the data actually used, there is a certain heaviness about the manner in which the author keeps returning to attitude toward the revolution and attitude toward Communism as the two dependent variables. Given the importance of the topic, the uniqueness of the field opportunity, the author's tenacity and resourcefulness in gathering the data, and the five years which then passed before the book was issued. one might hope for a more complete and multifaceted analysis. Essential reading on the Cuban Revolution it is; a classic it is not.

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The Swatantra Party and Indian Conservatism.

By Howard L. Erdman. (New York;
Cambridge University Press, 1967. Pp. 356.

\$9.50.)

Mr. Erdman's lucidly written, well-organized and thoroughly researched book offers a comprehensive view of the Swatantra Party's origins, structure, leadership, ideology and decision making processes through India's fourth general election held in early 1967. By relating his analysis to conservatism in Indian thought and society and to the economic and social forces that constitute the party's environmental challenge; he provides perspectives and insights hitherto unavailable in studies of Indian politics. Conservatism, both manifest and latent, has been obscured by the shadow of Nehru and neglected by scholars concerned with economic and political development. By calling our attention to latent conservatism, he makes clear that the Swatantra Party has mobilized only a fraction of the conservative forces in the country. The an-

alvsis is based on national party files and records, published commentary and statements by the party organizations and its notables, and extensive and detailed interviews conducted throughout India in 1962/63 and again in 1966/67 with elected and party officials and party supporters. Mr. Erdman was remarkably successful in winning and holding the confidence of those whom he interviewed and in writing an account that keeps faith both with them and with scholarship, no mean accomplishment in these days when American scholars abroad are everywhere suspect. Although it does not attend to the doctrines of representation that introduce Samuel H. Beer's superb study of Britain's Labour and Tory parties. Mr. Erdman's book provides a comparable understanding of one of India's major parties.

The Swatantra Party's outlook ranges from the modified Gandhianism of its aged and nationally respected leader, C. Rajagopalachari, through the "feudal" landed conservatism of princes and nobles, to the modern liberalism of urban professionals and Bombay industrialists. Heterogeneity of outlook is matched by heterogeneity of support. While Minoo Masani was general secretary, he pressed for more rationalized professional and centralized party organization, emphasized in the party program and image its liberal qualities and gave strategic priority in the allocation of finance and official support to national parliamentary as against state legislative candidates. The party's state and local elites, made up primarily of rural based "feudalists," the former rulers and noblemen of princely India, command most of the party's electoral support in the states where it is strong, Rajasthan, Orissa, Gujarat and, for a time, Bihar. They have resisted the attempts of the party's national elite, made up primarliy of ex-civil servants and modern businessmen, to use the party's central organs to achieve the goals pursued by Masani when he was general secretary. They are self-financing, and able to rely upon what in eighteenth century Britain were called interests and connections, that is, command of the political resources provided by organic and hierarchical territorial communities and the aggregation of these and other kinds of political resources through channels of kinship, dependence, patronage, friendship and personality. More concerned than the national elite to capture state power. they have also been more sympathetic to doctrines and programs that speak to rural electorates in terms of religious fundamentalism and local pride.

Mr. Erdman makes clear that the Swatantra national office has not had the resources to make good its preferences. It is ironic that the leading laissez-faire party in India has found that the commercial and industrial leaders from whom funds for the national office might be raised were, in the words of C. Rajagoplachari, "in the grip of the ruling [Congress] party." (p. 172) Through the 1967 general elections most businessmen felt they could protect themselves better from Congress socialism by giving more to the Congress than to Swatantra. (Now that Congress dominance has been shattered, it has brought in legislation barring corporate giving to political parties.) Given these constraints and limitation, Mr. Erdman remains cautious in his prognostications concerning the party's future.

Mr. Erdman's book invites comparison with other entries in the literature on Indian parties. Like several of them—Myron Weiner's 1957 account of the non-communist parties in opposition to Congress; Marshall Windmiller and the late Eugene Overstreet's 1959 study of the then Communist Party of India-it focusses on the national level of party structure, leadership, ideology and behavior. Unlike them it pays much more attention to the state level and to patterns of interaction between national and state parties. It does not concern itself explicitly and systematically with the relationship between district and state politics as does Paul Brass' 1965 study of Congress factionalism in Uttar Pradesh nor with the interaction and mutual penetration at the district level between modern political structures represented by the Congress and the various organized economic and social forces found in the environment, as does Weiner's most recent study. These contrasting research strategies vield somewhat different kinds of knowledge about Indian parties. Erdman's study and the other national studies tell us more about ideology, program and party organization while Brass and the second Weiner study tell us more, for example, about paracommunities and personal followings. Such differences are not only the result of varying research strategies employed in the study of Indian parties; they are also artifacts of system level differences and of the parties themselves. It is not until one reaches the national level, for example, that ideological differences within and among parties become a meaningful independent variable. By focussing as much as he does on the state level system, Erdman manages to maximize the range of his observations and findings. And there is much less point in attending to districts in a study of the Swatantra Party for the simple reason that it, unlike Congress, lacks viable district organizations.

It is difficult to cavil at Mr. Erdman's decision to set his analysis of the Swatantra Party in the context of conservatism generally and Indian conservatism in particular. This was the book that he intended to write. Yet in doing so he dealt with some questions only by implication; the evidence is there but the questions and concepts necessary to provide answers are missing. For example, how are Swatantra's strategy and structure shaped by its place in the party system, by the electoral system and by larger political environment? To what extent does the party shape social forces and cleavages and to what extent is it shaped by them? To what extent is its organizational looseness a consequence of the Indian political system, particularly its federal dimension? Finally (and here the evidence is not provided), how does the Swatantra Party compare to conservative parties in other countries, including European countries, not only today but as they took shape and entered earlier political arenas?

The Swatantra Party and Indian Conservatism is work of enduring value. By directing our attention to the India of businessmen, princes and peasants it provides a much needed corrective to the India of modern nationalists and urban radicals of the left or the right so often featured in Indian political studies.

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Mathematical Applications in Political Science, III. Edited By Joseph L. Bernd. (Charlottesville, Virginia: The University press of Virginia, 1967. Pp. 119. \$5.00.)

This volume is a collection of papers from the third National Science Foundation sponsored conference on Mathematical Applications in Political Science. The essays involve mathematical applications in five different areas. Otto A. Davis and Melvin Hinich extend the mathematical model of the electoral process which they developed in the second volume of this series. Gerald H. Kramer uses the theory of finite automata to obtain a result concerning the impossibility of a form of rational decision-making. William H. Riker uses experimental games to verify two theories from game theory. S. Sidney Ulmer proposes a discriminant function model as a means of predicting judicial decisions. Richard L. Merritt describes procedures for graphic display of time-series data on the attitudes of countries toward one another.

Merritt's chapter is the most elementary mathematically. He analyzes 1954–1964 European survey data concerning attitudes toward other countries. Basic trends are obtained through regressing friendliness and salience scores for a pair of countries on time. Merritt then shows which pairs of countries became more and less friendly over time, utilizing several suggestive means of graphic representation. The result is an interesting data analysis which regrettably lacks theoretic focus.

Ulmer's essay is another in the series of articles dealing with the problem of prediction of judicial decisions from "the facts of the case." Ulmer factor analyzes the facts of several cases in order to reduce the number of predictor variables sufficiently for his model. The factor scores of the cases are then used as the independent variables and the court's decisions on the cases as dichotomous dependent variables in a discriminant function model. Finally Ulmer selects the prediction equation which yields the highest proportion of correctly predicted cases from the smallest number of factors. The maximization of the proportion of correct predictions is a reasonable criterion. though the discussion remains insensitive to the interpretability of the resulting equation. The successful prediction of an additional one to five per cent of the cases is of little importance if the final predictors lack theoretic meaning. There is insufficient emphasis in this article on the role of subtsantive theory in the search for the best statistical model.

Riker examines coalition formation in threeperson bargaining experiments in order to test two results from game theory. There were proposals and counter-proposals of coalitions in the experiments until a pair of players agreed on how they would divide the money they would be given if they formed a two-person coalition. The average payoffs within possible coalitions fit very closely with the values predicted mathematically. This fit of the model is explained in terms of the concept of trustproposals of coalitions giving a player more than his quota were not trusted. Thus there is political relevance in Riker's discussion of the mechanisms of the bargaining situation, though the games themselves are apolitical in face content. Yet the basic use of game theory as a theory giving predictions which require empirical verification remains questionable. The utility of a mathematical theory does not rest on its descriptive validity.

Kramer is concerned with the feasibility of rational behavior given the limited computational capacities of real decision-makers. He

constructs an analogy between a decisionmaker and an information-processing device, an automaton. The question becomes whether any conceivable program can be devised for such an automaton which leads to decisionmaking behavior which is consistent with rationality. Rationality is here defined as acting in accordance with a set of consistent preferences. The theory of automata is then employed to establish that rationality with respect to an infinite number of alternatives is incompatible with a computing device which is finite. It would seem doubtful whether an infinite number of alternatives either could be represented by the input language for the device or could be processed by a finite device in a finite period of time. Kramer's terse prose style leaves the reader uncertain as to whether these conditions are required by his proof, so the significance of his result is not clear.

The Davis and Hinich essay continues their work on a multidimensional model of party competition. In their earlier article, Davis and Hinich assumed that on a given issue each voter has the same level of concern. They now relax this assumption, instead assuming that the level of concern on a given issue is variable but is independent of the position of the voter on that issue. With this new assumption, the dominant strategy for a candidate still is to take the mean position on each of the issues, if the distribution of voters in the space is multivariate normal. The candidate whose platform is closest to that mean will win the election. The Davis and Hinich model is extremely elegant, though their basic result would seem to require much less elaborate machinery. Given a symmetric and unimodal density of voters in the space, such as the multivariate normal distribution, with either equal or symmetric levels of concern on issues, the mean is the dominant strategy for the candidates. If this assertion is not intuitively obvious, a simple geometric proof would seem possible. Also it is not entirely clear whether they have significantly relaxed the assumption of an equal level of concern for all voters in this article. They restrict the standard deviation of the concern of voters to be much less than the smallest eigenvalue of the matrix of average concern. Notwithstanding their assertion to the contrary, this condition would seem to make the variation permitted nearly trivial relative to the average size of the level of concern. At a minimum, a more complete discussion of both this restriction and the meaning of the general model would have been appreciated.

"Mathematical applications in political science" must be judged simultaneously on the

basis of their relevance to political science and their usage of mathematics. "Mathematical applications" involve sophisticated use of mathematics, though the mathematics used need not be sophisticated. Experimentation with novel forms of mathematics is to be encouraged, if their application is truly appropriate. Mathematics more powerful than is required to solve the problem at hand should not be employed unless the formalization in terms of high-power mathematics is likely to lead to insights in the solution of a more general problem. Mathematical modelling should involve more than statistical modelling and routine data analysis. Still a confrontation with empirical materials need not be avoided. The use of mathematics heightens the responsibility of an author to communicate to his audience in a readable manner. Finally the emphasis on mathematical sophistication does not alter the conventional standards of judgment of a work: substantive merit and theoretic importance are of greater significance than technical considerations of method.

There is a definite and growing need for the publication of volumes of essays on "mathematical applications in political science." Articles dealing with substantively important questions in a mathematically technical form can rarely be printed in the major political science journals which must balance the importance of the article against the reaction of their readers. Yet it is hoped that the articles in future volumes of this series will contain a more skillful blending of the technical and the substantive, mathematical sophistication with theoretic significance.

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NATO and the Range of American Choice. By WILLIAM T. R. FOX AND ANNETTE BAKER FOX. (New York: Columbia University Press, 1967. Pp. 352. \$7.95.)

NATO and Europe. By André Beaufre. (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, Inc., 1966. Pp. 170. \$3.95.)

The Atlantic Idea and Its European Rivals. By Harold Van B. Cleveland. (New York: McGraw-Hill Book Company, 1966. Pp. 186. \$5.95.)

It is part of the conventional wisdom that NATO is something special as peace-time alliances go. It maintains an infrastructure of communications, airfields, etc.; it functions under a partially integrated command structure; and it has troops and airplanes at its disposal. These and other novel features smacking of supranationalism are taken as evidence that

NATO is significantly more than the usual contingency pact—just how much more and why has been a matter of conjecture among students of alliances, in general, and the North Atlantic Area, in particular. But for all its successes. NATO has had notable failures and periods of general malaise. Most significantly, troop commitments have seldom been met and the dominant role of the United States has led to periodic-perhaps continual-resentment among the other members of the system. Within the last five to ten years centrifugal forces have been particularly strong. Gaullist prodding has succeeded in raising basic questions about the future of the Alliance. Indeed, there is reason to wonder whether NATO has a future-except perhaps as a traditional contingency pact.

All three of the books covered in this review devote considerable attention to diagnosing NATO's current ills. Two of them, Beaufre and Cleveland, offer prescriptions for the future. Fox and Fox, on the other hand, give the reader a sense of the practicability of these prescriptions by focusing in some detail on a variety of constraints and choices impinging on U.S. policy makers. It is interesting that with respect to diagnosis, all three, the French general, the convinced Atlanticist, and the academic analysts, are in fundamental agreement. In addition, all three books share a common perspective; they are concerned first and foremost with American behavior. They all, in other words, accept at least implicitly American leadership.

NATO's ills are, first of all, traced to the stabilization of the strategic balance and the emergence of a Soviet-American detente. Since the basic premise of all the authors is that NATO is primarily a military alliance, they agree that as the Soviet threat has receded, the willingness to participate fully in the alliance has declined. Secondly, there seems to be general agreement that the strategic balance has reduced the credibility of the American nuclear guarantee. Finally, given reduced threat and reduced credibility, the allies have become increasingly unwilling to accept the dominant role which the United States has played in NATO policy making in general, and in control of the nuclear deterrent in particular. NATO conflicts turn out to be partially over policy and partially over structure.

With respect to structure, all the authors agree that control of the nuclear deterrent is indivisible. Beaufre, thus, writes off the MLF as impracticable. If Cleveland is more positive, it is simply because he saw the MLF as a device which might have locked Germany more securely into the NATO system and reduced

the likelihood that the Germans would seek their own deterrent. In any case, Beaufre sees the MLF as just another instance of the U.S. failing to coordinate and consult with its allies before policy decisions are made and announced. Beaufre's major concern is with the establishment of simple but effective procedures assure real consultation. Cleveland strongly argues that relationships within the alliance are based on power realities; accordingly, he claims that while the U.S. should strive for consensus, it should be willing to settle for something less. He feels, for example, that the U.S. should have pushed ahead with the MLF using whatever leverage was at its disposal, so long as the MLF was deemed useful. Real-politik within a framework of reciprocal interests is Mr. Cleveland's vision.

These perceived reciprocal interests serve as the foundation for the substantive policy prescriptions espoused by Beaufre and Cleveland. For both men the Soviet-American détente depends for the foreseeable future on the continuation of a stable strategic balance. Accordingly, they agree that the Alliance is necessary, although neither makes it clear just exactly why the strategic balance is dependent on the alliance rather than simply on U.S. and Soviet nuclear capacities. Presumably the link is that within this balance, the USSR must not be tempted to nibble at the periphery of Western Europe. It is assumed by Cleveland that U. S. interests in a non-Communist Europe would necessitate an American response to such nibbling. Beaufre also believes that the U.S. has a stake in preventing conventional military action in Europe, because such a war could not possibly be contained—presumably the force de frappe would trigger the escalation.

What then should the United States do to maintain the alliance? The European allies are, on the one hand, restive under American control. On the other hand, the Europeans are not inclined to take on the costly responsibilities for their own defense. Beaufre and Cleveland offer prescriptions which in the medium term are not significantly different, since they both suggest that the U. S. accept and recognize the growing strength and cohesion of Europe. But because their long term visions of Europe differ markedly, there is disagreement as to whether European autonomy should be encouraged or simply tolerated.

Cleveland casts his vote for toleration and so his policy recommendation amounts to temporizing with the current situation. The U. S. should not work against European unity, but should cease to promote it. In any case, the Furopean idea has lost its vitality; it is stalled and will continue to be stalled somewhere between a collection of discrete nation states and a federal union. Accordingly, the United States must work to drive home to the Europeans the importance of the reciprocal interests-military, financial, and commercial-which bind the Atlantic Area into what Stanley Hoffmann has called a "partial international system." According to Cleveland, the keys to successful policy are: (1) to promote the cause of the British who will serve as the linking force between the U.S. and Europe, and (2) to make certain that the Germans are kept reasonably satisfied, since Cleveland sees a revisionist Germany as far and away the biggest threat to a generally acceptable status quo. Thus, Cleveland suggests that the U.S. not oppose a European nuclear force if it is the price de Gaulle demands for British entry into Europe and if providing for German participation binds Germany more firmly into the Atlantic system.

Beaufre's prescription is more radical, for he wants the U.S. to encourage European autonomy by promoting the staged development of an independent European military force. The medium-term goal is total European takeover of responsibility for ground defense of Europe. Eventually, this European military establishment should include a nuclear force as well. For Beaufre, military integration and defense responsibilities are the key to real union. Beaufre agrees with Cleveland that the drive towards European union has been stalled, but unlike Cleveland, Beaufre believes that it can be revived. Again, in sharp contrast to Cleveland, "Europe" for Beaufre must in the final analysis stretch from the Atlantic to the Soviet border. If in the short run Beaufre's scheme assumes limited European autonomy combined with more intensive NATO consultation and enhanced joint planning, in the long run it adds up to an orthodox Gaullist third force strategy.

Beaufre and Cleveland, thus, present different prescriptions for reviving the alliance. Fox and Fox offer the reader a decision-making perspective on the feasibility of these alternatives. The reader can, for example, infer from Fox and Fox just what kinds of obstacles are likely to be raised within the American system to establishing more intensive consultative machinery. Similarly, it is possible to assess the effectiveness of such machinery should it be accepted.

In order to indicate the general lines of their analyses I will discuss the feasibility of the two prescriptions from the Fox and Fox perspective. But first let me emphasize that this exercise is only illustrative. The book is, first of

all, inordinately rich in detail and balanced in judgment. Accordingly, the data are surely open to other inferences. Moreover, I am considering the problem only in terms of internal U. S. decision-making processes while their analysis extends to NATO processes, to alternative claims on American policy makers, and to the variety of purposes that NATO is perceived to serve. With these caveats in mind, let us consider the two prescriptions.

First, it seems reasonably clear that the Cleveland policy would be more acceptable simply because it calls for the most limited departure from current stands. NATO policy making in the U.S. Government is a very cumbersome process. If it is difficult to achieve consensus with our allies, this task is almost as difficult within the government. Coordination within the executive branch involves intradepartmental struggles as well as coordination between Defense and State. In addition, any policies requiring substantial expenditures or having to do with atomic energy must be driven through a polycentric Congress and therefore made acceptable to Congressmen who are not very often responsive to the policy as such, but simply to whether or not it threatens to accelerate government expenditures or aggravate the balance of payments.

While all government policies must run this political gauntlet, Fox and Fox point out some of the special handicaps under which NATO policy labors. Virtually any NATO issue will stir up interservice rivalries. Moreover, NATO has not been a high priority problem area even at times of crisis and so the President has not been inclined to devote his scarce attention resources and limited political capital to such issues. Still another difficulty is that many of the policy makers charged with responsibility for NATO are not really attuned to NATO problems. The military seems to have done a better job than the diplomats in building a concern for and understanding of NATO into its bureaucracy, but in neither department are NATO duties perceived as strong pegs upon which to hang a career. Finally, the history of NATO has given rise to expectations by American decision-makers that our leads will be followed. This is not simply an expectation based on what have been the power realities of the alliance. NATO is perceived to be anchored in a strong mutuality of interests and empathies. Accordingly, we seem to expect our partners to accept our offers in a spirit of friendly cooperation.

What all this adds up to is, on the one hand, a general policy inertia and, on the other, the likelihood that reforms aimed at bringing our allies into the policy making process may be more trouble than they are worth. Such reforms will probably be resisted in Congress and in the executive branch—given the rather restricted NATO constituency and the burden of adding more 'decision makers to the already cumbersome process. Even if accepted, a device like Mr. McNamara's "select nuclear committee" may not make the system more responsive. Indeed, it may increase frustrations by further complicating matters.

As I indicated, it is not really possible to do justice to Fox and Fox within the compass of this kind of joint review. The book manages to bring together, synthesize, and evaluate within a useful process framework vast amounts of information. As such, it is a real contribution to a literature cluttered by policy studies and abstract theorizing. It lays a foundation for some of the middle range theory that scholars in the international relations field have been calling for for so long, and may well catalyze important new research projects.

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Congressional Conservatism and the New Deal: The Growth of the Conservative Coalition in Congress, 1933-1939. By James T. Patterson. (Lexington: University of Kentucky Press, 1967. Pp. 356. \$8.50.)

The writers connected with the Survey Research Center must often wish that someone had started gathering their data in the 1930's rather than later. It would be fascinating to be able to gauge party identification in a period of change rather than in one of electoral stability. For like reasons the 1930's ought to be attractive to Congressional roll-call analysts, and it is a little surprising—even given the lack of ordered data—that the Congressional voting of the New Deal decade has been given so little attention. Changes in electoral patterns in the 1930's surely provoked changes in Congressional alignments, and the latter are no less subject to statistical analysis than the former.

James T. Patterson, an Indiana University historian, has not written a "roll-call study," but he has made good use of roll-calls in providing a blow-by-blow account of Congressional politics in the 1930's. His subject is the rise of the "conservative coalition" between 1933 and 1939. The emphasis is on heretical Democrats, and especially heretical Democrats in the Senate. Patterson wastes no time worrying over a definition of "conservatism"; he uses the term conventionally but, in the context, sensibly, to denote opposition to Rooseveltian domestic reforms.

It goes without saving that Republicans alone could not sustain an effective opposition, conservative or otherwise, in the 1930's. At their lowest point, just after the 1936 election, they numbered only 16 in the Senate and 89 in the House. Their strategy by 1937 was to keep silent and supply back-bench votes for the causes of vocal anti-Roosevelt Democrats. Patterson's study of the disaffected Democrats is a study in gradual alienation. In the Congress on 1933-1934, there were only 5 Democratic Senators who were consistently opposed to major New Deal measures: Byrd and Glass of Virginia, Bailey of North Carolina, Tydings of Maryland, and Gore of Oklahoma. By the end of the 1935 session, after the intense struggles over the utilities holdingcompany bill and the "wealth tax," some 19 Senate Democrats had broken with the President on two or more major issues. The bitter Court controversy of 1937 drove many more into opposition and cemented an alliance of Republicans and conservative Democrats. After the 1938 election this cross-party coalition was in a position to take over the Senate. Over in the House the trend from 1933 through 1939 was more or less the same. One difference in the larger body was that the opposition made more use of formal machinery; soon after the 1936 election the Rules Committee moved into its familiar blocking role and Martin Dies surfaced with his passion for investigations.

Who were the renegade Democrats? To put it another way, how were they different from Democrats who remained loval New Dealers? Patterson finds no significant difference between the two groups either in age or in seniority. Nor was region as critical a variable as one might retrospectively assume. Before 1936 it was not even true that the opposition was disproportionately Southern. Senators like Byrnes of South Carolina and Harrison of Mississippi remained loyal to the President long after colleagues like Gerry of Rhode Island, Copeland of New York and Burke of Nebraska had vociferously declared their independence. In Patterson's list of the 35 "most conservative" Democratic Senators of the 1933-1939 period, only 10 were Southerners and only 5 more were from the Border states. It is true that by 1939 the opposition had a Southern cast to it, but even then Southern Senators were not as cohesively conservative as they later became in the 1950's and 1960's. Senator Bilbo, among others, was still waving a New Deal flag.

A merit of Patterson's study is that it provides suggestive evidence for the kinds of inductive generalization and theoretical specula-

tion political scientists like to engage in. What, for example, has been the relation between electoral realignments and Congressional rollcall behavior? It seems clear that "dimensions of voting" in Congress, rather stable since World War II, were thoroughly reshuffled in the 1930's. An extended longitudinal study of roll-call voting might turn up the same pattern of normal stability broken by occasional realignment that V. O. Key, Jr., Walter D. Burnham and others have found in the partisan behavior of the electorate. The Democrats, both at the grass roots and in Congress, shifted their center gravity north and east during the New Deal decade. One consequence of the Democratic shift was a rearrangement of forces within the Congressional Republican Party. The New Deal dealt a death blow to Midwestern and Western Republican Progressivism, but at the same time gave birth to a new Republican heresy in the formerly orthodox Northeast. The new sectional leanings became apparent in 1937 when the only Senate Republicans to support Roosevelt's minimum wage bill were Lodge of Massachusetts and Davis of Pennsylvania. Ten years later the old and proud Republican Progressive tradition survived only in the erratic career of Senator Langer of North Dakota.

Patterson's account of the confrontations between New Dealers and anti-New Dealers is also of relevance to coalition theorists. What was the logic of the opposing strategists? The propositions of William H. Riker's Theory of Political Coalitions seem to fit the facts surprisingly well. After 1934 the Roosevelt Administration followed Riker's principle that it makes no sense to maintain an excessively large crowd on a winning bandwagon; that is, Roosevelt, instead of trying to keep his party united, served his liberal adherents by submitting legislative proposals sweeping enough to command the support only of narrow majorities in House and Senate. The utilities holding-company bill, for example, survived a key vote in the Senate by only 45-44. Not long after the 1936 election it became possible and expedient to throw off the bandwagor the leaders of the Senate Democratic establishment-Byrnes, Harrison, and also Vice President Garner—and thrown off they were. How did the conservative opposition react to Roosevelt's strategy? In general, by seeking support wherever they could find it. There were times in 1937 and 1938 when the conservatives could hope to win Senate majorities only by making Burton Wheeler their informal leader; they quickly suppressed the animosities of two decades and rallied behind Wheeler. Roosevelt's strategy of maximal immediate accomplishment doubtless served the interests of his New Deal following, but there was a price to be paid for it later. When Democratic Congressional majorities fell to a "normal" level after 1938, the President had to work with Congressmen and Senators who displayed toward him the sullen hostility described by Allen Drury in his Senate Journal, 1943–1945.

Besides being thought-provoking, Patterson's study is well-written, well-documented, and consistently analytic rather than discursive.

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The Japanese Communist Movement, 1920–1966. By Robert A. Scalapino. (Berkeley: The University of California Press, 1967. Pp. 412. \$6.75.)

We have come to expect of Professor Scalapino exhaustive and insightful analyses of Japan's experience in political party development. This well-organized and brilliantly written study is no exception—a product of a decade or more of research in depth into a wide range of Japanese and non-Japanese documentary sources and a limited series of interviews with key figures active in or close to the JCP. Ample footnotes and an excellent bibliography are also included.

The author concludes that communism in Japan is an isolated, minority movement. "Barring external interference," it shows little promise of success in a society which "having attained modernity, can afford freedom." (p. 354). Few, except Marxist-Leninists, would take issue with this conclusion. On the basis of the detailed chronology Professor Scalapino presents, communism in Japan has missed whatever opportunities it might have had as a revolutionary force. However, a more penetrating analysis of economic and social factors might make the hypothesis fully convincing, especially in an era when "revisionism" appears to be becoming orthodox throughout the communist world.

The study, jointly sponsored by the RAND Corporation and Berkeley's Center for Japanese and Korean Studies, traces communism in Japan from its earliest origins in 1898 and follows the gyrations of the movement through the pre- and post-World War II eras, continually couched within the context of communist policy developments in the U.S.S.R. and, after 1949, in Red China. The major portion of the book deals with the events since Japan's surrender to the Allies.

The first six chapters provide a highly detailed chronology of the JCP. The last two are

given over to an assessment of the party's current status and its future prospects. Communism's prewar legacy (Chapter I), developed when the party for the most part was illegal and suppressed and had fewer than 1,000 members, was "an unending series of frustrations and defeats," unable to compete with Japanese nationalism (and eventually ultranationalism), led by increasingly extremist intellectuals, lacking a working class base, and after 1924 controlled by the Soviets. Heaped upon these was a constant plague of internal factionalism, fed by characteristic Japanese organizational cliques. The major bid of the communists to gain ascendency came with the Allied Occupation's call for drastic political, economic, and social reforms, release of communist leaders from jail, and strong encouragement of "progressive" groups. "Making communism loveable" (Chapter II) failed when SCAP reversed its policy after 1947, the united front of leftists crumbled, and the Russians attacked the JCP leadership for its "Japanization" of Marxism-Leninism. Yet, this precursor of today's nationalist communism did vault the JCP to its greatest proportionate strength, capturing almost 10 percent of the popular vote in the 1949 general election and 35 seats in the Diet's lower house. Since then, the party's fortunes ebbed, barely registering more than five percent of the votes, as the socialists and other minority groups (such as the Clean Government Party) retained the great bulk of the populace opposed to the conservative party in power.

As Japan's economy recovered and entered its period of "miraculous" growth, the JCP has been unable to achieve widespread popular identification and has suffered from the stigma of foreign control. At best, it has been a catchbasin for protest against imbalances, inequities, and grievances felt by scattered groups in the burst of Japan's recent dynamic changes.

Shifting to the left after 1950 (Chapter III), the party's bitter factionalism reemerged as the communists' success in mainland China spurred on dreams of Maoist guerilla warfare from mountain hideouts. By 1955 Peking dominance was clear, and with de-Stalinization, the stage was set for the JCP to become caught in the rise of the Sino-Soviet dispute. Despite a return to legalism after 1955 (Chapter IV), the JCP, attempting to find an impossible solution between the Russian and Chinese positions, lost out again in an effort to form a united front and capitalize upon deep sentiments among the Japanese for preserving the peace, banning the bomb, assuring Japan's independence, and advancing democracy. In the early 1960's, the communists were more isolated than

ever and, swinging to Peking in 1963 (Chapter V), lost dissidents who favored either "internationalism" or "structural reform." A "struggle on two fronts" (Chapter VI) then ensued, continuing to the present as the mainstream struggled over "how to use and abuse the social democrats at the same time" and how to achieve internal party unity. As "modern revisionism" gripped the communist world, by 1966 "never in its history had the Japanese Communist Party attempted so ardently to place itself in the mainstream of Japanese evolution, to fit itself into the pendulum-like swing toward and away from external influences that had characterized the most basic political forces operative in Japan." (p. 276). While as elsewhere Japanese communism is increasingly autonomous, it remains nonetheless isolated both domestically and internationally.

How "isolated" is a problem difficult to gauge from the study. The author finds (Chapter VII) the party's membership of 270,000 predominantly urban, young, more "bourgeois" than "proletariat" (and little "peasantry"), relatively well-educated, intellectual, and gradually gaining voting strength. The JCP also appears well-financed (probably from foreign sources) and tightly organized. Yet its

chances for achieving a united front, the main hope of the JCP, remain slim, as the socialists, labor unions, student movement, and other left groups themselves continue to hew orthodox Marxism without embracing the communist formula because they continue to capitalize upon the alliance with the U. S., uneven economic development, the lack of Japanese "individualism," and, the impact of the Chinese communist victory (Chapter VIII).

This study should be of immense value to any student of communism or of Japanese politics, although it is possible to raise doubts about the selection of materials used and the emphases given to them, as the author himself acknowledges. It evokes a number of questions for further penetration into the basic premises that the process of Japanese government is comparatively well-established, that Japanese generally are highly socialized to accept its legitimacy, and that the changes now occurring so rapidly in Japan can be readily accommodated in an "advanced" society. The answers to questions such as these may hold the key to the future of the whole Japanese Left (and perhaps extreme Right) and the role of communism within it.

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NOTES

POLITICAL THEORY, HISTORY OF POLITICAL THOUGHT, AND METHODOLOGY

The Power Structure: Political Process in American Society. By Arnold M. Rose. (New York: Oxford University Press, 1967. Pp. 506. \$8.50.)

Who Rules America? By G. William Domhoff. (Englewood Cliffs: Prentice-Hall, 1967. Pp. 184. \$4.95.)

The Emergent American Society. By LLOYD WARNER, ET AL. (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1967. Pp. 667 \$15.00.)

All three of these books are best read and regarded not as the efforts in social science they purport to be but rather as expressions of political ideology. To be sure, each bears respectable methodological hallmarks and all present the fruits of impressive empirical homework. Still and all, it is abundantly clear that in each case the authors had their conclusions well in mind before they began to search for materials that would support their points of view.

All writing on a subject such as power is bound to be ideological in that an author's selectionand omission—of illustrations and emphases will inevitably reflect his personal judgments about the quality of the society he is purporting to depict. To be sure, it usually remains for the reader to locate these moral premises: part of the fun of the game stems from the fact that certain cards are always kept face down.

Arnold Rose, who died shortly after completing his book, sets out to rebut and refute C. Wright Mills and Floyd Hunter. This is not really very difficult once you decide to depict the Mills-Hunter position as a simple-minded monolithism. It is ironic how much academic energy has been expended attempting to lay to rest these two stimulating but hardly research-worthy tracts. Nevertheless, to coin a paraphrase, it takes an ideologue to catch an ideologue. Rese's unstated opinion is that the United States is a pretty good place by any objective or comparative standard: the society is pluralistic, power is dispersed, and political influence is diffused throughout a vigorous population. In short, not much is wrong with the way things are. This position-not at all un-

common among political scientists-combines elements of liberalism and conservatism. That is to say, it supports a New Deal conception of the good society-more or less, a Hubert Humphrey view-with a liberal government in an essentially capitalist culture. However such an outlook is necessarily conservative if only because it has so much to defend. New Dealers are compelled to justify the existing contours of American politics and society, for that structure is in large measure a product of the policies to which they have long been committed. To suggest that almost three decades of this kind of government has still left the nation in a seriously unsatisfactory state would be to condemn one's own handiwork. Thus The Power Structure is, in these terms, an apologia for the America in which we now live. The status-quo is defined as democracy; and democracy is seen as suffusing the status-quo. It is instructive that an author of Rose's disposition saw fit to invest so much time and effort in attacking critics on his ideological left; yet it is understandable that he do so, as they are claiming that all his successes were in fact failures.

Professor Domhoff, in contrast, is a young man with no commitments to the policies or programs of the past. His mercifully slender volume purports to show than an intertwined circle—he prefers to call it a "class"-presides over the major instruments of power in American life. The book names names, draws lines of relationships, and concludes that a small and concerted group in fact rules America. Quite plainly, Domhoff considers that United States to be a most undemocratic and inequalitarian society; by his moral measure it is a hypocritical and decadent culture direly in need of thoroughgoing reform. However while he draws on and has much sympathy with the thinking of C. Wright Mills, Domhoff wears at least one of Rose's ideological blinders. For all his radicalism, he is temperamentally too much in the American grain to acknowledge that the power structure he is examining remains essentially capitalist in character. Hence his elaborate preoccupation with the people in high places, but hardly any attention to the institutional complexes which provide the chairs in which they sit.

My own judgment is that Rose's description of power in our national life is a very partial picture, having selected for empirical analysis only those areas where in fact a relatively broad and diversified series of publics participates in the making of policy. (No one, not even Paul Sweezy, has ever suggested that PTA's are puppets of a ruling class.) But Domhoff's assiduous mining of the Social Registers never comes to grips with the fact that the United States is a system built on private ownership, advanced technology, and a government which must necessarily expend most of its

efforts reacting to conditions not of its own making. His problem is that he has no coherent conception of the macro-structure which elevates al the board-room types he enumerates. I am no suggesting that the answer is somewhere in Volume IV of Capital; however I would assert that until Domhoff and others like him begin to look at American power in its capitalist context, they will only be charting effects rather than causes (Let me add that those of Rose's persuasion are convinced that capitalism disappeared between the break-up of the old Standard Oil Company in 1912 and the inauguration of Social Security in 1935. They have such an intellectual vested interest in the assumed irrelevance of Marx that it is too much to ask them to rethink their conclusions about that mode of perception.)

Finally, Warner's non-book—and a \$15,00 nonbook at that. The formula is of course familiar First persuade yourself that you are qualified to delve into a very significant subject; next convince a foundation that you are the man to preside over a research project that will produce the definitive statement for our generation; and then proceed to spend lots and lots of money gathering lots and lots of facts. Here we are presented with fifteen chapters, by different authors, on churchesand corporations, unions and universities, trade associations and government agencies. Literally thousands of questionnaires were sent out and their replies sedulously recorded. Some of the facts are quite intriguing. (For example, most religious associations have governing bodies with 50 or more members whereas most groups devoted tothe advancement of education are presided over by boards having less than 20 members.) But the general conclusion is a non-conclusion: large and complex organizations in contemporary American society are large and complex. On first glance, it would seem that Warner and his colleagues are not infected with an ideological glaze. After all, no conclusion should be a sign of no ideology. But further scrutiny reveals that what we have here is not simply knowledge that has been produced by mechanical means; more important, the very substance of that knowledge has been shaped by the machines it has employed. Ideology is basically a manner of perceiving reality, and here the distorting lens is inherent in the method: for the Warner volume assumes that only information which car be secured by certain mechanical means is entitled to be regarded as reportable knowledge, Needless to say, this limits one's purview.

With all deference to Karl Mannheim, I do not believe that scholars can somehow raise themselves above the ideological smog which infects the senses of lesser men. But I do believe that we can do a lot more to understand the scope of our preconceptions and the limits they impose on our perceptions. I also have a hunch that if we were not so cautious about soiling our career credentials we might even preface our books by acknowledging our biases about the good, the true, and the beautiful. Certainly to continue to claim that we can immunize our writing from ideology is pretentious nonsense.—Andrew Hacker, Cornell University.

Political Philosophy and Time, By John G. Gun-NELL. (Middletown: Wesleyan University Press, 1968. Pp. 314. \$10.00.)

Plato's capacity to elicit writing of the highest quality from his commentators is instanced once more by Prof. Gunnell's Political Philosophy and Time. It is one of the wonders of intellectual history that given talent and sympathy, a scholar can be raised almost above himself by the force and beauty of Plato's dialogues. They infect the studious admirer with some measure of their own excellence: they insist that a man be at his absolute best when he responds to them, and they insensibly, mimetically, impart inspiration to him. Aside from Rousseau and Burke, it would be hard to think of any other political theorist who possesses this power of enchantment to nearly the same degree. Naturally, agreement or disagreement with Plato (or Rousseau or Burke) is not in question. Rather, it is a matter of honoring with attention imaginative genius wherever it appears. Gunnell's book is the fruit of such devotion.

His thesis is that "... political philosophy was at its inception, that is, with Plato, a reconstruction, on the level of conscious thought, of the vision of political order as a mediating space, a mesocosm, which would assimilate man to or integrate him with that which is most eternal and overcome historical existence, which in terms of the Greek experience meant essentially the fall from order." Long before the time of Plato, several ancient societies had achieved that "integration" by means of myth. Gunnell gives a chapter to Egypt and Mesopotamia. In each society, "... life is lived essentially in the 'present' . . . the 'future' exists only as a repetition of the 'past'; the uniqueness of events is not perceived, and temporal distance contracts into the present. . . . In mythic thought, change in the sense of becoming or the experience of unique events is sublimated in the concrete, recurrent, and spatially grounded rhythms of nature. . . . Primordial time is the time of cosmic creation, and the events narrated in the myth are continually made present and serve as archetypes which give meaning to experience. The unique event or act is meaningful only to the extent that it can be joined to an archetype. Here life moves not historically, but ritualistically between significant points in the cycle of nature and society. . . ." There is no sense of history as a continuous flow full of the possibility of novelty, either for good or bad; there is consequently no sense of individuality, no idea of the self, which is dependent on the sense of history.

Gunnell does not say why he assumes societies built on such myths survive unaltered for long periods of time. Were the myths sufficiently close to the needs of human nature, sufficiently "true?" Or, would any mythic orientation which enclosed the individual in a social system purporting to be regulated in accordance with the perceived order of nature have been adequate? Or, was it the cunning of social devices, made even more cunning by having the sanction of myth thrown over them, which accounted for the longevity of certain ancient societies? In any case, there the examples of Egypt and Mesopotamia were: they served as precursors, and perhaps as direct influences, on the later Platonic, non-mythic effort to abolish time. and with it, change, disorder, and decay. After examining the reluctance of the Hebrews to associate the rescue from time with a coherently articulated political society, and their consequent trust in God's ability to redeem them through the very workings of time. Gunnell reaches the heart of his book, three long and brilliant chapters on the Greeks.

First, Gunnell traces the attenuation of "the integral myth" in Greece. He takes up Homer, Hesiod, Aeschylus, Sophocles, and a few other poets, and shows through them the steady growth in complexity of the Greek idea of time: a combination of historical and intellectual developments led to a common awareness of the inexhaustible potency which life has for ruining the social structures men laboriously build. The inherited integral myth proved powerless when faced with the ravages of time. Though the Greeks' idea of cosmic time was cyclical, their understanding of human time had a different pattern, the pattern of tragedy. Awe before the eternal yielded to the passion to perform those individual deeds of political and military greatness which earned immortality. The self became the world, though, to be sure, not the modern romantic self in all its depth and cultivated idiosyncrasy. But just as the self contained passional elements which drove men to aspire and hence to suffer, so it contained the divine element, an element of reason, at last fully recognized, which could serve as the basis for a new vision of order.

It fell to Plato, in Gunnell's account, to make a system out of Greek impulses to save men from "the futility of action" and constant political upheaval. Through reason, the philosopher could detect the underlying reason of nature and use it as the paradigm for social order. Reason would thus restore the unity of self, society and nature of the earlier mythic orientation, but now a unity

founded on genuine knowledge, not merely dim intimations. Gunnell presents an extremely skillful and creative reading of the Republic, and then of the Laws, in the light of his general thesis. Of special interest is his sustained comparison of the Republic with the Laws: the latter book emerges as the culmination of Plato's obsession with the problem of order. A far less beautiful book than the Republic, it nevertheless is marked by an utterly serious practicality of purpose lacking in the Republic. Several themes stand out in Gunnell's book: the way in which the Philebus and the Timaeus provide the bridge between the cosmologies of the Republic and the Laws; the nature of the philosophical understanding which the higher office-holders in the Laws must have, as distinguished from that of the rulers in the Republic; the meaning of Plato's assertion that the polity of the Laws was "second best" in comparison to the ideal polity of the Republic; the change in Plato's use of the word, "law"; the meaning of Plato's concept of life as "serious play" in the polity of the Laws.

One's only complaint is that Gunnell does not deal with the major contention of Glenn R. Morrow's great book, Plato's Cretan City (1960), that the practices advocated in the Laws were heavily dependent on both contemporary Athenian practices, and the practices of the "ancestral" Athenian constitution. But that is only a small complaint. Gunnell has made a substantial contribution to the history of political ideas. In addition to that—I do not mean to say "more important than that"—he has shown that a reading of some of the major texts in political theory can be, without artifice or strain, perhaps even unintentionally, a substantial contribution to political science.—George Kateb, Amherst College.

Aus Nächster Nähe: Lebenserinnerugen. Vol. I. 1884-1927. Mit der Kraft des Geistes. Vol. II. 1927-1967. By Arnold Brecht (Stuttgart: Deutsche Verlags-Anstalt, 1967. Pp. 526, 496. DM 38 each.)

During the German war of liberation against Napoleon, Goethe, in the opening poem in his cycle Der West-östliche Divan, viewed the turmoil in western Europe with a total lack of engagement and urged his readers to flee these unpleasant realities "and in the purer east enjoy the air of sages." To many respectable Germans in the nineteenth century, this seemed sound advice, and they were encouraged by it to abstain from political activity—indeed, to regard politics as a distasteful and demeaning business with which a cultivated man would have nothing to do. "Politics," according to the popular saying, "destroys character." Essentially, of course, this was an irresponsible attitude; it left all effective power in Germany in the hands

of people who could not be held accountable for the way in which they exercised it; and in the long run it had catastrophic results. It would be wholly appropriate, Arnold Brecht writes with an allusion to the lines quoted above, to compose an essay entitled "Goethe's Co-Responsibility for the World War."

For the first thirty years of his life, Brecht was himself-as he admits ruefully but with a certain nostalgia for lost pleasures and quieter times-a "Goethe-German." Thereafter, however, as if he meant to atone for his long abstention from it, politics became his life. From the birth until the death of the Weimar Republic, he was never far from the center of events; and when Hitler's takeover forced him to leave Germany, it was to the study of the political process that he devoted himself during his years at the New School for Social Research in New York, where, among other things, he wrote his brief memoir of the last days of the German republic-Prelude to Silence (1944) -and his magisterial study Political Theory: The Twentieth-Century Political Foundationsof Thought (1959).

Now, in these two big volumes of reminiscence, Brecht tells the story of his years of active service in the Weimar Republic, and it is difficult to comment on his achievement without breaking out in a rash of superlatives. Written with a remarkable objectivity and a freedom from rancor that is rare in books by men who have been forced to leave their country, rich in reflection upon the structural defects of the democratic constitution and the personalities and policies of the men who tried to make it work or, alternatively, to destroy it, and presenting a not inconsiderable amount of new data on the political struggles of the 1920's and the permanent crisis of the years 1930-1933, this book will become required reading for all serious students of the period, and will doubtless, because of its wealth of anecdote, be mined assiduously by college lecturers.

The uniqueness of these recollections is to be explained in part by the position from which Brecht was able to view the early history of the republic. After completing his legal training and serving for brief periods as counsel in the Reichsjustizamt and the Office of Economics, his investigation of the war aims of the allied powers and his attempts to improve German propaganda with respect to claims in general brought his name to the attention of the last imperial chancellor, Prince Max von Baden, who, in October 1918, offered him a post in the Reichskanzlei. Here Brecht remained for the next three years, working under seven chancellors (Prince Max, Ebert, Scheidemann, Bauer, Hermann Müller, Fehrenbach and Wirth) and experiencing, and playing a role in, the abdication of the Kaiser, the revolutionary disorders of 1918 and 1919, the drafting of the constitution, the crisis caused by the Versailles peace terms, the Kapp *Putsch*, the loss of the democratic majority in the elections of June 1920 (which he calls the germ of death for the democratic system), the reparations debate, the murder of Matthias Erzberger, and the beginning of the policy of fulfillment.

His account of these events, and of the general history of these years, is that of an insider at the elbow of those making the decisions, and, even when the story he tells is well known, the vantage point throws new light upon it. From his notes of cabinet meetings in November 1918, for instance, we learn what the ministers of state were worrying about on the eve of the revolution that was to make most of their concerns irrelevant. We learn, from one who observed it himself, of the fearful impression that the murder of Rosa Luxemburg made upon Ebert, and of the frustration felt by the much-maligned Gustav Noske when he was compelled to rehabilitate the old military system because the working class refused to provide the volunteers who would have made possible the establishment of a new one. And we learn (with a surprised shock of recognition) of the cabinet's attempts to buttress federal authority, end the excesses of private justice, and strengthen the rule of law in the country by working for gun-control laws and the surrender of weapons. One of Brecht's special missions was to go to Munich in 1921 to urge the Bavarian police chief Pöhner to cooperate with the federal government in this policy; and it was in Pöhner that he encountered for the first time the political mentality that was to dominate Germany in 1933. "If any commie dog tries to take my gun away from me," Pöhner told him, "I'll put a bullet through his head."

Brecht left the Reichskanzlei in 1921 to become head of the division of political and constitutional matters in the Federal Ministry of the Interior. During his term there, Rathenau was assassinated, the French occupied the Ruhr, Hitler made his first attempt to seize power, and the country moved, by way of the Dawes Plan and the Locarno Treaties, into the period of stabilization. Brecht has comments on all of these matters, although his role in most of them was minor. (He is one of the few survivors of that period, he says, who does not claim to have a hand in the stabilization of the currency in 1924.) His real interest by this time was in the question of the relations between the federal government and the states. Because of ill-defined separation of powers, this had, on numerous occasions and particularly in 1923, caused major crises; and it was Brecht's belief that a basic reform was needed that would clarify the question of competence and at the same time rectify the gross discrepancy in the relative size of the various states. This question, which in his mind was one of life or death for the republic, continued to hold his passionate interest after he was dismissed from the Ministry of the Interior by a conservative government in 1927, because his views were too democratic, and had entered the Prussian service to become that state's representative on the Federal Council. Like many other proposals that might have strengthened the republic, *Reichsreform* was lost in the rush of events that overcame German politicians after 1930; but Brecht's analysis of the problem and the proposed solutions is highly instructive.

The most dramatic aspect of Brecht's official life came in 1932 when, after Papen's dissolution of the Prussian government on 20 July, he appealed to the highest court of the land for a ruling on the constitutionality of the action. Dismissed by Papen but reinstated by the court, he carried on the fight during the short period of Schleicher's chancellorship, only to have his hopes defeated, and to be deprived once more of his seat in the Reichsrat, after Hitler's accession to power. In his lively account of these events, he shows little respect for Papen, recalling Briand's comment on the gentleman jockey, that the longer he knew him the more he admired his horse; but he is clear in his own mind that it was this dilettante who made the first serious breach in the Weimar constitution (a view, incidentally, which he shared with Hitler who, in a war-time conversation, ironically thanked Papen for smoothing his path to

Brecht's portraits of the leading personalities of the period are almost invariably striking and always fair. The best, perhaps, are those of Erzberger, Rathenau, Wirth, Bruening, and particularly Otto Braun, the long-term prime minister of Prussia. Toward Hindenburg he is more charitable than most writers, feeling that he loyally defended the constitution as long as he recognized the issues at stake; but he feels that the Field Marshal's reelection in 1932 was a tragedy for the country and wishes that his own candidate, Dr. Hugo Eckener, had run in his place. With Stresemann, Brecht seems to have had no intimate contact, and the Foreign Minister remains an almost shadowy figure in these pages.

Brecht is not, however, a believer in the great man theory of history. In an interesting passage in his first volume, he talks of his friendship with Kurt Hahn, an assistant of Prince Max von Baden and later the founder of the Salem School in Baden and Gordonstoun School in Scotland. Hahn was always talking about the necessity of educating boys to be leaders, but his constant iteration of the word Führer worried Brecht. It was, after all, leaders that the "Goethe-Germans" wanted, to relieve them of political responsibility. Brecht

himself wanted more engagement by more people on every level of politics in the interests of a healthy democracy.—Gordon A. Craig, Stanford University.

The Social Psychology of Organizations. By Dan-IEL KATZ AND ROBERT L. KAHN. (New York: John Wiley, 1966. Pp. 498. \$8.50.)

This book might well have been subtitled "A General Basis for the Study of Behavior in Political Systems." As far as I can judge and know the field, it comes closer than any other work to putting into one frame of reference an interrelated body of significant and powerful propositions about the central focus of (much) political study—how people behave in organizations.

The treatment is in terms of an open systems meta-theory; organizations are viewed-so far as I can see, almost always successfully and systematically-as in constant transactions with their environments, receiving inputs, transforming them, and transmitting outputs. "An open system is defined by its boundaries for the selective reception of inputs (a coding process) and for its typical transmission of outputs. It is further characterized by such properties as negentropy . . . feedback . . . homeostasis . . . equifinality . . . and differentiation." As Bennis says in reviewing the book in the American Sociological Review, "no other writers have used (open systems theory) in so systematic and radical a way . . . (In so doing), they have succeeded in removing some substantial roadblocks to further development (of organizational theory)."

For purposes of optimum use by political scientists, the book would have to be radically reorganized and revised; it is, after all, not addressed to our particular traditions; the writers are social psychologists, whose major focus is on industrial management. So far as I can guess, most political science adaptations would best start off with the seventh chapter on "the taking of organizational roles." Human organizations are defined as contrived entities, the structure of which consists of acts or events (rather than of physical properties; I found my own long standing concern about the effect of political "structures" upon outcomes greatly clarified by this open-system approach to organizations). Organizations, therefore, attain constancy and stability in terms of relationships between units, rather than in terms of units themselves. This constancy is provided by role expectations, the prescriptions and proscriptions held by members of a role set (the occupants of offices adjacent to a member within organizational space). Obviously, many role expectations are irrelevant to or run athwart the formal job descriptions. "The crucial point is that the activities which define a role are maintained through expectations of

members of the role set and that these expectations are communicated or sent to the focal persons . . . Acts of role sending can be characterized in terms of such dimensions as magnitude, specificity; intensity, etc." They then proceed to show how the fit or lack of fit between the sent role and the received role may be due to such factors as differential relationships to the productive process, differential reward receipts, noise in the communications channels, etc.

Any review or summary of a book of this character is likely to be unjust or demeaning. This is so because a successful synthesis is, taken as a whole, substantially greater than any of its parts; and so whatever the reviewer selects for praise is, taken out of context, less impressive than within it. It happens that Katz and Kahn follow up the discussion of organizational role taking with what I regard as a very useful treatment of power and authority; summarized by itself, I do not know that it would immediately strike the reader as a great advance over everything in, say, March's Handbook of Organizations (Rand, McNally, 1966). But the precise point is that their treatment of power and authority is presented in general and carefully thought-out relationship to role episodes and to open systems analysis in general.

This is, of course, only a portion of what they offer; they provide, for instance, the clearest description and definition of policy decisions which I have seen. As the co-author of a book on Americar Business and Public Policy, (Atherton, 1963) I am glad finally to get some clarification on that very popular notion, "policy." Similarly, their treatment of communications in organizations seems to me to permit interpreting and generalizing a good many studies of political communications (including incidentally American Business, etc.).

I myself have used the book with satisfaction in a graduate seminar (at Berkeley) on interest groups; it helped make sense out of the loose notions of influence and pressure which help to confuse that topic. I also found the Katz and Kahn approach helped to clarify my own forthcoming discussion of The Job of Government Relations; Washington Representation (Bobbs Merrill, 1969). I expect to use the book in future seminars in Military Policy and in Problems of Undergraduate Social Science Teaching (in the latter case to help illuminate the organizational issues which teachers need to take account of in curriculum construction and course planning). Finally, I followed the ideas of Katz and Kahn (though I did not use the book itself) in a junior level second course on Administration (Michigan State U.) in order to relate the Case Studies in Public Administration to each other.

One of the reasons I did not use it as a text in this undergraduate course was its very wealth of ideas. On the fifth reading, I still find myself seeing new implications. Beyond that, non-psychologists will generally be discouraged by its vocabulary. And many readers will be thrown off by the fact that the carefully worked out, convincing examples are largely from the field of industrial management (plus, to be sure, some from university life and a few from hospitals, etc). The authors certainly are not as familiar on a day-to-day basis with state government, political campaigning, etc: and, unfortunately, many of the political examples they choose are (as compared with those from business) rather superficial. However, despite a somewhat negative first reaction to this latter circumstance, I have been able to see how examples from state and national government, comparable to those they cite from business, can be used to show the illuminating character of their theory, meta-theory, conceptions, and generalizations.

More objectionable is a kind of compulsive optimism, which at points Sinclair Lewis would have satirized. "Conflict" they tell us "clarifies." In Biafra? In La Violencia in Colombia? In border warfare in Scotland in 1400? In big city slum gang fights? A wider historical and anthropological perspective would have aided; most of the examples from outside the United States are from Western Europe, especially from Norway. Or, such theorists of tragedy as Thomas Hobbes and Niebuhr would have helped the writers to handle the fundamental problems of conflict and change; it is not surprising that in this otherwise extraordinary book, their attempt to tackle organizational change fails entirely to handle revolutionary or catastrophic situations. As with many other works -as with any textbook I can think of on American government-students need to be warned against the professional, middle-class, Western European-North American focus of the value assumptions and interpretations. But, unlike most American government texts, these writers supply a theory and meta-theory which permits correction in the light of incongruous data.

These reservations are important and should, since the volume ought to be recognized as classic, in any case be mentioned. But I am emphasizing them here, not in order to criticize the book negatively, but merely in order to point out some of the reasons the contribution Katz and Kahn have made has not been recognized in our field (and may not be so recognized) as quickly as it ought to be.—Lewis Anthony Dexter, Belmont, Mass.

Contemporary Radical Ideologies. Totalitarian Thought in the Twentieth Century. By A. James Gregor. (New York: Random House, 1968. Pp. 370. \$5.95.)

It takes courage to devote another volume to

the theoretical explication of totalitarian systems of government. Professor Gregor, whose Survey of Marxism (1965) was greeted with critical acclaim, has that courage. He is also a professional philosopher, and the lucidity and severity one expects from men of his discipline stands him in good stead as he takes us over the well-trodden ground, beginning with the founding father, Hegel, on to Marx. Lenin. and the Leninists on the one hand, and to Croce, Gentile, and the fascist spokesmen on the other. Some readers might consider the treatment of the classical elitists (Mosca and Pareto) as "protofascists" too conventional: others will find the space allotted to Apartheid and to native African socialism (more than one fourth of the book) excessive. But the students of national socialism will welcome the addition of the little known figure of Ludwig Woltmann to the gallery of thinkers who informed and misinformed the mind of Adolf Hitler.

As a professional philosopher, the author chooses to remain "indifferent to the efforts made to explain empirically the advent and prevalence of any specific ideology and ideologies in general." (4) He is emphatic on this point: "Assessment of the validity of the various theories advanced to account for ideologies is not one of the obligations of critical social and political philosophy." (5) Only at the very end of his trail does Professor Gregor sufficiently relent to admit that "all radical collectivist movements represent a manifest radicalization of trends . . . increasingly apparent even in nontotalitarian states." He dutifully lists the well-known empirical facts: economic and political centralization and bureaucratization, the development of mass communications. Indeed, "some of the principal species traits of totalitarianism are already common to all industrially advanced countries . . . Without the rapid technological advance . . . totalitarianism would be impossible." (339)

But Professor Gregor does not rely on the usual distinction between terroristic and non-terroristic regimes. Instead, he prefers to contrast Western political pluralism and the one-party state which "fixes upon a unique community as the ultimate and fundamental source of values . . ." (327) That legitimation will be either class origin, or race, or the concept of the nation, and of these three "the nation has become the focal community of contemporary movements of solidarity . . ." (336). Not class: "the fundamental issue of our century is not the ownership of property but its management" (340), and we are told that "Leninist parties . . . have never succeeded in winning the allegiance of the proletarian class wherever there was a proletarian class to be won" (338),—a statement which students of French and Italian politics will find more difficult to accept than the observation that even in the Soviet fatherland of scientific socialism "the critical search for truth is the privilege of the elite." (332)

Hitlerism, based on the ideas of the racial folk and its leader, appears to be "unique insofar as it was apparently seriously committed to an intuitionist and mystical epistomology." (Ibid.) But only apparently so, for "one of the principal theses of this work will be that even radical social and political ideologies are in significant measure the products of reason, experience, and observation, and are, consequently, to some degree corrigible . . ." (vii-viii). Even national socialism comes under these headings. The conventional distinction between the pseudo-rational marxist and the intuitionist fascist versions of totalitarianism is boldly discarded and inverted. "The employment of myths or political formulas calculated to engender . . . the acquiescence to rule, is not irrational or transrational in itself." The fact that "the anomic masses . . . can be, and perhaps must be, lead through the manipulation of sentiment does not characterize a political strategy or the movement that employs it as irrational." (329) It is in this sense, then, that "all totalitarian or protototalitarian collectivisms share a constellation of diagnostic traits that makes them more nearly like each other than like any other system of government ..." (337). They also share in over-all anticapitalistic tendency: "There is scant data . . . to support the thesis that the totalitarianism of the right, Italian Fascism or German National Socialism, is the 'creation' of large-scale capitalist interests." (341)

All this is presented as an "attempt to provide the exposition of radical ideologies without polemics . . . The essential function of this volume is the rational reconstruction of the justificatory arguments advanced to support radical ideologies." (ix) But something more than that emerges. something like a very personal conclusion: "In our own time it has become increasingly evident that fascism typifies the form that totalitarianism has taken and in all probability will continue to take during the twentieth century" (334), and since nationalism has proved, at least to the author, its superiority over the competing ideologies of class and race, it is Italian fascism that emerges as "paradigmatic of twentieth century totalitarianism ... (336). Almost thirty years ago, Professor G. A. Borgese, then a refugee from Italy, proclaimed the same view in Thomas Mann's Princeton home. He asserted heatedly that Mussolini, not Hitler, was the more important, and more dangerous of the two dictators. When Mrs. Mann commented: Borgese, your Italian nationalism is showing!" the distinguished antifascist author was not amused. -James H. Meisel, The University of Michigan. The Logic of Choice: An Investigation of the Concepts of Rule and Rationality. By Gidon Gottleb. (New York: Macmillan Company, 1968. Pp. 188. \$5.95.)

This is a book on what judicial decision-making is and, to a lesser extent, what it ought to be. It is written from an analytic jurisprudence point of view by a professor of legal philosophy at the New York University Law School. The book is related to the writings of Llewellyn, Cardozo, and Frank but is more closely related to Hart, Austin, and Wittgenstein. It clearly illustrates the great concern shown for detailed definitions, conceptual schemes, and the use of words by analytic legal philosophers as contrasted to generalizing about judicial behavior from numerous specific instances.

According to Gottlieb, the essence of judicial decision-making, at least at the appellate level, is reasoning with rules. Such reasoning consists of a process of deliberation arising out of a set of relevant facts designed to arrive at a decision governed by procedural and substantive rules which are based on certain purposes (ch. 3). Subsequent chapters are devoted to defining each of these basic elements ending with a discussion of rationality or good reasoning. Once the facts and rules are given, the process of deciding is essentially deductive (ch. 5). Determining what facts are relevant depends on the substantive and procedural rules and purposes (ch. 4). Likewise determining the rules or precedents depends on the facts in the precedent cases, the rules pre-existing the precedent cases, and the purposes upheld by the courts (ch. 6). To interpret an ambiguous rule involves looking at its language, intent, anticipated appellate decisions, the reasonable man's common sense, and free discretion (ch. 7). To decide between conflicting rules requires looking to the purposes behind the rules (ch. 8).

Where purposes conflict, Gottlieb takes a position between Black and Frankfurter (ch. 10). He (like Black) advocates making an absolutist interpretation of the Constitution or other relevant fundamental document rather than weighing or balancing the values involved. If, however, there is no fundamental document relevant to the dispute, he (like Frankfurter) advocates strict judicial restraint relative to the legislative. Gottlieb also seeks to escape down the middle of the law and morality conflict by emphasizing how reasoning from rules applies equally to legal rules and moral rules and by emphasizing how moral rules tend to be part of the purposes behind legal rules (ch. 9).

In deciding between conflicting facts, rules, or purposes, Gottlieb recognizes the importance of attempting to predict the impact of the alternatives on the parties, society, and future cases (ch. 5 and 11). He does not, however, recognize the role that social science can play in testing generalizations about the impact of alternative behaviors on subsequent attitudes and behaviors. He goes so far as to say (p. 22): "It is clear that reasoning with rules is manifestly non-scientific. There is nothing testable about a decision, for the consequences which it may occasion can themselves be evaluated only in non-empirical terms." In reality most consequences are really means and can thus be evaluated in terms of their observable ability to achieve other consequences. Intuitive acceptance is only necessary in the rare situations where ultimate consequences or purposes are involved.

Likewise Gottlieb impliedly recognizes subjectivity in proving facts, but he fails to recognize the subjectivity of choosing among conflicting facts, rules, or purposes when he dismisses Jerome Frank by saying (p. 53): "A defective mode of proof does not impair the rationality of the process of reasoning on the basis of the facts proved and believed." One does not have to be a Marxist to recognize the importance of class identification and orientation in shaping the legal reasoning process among different judges in many situations where there are conflicting facts, rules, or purposes.

In his initial and concluding chapters, Gottlieb defines rationality or good reasoning in terms of reasoning procedure rather than in terms of the relation between consequences and purposes. Thus a judge is deciding rationally if his reasoning is governed by the relevant facts, rules, and purposes as determined by the above-described procedures. The alternative would be to say a judge is deciding rationally if the consequences of his decision are in conformity with his purposes. Social scientists including political scientists can thus contribute to making judicial decision making more rational by testing generalizations as to the nature of the purposes of judges and the public and the nature of the social consequences of alternative decisions.—Stuart S. Nagel, University of Illinois.

The Social and Political Thought of Karl Marx, By Shlomo Avineri. (London: Cambridge University Press, 1968. Pp. 269. \$8.50.)

As the author himself remarks, yet another book on Marx may be difficult to justify. Not so, however, with this one. In addition to its substantive contributions, of which more below, Avineri's concise and thoughtful explications of Marx's basic ideas will serve general readers and beginning students alike as one of the more lucid available interpretations of a complex subject. Professional scholars are no doubt perfectly competent to deal with Marx's specialized and archaic philo-

sophical vocabulary, but many novices will surely be thankful for Avineri's clear explanations of seemingly arcane passages, like the following from the early writings: "Subject and predicate [in Hegel's philosophy] have, therefore, an inverted relation to each other; a mystical subject-object, or a Subjectivity reaching beyond the object, the absolute subject as a process of self-alienation and of return from alienation into itself, and at the same time of reabsorption of this alienation, the subject of this process; pure, unceasing revolving within itself."

The author's primary aim, of course, is to provide more than a clear rendering of the complexities of Marx's thought. He has designed this book as a contribution to the historic and continuing debate over what in that thought is vital-humanism, determinism, liberalism, authoritarianism, neurosis, prophecy, social myopia, or whatever. He believes, and many scholars will concur, that the debate has been slanted by distortions flowing from diverse political objectives and academic vogues. Thus we now have Marx à la Engels, Lenin, Lukacs, Hook, Sartre, Calvez, Cornu, Fromm, Tucker, and others. Europeans quote Marx to criticize the Soviet Union, Americans reconstruct Marx to condemn Communism, and the New Left revives Marx to berate the Establishment. The result, according to Avineri, is that partisan exegetes have upset the inner balance of Marx's thought, especially by distinguishing sharply the young from the elder man, and we have thereby lost sight of much of the unity and fundamental harmony of the principles he espoused. The Social and Political Thought of Karl Marx seeks simply to restore the balance, to rescue Marx from both his friends and enemies.

Avineri's substantive and polemical accomplishment, then, is his closely reasoned and carefully documented argument that the bulk of what Marx said and wrote remains consistent throughout. His rationale is intricate, covers two hundred and fifty pages, and cannot be summarized with justice here. But two major points of emphasis do deserve mention. The first is the transformative method, which Marx borrowed from Feuerbach and used to upend Hegel. Avineri shows how this philosophical device is first expounded in the early writings and then woven into later works. Employed as a critical tool, it provides the constant framework of inquiry which generates Marx's early interest in alienation and later concern with economics. Secondly, Avineri devotes several chapters to Marx's views on praxis and revolution, tracing them through a variety of sources including the early writings, the Manifesto, Book III of Capital, letters, speeches, and works on the midcentury revolutions and the Paris Commune. In these sources, according to the author, the founder of Marxism-Leninism maintained that the historical consciousness of the proletariat, and an increasing degree of managerial control of industry, will develop dialectically. Where the two trends merge, capitalism will gradually transform itself into socialism without the midwifery of either a conspiratorial Communist Party or a Jacobin-style paroxysm of violence. That is to say, Marx never really abandoned his early humanism to a harsh materialistic determinism.

This reviewer thinks Avineri's interpretation of Marx a good one, cogently and persuasively argued, never unreasonable or dogmatic. If it stimulates a re-evaluation of Marx, as the author hopes, so much the better. Others no doubt will research the enormous bibliography of writings by Marx, his disciples and students, and deploy a different combination of key quotations in order to contradict Avineri's findings. Their conclusions will not decisively refute his, however, for it is in the nature of such inquiry that while facts are readily procured, their meaning in totality cannot be definitely ascertained. Meanwhile, even scholars who question the book's broad theme of consistency will profit from scores of well-informed and perceptive comments on important extant interpretations ranging from Kautsky, Weber and Lenin to Calvez, Cornu, Meyer, Tucker, and Lichtheim.—David M. Ricci, Pennsylvania State University.

America's Political Dilemma: From Limited to Unlimited Democracy. By Gottfried Dietze. (Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins Press, 1968. Pp. 298. \$7.95.)

From the preface to the last chapter of his book, Gottfried Dietze asserts and reasserts the argument that the expansion of American democracy in the twentieth century has resulted in the undermining of constitutionalism, free government and individual liberties. Embracing the values of the Federalists, he is at a loss to understand how any departure from their political philosophy could rationally be construed as anything less than tragic. The wisdom and insight of Madison, Hamilton and Marshall are contrasted to the naive and foolish views and actions of men such as Woodrow Wilson, Franklin Roosevelt and John Kennedy. One cannot but admire the author's boldness and directness in presenting a position that will find few adherents. Unfortunately, his argument is supported neither by reason nor fact.

On the topic of economic rights, he states: "When American popular government, traditionally favoring the individual, became one favoring the masses, when the United States came to be considered a democracy rather than a republic, the ethnical melting pot was complemented by a fed-

eral one in which the protection of economic rights melted away." (Pp. 73-4). In a typically Federalist manner, Dietze assumes that a government that expands the economic rights of "the masses" also undermines the rights of "the individual" (presumably the natural aristocracy) and thus departs from the Constitution and "free government."

It is no surprise that he believes also that the recently passed civil rights statutes are basic deprivations of individual freedoms and contrary to the Constitution. Overlooking the fact that there is no freedom of contract clause in the Constitution, he asserts, "Freedom of contract is one of the foremost American liberties." (p. 132). In erroneously thinking that civil rights statutes prohibit prejudice (they prohibit discrimination) he declares that, "Although prejudice should not be promoted, it should be permitted out of respect for the dignity of man." (p. 136).

In Professor Dietze's view, the Supreme Court has abdicated its role as guardian of the Constitution since, during the past thirty years, it has not had "the courage to seriously challenge [the] majority" by invalidating laws which regulate economic activities. The fact that during the same period the Court held eighteen Congressional statutes, or parts thereof, unconstitutional on the grounds that they infringed personal liberties safeguarded by the Constitution does not impress Dietze. Clearly, he and the Court fundamentally disagree on the relative importance of economic and human rights. An equally clear difference between Dietze and the Court is that the latter makes a reasoned argument for holding to a double standard while Professor Dietze makes none.

Because strong presidents are inclined to favor regulation of property, Dietze advocates an amendment that would restrict presidential tenure to one term of office. He believes that if Hamilton lived today, he too would favor a weak presidency. He concludes his indictment of what he considers to be the excesses of democracy with a discussion on foreign policy. If postwar presidents had not been under pressure from public opinion, the United States, he argues, would have rightly gone well beyond a policy of containment of the Soviet Union. In his view a showdown with the Soviet Union would have cleared the air.—Peter Bachrach, Temple University.

The Function of "China" in Marx, Lenin, and Mao. By Donald M. Lowe. (Berkeley University of California Press, 1966, pp. 200, \$5.00.)

Li Ta-chao and the Origins of Chinese Marxism. By Maurice Meisner. (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1967. Pp. 326. \$4.95.)

The two books under review have much in com-

mon. Both were written by intellectual historians who exhibit a firm grasp of Marxist-Leninist theory in general. Both are well-written and thoroughly documented. Both have a theoretical orientation representing a promising direction in China scholarship.

The two books neatly complement one another in illuminating the "function of 'China'" in Marx, Lenin, Le Ta-chao, and Mao Tse-tung. They document, at the same time, a shift of focus from Eurocentric to Asiatic (Chinese, to the exact) Marxism. Professor Meisner's sweep is necessarily narrower than Professor Lowe's, but the former painstakingly draws a consistently informative picture of a major figure in Chinese Communist history and of the Chinese intellectual situation at the turn of the century.

Towe's central concern is "the correlation of the changing ideas of China with the changing Marxist unity of theory and practice in different, changing situations" (pp. xiii-xiv). Successively and systematically, he gives an exposition of the intellectual situation in Western Europe, Russia, and China and relates each to emerging theory in Marx, Lenin, and Mao, respectively.

Marx inherited from his intellectual predecessors an image of China as a despotic, reactionary, and static society. The image was gradually transformed into a view of China as caught up in the vast process of universal history. This change was due to Marx's interpretation of the opium war as having introduced capitalism into China, having ended China's isolation, and having made her a part of the international capitalist market. This argument, as Lowe points out, contradicted the materialist interpretation of history and the view of change as instigated by internal forces. rather than being externally induced. Marx further anticipated that the Taiping rebellion in China would lead to an economic crisis in England, since the rebellion would inevitably bring about a disruption of the Chinese economy on which the British economy in part rested. Indeed, Marx predicted that China would precipitate a general European crisis, a series of revolutions on the continent. In his Eurocentrism, in short, Marx was concerned with China not in its own right but in its relation to Europe.

Lenin's conception of China was ancillary to his constant endeavor "to correlate Western-oriented theory and Russian-preoccupied practice," to identify "Russia's equivalence to the West" (passim). Before the abortive Russian revolution of 1905, Lenin subscribed to the prevalent image of China (and "the East" generally) as stagnant, reactionary, and despotic. After the 1905 revolution, and particularly after the October Revolution, Lenin began to see the East as changing, moving, revolutionary. In his quest for a revised model of the

Marxian revolution, the East suddenly became "politically alive" (p. 67). World War I, Lenin believed, had dragged the East and all colonial and semicolonial countries into the world revolutionary process. He developed his well-known strategy of the dual revolution in colonial and semicolonial countries, a strategy that permeated the revolutionary movement in China.

The first major step toward the Sinification of Marxism was taken by Li Ta-chao, who was an ardent nationalist, the first important Chinese intellectual to declare his support for the Russian October Revolution, and the foremost interpreter of Marxism before Mao. Li's intellectual development-from preoccupation with the Chinese classics, to exposure to Western philosophies (particularly Bergson's voluntarism and Emerson's transcendentalism), to conversion to Marxism, to the advocacy of a peasant revolution in China-is carefully detailed by Meisner. Born in 1888 and secretly executed in 1927, Li is now honored by the CCP as its true founder and greatest martyr. Li became chief librarian at Peking University in 1918, in which capacity he influenced his young assistant, Mao Tse-tung.

Throughout his intellectual development, Li subscribed to a mystical vision of an imminent global regeneration in which China played a central role, a vision that was reinforced by the October Revolution. China was a "proletarian nation," which although lacking the economic base for socialism, was ready for a Marxist revolutionary movement; she would join the forces of world proletariat because China as a nation had suffered under international capitalism. Li's populism made it easy for him to support the Communist alliance with the KMT in 1923; in fact, he became the only Communist member of the KMT presidium.

Though strong, Li's populism showed reservations toward the urban proletariat. Thus, after the failure of the CCP-KMT alliance, Li was among the first to turn his attention to the peasantry and the countryside. As early as 1919 he had called upon the Chinese youth to go to the villages in order to liberate the peasants as a revolutionary force. In a 1925 article on "Land and the Peasants" (highly suggestive of Mao's "Hunan Report") Li assigned the peasantry the central role in a communist revolution in China.

This strategic modification of doctrine became a key factor in Mao-Tse-tung's thoroughgoing Sinification of Marxism. Mao became progressively disillusioned with the efficacy of the Soviet model for China and he increasingly stressed the unique features of the Chinese situation. Mao retained the nationalist and populist ideas of Li but he was a far more astute student of Lenin than his mentor. Li did not appreciate the pivotal role of the

Communist party in organizing and leading the peasants. He did not fully perceive the importance of military organization and military activity. And he did not see the unity of peasant revolutionary activity in the countryside and proletarian revolutionary activity in the urban centers.

These two books represent a step in the right direction in China scholarship-a move toward a theoretical approach to an understanding of communism in China. The studies of China-as the early studies of the Soviet Union-have been overburdened with descriptive and historical detail. Franz Schurmann's brilliant Ideology and Organization in Communist China (1966) being a major exception. What is needed is a more conceptual treatment of China as a type of communist regime-the kind of treatment now well under way in Soviet studies and best exemplified in the work of Alfred G. Meyer and Robert C. Tucker, among others. It is time, in short, to begin the crucial task of incorporating the mass of available data into a theoretical structure for the study of Communist China in the context of the comparative study of communist political systems.—Mostafa REJAI, Miami University.

Bolingbroke and His Circle: the Politics of Nostalgia in the Age of Walpole. By Isaac Kram-Nick. (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1968. Pp. 321. \$6.95.)

This book should do much to disabuse students of political thought of the notion that Augustan England was, as dismissed in Sabine's classic guide, "a period of quiescence or even of stagnation." For, in seeking to determine reasons for the Bolingbroke-Walpole feud-and the appeal of the former, reputedly a philosophe, to later Tories, Professor Kramnick bares an ideological division in English political life in the years from Locke to Hume. The struggle betwen Walpole's government and Bolingbroke's opposition did not, he finds, turn mainly upon a concern with the dignity and emolument of public office; more importantly, it involved a clash of different sets of ideas about society and politics. Thus the central figure of this study emerges, not as a mere opportunist inventing principles to suit the exigencies of the moment, but as the "full-blown spokesman" of gentry discontent with basic social assumptions "from which he never wavered" (p. 37).

The author interprets Bolingbroke's political attitudes, and those of his coadjutors—principally Swift, Pope, Gay, and Lyttleton, as, in a negative way, "inextricably bound" to the financial revolution of 1690-1740. The Viscount assailed the new world of liberal capitalism—endorsed and, in part, sponsored by Walpole's regime—because, in corrupting political life and undermining a traditional society, it was threatening the fundamental consti-

tutional balance. Here, Bolingbroke is seen as a "frightened Harringtonian" who knew that, with the rise of moneyed and decline of landed property, the law of the balance, which had elevated the gentry-led Commons and perfected the Tudor constitution, now militated against nobility, gentry, and family. Yet he abandoned Harrington for Machiavelli in "the summation of his political writings and career" (p. 163), and looked to a great man, above politics, to again restore the constitution and reform a corrupt society. "The Patriot King, the great testament of Bolingbroke's Opposition," Kramnick concludes, "explains . . . the movement's failure . . . Bolingbroke, because of his . . . obsession with morality, example, and the just ruler, befuddled his institutional insights" (p. 168).

To support his claim of an Augustan ideological conflict, the author compares positions in the Bolingbroke-Walpole confrontation. In almost all areas, they are seen as opposed. Bolingbroke, e.g., used traditional Whig conceptions of the past to argue, against-paradoxically-Tory interpretations in the Walpole press, that 1688 had but restored and renewed the liberties of an immemorial constitution; he challenged Locke because the latter, "given the official stamp of the government and the Whig Establishment" (p. 117), was being used to negate the institutions and values of a 'genuine' polity; he rejected Walpole's two-partystruggle view of politics and distinguished between a faction (the 'anti-constitutional' Whig regime) and a national 'party' (his 'constitutional' opposition); and he espoused the right of constituents (reflecting the national consensus) to instruct their delegates (being corrupted by the ministry and moneyed interest) while Walpole's apologists denounced the radical theory of representation. Thus is explained Bolingbroke's role as both conservative and 'populist' spokesman for the declining gentry, and his appeal to later Tories-and radicals.

Professor Kramnick's is, on the whole, an excellens book-erudite, penetrating, and extremely well-written. But, while his knowledge of Bolingbroke is most impressive, when he moves away from the fulcrum of his inquiry, he is, in places, on somewhat less sure ground. Defoe is a case in point. To credit his "huge literary output" with consistently liberal views and then assert that all that he wrote "paid tribute to the ideas, institutions, and society . . . over which Walpole presided" (pp. 188-189) needs explaining. On one side, Defoe clearly "embodied the projecting spirit" (p. 193). Yet his was a bifocal mental outlook; he, too, could, on occasion, condemn the 'villainy' of projecting and stockjobbing, attack the big companies for various forms of 'knavery' including 'parliament-jobbing,' and demand corrupt-practices legislation. And, rather than being mere popularizations of Locke (p. 189), his serious views on the origins of government are closer to Bolingbroke's. Both, e.g., saw family groups as the fundamental units in a pre-political condition, landed property as the basis of legitimate power, the state as formed by an association of families. and the contract as between people (family heads) and prince. Furthermore, both scored party government. Finally, the author's ignoring of Defoe as a link in the revival of the radical theory of representation (pp. 169-174, 243-250) is perplexing; for, in his prime, he was the foremost exponent of the theory-and of the doctrine of the 'original power' of the people (both flatly rejected by Walpole). All of this, Defoe's and Swift's simultaneous counseling of the same minister (Harley), and Defoe's service, in 1713-1714, to Bolingbroke himself (on the Mercator) suggest that the total Augustan ideological situation was even more badly tangled than is conceded in the last chapter ("The Ambivalence of the Augustan Commonwealthman") of this valuable study.—JAMES V. ELLIOTT, Tufts University.

The Origins of Modern African Thought: Its Development in West Africa During the Nineteenth and Twentieth Centuries. By Robert W. July. (New York: Frederick A. Praeger, 1967. Pp. 480. \$10.00.)

It is with a great deal of interest that one picks up a book which sets out to examine the origins of modern African thought—a subject of consider--able relevance and interest at the present time. Professor July suggests that modern Africa has been shaped largely by "two of her most recent minvasions," Islam in the mid-seventh century and ■the "scientific-technological revolution introduced From Europe at the beginning of the nineteenth sentury." (p. 15) Of these two major influences the author chooses to examine the latter in detail since "the more recent arrival of western scientifc-technological thought seems more completely to have influenced the institutions and ideas of the nodern states of mid-twentieth-century Africa." p. 15) The geographic emphasis of the study is the West Coast of Africa, in particular the areas of what are now Senegal, Sierra Leone, Liberia, Rhana, and Nigeria.

The focus on *origins* of modern African thought coses serious problems for Professor July. He does ot tell us how he wishes to use the term. On the casis of the author's Preface (and especially the cook jacket) we are led to assume that he means origin" in the sense of the source or determinants f modern African thought. We expect that the uthor will set out these themes and show us the nks between nineteenth and early twentieth centry thought and modern African thought. Except

for a brief effort in the Epilogue, we are destined to disappointment. By "origin" it appears that the author means that which came before the modern period. If he means more than this, it is not evident in his presentation or analysis.

Professor July devotes the major part of his effort to an examination of the thought and writing of important West African thinkers and activists. All of these men had at least a limited "western" education and had accepted the legitimacy and to some extent the necessity of British and French influence in Africa. Some, such as Paul Holle and Blaise Diagne, regarded the contact with Europe as providing the means for the betterment of Africa. Indeed we see the paradox of Africans like Holle and Abbé Boilat viewing with discain the efforts of Frenchmen like Governor Faidherbe to study and guard local customs. In sharp contrast, other Africans like Edward Blyden were concerned about the maintenance of African values and the debilitating influences of much of what came with the benefits of external contacts.

Some of the studies of these early thinkers and writers are very well done, showing great sensitivity and understanding. It is here that The Origins of Modern African Thought makes a significant contribution. A number of important conflicts become clearer-that created by the contact between relatively highly modernized societies and nonmodernized societies; the disruptive influences as well as the contributions of western education and religion; the identity crises of those torn between traditional ties and a strong attraction to foreign ideas and religions, and their often torturous efforts to justify and come to grips with their new roles. Men like Bishop Crowther tried to resolve some of these conflicts in arguing (in his early writings) for a synthesis of European ideas, Christian teaching, and indigenous African customs (p.

These studies of West African thinkers also contribute to an understanding of the diffusion of ideas along the coast of Africa, especially the major influence of the slaves returned to Sierra Leone who later moved up and down the coast, and the strong assimilationist influences of both the French and English.

Unfortunately the studies of individual thinkers are of a varying quality. All too often we are at a loss to know what the author thinks and why he deems a particular writer worth quoting or sees his work as significant. Can we accept what "X" says as valid? We are seldom told. What was his contribution to modern African thought? Often one must guess. Only two paragraphs, for example, are devoted to "the significance of Africanus Horton" at the end of a chapter on his work. In addition, the way in which secondary sources are used is often confusing. We find statements like this:

"Everywhere Christian worship became standard, and European schooling was much sought after..." (p. 131). While I do not think that Professor July believes this as a general statement in the light of what he says elsewhere, comments such as this one are confusing at best. Again and again we are confronted with the problem of lack of definitions. The author talks about "the modern African mind" (p. 22), the "unusual turn of the Gallic mind" (p. 28), or English and French "national character" (p. 30), without ever specifying what it is that differentiates them from each other. To understand their influences we must first know what they are.

The importance of the individual thinkers studied in this book is not questioned here. What is generally lacking, however, is a systematic effort to relate their activity to modern African thought and to set out general themes which ought to emerge from this study. As it is, we can only infer many of the author's conclusions. We must ourselves draw most of our conclusions from the material-sadly, without the benefit of the extensive and impressive work that went into the preparation of this study. Perhaps as political scientists we are asking too much of Professor July who is an historian speaking no doubt to an audience consisting largely of historians. Yet in this instance, I think we are not. The author sets out to examine origins, the relationship of the contact between individuals in societies with fundamentally different ideas and traditions, and the influence of western ideas on modern thought in Africa. It is in the analysis of these questions that the work is most deficient.

In short, this study is of uneven quality. At times the author shows considerable sensitivity and insight, at other times he is oblique and lacking in clear analysis. Despite its shortcomings, The Origins of Modern African Thought will be useful as a reference work for those interested in the political thought and influence of nineteenth and early twentieth century West African thinkers who had extensive contact with the West.—Fred M. Hayward, University of Wisconsin.

Freud: Political and Social Thought. By PAUL ROAZEN. (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1968, Pp. 322. \$6.95.)

The author notes at the outset that a theory of human nature has been an integral part of political philosophy throughout its entire history. In the Republic, for example, Plato offers not only a theory concerning the nature of the human psyche but also (books VIII and IX) the first social psychology in Western thought. Very little of subsequent political philosophy is as explicit as Plato is on this point, but the theme is never entirely absent and is always of fundamental importance.

Although the significance of the theory of human nature is quite obvious, it is often overlooked or not fully appreciated in writings on political philosophy. Periodic reminders are thus not inappropriate, and Professor Roazen's book ought to be welcomed on this account. Nothing in twentieth-century Western thought can rival Freudian theory as an original contribution to the historical concern with the problem of human nature; it follows that no serious work in political philosophy can fail to come to terms with Freud's thought. Professor Roazen has attempted to remind us of this fact and to show in systematic fashion the relevance of Freudian theory for present-day work in the social sciences.

The author's main contention in this book is that Freud's work has been divided into two distinct strains: the clinical tradition on the one hand, which concentrates on a narrow therapeutic approach, and social theory on the other, which puts exclusive emphasis on Freud's metapsychological writings and neglects his clinical contributions. Prof. Roazen argues that this situation is detrimental to both psychoanalysis and social theory, and especially to the latter; he writes (p. 19) that it is "impossible to understand these late social and political speculations of Freud's without fitting them into the context of his theories of clinical psychoanalysis." By examining Freud's clinical writings Prof. Roazen tries to demonstrate that Freudian theory can supply a vital ingredient for social science: a "systematic notion of human motivation" and a theory of the human personal-

By far the most valuable part of this book for political scientists is the section (pp. 59 ff.) dealing with an application of the insights afforded by psychoanalysis to the research techniques widely used at present in political science. Prof. Roazer shows that, if the data gathered in questionnaires and surveys and in the analysis of political behavior (e.g. voting) is evaluated without the sophisti cation in the understanding of human motivation made possible by psychoanalysis, such empirica studies are likely to be of little value. Since much effort is currently invested in these studies, hi challenge is quite important. Unfortunately hi discussion of this point is too brief, and one woulhope that the author would publish a more exten sive account of this topic in the future.

Certainly further pursuit of this aspect of Proparation Roazen's analysis is necessary for political science. But the main contention of this book is mor problematical. He wants to rescue Freud from mistreatment by philosophers and metaphysician who, he claims, have distorted Freud's work by emphasizing his metapsychological theories and ignoring his clinical writings. He does not only want to restore the balance, but to reverse the priorit

of attention; and he argues that "clinical psychoanalysis has a logical independence from Freud's own social theories" (p. 112).

It is hard to know just which philosophers and metaphysicians the author has in mind in making this indictment, for he does not mention any names. In fact much creative work has been done in applying psychoanalytic conceptions to social theory, even by philosophers. Outstanding examples are: some of Wilhelm Reich's writings, studies by individuals associated with the Frankfurt Institute for Social Research, Herbert Marcuse's Eros and Civilization and his essays in the volume Freud und der Gegenwart, and Norman O. Brown's Life Against Death. The interpretations of Freud by Brown and Marcuse are just the opposite of Prof. Roazen's. They maintain that Freud's metapsychological inquiries cannot be separated from his earlier clinical work: "the psychoanalytic theory of therapy has to be a theory of culture" (Brown); "Freud's theory of civilization grows cut of his psychological theory" (Marcuse). As a result Brown and Marcuse have been able to indicate quite clearly the interconnections between Freudian theory and the traditional concerns of social theory. If Prof. Roazen thinks that they have done Freud a disservice, he ought to show us where they have gone wrong.

One cannot establish the "logical independence" of Freud's earlier and later work by quoting his private comments expressing dissatisfaction with his metapsychological efforts or by suggesting (p. 102) that Freud's later writings represent his attempt to "stave off his own personal disintegration" by "appealing to society through social theory." What is required is a much closer examination of the texts. Such an examination reveals a great many complexities and indeed difficulties—for example, in the problem of the relationship between the individual and society; but that is what makes the study of Freud so valuable for the political theorist.—William Leiss, University of Saskatchewan, Regina.

Democracy's Dilemma: The Totalitarian Party in a Free Society. By BENJAMIN E. LIPPINCOTT. (New York: The Ronald Press Company, 1965. Pp. 293.)

Professor Lippincott's main thesis is that the presence of a "totalitarian" party in a "free" society poses no genuine dilemma for democratic poitical theory. The Communist Party in western countries is not a bona fide party according to the author, but a revolutionary conspiracy masquerading as a party. As such it stands outside the pale of liberal politics, especially as it would abrogate political pluralism and tolerance if it ever capured state power. Thus the problem of the CP in liberal democracy is never one of freedom of

speech of individuals, but rather a problem of illegal action by a conspiratorial association. As a consequence, the Communist Party has no moral right to exist and can be outlawed or otherwise controlled without involving democratic theory in self-contradiction. What specific measures are taken against the Party is a matter of mere expediency, having no implications for the civil liberties of genuine democrats.

A subsidiary argument of Lippincott's seeks to demonstrate that the failure of democratic theory to recognize the "true" nature of the Communist Party and the liberals' preoccupation with rights and disregard of duties have impaired the ability of democracies to withstand the internal and external onslaught of Communism. The third purpose of *Democracy's Dilemma* is to provide evidence of the democratic theoretical shortcomings by a survey of the writings of American and British socialist, liberal, conservative, and Catholic intellectuals and political leaders between 1917 and 1952.

The structure of the book reflects these three concerns. Lippincott opens with a short historical chapter purporting to demonstrate the awesome and evil power of Communism in America and to link it to the inappropriate scruples of liberal democrats whose paralyzing sense of an insoluble dilemma has prevented them from dealing with the situation self-confidently and with a good conscience. The following three chapters are devoted to a report on the results of an examination of 6,000 books and articles that deal (or at least might have dealt) with democracy's dilemma, and to an account of the position of traditional ("orthodox") liberals and so-called "realistic" authors. (The "realists," unlike the "traditionalists," recognize in the "totalitarian" party an agency for revolution which-given a chance-would deny the very freedoms on which it relies to promote its subversive aims.) Lippincott finds that only few writers dealt fundamentally with what he thinks is "the most crucial internal dilemma confronting democracy in the twentieth century." Forty-four American and British authors who did confront that "dilemma," however, receive more extensive treatment. The account of their arguments is reliable, fair, and unpolemical. These chapters—the distillate of a prodigious amount of reading-constitute a handy summary on an important subject and are the most valuable part of the book. The central core of Professor Lippincott's concern, however, is reached only in the following three chapters in which the traditionalist liberal view of the dilemma is severely criticized and the author's own thesis is presented according to which the suppression of "totalitarian" parties in democratic states does not involve democratic theory in selfcontradiction. The work concludes with recommendations for meeting the danger of internal subversion by, and external threat from, the supposedly world-wide Communist conspiracy.

We can do here no more than merely suggest briefly some of the major difficulties that vitiate Lippincott's book. Underlying them all is the ideologically distorted view of the world as a battlefield on which the forces of Good (the "free" world) are locked in mortal combat with the forces of Evil (the centrally directed Communists, bent on enslaving mankind). Constrained by this mythology, Lippincott remains unaware of the ideological content and the role of the concept "totalitarianism" whose use blinds him to the differences between Fascism and Communism, and to the analytical distinctions between revolution and counter-revolution. Indeed, except for two peripheral comments (pp. 38 and 221f), there is no indication that Lippincott is aware of the dynamics of social revolution. On the contrary, much of his argument depends on the implicit judgment that the maintenance of the status quo, tempered by incremental reformism, is a good in itself which the United States has a moral commitment to uphold all around the globe, and that the world-wide forces of radical social change can be understood only as the agents and dupes of the Kremlin.

The reader will search in vain in Lippincott's book for a realistic analysis of the post-industrial state, or for an inkling of the pervasive crisis of confidence in liberal pluralism, in its compatibility with democracy, and in its capacity to organize a just and authentically free society. Rather, when Professor Lippincott speaks of "democracy," "free society," or "equality," these terms remain purely formal, devoid of any realistic content. He never defines freedom at all and confuses the notion of the correlative nature of rights and duties (which holds that the rights of one person create necessarily obligations in another person, and not, as Lippincott would have it, in the person claiming the rights) with a theory of contingent rights (which insists that the valid claim to a right depends on the fulfillment of certain conditions).

A more exhaustive review would have to question Lippincott's almost total disregard of the relevant Supreme Court decisions (Yates, Lightfoot, and Albertson are not even mentioned; Scales and Noto receive one footnote each); his dubious interpretation of the Dennis case (Lippincott sees no difference between the "clear and present danger" and the "grave and probable danger" doctrines); his failure to use the many recent studies on the politics of integration and the dynamics of economic development (indeed, of all the books cited, only twenty three were published after 1956, only twelve of them in the 1960's, and the most recent systematic political science source used is

Duverger's Political Parties of 19591); and Lippincott's parochial analysis of political parties. A more extended criticism would, finally, have to take issue with Lippinuott's unbalanced version of the history of the Cold War and with the numerous misjudgments concerning European, especially German and Austrian, political events of the interwar years; his disregard of important changes in, and profound divergencies among, Communist states; his very incomplete account of the role of revolution and violence in Marxist and Leninist theories; and his championing not only of the data developed by the House Un-American Activities Committee, but also of its record of "expos[ing] for the sake of exposure," without even mentioning the Watkins decision.-Kurt P. Tau-BEL. Williams College.

The Revival of Democratic Theory. By Neal Ris-Mer. (New York: Appleton-Century-Crofts, 1962. Pp. 190. \$2.25.)

The Democratic Experiment: American Political Theory. By Neal Riemer. Vol. I. (Princeton: D. Van Nostrand Company, Inc., 1967. Pp. 245. S2.85.)

Riemer's main purpose in The Revival of Democratic Theory is "to analyze the decline and to suggest a case for the revival of democratic theory." Drawing principally from the writings of Strauss, Easton, Brecht, Cobban, and Morgenthau, he adduces five reasons for the failure of political theory "to unify and undergird political science." All of this consumes some 17 pages. Next, he explores "democratic theory in particular" in light of the more general malaise that has overtaken political theory. He writes: "Democratic theory lacks a conceptual scheme which unites the values, facts, and policies of a democratic society. Consequently, a major task of the democratic theorist is to relate harmoniously the normative, empirical, and prudential components of democratic political life." This is a recurrent theme of the book and the very task to which Riemer devotes himself in the remaining chapters (3-7).

What is the function of the "prudential" component of political theory? In the main it serves "to harmonize the values relevant to the good political life and the empirical realities which inevitably affect our strivings to fulfill these values.' What is the good life? It comes down to a "commitment to individual realization within the framework of the common good." There is some discussion and analysis of the perplexing questions that enough to guide an individual intent upon following Riemer's prescriptions. What is more significant at this juncture, however, is Riemer's evident concern to avoid being labelled an "absolutist'

or one possessed of "THE TRUTH." On the other hand, he evidences a queasiness towards moral "relativism" (as perforce he must unless he wants to pull the cornerstone out of his entire enterprise). Whether he really negotiates this channel or not (we need not ask here the broader and more interesting question of whether any such "channel" exists) is certainly open to debate. Ultimately his commitment to his formulation of the good life is a matter of "reasoned faith."

In a chapter entitled "Umpiring the Struggle for Power," Riemer stresses the need for "democratic and constitutional accommodation" for the resolution of conflicts that inevitably arise in the body politic. Here we find a defense of majority rule in conjunction with a textbookish examination of the role and functions of American institutions-parties, the Presidency, the Supreme Court, and the Congress. The last of the substantive chapters deals with what Riemer perceives to be two of the major challenges confronting a modern democratic theory: "the lonely crowd and world disorder." There is a plea for a "theory of transition" which will guide underdeveloped countries, if they so desire, to move in the direction of becoming mature and stable democracies. We are informed that accommodation between the Soviet Union and United States is quite likely because the two powers "will in actuality move closer to the meeting ground of democratic socialism." The final and very short chapter repeats and expands upon the theme that "the seeming decline and apparent ineffectiveness of democratic political theory may be attributable fundamentally to the failure of political theorists to view theory as the harmonious relationship of its normative, empirical, and prudential components."

The Democratic Experiment represents the first of a projected "three volume study of the political theory of American Democracy." The "theme" of this volume "is the creative Democratic experiment in reconciling Liberty and Authority in a large state." Riemer sets out to deal with a number of recurrent problems in the "American political community." "What is the nature, and what are the uses, of political theory?" (We already know the answer to that question.) "To what extent are we captives of, or emancipated from, our inheritance?" "Does Puritanism produce the good political life?" "What has been, is, and should be the theory of revolution in democratic America?" "Is just republican government possible in a large state?" "Upon what principles can we build a strong and prosperous nation?" "How do we perceive the American vision?" To answer these and related questions Riemer examines-in seven chapters, a "Prologue," and an "Epilogue"-the writings of Roger Williams, Edmund Burke, Thomas Jefferson, James Madison, Alexander Hamilton, John Adams, John Marshall, John Quincy Adams, and, among others, Andrew Jackson. Chapter 2, "America's Inheritance: Two Ithe Judaic-Christian and British Constitutionall Traditions," is designed to give us some historical and theoretical background for a better understanding of the American tradition. The very scope of the book precludes detailed analysis here.

What can be said of these two works? If they were intended, and we cannot be at all sure of this given the claims made for them by the author, to be simply texts designed to introduce the undergraduate to some of the enduring problems associated with democratic and American political thought, then something positive can be said about them. The Democratic Experiment is comparable in scope and depth to the major texts in the American theory field, and the Revival volume does raise a number of salient questions and issues, so that it, too, is suitable for assignment in undergraduate courses that center on democratic theory and practices. Beyond this we cannot go. Neither volume advances the existing frontiers of thought in the realm of democratic or American theory. Surely one who can see fit to write 'Locke, with superb common sense, sams up the best in Coke, the Levellers, and Harrington, He reaches back to Hooker, Aquinas, Cicero, and the best in the medieval and classical traditions. . . ," is totally unaffected by a vast corpus of scholarly literature that interprets Locke in a totally different way. And this is no small point, for a reassessment of Locke might well have served to change the thrust of Riemer's arguments, particularly those in The Democratic Experiment. Or one who views Jefferson's stance toward the Alien and Sedition Acts as libertarian (a) is probably wrong, but more importantly (b) glosses over a complex of issues that would lead us to a better understanding of the American tradition. Or, again, for one who claims that Madison ranks among the very best of our "modern political philosophers" but cannot conjure up intelligible reasons why Madison believed "rightful [rather than factional or "bad"] majorities . . . will normally have their way" in our extended republic (a crucial point in Madison's theory), certainly cannot be awarded any merit badges for either imagination or intensive theoretical analysis. And, finally, the presumed "revival" of democratic theory which was promised never materializes. The problems treated, as Riemer's footnotes and bibliography will amply attest, are not original or novel. All of them have been explored with greater sophistication and depth than we find in this particular volume. In fact, off of Riemer's own showing, we can only conclude that democratic theory was never-not until now, anyway-in a somnambulant state.-GEORGE W. CAREY, Georgetown University.

The Political Creature. By Peter Zollinger. (New York: George Braziller, Inc., 1967. Pp. 303, \$7.50.)

Like some of the classics of political philosophy, Peter Zollinger's tract in political theory begins with the state of nature. This time, however, we start not from a jungle, whether nasty or idyllic, but from a negatively charged, dynamic, miniscule electron orbiting around a relatively huge, immobile proton. What is important about this primal state, if you will, is that in 1927 it was discovered by Heisenberg that it is impossible to isolate p (position) and q (momentum) of subatomic particles. The two are aspects of a single event, related in such a manner that the more precisely p can be obtained, the vaguer becomes q and vice versa.

According to Dr. Zollinger it is not merely the fact that the physical base of the universe is indeterminate that is critical to our fate as social and political man. Even more important is the principle derived by Niels Bohr in analyzing Heisenberg's findings, namely the principle of "complementarity," the fact that position and momentum were complementary aspects of a single unitary event, not separate realities. It is the universality of complementarity, the fundamental interdependence of everything with everything within any system from the microphysical to the macroscopic, which is the law that is the basis of all matter, both living and non-living, and is the force that has pushed the evolution of things from the hydrogen atom to our own civilization.

The author takes us on a journey, one almost wants to say a Space-Time Odyssey, through the negatively and positively electrically charged microphysical particles to the negative dynamic spermatozoon and positive, static ovum to static, immobile, protonic plants and dynamic, electronic animals. The journey, and I am paraphrasing the author in following it continues into the social sphere with its conventions and domesticity, dominated by the vegetative-protonic sex, the women, and the dynamic-electronic sex with its trade, science, technology, the life military and political, the animalic male sex. Thus, the author tries to show the repetitiousness in evolution with the principle of complementarity the basis of all stages.

In this way Dr. Zollinger traces evolution as it is driven onward by the principle of complementarity. He discusses the emergence of organic and biological life in its most primitive forms and shows the development into more advanced forms, conscious life. He suggests that one must understand social and political life by the same principle and shows, for example, that social life must be understood in terms of the need for both self-preservation and species preservation. From an evolutionary point of view species preservation is of supreme import with functional diversity and

integration, the bases of complementarity, allowing for more and more advanced stages of civilization. Dr. Zollinger tells us that it is only when men understand and act according to the principle of complementarity that they can utilize this principle to preserve civilization and species development.

There are a variety of questions that must be asked in evaluating a book of this kind. The first has to do with what new insights or understanding this effort at political theory attains. Dr. Zollinger himself, one expects, would suggest that the most important achievement of the book is the connection he has tried to establish between a social and political ethics and the fundamental principles of the universe. One wonders, however, how the complementarity of proton and electron bears on the nature of an ethics that we search for. The nature of diversity, functional integration, and complementarity at the subatomic level has a formal similarity to the diversity and integration that one finds and tries to encourage among men, but one learns little about how men ought to act in merely saying complementarity is important, even essential. Dr. Zollinger places great importance on Heisenberg's not being able to isolate different aspects of the same microphysical phenomena. For some mysterious reason he concludes from this indeterminacy that somehow there is "freedom" at this level. The physicist should and usually does realize that to speak of the "freedom" of the atom because of its indeterminacy is to say very little about ethics or will. Surely the political theorist or that matter, any man, does not depend on the findings of men like Bohr and Heisenberg to discover his freedom and the freedom of his species. It is this fear of the loss of freedom (or, for that matter, the hope of finding freedom) in scientific work that limits people's understanding of science, particularly in the academic community. Thus, the complementarity and freedom that Zollinger discovers in the physical world seems to be of marginal worth in the problem of social and political ethics.

One might also ask of this book what contribution it makes to political philosophy. Using his "new understanding," Dr. Zollinger concludes that a tension between self-preservation and species preservation is desirable, that a tension between the individual and the state is desirable, that a tension between law and ethics is desirable, etc. The discussion of the nature of these tensions which must be resolved through complementarity adds little to what has already been written by the great political philosophers. The contributions to political and social theory found in this book add little to what we understand. Nevertheless, this effort is a Space-time fantasy and those readers who are wary of the fantasies of Hollywood

producers like Stanley Kubrick might find the voyage in this book a diversion that complements their more "electronic" activities.—SIDNEY WALD-MAN, Haverford College.

The Notion of the State: An Introduction to Political Theory. By Alexander Passerin d'Entrèves. (London: Oxford University Press, 1967. Pp. 233. \$2.95.)

D'Entrèves implies that it is the shortcomings of "certain modern theorists," indeed, of "contemporary political science" (p. 9), which motivates him to defend a more inclusive theory of the State. The new political science "bears a striking resemblance to certain old notions of the State as merely a relation of force" (p. 9), whereas in truth this force must be regularized through legal rules and these rules themselves stand in need of legitimation, i.e., a feeling on the part of the people that they 'ought' to be obeyed. His book is intended to redress the modern imbalance by reasserting the need for political philosophy as the guide to legitimacy.

Since no work more recent than David Easton's Political System (1953) is cited, one can hardly say the "contemporary" literature has been exhausted. One would think, e.g., that some of the recent studies precisely on legitimacy would have attracted d'Entrèves' attention. But if he does less than justice to modern political analysis, this does nothing to detract from his generally incisive assessment of the contributions of the major political philosophers to one or more of his three categories of the State. He devotes a chapter each to Force ('Might'), Legality ('Power'), and Legitimacy ('Authority').

It is not surprising that Thrasymachus becomes the first spokesman for the State as Force. D'Entrèves' analysis is good. He does not mistake Thrasymachus' embarrassed withdrawal from his Socratic confrontation for a withdrawal of force from the ruler. On the contrary, "Strength must be joined to wisdom" (p. 16). Socrates and Thrasymachus are both essential to the State.

The treatment of St. Augustine is less clear. According to d'Entrèves' earlier definition, legitimation involves "a sense of obligation," "'agreement' on the ends to be pursued," "a civic sense, love of country, complete dedication to the common cause" (pp. 5-6). Nothing is said of the quality of the ends. But later, Augustine's state is denied legitimacy. It is "'ethically neutral," "strictly factual," one in which "all consideration of values is left out," as is "any reference to its ends." While for Augustine it is a state even though unjust, for d'Entrèves, without justice it is "a simple organization of force" (pp. 23-24). From legitimacy consisting in what people do in fact accept as obligatory, d'Entrèves moves to what they ought to ac-

cept. Legitimacy is impossible without knowledge of this 'ought.' This is a hard, perhaps impossible, demand, though a noble one. It would seem to call not only for political philosophy but for empirical studies of possible factual 'oughts.'

The State thought of as Legality, the limitation and direction of Force by law, takes d'Entrèves through Aristotle, Cicero, the Romans, the Middle Ages, Bodin, and Hobbes, Space does not permit detailed coverage. One should say, however, that in building his case in this part, the author has done a masterful job of mustering the evidence with no distortion of the sources. Thus, for example, he covers accurately and to the point the differing stages of law as "declaratory" or as "creative": Bodin's origination of the word "sovereignty" to express supreme legal power in an independent national territory; and the legal criteria for Hobbes' force, in contradistinction from Machiavelli's. Also good is his timely reminder that the divided exercise of power does not challenge the principle of unified sovereignty.

As for Legitimacy, we have learned that the State depends not only on its acceptance by the people but on its pursuit of 'right,' of 'just,' ends (pp. 24, 159). What happens if people do not accept this pursuit of justice, d'Entreves does not discuss, any more than does Locke in posing as the criteria for legitimacy the twin concepts of consent, on the one hand, and action in accordance with the law of nature, i.e., reason, on the other. But with the consequences before us of the German Nazi plurality vote in 1932, can any theorist any longer ignore this question?

In terms of 'just' and 'right' ends, Aristotle's conception of the polis as natural, with its own ends but also instrumental to human virtue, was a normative concept. When this natural standard for the State was no longer accepted, the normative need was attached to the state of nature and the social contract (p. 166). D'Entrèves is correct in this attribution, but it would have added to his book had he evaluated the seeming paradox involved in considering as normative a state of nature which men found it necessary to leave, or, alternatively, which was only a construct to begin with

Contrary to inegalitarian elitists, d'Entrèves argues that the origin of legitimacy is in the fundamental equality of rights of all men. As with Madison, presumably this would not preclude inequality of political function as long as based upon consent. Indeed, seemingly only this kind of democratic elitism could actualize the justice essential to his legitimacy.

The book ends with a discussion of the ambiguity of individual rights and interests, on the one hand, and the common good, on the other, as legitimations of power. He rightly cites Locke in this

respect, but surprisingly considers it worth noting how strongly rooted was the idea of the common good "still in Locke's day" (p. 224). Since he had already shown familiarity with Madison, he might have lengthened his "still" by one hundred years and noted some of Madison's references to the public interest. Madison boldly joined in the same sentence the "permanent and aggregate interests of the community" and the "rights of other citizens" (Federalist No. 10), and believed that because of social pluralism and the separation of powers the two could be mutually reinforcing. D'Entreves might have explored this possibility, especially since we live in an age stressing individual rights and he is heavily committed to the common good.

Though subtitled 'An Introduction to Political Theory,' this revised English version of the original 1962 Italian edition would be hard going for a beginner. It would be most rewarding at the end of a course using original sources. Both its insights and its omissions could then be appreciated. It is one of those rare books which, good as it stands, would be better were it longer.—Maynard Smith, Hobart and William Smith Colleges.

Organizational Effectiveness: An Inventory of Propositions. By James L. Price. (Homewood, Illinois: Richard D. Irwin, Inc., 1968. Pp. 212. \$3.75.)

The relevance of organizational theory for political theory has not escaped recent notice. Wolin in Politics and Vision complained about the assumption of identity between elments in contemporary organizational and political theories. Kaufman in a piece in this Review several years ago was intrigued by the "parallels between organization theory and political theory." And recently, Denhardt in the Public Administration Review has reminded us that "citizenship" and "membership" may refer to the same phenomena. It thus should not surprise the reader that Price has utilized a conception of the organization's "political system" to order a major part of his inventory. The propositions there justify political scientists giving it a try. Those who study bureaucracies or political organizations should find the book even more worth the effort. My choice of words is deliberate for Price's purpose and style (which is in part a consequence of his purpose) make this book difficult no matter the interest of the reader. Those who prefer a more systematic and cumulative social science ought not complain about the purpose; for those same reasons they may rightfully complain about the results.

The author's purpose (with acknowledgement to Berelson and Steiner) "... is to present the core of what the behavioral sciences now know about the effectiveness of organizations: what we really know, what we nearly know, what we think we know, and what we claim to know." (p. 1). Fifty studies of "administrative organization" ("... an organization composed primarily of full-time members" p. 8.) were inventoried for "information pertinent to effectiveness." Productivity, morale. conformity, adaptiveness, and institutionalization were presumed to be more positively than negatively related to "effectiveness" and hence "functional" with respect to it. (In the final model these are listed as "intervening variables.") The format of the propositions is designed to alert the reader to the level of measurement presumably attained on each variable as well as to inform him of conditions imposed on the relationship. Accepting the conceptualizations and findings of his sources as given, Price casts those materials relevant to his interests into a series of primarily bivariate relationships with "effectiveness" the dependent variable. (Effectiveness is defined as the degree of achievement of "operative" as opposed to "official" goals.) Five sets of "determinants" are discussed: the economic system, the internal poltical system, the external political system, the control system, population and ecology. The resulting schemata also delineate potential relationships for future inquiry and are called "models" of effectiveness in organizations. The propositions are subsequently summarized and ordered in terms of the variables most likely to be related to "high effectiveness."

Crdinarily it is not fair to fault an author for more rather than less rigor. In this work, however, the author's attempted precision complicates explication and comprehension. Some examples should illustrate the unfortunate results.

Proposition 3.3 reads: "Except where there is a high degree of complexity, organizations which have a low degree of centralization with respect to tactical decisions are more likely to have a high degree of effectiveness than organizations which have a low degree of centralization and respect to tactical decisions." (p. 60). Later, on page 90, we read: "Therefore, when Katz, Maccoby, and Mcrse note that close supervision is inversely related to productivity, this inventory interprets this to mean that a very high degree of centralization is negatively associated with productivity. Proposition 3.3 refers, not to very high, but merely to a high degree of centralization. Data which suggest that a very high degree of centralization is dysfunctional or effectiveness thus do not necessarily contradict the proposed relation. . . " To be sure, the relationship may be curvilinear. But then again it may not be. Comparable feats of extrication by degrees appear elsewhere and highlight the fact that the concept "degree" and the differences between a low degree, a "mere" high degree, and a very high degree are cause for more concern than the author has shown them.

The use of "positive" and "negative" illustra-

tions must be carefully followed for "positive" means high x, high y, while "negative" means low x, low y. The concept of organizational "size" is defined as "volume of output" and is also measured in "degrees." At another point, the inventory's propositions refer to "degrees" of sanctions while the discussion refers variously to numbers and supplies.

The costs of concision are no better illustrated than on page 132 where we find: "The type of external political system most likely to result in a high degree of effectiveness will have a high degree of autonomy; an ideology which has high degrees of congruence, priority, and conformity; cooptation; major elite co-optation; a high degree of representation; major elite representation and a major elite constituency." The author must mean to say something like "Organizations are more likely to be more effective when their external political systems foster. . . ." Indeed he ultimately says as much on page 204.

Several minor notes as well. Surely there is a typo in Proposition 3.1 (page 49) which now reads: "Organizations which have a high degree of legitimacy are more likely to have a degree of fectiveness than organizations which have a low degree of legitimacy." And we need not be reminded to the point of irritation that illustration is not proof.

Synthesis and systematization of a literature as voluminous as that surveyed by Price is no mean chore. And while I have quarreled over several features of the final product I would also take issue with any who would disparage this or any other equally comprehensive review of a literature. We truly need to know what we know about a lot of things. Price had contributed to our knowledge of organizational effectiveness through his efforts.—Dale A. Neuman, University of Missouri at Kansas City.

The Industrial Society: Three Essays on Ideology and Development. By RAYMOND ARON. (New York: Frederick A. Praeger, 1967. Pp. 183. \$4.95.)

The three essays comprising this volume are inked more by M. Aron's remarkable person than by any systematic presentation of ideas. Thus, nowever one may wish to resist the temptation to ndulge in the sociology of political knowledge, to examine such a volume otherwise is simply not to ake seriously perhaps the most important singular actor in the book as such: Aron's aesthetic vision. The three papers are also connected by a systemtic attack on the Left. The first paper is a cririque of the thesis which unites the underdevelopient phenomenon with the fully developed naions. The second paper is a stong assault on evoitionary theory, or at least those forms of evoluonary theory which feed the flames of histori-Ksm. The third paper is an assault on the convergence hypothesis, which maintains that capitalism and socialism are beginning to approximate one another.

However limited much of the writing is, and although Aron remains a prisoner of the ideological parameters he so detests, important coordinates are raised. While Aron's book is not the first effort to attack the idea that socialism is necessary to initiate the developmental process in the Third World, it is one of the few attempting to relate problems of development to those of international peace and order.

In his first paper Aron shows how developmental theory raises a series of causal issues that continue to plague the field. He centers on what is perhaps the major problem, whether underdevelopment is caused by or necessarily responsive to the fully developed and advanced nations. While he takes issue with those who would deny that every nation, like every man, is responsible for the consequences of his own behavior, he does not really show how national behavior is autonomous. For example, he fails to explain why nations which were not impoverished in previous epochs, nonetheless remain backward. Nor does he explain how the widespread monopoly of research and development gives advanced nations leverage over the underdeveloped nations despite intensive efforts on their part. And while Aron realizes that the single crop economy is a weak point in underdeveloped economies, he does not indicate why, these single crop economies seem to persist-although all reasonable evidence indicates the wisdom of diversification. As in so many of his works there is emphasis on ideology at the expense of economics rather than as a consequence of economics. Too often Aron tends to see the problem of underdeveloped areas in terms of administrative strategy rather than as a matter of social structure.

The second study in the volume, ostensibly a response to the tenets set forth by Morris Ginsberg, that the evolutionary or rationalistic interpretation of development has lost ground, permits Aron a statement of his cwn faith and reason. He makes some shrewd observations about what he terms the "schedule of development." He notes that whether one starts from a Marxian or Rostovian premise, development seems to imply a range of choices and decisions. The volitional character of development thus means that the quality of existence will be differential no less than the goals sought.

Aron's position is that rational choice should not be equated with a plan for social life to proceed through inexorable stages of history or development, but rather as a chance to live in the modern world without having to confront "development" and force it upon the political processes. Unfortunately, Aron, while describing the schedule

of development, does not take note of when and how this developmental process is to be realized. Since developmental theory no longer accepts any historical explanation, it remains more rooted than ever in teleology. In hunting for the future by arguing with the past, Aron's volume must be seen as a justification for the continuation of a middle class growth pattern. While the basis of a reliable schedule of growth remains the touchstone of developmental strategy, Aron would prefer to think that it is the cultural artifacts produced in the West that remain the essential model to be employed by the underdeveloped world. However, Aron does draw our attention to the problem of determining just what can be measured in the developmental process. As an extreme rationalist he is unwilling to accept that forces outside human volition determine the outcomes of the developmental process. Too often he allows his own detestation of determinism to drift off into dramaturgy. Just as God seems to lurk behind the rationalist philosophes of the eighteenth century, so too Culture seems to lurk behind the idealist social thought of Aron.

As readers of Aron well appreciate, if his critical acumen can at times rise to oracular brilliance, his constructive skills remain pedestrian and at times even absurd. In his criticism of Anglo-American theorists such as Aiken, Lichtheim, and Rostow, Aron exhibits both of these elements. When he criticizes these men, we have some sterling writing, but when constructive alternatives should be posited, he gives us nothing. The conclusion to the book is a series of dreary banalities, such as the following: "The breakdown of ideological syntheses does not lead to insipid pragmatism or lessen the value of intellectual controversy. On the contrary, it encourages a recurrence of rational discussion of problems which, in any case, must be solved pragmatically." Then, in complete denial of the premises upon which his book is built, he notes that: "We are more fortunate than previous generations in that we are not forced to make a choice between conservatism and fanaticism." Presumably what will save us is that, "We know that modern methods, scientific and technological progress, and the rational organization of labor enable us to achieve the objectives to which liberals and socialists of previous centuries aspired." And finally, as if his palliatives were insufficient, we are given a set of prognostications which have the predictive force of Chinese fortune cookies. "History from now to the end of the century will be

ings get wrapped up into a gnarled bundle of twine that he seems too impatient to bother unraveling.

The book is more a study of developmentalists or at least some developmentalists than it is of development. This would not be so bad had Aron acknowledged this to begin with: however his failure to appreciate the limits of the text inclines one to ponder the depth of analysis. To appreciate how thoroughly out of tune Aron is with recent developmental literature, one has to keep in mind that his notion of Western developmentalists does not extend beyond Walt Rostow and James Burnham, neither of whom can be considered as recent; and Henry Aiken and Herbert Marcuse, neither of whom can be considered developmentalists. The work of modern developmentalists, the bocks by people such as Adelman, Apter, Pye, Moore, Verba, et al., and on the Soviet side, Liberman and Kurakov, simply don't exist for Aron. The tragedy is that so many conflicts which are real for him no longer exist in the political world. Although Aron's book can be read either for fun or for profit, it is not likely that contemporary American social scientists will turn to it as an example of how to deal with the relationship between modern industrial processes and developmental orientations. Perhaps M. Aron will yet favor us with the big book on this subject.—IR-VING LOUIS HOROWITZ, Washington University at St. Louis.

Systems of Political Science. By Oran R. Young. Englewood Cliffs: Prentice-Hall, 1968. Pp. 113. \$4.50.)

Young's book is so very badly done that I would not, ordinarily, agree to review it. Yet it illustrates a trend in contemporary publishing in political science whose implications for the discipline are worth careful examination. Since Young is not responsible for that trend, it is perhaps unfair to use him as a whipping boy, but the point I am trying to make is, I believe, sufficiently important to justify what has been done.

First, the book. Young sets out to expound critically a variety of "approaches" to the study of politics-general systems theory, structural-functional analysis, communications theory, etc. He fails, for reasons that are both procedural and substantive. First, the writing is atrocious. Cliches abound, often in most unusual form: "... pin down the level of interdependence which forms the breaking point..." [p. 25] Clauses dangle; punc-

cal assumptions implicit in the treatment of inquiry are hopelessly naive. The descriptive accounts offered for the various "approaches" are grossly inadecuate if not positively misleading. The criticisms offered for these "approaches" are trivial or merely confusing. Space does not permit more than a hare enumeration of the worst faults and a few illustrations.

The methodological confusion is so severe that it is hard to illustrate. The treatment of "theory," for example, makes use of a concept identified as "inductive testing" without in any way spelling out what is meant by the term. The distinction between logical and empirical limitations on inquiry is simply ignored. The general conception of the goals of inquiry is idiosyncratic to the point of being bizarre. A single illustration—the treatment of "description"—will illustrate the difficulties:

Probably the most basic set of variables and organizing concepts in any discipline can be labeled descriptive. The subject matter of much work in political science falls into this category of description, whose effort is more to delineate relevant phenomena, to generate useful classifications and breakdowns, and to pinpoint the important characteristics of political activities than to explain complex patterns of events, to extrapolate and evaluate trends, or to make predictiors. [p. 5]

The confusion of meanings here is quite hopeless. Some of the more substantive inadequacies of the book can be illustrated from the treatment of "general systems theory"—a topic on which Young has written earlier. The content, if any, of general systems theory is left unstated; we are told something of the *kind* of propositions included in the theory, but not given the propositions themselves. We are warned [pp. 20, 25] on three occasions that "the propositions" of the theory are badly scattered through the literature, but provided with no examples. In one place [p. 19] we learn that

. . . above all, the communication and transfer of insights along the channels of isomorphisms (sic) and interlocking systems provided a real impetus for empirical work.

A few pages later [p. 26] it appears that Young has changed his mind, for he asserts that:

. . . general systems theory proper has been utilized very little in the social sciences and (that) it is very difficult to judge its utility at this time.

The manner in which the book's poor organization and conceptual inadequacy is reinforced by extremely poor writing is well demonstrated by the treatment of the very important notions of "isomorphism" and "homology."

The concept of icomorphism has been defined as "A one-to-one correspondence between objects in different systems which preserves the relationship between the objects." An isomorphism is therefore more than an analogy since it refers to relationships that are closer than simple likenesses or partial similarities. In this sense, the notion of homology corresponds more nearly with the meaning of isomorphism in general systems theory. Both concepts can refer to important structural correspondences across systems. But the

notion of isomorphism has a broader reference than that of homology. In fact, from the standpoint of general systems theory, the most important isomorphisms are functional (rather than structural) correspondences across systems or fundamental similarities in the governing principles or processes of systems, and not homologies at all. [pp. 16-17]

That paragraph contains all of the information supplied on the subject of homology!

Young has written a very bad book. But what is striking about the whole affair is not the quality of the book but the fact that it appears on the open market, is expected to be successful, and has been chosen for review by at least one of the prime journals in the field. How can this be? The answer, apparently, is that books are judged by sponsorship rather than content. Young's volume appears in a series marketed by a major publisher and edited by one of the more prestigious bellwethers in the political science flock: that alone is enough to sell the book to a great many political scientists. But if academic sponsorship is so important for sales, then academic sponsors have some responsibility for the quality of the product they endorse, for the books they include in "their" series, unless caveat emptor in the name of monetary gain is to be the rule. Those who offer us books dealing with the "foundations" of our discipline should not package an edifice of sand and market it as an item of steel and concrete. In the case of Young's book, that responsibility has been shirked by all concerned.—EUGENE J. MEEHAN. University of Illinois (Urbana).

The Political Philosophy of Spinoza. By ROBERT J. McShea. (N.Y.: Columbia University Press, 1968, Pp. 214. \$7.50.)

The dust-jacket announces this book as "the first systematic treatment of Spinoza's political thought to appear in over half a century." The author more modestly disavows novelty or the explication of "knotty problems," but claims to provide clarification of some central political ideas and an explication of Spinoza's "system" (vi, vii).

Unfortunately he begins from an ambiguous distinction between Spinoza's "metaphysics" and his "ethic of personal salvation" (30-31). McShea claims that Spinoza is not primarily interested in politics or metaphysics, "but in an ethical program for the achievement of personal autonomy" (30: cf. 204). This distinction assumes the independence of ethics from metaphysics, or at least the subordination of the latter to the former. It seems to reduce political philosophy to a means toward the end of individual perfection. What then are we to understand by Spinoza's "system?" What of the claim in the Improvement of the Understanding that all sciences are directed toward one goal? If the goal is personal autonomy or salvation, how is this deducible from the "philosophy of science" which McShea sees in Spinoza's metaphysics? (42: cf. 33-34). McShea himself says that Spinoza's political philosophy is derived from his metaphysics by way of his ethics (32). This would seem to imply that ethics is subordinate to metaphysics, and to confirm the cognitively low status of politics.

McShea quotes as the central statement of Spinoza's political thought: "I start from the natural rights of the individual, which are co-extensive with his desires and powers." To this, he adds: "if there is any point at which one could separate [Spinoza's political] thought from his metaphysics, it would be here, although only in the light of the metaphysics can the full force of the point be seen. Spinoza knew how critical was his natural right theory to his system; he spoke of it as being the principal distinction between his own political theory and that of Thomas Hobbes" (58). Because McShea underestimates the importance of Stoicism on Spinoza's own teaching, he does not realize that the natural distribution of power is Spinoza's version of the classical doctrine of a hierarchy of natural kinds. The equation of right and power is precisely the point of connection between Spinoza's metaphysics and his politics. One cannot distinguish between his ethics and his metaphysics because salvation or freedom is identical with knowledge of the natural order. This is the key to the metaphysical difference between Spinoza and Hobbes, For Spinoza, man is one natural being among others; the study of man proceeds precisely as does the study of non-human nature. For Hobbes, natural right is essentially and peculiarly human, a result of the specific patterns of human motion. Hence man cannot be explained exclusively in terms of non-human motion: the "natural order" is a political or anthropomorphic interpretation. The philosopher therefore has no special political status for Hobbes, whereas for Spinoza, freedom is identical with philosophy. For this reason, it is false to say that "Spinoza was a more consistent Hobbist than Hobbes" (138, 142). McShea means by this that, whereas Hobbes illegitimately restricts men's right in the state of nature by some form of political obligation, Spinoza does not (138-39, 172). But he also observes that Spinoza is not a narrow utilitarian egocentric (167), and that he is "more than a Hobbist" in preserving the right of the individual to rebel against the government (193), although he furnishes "no rule . . . for determining when and how much to resist government" (194).

McShea cannot unify these assertions because his conception of Spinoza as a systematic philosopher of science leaves no room for the ethical partisan of personal salvation. Even when he equates freedom with "power to know," he obscures the absolute dependence of self-preservation (=freedom) upon philosophy as the highest (=most powerful) human activity. Thus he says

that our ability to grasp the truth of Spinoza's teaching "is a matter of 'chance' or 'grace'," whereas it is obviously a function of our power to know, or natural intelligence (62-65). So far as the political teaching is concerned, McShea cannot explain the basis for the differences between Spinoza and Hobbes, nor can he account for the link between personal salvation and political obligation in Spinoza. His analysis of this link seems almost to rest upon a quotation from Locke (194, fn. 67); the ambiguity as he presents it is exactly as it is criticized in Hobbes.

To summarize: this book has some helpful passages (e.g. 168, 173, 185ff., 201), but too many defects. Almost all the remarks on "metaphysics," natural law and pre-Machiavellian philosophy are intolerably vulgar. (Slightly better are the comments on Machiavelli, Hobbes, and Locke; but Rousseau is taken exclusively as the author of the Social Contract.) The summary of Spinoza's political teaching is incomplete, and while pleasantly written, superficial. McShea radically overestimates the ease with which Spinoza may be understood at first reading (7, 180); that is, he fails to appreciate the complexity of Spinoza's rhetoric. And this in turn is because he does not grasp the complexity of traditional philosophy and religion, which he seems to regard as beneath rational consideration (13, 17-18, 42, 53-54, 132, 137, 179ff.). He shares some of Spinoza's conclusions without possessing Spinoza's reasons. His treatment of Spinoza's attituce toward religion, although not altogether wrong, is altogether inadequate. He never clearly explains why it is permissible for a contemporary student to disregard the long polemic with Judaism generally and with Maimonides in particular. He naively accepts Spinoza's assurance that political control over religion would be public or external rather than private or internal (182); that is, he has failed to ponder over Spinoza's statement that "men are to be so led that they think themselves not to be led but to live by their own mind and their own free opinion" (TP, X, 7). and that, by the equation of right and power, freedom of thought is necessarily restricted to the philosopher or free man. He therefore cannot understand why Spinoza is relatively silent about "the civil rights or liberties of citizens," and is forced to disregard Spinoza's ipsissima verba in order to retain the notion of democratic individualism so appealing to contemporary readers (188-89). Finally, McShea's misunderstanding of Spinoza's metaphysics leads him to underestimate the degree to which Spinoza was a political revolutionary (cf. 196, fn. 73). He is therefore unable to speak with force or certitude on the contemporary relevance of Spinoza's naturalistic ethics (176. 202).—STANLEY ROSEN, Pennsylvania State Universitu.

AMERICAN GOVERNMENT AND POLITICS

Party Leaders in the House of Representatives. By Randall B. Ripley. (Washington, D.C.: The Brookings Institution, 1967. Pp. 221. \$6.75.)

With the publication of Party Leaders in the House of Representatives, Randall B. Ripley and the Brookings Institution have given the legislative literature its most thorough analysis of House leadership and its role in the functioning of the lower Chamber, As it happens, the literature in the legislative field is particularly well developed, but Ripley has made several important contributions with this study. First, he provides a longitudinal analysis of the changing function of party leadership; second, he gives us some suggestion about the direction of future development of party leadership; and third, there is occasional insight into the relationship between the structure and process of party leadership and the larger functioning of the legislative process.

Ripley traces the growth and changing function of party leadership in the House starting in the Nineteenth Century with highly centralized power in the hands of the Speaker and a "few close lieutenants"; moving to more regularized patterns of power distribution through the use of seniority and career service patterns; and leading, after the second Roosevelt, to the clear bureaucratization of the party structures in the House. In short, the party and their leadership structures have evolved in a pattern closely similar to the development of government and American society generally.

The complexities of Twentiety Century American life appear to have their parallel in the structures and pattern of leadership in Congress. More formal lines of authority and communication; the proliferation and formalization of staffing; and the development of intra-House and party cliques, associations, and voting blocs have all in their way been a reflection of the changing shape of American society generally. It should be no surprise that the function and structure of party leadership in the House have responded to these forces. What is significant is that a scholar of Ripley's ability has taken a close look at these developments and has typed them and offered us a systematic analysis of their meaning to the functioning of party leadership in the House of Representatives.

Ripley is at his best in describing the ways in which the leadership patterns relate to the techniques of leadership. In a series of vignettes from recent legislative issues he illustrates that legislative party leaders, like other leaders, have to rely on techniques of persuasion, control of information and the development of mutual trust with their colleagues as they work to forge the majorities that enact legislation. Ripley effectively re-

lates the abstractions of leadership resources (tangible preferment, psychological preferment, and control over communication) to the structural and partisan realities of the House. The role of the White House and agency congressional liaison personnel, as well as internal House practices, is tied into the leadership function.

Inter and intra-party relationships, leadershipcommittee interaction, and the majority-minority status of the parties are all shown to have relevance for the functioning of the leadership and therefore to the decisions of the House.

For this reviewer, one of the most intriguing parts of the book is a short section on the party leader's dominance of the internal communication process. As rich as the legislative literature is, there is very little empirical analysis of the patterns of information flow in Congress. Sources of information, the initiation of information distribution, and the route such distribution follows are just some of the more obvious questions to which our literature has not yet addressed itself. In part, this lack of systematic attention to the communication system in Congress derives from its sub rosa character. Where the formal lines of communication are visible in large complex organizations. the Congress for all its bureaucratization still remains non-hierarchical and decentralized. One of the significant consequences of this pattern is to decentralize the sources of important information, making it difficult to uncover and analyze.

Ripley offers us a start with some interview data reflecting the various sources of information for the membership of the two parties. For example, committee chairmen and senior members of committees were less important to Democrats as major sources of information on party positions than to Republicans who have not had the White House and majority party leadership to look to. There is much that is suggestive in this discussion of the communication process which needs to be developed. It is one of the important next subjects deserving concerted attention by our discipline, for as Ripley puts it, "The leaders are at the center of the communications network in the House and can use this position to influence legislative results."

A few words are in order about Ripley's methodology. He has nicely balanced a variety of data from several sources: roll call data; personal observations of the House over a four-year period; formal and informal interviews with House members and staff personnel; and a rich use of historical materials. The balance of these data gives the book a perspective so often absent from many recent studies of our political institutions, Ripley in

his introduction sums up the principal strength of his method and as a result of the book itself: "... some of the specific historical judgments ... may be found in error by subsequent research. But the disadvantages of using historical material that is uneven in quality and quantity are outweighed by the advantages of viewing the House in broad historical perspective and of developing categories for understanding changes that have occurred in it."

In a style that is occasionally flat, Randall B. Ripley has given the discipline an important addition to the legislative literature. He has added to our understanding of changes that have occurred and are occurring within the House of Representatives.—Eugene Eidenberg, University of Minnesota.

Ideology and Electoral Action: A Comparative Case Study of the National Committee for an Effective Congress. By Harry M. Scoble. (San Francisco: Chandler Publishing Company, 1967. Pp. 298. \$5.75.)

This book is by an engaged man; Harry Scoble has strong views about American politics and how it ought to be studied. Scoble points to an important problem in current American politics by asking: "When the career of the educated American orients him to accept continent-wide moves as normal aspects of occupational success, when the media he uses increasingly insist upon the relevance of positive neutralism by Kenya, of agitation by tin miners in Bolivia, of princely feudalism in Laos-how will the individual relate himself and this external world to such issues as the factional condition of the parties in Virginia, the significance of a House by-election in Texas, or the contest being waged to represent a few thousand Alaskans in the Senate?" The author sees the National Committee for an Effective Congress as a new organizational pattern that makes it possible for such a concerned individual to participate in a meaningful way. Professor Scoble regards himself as "a hard-data, empirical, positivistic political scientist" who believes the "central focus of political scientists should be the distribution, bases, techniques and effects of political powerthat is, the ability to control the behavior of others through public policies sustained by sanctioned force." Consequently he devotes much of his book to the development of measures for comparing the power of the NCEC with that exerted by other interest groups.

The analysis of power in this context suggests attention to five related questions: the amount of political resource potential, the degree of potential resource commitment to politics, the efficiency of the exploitation of those committed resources, the translation of efficiency into electoral power, and

the translation of electoral power into legislative power. Since the principal technique of the NCEC is raising money and disbursing it to favored candidates. Scoble's indicators of efficiency necessarily deal with campaign finance. On the amount of political resource potential, he points to the amount of money raised, the number of contributors, and the willingness of many to give money more than once. The degree of resource commitment of politics is measured by disbursements to candidates, and the ratio of NCEC disbursement to those of other groups is suggested as an index figure of relative commitment. Efficiency is gauged by the concentration of expenditures in close races (between 46% and 54%) where money presumably will have more effect. Electroal power is seen as a function of the number of victories, and an ordinal scale with eight magnitudes is developed on the basis of distinctions between whether the NCECbacked candidate won or lost, whether he was an incumbent or not, and whether his party won or lost the seat involved. The last consideration becomes the basis for a summary measure of net partisan change:

I = no. seats gained—no. seats lost total contests

This index number, which will fall into the range of -1.0 to +1.0, represents the net impact of each group on the electoral process. The translation of electoral power into legislative power is measured by the proportion of leadership positions and seats on relevant committees held by NCEC-backed legislators. An index of committee power is:

$$I_{cs} = \frac{\text{members supported--members opposed unsuccessfully}}{\text{total membership}}$$

Illustrations of these measures are given using data on the NCEC and, where additional data are available, the NCEC is compared with other relevant groups: the A.D.A., organized labor, and the Democratic and Republican Senate Campaign Committees.

Ideology and Electoral Action also has intrinsic interest because of the nature of the group it describes. There are three organizational elements: the staff, the members (a few liberal co-founders plus coopted others of whom about ten could be regarded as active), and the contributors who now number over 35,000. Power within the organization is concentrated; almost all major decisions have been made by the principal founder, Maurice Rosenblatt, and the long-time staff director, George Agree. Their ability to retain effective control and see their organization prosper has been due to two things: their discovery of an appropriate role in American politics and a coincidence between their policy views and those of their contributors. Professor Scoble describes a variety of activities in

which the NCEC has engaged since it was founded in 1948 essentially as a successor group (with somewhat broader foreign policy interests) to the American League for a Free Palestine, Over the years, the NCEC has experimented with an information clearing house for those opposing Senator Joseph McCarthy, fund-raising for primary elections, special funds such as a Clean Politics Appeal, and "Citizens for Jones" Committees for candidates who required special backing. Their efforts can be viewed as a trial-and-error learning experience. When a technique did not work, it was dropped; when support was forthcoming from the American political environment, the use of the technique was expanded. Their basic strategem has been fund-raising largely in urban areas and transmitting these monies to general election candidates, most frequently from mid-west or plains states, who have internationalist-civil libertarian views. Until 1960 their efforts were concentrated on the Senate. Since that time, they have been increasingly active in House races. The contributors have tended to be politically active. Stevensonian Democrats, issue oriented, concerned with domestic and international politics, and satisfied with the NCEC serves these interests in a way the major political parties do not. Scoble presents considerable survey data on the contributors, but because "the purpose of this book is to focus on the NCEC as an organization," they are scattered in footnotes throughout the book. I do not follow this reasoning, but references to a "larger study" suggest the author may be saving the data for a more intensive analysis at a later date.

I think the book is less valuable as a contribution to group theory. Professor Scoble argues that earlier group theory has neglected ideology. However, the essential stuff of ideology can be viewed easily as David Truman's "shared attitudes." Likewise the author argues that the NCEC cannot be analyzed as a primary group. True, but if group theory is the appropriate frame of reference for an organization with 35,000 contributors, then Cooley's "secondary groups," or Hyman's "reference groups" could have been pressed into service. In fact, this book strikes me as a fine example of what Thomas Kuhn calls normal science, "empirical work undertaken to articulate the paradigm theory, resolving some of its residual ambiguities and permitting the solution of problems to which it had previously only drawn attention." The major parameters of the relevant paradigm come from the work of David Truman, Robert Dahl, and V. O. Kev. This being the case, it was disconcerting to find in the last chapter an undeveloped attack on what Scoble takes to be the values of his mentors. An incorrectly cited chapter in a V. O. Key text is dismissed as "myopic . . . a valueladen response of a middle-class Harvard professor." It has become fashionable for those with romantic notions of confrontation to spice their writings with barbed comments about "the WASP mind," "the establishment," and "middle class values." But Professor Scoble cught to realize that practice is just as mindless and just as irrelevant to political science as the worship of institutional reform which he deplores in an earlier generation of political scientists.—John H. Kessel, Allegheny College.

Politics and Television. By Kurt and Gladys Engel Lang. (Chicago: Quadrangle Books, 1968. Pp. 315. \$6.95.)

Political Television. By Bernard Rubin. (Belmont, California: Wadsworth Publishing Co., 1967. Pp. 200.)

As another Presidential year unfolds before our eyes, professional and lay interest in the way a lot of it unfolds—as 525 lines per second, 430 dots per line—experiences its periodic upsurge. Plans are already laid, I suppose (and will have been executed by the time this is read) for measuring the impact of television debates. There is again concern about the costs of campaigning and television's substantial contribution to those costs. Once more questions of equity, bias, and completeness come to the fore.

What don't seem to get raised are the broader trends and implications of this medium. One of the trends with negative attributes is the apparent shortening of the half-lives of programming innovations. This is most evident in the entertainment segment of the medium, because that is the predominant use. Trial periods are shorter; "seasons" last five months; theme fads disappear unlamented. All in all the networks spend more time, and develop more frustration, trying to divine when and what the next crest will be—when in fact they may be witnessing a qualitative shift in public interest and consumption of television programming that transcends particular decisions about westerns, blue comedy, and old movies.

On the margins, political programming may also be undergoing the same sort of revised public appraisal. The past five years have witnessed an increasing tempo of format tinkering with regular news programs—the move to a half-hour, computer election forecasting, assorted personnel ploys (mostly to counter Huntley-Brinkley), extemporaneous chit-chat, and so forth. Much of this is designed, of course, to affect the division of viewers among the networks; but one can also envisage it as an attempt to hold back the ebbing of addiction to indiscriminate viewing.

Similarly we must entertain the possibility that certain kinds of special programming no longer have the impact they did. A great deal was made at the time of the Kennedy-Nixon television debates of 1960. Can we assume safely that such effects will flow from comparable encounters now? Or is the literature on the 1960 debates as irrelevant, if fascinating, for contemporary understandings as the literature on Orson Wells' "invasion from Mars?"

These questions of secular transformation are not terribly profound, yet they lie beyond the commentary and analysis of too many observers in and out of our professions. Both of the books considered here fail in most respects to move beyond rudimentary levels of analysis, and both fall victim to the pace of television change, dwelling almost nostalgically in the glorious and traumatic days of early television: MacArthur's return in 1950, the 1952 conventions, Murrow's devastating program on Joseph McCarthy, the Kefauver crime hearings, the Army-McCarthy hearings, and so forth.

All this makes enjoyable reading for the general market (for which these books were designed) but for the most part not professionally useful. The Langs offer their own original research, some of it now fifteen years old. Parts of it may be important, but suffer methodologically. Their somewhat informal study of television versus in-person perceptions of the MacArthur parade in Chicago demonstrated the ability to exaggerate crowd size and enthusiasm through selective camera work and narration-clever then, perhaps, but a technique millions of viewers of such January extravaganzas as the Liberty Bowl know how to discount these days. Other aspects of their work is of marginal importance. I find it questionable, for instance, to label as either significant or as biased the kinds of variation in coverage and comprehension exhibited by the three networks television political conventions.

There are some important policy questions raised by these books: does, for instance, the presence of television cameras tend to generate "artificial news?" In certain senses the answer is obviously, yes. We are all aware of the proclivities of rioters to create a little extra action for the camera, and of the self-conscious piety that masks a public figure's face when a zoom lens focuses on him at a King or Kennedy funeral. Of the two books, Politics and Television deals more effectively with this and related problems of the indeterminacy effect. Yet one longs for a recognition that television is hardly an artificial intruder these days, but is decidedly part of the scene, as much as an audience for a speech is. The pervasiveness of news coverage is such that the absence of televised coverage must be considered the abnormality. Again, data or speculation about secular trends might have been helpful; is it not probable that increasing expectation and familiarity with the presence of television, coupled with technological innovation (expecially miniaturization, longer-range lenses and microphones), will diminish this problem decisively?

Political Television has greater trouble than the Lang book keeping its eye on the screen. Substantial portions of the book provide general background, in the Theodore White vein, background to the events which among other things involved television. These portions may be helpful and interesting to younger readers whose political awareness was not too acute in the 1950s and early 60s; this presumably does not include many readers of the Review. The Rubin and Lang books both tend to be careless from time to time about the distinctiveness of television as against other media. All of the advantages of television are found to one degree or another in the other media: visuality in the press and movies, immediacy and voice in radio, confluence of sight and sound in movies, ease of consumer access particularly in radio (much more than television), personalization in radio (Lowell Thomas used to seem as real as Brinkley) and in opinion newspaper columns, and so forth. So too are some of the neutral, controversial, or negative characteristics: candidates and rioters also respond to the presence to radio microphones and newspaper reporters. I don't mean to underestimate the significance of television, but to €mphasize that its contributions to our culture. political or otherwise, are incremental and in certain respects interactional (in the statistical sense). Our investigative talents for isolating and measuring the increments and the interactional effects have not really been imaginatively mobilized.

Troubles with delineation of variables extend to the political behaviors television affects. These authors properly allude to the barrenness of studies identifying viewers' perceptions of "who won" television debates. But their own dependent variables suffer, variously, from imprecise definition, insufficient measurement, and demonstrated or even conjectural relationship to the electoral process or more broadly to the political system. For example, at some level deviations from cognitive accuracy flowing from network bias, naiveté, or incompetence may significantly affect the political process—but not the kind of infinitesimal variations of coverage of the 1952 Democratic Convention studied in depth by the Langs. Rubin discusses in some detail the 70 hours of coverage following the John Kennedy assassination. The impact of that length and intensity of viewing may have been significant, perhaps in the long- as well as the short-run. But Rubin offers no systematic analysis of even the theoretical possibilities, nor of the specific contribution of television.

Reference to that assassination underscores an omission that is sorely missed by this reviewer: an exploration of the role of television in the political socialization of children. The socialization effects of Kennedy's death are known to some extent, thanks to the burst of studies that followed it; and those effects are primarily traceable to televiewing. More broadly, television has to be assessed as an agent of socialization noticeably stronger vis-à-vis family and school than other media have been in the past. This is particularly the case cognitively and in certain segments of politics (e.g., international relations) in which the family effect has usually been weaker.

The most perplexing question about television is its subtle contribution, along with other media and other acculturizing agents, to the setting of cognitive and affective boundaries in the minds of members of a political society. In their concluding chapter the Langs express some of the frustration in trying to track this contribution:

"No one has yet been able to 'demonstrate' through a convincing experiment what the long-range effects of television have been. Nor are they likely to. To trace a change in a political climate or a realignment within the electorate straight to the door of television is a task foredoomed to failure."

Perhaps so; certainly so if attempted at the level of these two books.—Bradeury Seasholes, Tufts University.

The Warren Court: Constitutional Decision as an Instrument of Reform. By Archibald Cox. (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1968. Pp. 144. \$4.95.)

These brief lectures, which former Solicitor Genral Cox delivered at the University of Hawaii in 1967, have two main objects: (1) to survey and evaluate recent constitutional developments, and (2) to explore the implications of the Warren Court's egalitarian activism for the judiciary's role in the political system. Since the nucleus of Cox's argument was published in the November, 1966 issue of the Harvard Law Review, prospective purchasers may fairly ask, what new material justifies the extra expense? The answer does not lie in the subtitle; the theme there announced is not completely realized. Nor does Cox emphasize his personal experiences in shaping the litigation discussed—an omission one hopes he will someday correct. Rather, the lectures enable him to enlarge his focus, elaborate his argument, and get some criticisms off his chest regarding the Court's current course. Though his incisive earlier discussion of state action forms the key chapters of the book, he also covers judicial reform of criminal procedure, displacement of state libel laws, and

supervision of reapportionment and voting rights. Specific litigation is then anchored in introductory and closing sections which amplify his variations on the "role of the Court" theme.

The result is a tight little volume of considerable appeal. Cox has exceptional ability to discern emerging trends and to express them with economy of language. He is persuasive, for example; in ranking the Civil Rights Act decisions of 1966 with those upholding the Wagner Act for the potential power of Congress to combat private discrimination. His nimble trip through the wiretapping bog is a model of concision. Since his viewpoint reflects the varying perspectives of advocate, scholar, and critic, there is throughout a healthy appreciation of political realities and tolerance for the rationality, if not wisdom, of contrary views. Consequently, the lectures can be recommended to teachers as concise, fresh interpretations of recent litigation, to scholars as food for thought with a minimum of waste, and to analysts of decision-making as neat illustrations of how a skillful constitutional lawyer goes about his business as midwife of incremental change.

The most arguable theme is Cox's criticism of the Warren Court for excessive innovation. Here the forward-looking frontiersman of the Kennedy-Johnson administrations, who warmly supports the institution and its egalitarian goals, grapples with a lawyer's doubts about the Court's methods and constitutional reform as a staple diet. Refreshingly, Cox wastes no words wondering whether the high tribunal is a political or legal body. He assumes that it is both and that role conflict is inevitable. He also concedes that judicial pioneering has been invited by politicians' default, that Justices have latent functions of moral leadership and can generate support as they proceed. But in the end the lawyer triumphs. Cox advances most of the stock criticisms of the Court for unprofessional methods, too much politics and too little law, endangering the popular consent on which judicial power ultimately rests, etc. He concludes that legislative rather than judicial action is the preferable way to create sustained constitutional obligations in defense of human rights.

It is not always clear whether Cox's main objection to judicial crusading is functional, democratic, or simply prudential—i.e., entails excessive political risks. Implicit also are several debatable assumptions about the objectivity of the judicial process and the popular basis of judicial power. Whatever may be said for "neutral" principles and all that, political scientists are likely to find fault with his political analysis. Cox offers no balance-sheet of the Court's political gains and losses among client groups, no suggestion why it is so damaging for the Justices to lose a battle with

Congress. Basically, his argument rests on rather uncritical acceptance of the maxim, first advanced by de Tocqueville, that judicial power is ultimately public opinion. The trouble with this maxim is that it says nothing distinctive about judges and fails to differentiate their publics. Cox's notion that courts derive no authority from popular participation underestimates representation via the adversary system and overestimates popular control elsewhere. The notion that Supreme Court power depends on "ability to command a national consensus" underestimates the leverage of the Court's allies and overestimates its saliency in mass opinion. Disarmingly, Cox admits he cannot prove the connection between craftsmanship and legitimacy. Neither can we disprove it-vet. My quarrel is that Cox, like most writers who wrestle with "role of the Court" justification, made little effort to check his political maxims against empirical studies of popular attitudes about the judiciary. Lawyers often ask what social science can do for law. Bathing normative assumptions in the acid of fact is surely one way empiricism might contribute to a perennial normative concern-if only lawyers would look!-J. Wood-FORD HOWARD, JR., Johns Hopkins University.

The Second American Party System: Party Formation in the Jacksonian Era. By RICHARD P. McCormick. (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1966. Pp. 389. \$7.50.)

Basic patterns of American party politics were set for generations to come by the party system the Jacksonian era produced. For anyone who wants to understand this formative stage of political development and party action, this volume is essential reading. It is meticulously researched and carefully stated throughout, and brings more discrimination to the subject than any previous study.

At the outset Professor McCormick provides a useful summation of the first party system of Jeffersonian Republicans and Federalists, and its collapse in the years of James Monroe's presidency. By comparison the second party system, he argues, was more popular, more competitive from state to state, high organized, firmly geared to the contest for the presidency, less issue-oriented, and far more given to mass appeals, drama, and "hurrah"-in short, more "modern," as the United States has known parties. Yet it also lived by muting sectional tensions; as a result, it fell sudden victim to intense conflict over the slavery issue in the 1850's, and was soon replaced by a third party system. In its heyday, however, it was more evenly balanced in every section and state than earlier or later party systems were.

Some four-fifths of the book is given to political patterns in the twenty-three states that were rele-

vant in party formation. These chapters, arranged broadly by geographical section, are virtually encyclopedic and never limited to mere narrative; Professor McCormick promises us an analytical-historical study, and keeps his promise. The state chapters vary in length and detail, but in every case they provide data concerning constitutional and governmental structure and the state's heritage of political practices and styles. We are informed about suffrage and voter turnout, relevant experience in the Jeffersonian-Republican era, leadership patterns, and the state's progress—or lack of it—in the years from 1824 to 1840 that brought Democrats and Whigs into being.

Party formation was halting and erratic. To proclaim a national Democratic party with Andrew Jackson's election in 1828, a National Republican phalenx in 1832, and a national Whig party in 1834, as much conventional historiography does, not only races the clock unconscionably, as Professor McCormick shows. It also ignores a whole array of conditions which he argues were crucial in explaining why at least proto-party structures emerged in some states as early as 1828, and in others not until the 1830's or 1840. It also passes over such important matters as the differential rate with which state political management through legislative caucuses gave way to delegate conventions and party committees, matters Professor McCormick treats carefully as an aspect of the creation of modern party structures.

Throughout, the book's major thesis is that the second party system arose as a response to the revival of contests for the presidency. Thus Jackson's challenges to John Quincy Adams in 1824 and 1828 began the process in several states; the fact that Henry Clay as Jackson's rival in 1832 could not command Adams' sectional support in New England brought the growth of party competition there; the process was advanced when the Whigs made the most of Martin Van Buren's unpopularity in the South and elsewhere as the Democratic candidate in 1836; and party structure and competition was brought to apogee by the innovative, bandwagon campaign for William Henry Harrison against Van Buren in 1840. Keen party competition in elections was highly correlated with voting turnout in state and nation, despite some local variations. National turnout in presidential elections, which rose from about 26 per cent of adult white males in 1824 to about 55 per cent in 1828 and 1832, reached a peak of nearly 80 per cent in 1840 and remained at high levels.

The stress Professor McCormick places on presidential contests and other institutional factors as an explanation for party formation is debatable. His emphasis on such features leads him to give short shrift to other probably relevant conditions of social structure, political culture, and political devel-

opment in general. He also reiterates and recapitulates relatively narrow hypotheses in space that might better have been used for synthesis and for broader, summary analysis; indeed, many analytical historians as well as political scientists will not find themselves wholly satisfied with his conceptual framework and ultimate explanation. Finally, his useful concern with inquiry into state and local roots comes at the expense of similar attention to the articulation of national, if always federal, party structures.

Taken over all, nonetheless, The Second American Party System is not only a gold mine for scholars and students. It is also the most significant assay so far of a crucial, innovative stage in American party development.—WILLIAM NISBET CHAMBERS, Washington University (St. Louis).

The Upper House in Revolutionary America, 1763-1788. By Jackson Turner Main. (Madison: University of Wisconsin Press, 1967. Pp. 311. \$7.50.)

In this work the author, a professor of American history at Stony Brook, attempts to trace the evolution of the upper house in the quarter century preceding the adoption of the Constitution. The main outlines of his argument are as follows. The upper houses or councils in Colonial America functioned in practice as legislative bodies, though their theoretical status as such was cloudy and their members were chosen by and served at the pleasure of the governors. Despite the fact that a number of ccuncils were dominated by "placemen," recent immigrants or native colonials who held lucrative offices in addition to their positions on the councils, in most colonies their membership was drawn primarily from the established, stable upper class. The most important function these bodies assumed was defense of royal authority. Nonetheless, they were far from a wholly negative force. Though they were unrepresentative of the colonial upper class which was broader than the old, wealthy elite, they defended the economic and social interests of this class and also performed important legislative functions as reviewers and perfectors of bills.

With the coming of the Revolution the upper houses were not abolished, but rather modified and retained. The framers of the state constitutions recognized that the councils, due to the greater wisdom and ability of their members, had performed valuable legislative functions and thus wished not to destroy them but only to make them truly independent legislative bodies. In addition, the desire of the upper class to protect property interests as well as the general attachment of the articulate portion of the population to Whig notions of a balanced constitution containing monarchic, aristocratic, and democratic elements

figured in their retention. The new upper houses or senates, however, proved a disappointment to aristocratic hopes. They were or became by 1788 radically different bodies than the councils of the pre-Revolutionary period. Despite the efforts of the upper class or elite elements, the property restrictions on membership that were imposed barred few men who wanted to serve and the great majority of senators were elected for short terms by small property holders. Thus, the composition of the senates was broader than that of the councils. They were no longer composed mainly of established, upper class elements, but rather of a far more diversive group of men of moderate property. As a result, they no longer served as instruments of the upper class, but rather became indistinguishable from the lower houses. In short. both houses became arenas of factional conflict, arenas in which various interests competed for advantage. All in all, however, the most important function the senates performed was legislative, i.e., the initiation and revision of bills. Though this role was old, its extent and importance in the senates was new.

Finally, experience both before and after 1776 with upper houses had an important impact on the Federal Constitution. Though the debates in the Convention were curiously anachronistic in that they failed to recognize the new character of the upper houses, the senates in the states had proved so valuable that there was no question as to the existence of a federal senate, but only to its form. In addition, adherence to Whig notions of a balanced constitution as well as belief in the necessity of a second house to temper the passions of the lower house and limit its power contributed to the desire for an upper house. The federal senate that emerged was in many respects an entirely new body. Its members needed no property to hold office and it was as responsive to majority will as the lower house. Within a few years it like the state senates became the vehicle of party and when this occurred the transformation of the councils was completed.

To present the argument of the book so briefly and simply, however, is to do it more justice than it deserves. What also must be noted, and to some extent it is obvious even in our summary, is that the book contains much that is contradictory, vague, and/or inadequately supported. On the one hand, the information the author has gathered, though impressive at times in terms of the scholarly labor involved, is nonetheless often contradictory, inconclusive, or incomplete. Moreover, this source of difficulty is compounded by other deficiencies. The author's use of many of his key concepts, such as function, role, class, elite, representative, etc., is vague and varied. In addition, he largely separates and confines his discussion of in-

stitutional context and theoretical status to a single, highly general chapter late in the book. As a consequence, he severely impairs his ability either to provide guidelines and perspective in his lengthy treatment of the composition and activities of particular upper houses or to relate his brief treatment of context and theory to the events and trends he identifies. On the other hand, the author is prone to repeated mulling over of his themes. Each chapter and each of the three major subdivisions of the book contain sections of review and conclusion and in these various sections themes are stated and restated with both major and minor changes of tone and meaning. In part, this derives from the author's wish to deduce his conclusions from a colony by colony and state by state review of the evidence. But one suspects that in large part it also derives from defects in his information, analytic framework, and use of concepts.

In any event the result of these defects combined with a continuing process of digesting themes is a melange of statements regarding the nature and causes of the experience under analysis. Thus, in truth, the argument of the book is immersed in a welter of conflicting statements and facts and the summary provided above to a large extent represents a piecing together of what appear to be the main themes without regard for the contradictions. To cite one example the author undercuts perhaps his most crucial point regarding the changed character of the senates by also noting that the senates protected property far better than the lower houses and that most issues did not become the subjects of factional conflict.

Nor, as we have suggested, is contradiction the only problem. As can be gleaned even from the summary we have provided, there is much that is vague in the author's argument. Indeed, such vagueness pertains not only to particular points, e.g., the changed dimensions of the legislative role of the senates, but to the contours of the whole experience. We cannot be sure because the author himself seems not entirely sure whether he is simply dealing with developments between 1763 and 1788 or whether he is postulating the emergence of a new, discrete, and enduring form of upper house in this period. Lastly, the degree to which key points are not supported by the evidence is disturbing. We may note, for example, that though the author in most of the book attributes primary causal significance to the superior ability of members of the councils and senates and the great value of these bodies as legislative mechanisms. there is little or no direct or indirect evidence to substantiate these points. Here as elsewhere, the standing of key points that are not necessarily convincing on their face rest simply on the authority of the author despite the mass of information he has gathered.—Joseph Cooper, Rice University.

Censorship of the Movies: The Social and Political Control of a Mass Medium. By RICHARD S. RANDALL. (Madison: The University of Wisconsin Press, 1968. Pp. 280. \$7.95.)

Generally, Americans who write about censorship either assume a libertarian posture that cannot tolerate official restraint on any form of communication, or they argue that the freedom to corrupt public morals is not protected by the Constitution and that society may shield itself against moral debasement. In his book Professor Randall espouses neither position but carefully analyzes the censorial techniques that have been used on one of the most powerful segments of the mass media, the movies. He considers the censorship interest as "political energy, pressure, or force rather than as value" and succeeds reasonably well in remaining neutral on the merits of censorship while describing how it has operated over the years beginning with the protest against a peep-show in Atlantic City called Dolorita in the Passion Dance, in 1894. Mr. Randall maintains that two events, the coming of television and the judicial inclusion of movies under the protection of the First Amendment revolutionized movie making. After many years of providing morally safe but artistically immature family entertainment, movies recently have acquired a new quality and maturity, but at the same time, they have become guilty of excesses in the detailing of erotica, nudity and violence as well as giving rise to the "exploitation film" depicting nudist camps, girls in various states of undress and sado-masochism, the advertising for which can be seen daily in any big-city newspaper. Like television and newspapers movies are aimed at a mass audience, but the movies differ from their sister media, says Randall, in that they are uncontrolled by advertisers and now deal with themes that at one time were limited to the theater and to the hard cover book -both of which aimed essentially at an elite audience. Thus movies raise in "acute form" the question of "how a free speech society can coexist with a mass democratic society." Perhaps the proper question to ask is whether modern, mass, industrial society ought to permit as much freedom as it does since, to paraphrase the late Zechariah Chafee, the degree of unity and harmony required for a decent society is not the inevitable consequence of freedom but is the result of political and moral effort. If freedom is not accompanied by self-control, public control will inevitably fol-

The movies are in a peculiar position since, on the one hand, they claim, and rightly, that they are engaged in the creative arts and in communi-

cating ideas and should be free of official restraint. but on the other, they are manufacturing a commodity for the mass market for profit—tremendous profit. But is not the writer or artist also engaged in work for financial gain? How, then, do the movies differ from the printed page or from the painted canvas? Randall suggests that the key to distinguishing motion pictures from printed media, and this would also hold true for the painting, lies in the amount of "distance" placed between the viewer and the simulated reality. That is, movies in sweeping away the ordinary barriers that stand between the viewer and physical reality -words, lack of motion, diminution-may reasonably be required to substitute new barriers such as indirection, stylization or absence of detail since they are capable of simulating reality to an extent unknown in the past. In this sense a movie that meets the "redeeming social importance" test might nevertheless be declared obscene if it were to show detailed scenes of sexual intercourse. It would then be failing to place enough "distance" between the viewer and simulated reality. All of which indicates that the constitutional standards for obscenity in literature cannot be precisely applied to cinematic productions. Unless a majority of the Supreme Court adopts the Black-Douglas position that all prior restraint on movies is bad, and this seems unlikely, some standard might be devised that takes into account the special characteristics of the medium. Randall's idea that obscenity be viewed as a "variable phenomenon" makes sense. It is flexible enough to embrace not only what is being shown but the way in which it is shown, and it is particularly adaptable to motion pictures. Already the movies are constitutionally distinguishable from the press in that the doctrine of Near v. Minnesota proscribes any censorship of the printed word whereas the cinema, with all its freedom, is constitutionally subject to prior restraint.

The sections of the study that describe the operation of censorship, public and private, are extremely well researched, and, while in part they confirm one's suspicions, they also dispel a good deal of mythology. Of the thirty-eight cities and towns with motion picture censorship laws, only ten actively censor movies. But the fact that only a few municipalities actively engage in restraining the showing of certain themes is somewhat misleading, since censorship has an extraterritorial effect in that suburban authorities may follow the lead of a big-city censorship board. Furthermore, some cities have extra-legal citizens advisory committees which may be just as effective as legal censors when they exact voluntary compliance by local exhibitors. Although most censors admit that they would be more restrictive than recent court decisions permit, they are, nevertheless, attempting to comply with the new legal doctrine. Regardless of what statutes and ordinances allow, the vast majority of censorship orders are confined to erotica and most censors are familiar with the Roth-Alberts test in some degree.

Randall finds that the old stereotype of the censor as one lacking in aesthetic sensibility and morbidly interested in seeking out obscene matter to keep from his fellow citizens does not characterize today's movie censor. Although not generally recruited under methods of high standards censors seem no less well-balanced as personalities than those who exercise much more power over the content of movies, namely producers, distributors, and exhibitors. Sitting on Chicago's Motion Picture Appeal Board, for example, are Dr. Ner Littner, a psychiatrist on the staff of the University of Chicago, and Dr. Henry Rago, editor of the monthly, Poetry, the latter actually being against censorship and a strong advocate of classification. In conclusion Randall declares that prior censorship is more of a disadvantage in form than in substance and that movies have far greater freedom over content than any of the other mass media. Today films displaying nudity, sado-masochistic violence, erotically suggestive dances and dialogue are routinely passed, generally without an audience classification. If anything, informal censorship, completely lacking in standards of due process, is a greater threat to free expression in films than formal boards, and the libertarian view that government is the enemy is just not true in this instance.

Although the book is a careful and balanced account of the nature and development of public control over the content of films, it is presented from a single perspective, that of a problem in politics. But more is at issue than a political struggle between those who make and exhibit movies and the general public. There are questions of standards in the arts which are, as William Ernest Hocking wrote, "man's own religion of self-elevation." Overemphasis on the erotic is a corrosion of good taste and no self-respecting civilized society can permit the individual the liberty to degrade the arts at will. To do so is to insult humanity itself. Randall makes no such judgment, but perhaps he should have.—Robert J. Steamer, Lake Forest College.

Prairie State Politics: Popular Democracy in South Dakota. By Alan L. Clem. (Washington, D.C.: Public Affairs Press, 1967. Pp. 174. \$5.00.)

Over the next decade or more, those who write in the area of comparative state politics will find Alan Clem's book a useful storehouse of data. In Prairie State Politics one can find facts and figures accompanied by analyses and descriptions concerning every conceivable aspect of South Dakota politics, ranging from party loyalty in the legislature (p. 111) to personal characteristics of the governors (p. 93) and members of Congress (pp. 119f). Few people will read *Prairie State Politics* for pleasure. It is too crowded with data to attract a lay audience. However, serious students of politics will make use of the book to their profit.

The dominant impression of South Dakota politics carried away by the reader is of a politics of frustration. In fact, one gets a distinct feeling that Mr. Clem feels more than a little tired and depressed as he surveys the state's political scene.

He establishes at the outset that South Dakota's political behavior differs from both the national and regional norms. By means of a comparative study of voting results in neighboring midwestern states, he finds that the currents of political change that have affected other midwestern states, as well as the nation, have largely bypassed South Dakota. South Dakota remains very nearly as Republican as ever.

Secondly, he determines by means of a chronological account of the state's political history that the drift of its politics has been toward an ever more conservative and isolated political posture. True, in the latter part of the nineteenth and the early twentieth centuries, South Dakota did have its share of populists and liberal or Bull Moose Republicans, such as Peter Norbeck. However, in the mid-twentieth century, the party is increasingly dominated by men of comparatively limited political horizons, such as Senator Karl Mundt.

If I interpret Mr. Clem aright, the reason for South Dakota's political isolation is that it is literally a "backwater" state—isolated geographically and culturally from the rest of the nation. According to Mr. Clem, its members of Congress are almost uniformly undistinguished souls. It seems that they rarely, if ever, head any committees at all, let alone important committees, and they are even less likely to provide national leadership in Congress on important national issues.

Similarly, according to Mr. Clem, the delegates from South Dakota to the national Republican and Democratic conventions are just as uniformly undistinguished. They always "play it safe" in the convention, are outside the main currents of the party, and rarely, if ever, play a meaningful part in the decision-making process.

All of this leaves Alan Clem feeling a little glum when he writes his conclusions concerning the political party system in South Dakota. He writes that "the party as such in South Dakota contributes little imagination or initiative to the state's political life" (p. 183). One of the factors responsible for South Dakota's rather grim political picture seems to be the physical isolation of Pierre, the state capital, located as it is in the rangeland center of the state and separated by

"seas of grass" from the population centers in the western and eastern ends of the state.

Clem concludes, "It is in the midst of this vast sea of grass that the nerves of state government are collected. Those nerves are thickly insulated by the vastness of the prairie from popular pressures, and as a result the response of state government to many needs and wishes has often been relatively slow" (p. 137). However, Mr. Clem is equally unenthusiastic about South Dakota politics and government when the voter does have an impact on policies. He observes with all the dourness one can muster while surveying an endless sea of grass that the state's political problems are also partially attributable to the "comparatively large degree of popular control in South Dakota government. The masses are not known for their ability to perceive present problems touching a small number of institutions, let alone the future problems" (p. 137).

We can forgive the sour turn taken by Alan Clem's prose as he peers outward from Pierre's grass, for the book is well done.—John H. Fenton. University of Massachusetts.

Origins of the Fifth Amendment. By Leonard W. Levy. (New York: Oxford University Press, 1968. Pp. 561. \$12.50.)

The decision in Miranda v. Arizona, in which the Supreme Court interpreted the Fifth Amendment's guarantee against compulsory self-incrimination as a limitation on the efforts of police to obtain confessions from suspects through interrogation, has rekindled the public controversy over the wisdom and utility of this guarantee that flourished a decade ago when witnesses before various congressional and state legislative committees investigating Communism frequently found it expedient to rely on the Fifth Amendment as a justification for refusal to answer questions about their past or present politics. Leonard Levy began the research for this book during the earlier phase of this controversy, and has completed it, with perfect appropriateness, in time to make an important and useful contribution to the current phase, as well as a matchless contribution to our understanding of the historical background underlying the adoption of a major provision of the Bill of Rights.

Professor Levy is an historian who believes in calling a historical spade a spade, and who rejects totally the view that research into history is undertaken in order to discover those facts—and only those facts—that tend to support the ideological predispositions of the researcher. In his book, Legacy of Suppression, he effectively demolished, beyond hope of serious redemption, the view put forward by overeager libertarians that the framers of the First Amendment literally meant to forbid

all abridgment of speech by the federal government, that toleration of absolute freedom of speech was the practice as well as the intent of the founding fathers in that golden age of American liberty, and that, by interpreting the guarantee of the First Amendment as something less than absolute, we had fallen disastrously from the pinnacle of freedom then attained. He demonstrated, with evidence piled upon evidence, that the practice and intent of even the most revered of the founding fathers was vigorously to suppress speech and publications that they thought dangerous. Consequently, when, in this work, his evidence brings him to the conclusion that the right against compulsory self-incrimination (Levy refers to it always as a "right," rejecting as unnecessarily denigrating the common reference to this guarantee as a "privilege") was looked upon as fundamental in the United States at the time of the adoption of the Bill of Rights, and that the overwhelmingly predominant practice even then was to respect this right during trials, grand jury proceedings, preliminary examinations prior to trial, and legislative or executive inquiries, there is reason for confidence in the reliability of his data.

But there would be grounds for confidence even without knowledge of Professor Levy's earlier works, for this book is manifestly the product of painstaking and exhaustive research into available primary and secondary sources, fully and critically documented. By far the largest portion of the book deals with English history through the seventeenth century, because the origins of the constitutional guarantee are primarily to be found there, and also because the English sources (particularly including reports of trials) appear to be considerably more complete and richer in detail than the relatively sparse material available for colonial America. The English history centers around the High Commission, the ecclesiastical court that was reconstituted by Queen Elizabeth in 1583 at the behest of John Whitgift, Archbishop of Canterbury, for the purpose of exposing and punishing Puritans, and which proceeded inquisitorially by means of the oath ex officio. It culminates with the abolition of the oath by the Long Parliament in 1641 and the establishment of the common-law right against self-incrimination in the trials of the Leveller leader, John Lilburne.

The book ends with the adoption of the Bill of Rights, and, as Professor Levy emphatically states in his Preface, "nothing in this book is intended to prove or disprove any position relating to the contemporary controversy about the right against self-incrimination. I care only for an explanation of its background." (p. viii.) Yet, despite this disclaimer, the book is highly relevant to the contemporary controversy. Critics of the right against self-incrimination, such as Jeremy Bentham in the

nineteenth century and Sidney Hook in the twentieth, have stressed its inutility and illogicality. Its end result is severely to limit the capacity of the government to obtain evidence by forbidding both the questioning of those persons in the best position to provide it, and the drawing of presumptions of guilt from refusals to answer. As a matter of logic, this position is difficult to refute, but, as a matter of history, as Professor Levy has shown, it appears to be too easy to move from the simple questioning of suspects to harsher methods of interrogation born out of frustration at the failure to obtain desired answers, or to indiscriminate interrogation of individuals, without reasonable grounds for suspicion, in the hope that something incriminating might turn up. The imposition of constitutional checks on the freedom of both investigating committees and police interrogators to obtain self-incriminating testimony would appear to be historically justified. The accusatorial system is less subject to abuse than the inquisitorial.— DEAN ALFANGE, JR., University of Massachusetts.

On Law and Justice. By PAUL A. FREUND. (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1968. Pp. 259. \$4.95.)

This is a collection of articles and shorter pieces by one of the best known commentators on the work of the Supreme Court. Written over two decades, their diversity of subject matter and variety of mood makes difficult an adequate appraisal of their value in a short review.

Most readers will probably find most interesting the essays of varying length on some of the leading justices, of which those on Brandeis, Frankfurter, Jackson, and Black are more appealing to a general student of the Court. One might have expected a more acerbic analysis of Black's judicial craftsmanship from one whose approach to constitutional exgesis seems poles apart from that of Black, yet, perhaps inhibited by the occasion of publication (the anniversary of Justice Black's appointment to the Court), he touches lightly on Black's flat rejection of natural law thinking and judge-made law to concentrate on the moral force of Black's contribution to our public law.

One senses the author's greater affinity with the judicial philosophies of the late justice, Jackson and Frankfurter. Both jurists were wary of those who saw great social issues in simple terms. Though he challenges Justice Frankfurter's over reliance on history (in favor of greater reliance on philosophy), he admires the craftsmanship evident in the opinions of both justices, their careful delineation of issues, their detailing of the conflicting values. Freund deplores the fact that the Court is so pressed for time that its opinions only rarely reflect the full explorations of issues so characteristic of Justice Frankfurter's opinions, and suggests

"a more selective granting of review and more systematic procedures within the Court for consultation, interchange, and collaborative endeavor leading toward persuasive and scholarly exposition," (at 162).

While applauding Justice Jackson's cautions to his activist-minded colleagues, Freund argues that the "nay-saying counsel must yield substantial ground," especially with respect to the constitutional guaranties "not excluding those stated in the open-ended or ambiguous terms of the first, fifth, and fourteenth amendments—" (at 167). He reminds us that "the moral and educational effect of a number of those decisions has been great, indeed comparable to the sobering effect of questions in the House of Commons or even to the English literary classics of the liberal spirit—the essays of the trinity of Johns, Milton, Locke, and Mill." (at 167).

It is perhaps in rationality in Judicial Decisions." reprinted from Rational Decision (Nomos VII) that Freund attempts to deal most thoroughly with the central concern of all of these essays. How can the great conflicts of interests and values in our society be resolved through legal processes? It would be unfair to the author, and futile to try to summarize his perceptive exposition. Nor is it in a carping spirit that one concludes that in using the framework of Cardozo (The Nature of the Judicial Process) to explicate the role of rationality in the judicial process, his analysis does not take us much beyond the boundaries reached by that master of the Common Law. Logic, precedent, history, and social utility all play a part. Reason, tests of consistency, exposure of bias, neutrality, and creativity are concepts with which the enlightened judge must live his daily life, but any prescription of how a judge must balance values and competing considerations, of how he must remain true to the law as received doctrine and yet press imaginatively toward a new accommodation of the law to perceived needs and reasoned demands, defies persuasive and meaningful analysis. Once we depart from general statements and reach concrete questions, reasonable men seem bound to differ on the means to be used and the ends to be achieved by the judicial pro-

To many readers these essays may seem excessively philosophical, somewhat remote from the daily life of men performing a difficult job by command of their fellows, with little of the earthy flavor of politics, and not the slightest gesture indicating that the social sciences can provide significant data or insights to those seeking to understand the role of the Court in our political and social system. Nevertheless, as intelligent commentary by one who has studied the Court and its work with intensity and devotion, there are nu-

mercus observations and insights here than can hardly fail to stimulate the imagination of students of the Court and suggest forms of research which may yield substantial documentation to support or modify Professor Freund's philosophically held views.—William M. Beaney, Princeton University.

American Legal Realism: Skepticism, Reform, and the Judicial Process. By WILFRED E. RUMBLE, JR. (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1968. Pp. 245. \$6.75.)

Aryone who believes that the legal realists were characterized by a disregard for the normative content of law and that they tended to identify law and power should read Wilfrid Rumble's American Legal Realism as a healthy corrective for such oversimplified interpretations. Rumble's carefully documented description and appraisal of the realist movement presents a convincing argument that legal realism shared the moral fervor which marked American pragmatic reform several decades ago. Men like Karl Llewellyn and Jerome Frank were more interested in liberating the judicial process from a rigid and often hypocritical formalism than they were concerned with establishing a scientific sociology of law. Rule-skepticism and attention to the behavior of judges were weapons in a campaign to make American law more comprehensible, honest, adaptable to social change and perhaps authentic in the terms of contemporary existentialism. Certainly the rhetoric of realism does not resemble the language of research reports. We are told that legal jargon "befcozles" the ordinary man; that the classical conception of law obscures the ethical character of every judicial question, and thus "serves to perpetuate class prejudices." Of course, since realism was ε movement rather than a school of jurisprudence with fixed doctrinal principles, the various practitioners struck personal balances between reformist zeal and attention to a science of law. While Felix Cohen attempted to reconcile the theories of G. E. Moore and Bentham, Underhill Moore anticipated current work in judicial behav-

Although Rumble tries to comprehend the entire scope of legal realism in his essay, his most significant analysis appears in the chapter devoted to realist efforts in the area of judicial methodology. Both Frank and Llewellyn addressed themselves to the problem of elaborating norms for reaching judicial decisions. They both attacked the traditional conception that courts should adhere to precedent with the familiar arguments that conflicting rules can be applied to litigated cases and that no two disputes brought to court are the same in all relevant respects. They also agreed that judges should be as conscious as possi-

ble of the reasons why they made their particular decisions. Responding to traditionalist criticisms that pragmatism would render the legal process unpredictable, they contended that self-conscious judges would be more consistent than judges hiding behind a facade of precedent. Frank and Llewellyn clashed, however, on the means for attaining judicial self-knowledge. Frank suggested that judges undergo a form of psychoanalysis so that they could recognize their prejudices and decide cases in accordance with a clarified "sense of justice." Judicial opinions would be psychological reports of how the decisions were reached. Llewellyn felt that opinions should be written in the "Grand Style," explaining why certain precedents were chosen rather than others and "why the technically solid argument of the loser had no business to be listened to."

Rumble deals at some length with the objections which have been raised against the realist accounts of preferred judicial methodologies. First, the realists have been accused of offering no prescription of the values which decisions should reflect. Whether or not this criticism is damaging depends on the ethical theory to which a man subscribes. Rumble contends that moral guidance for judges is needed, "if the range of choice which confronts them is as wide as the realists claimed." In this case the realists seem to be more contemporary than their intellectual biographer. Like the realists, recent existentialists and situation ethicists have stressed self-knowledge and free commitment rather than obedience to codes as the appropriate bases for decision. The recognition of choice does not "assert that nothing can be gained from systematic, conscious analysis" of values, as Rumble implies, Acceptance of freedom does imply that after ethical debate has ended the judge must still make a decision in a particular case. He is acting in bad faith if he holds that the compulsion of precedents or external norms are responsible for his decision rather than the commitment he has made after study of the law and moral dialog. This is the primary ethical insight of the legal realists, which they share with many twentieth century philosophers and theologians.

A more interesting line of argument against Frank and Llewellyn is that judicial self-consciousness is undesirable because myths that the law can be found with certainty preserve the power and prestige of courts. Thurman Arnold, a realist in other respects, contended that traditional ideals furthered public acceptance of the judicial system and that "realism, despite its liberating virtues, is not a sustaining force for a stable civilization." Arnold's views are consonant with the positions of the political scientists termed "democratic elitists" by Peter Bachrach. Aside from the familiar moral objections to elite theory, the at-

tack on legal realism is subject to the particular criticism that once old ideals have been discredited, compulsively proclaiming them will not restore their appeal. Rumble, in fact, calls attention to evidence that public acceptance of judicial myth is itself a myth. Whether or not a more appealing restatement of judicial infallibility should be devised to promote deference is a crucial question which has its counterparts in current debates on democratic theory. American political thought is currently undergoing a creative surge and it is to Rumble's credit that he has published a work which brings to light theories which should be useful to those of us wishing to reestablish the tradition of radical democratic theory.

While Rumble has succeeded in refuting the charge that the legal realists were skeptics and no more, his otherwise excellent essay is flawed by its lack of historical perspective and its absence of comment on the current relevance of the movement. Rumble implies that the insights of realism have been incorporated by contemporary jurisprudence and the excesses remedied. This is quite doubtful. However, American Legal Realism is a rich mine of argumentation which appears at just the right time.—MICHAEL A. WEINSTEIN, Purdue University.

The Pendergast Machine. By LYLE W. DORSETT. (New York: Oxford University Press, 1968. Pp. 163. \$6.00.)

Historian Lyle Dorsett has posed the following questions in his study of the Pendergast machine: What is a political machine? How does it function? What does it do with its power? How does it meet the challenges that it faces? (p. xi.)

Professor Dorsett has done an impressive job of research in the attempt to answer these questions, and has made an important contribution to the study of American urban political history. Had he employed research procedures in common use among political scientists, however, his book would be even more valuable.

The Dorsett study agrees on most points with previous analyses of machine politics. That is, the machine is seen as a political organization which is based upon "specific material inducements" (Banfield's and Wilson's term), i.e., the provision of favors and patronage jobs to its supporters. The author provides a wealth of examples illustrating this point, which makes his study stand out as a successful attempt to recreate the political environment of Kansas City's past.

At two points, however, Dorsett's study differs from the conventional wisdom on the rise and fall of machine politics. Most writers on the subject have conceived of the machine as a system whose foundation is immigrant ethnic groups of low social and economic rank. Dorsett argues, however,

that the Kansas City machine, at least in its later stages, drew just as much support from the nativist middle class as from the immigrant working class. ". . . the majority of Kansas City's population was middle class . . . in the 1920's less than 6 per cent of Kansas City's registered voters were foreign-born. The Negro population was larger than in some major cities, but by 1930 less than 10 per cent of the Kansas City population was colored. Primarily a mercantile and financial center. the metropolis in the heart of America was populated by a large native-American middle class. (p. 82)." For this reason, according to Dorsett, a majority of the electorate backed the 1925 campaign for a charter establishing a nonpartisan form of government. Boss Pendergast, therefore, decided to support the proposal, which was enacted. Kansas City's nonpartisanship, however, was de jure only, and actually strengthened the boss's hand. He was now able to pose as the "spokesman for efficient city government conducted on sound business principles. (p. 81)." Pendergast extended his organization into middle-class areas, where the inducements he offered residents were of a purely social nature. The political clubs in these areas functioned year round, sponsoring teas, parties, dances, picnics, and athletic contests. "In these various ways, then, the Pendergast machine provided a social outlet for many citizens who could not afford to belong to the city's expensive and exclusive country clubs, (p. 83.)"

Second, Dorsett notes that the rise of the welfare state did not hurt the Pendergast machine in the slightest, but rather strengthened it. This point also flies in the face of the conventional wisdom, which credits the welfare state's provision of services formerly available only through the machine with a key role in the demise of the latter institution. Pendergast, however, controlled the distribution of New Deal alphabet agency jobs in Kansas City, and thereby greatly increased his political resources and power. Since the Pendergast machine collapsed in 1940 after the exposure of its enormous corruption and the resultant scandal, one might argue that the machine would have declined at the hands of the welfare state had it somehow managed to survive the crisis in which it was destroyed. As the author points out, however, there is no empirical evidence anywhere in the literature to support this generally held assumption of writers in the field.

As valuable as Dorsett's book is, there are serious problems relating to the sources and methodology upon which the thesis of the middle-class machine is based. Although the author provides us with four handsome charts of the changing ward boundaries of the city, there is not a single table of figures relating to the extensive census and election returns data available. Kansas City did

have a notably low per cent of foreign born residents during the Pendergast era, compared to other large American cities. The figures quoted above are misleading, however, for one-third of Kansas City's population was either of foreign stock (as opposed to foreign-born) or Negro in 1930. Second. Dorsett does not define what he means by "middle class," and presents no evidence to document his point that Kansas City's population was predominately middle class in 1930. (And thus, by implication, more middle class in composition than other major American cities.) Third, there is no investigation of voting returns by wards, a prerequisite for any assertions about the strength of the machine in middle class areas. As Arthur Mann's recent study (LaGuardia Comes To Power) shows, there is no reason for an historian to be so disdainful of quantitative empirical evidence.—Douglas Fox, Bowdoin College.

The President as Chief Administrator. By A. J. Wann. (Washington: Public Affairs Press, 1968. Pp. 219. \$6.00.)

Frofessor Wann has written an excellent administrative history of the Roosevelt era. Not before nor since those exciting times have such significant developments occurred affecting the bureaucracy. The Roosevelt administration was one of bureaucratic expansion, experimentation, controversy, and on many occasions "muddling through." Professor Wann illustrates all of these occurrences, and undoubtedly his book will cause some nostalgia among those who lived through and participated in the bureaucracy during the Thirties and Forties.

This book pulls together most of the diverse literazure relating to the administrative branch uncer Roosevelt. Certainly the New Deal was one of the most chronicled in our history. Ample use is made of the memoirs of the period, as well as relevant documents, newspaper accounts, and seconcary sources. The synthesis of these materials is well done and valuable. Not only does the book refresh the memories of and provide new insights for scholars of administration, but also it is particularly valuable for students of administration who all too frequently these days have little understanding of the historical roots of the administrative branch. It is somewhat shocking how many contemporary students of political science have never heard of the Bureau of the Budget, the Executive Office of the President, the Reorganization Acts, the independent regulatory commissions, the President's Committee on Administrative Management and even the Hoover Commissions! And this list is only the beginning of what is a long list of important developments shaping the bureaucracy that are often ignored today although they were considered of central importance during the

Thirties, Forties, and early Fifties. Should our government begin to focus upon domestic problems once again as during the Thirties, increased attention will be given to problems of administrative planning and management.

Professor Wann uses as his basing point the widely accepted view that the President has a constitutional responsibility to be "Chief Administrator." The author accepts this Hamiltonian concept, although at one point he is careful to point out that Congress has a large measure of authority over the bureaucracy. In judging the successes and failures of Presidents in the performance of the role of "Chief Administrator" it should be emphasized that the thrust of the Constitution was not entirely in this direction. Fragmentation of the governmental process through the separation of powers encouraged the fragmentation of the bureaucracy, and the placement of agencies outside of the control of the President. The President is swimming against the tide whenever he attempts to tighten the reins he holds to the administrative branch. The book vividly illustrates this in connection with F.D.R.'s unsuccessful attempt to get Congress to implement the recommendations of the President's Committee on Administrative Management of 1937. In that instance he came face to face with intrenched bureaucratic interests that did not want to be reorganized, and intense pressure was exerted on Congress, particularly by the clientele groups of the old line agencies which also had a vested interest in the status quo, to defeat the reorganization proposals. Perhaps the pervasiveness of the view that the President is "Chief Administrator" should be modified in light of the constitutional and political facts, so that Presidents confronted with bureaucratic intransigence will not feel that they are failing to perform their constitutional "duty." Such a recognition of reality might also soften the views of those who like to criticize various Presidents for failing as "Chief Administrator."

In light of the foregoing considerations, was F.D.R. a successful "Chief Administrator"? The author makes the statement that "although Roosevelt was always interested throughout his career in questions of administrative organization, it is accurate to say that his interest in administration was subordinate to his interest in politics. Perhaps it is really more accurate to say that Roosevelt as President never actually distinguished politics and administration from each other in any clear-cut way." In my view this is the very reason F.D.R. was successful in many of his dealings with the bureaucracy. Whether or not the author would accept the view that politics and administration are inevitably intertwined is not made completely clear, although the facts of his book support this view. Public administration is politics, and to mas-

ter the art of public administration it is necessary to ignore many of the "principles" of scientific management and concentrate upon the political management of men. Roosevelt proved this. There was a conflict between what he and many of his contemporaries considered to be the proper principles of management, and his instincts about politics. For example, on the one hand he preached the importance of hierarchical control and elimination of overlapping responsibilities, and on the other purposely pitted men and agencies against each other to receive from the clash of viewpoints the components of a good decision, which in his terms meant a wise political decision. There is no contradiction in this except for those who fail to see the true nature of the politics of administration. Although on occasion this book suggests a separation of politics and public administration, its contents actually vividly illustrate the connection between them.—Peter Woll, Brandeis Uni-

The Political World of the High School Teacher.

By Harmon Zeigler. (Eugene: Center for the Advanced Study of Educational Administration, University of Oregon, 1966. Pp. 160. \$2.00.)

The Political Life of American Teachers. By Harmon Zeigler. (Englewood Cliffs: Prentice-Hall, Inc., 1967. Pp. 149. \$4.95.)

We live in an era of increasing unrest and militancy of American teachers. Teachers may very soon come to display the kind of vocal protest now characteristic of college students and Negroes. Both high school and college teachers are often faced with low salaries, unpleasant community and school conditions, and little effective voice in the decisions that most affect them. That they should turn to strikes, mass resignations, sanctions and other tactics in making their demands heard should not surprise us. The question for political science is, will we be prepared to offer any illuminating scholarly insight and evidence on these problems, or will we be caught once again in the same ineffective position that we now are in with respect to Negro and student radical activism?

Against this background, one welcomes Harmon Zeigler's work on the occupational and political perceptions of teachers. Using a sample survey of 803 high school teachers in Oregon, Zeigler attempts to provide a basis for understanding several facets of teachers' political roles. He focuses upon their varying perceptions of the teaching experience and job satisfaction, involvement in the teacher's association, expectations about the goals and performance of the teacher organization and its leaders, abstract political and educational values, perceptions of the role of the teacher as an agent of political socialization, and beliefs con-

cerning the sanctions that can be brought to bear by others to constrain the teacher's performance of his or her political and educational roles.

The theme given perhaps most emphasis in both versions of the book is that there are many interesting and important differences in the perceptions of men and women teachers. Men are, for example, less satisfied with their jobs, participate less in the Oregon teacher organization, and are more likely to want the organization to involve itself with wider political matters and less with educational politics per se. Although one might be well-advised to wait for other, replicative evidence before putting as heavy reliance on these sex differences as an explanatory device as does the author, such differences are suggestive of sources of discontent in the teacher ranks. In particular, the less successful male teacher, a fairly misanthropic creature in Zeigler's analysis, might bear closer scrutiny in future work. And, it is striking that in one of the few occupations that has long afforded equal access to the sexes, male high school teachers exhibit a political syndrome of lower efficacy and involvement that is more typical of women in the general population. The possible clash of such professionally-defined roles of men with those they have in the more general culture may thus well provide some motive power to radicalize them in the future. That males are less politically conservative and more apt to be attracted to unionization is also suggestive of greater militancy, especially as the proportion of males in the profession rises.

The differences between the two versions of the book are important, especially for the political science reader. The Political World of the High School Teacher presents the data used to make the generalizations presented in both versions. Only The Political World therefore provides the reader with a basis for assessing the extent and significance of the relationships presented. The Political Life version is evidently aimed at a non-technically oriented audience in that it contains few tables or direct references to the data.

The latter, however, does expand the interpretation somewhat. Given how threadbare were the interpretative aspects of *The Political World*, even small improvements are welcomed in *The Political Life*. Nevertheless, the book still lacks theoretical integration. It consists essentially of a collection of fairly isolated hypotheses about teacher perceptions. Even the male-female difference theme is largely unsuccessful as a unifying device. The author had perhaps too many disparate empirical purposes when he set out originally to collect his data. The result is that his attempt to weave his various purposes into whole cloth was doomed to failure from the beginning. Combined with a tendency of his writing style to lapse into "disserta-

tionese," such theoretical diffuseness clearly limits the work's utility and readability.

In spite of these flaws, the book may well serve to focus attention upon some important questions for further analysis, especially how the changing composition of the teacher profession together with its changing environment may lead it to greater political action. The work also suggests some interesting questions for future research into the role of the teacher and the school in political socialization. As for many attempts to break new ground, it contributes most in raising new hypotheses and suggesting further lines of inquiry.—

JACX DENNIS, University of Wisconsin.

The Politics of Food for Peace: Executive-Legislative Interaction. By Peter A. Toma, with the assistance of Frederick A. Schoenfeld. (Tucson, The University of Arizona Press, 1967. Pp. 195. \$3.95.)

Professor Toma's study is concerned with both the past history and future prospects of food-aid, however it focuses on "executive-legislative interaction" in the 1964 Congressional hearings on the extension of Food for Peace. "Why did the Congressional attitude toward Food for Peace change in 1964, Toma queries, "... an answer to this question becomes fundamental to understanding the future of food-aid in the context of American policy."

To set the stage for a discussion of the 1964 hearings, Toma briefly reviews "Agricultural Politics and Policy in the United States," the history and scope of the Food for Peace Program, beginning with the passage of Public Law 480 in 1954. and the "attitudes" and "images" of Congress in years when food-aid legislation was extended or modified. He emphasizes that, while the primary motives for the initiation of Public Law 480 were domestic concerns (i.e. surplus disposal), by 1964, food-aid had become primarily an "instrument of U.S. Foreign policy." This trend was reinforced by the "Food for Peace" label attached to the program by the Eisenhower Administration and, especially, by the organizational and policy changes which were introduced following the election of President Kennedy.

Euring the period from 1954 through 1961, according to Toma, there was also a trend of growing Congressional support. However future support was endangered by several unresolved issues which had recurred in the successive legislative hearings. The most important of these issues were (a) the intent of the program (i.e. to serve foreign or domestic policy objectives), (b) the appropriate term for legislative extensions, (c) whether or not to assist Communist nations, (d) the degree to which Congress should directly supervise program operations, (e) the accumulation and handling of

Title I proceeds (from concessional sales) and (f) "the question of organizational efficiency to implement the program according to Congressional desires." An additional problem which was to lead to future difficulties was the lack of an effective method of evaluating the program.

Up to this point, the analysis is relatively clear and straightforward, although the discussion of "Agricultural politics and policy" in Chapter One is extraneous to subsequent material. However, in the more detailed consideration of the events of January-September 1964, the thread of the argument becomes difficult to follow.

There are three major problems with Toma's analysis of this period and the conclusions and implications which he derives therefrom. First, there is no clear conceptual framework or theoretical focus. There is a fragmentary and somewhat puzzling discussion of Congressional and Executive decision-making as "systems" (using a version of Easton's paradigm) but the model is neither elaborated nor applied.

A second problem derives from the neglect of relevant literature on legislative processes and administrative decision making in government. Much of this literature discusses the kinds of issues with which Toma is concerned (i.e. the budgetary process, legislative strategies of administration officials, the position and power of committee chairmen in their respective houses, House-Senate similarities and differences, etc.). Wildavsky's Politics of the Budgetary Process, for example, would support Tcma's contention that the lack of "evaluative documentation" was a handicap to the administration in its relations with Congress. However Wildavsky's study would raise serious doubts about the conclusion that Congressional "penetration" of the "facade" of executive unity is a very helpful explanation of the defeat of the administration proposals. Virtually every important legislative proposal tends to be the result of discussion and compromise in the Executive branch and in the case of Food for Peace the degree of "unity" seems to have been relatively high. To cite another example, the analysis of Congressional decision-making in Chapter Five is virtually de novo as if (to cite just a few relevant works) Matthews' U.S. Senators and their World (1960), Clapp's, The Congressmen (1963) and Carroll's The House of Representatives and Foreign Affairs (1958) had never been written.

The third problem is Toma's use of the Pearson cht to identify "variables" which had "causal influence" on decision-making patterns of Congressional committee members. Toma has taken ten variables from the Congressional Quarterly Almanac and computed contingency coefficients between these variables (individually) and an incomplete record of committee voting on the 1964

bill derived from a mailed questionnaire. The response to this questionnaire was sixty-five per cent (26 responses out of 40) with a strong possibility of systematic variation in the response-non response patterns. From these data, he draws conclusions about the relationship between the "independent variables" of (a) Party, (b) Party unity, (c) Liberal-conservative, (d) Presidential support, (e) Attendance at hearings, (f) Farm Constituency, (g) PL 480 constituency, (h) Age and (i) Seniority and the "dependent variable of "Executive support," "indifference" or "opposition." Where a "statistically significant relationship" (at the .05 level) exists, Toma concludes that the dependent and independent variables are causally related. He then uses the chi2 significance values to order the independent variables with respect to their "intensity of influence" on the dependent variable. There is general agreement, I think, that significance tests cannot be used in this way. Omitting the problem of meeting the mathematical assumptions of the statistical model (which Toma's "sample" clearly fails to do) a measure of the strength of relationship between variables (for example, the omega coefficient) is what would be needed to draw these types of conclusions. In Toma's presentation, there is no connection established between data and conclusions; only the illusion of such a connection.

Because the topic of investigation is a worthy one, it is too bad that these types of problems arise in Toma's analysis. Public Law 480 represented a rather unique symbiosis of domestic and foreign policy interests. Thus the Food for Peace idea has survived the legislative "minuet" better than most foreign assistance legislation and would be a most interesting focus for detailed study of interrelated foreign and domestic issues in the legislative process. Moreover, there is also a need for a book which would increase public awareness of the War on Hunger and its significance, much as McGovern's War Against Want attempted to do several years ago. The Politics of Food for Peace accomplishes neither objective. The non professional who is concerned with the general background and significance of food-aid will find that the style of presentation is too technical and pedantic to hold his interest. The political scientist who is concerned with the legislative or administrative processes of government will find that the connections established between data and conclusions are far from convincing.—JOHN M. RICHARD-SON, JR., University of Minnesota.

Legislative Representative in the Contemporary South. By Malcolm E. Jewell. (Durham: Duke University Press, 1967. Pp. 141. \$5.50.)

One of the by-products of the "Reapportionment Revolution" has been renewed interest

by political scientists, and members of other disciplines, in representation theory, practice, and results. The state legislatures have served as laboratories for empirical analyses of various representative systems and their consequences. From them, considerable hard data have emerged to add to our knowledge and understanding of the American political system, and of the implications and effects of diverse representation schemes.

Malcolm E. Jewell has undertaken a comparative analysis of certain aspects of legislative representation in eight states in Legislative Representation in the Contemporary South. He examines legislative politics in Alabama, Florida, Kentucky, Louisiana, North Carolina, South Carolina, Tennessee, and Texas. He is concerned chiefly with the extent of Democratic primary competition, the existence of factional political systems and the development of two-party competition. But, while there is much valuable material here, the problems of comparative studies among the states and especially among their political sub-systems force the conclusions, where they are even possible, to be very broad.

Jewell concludes that the levels of primary competition "vary substantially from state to state" but the data led him to discount as causal factors the length of terms, the number of incumbents who run, and the proportion of Negro or metropolitan districts. In each of the states, however, it appears that one or more of these factors contribute to the incidence of primary competition. Incumbency seems to be an important variable in determining competition—the lack of an incumbent seems to produce a higher level of competition. Also there is somewhat more competition in metropolitan districts and "occasionally" less in the more rural districts.

In assessing the influence of factionalism, Professor Jewell is compelled to focus only upon Kentucky, Louisiana, and Texas because in the other five states there is little evidence of factionalism in legislative primaries. Even in the three states, only limited conclusions can be drawn since factionalism as evident in slating arrangements occurs in too great a variety of situations to permit broad generalizations to stand.

Firmer trends emerge from the consideration of two-party competition. Professor Jewell finds increasing competition from Republicans in legislative elections. This competition is manifested both in more Republican candidates and more Republican success in winning legislative seats. Further, Republicanism has spread from traditionally Republican areas to metropolitan counties, and particularly those in which Republican presidential and gubernatorial candidates have run well. Jewell notes that these counties too are those in which the Democratic primaries are most competitive

and where reapportionment is producing additional legislative seats.

In his final chapter, Professor Jewell speculates on the future of competition in these states. He identifies reapportionment and a growing Negro vote as the two major factors that will affect legislative contests, and lead to increased levels of competition in both primaries and general elections. Reapportionment will allot proportionately more legislative seats to areas already characterized by higher levels of competition and enlarge the size of rural districts where long incumbency seemed most deeply rooted. At the least, reapportionment changes the pattern of election systems by altering historic districting schemes to add more legislators from multi-member districts, increase the number of multi-county districts, and introduce single-member districts into métropolitan areas. The impact of the Negro vote increasingly can be expected to be felt in both metropolitan and rural areas as Negroes become participants in Southern political society. Already evident in metropolitan areas, Negro voting in black-belt areas potentially can affect the entire structure of Southern politics. Together with reapportionment, it can lead to more primary and party competition.

This study is useful to understanding state legislative systems as well as Southern politics. Even though he finds that many of his hypotheses about legislative representation in a one-party environment are not confirmed, Professor Jewell contributes valuable data about legislative politics in the eight states. The analysis of Kentucky, Louisiana, and Texas slating practices has the greatest depth, and the data on party competition is most useful from a comparative standpoint in the Southern region.—RALPH EISENBERG, University of Virginia.

Anti-Politics in America: Reflections on the Anti-Political Temper and its Distortions of the Democratic Process. By John H. Bunzel. (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1967. Pp. 291. \$6.95.)

A-tti-Politics in America is a book of reflections rather than a research report. Many of the reflections are undoubtedly accurate; at any rate, they are banal and unoriginal. Some of the reflections are fascinating, and testable, propositions about the political attitudes of people outside of the mainstream of American politics. Prof. Bunzel's greatest failing in this book is that he has in no meaningful way attempted to verify these propositions. Reflections on impressions gathered at Bay Area brunches and cocktail parties can no longer be accepted as serious scholarship in political science unless these impressions are supported by some hard data.

The author's failure to gather any meaningful

data is particularly unfortunate because he is dealing with a major theoretical problem. Anti-politics, according to Bunzel, is the rejection of politics "in the name of some non-political 'truth.'" (p. 3) He lists among the people rejecting politics those on the radical right, the far left, pacifists, psychological determinists, and utopians. Their common characteristic, he asserts (but does not test) is unwillingness to compromise major goals; such people are anti-political because politics necessarily involves compromise following conflict.

Before discussing the book's technical shortcomings in detail, it is necessary to consider some theoretical issues. The first is that there may be some issues on which a reasonable man will not compromise. Bunzel's commitment to democratic procedures seems to be of this nature. The second is that Bunzel seems to claim that there cannot be politics outside of democratic systems, "There is no politics in a totalitarian society because conflict is looked upon as a form of illness." (p. 7) Are we to take this to mean that the process of making binding decisions in totalitarian societies is something other than a political process? And what are we to think of Chairman Mao and his theory of contradictions? Finally, Bunzel writes that politics "leads not to order and stability but to instability and change." (p. 10) Perhaps the author is working in terms of a highly individual conception of stability and instability, but one of the main currents in social thought today seems to be the quest for change with stability. At any rate, it seems more reasonable to argue that politics can lead to any combination of those four terms.

Bunzel's critiques of the manifestations of the anti-political sentiment are generally summaries of the writings of other social theorists, most of whom are at Berkeley, and the reader should be advised that the original works are better. At times, the effusive citations approach sycophancy: the radical right is subjected to the critiques of Franz Neumann, Daniel Bell, and Richard Hofstadter; C. Wright Mills runs Nelson Polsby's formidable gauntlet; the most telling points on psychological determinism are made by Norman Jacobson and Gabriel Almond. But it is not until the last two chapters that this technique reaches its full strength. In the chapter on the utopians and the elimination of politics, we read. "As Bendix and Fisher have observed. . . " (p. 247), "As Bendix and Fisher have pointed out. . . ." (p. 248), "As Wolin says . . ." (p. 249), and "As Wolin points out ..." (p. 250). In the final chapter, "The Commitment to Democratic Politics," there is a quotation running from page 280 to page 282 from Charles Lindblom's "A New Look at Latin America." which is footnoted in the following way: "I thought so highly of his approach and analysis that I had the same piece reprinted in a book of

readings I edited for college undergraduates..." (p. 282) and then plugs the book. Perhaps these are only matters of style, but a book devoid of data should not also commit the sin of being aesthetically offensive.

Let us continue to examine the book's methodological problems. Bunzel's basic technique is to infer from the writings of a movement's leaders to the attitudes and probable behavior of the movement's followers. These inferences are generally supported by referring to anecdotes and to the author's conversations with students and other acquaintances who are engaged in such movements. Even Bunzel must realize that this is a risky sort of verification, for at one point he writes that H. Stuart "Hughes, like many followers of the peace movement, reveals subtly that his ringing statements are actually more extreme than would be his own personal actions were he in a position of political responsibility, but that the voicing of such positions is necessary." (p. 169) If this is the case, why does Bunzel assume that all Birchites agree with The Blue Book, that all members of the radical left share the thoughts of C. Wright Mills and the Lynds, that a large proportion of Quakers prefer absolute truth and peace to the give and take of politics (Bunzel claims, by the way, that community action programs are nonpolitical, p. 153), and so on for each of the groups he reflects upon.

Bunzel would have made a significant contribution to our understanding of extremest politics had he gone out and measured the degree of ideological thinking among followers of such movements, and had he correlated the beliefs of leaders with the beliefs of followers. Let me list a few of his conjectures that merit rigorous testing:

- Thinking only in terms of moral cutrage, she ["a friend of mine"] believed an issue to be more important than an institution or a procedure. (p. 28)
- The hostility to democratic politics on the part of the right wing is in large measure a result of its fundamentalist roots. (p. 65)
- 3) The extremists of the far right . . . are a religious people who are separated from the rest of mankind for the great purpose of preserving and propagating the true religion. . . . Worship of the past is coupled with a mistrust of modernity. (pp. 86-87)
- 4) Their deepseated suspicion of everyone but themselves merely underscores their belief in the betrayal of the American Dream by hidden conspiracies and reaffirms their fervor for immediate and total solutions. (p. 87)
- 5) Yet anyone who understands or is sympathetic to the ways of politics in this country knows that many businessmen, bankers, and other "clite" members of the community are very often too indifferent to public affairs for the simple reason that they are too busy making money. (p. 108)
- The religiously dedicated members of the peace movement see a definite dichotomy between politics and their own action. (p. 166)
- There is a real tendency [for pacifists] to apply a double standard to the United States and the Soviet Union. (p. 180)

It is a shame that Prof. Bunzel has not tried to gather the kinds of data which might have verified some of these propositions. I would guess that some of them are correct; others seem to be patently false. Serious testing of these propositions and analysis of their implications for the maintenance of the democratic process would be a significant contribution to the discipline. As it is, we are left with a disappointing and frustrating book, which, in the words of one of my colleagues, "ranges from banality to bêtise to bunkum."—Kenneth S. Sherrill, Hunter College, City University of New York.

The Admirals' Lobby. By VINCENT DAVIS. (Chapel Hill: The University of North Carolina Press, 1967. Pp. 329. \$7.50.)

"In the councils of Government we must guard against the acquisition of unwarranted influence, whether sought or unsought, by the military-industrial complex. The potential for the disastrous rise of misplaced power exists and will persist. We must never let the weight of this combination endanger our liberties or democratic processes." Thus cautioned General Dwight D. Eisenhower. Professor Davis' study of the U.S. Navy's officer corps reads as a well argued brief for the defense -at least in defense of the U.S. Navy. He finds that naval officers do not like to engage in activities that clearly have political purposes (p. 302). And in a "propositional" summary at the end of the book he concludes they engage in such activity only when the following two conditions are met: (1) ". . . a dire and immediate sense of threat to the continued existence of the Navy...." and (2) "... leadership, or at least tacit support, from one or more ranking civilian officials, usually the Secretary. . . ." (p. 319). While these findings may not entirely console those who share the fears of the former Commander-in-Chief, the evidence offered in support of them is even less assuring. Especially distressing is the Navy's tendency to interpret everything from Army Air Corps' doctrine in the 1920's, the National Security Act of 1947, to Secretary McNamara's management practices as threats to survival. The author attributes most such reactions to "The Navy's traditional sense of being misunderstood and unappreciated by the American public" (p. 270).

Beyond providing evidence of paranoic tendencies, the bulk of the study presents the reader with a wealth of material which suggests there is nothing particularly sinister or overbearing about the political activities of the Navy. That naval officers and, less frequently, offices engage in lobbying, propaganda, and information manipulation is incontrovertible and the author provides many examples of each. The relevant questions are, how endemic is such activity, to what purposes has it

been put, what restraints and checks operate? The answers, considered at length, are for the most part reassuring.

More than anything else, the book is a recounting of the perceptions and attitudes of naval officers themselves. The author has gone to great effort to uncover and set forth a "frame of reference" or "cognitive map" characterizing the officer corps. Drawing from published and some unpublished sources, extensive personal interviews, and very probably his own insights as a former naval aviator and Annapolis graduate, the author attributes to the Navy a vision of strategy, technology, and politics not inconsistent with the colorful statement attributed to Secretary of War Henry L. Stimson: "The Navy is a religion, Neptune is god, Alfred T. Mahan his prophet, and the U.S. Navy the one true church." Officers have a healthy distrust of the virtues of centralized defense organization (Place the Navy at the mercy of a Secretary of Defense who might not appreciate the nature of sea power? Never!). There is a lack of vision in assessing the impact of new technolcgy (We are told for example, "As for the control of nuclear energy, its military significance is dramatized at least as much by its application to propulsion systems for submarines as by its more spectacular uses in ordnance devices" (p. 58). By the way, it is not clear whether this represents the author's or the Navy's belief.). Finally, there is dogged belief in "command of the seas" as a vital element of national security, achievable only through a "balanced Navy." Most interestingly, politics is viewed as a somewhat tainted activity, beneath the dignity of a professional and certainly not the domain of a military professional committed to the norm of civilian supremacy in matters of higher national policy.

The study devotes about equal attention to the development of attitudes and positions prior to World War II and to their evolution during the post-war period. What emerges is a picture of the military as just another bureaucracy devoted to its own particular subgoals and survival interests. Norms which inhibit political activity serve to reduce the Navy's effectiveness in the rough and tumble of the national policy process—but not too much. Despite promises of a conceptual analysis of the subject made in the Preface and notwithstanding the "propositional" summary at the end, the book is primarily a chronology of views and events—closer to military of institutional history than to interest group or organizational analysis. The book's virtues are also its vices. Often drawing on unpublished and frequently anonymous sources, the author creates an interesting and plausible sketch of perceptions among naval officers-accounting for their origins and tracing out some of their implications. However, these

merits are achieved at the cost of treating the subject in virtual isolation from the domestic and international events which give the perceptions meaning (for example, little treatment of changing national views about opponents and the threats they might constitute). Foregone are countless opportunities for applying or testing relevant hypotheses from the literature of contemporary studics in politics and organizational behavior. Perhaps most disappointing is the failure to shed much light on what is billed as ". . . really a hypothesis intended to be tested in the research," namely, "... that the nature and employment of armed forces within and by any given nation-state would be to a large degree determined by the nature and culture of that nation" (vii). Perhaps the best judgment of this book is the one the author makes in the Preface, ". . . regard the work in hand as only an early report on an ongoing research project that will require far more work to complete with any substantial degree of thoroughness" (xi).-J. C. Ries, University of California, Los Angeles.

The Political Beliefs of Americans: A Study of Public Opinion. By Lloyd A. Free and Hadley Cantril. (New Brunswick: Rutgers University Press, 1967. Pp. 239. \$10.00.)

The contents of this book are more accurately represented by adding onto the present title, The Political Beliefs of Americans: A Study of Public Opinion, the term, Pre-election, 1964. For this is a study basec on 3215 national cross-section interviews conducted in September and October of 1964 by the Gallup Poll.

The bill-of-fare will be familiar to the student of public opinion accustomed to perusing bivariate cross-tabulations among issue positions, party and class identifications, socio-economic and demographic characteristics, and psychological attributes. However, the reader with an interest in voting behavior is served notice that his appetite will only be whetted by a rare entry or two concerning the relationship between political beliefs and opinions and voting intentions. It is true that the usefulness of working with voting intentions, as opposed to the vote report available from a postelection study, may be questioned due to the discrepancy between intention and behavior. However, given the author's concern with liberal-conservative ideology, the unusually sharp distinction between the Presidential candidates in this respect, the rate of defection from partisan affiliations in candidates choices, and the professed interest in providing an analysis for the use of politicians and the student of practical politics, more attention to voting intentions would seem to have been justified.

The audience to which the book is directed, and

the type of analysis employed, is quite accurately stated by Free in the Acknowledgments. "The level of analysis . . . has necessarily been determined by the fact that I am a pollster and political analyst, not a psychologist or a sociologist. . . . In selecting the information to be gathered and in analyzing and presenting it, I have had primarily in mind the politician and the student of practical politics. Accordingly, I have not attempted to trace causation in depth." And that's the way it is.

Apparently the contribution by Cantril is very much restricted to the last chapter. Once again, according to the Acknowledgments by Free, "... my associate, Hadley Cantril, insists that I confess to being primarily guilty for most of it. On the other hand, I insist on making it clear that his is the responsibility especially for the last chapter, the most important and difficult to formulate."

In the last chapter, Cantril observes the need to develop an American ideology which is consistent with the way we behave. The observed inconsistency is between the support for a conservative ideology of private initiative and a limited federal government on the one hand, and support for the welfare programs of the federal government on the other. The empirical base of the observation is provided by the distribution of the population on two scales: an "ideological spectrum" and an "operational spectrum." On the operational spectrum, consisting of five items on federal aid to education, medicare, federal housing, urban renewal, and the eradication of poverty, 65 percent of the population is classified as predominantly or completely liberal. On the ideological spectrum, based on attitudes towards federal intervention in private enterprise, state, and local affairs, and individual initiative, the conservative pole is favored with 50 percent predominantly or completely conservative and only 16 percent in the two most liberal categories.

The apparent inconsistency may be discounted partially on two points of methodology and on one point of interpretation. The first methodological point is that, because of the item content and format, individuals disposed to acquiesce to plausible statements and to accept the status quo are well on the way to becoming ideological conservatives and operational liberals—in the absence of any informed or firmly held opinions to the contrary.

A second methodological issue is raised by the failure to state the basis for selecting the items to be included in the two scales. Why, for example, is an item concerning the amount of power exercised by the Federal Government excluded from the ideological spectrum scale? Its inclusion in the ideological scale, with two-thirds of the population supporting the present, or an increased, exercise of federal power, would help to shift the distribution

on the ideological spectrum towards the thinly populated liberal end. Indeed, the strong Guttman scalar relationship between the orderings on the ideological and operational spectrum suggests that a common dimension underlies both measures, with the difference in the distributions on the two spectra a function of item bias.

The observation of a strong Guttman scalar relationship between the ideological and operational spectrum scales is relevant to the point of interpretation that is being questioned here; that the electorate is characterized by a sharp inconsistency of ideology and behavior. No more than a fourth of the population is conservative on the ideological spectrum and liberal on the operational spectrum. Nearly all of the remaining respondents are either liberal to middle-of-the-road on both scales or conservative to middle-of-the-road on both.

Certainly the American political system faces graver challenges than that posed by a quarter of the population, at the very most, subscribing to a conservative ideology while supporting specific programs somewhat at variance with that ideology. It is more likely that the promulgation of this more or less unsubstantiated view of the American electorate serves primarily as a source of frustration for the Republicans who, as the authors put it, "have a philosophy but no program," while "the Democrats have a program but no philosophy."

By implication, this review has suggested that the contradiction between conservative ideals and liberal practice is the only concern of this work. Although the data analysis repeatedly involves the ideological and operational spectra, the interests of the author(s) are much more diffusive. I leave the reader to select among the varied data presentations according to his special interests and needs.

In conclusion, this book may be useful as an "outside reading" for an undergraduate course and it may serve specific purposes at the graduate level without making the prelim reading list. The professional-academic analyst of American public opinion may find it stimulating at points to the extent that he is energized by particular pieces of data.—Aage Clausen, University of Wisconsin.

Claus Spreckels: The Sugar King of Hawaii, By JACOB ADLER. (Honolulu: University of Hawaii Press, 1966. Pp. 339. \$8.50.)

Interviewed by a San Francisco Bulletin reporter during his campaign against annexation of the Hawaiian Islands by the United States, Claus Spreckels, The Sugar King, proclaimed that the Islands may be annexed "by and by, some time ... but not now. I'll guarantee to deliver them at any time" (p. 248). This claim of political omnip-

otence by "His Royal Saccharinity," as his enemies called him, was promptly challenged. Nevertheless, it caused such concern that one of the supporters of Hawaii's revolutionary, Provisional Government warned that Spreckels

can largely control Maui, and can have great influence in other parts of the Islands. . . . He is a strong factor . . . and it is important to use him and not quarrel with him (p. 251).

This political jousting occurred at a significant time in Hawaii's political history and in the course of Spreckels' Hawaiian adventure. Both strands of these intertwined narratives are skillfully traced by Adler, who concentrates on the decisive part played by Spreckels in Hawaii's political history during the final quarter of the 19th century. Adler thereby helps us better to understand the decline of the Hawaiian monarchy and the revolutionary outbursts by which it was finally destroyed.

As Adler makes clear, a grasp of these developments is indispensable to those seeking to understand a broad aspect of The Islands' political development: the transition from the monarchic-oligarchic regime of the late 19th century to Hawaii's increasingly egalitarian, democratic regime of today. The importance of Adler's work transcends its analysis of Hawaii's political history by providing political scientists with an opportunity to reflect on a question of fundamental importance: What is the nature of oligarchic rule, the character of the oligarchic regime?

As recounted and interpreted by Adler, Spreckels' career provides an arresting model of the oligarchic man. A remarkably short time after his arrival in the U.S.—in steerage, and with but a single taler in his pocket—Spreckels advanced to a position of enormous financial and political power in California, where he became the acknowledged Sugar King of the West Coast during the 1870s. Not surprisingly, Spreckels turned to Hawaii to supply his California refineries with the enormous, unending flow of raw sugar they required. Thus, it was in Hawaii that he created the world's largest and most efficient sugar plantations.

Adler is at his best as he reveals the scope of Spreckels' genius in matters of finance and production. Guided by an almost uncanny grasp of the possibilities for creating an all-inclusive, vertically integrated, near monopolistic control of the Hawaiian-West Coast sugar industry, Spreckels simultaneously developed plantations, railroads, utilities, shipping lines, banks, and refineries. His oligopolistic, centralized, "factory-in-the-field" pattern of agricultural production was the work of a brilliant and far-sighted man, and was to serve as the model for commercial agriculture, in Hawaii and—many decades later—on the American mainland. Indeed, contemporary students of economic

development in the emerging nations would do well to consider Adler's analysis of how Spreckels constructed his empire.

Spreckels faced seemingly insuperable obstacles to his goals. But, as Adler makes clear, he was armed with the maxim, "Every man has his price," and he alternately bribed, then intimidated, Hawaii's royalty in his successful efforts to secure land, water rights, and special privileges of all sorts. At the peak of his power, he controlled over half of the enormous sugar industry in the Hawaiian Islands, and he boasted, "When Kalakaua was King, I practically ran the country" (p. 231).

Nevertheless, Spreckels' methods of achieving his ends in the sphere of production emphasized the defects of his character and perspective. These proved to be his undoing. Unable to comprehend the outlook and motives of non-oligarchic men. Spreckels never believed that King Kalakaua could dare to bite the hand that bribed him. Yet so it happened. Kalakaua, made furious by Spreckels' boasts and bullying, turned to others for assistance. At the same time, the democratic leaders of Hawaii, men such as George Washington Pilipo, a courageous and intelligent native Hawaiian, and Sanford Dole, continued to battle unceasingly against Spreckels in the legislature. These men believed that their political community should be more than an enormous sugar plantation or joint stock company and the goal of human life more than mere production. They were intent on developing Hawaii's agriculture in the traditional pattern of American family farming in order to insure the development of a sturdy, selfsufficient, and free citizenry.

With the overthrow of Hawaii's monarchy in 1893, Spreckels' political defeat was completed. He was unable to restore Queen Liliuokalani to her throne or, subsequently, to prevent the annexation of Hawaii by the United States. His political power crushed, the great oligarch was unable to maintain his economic position, and he lived to see the ownership of his stupendous enterprises fall into the hands of Hawaii-born descendants of the missionaries.

Even though Spreckels' political and economic power had been broken, a powerful oligarchic element remained in Hawaii. It is to a much needed and comprehensive consideration of this aspect of Hawaii's political-economic history that Adler's study of Spreckels points us. As Adler notes, the definitive study of Hawaii's "Big Five" corporate structure remains to be written, as does an adequate account of the persistently monopolistic patterns of land ownership and utilization in Hawaii. Adler's efforts will undoubtedly guide and stimulate this further work. We are thus all the more indebted to him for an extraordinarily useful, im-

portant, and fascinating study.—ROBERT HORWITZ, Kenuon College.

North Carolina Politics: An Introduction. By Jack D. Fleer. (Chapel Hill: The University of North Carolina, 1968. Pp. 185.)

This book is an introduction to electoral politics in North Carolina since 1940. Professor Fleer of Wake Forest University has utilized aggregate data, historical documentation, and statutory regulations to produce a clear though simple picture of the state's electoral politics. It is a very useful book for high school and introductory college courses. The author has used scholarly accounts, plus the data he collected and analyzed, to go beyond the extremely simplistic introductions to the politics of individual states which one often finds in books of this nature.

The work includes a brief introductory section on the political environment which describes the elective offices, statutory regulations relating to them, and the effects of reapportionment and redistricting. This is followed by a chapter on the electorate in which the author describes the qualifications for voting, the registration system, and rates of participation. Next comes a chapter on party organization-emphasizing party regulation and activities at various levels. Then a chapter on the electoral process with sections on nominations, campaigning, financing, and elections follows. Analyses of party competition cover the two final substantive chapters—one of these being about intraparty competition, the other about interparty competition.

As with most books, this book could have been made stronger. Data about political opinion, interest aggregations, and other aspects of the informal political structure are missing. (Which might cause some persons to suggest that "The North Carolina Electoral System" rather than "North Carolina Politics" would have been a more accurate title.)

A section on Negro and white political attitudes and involvement in North Carolina politics would have been particularly relevant and helpful. Even though data of this nature for generalizing to the entire state does not exist currently, several studies in recent years have provided valuable individual data about important segments of the North Carolina electorate. Incorporation of these data in the section on the political environment and the section about elections would have added considerable depth to the book.

The book obviously is based on adequate data. However, the documentation often does not show this. The decision to omit all but a few references undoubtedly was a publisher's decision. And, for the beginning student of state party politics, this lack of documentation throughout will be no

problem. However, this is a problem for the serious scholar, who would like to pursue the many leads Professor Fleer has provided.

For the political scientist, the value of this book is in the many interesting implicit and explicit hypotheses which the author has raised about North Carolina politics. Currently, survey data are being collected which may provide support or refutation for many of these hypotheses. Both the continuing Southeastern survey and the survey for the Comparative State Elections Study in 1968 include North Carolina as a survey universe. Both will provide data for some of Professor Fleer's hypotheses.—Lewis Bowman, Emory University.

Social Welfare and Urban Problems. Edited by Thomas D. Sherrard. (New York: Columbia University Press, 1968. Pp. 210. \$6.00.)

This volume presents some of the papers prepared for the 94th Annual Forum of the National Conference on Social Welfare, held in the spring of 1967. It is a mixed bag, without any very coherent theme or focus. There is one report of field research, presenting evidence that not all black ghettos are alike. There are two essays concerned with the barriers to and the possibilities of social mobility for poor slum-dwellers. Two papers are concerned with significant trends in the practice of social welfare—the use of neighborhood organizations for the delivery of services and the growth of quasi-legal and legal representation in public assistance administration. Another is concerned with the need for comprehensive social and physical urban planning, rather than a varied collection of particular program plans, as a requisite for iniproving slum conditions. The final paper argues the case for a federal guarantee of minimum income. The introduction, by the editor, is the most general and wide-ranging of the papers, with a good many trenchant opinions about current social welfare problems.

Although there are interesting insights and ideas in many of the papers, a reader led by the title to expect something resembling a comprehensive presentation of a "social welfare" approach or viewpoint toward urban problems will probably be disappointed. The primary concern is with poverty and deprivation; only one of the papers (that by Meltzer and Whitley on social and physical planning) devotes much attention to relating these problems directly to any general urban context or system.

Even in the absence of a central theme or organization, several ideas implicit in all, or at least several, of the papers may be singled out. First, of course, is the general sense of crisis, of current failure, of need for important changes in policy and practice. Another is the clear feeling on the part of at least several of the authors that the

provision of financial support for the poor should be separated from "social work" proper. Third is the apparent acceptance of the likelihood of positive effort on the part of the underprivileged themselves to change the existing situation, often through methods which will contravene or disrupt the efforts of those who think they are trying to help. Not only are such efforts—labeled variously "indigenous organization," "self-help," or "black power"—expected; encouragement and help for them, even with public funds, is suggested.

Every occupation develops special uses of words that are presumably meaningful among the initiates, though not so clear to "laymen." These papers include some examples. When an author talks of the need to remedy "cognitive deficiency in adults," I am not sure whether he means ignorance or stupidity; if the latter, it may not be easy to remedy. When another writes of the need to enlist large numbers of the poor in "people-helping" occupations, he is probably not thinking of jobs as garage mechanics or typists, though some people might well feel that such efforts belong within the category.

The varying approaches and arguments of these papers themselves constitute excellent evidence supporting the statement of the editor: "No major field of human activity in this country operates with less theoretical and scientific guidance than the field of social welfare" (p. 30). It is a professional field even more heavily laden than political science with sweeping value judgments and unproved assumptions about human behavior. One of the most encouraging things about this volume is the fact, clear in many of the papers, that the leaders of the profession recognize clearly that the profession itself, and the crucially important functions which it performs, are deeply troubled, and that major changes are in the cards.-YORK WILLBERN, Indiana University.

The Development of Political Attitudes in Children. By Robert D. Hess and Judith V. Torney. (Chicago: Aldine Publishing Co., 1967. Pp. 288. \$9.75.)

Interested scholars have long awaited book length publication of findings from the large study of political socialization undertaken by Hess and Easton in the early 1960's. Apparently another book by Easton and Dennis will follow this one and will be written more to the concerns of political scientists. Meanwhile, the Hess and Torney book provides a good deal of useful information for scholars in the field as well as students and laymen.

The study is based on questionnaire evidence from 12,000 students drawn from eight cities in four regions of the United States and covers grades two through eight. The sample is biased in

that it covers no rural schools, no parochial schools, and contains a disporportionate number of higher status children. The authors are frank about these shortcomings. On the other hand, a large sample of 12,000 enables one to have reasonable confidence in the results once one is aware of the biases. The study was competently executed methodologically and some clever ideas were employed in data gathering and analysis that students in the field should review for possible use before launching their own studies. Measurement of variables was not particularly elegant and the authors, appropriately, have not tried to push the data in statistical analysis. As a matter of fact, the analysis is rather simple and straightforward so that readers not sophisticated in statistical evaluation can readily grasp it.

Fundamentally the book is a developmental analysis; the title is closely accurate as to its contents and flavor. The authors posit four models for developmental processes (the accumulation model, interpersonal transfer model, identification model, and cognitive-developmental model) and suggest at various points in the book which model best fits their interpretation of the findings. Most of the book is devoted to presentation of findings and relatively little space is given to discussion of their implications. Political scientists will not be impressed with the quality of their analysis of politics; the book should be seen, rather, as a contribution to theories of child development. It seems to this writer that the book is inadequately organized; there is a good deal of redundancy from chapter to chapter. On the other hand, summaries appear at frequent intervals and are an aid to review and skimming. Another nice feature is the inclusion of quotations from interviews with children which provide the reader with the flavor of the way kids think about politics.

The reader who is familiar with the literature on political participation, voting behavior, and political socialization will find the great proportion of findings from this study confirming what he already knows from previous studies. For example, political participation and social participation are significantly correlated. More interesting are the findings unique to this study. For example, most adult studies have not been able to use IQ as a

variable but it is available here. They find that children with high IQ are much more likely to feel efficacious politically; they become politicized much more thoroughly and speedily; and they have more reservations about government thus developing a need to try and influence it.

Some of the more global generalizations about development are of special interest as well. Political socialization is already well advanced by grade eight: party identification is established in many children and their knowledge of how government works and how they can relate to it is reasonably adequate. As grade level rises the following things happen: Their definition of "good citizen" increasingly emphasizes voting and keeping informed while helpfulness to others and obedience to laws declines. The tendency to see the President as personally responsive and benevolent declines. The tendency to equate parties with candidates declines and they more adequately distinguish the stands of the parties. The tendency of young children to prefer a political image of unity and lack of conflict declines in favor of more acceptance of party disagreement and political contention in general.

The authors conclude that the schools are the central socializing agent, their predominance over the family in teaching about politics is especially marked in low status homes. The family seems predominant only in socializing political party identification, probably because the schools shy away from partisanship. The authors are critical of the schools for emphasizing a norm of citizen duty to vote but not for citizens to be active in a partisan way or to join with others in group activity designed to influence government. The norm to support candidates rather than parties rises with grade level and is most marked among high IQ students. Children, even at grade eight, have difficulty grasping the meaning and role of pressure groups and seem unable to assess their influence. The schools are propagating a belief in individual access to power via the vote which the authors feel is unrealistic and will later be seen as false and disillusioning. They call for a thorough reassessment of the role and curriculum of the schools in political socialization.—LESTER W. MILBRATH, SUNY at Buffalo.

FOREIGN GOVERNMENTS AND COMPARATIVE POLITICS

The Politics of Accommodation: Pluralism and Democracy in the Netherlands. By Arend Lijphart. (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1968. Pp. 222. \$5.75.)

This book will be welcomed as an important

contribution to the scarce literature on the political system of the Netherlands as well as an interesting attempt to formulate amendments to pluralist theory. The way in which it integrates modern theory, survey data and historical data in a mosaic is in many respects admirable. It is based on a thorough knowledge of Dutch and other literature. It adds some new empirical data; and above all it gives evidence of an original and stimulating vision.

The author's starting-point is what he calls a paradox: on the one hand, the political system of the Netherlands is characterized by an extraordinary degree of social cleavage (deep religious and class divisions). On the other hand Holland is also one of the most notable examples of a successful democracy (pp. 1, 2). Lijphart tries to explain this paradox in terms of pluralist theory.

After an interesting analysis of several versions of the so-called crosscutting cleavage proposition, Lijphart starts from the conviction: "The Dutch case is prima facie contrary to the crosscutting cleavages proposition. Expressed in the jargon of the cited writers, Dutch politics is characterized by 'mutually reinforcing,' 'superimposed,' 'congruent' and 'parallel' rather than 'crosscutting' affiliations and organizational patterns: class and religious cleavages separate self-contained 'inclusive' groups with sharply defined 'political subcultures.' . . . But Dutch democracy is eminently stable and effective!" (p. 15).

I must confess that I do not fully agree with this starting-point. In the first place, the question arises as to the criteria by which a political system can be classified as one of "crosscutting" rather than "mutually reinforcing" cleavages. The answer on this question will, among other things, have to do with perceptions of the political relevance of the several cleavages. These perceptions in their turn will depend on perceptions of public policy, issues and objectives. Lijphart pays relatively little attention to the latter perceptions and I think this is one reason for a fundamental ambiguity in the book: on most pages the Dutch political system is seen as a system characterized by mutually reinforcing cleavages, but on other pages one can read for instance "that the basic cleavages in Dutch society-religion and class-do cut across each other at an almost perfectly straight angle" (p. 205, see also page 90 and 15, footnote 41).

Personally I think that the cleavages in the Netherlands are, generally speaking, more crosscutting than mutually reinforcing. What characterizes Dutch politics in this respect is that, on the one hand, there are Catholic and Protestant parties, each of which resembles the class composition of the population as a whole very closely, and on the other hand there are liberal and socialist parties, each of which is more homogeneous as far as class is concerned, but more heterogeneous as far as religion is concerned. The fact that not only several parties, but also labor unions, employers' associations, farmers' organizations, newspapers, radio and television organizations and schools are

partly based on religious cleavages, does not take away the fundamental crosscutting of the two basic cleavages: religion and class.

This crosscutting is camouflaged in part by the way in which Lijphart repeatedly divides the Dutch population into a Catholic, a Secular and a Calvinist bloc. The Secular bloc comprises, according to Liphart: (a) those without religious affiliation, (b) the Dutch Reformed irregulars (members of the Duch Reformed Church who attend church less than once a week), (c) Catholic irregulars and (d) the 4% adherents of other religions than Catholic, Dutch Reformed or Reformed (p. 30). I think the terms "secular" and "bloc" are misleading if used for such a heterogeneous collection of categories. Still more confusion is created when the author identifies this religious "bloc" with two political blocs, for instance when he speaks of "the secular bloc (i.e. the Liberal plus the Socialist blocs)" (p. 30). How rough this identification is can be read from table 5 on page 31, which shows for instance that 6% of the adherents of the Labor Party belong to the Catholic regulars, whereas no less than 22% of the adherents of one of the protestant parties (the Christian Historical Union) belong to the Dutch Reformed irregulars.

It is a pity that Lijphart's national survey, conducted in November 1964, consisted apparently of only a few questions. This limited severely the possibility of testing one of the convictions with which the book opens, namely that "Social communication across class religious boundary lines is minimal" (p. 2, see also pp. 54-57). Especially with regard to the problem of crosscutting cleavages. I am sorry that the author did not have a look at Dutch survey data available on political opinions within several churches, which make clear that within the churches political progressives confront political conservatives. The book was apparently written too early to take into account most of the Dutch survey data of 1967, which prove that the author's premises about the "firm persistence of a stable, effective, and legitimate parliamentary demccracy, which has served the people well and which has by and large enjoyed their active support or acquiescence" (p. 2) are outdated. To mention only one thing: in 1967 no less than 64% of the Dutch voters agreed or strongly agreed with the statement: "The members of the second chamber do not enough take into consideration what the voters want." This is in clear contradiction to the remark that "the dilemma of whether an elected official should be a representative or a delegate is not a dilemma in Holland: Leaders lead: followers follow" (p. 158). The picture of Dutch politics that one gets from the book is in several respects more that of, say, 1948, than that of 1968.

To the heart of the book belongs the term accommodation, which is used "in the sense of settlement of divisive issues and conflicts where only a minimal consensus exists. Pragmatic solutions are forged for all problems, even those with clear religious-ideological overtones on which the opposing parties may appear irreconcilable, and which therefore may seem insoluble and likely to split the country apart" (p. 103). Some special characteristics of the pattern of the politics of accommodation are (1) the pre-eminent role of the top leaders, (2) the participation of the leaders of all blocs in the settlement and (3) the principle of proportionality in the substance of the settlement (p. 111). The chapter on the spirit of accommodation is, as most other chapters, excellent,

In a final chapter Lijphart argues that the Dutch case, which is according to him a deviant case, does not invalidate the basic pluralist thesis concerning the moderating effect of crosscutting cleavages and cross pressures, but rather suggests a number of amendments to it. The amendments that Lijphart proposes—for instance that overarching cooperation at the elite level can be a substitute for crosscutting affiliations at the mass level—are very much worth study.

However, I do not think the Dutch case is as deviant as Lijphart supposes. Whereas the author concludes that "the politics of accommodation fits perfectly within the context of (amended) pluralist theory as a genuinely alternative model to the model of pluralistic theory based on crosscutting cleavages" (p. 20), I think the Dutch politics of accommodation which Liphart analyzed so well is simply one particular case of pluralist democracy based on crosscutting cleavages. It must be added that there is a growing effort in the Netherlands to strengthen both the element of crosscutting affiliations and democracy. I hope professor Lijphart will enrich us in the future with a further analysis of Dutch politics in transition.—Andres Hooger-WERF, Free University, Amsterdam,

Party Democracy: Politics in an Italian Socialist Federation. By SAMUEL H. BARNES. (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1967. Pp. 279, \$7.50.)

This volume is an inquiry into the functioning of democracy in modern society by means of a study of the internal politics of the Arezzo Provincial Federation of the Italian Socialist Party. The theoretical point of departure is the line of inquiry begun by Robert Michels in his classic Political Parties and continued by Lipset, Trow and Coleman in Union Democracy; namely, the problematic relationship between complex organization and democracy.

For Barnes the strategic factor of democracy is the existence of multiple autonomous communication channels that tie together the diverse parts of a unit and permit the extensive exercise of influence. The chapters of the book consist of the variables that are presumed to facilitate or hinder the establishment and maintenance of such communication channels.

In addition to an insightful and concise review of Italian politics and a discussion of the development of the socialist party, the bulk of the volume is devoted to a comparative analysis of the attitudes of party leaders on the one hand and followers on the other. The data for this analysis is based on interviews with 58 of the 59 incumbents of formal leadership positions as well as 301 rank and file members. Particular chapters focus on levels of participation and political competence, socialization and recruitment patterns, primary and secondary group influences or membership behavior, the relevance of ideology, membership attitudes toward party politics, communications and party politics and finally, some speculations on democracy and the organization of political parties. These chapters demonstrate that party leaders and activists differ with the rank and file membership along a number of dimensions. The activists come from more middle class backgrounds than the non-activists and also tend to score higher on measures of political competence, political knowledge, efficacy, ideological sensitivity and mass media exposure.

One of the most interesting of these chapters is devoted to a consideration of various conceptions of party democracy held by the membership. Since members' expectations about party democracy in part determine the interpretations they place on the actions of the leaders, respondents were asked to choose one of the following conceptions of democracy: Classic-members are able to participate and influence the policies of the party; Neoliberal-members can choose among various leaders and policies; Marxian-when the party represents the true interests of the most numerous and needy class. The rank and file chose the Marxian conception of democracy in much greater proportions than those with opposite characteristics. And, as this conception emphasized democracy as a goal rather than as a process, the majority chose a view that said nothing about the importance of participation or choice on the part of the individual. This view of democracy as economic equality rather than participation in decision-making was partially offset by the active members, however, the majority of whom valued participation and choice as criteria of internal democracy. It is, consequently, not only skill and party position that encourage activists and leaders to support internal democracy: they are also the ones most ideologically committed to it.

Another central chapter is devoted to communi-

cations. There Barnes reports that the most severe limitation on anti-democratic tendencies within the party is the inability of the leadership to dominate all communication channels reaching the membership. He finds that the bulk of the non-participants are not deeply enmeshed in any communications network, whereas the activists are. The latter are not only the most attentive but also the least dependent on the party newspaper and are informed by a variety of media, including radio, television, nonparty newspapers, etc. They thus acquire wide perspectives on party affairs and cannot be deprived of independent, or at least divergent, interpretations of intraparty matters.

Now this inability of the leadership to control all the communication networks reaching the membership is seen by Barnes to be a major factor facilitating democracy. But the behavioral characteristics of the members provide a weak defense against anti-democratic tendencies; the majority simply do not possess the political competence to oppose the leadership. Moreover, there is little in the belief systems of the members that requires democracy. For most, democracy means more equality and more of everything: it is not a process but an end product. If nondemocratic means are more effective for achieving these ends, then they are quite acceptable to the membership.

But, paradoxically, when political competence is in short supply, its value as a commodity rises sharply and since the leaders recognize this and seek to coopt new talent, the party leadership remains an "open stratum." This cooptation process, the continuing factional disputes over party goals and the relatively independent sources of information, combine to facilitate the building of coalitions which bind together levels in order to aggregate the demands of subunits, filter them and translate them into policy alternatives.

The volume concludes with an intriguing discussion of the suitability of the PSI in achieving membership goals; that is, how can the lower social strata who possess low levels of political competence secure capable leadership? Barnes suggests that evaluations of left wing parties should not be based on classical notions of democracy as participation but should concentrate, instead, on the extent to which such organizations increase the numbers in the meaningful communication network. By this criterion the PSI meaningfully mobilizes segments of Italian society that would not otherwise be mobilized.

Overall the volume is imaginatively conceived, tightly argued and makes skillful use of a wide body of literature. But even with these positive qualities, the work does have shortcomings. Barnes emphasizes the point that his conception of democracy as multiple antonomous communication channels is in principle quantifiable, but he never

proceeds beyond the definitional level to construct direct measures of communication channels and flows. Because of this limitation, the fundamental task of explaining variation in the dependent variable is rendered difficult. The reader is forced to infer that such channels exist from data on party structure and the behavioral and attitudinal characteristics of the leaders and rank and file members. The volume would have been considerably strengthened by a variety of sociometric data on interactions between leaders and followers as well as records of actual communication flows. Such additional data would give empirical grounding to the view of the party as a communications channel connecting politically relevant units which, in turn, could place cadre, mass, totalitarian and democratic parties within the same analytical framework.

Despite this criticism, there is much of this volume of genuine value for those concerned with the problem of democracy in political parties. Its greatest strength consists in the author's skillful integration of data on the characteristics of party leaders, activists and followers with information on the structural characteristics of the party. In this sense, Party Democracy is a contribution to the line of inquiry begun by Michels and continued by Lipset, Trow and Coleman.—Timothy M. Heinessey, Michigan State University.

L'Attivista di Partito. By Francesco Alberoni, Vittorio Capecchi, Agopik Manoukian, Franca Olivetti, and Antonio Tosi. (Bologna: Societa' Editrice Il Mulino, 1967. Pp. 616. L. 10.000.)

Most social scientists don't read Italian. That fact is probably the only obstacle to this book's becoming a classic in its field. It is a sensitive, theoretically-informed, and methodologically-sophisticated study of the background, beliefs, and behavior of Italian party activists. Fortunately, some of the more important sections of the research will soon be available in English, particularly in a forthcoming volume by Giorgio Galli and Alfonso Prandi, tentatively entitled Patterns of Political Participation in Italy. This latter work will present a summary of the results of a massive series of studies conducted by the Carlo Cattaneo Research Institute on many aspects of elite and mass political behavior in Italy; L'Attivista di Partito reports the findings of one of the studies in this larger research program.

"How is it that some people and not others at a certain moment feel themselves called [to] dedicate their lives to partisan political activity? What weight in their choice had and have the many factors which one can abstractly hypothesize: from childhood and adolescent experiences to family tradition, from social class position to crucial individual or collective experiences in the

course of their lives and that of their community? How do they see and judge things: from the grand problems debated and codified in ideological terms to those of daily personal and family experience? What sort of lives do they lead and what weight does their role of activist have among their other roles—what compatibilities and incompatibilities are there? How do they participate in the community and how are they integrated in it and at the same time segregated from it? How do these things differ between the two great Italian parties and how have they changed over time from the period between the wars until today?" (p. 12) These are the questions which the authors of this study set themselves. Obviously, the issues involved are quite broad and have attracted the attention of numerous scholars, with results, however, more often theoretical and speculative than empirical.

The authors sensibly argue that survey research methods are not likely to reach the depths of personal faith and experience of interest to them. They use a technique of extended (6-7 hours), focussed, non-directive conversations with a sample of 108 Communist and Christian Democratic party activists, nine members of each party in each of six middle-sized communities, chosen to represent different regions, stages of socio-economic development, and types of party competition. The authors are understandably diffident about claiming statistical representativeness for their sample, but there seem to be no biases sufficiently striking to call into doubt the main findings. Transcripts of each interview were studied and impressionistically "scored" on the relevant dimensions by a panel of four of the researchers. The data were then subjected to a variety of statistical techniques, from simple 2 × 2 crossbreaks to factor analysis and causal modelling.

Any brief statement cannot adequately summarize the rich, diverse, and intricate conclusions of the research nor convey the fascination and insight provided by the extensive quotations. Three sets of findings seem to this reviewer particularly interesting and important.

One current interpretation of political activism, especially of the "ideological" kind found in Italy, and more especially of communism, traces it to social devience and psychological weakness. This interpretation comes off rather badly when applied to the findings of L'Attivista di Partito. Both Communist and Christian Democratic activists are well-integrated, well-adjusted members of their communities. Their political and ideological dispositions were formed in supportive family and community environments and their active involvement matured gradually in the context of work groups (particularly for the Communists) and religious and other associations (particularly for the

Christian Democrats). By and large, these are men at peace with themselves and their immediate environment; the evidence suggests that the intensity of the Communists' commitment to their cause stems less from alienation from "the system" (important though that is) than from involvement in a traditional Communist sub-culture.

In a statistical sense, of course, these activists are "deviants" from the typical patterns of Italian mass political behavior. They are not Almond and Verba's apathetic "subjects." Nor are they, for the most part. Banfield's "amoral familists." On the whole, activists from both parties share some commitment to "ideological" tenets. (In this sense, their motivation is much more "principled" than, for example, Eldersveld's Detroit activists.) This important similarity apart, the Christian Democrats and the Communists differ significantly from each other in both sources and styles of participation. The Party occupies a much more central position in the life and loyalties of the Communist. His emotional commitment to the Party is based. as one respondent said, on "giustizia e fraternita'," on both moral conviction and intense comradeship. The involvement of the Christian Democrat, by contrast, is mediated through the Church and other non-party associations and based on relatively more concrete political concerns. The Communists' view of politics and society is, the authors find, more dichotomous and stereotyped than is that of the democristiani.

This last generalization, however, brings us to perhaps the most significant finding of the study: on nearly every dimension members of both parties are becoming markedly more open, pragmatic, and "democratic" (in the sense normally used in Western liberal democracies). Having interviewed party workers whose periods of maximum activity ranged from 1945-1950 to 1956-1963, the authors are able to provide evidence on the changing nature of party cadres in the post-war period. In both parties the intensity and dogmatism of political activity is declining, as is dichotomous, "black-white" thinking. Acceptance of intra-party differences and willingness to criticize party leaders are increasing among Communists. Fewer and fewer members of the PCI are wholly and unreconcilably opposed to the existing political system. More and more see "the democratic way to socialism" as not merely good tactics, but intrinsically right. Fewer now use the Soviet Union or any other "utopian" models in dealing with Italian social reality. Similarly, Christian Democratic activists are decreasingly "knee-jerk," intolerant anti-Communists, and increasingly they feel themselves independent of the directives of the Church hierarchy. This trend from an activism which is totalitarian, crusading, and antagonistic towards an activism which is more professionalized, rational, and conciliatory is of inestimable importance for Italian politics.

This reviewer's enthusiasm must be tempered by several weaknesses in the book's style, scope, and method. It is composed of separately-authored sections, individually competent, but badly integrated. The theoretical background of the study is brilliantly traced by Francesco Alberoni and Antonio Tosi in a comprehensive and insightful review of the European and American literature on parties, social movements, and political participation. Vittorio Capecchi's advanced statistical treatment of the data is skillful and in many ways innovative. (An English language version of his novel use of causal modelling in typology-construction is available in his "Linear Causal Models and Typologies," Quality and Quantity, vol. I, nos. 1-2 (Jan., 1967) pp. 116-152. This is a new European journal of methodology published by Marsilio Editori in Padova, Italy.) The theoretical and the statistical aspects of the work are, however, virtually independent, so that Capecchi's contributions tend to be essentially tours de force, illustrating methodological tricks, while Alberoni's and Tosi's theoretical questions go unanswered. A short concluding summary by Agopik Manoukian is helpful, but does not succeed in overcoming this gap.

This study like the others in the Carlo Cattaneo series restricts its attention to the two largest Italian parties on the assumption that the Italian system is essentially, as Giorgio Galli claims, "bipartitismo imperfetto," an imperfect two-party system. This reviewer remains unconvinced that one can comprehend Italian politics by looking at only these two parties. Samuel Barnes' recent study of Italian Socialist Party workers provides some of the missing information, but important lacunae remain.

The authors' use of unstructed interviews, disciplined by attempts at categorizing and counting, is the right road for studying political belief systems, but we need to be aware of the possible pitfalls. In particular, we need to consider the objectivity and reliability of the coding operation. The ideal would be "blind" coding, in which ratings of individual dimensions were uncontaminated by knowledge of the respondent's other characteristics. This is prohibitively expensive in most cases, but we must then take the correlations among various traits with some caution. How much of the "stereotyped thinking" of the Communist respondents, for example, was "read into" the interviews by the coders? (This problem also plays havor with the "uncorrelated error terms" assumption of causal modelling.) Minimally, we could have wished for some specification of inter-coder reliability, especially since many of the dimensions

involved are quite vague (e.g., "stereotyped thinking" or "dichotomous thinking").

Even taking into account these weaknesses, however, L'Attivista di Partito is one of the most important contributions to comparative political science to appear in recent years.—ROBERT D. PUTNAM, University of Michigan.

Africa: The Politics of Unity. By IMMANUEL WALLERSTEIN. (New York: Random House. 1967. Pp. 274. \$4.95.)

Federation in East Africa: Opportunities and Problems. Ed. by Colin Leys and Peter Robson. (New York: Oxford University Press, 1966. Pp. 244. \$3.95.)

Professor Wallerstein's Africa: The Politics of Unity, written (as he himself puts it) as a sequel to his Africa: The Politics of Independence, proposes the thesis that the "movement for African unity . . . was, in fact, the most important indigenous political force on the African continent." (228) He examines the main thrust of this movement between 1957 and 1965, and suggests that it lay with an African "revolutionary core" composed of four separate but interlinked segments: (a) the "radical-nationalist states," including Ghana, Guinea, Mali, Tanzania, Congo (B), the U.A.R., and Algeria; (b) the All-African Trade Union Federation (AATUF), which Wallerstein characterizes as a "key popular organization in the avant-garde" of the movement; (c) the "radical opposition parties in independent states," such as the Sawaba of Niger, the Union des Populations du Cameroun (UPC), and the Union Nationale des Forces Populaires (UNFP) of Morocco; and finally (d) "certain liberation movements" from Portuguese Africa, Southern Rhodesia, South West Africa, and the Republic of South Africa. The movement itself, according to Wallerstein, found its guiding principles in the goal of modernization through self-discipline and isolation. Isolation does not, of course, mean withdrawal from the world or a refusal to interact with other states; it is the symbol for resistance to neo-colonialism, that new stage of imperialism that seeks domination through means other than outright occupation: alliances, economic dependence, market and investment manipulation, control through the more subtle forms of political, economic, and even cultural conquest. Self-discipline, then, to the "revolutionary core," requires ideological and state structures appropriate to the defense of "isolation," forms that can effectively mobilize human and physical resources toward self-generating and self-sustaining modernization. The means require, therefore, among other things, a radicalization of the political atmosphere throughout Africa, and a commitment to organizational forms—on as wide a scale

as possible—that further the aims of the movement.

The above summary does, I hope, as little violence as possible to what is a most carefully and well-developed argument. There is little question that Wallerstein's sympathies lie with the "movement"; he makes the case for it most persuasively, and it would not be impertinent to suggest that its proponents could read his arguments with considerable profit.

Wallerstein suggests that the movement has been impeded, if not stymied by the resistance on the part of various African governments, by those who see "unity as alliance" (Wallerstein's phrase). Concrete manifestations of this approach has been, among others, the creation of various regional and functional organizations. The creation of such organizations by French-speaking African states he interprets as moves to counter the insistent pressure and demands of the "revolutionary core." It is the reaction of the so-called moderates and conservatives. Wallerstein implies that the movement toward African unity is both desirable and perhaps inevitable; the African states, given the triumph of the "movement," will somehow find their way to both political union and political understanding. In the future, perhaps. For the present, I am not so sanguine.

One of the problems raised, and perhaps even caused by the "revolutionary core" of states is that their attempts to create a satisfactory climate for the success of the "movement" has been accompanied by support for various and sundry political organizations whose stated purpose it was to overthrow the governments of the states whence they came. It is no longer a secret that during the Nkrumah period Ghana was a base for many so-called "national liberation movements," that trained in Ghanaian camps for the violent overthrow of the governments of such countries as Niger, Senegal, Ivory Coast, and Cameroon. Such groups found ready support in Guinea, Mali, Algeria, Egypt, and Sudan, all of which governments at one time or another provided both sanctuary and logistical aid. It is irrelevant whether one approved or disapproved of these groups' aims; what is crucial is that the "movement to unity" was expressed, at least one aspect, by concrete attempts to undermine and overthrow other African regimes. The target regimes, it seems, were those with which the "revolutionary core" had the most deeply-felt ideological disagreements. It would be reasonable to suggest that the target governments felt threatened by the "revolutionary core," and that part of their reaction was to reject its leadership in the movement for unity. Regional and functional, organizations were perhaps one way of expressing their suspicion of the revolutionary message. What Wallerstein appears to have overlooked is that it was the tactics, perhaps as much as the ambiguous rhetoric, of the "revolutionary core" that contributed largely to the stultification of the drive to unity on the African continent.

Nor is it entirely clear that the "movement for unity" has been impeded by the more recent organizational and political developments on the continent. What is entirely clear is that whatever the choice of means by this or that state or group, "African unity" remains one of the most potent political symbols on the continent. No leader, no government (be it military or civilian) can afford to disregard its emotive force. The political education of most African leaders has included acceptance of the symbol, and "attentive" African political publics have made it part of the common political language. The current trend-despite "revolutionary core" rhetoric to the contrary—is toward cooperation along pragmatic lines devoted to the solution of common problems. It should, perhaps, be added that the example of political unification provided by the "revolutionary core" -the Ghana-Guinea-Mali union-hardly provided support for its theses. The UAS foundered, unhappily, on the rocks of national political expediency; save for some token moves, none of the partners were willing to commit the resources, political skills, or effort to make the so-called "federation" a reality. Perhaps the "revolutionary core" found the consequences of its rhetoric unpalatable.

The volume edited by Leys and Robson is a happy complement to Wallerstein's discussion. Though published in 1965 (most of the papers were written in 1963) it is immediately relevant to an understanding of the latest attempt at east African unification, the East African Economic Community, inaugurated on December 1, 1967.

The several papers include contributions by Arthur Hazelwood, who edited a volume on African case studies in economic and political union, and Joseph S. Nye, the author of an excellent book on the implications of east African integration. (Arthur Hazelwood (ed.) African Integration and Disintegration (New York: Oxford University Press, 1967); Joseph S. Nye, Panafricanism and East African Integration. Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1966). A. H. Birch, Jane Banfield, Dharam Ghai, D. G. R. Belshaw, Tom Mboya, B. Van Arkadie, Peter Newman, S. A. de Smith, Yash Ghai, and the Editors complete the list of contributors. In particular point is the Editors' concluding chapter, which examines the two related questions of "what form of political union is best?" and "what are the prospects for political union?" Given what appears to be at least a temporary abandonment of the goal of East African political organization in favor of a functional union, the Editors' comments are in fact pertinent to the implicit goals of the new Community. The

Editors and Contributors would, I venture to guess, endorse the new east African Economic Community as representing a step in the direction of creation the conditions that would favor the emergence of an East African Federation. As the Editors put it, "It appears that the real issue in East African is not so much the possibility of creating a federal government as of creating an East African political system." (189) The Editors, reflecting their own and their contributors' standpoints, suggest that "Federation" can be seen as one constitutional means of entering into the process of creating a common political system." (190) There is, consequently, no one form that is 'best,' but in fact a variety of possible forms of which federation appears as the most feasible, given the satisfaction of various preconditions discussed by the Contributors and Editors. The prospects for federal union would, therefore, be a function of the extent to which political and economic integration can in fact be achieved during the next few years. There are reasonable and not unexpected conclusions, but worth restating in the context of the excellent discussions found in the volume.

Most of the contributions deal with economic and legal matters, and one misses a fuller discussion of the political variable at which the Editors hint so tantalizingly. But that was not their "bag," and the book is not to be faulted for the omission. The book is, perhaps, most useful as a counterpoise to Wallerstein's volume; Wallerstein argues a "movement," something difficult to define and even more difficult to observe; the Leys and Robson volume considers the more concrete, and perhaps less exciting pragmatic realities on the road to African unity. Both are worth reading: both make useful contributions to the continuing discussion of Africa's political and economic future.—VICTOR T. LE VINE, Washington University (St. Louis).

The Politics of Exile: Paraguay's Febrerista Party.
By PAUL H. Lewis. (Chapel Hill: The University of North Carolina Press, 1968. Pp. 197. \$6.00.)

Paraguay's febrerista movement derived its name from a short-lived regime which came to power in February, 1936, and was overthrown by an army coup the next year. Despite its modest governmental success, the regime symbolized an important break with traditional Paraguayan politics. As disparate as their ideological origins were, the febreristas were united by their dislike of weak, ineffective government, and their advocacy of an intensely nationalistic, interventionist regime committed to social and economic reform. The movement drew inspiration from the regime of José Gaspar Rodríguez de Francia, Paraguay's first political leader and dictator, who ruled from

independence until his death in 1840. Francia's regime was a precocious experiment in autarchy, international isolationism, and totalitarianism. He initiated a collectivised land system, with stateowned farms managed by the military and leased under a system of emphyteusis to peasants who worked them. The farms prospered, but attempts to make Paraguay self-sufficient met little success. Within the boundaries of Francia's will, the system evolved elements of social and economic egalitarianism. The febreristas romanticized the 19th century socialist experiment, but updated their ideology with more modern symbols and European influences. Like the apristas in Peru, the febreristas for all their borrowed symbolism were an indigenous product of their national history and culture.

After 1937 many febrerista leaders left Paraguay for neighboring Argentina and Uruguay. United by common ideological sympathies, hostility to post-1937 regimes, and a desire to return to power, the febreristas maintained an international organization and channels for communication. The persistent divisive and cohesive pressures within the movement form the basic theme of the present book.

Studies of Latin American political parties, not to mention Paraguayan politics, are rare, and this book is a necessary addition to the literature. Drawing upon secondary sources and interviews with exiled leaders, Lewis provides a useful political history of the *febrerista* movement. Particularly informative is the discussion of the factionalization and rivalries within the movement.

In view of the contribution the author makes. an apparent conceptual dilemma may be less important. The dilemma is whether to stress the historical particularism of the febreristas, or the more general theme of a "politics of exile." As an example of the latter, the febreristas may not be the most obvious case since their's is a politics "in and out of exile." A significant faction of the leadership remained in Paraguay, and participated in national elections. The present regime extended a general amnesty to the febreristas in 1964. As Lewis correctly observes, "... most of the exiles have left Paraguay voluntarily, and in many cases it is lack of work and a low standard of living rather than government action which influenced their decision." The author's evidence clearly reveals that the majority of febrerista leaders are by occupation lawyers-solicitors, doctors, economists -in other words, upper middle-class. Migration of middle-class, educated Paraguayans to Buenos Aires, Montevideo, and Northern Argentina for personal and economic reasons has never been an uncommon phenomena, and may partly explain their political hostility and affiliation with febrerismo.

The author's prefatory suggestion that the poli-

tics of exile is "abnormal politics" which "may help to clarify our concept of what is normal" and "lead to a clearer understanding of the functional prerequisites for the existence of legalized parties" hardly simplifies his conceptual framework. Since much of the analysis anticipates the actual period of exile, one wonders whether the author has inadvertently overstressed either the historical antecedents or, more probably, the concept of exile. The conclusions reached about the "difficulties and problems" of the febreristas in exile do not seem to justify the ambitious but ambiguous concept imposed on the analysis.

The conceptual conflict obscures the more vital internal analysis generated by the author's research. Despite assurances that exile has been accepted as "part of the rules of the game in Latin America," the author fails to relate his analysis to other instances in Latin America for comparison. Instead he draws analogies and theory from somewhat alien contexts. Eldersveld's analysis of North American parties (Political Parties: A Behavioral Analysis) seems an awkward model for comparison, no matter how one asserts that both are "party contexts." The resulting comparisons are neither surprising nor particularly revealing.

Despite these reservations, the book presents useful information unobtainable elsewhere, and on a more modest plane is an interesting case study of a Paraguayan political movement. On balance it must be considered an important addition to the literature on Latin American parties.—Ronald H. McDonald, Syracuse University.

Veto-Group Politics: The Case of Health-Insurance Reform in West Germany. By WILLIAM SAFRAN. (San Francisco: Chandler Publishing Company, 1967. Pp. 261. \$5.00.)

In many areas of domestic policy, immobilisme characterizes German government as it once characterized the Fourth French Republic. Cabinet stability, the dominant personality of Adenauer, and then the huge parliamentary majority enjoyed by the Great Coalition have obscured the inability of successive German Governments to enact major social and economic reforms. Professor Safran's book illuminates this relatively unexplored theme of stalemate in German politics. It is a case study of legislative failure: the inability of the Adenauer Government, at the height of its power between 1957 and 1961, to obtain passage of a major reform of the system of public health insurance.

Safran explains the intricacies of statutory health insurance in Germany, which by 1960 covered 80 percent of the population and provided free medical care, drugs, and hospitalization, as well as compensation for wages and salaries lost due to illness. Administered by local "sickness funds," the system was financed by compulsory

contributions from employers and employees. Demands for extension and equalization of benefits, government subsidies for the "funds," centralization of administration, and a differentiated scale of compensation for physicians according to services rendered, raised fundamental issues which the Government sought to resolve in an omnibus reform bill.

But the very comprehensiveness of the bill was its undoing. It called forth a wide range of conflicting public attitudes, mobilized by a great variety of interest groups. Safran describes the activity of the labor unions, employers' organizations, medical profession, and public health administration in impressive detail, with thorough references to the fugitive source material on these groups. He recounts the bargaining which took place through six years of bill drafting at the ministerial level, and relates the abandonment of the bill after fifteen months of deliberation in a parliamentary committee in which the Government enjoyed a clear majority.

The complexity of the issues which Safran describes, and the multiplicity of the contending groups whose tactics he traces, threaten at times to overwhelm the main lines of his analysis. In the introductory chapter, Safran identifies his chief variables: the formal framework of decision-making in German government, the traditional public attitudes toward health insurance, the established patterns of bargaining, and the aims, cohesion, and resources of the major groups. The data is not, however, presented in these analytical categories. There are successive descriptions of each of the main groups, and extensive stretches of chronological narrative describing the sequence of legislation. The facts are set out clearly, often with the aid of effective tables and diagrams, but only rarely are they used to demonstrate the relationships among the chief variables.

In his conclusion, Safran explains that each of the major groups was able to block the others, but none was able to prevail. Each was weakened by internal divisions, particularly between rank-andfile members and professional leaders who enjoyed institutionalized access to government. The decision-makers in the government, for their part, were unable to strike an effective bargain among the groups. The parliamentary parties could not arrive at coherent positions; the Minister of Labor was unable to justify his bill in terms of the traditionally accepted attitudes toward public health insurance; and the Chancellor operated at such a lofty level of authority that he never reached the members of his parliamentary majority whose support was critical.

The evidence on the interest groups is particularly solid. Their organization and objectives are well set out, and their negotiations at the ministerial and parliamentary committe levels are fully

described. But ultimately the bill failed because of the inability of the majority party in Parliament to arrive at an agreed position. On this crucial phase of the legislative process, the author unfortunately offers insufficient information. Despite his excellent account of the treatment of the bill in committee, Safran fails to distinguish among parliamentary sub-systems. This leads him to associate himself with the view that Parliament, regarded as a collectivity, "was ill-prepared to assert itself as a decision maker" (p. 221). A more precise look at the performance of interest aggregation by the CDU/CSU, regarding it as a parliamentary sub-system, might have been more helpful in explaining the failure of the bill in Parliament.

There is some carelessness in the presentation. The names of organizations are not always translated consistently. The DGB is sometimes the German Federation of Trade Unions (p. 16) and sometimes the German Confederation (p. 19); the DII is the Institute of German Industry in the Glossary, but it is presumably the same as the Joint Committee of German Trade and Industry referred to in the text (p. 89); the BDI is both the Federal Association of German Industry (p. 46) and the Federation of German Industries (p. 88). Since the reader must keep many similarsounding organizations distinct, this inconsistency in rendering names in English adds to his difficulty. There are also some factual errors. The Ahlener program of the CDU was written in 1947 as a platform of the CDU in the British zone of occupation, not in 1949, and it cannot be regarded as the program of "a Christian Democratic government" (p. 67). Erich Peter Neumann was not yet a CDU Member of Parliament in 1958 when the public opinion institute of which he was a director made a study of workers' opinions on health insurance (p. 56). But these are minor shortcomings in a highly informative and generally reliable account.

More problematic is the author's occasional lack of detachment. Although he rightly emphasizes at the outset that "with their stress on objectivity and their acceptance of Hegel's definition of the state as reason incarnate," Germans "have tended to regard interest groups with suspicion" (p. 5), Safran himself employs the concept of "objectivity" normatively. He finds parliamentary committees capable of "an objective examination" of bills (p. 170), asserts that civil servants should have drafted the bill "according to the objective necessities" (pp. 218-219), and concludes that "the parliamentarians had failed to protect the government officials—the only group capable of making convincing (if not always totally objective) technical decisions—against the interest groups" (p. 221).

The book was apparently completed in 1964, although a postscript traces events in German health insurance policy through 1966. But since the case of health insurance legislation is only the instrument for illustrating interest group behavior in Germany, it is regrettable that the author has not taken account of the important literature in this field which has appeared in the last several years, notably Gerard Braunthal's study of The Federation of German Industry in Politics.

If case studies are to contribute incrementally to political science, they must be done within a common theoretical framework, and they must relate their findings to each other. Although Safran refers to the works of Eckstein, Finer, Key, LaPalombara, and Truman, he largely leaves it to the reader to determine the significance of his findings for interest group theory generally. But there is no doubt that his book possesses such significance. It is a valuable addition to our understanding of interest group behavior, and of the role of interest groups in blocking policy change in postwar Germany.—Gerhard Loewenberg, Mount Holyoke College.

The Japanese Imperial Institution in the Tokugawa Period. By Herschel Webb. (New York: Columbia University Press, 1968, Pp. 296. \$8.50.)

Prof. Webb has written a useful book on the imperial institution in Tokugawa Japan. The study basically deals with three aspects of the Japanese imperial institution: its origin and development up to the year 1600, its major institutional characteristics during the 1600-1867 (or Tokugawa) period, and political theories re-evaluating the imperial institution in this period along with major political events leading up to the Meiji Restoration of 1868.

After introducing the Shinto mythology in which the emperor is considered a direct descendant of the principal deity, the Sun Goddess, the book discusses the early clan system in which various households competed for secular power under the emperor, and the Taika Reform of 645 AD which indisputably established the imperial family's political primacy. The book also explains the compilation of the Taihō ritsuryō code in 701 AD. which not only formalized those governmental institutions which had already evolved in Japan but also created many new institutions imitating those of more advanced Sui and T'ang China.

However, the standardization of the governmental structure hardly prevented its modifications or the creation of additional apparatuses. Despite the fact that in theory the *ritsuryō* system continued to exist up until the Meiji Restoration, the apex of this system, the emperor, was generally divorced from political power for most of this period, and as power shifted from one group to an-

other, legal and extra-legal arrangements were improvised to authenticate the change that had already taken place.

In the ninth century, for instance, the rise of the Fujiwara family inevitably led to a modification of the system, primarily resulting in the upgrading of the Regent (Sesshō) and the Civil Dictator (Kampaku) to positions of prime political importance. In the eleventh century, as power was briefly returned to the imperial family, the Ex-Sovereign's Private Secretariat (In-no-kurōdodokoro) was converted more or less into a central government itself; and in the twelfth century, the supremacy of the samurai led to the elevation of their Commander-in-Chief for Barbarian Subjugation (Sei-i-Taishōgun) to the secular ruler of Japan and to the establishment of the feudal system which was to prevail for most of the following seven hundred years. Although it is true that during this period the emperor's symbolic status was never really challenged, his political power continued to dwindle, and the imperial institution reached its lowest point in the Tokugawa period.

The book then turns to a discussion of the imperial institution's major characteristics as it obscurely existed during the Tokugawa period. After describing the outline of the imperial palace compound and its major buildings, some of which still remain in Kyoto today, the book presents a brief profile of each of the emperors who reigned during this period and elaborates on the rules governing the imperial family and the methods by which a successor to the throne was chosen and installed. The book also reviews the court nobility and the grade system by which they were stratified, explains court activities including traditional arts and disciplines, rituals and ceremonies, the wealth and income by which the imperial institution was supported, and describes the Shogunal Deputy (Shoshidai) who officially represented the Shogun in the court and also kept close surveillance over political and other activities in and around the court.

Finally Prof. Webb surveys Tokugawa political theories on the imperial institution and some of the political events immediately preceding the Meiji Restoration. One of the major intellectual currents in this period was that of classical studies, which revived scholarly interest in Shintoism and consequently stressed the political role of the imperial institution. Two others, the Hayashi school and the Mito school, were those of Confucianism. Although both of them belonged to the orthodox Chu Hsi branch of Confucianism, the former was the official doctrine at the government academy and remained faithful to the Tokugawa regime. The latter, however, stressed historical studies—especially those clarifying the theoretical basis of the imperial institution—and did much to discredit the rationale of the Tokugawa hegemony. In addition, there were a number of individual scholars such as Yoshida Shōin who not only provided intellectual bases for the Restoration but also trained many of the Restoration and early Meiji leaders.

Against the background of such intellectual development there was a growing recognition that the Tokugawa government was no longer capable of dealing with mounting domestic and external difficulties. On the one hand, the development of the money economy undercut the economic foundation of the feudal rule, and as the Tokugawa failed to defeat one of its subordinate lords, its political authority over other feudal lords declined rapidly. On the other hand, the arrival of Commodore Perry and America's demand to open the country diametrically challenged the Tokukawa seclusion policy, which was the then cornerstone of Japan's foreign policy, and furthermore it was painfully obvious for the Tokugawa that there was no choice but to acquiesce to the American demand. Apparently this is the most important part of the book, and Prof. Webb presents a brilliant account of both the intellectual development and the political chronology-especially those of the Mito school and the Mito domain-of the period immediately preceding the Meiji Restoration.

There is little question that the imperial institution is one of the major topics in the study of Japanese political history. Yet for one reason or another this has been largely ignored by native as well as foreign scholars. Prof. Webb must be congratulated for his contribution in filling much of this important gap in our knowledge. Also the book is highly readable. Despite the fact that the book provides a host of facts and details, its presentation is remarkably lucid, and its coverage admirably objective. In many ways, this seems to represent one of the finest studies carried along the lines of the "institutional" approach in history.

Nevertheless, it is also true that many questions are yet to be answered. One of these is the evaluation of the exact role of the imperial institution in the Japanese political process. Traditionally, two extreme interpretations prevailed. On the one hand, political theorists tended to attribute every political force to the emperor, but on the other hand, historians tended to minimize or ignore the political role of the institution. Although it is admittedly difficult to be precise in a measurement of this sort, it seems probable that the truth lies somewhere between these two extremes. Also a key seems to be a distinction between the emperor and the imperial institution. Thus, even if one readily rejects the proposition that the emperor influenced the making of specific political decisions (although it appears that there were a few rare exceptions to this), one may find it difficult to deny some generalized political role for the imperial institution.

The Meiji Restoration itself is a case in point. Although it is true that the feudal political system rapidly deteriorated, the Tokugawa government nevertheless commanded large well-equipped armed forces and could have opted for a course which would have plunged Japan into a civil war of an extended duration. Instead, the feudal regime capitulated practically without any bloodshed. Is it likely that without the imperial institution and its symbolic status, the transition would have been as dramatic as it in fact was? How about the series of reforms following the Restoration by which samurai themselves quickly dismantled the very system of which they were part and began building a new Japan? Is it probable that Japan could have maintained both a rapid rate of change and a stable political orderwhich are some of the keys in modernizationwithout its superstructure of the imperial institution? Questions such as these are clearly beyond the scope of The Japanese Imperial Institution in the Tokugawa Period, which is by and large descriptive in nature, but the book provides a significant step toward a dynamic and functional analysis of the Japanese imperial institution.—AKIRA KUBOTA, University of Michigan.

Political Institutions and Social Change in Continental Europe in the Nineteenth Century. By EUGENE N. ANDERSON AND PAULINE R. ANDERSON. (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1967. Pp. 451. \$10.00.)

Social scientists have turned increasingly to history as a source of study in the last few years. The nineteenth century especially is a good one for hypothesis testing in the theories of political and social change. The application of new methodologies and new perspectives gained from current research to studies of rapid change in historical context holds promise for enhancing our understanding of conditions in the contemporary world.

Political Institutions and Social Change in Continental Europe in the Nineteenth Century proceeds, however, not from the interest of "a political scientist with a penchant for history" but from that of "a social historian interested in perceiving how change in governmental and political institutions affects and expresses social change." This appears to mean that hypotheses and explicit theory have been abandoned in order to let the facts speak for themselves. Indeed in a few chapters one has the impression of reading essentially unordered note cards from a file. The notes do contain an impressive amount of information gathered painstakingly from a wide range of English, German and French sources although heavy reliance is placed on the views of contemporary

thinkers rather than upon an independent assessment of the institutions themselves.

Under such headings as central government, local government, intermediate government, bureaugracy, civil rights, suffrage, political parties and representation, the authors describe the institutions of government in France, Prussia, Austria, Russia, Hungary, Spain and Italy at various times during the nineteenth century. These descriptions are not of the dry formal structure of written constitutions but are of the living procedures and mechanisms of political life. The authors' interest is in the interplay of political forces and their focus is upon the legitimate structures of government which contain and support this interplay. They stress the "close relationship between governmental institutions and practices and social structure" although in a self-imposed limitation only one chapter of eleven is devoted to social composition of the population. Moreover, the close causal relationship between institutional charge and "cultural advance"-which seems to consist of "the emergence of individualism, social mobility and means of political education"-is not hypothesized but assumed. Exactly why or how or even whether cultural advance brings about institutional change is left to the reader's imagination.

The cascade of facts first about Prussia, then France, now Russia, first in 1801, then 1906, now 1870 leaves one with the impression that nineteenth century Europe was somehow homogeneous over time and space. To be sure, there are isolated comparisons of one country and another and there are references to changes in institutions but these are not gathered into an intellectual framework that makes sense of the ferment characteristic of European institutions between the Napoleonic Wars and the First World War. The authors share the view that the movement from absolute monarchy towards democracy was in fact political development or growth. They might, therefore, have sought patterns of political development within countries and compared these to examine the extent of a common pattern. In many ways, the experience of the British was repeated by the French and later by the Prussians and Austrians and finally by the Russians only to be cut short by the revolutions of 1917. In many other ways, of course, the polities were unique. One suspects that the authors think in terms of patterns since every so often they insert such phrases as "the normal practices of an absolutistic government in the first stage of acquiescence in the existence of elections and representative assemblies," but to explicit comparisons they do not commit themselves.

If hypotheses are avoided, causality is not. Longer life expectancy is credited with increased interest in politics. If public services could prolong

life, people would demand participation in political affairs to gain these services. Censorship caused public mistrust of all published materials since no one could know whether the work expressed an author's view or only those agreeable to an official. These and several other bald assertions would be worthy of testing.

It is unfortunate that the authors content themselves with these assertions and leave the facts to speak for themselves. The facts refuse to do so, but there is just enough in the book to indicate that the authors could be very good advocates.—Charles Lewis Taylor, Yale University.

The French Parliament: Politics in the Fifth Republic. By Philip M. Williams. (New York: Frederick A. Praeger, 1968. Pp. 136.)

In his latest book, Philip Williams ably contrasts the first and second parliaments of the Fifth Republic to show the evolution of constitutional and political conditions and practice. He uses a number of sound, recent French secondary sources to good advantage. He relieves the necessarily lengthy descriptions of the legal framework and operations under it with many pertinent and pungent quotations and observations. This is a short and thoughtful study, essentially limited to the effects of "constitutional engineering" and concentrates on Parliament.

The constitution of the Fifth Republic established a rationalized parliament with limited powers. From its former status as one of the world's most powerful, the legislature was reduced to subservience to a strong Presidnet, who was not even responsible to it. Indeed the founders of the new regime overreacted to the dangers of a strong legislature and resisted making concessions to parliamentary power and prestige, even though the Assembly had majorities loyal to the Government.

In the first parliament the UNR and the old style conservative parties that had won were strongly Gaullist and much of their leadership was most articulate in support of "Algérie française." It soon became evident that their election was due to their support of deGaulle and not of French Algeria. As Algerian policy shifted in a liberal direction, the Government, loyally supported by the UNR, faced a right-wing opposition much stronger in the Assembly than in the country as a whole and a left-wing opposition underrepresented among the deputies and unwilling to increase parliamentary power for fear it might undermine an Algerian settlement. The first parliament operated in a crisis atmosphere. Algerian policy was administered by deGaulle and the parliament simmered. Many still believed then that the parliamentary aspect of the new constitution would normally prevail over its presidential aspects. This was the period when much was being written of the President's role as an umpire (arbitre). The coup de grace to this concept was administered with the replacement of Debré by Pompidou and the direct election of the President.

The parliamentary elections in 1962 resulted in heavy gains for the UNR and in the decimation of the Right, which lost half of its votes and three quarters of its seats. The Left, while losing votes, won sixty more seats through disciplined second ballot alliances.

By the autumn of 1965 the old opposition parties were in disarray and could not muster a coherent alternative government. The failure of de-Gaulle to be elected in the first round of the presidential elections gave them new heart and sharpened their efforts to federate and cooperate and to work for victory in the next election. While they did not win control of the third parliament in 1967, the gained a further 40 seats and forced the Gaullists to lose seats, even though they made impressive voting gains.

Under the new constitution the Government controlled the parliamentary timetable and could get its business through in reasonable time and the form it desired, for committees could no longer mutilate a bill. In practice the ministers have tended to use their wide discretion in the control of the parliamentary timetable almost as ineptly as had the deputies previously.

Williams cites René Pleven's bitter complaint in 1963 of "empty trough periods followed by weeks of overwork." He suggests that the oral question day on Fridays, conceived by Debré as an effective means to criticize the Government, has not matched expectations. Both opposition and majority members have tended to air only minor constituency grievances, and absenteeism has proved very heavy. Most deputies prefer to "cultivate" their municipal and regional responsibilities.

While, under the first parliament, opposition members had as good a chance as the majority members of seeing their proposals debated and even adopted by the Government, it is suggested that in the second parliament the Cabinet tended to favor the bills introduced by the majority.

Bills are still seriously examined in the committee stage, according to Williams, but the importance of committees has been sharply reduced. No longer can a committee emasculate or reshape a bill. Committees are larger and less cohesive. In practice, however, absenteeism has lead to the attendance of only those members interested in the bill to be discussed and, in this way, unexpectedly has enhanced committee effectiveness.

The Government now employs a useful procedural weapon, the "blocked vote," to be taken on a whole bill. This obliges members to pronounce on a given clause or amendment in the context of the bill as a whole. In his Chapter 4, "Streamlined

Legislation," Williams interestingly relates how this procedure tends to penalize the moderates and not the extremists, whose destructive criticism could be beaten off without it. He cites André Colin, chairman of the MRP senators in 1963, deploring Article 44 as "introducing between Government and Parliament the methods and style of the referendum."

The vote of confidence procedure which passes the Assembly automatically, unless a motion of censure is carried, is a drastic weapon which, in combination with conference machinery (Senate-Assembly), can pass into law a bill for which neither house has voted.

In addition, the more publicized weapons employed by the President, by which legislation can acquire legal force without going through Parliament, are the emergency powers under Article 16 and the famous referendum procedure under Article 11.

In spite of this array of procedures reducing the area of legislative self-determination, Mr. Williams says that Parliament, in essence, now has even a better chance to work more effectively in the broad sphere in which it is still competent.

In his opinion, budget debates still provide the most useful occasions for questioning and scrutinizing the Government policies. In the first parliament, with its right-wing majority and predisposition to industry and commerce, half of the amendments and two-thirds of those proposed by the rapporteur general were passed and even the Communists managed to have 28 percent of their amendments accepted.

The second parliament was apparently no less effective, but its pressure was more discreetly exercised behind the scenes. The heavy UNR gains and the increase in the number of ministers chosen from Parliament brought the UNR backbencher to greater prominence. The UNR subject groups have facilitated ministerial consultations within the party in advance of legislation.

The Government is criticized by many for its over emphasis on speedily passing the budget and in the usurpation of the limited debating time available by its majority members, and for abusing the use of the rider on budget measures.

In his overview of the system, Williams suggests that France today has a political executive and an administration strongly autonomous in decision-making. There is an overconcentration of policy-making at the Elysée. Few ministers have been backbenchers and fewer have attained office through their parliamentary performance. The Cabinet does not have to represent the leaders and factions of the parliamentary majority and the various opposition parties are deeply divided among themselves. Pompidou is apparently willing to play a subordinate role as long as deGaulle is

President, but a dual-headed executive still poses problems, for the system can only work if the President and the Premier agree.

Recent events confirm Williams' observations. Parliament is not an effective forum for popular grievances, or an effective check on administration, or a meaningful political sounding board for the opposition.

The author, in his last chapter, lightly but thoughtfully touches upon the changing social bases, forces and attitudes, and the impact of economic modernization, which, in essence, have a greater bearing on the new France than does a rationalized parliament. The old parties and ideological conflicts seem hopelessly outmoded and the younger voters, now more numerous than ever and ranging across the political spectrum, respond far less than their elders to historical memories and show far more interest and eagerness for specific reforms and in better living conditions.

At this moment French institutional arrangements are fluid. France has undergone a phase of strong executive leadership which, too, has been found lacking. It is doubtful if it has offered more than the preceding strong legislative phase in integrating interests and legitimizing policy decisions.—Henry C. Galant, Skidmore College.

A Short History of Chinese Communism. By Franklin W. Houn. (Englewood Cliffs: Prentize-Hall, 1967. Pp. 237. \$2.45.)

The author of this modest book maintains that he is neither a critic nor an apologist for the Chinese Communists but simply a describer and interpreter of their actions. It is to his credit that he achieves a high degree of objectivity and avoids the moralism which infects so many popular works on China.

While the book could not be accused of being an important contribution to the field of Chinese studies, it does offer a reasonably thorough and comprehensive introduction to the history of the Chinese Communist movement (chapters 1-5) and the Chinese Communist regime (chapters 6-13). As such the book is one of a small number of works appropriate for undergraduate courses on modern China.

Perhaps the most distinctive characteristic of this valuable survey is that the author relies heavily on primary sources except in his chapters on the development of the Chinese Communist revolutionary movement. While his erudite commentary certainly reflects the author's familiarity with major secondary works, this survey would have been strengthened if the author had introduced his reader to the contrasting interpretations and insights of other China specialists. A reader without an extensive background in Chinese studies must

rely on Houn's synthesis of conflicting interpretations. For instance, Houn fails to alert his reader to the fact that Professors Cohen and Schram offer interpretations of Mao Tse-tung's thought which are far from identical. While Houn's approach holds the footnotes to a minimum, there is something to be said for introducing students to the pluralism of China scholarship. A good textbook ought to reflect the insights of recent scholarship and not merely describe the latest episodes and crises.

The book also seems to place more emphasis on description than on analysis and interpretation. While this is consistent with the author's desire for impartiality, it does not allow him to stimulate his prospective readers to seek out the "whys" behind events. Moreover, literal description can indeed become misleading especially when one writes of Communist China, For instance, Houn generally seeks to explain the events of the great cultural revolution in terms of the same "conspiracy theory" that Mao himself used to discredit his former colleagues. Houn observes (p. 98) that Liu Shao-ch'i's "infidelities to Mao and his 'revolutionary line' must have most disturbing to Mao and his followers." (See also pages 119 and 126.) Can we in fact rely on Maoist accusations to provide a truthful picture of the actions of P'eng Chen or Liu Shao-ch'i? At best these accusations can only be a starting point for analysis.

The least descriptive and probably the most interesting chapter in this book deals with China's foreign policy. Houn suggests that the Party's major goals are to safeguard the territorial integrity and political independence of the Chinese nation. Houn seems to reject, as well he might, the official American interpretation of Communist China as a yellowish red peril about to engulf Asia and the world. He sees China as a relatively weak nation, conscious of the limits upon its capabilities and seeking to maintain its independence and heighten its prestige in a hostile world.

Outside of the chapter on foreign policy, this is the kind of book which will elicit little emotion from the reader while providing him with a wealth of information. When the author occasionally paraphrases NCNA dispatches too closely (as on p. 193) the book becomes very dull, but the reader's interest and attention is sustained by the author's facility for introducing most paragraphs with an incisive topical sentence. Despite its weaknesses, this is the kind of book that might well be assigned to students beginning their study of modern China.—Dennis M. Ray, California State College at Los Angeles.

Breakthrough in Burma: Memoirs of a Revolution, 1939-1946. By Ba Maw. (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1968. Pp. 460, \$8.75.) Burma From Kingdom to Republic: A Historical and Political Analysis. By Frank N. Trager. (New York: Frederick A. Praeger, 1966. Pp. 455. \$10.00.)

Burma Through Alien Eyes. By Helen G. Trager. (New York: Frederick A. Praeger, 1966. Pp. 239. \$6.50.)

Helen Trager's book is entitled Burma Through Alien Eyes, but all three books under review display different ways in which a single country can be assessed dependent upon the observers own perspective. Mrs. Trager (part of the husband-wife team) provides us with the views of missionaries serving in Burma during the 19th century. This fascinating little book portrays the often ill-informed, iaundiced and despairing, yet committed and self-sacrificing views of those seeking to convert a people less than anxious to "see the light." It beautifully displays how these deeply motivated individuals were often inhibited by their own cultural socialization to the point where they could not really understand those whom they are asking to make perhaps the most fundamental change in their lives. Professor Frank Trager's political history of Burma shows a major effort to understand the forces which have influenced Burmese political actions and in several chapters has provided penetrating insights into factors responsible for both domestic and foreign policy decisions made by various political actors. However, even he finds himself too heavily dependent upon European sources, particularly in his description of pre-independence history. Finally, the memoirs of Dr. Ba Maw give us quite a different perspective as that wartime ruler of Burma attempts to explain Burmese nationalist attitudes and his role in the immediate prewar and wartime period. Here we get the views of an extremely articulate, highly political Burmese with strong feelings on western wrongs (including American and British academics), Burmese political personalities and the Japanese occupation. All three books enhance our understanding of both one another and Burmese history. An effort will be made here to concentrate on the contributions of Frank Trager and Dr. Ba Maw. These two authors provide interesting points of contrast on the periods which they mutually cover. Particularly with regard to political personalities, Trager reflects the more standard assessments of individuals such as Aung San while Ba Maw provides fascinating if highly personal sketches. While Trager's book is well documented with western and Burmese source material, Ba Maw presents his own recollections only using western sources as a take-off point for his own views. It is regrettable that both men are weakest in describing the pre-1940 period, Trager primarily relying on traditional western sources and Ba

Maw inexplicably passing over all too lightly events in which he was deeply involved, such as the trial of Saya San and his own premiership.

Professor Trager's book is divided into three sections although its two primary divisions are between the first two sections which are given over to the political history of Burma and a third which reviews Burma's foreign policy. If at times the book tends to be too descriptive as in the chapters dealing with pre-independence period and on the relations of Burma with her neighbors, other sections provide us with very challenging and interesting analytic passages, most particularly those assessing the early insurrections, the beginnings of Burmese foreign policy and United States-Burmese relations. Of particular interest is his position that "Burma did not begin as a neutralist nation, she became one," (228) arguing that neutralism was not necessarily a first choice. Finally, it is regrettable that the manuscript was finished in 1965 and does not sufficiently take into account the severe economic difficulties of General Ne Win's regime and later Sino-Burmese tensions. The treatment of the post 1962 coup era at times provides a more optimistic picture than even General Ne Win has been prepared to present. The book is complemented by almost 80 pages of bibliographical notes which will be extremely useful to the specialist in the field.

Dr. Ba Maw's memoirs are primarily concerned with the war years and are an attempt to present that period in the perspective of Burmese nationalism and Dr. Ba Maw-at times it is difficult to assess when the one begins and the other leaves off. Be that as it may, this is the only personal rendition of the war years by one of the wartime leaders such as Sukarno and Aurel who were termed "puppets" by the allies and "patriots" by their following. As such it gives characterizations of the Japanese military and civil leaders far less sweeping than those too often appearing in western history and paeans of praise for fellow wartime cooperators with the Japanese such as Subhas Chandra Bose. As a primarily personal account of characters and events these memoirs need to be read with care, but as a highly articulate apologia for the wartime nationalists it is both fascinating reading and necessary source material. In writing his memoirs Dr. Ba Maw presents personal assessments of individuals active in the nationalist cause and strong indictments of western authors who he feels have maligned him in his wartime activities, particularly John Cady, who he characterizes as "typical of wartime mentality" (367). Those who have had the opportunity of discussing the wartime era with Ba Maw know how strongly he feels about the manner in which his rule has been characterized and this attitude is strenuously presented in a number of pages. Aside from some of his personal views of history Ba Maw himself can be criticized for too often entering into generalities which may give the flavor of nationalist views but are reminiscent of campaign speeches. Yet, one would wish that other wartime leaders, and particularly Sukarno, could provide us with his own views of this period, for like Ba Maw, Sukarno was politician, nationalist, cooperator in the Greater East Asian Prosperity Sphere and a most eloquent spokesman for his beliefs. The volume also includes a useful chronology and a Who's who.

As a three dimensional view of Burma's history these three books add to our all too superficial knowledge of intercultural relations in general and the Burmese political and cultural system in particular.—Fred R. von der Mehden, Rice University.

Régime Interne et Politique Extérieure dans les Pays d'Asie. By Georges Fischer and others. (Paris: Librairie Armand Colin, 1966. Pp. 295.)

This volume is composed of five essays, more or less related, focusing on the theme of the influence of environment on foreign policy in the new states of Asia. Chapter 1 ("Etude géneralé"), constituting almost one-third of the book, by Georges Fischer, Director of the Centre Nationale de la Recherche Scientifique, was written especially for this volume and draws both on the work of the other authors and most of the basic scholarly studies in English and French. The remaining four chapters are in the nature of case studies, which were originally presented at a colloquium of the Centre d'étude des relations internationale in late 1963. Of these, Fistié's first essay, "The New States of South and Southwest Asia," is a rather superficial series of case-study summaries dealing with India, Pakistan, Burma, Cambodia, Laos, Malaysia, Indonesia, and the Philippines (only Malaysia is treated in any real depth, and even this must be rather hurried). Fistié's "Thailand" (Chap. 3) is more detailed and useful but it suffers from an overemphasis on the Phibun regime. Bernard Fall's "Les deux Vietnam" (Chap. 4), which is not a rehash of his famous book despite the unfortunate choice of title, provides a good summary of the development of the two foreign policies, though the essay itself departs considerably from the intended thrust of the colloquium. Finally, Claude Cadart's very brief "Note on China from 1949 to 1954" is interesting but seems curiously out of place in a collection that deals almost exclusively with the former colonies of South and Southeast Asia.

The goal of the colloquium, to examine the domestic factors affecting the policy-making process, was an admirable one, given the fact that foreign policy studies have too often ignored this

side of the coin. However, it must be noted that, as usually happens when several scholars are brought together in a symposium, very seldom do the various authors feel restricted by the ground rules. Moreover, even in Fischer's introduction, which adheres most closely to the guidelines, one can quibble with several aspects of the study. First, despite his criticisms of a number of scholarly attempts to create more systematic comparative frameworks, his own threefold classification of regimes based on the degree of disruption of traditional social and economic institutions (from China and North Vietnam to Malaysia, Pakistan, and Thailand) adds little to existing theory or to his own essay. Secondly, not all will agree with the weight he assigns to the various domestic factors considered here. To treat history in five pages and dismiss geography in one paragraph while discoursing at such length (30 pages) on the economy and class structure may fit into his own framework but it strikes this reviewer as something of an imbalance.

Despite these and other reservations, this volume has performed a useful service in providing a compendium of valuable information and in calling our attention again to the need to consider the nexus between foreign and domestic politics in all states, Asian and Western, old and new.—ROBERT O. TILMAN, Yale University.

Influencing Voters: A Study of Campaign Rationality. By RICHARD ROSE. (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1967. Pp. 288. \$5.95.)

Compared to the wealth of information concerning other factors which influence voting behavior, political scientists know little about how the campaign affects the vote, or in fact whether it influences the vote at all. Unfortunately Influencing Voters: A Study of Campaign Rationality does not address itself to this gap in our knowledge. Instead the author, Richard Rose, evaluates the rationality of campaign advertising in recent British elections by the three political parties and by industrial associations and firms opposed to nationalization.

Campaign advertising is broken into categories of activities according to a "paradigm" which parallels Lasswell's communications categories, "Who says What in Which Channel to Whom with What Effect," except for the last category. Simply stated, Rose's outline follows "clients" (politicians, etc.) who engage "media men" to prepare advertising copy, etc. to influence various "audiences" (categories of voters). All this takes place within an "environment" (the "givens" of the campaign situation). If the activities connecting these categories are carried out so as to maximize the vote, then they are evaluated as being rational. Rose's conclusion is "... the rational, vote-maximizing

politician, acting with consistency and empirical justification in pursuit of a single electoral goal, is a myth. Campaigners are only imperfectly and intermittently rational." (p. 195).

The book is divided into two major sections. The first section is preceded by an introductory chapter which contains a brief history of campaigning in Britain and the "model." The historical discussion includes an interesting analysis of "political lag" between the development of campaign technology, like the use of surveys, and the willingness of British politicians to fully utilize it.

The first section of the body of the book consists of five chapters devoted to case studies of campaigns waged by various groups in recent elections. Through interviews with many of the activists involved in campaign decisions. Rose retraces the steps taken in these propaganda efforts. He seems unable to rise above a traditional hallmark of the case study in these chapters—excessive detail. The identification of the personnae of the drama will seem especially beside the point to American readers. For example, on pages 38 and 89 we learn that in 1959 and 1962 the following individuals were appointed to publicity positions in the Liberal party, Frank Byers, Rev. Timothy Beaumont, "a publisher," Dominic LeFoe, and "Following the retirement of Miss Phyllis Preston, Pratap Chitnis was named press officer." Of these only Dominic LeFoe, and to a lesser extent, Pratap Chitnis figure importantly in the concerns of the book.

The second section contains five chapters each of which is comparative in some sense. One compares the activities of the industrial groupings included, three compare phenomena across all units of analysis, and the last focuses upon the differences and similarities between American and British campaigning. Although the chapters in this section are more analytical in their orientation, they necessarily repeat many of the details already set out in the narrative chapters. The book also contains an appendix on the rationality of the management of campaign finance and a postscript on the 1966 election.

Several of the points developed in this book are related to points of controversy either within the discipline or within the attentive public. To the argument that there is a unity of action between business interests and the Conservative party, Rose replies in pluralist terms—the immediate goals of these groups so differ that there seems to be minimal coordination and consistency between their propaganda efforts. To the criticism that modern campaign technology will lead to a politics of public relations rather than a politics of principles, he charges that the extent to which Britain ever had a politics of principle is overstated, that, in fact, the motives of British politi-

cians have been mixed historically, and that on balance the morality of campaigning has improved over the past century because of electoral reform. To the related argument that specialists like market research experts have become dominate in British campaigning, he counters that his findings suggest that for the most part the opposite is true—their efforts are largely ignored in favor of the intuitions of the politicians.

Two points concerning the goal of this book should be reviewed in detail. First if I am right that we know little about the influences of campaigns, how do we know if campaigns are being manipulated efficiently to give the desired outcomes. Although Rose indicates that he is evaluating propaganda in terms of our findings in the field of voting behavior, many of his criticisms are based upon common sense models of how to influence voters-models that most of us would have little trouble agreeing with. Thus it is probably effective to use brief slogans and attractive pictures to tell voters what they like to hear, to use surveys to find out what they like to hear, and to try to appeal most to strategically located segments of the electorate.

The reason that Rose is able to make his evaluations is that apparently many campaigns in Britain are so inept or disorganized that they fail to do even the conspicuous. For criticisms on somewhat more narrow grounds we need more information. For example, Rose's discussion of the timing of campaigns is his most solid usage of voting behavior evidence. He says that the findings indicating that most voters make up their minds before the formal campaign starts means that rational propagandists would advertise continuously, not just during the campaign. But it is quite possible that the early deciders are more intensely committed to their party while the late deciders tend to be the less strongly identified. If so, among the latter group the last stimulus before the election may be decisive. This pattern of relationships would argue strongly for concentrating propaganda just before the election when the non-identifiers may be more immediately influenced and while the partisans can still be reinforced. The point of this is that the evidence is as yet too incomplete to make incontrovertible prescriptive statements that go beyond the obvious.

Second, the use of the rationality concept as an evaluational device causes me some discomfort. We can easily achieve a post facto circularity of reasoning with rationality simply by positing a conflicting goal which is more important to the actor than some nominal goal which is not being maximized. My evaluation of your behavior as irrational then often is equivalent to my disagreeing with your ranking of goals, i.e., ranking gentlemanly behavior over winning elections. If so, then

it seems preferable to deal with these goals or values explicitly rather than cloaking them in a seemingly objective study of rationality.—Charles F. Chudde, *University of Wisconsin*.

Southern Africa and the United States. EDITED BY WILLIAM A. HANCE. (New York: Columbia University Press, 1968. Pp. 171. \$6.50.)

Unlike many compilations of old and often stale journal articles published to prevent someone from perishing, the present volume consists of four original essays and a conclusion all of high quality. The authors—William Hance, Leo Kuper, Vernon McKay, and Edwin Munger—are thus able to combine both the most recent research and the most recent events into their papers. The subject is divided among the four writers according to their special interests, and although differences of viewpoint emerge, as they must, the conclusion does bring them into perspective.

In the first essay Vernon McKay considers the complex relationships between and among the various African countries and the United States in the light of their different policies and demands. He relates internal and external affairs, including a section on pressure groups operating in this country on behalf of the countries of Southern Africa. Inceed McKay is the only one of the four to deal in any detail with Southern Africa as a whole. The others, despite the book's title, stick to South Africa. Leo Kuper writes of the forces at work among the colored peoples of South Africa and of the vexed problem of race relations. Edwin Munger takes this theme from the other end, discussing the forces of stability and change in the White community in a truly masterly way. Munger's essay is one of the best features of the book and alone makes the book worth reading. William Hance has not only acted as editor and written the conclusion, but has also contributed a lengthy and well-argued section on the feasibility of economic and political disengagement with South Africa. In all any reader will be hard put to it to find any subject of significance not at least touched upon by the authors. Clearly this is a bock meriting the attention of students of international affairs and of Africa.

Despite its many virtues the book inevitably has some shortcomings that diminish its usefulness. It is least valuable to South African area specialists to whom most of the material surveyed is familiar ground. There is not sufficient that is new either in insight or in fact to excite such scholars. But then, perhaps, they are not the intended audience. Being strictly policy oriented as it is, the book is doubtless aimed at present and future makers of foreign policy, but even here there are puzzling aspects. The book assumes a fair background in South African history and poli-

tics. There is certainly not enough background for the beginner coming fresh to the area after say, a general introduction to international affairs. But it is precisely a person such as this who stands to benefit most from it. The intelligent reader will probably pick up a good deal on the way, and as the unintelligent reader is unlikely to pick this book the defect may not be serious, but an introductory chapter providing background would have been most helpful to an interested newcomer. The bibliography is also weak from this viewpoint, the selection of some books and the omission of others better known being distinctly odd. An annotated bibliography would have been of particular value, or if this were too time-consuming to complete, at least a grouping of the books to indicate the political commitment of the author. For obvious reasons a book such as the late Brian Bunting's "Rise of the South African Reich," has to be read in the knowledge that Bunting was a Tass correspondent, and this is only one instance. The bibliography is also marred by the absence from it of works cited in the text. As a result checking a citation often involves searching through numbers of footnotes for a title buried among others in the tiny print.

A more substantive defect is, perhaps, the unresolved difference between the authors' perceptions as pragmatic social scientists and their hopes as men steeped in a liberal humane tradition. Meaningful discussion of foreign policy involves the setting of priorities. But in the South African case assignment of priorities is complicated by the character of the regime. The authors recognize that a strong and stable South Africa is important to American interests, but cannot stomach the price of strength and stability. So they are faced with the painful problem of what American policy should be. Should it center on enforcement of a moral standard? And if so, is America in a position to preach morality to others? Is the business of America business? Or is the main goal the preservation of national security, however that elusive term is defined? Or is it the extension of American influence in Africa? If all four are wanted, as they probably are, which comes first, which second, and which follow? The authors are unable to decide. As a result all they can do is to recommend the mixture as before, which is an amalgam of normal relations tinctured with endless admonition. As South Africa is too important to be ignored, and too powerful to be bullied or browbeaten, this policy is self-defeating. It does not satisfy the African states, irritates the South Africans, and does not help the Africans in South Africa. Indeed it more often than not achieves the opposite, for South African whites are convined that concessions are not enough and that what is demanded is their abject surrender-a surrender to which they are not resigned. The authors consider alternative policies, but while calling attention to these alternatives do not take them sufficiently seriously. Their hopes as men clashing with their knowledge as scientists, the authors are unable to revalue American policy towards South Africa. Having said this, it is only fair to say that the authors do essay the effort, and for that they deserve respect even where they fall short.

Although it would be pointless to embark on an expedition to find small faults, there are some which knowledgeable readers will find irritating. McKay for instance insists on lumping the South African, Rhodesian, and Portuguese Governments together as "right-wing." While it is questionable if such categorization is meaningful anywhere, it is irrelevant in Africa. According to some definitions all South African political parties, from the Progressives to the Nationalists, would be classed as "right-wing" while others would arrange them on a left-right spectrum. According to other definitions, the Nationalists, with their emphasis on a planned economy, on state participation or ownership of industry, and on radical social experimentation could well be called "socialists" by American "right-wingers." One has the feeling that the term is put in to "double-damn" a regime or regimes McKay dislikes. One can also quarrel with Leo Kuper's description of the Freedom Charter as "mild socialist doctrine." In their program of 1963 the South African Communist Party admit that implementing the Charter would involve the nationalization of all banking and finance, of most industry, and of land. Such a program goes well beyond what most people conceive of as "mild socialism." But these are relatively small defects which, together with others, do not greatly detract from a good book.

In sum, the authors can be congratulated on an interesting collection of essays that will prove useful to those who make or study foreign policy.—EDWARD FEIT, University of Massachusetts.

Quebec Confronts Canada. EY EDWARD M. CORBETT. (Baltimore: The John Hopkins Press, 1967. Pp. 336. \$8.95.)

If you are unfamiliar with the current problems Canada's Confederation is facing, if you are puzzled by what you have read in the newspapers about Quebec's uneasy relations with the rest of the country, and if you would like to get a more thorough introduction to all this from someone who has an articulate view of the situation, read this book. It presents, in a balanced fashion, an overall description of Quebec's unrest and the demands it makes on the rest of Canada, and English Canada's responses to these claims. Though the author may have had some disguised sympathies for those he considers the underdogs in this

situation, he has shown an ability not to be swayed by any one side's arguments. But above all, what is most gratifying is the author's familiarity with the multifaceted problems which are a challenge to Canadian unity; the breadth of his information on the political views of representatives from all walks of life in Canadian society is as complete as one would expect from a serious study of this kind.

The author's central idea is that a new self-confidence and a new drive have developed among French Canadians, in political as well as in economic and social matters, in technical as well as in cultural endeavors, and that these people are terribly impatient; the movement cannot be stopped now, and English Canadians will have to make room for the expressions of these aspirations, if they want to keep the Confederation working, The key to the dilemma actually lies in their hands: the question is whether or not they will be willing to satisfy "the new insistence, on the part of French Canadians, on sharing in all the responsibilities and advantages of modern life in all spheres of national existence" (p. 3). According to him, the economic sector will be one of the key spheres, and whether French Canadians get a decent share of economic power will be critical.

These themes gradually develop as the author moves from a short, but precise historical review of the development of Quebec central ideologynationalism-to the intellectual climate which has grown in the last two decades; he shows how a monolithic conservative and clerical outlook has given way to ideological pluralism, though nationalism remain the dominant force. Then he goes on to examine the problems of various sectors in detail: the language issue, the political forces and their positions on Quebec's relations with the rest of the country, the specific constitutional changes that have been proposed, from cooperative federalism to special status and associate state, finally the problem of Quebec's power in social and economic decisions, and the changes that have occurred in these sectors. Then he turns to an analysis of the English Canadian moods toward Quebec, and concludes with a brief-too brief in my view -outlook on what the future holds.

This short conclusion reveals in fact what appears to me to be a weakness of the book. The author has clearly well succeeded in describing the outward dimensions of the Quebec-Canada confrontation. But from this description of the explicit contentions, the author could have pursued in at least two different directions.

One was to try to develop from his account of recent developments some overall view of what the future holds for Canada. But given the complexity of the reality, this is not an easy task, to say the least. The author, however, seems to have been tempted by this avenue, and given his inabil-

ity to master the multiplicity of factors involved in one global view, he has been led to a frustrating series of "if ..., then ..." statements, which characteristically tend to end many sections and chapters of the book. Too often, the condition is presented as if it were the most important one for Canada's survival.

The other avenue could have been more manageable and, at the same time, intellectually stimulating. It would have consisted in an effort to present a sociological and political inward analysis of the forces which underly Quebec's unrest and give it its full force; ideally this should have been done in comparison with other political movements. But I suppose this was beyond the author's aim. The potential reader should be warned, however, not to expect this kind of analysis. Corbett limits himself to an examination of current political developments and the demands and grievances explicitly expressed by the two groups' representatives; it is journalism, albeit of a very sophisticated kind. This will make the book, incidentally, soon out-dated: in fact, this problem is already apparent, since the author's inquiry seems to have stopped around 1965-66, and many political issues discussed here have since developed far beyond the point at which the author left them.

We unfortunately cannot conclude this review without noting many spelling errors, such as "civil source" for "civil service" (p. 12), "adaption" instead of "adaptation" (twice on p. 186). This is particularly frequent in French references (for instance, p. 33, 115, 239, 312). Finally, the author refers to the National Film Board, as the National Film Office (p. 59), to The Canadian Journal of Economics and Political Science, as Canadian Journal of Economics (p. 273 n.), and to Albert Breton, as André Breton (p. 32). These are inexcusable errors in an otherwise very well written and well presented book.—Maurice Pinard, McGill University.

The Democratic Revolution in West Indies. Edited by Wendell Bell. (Cambridge: Schenkman Publishing Company, Inc. 1967. Pp. 232. \$8.95.)

This volume is a prelude to a series that springs from the West Indies Studies Program at U.C.L.A. Wendell Bell's Jamaican Leaders (1963) and Decisions of Nationhood (1964) are lineal antecedents. The Program represents the most ambitious endeavor, to date, to study aspects of social and political behavior in the English speaking West Indies. More than half the studies in this book are excised or distilled from Ph.D. dissertations and the work, in some instances, suffers from an overdose of tabulation. Furthermore, because of the attempt to forge a common conceptual framework, the authors exhibit an irritating tendency to cite each other repeatedly.

Mr. Vernon Arnett of the Jamaican Parliament,

in his Foreword, poses a realistic thesis against which the progress oriented contributors pit their ideas and findings. Arnett argues that while the colonial yoke has been shed, the economic yoke remains, controlled by expatriate firms and landowners who, in turn, are reinforced by a small, vet potent, business and professional middle class. The masses, increasing in numbers in the finite territorial environment of the West Indies, do not enjoy the fruits of this structure. Independence, to Arnett, means the positive and autonomous choice to provide a more equitable distribution of resources and greater opportunities for the whole of the population. He is far from sanguine about the prospects. As for the Bell group, he notes that "some may feel that the study has done too well by us . . . in the presentation of an over-optimistic view of the future." Indeed, one of the characteristics of this volume is the optimistic outlook for egalitarian democracy expressed in its theoretical prose and the contrasting data that is found in its tables.

Bell and Oxall establish a theoretical position which will be familiar to those who have read Decisions of Nationhood. In the design of the book, they set out empirically to support their longitudinal, normative assumptions. They view "much of the political, economic and social change that is going on, in the world today, and has gone on in the recent past as a continuation of the democratic revolution." They focus on "recruitment, socialization and, above all, the performance of new national elites . . ." The extrapolated approach is based upon ten "decisions of nationhood" which are supposed to provide a holistic framework for the succeeding studies. The studies are elitist oriented for the most part, using a positional-reputational scheme to identify leaders. The paradox in this conceptualization and design is the positing of a global theoretical framework on the one hand and the omission, on the other, of exogenous influences in the decision model.

The eight studies cover a variety of topics and approaches and differ in their proximity to the central theme. Three attitudinal studies by Bell and Charles C. Moskos, Jr. adhere to the decision decalogue and are West Indies-wide in scope. The studies that are limited to individual islands are not as tightly integrated, but are interesting for the data and insights they offer. While the questionnaire-interview technique was most often employed, Ivar Oxaal's historical essay on the intellectual background of Trinidad and Raymond W. Mack, Jr.'s impressionistic analysis of class and race in Barbados are well rendered. Mack's finding that "when class boundaries shift rapidly, the boundaries of races also become fluid" could provide the basis for further empirical work.

The writers repeatedly offer disclaimers about the tentativeness of their theories and are candid about the problems of research in this region. Yet, very little attention is given to the body of theory on West Indian society that preceded this project. There is obviously more to West Indian analysis that Eric Williams and C. L. R. James. Lloyd Braithwaite earns an anecdotal note in the Oxaal article; M. G. Smith is acknowledged in the prefatory pages and a footnote, and other writers such as Vera Rubin, R. T. Smith, Sidney Mintz and C. Wagley go unrecognized. These people have built up a theoretical and empirical literature that should not be rejected out of hand in a seminal volume of this kind.

Obliquely the problem arises of field research in the English speaking Caribbean. When a Jamaican politician expresses a belief in progress, just what does he mean in relation to his actions? Island differentiations are important and are not given sufficient attention by Moskos and Bell. Furthermore, most of the research was done in 1960 to early 1962 when the West Indian Federation was in the process of a still birth. Certainly this traumatic event colored the views of political leaders towards independence and freedom. The Oxaal and Mack studies appear most sound quite possibly because they were devoid of interview schedules that raise questions about the conceptualization of the interview items in the first instance. The fact that English is spoken in the West Indies can, as I am sure the writers in this book are aware, be very deceiving. The contextual base, therefore, requires an internal, theoretical analysis and this is where the Bell group falls short. An external, global analysis has been imposed on a varied and complex society without accepting the existing theories that explain this society or devising a new one. Yet, this is an important book. Within the limitations noted, it is carefully done and may prove a landmark in the development of integrated studies in this fascinating region.—Morton Kroll, University of Washington, Seattle, Washington.

Canadian Labor in Politics. By GAD HOROWITZ. (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1968. Pp. 273. \$7.50.)

Despite considerable evidence to the contrary, Canadian politics continue to be portrayed as a minor variant of the American: while more than two parties compete in a plurality, single-member constituency voting system, the multi-party situation is often regarded as little more than a temporary aberration; the Liberals are the dominant party—they have been in power for 51 of the last 72 years—so they are often considered as the Canadian analogy to the Democrats in this country; another conventional assumption, related to the one about the Liberals, is that the political style of the Canadian labor movement is not much different from that of its American counterpart.

This study helps set the record straight on these

and several other points and is a genuine contribution to a developing literature on Canada that is both specific in content and comparative in orientation.

Horowitz traces the history of the political involvement of Canadian labor from the early organization efforts, through the schism between the politically quietistic AFL-affiliated craft unions (TLC) and the activistic CIO-associated industrial unions (CCL), the struggle with the Communists in the 1940's, the association with the Co-operative Commonwealth Federation (CCF), the merger between the TLC and the CCL to form the Canadian Labor Congress (CLC) in 1956 and the formation of the New Democratic party (NDP) in 1961. Employing party and union correspondence, minutes and other documents as well as personal interviews across the country, the author analyzes the social composition of the various conventions, the membership of the politically-involved unions and the motivations of the unionists and the leaders of the CCF and NDP. Even had he stopped at this, he would have successfully filled large gaps in knowledge about recent Canadian politics.

Of greater interest, however, is Horowitz' lengthy introduction which makes up one-fifth of the entire book. In it he resorts to a Hartzian approach to try to account for the fact that while "in the United States, organized socialism is dead, in Canada, socialism, though far from national power, is a significant political force and the official 'political arm' of the labour movement" (p. 3). He accepts Louis Hartz' argument in The Liberal Tradition in America that American political values originate with the bearers of liberal individualism who left the Tory end of the spectrum behind them. But he claims that the Canadian value structure is different in that it is not wholly individualistic and liberal. Rather it has a Tory tinge to it-not only a function of the migration north resulting from the American Revolution as Hartz believes but also a product of successive waves of immigration from Great Britain.

A variety of subsidiary factors are listed as being part of the Tory tradition in Canada: the failure of Jacksonian democracy to take root; the ambivalent and centrist character of left-wing liberalism in Canada; and the failure of English-Canada to develop a nationalist cult and the legitimacy of ideological diversity.

Accordingly, Horowitz points out, the Canadian environment is relatively congenial to concepts of community and class while the American, suffused with the ideology of individualism is not. He continues that this Toryism in Canada has been crucial to the development of a socialist movement and notes that Canadian Conservatism is quite unlike its American facsimile and is very close to

Canadian socialism in that its underlying assumptions about class and community are similar.

These ideas make a very useful essay in political culture. But then the author, attempting to link these notions with the problem of the continued existence of the CCF and now NDP in the face of the major parties, the Liberals and the Conservatives, falls back on the left-right continuum. He characterizes the NDP as a left-wing party, the Liberals as a center group with the Conservatives on the right. Unfortunately, while such a construct may be applicable on some issues, it has no general empirical justification and is meaningless in reference to the behavior of mass publics who, after all, participate in the process if only at election time. Moreover, it is unnecessary. The CCF-NDP has not been swallowed up by the Liberals not so much because of programmatic intransigence on both sides but because the Liberals have responded to the ethnic and religious diversity of the country by emphasizing ethnic and religious issues that give third party interlopers exploitable openings while the Liberals retain power.

Finally, this reviewer differs with the author in his labelling of the NDP as a "socialist" party. At the founding of the CCF in the dark days of the Depression of the 1930's, such an adjective was probably appropriate. However, in the midd'e 1960's, the NDP has been consistently down-playing ideology in favor of a bread-and-butter issue-orientation and face-to-face canvassing in the urban areas in English Canada. The electorate has responded rather favorably and today, the working class identification with the NDP is based on the party's success at projecting this style rather than deep-seated commitment to its long-term programmatic ideas.—Peter Regenstreif, University of Rochester.

Pils:udski's Coup d'Etat. By Joseph Rothschild. (New York: Columbia University Press, 1966, Pp. 435. \$10.00.)

Marshal Jozef Pilsudski assuredly belongs to the most important statesmen of the inter-war period. There are two criteria by which he and his acts can be judged—that of the contemporary European political scene from which he cannot be divorced, and that of Polish history of which he was the foremost actor. In his preface to Pilsudski's Coup d'Etat Professor Rothschild emphasized the difficulty of comparing Pilsudski's "guided democracy" with the autocratic regimes of the "new states" which emerged after the Second World War. One might add that it would be equally pointless to judge Pilsudski only in the terms of post-1918 politics. The Polish leader did not fit into the era of the League of Nations. Rather than a world citizen or a European, he was above all a Pole reared

in the nineteenth century romanticism which in Poland gave rise to a desperate struggle for national independence.

Professor Rothschild's excellent treatment of the May 1926 "political demonstration" which "degenerated into a military battle" is no doubt a valuable contribution to the study of the technique of a military coup d' etat resulting in the destruction of parliamentary government. It is to the credit of the author that he realized that his "case study," however useful from the more general point of view, was determined by Polish political experience. The events of the May 1926 seizure of power, so masterfully described by the author. would have stood in clearer relief, had he dealt more elaborately with the key position of Pilsudski before and during the First World War, as well as his role of Chief of State in the formative years of modern Poland. Such an inquiry would have revealed that the internal political split stemmed not only from the obvious inadequacies of Polish parliamentarianism or the impatience of its opponents; this clash to a large degree was the continuation of two political orientations—one represented by the impetuous and conspiratorial "socialist," Pilsudski, and the other by the more rationalistic representative of the Right. Roman Dmowski.

Discussion of these two orientations would have greatly enhanced the otherwise well documented analysis of the policies and aims of the May 1926 antagonists. In particular, it would have helped to explain the behavior of the socialists whose support decided the struggle in favor of the Marshal. In fact, the conflict between the Right and the Left in postwar Poland was unusual and bizarre. The authoritarian goals and tactics, which in other European states were pursued by the communists and later by the parties of the extreme Right, in Poland were embraced and put into effect by the socialists. It took them over almost ten years to realize that after November, 1918 Pilsudski-far from being prepared to solve Poland's problems in a "Socialist-Bonapartist" manner-ceased to be a socialist and decided to base his May 1926 regime on the army and the more conservative elements.

Unlike the majority of writers, who regarded Pilsudski either as a savior of Poland, or as a power-seeking autocrat, Professor Rothschild allowed the facts to speak for themselves, thus providing an insight into the complex mind of the Polish leader. Of special interest is the author's discussion of the uncertainties and internal torment of Pilsudski when he ran into conflict with some of his old comrades, such as President Wojciechowski and later Ignacy Daszynski.

It was this curious mixture of ruthlessness and moderation which explained Pilsudski's initial attempt to make peace with his opponents. He tried

to reap the rewards of his illegal action without having to bear the burden of its revolutionary character. That he failed to create an atmosphere of conciliation was due to a number of factorsthe inferior qualities of most of his military associates, his erroneous belief that the opposition parties of the Seim would do his bidding, and his inability to provide—apart from the action-related slogans of the Sanacia (moral sanitation)—a meaningful program for his regime. Despite his awareness of the "demoralizing and pattern-setting consequences of an illegal recourse to force for the solution of domestic political crises." Pilsudski proved unable to stop the tragic escalation of his feud with the opposition. In this sense there was a direct and logical relationship between the May seizure of power and the outrages of "Brzesc." Pilsudski himself was overwhelmed by the consequences of this ill-advised and hasty action which was to haunt him until the end of his life. Accompanied as it was by the electoral victory of the "government bloc," largely caused by the intimidation of the opposition, the brutal treatment of its leaders was a milestone in Polish political history which—to use the words of the author—"severed the moral tie between Pilsudski and his nation."

Pilsudski's Coup d'Etat is a scholarly study based on sound research and impressive evidence. The author is unbiased, despite his obvious sympathy for Pilsudski's May coup, with which not everyone would agree. Postwar democracy in Europe-both East and West-suffered from serious weaknesses. But is it necessary to brand Poland or any other European country as being "ripe for dictatorship?" Nor would every one agree with the clearly hostile approach of the writer to Wincenty Witos, the reasons of which are not sufficiently explained. Is it not true that in the last three years of prewar Poland Witos living in exile was regarded as one of the symbols of Polish freedom? To doubt the greatness and patriotism of Pilsudski would be patently wrong. But is it necessary to "give him primary credit for the fact that today the notion of Europe without a Polish state is no longer conceivable?"

Yet Professor Rothschild is to be congratulated for having admirably filled an important gap in our knowledge of East Central European political development.—Vaclay L. Benes, *Indiana University*.

Dollars, Dependents and Dogma: Overseas Chinese Remittances to Communist China. By Chun-HSI Wu. (Stanford: The Hoover Institution on War, Revolution and Peace, 1967. Pp. 231. \$7.00.)

Unlike many studies of Communist China that can best be described as long on generalized speculations but short on substantiating facts, *Dollars*, Dependents and Dogma by Professor Chun-hsi Wu is a thoroughly researched and carefully documented book.

Primarily of interest to China-watching economists, this book purports to analyze the nature and channels of overseas Chinese remittances to the mainland (Chapters I & II); to estimate the volume of such remittances from 1903 to 1964 (Chapters IV & V); to examine the policies and regulations of Communist China toward this supply of foreign exchange (Chapter III; and, finally, to forecast its prospects for the future (Chapter VI).

Because of Communist China's persistent reluctance to release official statistics on many crucial aspects of its governmental operations, this study, typical of studies on Communist China in general, is handicapped by the lack of hard, reliable data. Further complications, as Professor Wu points out, arise from the wide geographical distribution of the overseas Chinese, the diversity of currencies which they remit, and the numerous channels of remittance, some covert, often necessitated by the rigid restrictions imposed by various national governments.

Yet, Wu has succeeded in carrying out his research as scrupulously as can be expected under these circumstances and presents his findings in a most convincing manner. The persuasiveness of the book is strengthened considerably by data which Wu has uncovered from a variety of original sources. In addition to materials in Japanese and Thai, he has exploited several publications in Chinese, not available in English, such as Tsu-kuo (China Monthly), Chin-jih Ta-lu (Mainland Today), Hai-wai Yueh-k'an (Overseas Affairs Monthly), Fei-ching Yen-chiu (Research on Communist China), Ching-chi Tao-pao (Economic Bulletin), and Wen-ti yu Yen-chiu (Issues and Studies). This book demonstrates well the argument that much valuable information on China in Chinese is often overlooked by many Western scholars relying heavily upon translations of government agencies and research institutions which are selective due to the overwhelming volume of Chinese materials available.

Among his major theses, Wu maintains that overseas remittances have decreased since the Chinese Communists' take-over; that despite periodic encouragement by the Communist regime, overseas Chinese only remit between US\$25 to \$30 million to the mainland out of US\$90 to \$100 million which is remitted to Hong Kong annually; and that "the present prospects for any significant increase in overseas remittances to mainland China are, without a doubt, not encouraging. Nor do the long term prospects appear to hold much greater promise (p. 148)."

Although of considerable value to economists,

this book fails to dwell sufficiently upon several questions of interest to political scientists. During the period of "squeezing," what were Communist China's instruments of coercion in forcing overseas Chinese to remit and how were they actually carried out? What are the Communists' rationalization and attempted solution of the "contradiction" whereby a high percentage of overseas Chinese dependents in Communist China, by virtue of their trensured remittances in foreign exchange, can live more comfortably than ordinary people, or can retain their "capitalistic" possessions while industry and business owned by Chinese receiving no remittance are being "socialized," or can be exempted from work in the communes?

Another weakness of this book is the repetitious and monotonous "Summary and Conclusions" (Chapter VIII) which can be discarded without serious damage to the organization of the book. The "Introduction" by C. F. Remer is flawed by his erroneous view that this book attempts to answer a much broader question—"How is Communist China to make peace with economic interdependence (p. 1)?"—and by his misleading oversimplifications such as his description of Chinese Communist's policy toward remittance in terms of "Grandmother Wong's Hundred Dollars (p. 5)."

This book is produced by lithography and the original typing of the manuscript, from which final copies are photographed, is careless. Words or even sentences are missing. (The sentence which begins with "Ch'en Sung-k'uang . . ." and ends with "has provided us with" on p. 88 is followed, after three tables, on p. 92 by "according to their purposes.") Indentations are used inconsistently. (The subtitle, Remittances from the Philippines, is not indented on p. 112, but other similar subtitles, such as Remittances from Malaysia on p. 106 and Overseas Remittances from Indonesia on p. 116, are indented nine and eight spaces respectively.) Furthermore, words which should be capitalized are not. (The beginning word of a sentence on p. 162 appears in small letter.)

Despite its shortcomings Dollars, Dependents and Dogma is definitely a valuable contribution to the growing, though still inadequate, research on Communist China, a country consistently neglected in courses on comparative government which are culturally oriented toward European political institutions.—YI-CHUN CHANG, University of Delaware.

Ideas and Politics of Chilean Independence 1808– 1833. By Simon Collier. (Cambridge. England: The University Press, 1967. Pp. 396, \$12.50.)

This is a careful, competent, thoroughly researched study of the interaction of ideology and events during the formative years of the Chilean nation. The author, a British historian who views

ideas as "the lifeblood of political history" (p. xv), intends the book as a contribution to the historiography of the Chilean revolution for independence. But he also offers it as a case study of the political ideas of Latin American independence—"indeed, of Latin American political ideas in general," a subject which, Mr. Collier rightly notes, has been manifestly understudied.

The important political facts of the period of Chilean independence are here, dating from the Spanish imperial crisis induced by the Napoleonic invasion of 1808 and ending with tthe consolidation of a new "autocratic republicanism" in the Chilean constitution of 1833. The author's objective, however, is not to write the definitive history of Chile's struggle for independence. For example, minimum attention is given the military aspects of that struggle. The emphasis is rather on ideas: their sources, especially in French, British, and North American writings and public documents; and how these came to be embodied in Chilean political institutions. At this Mr. Collier is very successful.

The book is also of interest for its analysis of the gradual emergence of the very idea of independence and of a distinct Chilean identity, at least on the part of the small upper stratum that led the process of separation from Spain. The author's analysis shows very clearly the importance in this regard of the nature of the reaction of the Spanish government and its New World agents to initial demands for more autonomy within the framework of the empire.

One or two of the author's judgments may be questioned. Thus he laments the establishment of the Conservative Republic under Diego Portales after 1830 on the ground that further experiments along liberal lines during the first decades of the nineteenth century would have produced an increased measure of freedom or democracy in the long run. The histories of the other Latin American republics during the nineteenth century, however, as well as the social and political realities of the time, cast serious doubt on any such proposition. If the author also provides a more detailed examination of some points than is perhaps necessary, he has nevertheless achieved his goal of giving us an excellent analysis of the interaction of the ideas, events, and institutions during a crucial period in one country's early development.

Mr. Collier's book may also serve as a case study in the adaptation of imported ideas to the problems of constitutional engineering in a new nation, as he intended it to be. Unfortunately, though, in the eyes of a political scientist, the study is not placed within a conceptual framework—the reader must largely extrapolate his own comparative inferences from the material presented. The book remains essentially a history of

ideas. Yet other studies will hopefully be forthcoming of the interweaving of ideology and political institutions, both in other Latin American countries and in more recent phases of their development, on the basis of which comparisons can indeed be made. In such a context, this book is at any rate a beginning.

Moreover, for a political scientist, Mr. Collier's book indirectly raises other possibilities for comparative analysis. Thus the Latin struggles of the early nineteenth century may be viewed as the first continent-wide movement for independence, embracing what shortly became 18 separate polities (Cuba and Panama won their independence only much later). Comparisons of the causes, processes, outcomes, and ideologies of those struggles with the anti-colonial movements of the twentieth century should certainly widen the empirical base upon which rests our present understanding of independence movements generally.

A comparative analysis of the revolutions for independence throughout the various parts of the Spanish Empire (and including those places like Cuba, Puerto Rico, and the Philippines that did not at the time sever their ties) might also provide new material for the burgeoning analysis of internal wars and their causes. Again, studies of nation-forming in Latin America along the lines of Richard Merritt's Symbols of American Community, 1735-1775, or of early party systems in the mold of William Chambers' recent work on the United States, might be fruitful.

In short, it seems high time that students of comparative politics, as well as students of political thought, expand their perspectives to encompass the long trajectory of Latin American political experience, thus broadening the base on which theory may be constructed. So-called Latin Americanists likewise need to integrate the concerns of systematic comparison more effectively into their own work. With regard to the specific topic of Latin American independence, the historians—and most recently Mr. Collier—have been first in the field. Political scientists, with somewhat different and hopefully explicity comparative concerns, should follow.—Robert H. Dix, Harvard University.

Latin America. Social Structures and Political Institutions. By Jacques Lambert. Translated by Helen Katel. (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1967. Pp. 413. \$10.00.)

This is a skillful English translation of one of the most interesting broad studies of Latin America published in recent years. The author, a specialist on Brazil, is a professor at the University of Lyon, France, and the book first appeared in French in 1963. A note on the jacket states that "the author has added material on developments through 1965," but the bibliography lists several items published in 1966 and one in 1967.

Except for updating of text and bibliography, the new material leaves the original work substantially unchanged. It is essentially a political study. This is clearly apparent in the titles of the last three of the book's four main parts: "Contradictions in Political Life," "Political Forces and Political Parties," and "Political Institutions." And although Part I is entitled "General Features of Latin American Social Structure," and deals chiefly with the latifundio or large estate, its responsibility for lags in social development, and the survival of motivations peculiar to an aristocratic colonial society, the culmination of this analysis is reached in the statement that "Since the 1930's Latin America has tried to make her culture democratic and national," which is surely a political proposition. Moreover, if the book has a central theme, it is that of "presidential dominance," which is announced in the opening chapter and developed at length in Part IV. In both places the subordination of social to political interest is made explicit: in the former, by the assertion (p. 19) that "the chief executive must be given very broad powers because developing countries need this form of government"; in the latter, by the title of the final chapter, "Social Causes of Presidential Dominance: The Crisis of Democracy."

The author is at his best when dealing with politics, though less so with political parties (e.g., Mexico's P.R.I., Colombia's Liberal and Conservatives, and Argentina's Radicals) than with political institutions. His account of these in Part IV is fresh, highly informative and persuasive. His carefully defined concept of presidential dominance is a valuable contribution, and he shows clearly and at considerable length how this dominance has impinged upon the courts, local administration, and the national legislatures-all leading up to the present "crisis of democracy," which he attributes to the contradiction in most of Latin America between a genuine devotion to political democracy and the persistence of archaic and completely undemocratic societies. Unless the latter are transformed "fairly soon" for the benefit of "the backward masses," he sees no hope for political democracy in Latin America.

The other parts of the book are excellent in many respects and the whole gains added value by constantly taking account of the great diversity of Latin America and frequently comparing it with other areas of the world, both developing and advanced. Yet, as a study focused on the present state and future prospects of Latin America, the book suffers from an excessive concern with the dead hand of the past, to the neglect of relatively new dynamic forces of change. Thus, it has much to say about the old latifundio and archaic social

survivals, but makes only a very few brief and rather incidental references to industrialization, entrepreneurship, urbanism, communications, and international organizations whose activities are highly relevant to the problems discussed in these pages. The almost complete neglect of radio and television is particularly regrettable, for, as other writers have pointed out, by reaching even the illiterate half of Latin America's population these have done much to stimulate rising aspirations and grave unrest among the area's "backward masses."

In addition, two important topics that are by no means neglected need more searching examination. Agrarian reform is treated too narrowly as a matter of breaking up large estates, whereas there is much more to it than that, as has been pointed out by various specialists, including T. Lynn Smith in a book listed in this one's bibliography (p. 387). Nationalism, too, is treated too narrowly, as a rather simple middle-class phenomenon, whereas in fact it is a complex of several different varieties which find support in one or another of all the principal sectors of Latin American society. Not a single book or article on nationalism is listed in the bibliography.

There are a surprisingly large number of slips of one kind or another, some in the text and more in the bibliography. These include matters of fact, the spelling and accenting of foreign (particularly Spanish) words, and the erroneous attribution of Lyle N. McAlister's important article, "Recent Research and Writings on the Role of the Military in Latin America," to two other writers (p. 391). Also, the Latin American Research Review, in which his article appeared, though cited at this point, is omitted from the list of periodicals on p. 368. The index leaves much to be desired. A university press, especially one so long and favorably known for its publications dealing with Latin America, ought to do much better in the revised and corrected edition of this important book which it is to be hoped will be forthcoming soon.-ARTHUR P. WHITAKER, Riverside, California.

Governing the Commune of Veyrier: Politics in Swiss Local Government. By George A. Codding, IR. (Bureau of Governmental Research: Boulder, University of Colorado, 1967. Pp. 98.)

It is one of the ironies of comparative political analysis that Switzerland—rich in the problems of federalism, modernization, nationalism, democracy, and religious, linguistic and geographical diversity which most interest social scientists—has been thoroughly neglected by Americans throughout this century. Episodic attention has been paid it by a few Europe oriented political sicentists (e.g., Carl Friedrich, Hans Kohn and Karl Deutsch), but there has been no sustained or cumulative interest. For this reason alone the profession owes

its gratitude to Professor George A. Codding, Jr. for this, his second book on Switzerland. Like the first (The Federal Gvernment of Switzerland, 1961), Politics in Swiss Local Government is a completely descriptive study; its focus is the commune of Veyrier—a French-speaking settlement in the canton of Geneva.

Because the commune is the basic building block of government throughout Switzerland, Professor Codding apparently hopes through his detailed treatment of local political parties, civic organizations, communal finances, and the structure and functioning of the communal legislature and executive to shed some comparative light on local government in other parts of Switzerland and the world.

Yet despite its accuracy and thoroughness, the book fails in two decisive ways to rise to the level of stimulating comparative analysis. It fails first because Professor Codding simply does not exploit the vital themes to which his data again and again point. Commentary, criticism and analysis are persistantly—even obstinately—eschewed. The decline of farming and the increasing exodus of the young to the cities are noted, but the problems of rural depopulation and communal decline indicated by such demographic statistics remain unexamined. The fact of female suffrage (introduced only recently in Geneva, Lausanne and Neuchâtel), the customary reelection of officials for what often amount to life terms, and the use of the referendum are mentioned in passing, but nowhere are they elaborated in terms of the peculiarly patriarchical, collectivistic and participatory character of Swiss democracy. The five-fold increase in the communal budget since 1945 is dutifully charted, but its significance in conjunction with increasing bureacratization and growing strains on communal resources is left unexplored.

It would be impossible, from Professor Codding's often parochial account, to know that Swiss politics are today dominated at every level by a concern with the maintenance of precarious religious, linguistic and political equilibria in the face of burgeoning Catholic birth rates and immigration by foreign workers; or that the struggle to restrain overemployment and a land boom coupled with the increasingly depressed character of the rural mountain cantons have precipitated an on-going economic crisis which touches every aspect of Swiss life.

This points to the second major difficulty of Professor Codding's work: many of the critical issues noted above fail to find their way into Codding's study because the commune he has chosen as a "political microcosm" of Switzerland (p. 23) is in many ways completely untypical—a weakness which renders the generalizations that can be drawn from his analysis suspect and sometimes erroneous.

Veyrier is, after all, French, while Switzerland is predominantly Germanic-historically as well as constitutionally in its characteristic institutions. The referendum, the initiative, the Landsgemeinde, the separation of the commune into two bodies differentiating residents with federal voting rights from communal citizens with special communal privileges, and the pervading spirit of regionalism and local autonomy (summed up in the notion of Kantönligeist) are exclusively Germanic in origin and spirit. Second, Veyrier is in Codding's own phrase a "bedroom town" of Geneva (p. 16) giving it a population (c. 3000) well above the average, immunity from the economic problems which have plagued many smaller, rural communes, and a broad urban orientation which deemphasizes such traditional communal values as administrative autonomy and limited economic autarky: (most residents work in Geneva and were born outside of Veyrier).

The misleading character of Codding's French-Swiss, urban perspective on Swiss politics are exemplified in his understanding of the referendum as an instrument of public veto (p. 7) rather than of creative public participation, or in his dubious reading of Swiss federalism as more centralist than its American counterpart (p. 2). One wonders whether Professor Codding, in his legalistically justified but unrealistic insistence on the omnipotence of cantonal authority, knows the story of the commune in Graubuenden which when challenged by the canton on its jurisdiction over water power proclaimed "the commune existed long before there was a canton of Graubuenden and denies the canton any right whatsoever to decide questions concerning its existence or justification."

Ultimately, Professor Codding's book justifies only half of its title: it does provide some excellent if painstakingly (almost painfully) detailed material on "Governing the Commune of Veyrier," including reports on the location of fire extinguishers, the schedule for garbage collections, and vacation arrangements for town employees. But it does not effectively illuminate "Politics in Swiss Local Government," and what vision it does offer suffers from an urban, centralist astigmatism caused by overexposure to French-Swiss sources.

One cannot, however, lay on Professor Codding's shoulders the responsibility for decades of neglect. No single study can begin to deal with the rich and diversified political experience of Switzerland. Professor Codding has at least shown the way; let us hope that others will follow—Benjamin R. Barber, University of Pennsylvania.

Politics and the Military in Jordan: A Study of the Arab Legion 1921-1957. By P. J. VATIKIOTIS. (New York: Frederick A. Praeger 1967. Pp. 169. \$7.50.)

One of the unpleasant prospects facing the

writer on Middle Eastern politics, is the almost unfailing necessity for revising or updating his manuscript upon its completion. Because of the region's uncertainties and instability, the great onrush of events often leaves the scholar in a state of apprehension about the validity of his judgements and hypotheses. This dilemma is clearly illustrated in Prof. Vatikiotis' work on the Arab Legion of Jordan, which contains a 2-part Epilogue. followed by a "trailer" analyzing the consequences of the recent Arab-Israeli confrontation, that culminated in the June 1967 war. None of these occurrences, however, have invalidated the author's conclusions or detracted from the value of the book. A thoroughly documented piece of research, it is based on the published memoires of British officers and Arab leaders, regimental log books, as well as on interviews with various commanders and other participants. As a Greek, born and raised in Jerusalem, with the experience of a decade of distinguished scholarship on the Middle East, no one would be more qualified to write on Jordan's military than Dr. Vatikiotis. The end product is a generally competent and cogent analysis of the Legion's role in the creation and perpetuation of the manifestly unviable Hashemite state. It satisfies the needs of the area specialist in terms of depth and originality, and at the same time provides those pursuing cross-national type of studies with valuable data.

By casting his subject in a comparative framework, the author challenges the Western view of regarding military rulership as deviant from the norms set by the nation-state. Yet in the context of the universalistic Islamic *Umma*, until recent times the Western concept of the nation-state was alien; and in the case of Jordan the army preceded the state and was instrumental in its creation.

One may analyze the process of nation-building in terms of the interrelated concepts of control and legitimacy—themes that are central to Vatikiotis' thinking. As Dahl asserts, leaders in a political system usually move to acquire legitimacy through various means, thereby reducing their reliance upon naked force. Interestingly, in the case of Jordan the initial reliance on coercive means through the Legion to create the state has become virtually routinized, since the crisis in legitimacy surrounding Hashemite dynastic rule from the outset has never been fully resolved. Indeed, the manner in which Amir Abdullah went about carving out for himself a desert kingdom through British (Churchill) help against Arab nationalist aspirations, provided the bases on which Hashemite legitimacy was repeatedly challenged until recent times. Abdullah's suppression of local Arab nationalists, his alignment with Britain during World War II, followed by his accommodating attitude

toward Israel, had the effect of deepening the crisis in legitimacy in the Arab context leading to his assassination in 1951. It was no mere coincidence that whatever legitimacy the throne possessed came from the tribal-beduin component of society -precisely the group from which the elite ground forces of the British-led Legion were mainly recruited; the group that was least affected by nationalist ideology. The absorbtion of the West Bank after 1948 brought into the realm 750,000 Palestinian Arabs, a new anti-Hashemite component whose integration has become Jordan's central problem. The first steps toward integration and therefore the broadening of the base of legitimacy were taken by King Abdullah and pursued by King Husayn with new vigor and determination. Increasing numbers of Palestinians were brought into newly expanded structures such as the Cabinet, the Assembly, the Senate, the bureaucracy and more significantly into the Legion's expanding technical services, where they now predominate. In terms of loyalty to the throne, the new source of recuitment introduced a relatively more educated, and politically susceptible group into the Legion, which along with the townsmen troups (Hadari) of the East Bank, constituted a real threat to the system and to the supremacy of its tribal element. Under these circumstances Husayn's dual strategy has been to maintain control against recalcitrant elements through the use of the Legion's tribal ground forces, while pursuing policies engendering legitimacy.

In contrast to the many detractors and enemies of Husayn, Vatikiotis' attitude is one of admiration for the king's political performance. He attributes the young monarch's success, neither to "courage," nor to "luck," but to his political instincts and shrewdness in recruiting Palestinian political elites and deliberately integrating them into the governmental structure. With the full realization that "Uneasy Lies the Head," the king has skillfully proceeded from an initial traditional (tribal-religious) authority base, toward a limited rational-legal one, which is in turn reinforced by a policy of integration domestically, and the espousal of Arab nationalism externally.

What next for Jordan and King Husayn after such a virtuoso performance? The answer to a large extent, and ironically, will depend on the Israelis, the Legion and the amorphous Arab nationalist movement headed by president Abd al-Nasir. One finds it difficult to understand Israel's insistence on direct negotiations with a king whose consent would almost certainly mean his downfall. On the other hand, with Palestinian fedayeen forces operating freely from the East Bank against Israeli occupation forces, his position is equally untenable. While opposing these raids is politically impossible, each Israeli retaliation is bound

to undermine the king's position, especially with respect to the Legionnaires. And finally, had the June war never happened or assuming a near-total Israeli withdrawal, is this type of rule feasible over the long-range in Jordan or anywhere else? Admittedly, the choices are limited for a king, however intelligent and skillful; the Iranian or the Sau'di models are hardly practicable and abdication in favor of a greater Arab unity at present unacceptable to Israel. But then again, Husayn might surprise everyone by opting for a constitutional monarchy or even go the way of Prince Sihanouk of Cambodia.

It is indeed difficult to find serious shortcomings in this opus. One would have hoped for more information on the content of the Legion's educational programs and more quantitative and systematic data on recruitment into the Army and the government, although the usual difficulties facing the researcher in the Middle East would impede such an effort. Systematic studies of elite "circulation" and backgrounds with regard to a large number of Legion commanders and Cabinet-members may constitute an ambitious next step for research. Meanwhile the present volume will remain the definitive work on the military in Jordan.—Richard H. Dekmejian, Suny at Binghamton.

The Latin American Tradition. By CHARLES WAGLEY. (New York; Columbia University Press, 1968. Pp. 225, \$6.75.)

This book by a noted anthropologist consists of previously published papers and essays written by the author between 1951 and 1964 which for the most part are not easily come by today. Some of them have been slightly modified for presentation in book form. Through the exposition and examination of shared cultural ties in what he assumes to be a Latin American culture, and of regional and subcultural valuations, the author seeks to explain Latin America to Anglo-Americans and to remind Latin Americans of aspects of their own societies that they often overlook. He also offers a frame of reference to aid further research. In so doing Wagley emphasizes that it is the social anthropologists who will find his suggestions the most congenial.

The introductory chapter, "A Framework for Latin American Culture," specially written for the volume presents the two main elements of the common themes with which all of the papers are concerned i.e., the basic differences between the Latin American culture and that of Anglo-America, and the classification of differences and variations within that culture and society. Admitting that the regional and sub-cultural frame of reference has its shortcomings for social science research and is not the only way of ordering the

data Wagley asserts that "a sub-cultural frame of reference combined with a regional division of Latin America provides us with a most useful instrument for thinking about Latin America, although qualitative data may be unavailable within these categories."

This "traditionalist" political scientist ("political philosopher" would be a better identification) found three concerns of the book of the greatest personal interest: the model of behavior for the whole society created by the Iberian gentry in the colonial era which remains to this day; the discussion of "The Dilemma of the Latin American Middle Class," which closes the book, and the explanation of the different views of race that exist in Latin America and in the United States. These subjects have been treated by others, particularly in the past decade or so, including political scientists Stokes and Silvert to name but two but the social anthropologists were most frequently the pioneers. Wagley's second chapter, "An Introduction to Latin American Culture" was originally written for the Foreign Service of the Department of State and issued in 1953.

The culturally elite behavioral model is defined as including "familism, ceremonial and fictive kinship—the compadrazo system—double standards of sexual morals, emphasis upon social class, a disdain for manual labor, high regard for formal etiquette, and emphasis upon the saints and love of display in religion." Wagley notes how this model has persisted throughout history adapting itself to the great variety of historical and physical conditions in the New World so that it influences all sectors of the population with the possible exception of the most isolated Indian communities.

For the student of politics an appreciation of the significance of this aristocratic model affords an entree to the understanding of the distinctiveness of the Latin American political system. It makes him more fully aware of the reasons why the traditionally important social orders, the landed gentry (and their business successors), the church, the military, continue to be accepted as legitimate participants in the political process. It helps explain why those who base their claims to power upon democratic practices have had slow going and why in Latin America the existence of democracy does not by any means obviate the continuing importance of the authoritarian contenders for power within the political system. It suggests, moreover, why Latin America is basically a stable society-one in which there have been few genuine social revolutions and in which reforms develop slowly. The all-pervading cultural elite model was formed in the colonial era when there was no middle class. The bourgeoning of that class has come about in Latin America particularly in the years since the second world war. Wagley notes the disagreement among scholars as to the existence of a class in Latin America reasonably similar to that which developed in Europe and the United States. He himself accepts the existence of a Latin American middle class and treats extensively of its dilemma which he believes lies in the fact that the realities of Latin America run counter to the ideals and needs of the new class. "This sector of the Latin American population is caught up in a dilemma between its liberal ideals and the realities involved in the extension of liberal democracy..." and he lists in detail the material, economic, political and social elements in the big problem of ideals versus realities.

Space permits only the spelling out of the political aspects of the dilemma as he sees them. The middle class is, he believes, energetically interested in politics. It adheres to statism and to honesty and morality in government and politics. Yet it is, with few exceptions, unrepresented by political parties, fearful of both the statist masses and the upper classes. He concludes that "there is no guarantee at all that the development of a strong middle class in Latin America will lead to the strengthening of democratic institutions." As a case study he presents the Brazilian military coup of 1964 which was supported by the middle class. Victims of inflation, fearful of the pro-labor Goulart government, the middle class permitted constitutionalism to be replaced by military rule.

There is no doubt that Wagley is correct in his warning not to expect that the middle class will necessarily aid in the development of Latin American democracy. His examination of the dilemma of this new class is also helpful to an understanding of why it may not aid in developing a progressive society. What this reviewer missed, however, was a failure to enunciate the importance of the middle class desire to emulate the upper classes to an understanding of the middle class action. The European and North American middle classes in the days of their geneses were not as strongly limited by such a tradition. This reviewer has greater doubts than the author concerning the strength of the new middle class democratic ideals. The antidemocratic cultural model that Wagley has explained plays a crucial role in the political attitude and actions of its followers. It predisposes the middle class in Latin America to opt for the Right, the traditionally upper class, than for the Left. (Indeed this all-pervading model also influences the leaders of the workers and the peasantry and is a recognized means of defence by the upper classes of their claims to power.) Wagley surely must beware of this but for some reason he does not underscore the conservative bent of the elite model when he discusses the political action of the middle class when facing their dilemma.

The author's discussion of the priority given to social caste over race, and his note of the milder forms which prejudice and discrimination take in Latin America from those we experience in our own country must be at least called attention to by a reviewer during these days of race consciousness in the United States. And his expressed hope that in the process of "modernization" (his quotes) much of the humanistic tradition of Latin America can be preserved will be seconded by all who are sensitive to the dangers of the all-embracing, all consuming scientific and technological society.—Carroll Hawkins, Michigan State University.

1867: Disraeli, Gladstone and Revolution: The Fassing of the Second Reform Bill. By MAURICE COWLING. (Cambridge: Cambridge University Fress, 1967. Pp. 451. \$13.50.)

The Making of the Second Reform Bill. By F. B. SMITH. (Cambridge: Cambridge University Fress, 1966. Pp. 297. \$10.50.)

In a recent review Bernard Crick opined that "There can be a genuine text book on British government' the day we have a single natural history of a bill." This, like many of Crick's strictures on the profession, combines exaggeration with insight. But we do sometimes forget that the assumptions of macroanalysis depend upon, and are kept honest by, micro studies. And while the analysis of aggregative data can do more and different things than singular case studies, it cannot entirely replace them as rich sources of generalizations or as chastening reminders of the continuing complexities of political decisions. It may well be that the resurgence of interest in history and biography by political scientists derives in part from this awareness.

The two books considered here demonstrate amply the uses and limits of the case approach. Each was written to celebrate the centenary of the passage of the Second Reform Bill, not by praising it but by unsimplifying and demythologizing the process by which it came to be adopted. As Cowling points out, while sociologists and psephologists have known for some time that mid-Victorian political society was more aristocratic and socially conservative than earlier historians had been unwilling to admit, such knowledge has left little mark on those who have given us our ideas of how political decisions were made at the time. Both he and Smith attempt to show, by focusing on the events of 1866 and 1867, how misleading has been the dominant Liberal historiography as it dealt with the movement for parliamentary reform. In somewhat different ways each author scrutinizes in great detail, and throws into disrepute, the older assumptions that the Second Reform Bill was the natural and inevitable extension of the First; that it was a response by the political elite to mass uprising and the threat of revolution; that in the tangled course of its passage the lines of conflict were chiefly between democrats and anti-democrats; that, in fact, there was much coherence at all to the plans and actions of the principals.

What emerges from both chronicles is a picture of Byzantine maneuvering by party leaders and notables to the virtual exclusion of ideological concern or even of policy in the substantive sense. Overarching the counterpoint and confusion of the innumerable franchise, reapportionment and redistribution measures introduced in these years was the simple fact that both Disraeli and Gladstone believed that any successful reform bill would enhance the position of their party and themselves in the political climate of that day. Thus Smith's conclusion (p. 229) that the bill "survived because a majority of the members of both Houses of Parliament dared not throw it out. They did not want it, they did not like it, they feared what it might do." In the circumstances of the 1860s, before modern British parties had really come into being and when splinters and independent-minded factions abounded, the prize of party advantage went to him most successful in carrying along his own natural supporters and detaching or neutralizing the opposition's presumed supporters. It was, in a day of low party cohesion, a difficult feat. After countless struggles, Gladstone tried and failed in 1366. After more struggles, more intrigue and floods of ambiguity, Disraeli succeeded in welding together enough support to pass a bill more liberal in its electoral provisions than the Liberals were prepared to introduce a year earlier. The full story shows that it was almost as much a matter of chance as of shrewd political calculation.

Neither author is willing to credit the principal actors with essentially democratic intent. Disraeli, whose values were consistently conservative but whose strategy was bound by no fixed guidelines, was quick to rationalize the new act as the flowering of Tory democracy. Thus his words to the Merchant Taylors' banquet:

It is said we are on the verge of a great democratic change. My lords and gentlemen, believe me the elements of democracy do not exist in England (cheers). England is a country of classes, and the change impending in the country will only make those classes more united, more content, more complete and more cordial (cheers).

Gladstone and the Liberal leaders were scarcely more enamoured of mass democracy at the time. Like Key's southern Democrats, the British political class in the 1860s was in implicit agreement that the lower orders should not come to power; similarly, its politics took the form of fluctuating coalitions based largely on personal power and partisan interests rather than on issues and pro-

grams. Yet paradoxically, the substance of the Second Reform Bill—the sudden expansion of the electorate that it brought—was in large measure responsible for the unmaking of the mid-Victorian party system and the rise of mass politics in Britain.

Both of these books are thoroughly researched, well written, and overpriced. Neither makes many concessions to the lay reader who lacks prior knowledge of the intricate history of the period. Of the two, Smith's is easily the more straightforward, judicious and succinct. It has a less hammered-at thesis than Cowling's, and unlike the latter extends backwards and forwards from the years 1866-67 and draws in social as well as political materials. Smith also is less airy than Cowling in dismissing the influence of events outside Parliament and the inner circle. and he makes more of the activities of extraparliamentary figures like Bright and of groups like the Reform League. Cowling's book is a highly detailed interpretation of the two critical years leading to the passage of the bill. It is more difficult to follow, but it is superior to Smith's account in several ways. While he does little to relate the proceedings in Westminster to outside social movements-and in fact denies vehemently that there was a direct connection-Cowling shows in revealing detail how Disraeli was able to piece together his majority by playing on the needs of MPs for other legislative largesse and for patronage and honors. Cowling is also willing to let his speculative powers go, tossing out several competing but plausible explanations for the same conundrum and then showing how the historian, using primary materials and certain sets of assumptions, reaches a probabilistic conclusion. This results in a less lucid narrative and a more eccentric style, but for the social scientist a more enlightening book, than Smith's. As those who know Cowling's Nature and Limits of Political Science will surmise, it is also a book vou can argue with.-JAMES B. CHRISTOPH, Indiana University.

Huaylas: An Andean District in Search of Progress. By Paul L. Doughty. (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1968. Pp. 284. \$12.50.)

In recent decades, Peruvian politics have gradually changed from control by an oligarchy of traditional values to a system of multiple forces in which military guardianship of the peace appears to be a dominant influence. More socio-economic adjustments have occurred during the past twenty years than during a century and a quarter preceding the late 1940's.

When elected municipal governments were revived in 1963, after forty years of appointed councils, students of the Peruvian political system began to note efforts of municipal councils in car-

rying out reforms of President Fernando Belaúnde. The grass roots level of government took on a meaningful function as another set of calipers in measuring changes in this republic. Councils on the coast were examined by at least some social scientists not limited to Lima for field work. However, dozens of towns in the Andes have been ignored in terms of public affairs, even by ministries of the Peruvian government. Yet the Andes are a vital part of the nation.

This unitary republic is divided for administration into twenty-four departments, each in turn subdivided into provinces, which in turn are subdivided into districts. Professor Doughty, an anthropologist, chose for his field work the Department of Ancash, and finally narrowed his area to the District of Huaylas in the north-central part of Peru.

He gives social scientists a close look at a modern, changing peasant community, the town of Huaylas, and other towns in the district of the same name. He deals with social customs and other facets of society of concern to anthropologists, economists, and geographers. He also devotes considerable emphasis to public works projects, municipal administrators, and the problems of raising municipal funds.

The author presents much information that is missing in the usual ethnographic accounts: extensive data on local government and politics, put into social perspective with tables, maps, and photographs.

Doughty went into Huaylas during 1960-61, again during 1963-64, and briefly in 1966. Much of his data and general references are current, making this volume a handy reference for the Andean region of Peru.

In choosing Huaylas, Doughty found a district and town with excellent municipal records, extensive archives going back to 1889. The author conducted his own census and various surveys. Behavioralists will be pleased to learn that the census forms were printed on IBM cards and analyzed in Lima. The data collected on his questionnaires were transferred to Unisort 5-by-8 marginal punch cards and classified according to the system developed for the Human Relations Area files.

Aside from good local records, Huaylas also proved to be a fertile field to probe in terms of human relationships. The mayor and municipal council and the governor of the district were each eager to have surveys of their human and physical resources. In-depth interviews are only as valid as the rapport between interviewer and interviewee.

As a further vindication of the choice of the site for studying an Andean peasant community, an award should be noted. While this book was in press in 1967, the District of Huaylas was named winner of the silver award given each year by the President of the Republic to a community, district, or province in national recognition for what it has accomplished in its own behalf.

The District of Huaylas has accomplished much, in terms of road construction and civic projects ranging from a free public library to new school buildings.

In the chapter dealing with public works, the jaenc or public collective work force is described in detail. Back in the era of dictator Augusto Leguía, in 1921 the Conscription Law obliged all able-bodied men from twenty-one to fifty years of age to work twelve days a year on road construction, except for the exempted upper classes. The 1930 coup d'etat which ousted Leguia ended that law. The current Constitution, enacted in 1933, in Article 55 prohibits forced labor. Yet Article 135 of the Organic Law of Municipalities states: "In case of a lack of special funds for the maintenance of reads, all capable inhabitants will contribute . . . with personal work . . . or with their funds." Doughty found the faena persisting as one of the most viable of local institutions in the Andes.

In Lima, the Supreme Court has found no conflict between Article 135 of the Municipal Law and Article 55 of the Constitution, but in the coastal cities, community work parties since 1963 have usually been part of the Popular Cooperation Program, Peru's version of VISTA. In the Andes, however, when a road needs completing, the men of the community legally can be put to work. The author explains how it is done.

If Doughty had expanded his notes on the regional aspects of nationalism, political analysts would have been grateful. The book's flaws are minor, such as finding British translations: for example, the Ministry of *Hacienda* is called the Exchequer instead of Finance or Treasury. But undoubtedly here is a book of marked value to students of Andean Community public life.—Marvin Alisky, Arizona State University.

Disraeli. By ROBERT BLAKE. (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1967, pp. 819. \$12.50.)

This is a biography in the grand style. Learned, well-written, and exhaustive, it has justly been received with critical acclaim. Blake's approach may seem to modern behavioral scientists old-fashioned and his subject matter far removed from their own interests. However his book should not be dismissed as irrelevant for the student of contemporary politics. The author is careful to avoid the pitfalls of projecting present patterns into the past but he tells us a great deal about the nature of political leadership and politics in an industrializing society.

Like his subject as prime minister in the House of Commons, Blake speaks in the cool and sometimes cynical tones of a man of the world addressing a sophisticated audience. Far from taking a condescending attitude towards his readers, he assumes that they are thoroughly familiar with British politics in the Nineteenth Century and can appreciate his frequent literary allusions. But even those who may not know anything about the "Bedchamber Crisis" and have never read the novels of Max Beerbohm will find this book a fascinating study that judiciously combines careful research with imaginative speculation.

Disraeli's contemporaries and most of his previous biographers found it difficult to comprehend this complex man. It is one of the great accomplishments of this new study that we come to understand him so much better than from the biographies of Monypenny and Buckle or Maurois. Blake is unsurpassed in his astute probing of Disraeli's motives and personality development, though one wishes he had not sought to link them to traits attributed to the "Mediterranean character" and "Jewish race" of his subject. A little less disdain for psychological analysis might have been more rewarding. For instance, what we are told about Disraeli's relationship with his mother and Queen Victoria-his "Faery Queen"-and about his life-long attachment to older women raises some fascinating questions which Blake prefers to leave unanswered. However, one should not take an author to task for refusing to delve into matters which he considers beyond his interest or competence. The same applies to Blake's dictum that the biography of a prime minister does not call for a history of the times, though he might have been well advised to have given greater attention to the broader socio-economic and political conditions under which Disraeli had to operate. The world beyond the governing "Establishment" remains obscure and the stage setting for the leading actor reveals little of the England outside Westminster, the clubs and salons of London Society, and the manor houses of the ruling few.

Disraeli was not a heroic leader and Blake does not indulge in panegyrics. He shows us a brilliant and charming man, but also one who was vain and ruthless in his determination to overcome immense obstacles in his drive for power. When he finally made it to the top of the greasy pole Disraeli was too exhausted to savor it to the fullest. "Power!" he said at the apogee of his success. "It has come to me too late." He was a passionate man, but he lacked the moral fervor of his great rival Gladstone. He had great intellect, but he was no intellectual and considered the Victorian intelligentsia enemies. He was a man of strong conviction, but also an opportunist who used wile and flattery to advance his financial and political fortunes. He played a leading role in the extension of the Franchise in 1867 and as Prime Minister was responsible for a number of important social reform measures, but he was no egalitarian. Queen Victoria referred to her favorite Prime Minister as "a man risen from the people," by which she meant the middle class. But Disraeli thought of himself as an aristocratic defender of Crown, Lords, and Church against the lower classes.

The Disraeli who emerges from this book was above all a superb politician who stood head and shoulders above most of his contemporaries and more than held his own in the company of a Bismark, so different and yet also in some ways so like him. Blake calls him an extraordinary man of genius who, "like most men of genius operating in a parliamentary democracy, . . . inspired a great deal of dislike and no small degree of distrust among the bustling mediocrities who form the majority of mankind"—a judgement which perhaps tells us as much about Disraeli as about his latest biographer.—Lewis J. Edinger, Columbia University.

Mauritania. By Alfred G. Gerteiny. (New York: Frederick A. Praeger, 1967. Pp. 243. \$6.00.)

This book is, as noted by the author, the first in English about a "totally neglected and little known country," and is, therefore, a general survey of the geography, people, history, government, and economy of Mauritania, rather than being an analysis in depth of its political system. Professor Gerteiny is a historian who devotes only a small portion of the book to political institutions. His best chapters are neither those on history nor political science, but the ones which deal with the geography of the country and its people, the Moors, and black minorities, the Fulbe, the Halphoolaren, the Sarakoles, the Wolofs, and the Bambara

No doubt the chapters dealing with the Moors, who constitute 73 percent of the Mauritania population of an estimated 850,000, are better because of the greater availability of resource material and because Professor Gerteiny was a perceptive visitor while living among them. It is obvious that hard data in other subject-matter areas is lacking in a country that is 73 percent nomadic, extremely traditional (even slaving is common outside the urban areas), and poorly educated (only eight high school graduated in 1962). Professor Gerteiny has done well with what was available in data. Most of this, as he notes, is in France or Dakar. There is no institution of higher learning in Mauritania or library worthy of the name. There are no Mauritanian scholars; when Mauritania gained independence in 1960, there was only one trained lawyer, Moktar Ould Daddah, who came home from France to rule the country.

Mauritania's future, according to Gerteiny, is hopeful, even if her past and present have not been. The hope, so it seems, stems from two principal sources. One is the prospect for exploitation of mineral resources, primarily iron, in the north and the development of fishing around Port Etienne. The other is the one-party, benevolent dictatorship of the government under the leadership of Moktar Ould Daddah, Moktar is described as a man who realized the need for "balance" in the country: that is, between the basically hostile blacks and whites; between agricultural development near the Senegal River and mineral exploitation in the north; and between East and West by use of "positive neutralism." We are told that the President learned the value of one-party rule from Sekou Touré in Guinea, but that, unlike Touré, Moktar Ould Daddah knows the value of France. He should; Gerteiny estimates that until 1968, when the French-dominated MiFerMa company reaches an annual rate of iron ore production of six million tons, France will have subsidized the country annually, up to as much as 75 per cent of the national income.

The problems are many. As Gerteiny writes, "Sixty per cent of Mauritania is in The Sahara Zone, and half of that conforms with the classical description of the cruel desert. . . ." Four-fifths of the country has less than four inches of rainfall annually; only in a narrow band of 10 to 20 miles in width running along the Senegal River does the rainfall average from 12 to 26 inches. Sand dunes of varying types cover four-fifths of the country.

Of a population of 850,000, only 12,000 earn a regular wage. Eight thousand of these few derive their income as government bureaucrats. Average income in 1965 was approximately \$75 a year. Aside from mineral extraction the economy is based upon subsistence agriculture and animal husbandry. Scrawny cattle are pushed from one water hole to another, and when they are marketed, it is usually after a long drive in which they have lost an average of 30 pounds from an already meager frame. Save for some of the more progressive blacks living near the southern border of the country, the average Moor is caught up in a traditional feudal society in which role playing is rather rigidly prescribed, and work is distasteful. The Moor mixes Islam with African mysticism, and fears the black Africans; normal African tribalism is confounded with racism.

One cannot help but draw certain parallels between Ould Daddah and Kwame Nkrumah. Both were educated outside their own countries, only to return near the time of independence. Both saw tribalism as potentially disruptive, and both converted their republics in 1961 to presidential dictatorships to form "guided" democracies. Indeed, as Gerteiny points out, Mauritania differed from other French-speaking colonies of West Africa; it was governed by "indirect rule," more in the British fashion, and contrary to the more direct rule

of other French colonies. It, therefore, undoubtedly is true that both saw the problem of nation building in somewhat the same terms. Nkrumah cut off his British ties and was deposed; Ould Daddah has kept Mauritania in the Gaullist sphere so far, and has had the support of French military, political and economic aid. The future, in Gerteiny's terms, is hopeful; in mine, it is very uncertain.—Bruce B. Mason, Arizona State University.

Justice in Communist China. By Shao-chuan Leng. (Dobbs Ferry: Oceana Publications, Inc., 1967. Pp. 196. \$6.50.)

Despite its untiring chanting of creative application of Dialectic Materialism to the Chinese situation, the Marxist-Leninist teaching of law as a coercive machinery of class struggle remains a constant article of faith for the Chinese Communists. As Mao Tse-tung-stated in 1949, laws and courts, among other apparatus, are all weapons with which one class oppresses another. They are instruments through which the dominating class consolidates its control, suppresses its enemy and protects its social order. Consequently, for a Communist State existing in a stage when "imperialism still exists, domestic reactionaries still exist, and classes within the country still exist," it is necessary to strengthen such apparatus in order to eliminate other classes and further the cause of communistic harmony. A view which unmistakably echoes the famous Leninist dictum that "Law is a political instrument. It is politics."

Viewing from this perspective, any discussion of the judicial system of Communistic China will at first appear to be a self-contradiction. For if the system is run solely by terror and violence backed up by the coercive apparatus, then the term justice is a meaningless word. The system could, at best, be regarded as a worthless window-dressing showing the hypocritical concern for legal niceties by the Communist leadership. It could never be a safe subject, however, for a disinterested scholarly study in view of the constant meddling exerted by the political dictates of the state.

Such inferences, though seemingly sound, are nevertheless dangerous delusions which could only blind our real understanding of the system and weaken us in the long run. For despite its alleged progressiveness, Communist China, like other polities, must come to realize that justice is not a nicety or luxury but a necessity. Socialist legality undoubtedly must deal effectively with the "antipeople reactionaries" and their political crimes. But, on the other hand, it must also address itself to the daily maintainance of domestic tranquility and satisfy a basic need for some outlet for the feelings of order, of rightness, of reciprocity, or reward and punishment, which exist in all people.

Small wonder that seven years after he came to power, Mao Tse-tung took pains to make the distinction between antagonistic contradictions (contradictions between Communists and their enemies) and non-antagonistic contradictions (contradictions among the people) and spent hours defining the meaning of "enemy" and "people." Although the former contradictions must be dealt with cruelly, violently and summarily, the latter, as he belatedly conceded and advised, must be treated in a "democratic and benevolent" way.

Conceivably, the difficulty involved in studying such a judicial system lies in finding out, among other things, the proper bailiwick of the two contradictions, the apparatus through which political and non-political crimes are prosecuted, and the ways by which decisions are reached in both areas. To be sure, these are not legal questions per se. They are political questions which can be grasped only by employing broader frameworks and fresher approaches. It is here that Mr. Leng's book can be regarded as a significant step.

The book addresses itself primarily to the institutional aspects of the judicial system of Communist China. It is organizationally divided into two parts. The first part deals, chronologically, with the evolution of the system from the 1920's to the present (the most recent data cited in this book dated June, 1966.) The second part analyzes the structural and procedural aspects of the present system. While the first part is inherently informative, the second part is the more interesting and substantial portion of the book. Unhampered by the narrow legalistic concern, the author rightly focused on a broader judicial pattern as the basis of his discussion and avoided a rigid construction of the legal rules. He therefore provides his readers with informations on a variety of organizations through which justice is either ordinarily meted out or frequently sacrificed. Not only familiar organs such as the court, the procuracy and the system of legal counsel are all succinctly treated, extra-legal organs such as the police and other control structures like schools, factories, enterprises, mass organizations as well as mass trials and onthe-spot trials are also included and dealt with in varying degrees of penetration. Reading through it will inevitably lead one to the impression that justice in Communist China, to the extent it exists, is indeed at the mercy of the state. Lacking what is known as judicial independence, extra-legal organs may easily intervene into the merits of a case. The result, needless to say, would more often than not be an application of force rather than an administration of justice.

Confining itself, however, to the institutional aspects alone, the book undoubtedly leaves certain questions to be answered. By treating Communist China as a country in a fluid state of transition,

the author did not attempt to draw a line between the two contradictions and understandably refrained from telling us where justice may end and force begin in this system. There is no reason, however, to be equally acquiescent on this issue as it manifested itself during the period covered by this study. For without such a distinction, the study of judicial institutions, however broadly conceived, will appear to be formalistic. The reader is not clearly told about the informal and unwritten practices that govern the intervention of these extra-legal organs. Nor is the reader told about the process through which these organs bring their power to bear. Although party intervention is frequently implied, not a single case, for example, has been fully cited to illustrate the point. As such, the book may be said to have failed to exhaust the utility of the broader framework adopted by the author. It has avoided the most complicated issue in the judicial system of Communist China.

As a relatively slim volume, the number of misprints in this book has reached atrocious proportions. Some of them even obscure or distort the content of the book. An errata will definitely be needed to redress this clerical damage. Also, the citation, translation and transliteration of the Chinese titles need to be standarized. Perhaps an abbreviation in the beginning may well serve this purpose. In any event, obvious shortcomings notwithstanding, Mr. Leng has blazed the trail in a relatively new area. For those who are interested in Chinese Communist affairs in general and its judicial system in particular, this is undoubtedly a vital book.—Chan Lien, The University of Connecticut.

Nationalists Without Nations: The Oligarchy Versus the People in Latin America. By Victor Alba. (New York: Frederick A. Praeger, 1968. Pp. 248. \$7.00.)

Another effort has now been made to demonstrate the deficiencies of the Latin American political system by centering upon one set of actors and then censuring them for the societal malaise. Alba's book, however, is distinguished from many others in that it is written with a pervasive understanding of basic Latin American values and of the attitudes that shape Latin American political culture. Alba has had years of experience in Latin America which have allowed him to observe and analyze the varieties of Latin American nationalists and to offer some very telling insights.

The author is trying to answer the question: "Why have Latin American countries fallen so far behind in the race for prosperity and well-being?" The answer is given very early in the study—the oligarchy has encouraged a special type of ersatz nationalism which serves as a substitute for real

nationhood—and is discussed for the remainder of the book. The point is made that nationalist stances are taken by landowners, the middle class, various members of the socialist fraternity, professors, students and many others who wish to ease their consciences for being members of an advantaged sector of society. In many instances they take the same position as the anti-imperialist Communists. The upshot of these de facto alliances between the landowners, the middle class and left-wingers, the author maintains, is the tendency to deal with the effects rather than the causes of underdevelopment, while leaving the masses submerged and unassimilated.

The future appears somewhat dim, for any of these groups might turn to the military for support against another group and the armed forces are increasingly available to such overtures. Alba warns that the alternative to a new style of technocratic-militarism, in which, as the author calls them, "Leninist military men" would ultimately ask for Communist collaboration, is the new industrial middle class, interested in economic planning and social reform. The younger elements of the middle class must choose between the oligarchy and its allies and the people.

Though it is not explicity stated, the reader is made aware of Alba's ideational debt to the Aprista program and to its leader, Haya de la Torre. In the prescriptive parts of the book (especially chapter 8) Alba calls for the political unification of the Latin American states, planned industrialization, and agrarian reform in a fashion very reminiscent of proposals espoused in the past by the Aprista movement in Peru. Alba's views also closely coincide with the 1960 Declaration of Lima, (a conference attended by representatives of the Bolivian MNR, the Costa Rican National Liberation Party, the Paraguayan Febreristas, the Peruvian Apristas and the Venezuelan Acción Democrática) from which he quotes:

". . . national and revolutionary movements, formed as a front of the exploited classes, with a genuinely Latin American doctrine and program and with roots in civic majorities, are the most efficacious instruments with which to consummate economic independence and establish social justice in our countries. . . .

(they asserted their) unalterable rejection of Communist totalitarian penetration of Latin America, against which our parties have always fought, as much because of an insurmountable difference in social and political philosophy as because of the deviationist and prejudicial activity and frequent complicity with dictatorships and reactionary forces that have been typical of Communism in Latin America"

The book's best chapters are 6 and 7 which discuss Communist policy in Latin America as it cohabitates with equal alacrity under dictatorial, populist and conservative regimes. The author demonstrates that the Communist Party had little stomach for land reform when in positions of responsibility, as in Chile after World War II. He observes that the espousal of anti-imperialism enhances the credentials of any self-respecting nationalist very much the way anti-clericalism sustained liberalism a century ago. Thus the more moderate an intellectual is on domestic questions the more pro-Russian or pro-Chinese he must be on international affairs. Particularly worth reading are Alba's ironic interpretations of the Latin American artist as intellectual (pp. 152-156) and Latin American professors and students (pp. 159-160).

There are, however, several shortcomings in the book as a contribution to the political science literature on Latin America. There is an overabundant use of polemical sources, categorical and unsubstantiated statements are made and some major concepts are left undefined. The book reads as a personal indictment of the Latin American political system by an advocate of inter-American political union. Given his initial advocacy, he proceeds to find little but cynical and self-interested political leadership and major opposition groups. This gives his account, in several places, an air of unreality and makes it susceptible to the charges of being quite similar to some of the Marxist tracts which Alba himself admittedly shuns.

In several other respects it falls short of giving a balanced analysis of the problems and obstacles to national development. Nationalism is made to appear as some kind of identifiable quotient arrived at by the will of truly responsible leadership yet he has an understandably difficult time defining it in the 1st chapter. Nor is the reader given an explanation of how a nation achieves a sense of nationality, or through what stages it might pass. This makes it difficult to enter into any concerted dialogue with the author. The term "oligarchy," which appears as the single most crucial subject of the book, is not clearly defined. Sometimes the term is used to include only the largest landowners while elsewhere it implies everyone but the unskilled laborers and the peasants. As the "oligarchy" emerges as the bête noire (in this case the landowner) so the author also provides us with the key problem in the scenario-agrarian reform. The "oligarchy" is attributed with an excessive amount of cynicism and an extraordinary amount of omniscience as it wheels and deals in the political process. At the same time, agrarian reform is perceived as the Gordian knot.

Alba's basic thesis that the pseudo-nationalists and oligarchies are responsible for the Latin American countries falling behind in "the race for prosperity and well-being" is premised on the notion that "Spanish America was richer and better organized in 1810 than the poorer and more backward United States." Certainly in terms of entrepreneurial skills, technological knowhow, inter-

change of goods and services, exploited resources, communications, social mobility and parliamentary experience this view is difficult to substantiate. One is tempted to reflect on the importance of seeing Latin America in historical and comparative perspective.—Peter Ranis, York College, City University of New York.

Prospects for Soviet Society. Ed. By Allen Kassof, (New York: Frederick A. Praeger, 1968. Pp. 586. \$10.00.)

Soviet Politics Since Khrushchev. Ed. by Alex-Ander Dallin and Thomas B. Larson. (Englewood Cliffs: Prentice-Hall, 1968. Pp. 181. \$4.95.)

These two volumes provide a Horn and Hardart-like glimpse of recent trends in the USSR. They are a welcome supplement to the literature, much of which concludes with the Khrushchev era. Both the interdisciplinary nature of the volumes and the limitations of space prevent us from doing more than indicating the issues raised in these 25 essays and rendering some critical judgments as to the general nature of the enterprise.

The collection edited by Princeton sociologist, Allen Kassoi, grew out of a series of conferences sponsored by the Council on Foreign Relations and is considerably broader in scope than its title indicates. Most of the eighteen essays are expert summaries of developments in a particular field over the whole Soviet experience. In this respect, one is tempted to number the volume among the best of the several collections published to mark the -50th Anniversary of the October Revolution—except that the thrust of the latter portion of each essay is directed towards predicting future trends rather than evaluating past deeds.

With the exception of John Campbell's essay on the "International Environment," the editor has kept the focus on the USSR domestic scene. Economists Arcadius Kahan and Herbert Levine write on agriculture and industry respectively. Jeremy Azrael contributes a chapter on the CPSU and Princeton historian, James Billington, writing poetically on a subject dear to his heart-Soviet Intellectuals—will provide political scientists a short course in his Icon and the Axe. One must be impressed here as elsewhere in the volume by editor Kassof's ability to marshal indisputable experts in various sub-fields of Soviet Studies: Sidney Ploss on Interest Groups, Thomas Wolfe on the Military, William Medlin on Education, Alexander Vucinich on Science, and Mark Field on the Family. In the latter treatment is a moving section on the effects of the Detskie Doma on orphans, with the author concluding that "the Engelsian dream of freeing the family from its socialization function may be chimerical." Of interest too are significant essays in areas usually neglected: Population, Leisure, and Stratification by,

respectively, Warren Eason, Paul Hollander, and Dartmouth sociologist Robert Feldmesser.

Especially noteworthy is Cyril Black's comparative view of Soviet and Western development:

In the perspective of fifty years, the comparative ranking of the USSR in composite economic and social indices per capita has probably not changed significantly. So far as the rather limited available evidence permits a judgment, the USSR has not overtaken any country on a per capita basis since 1917 with the possible exception of Italy, and the nineteen or twenty countries that rank higher than Russia today in this regard also ranked higher in 1900 and 1917.

The chef d'oeuvre in this volume is Vernon Aspaturian's essay on the Non-Russian Nationalities. Twice the average length of the other contributions, it is a significant and well-argued—though not uncritical—apologia for Soviet nationality policy. The author's distinction between "russianization" (as in "hellenization") and "russification" is carefully delineated. Even those who will not agree with critics of Professor Aspaturian's views must regret his failure to give the reader a clearer idea of the political problems confronting the Soviet regime because of continued non-Russian nationalism.

By way of general comment, one is astonished that Leon Lipson's too brief essay on Law is the only concerted attention paid to civil liberties, a domestic concern that would seem to be the fundamental issue when discussing the "Prospects for Soviet Society." A lengthy volume might have been considerably shortened by avoiding background information in many of the essays; e.g., "The Ukrainians constitute a compact unit in the southwestern region of the Soviet Union." Finally, the markedly high quality of the collection and its copious documentation are made less useful by an inadequate index.

The Dallin-Larson series of seven essays is narrower in scope, presenting detailed summaries of events in key areas of Soviet politics since Khrushchev's fall from grace. It is interesting to sense here as in the Kassof volume how well Nikita Khrushchev wears with the passing of timemuch like our own Harry Truman. Alec Nove writes on Economic Policy, Jerry Hough presents an excellent and thorough study of reforms in government and administration, Thomas Wolfe again writes on military policy. There is considerably more attention paid to foreign affairs in this work with William Zimmerman contributing an essay on "Soviet Perceptions of the United States" and Aspaturian on foreign policy. Regrettably, here as in the other volume, there was not time to assess Soviet aims in the wake of the Middle East crisis. Both Wolfgang Leonhard and Richard Lowenthal present insightful interpretations of the domestic political scene in broad strokes. The editors are to be congratulated for successfully avoiding what might have been a highly repetitious series of essays. The publishers deserve thanks for leaving footnotes where they belong.—WILLIAM PARENTE, Antioch College.

The Dynamic of Mexican Nationalism. By Frederick C. Turner. (Chapel Hill: The University of North Carolina Press, 1968. Pp. 350. \$8.50.)

Starting just about a hundred years ago, Mexico began in earnest the slow process of nation building, constructing the railroads, opening up the mines, and developing the commercial agriculture which in time would permit the evolution of an internally oriented economy and growing interdependence among all of the regions of the republic. Only about fifty years ago did this material development result in a definitive break with past social-political patterns during the decade-long period of disruption known as the Revolution of 1910. Even so, writers of the thirties and forties could still speak of "Many Mexicos," or of the continuing process of forging a fatherland (forjando patria), for Mexico still was not fully unified into a single nation. To some extent the integration process is not complete today, but a sense of the Mexican nation is deeply enough felt and widely enough held to permit consideration of the factors which helped to implant nationalism in a majority of the country's citizens. Professor Turner's The Dynamic of Mexican Nationalism provides such a discussion.

Using a combined historical-analytical approach, the author shows how a mixture of xenophobia brought on by difficulties with Spain, France, and the United States and gradual physical-economic development provided a base of common attitudes which could relate to some of the shared values growing out of four centuries of Spanish-Roman Catholic influence to spark a national revolutionary movement after 1910. If in the beginning by no means all sectors of the population supported the Revolution, or even knew it had occurred, a large enough nucleus of citizens shared its integrating goals to permit the spread of a sense of national purpose. The bulk of this study describes the historical events and social mechanisms used to involve the greatest part of the populace in a generally shared, nationally oriented value system. Considering the nature of the study, not much emphasis is placed upon the important contribution to consensus made incidentally by mass communications and transportation as a by-product of technology. Instead, the book stresses the conscious efforts of the Revolutionary governments and of individual Mexicans to use the new conditions affecting the masses to instill more shared norms in the citizenry. Improved economic performance and more flexible social relations, coupled with breaking down of some of the divisive aspects of church and intellectual activities, are

shown to reduce the gulf between the masses and the elites. Marked expansion of the educational system does the same, though far too few persons receive sufficient formal training to make them really effective participants in national life. Instead, the study suggests, most Mexicans are socialized into an awareness of the wider world and given a feeling of belonging to single social-political entity through less formal devices, particularly literature, drama, and the popular arts—music, films, and more recently radio and television.

Mr. Turner's findings are slightly more optimistic than my own. My experience indicates that Mexico still has a way to go before the majority of its citizens acquire that sense of near absolute assurance of personal and national worth and identity which permits easy acceptance of divergence from generally approved norms. Similarly, despite greater willingness on the part of many citizens to accept critical discussion of specific conditions in their country, whether from other Mexicans or foreigners, a majority of the population continues to react negatively to such analysis. This kind of chauvinistic nationalism is perfectly understandable in a people still striving to consolidate their sense of national identity, but it is symptomatic of unresolved integration problems. Mexico has accomplished much in forging the bonds of constructive nationalism, as Mr. Turner so ably demonstrates, but the process is not yet complete. If some Mexicans find this judgment from a foreigner unpalatable, especially from a gringo, let me suggest that some of their brethren in our own southwest or the many inhabitants invelved in the crisis of the cities could tell them that the process of national integration is not yet complete in the United States either.—ROBERT E. Scott, University of Illinois.

Population and Political Systems in Tropical Africa. By Robert F. Stevenson. (New York: Columbia University Press, 1968. Pp. 306, \$10.00.)

For the most part, Mr. Stevenson's book is nothing other than a critique of Fortes' and Evans-Pritchard's African Political Systems. Right from the outset, one is confronted with a temptation which is often difficult to resist; the urge to admire the courage of a man who dares to attack a sacred cow. African Political Systems is regarded as a classic in social anthropology, and its authors have acquired the status of the founding fathers in the area of political anthropology. To the extent that Population and Political Systems in Tropical Africa takes issue with the classic, it demands careful attention.

Admittedly, the purpose of the author is to show that there is a demonstrable relationship between the density of a population and the complexity of a political system. He writes: "In short,

I am solely and exclusively interested in discussing their (Fortes' and Evans-Pritchard's) assertion that African data indicate that in Africa, at least, there is no relationship at all between population density and state" p. 17.

He does not argue that there is any direct causal or invariant connection between the two variables. Nor is he contending that in all state societies there will always be population densities higher than those in non-state societies. He merely attempts to show that "... there is a highly probable though indirect relationship between population density and state organization" p. 18.

According to Stevenson, two propositions, with regard to the two variables of population density and complexity of political systems, can be deduced from African Political Systems:

- States are correlated with high population densities; stateless societies with low population densities.
- II. States are correlated with low population densities; stateless societies with high population densities p. 14.

The authors of African Political Systems denied the validity of both propositions, but an examination of the six cases presented in their book will suggest that the second proposition is valid. This tends to obfuscate the authors' stand and invalidate their contention. Robert Stevenson challenges the no-relationship stand of Evans-Pritchard and Fortes. In addition, he vigorously contests the relationship which their data seem to imply.

The methodology of the authors is criticised and the accuracy of some of their data questioned. Stevenson thinks it is unfortunate that food-gathering bands were omitted from their sample by definition. He is skeptical about the fact that all the states cited were in the southeastern part of Africa and questions their judgment for not including any of the recognized major African states in the sample. Perhaps his more serious criticisms are threefold:

- that the sample of the authors was not truly representative of the studies included in the book;
- that, in many cases, population estimates were grossly incorrect;
- that the authors used, in a strictly synchronic context, data from the colonial period in order to test generalizations concerning the formation process of indigenous states.

Broadly speaking, Stevenson's investigation can be divided into several parts. First is the comprehensive analysis of the cases presented in African Political Systems. Then, there is the demographic inquiry where he looks at contemporary population patterns in Africa and tries to interpret what they show regarding the relationship between density of population and indigenous state formation. Finally, there is a concentration on a special case,

the Ibos of southeastern Nigeria, which he considers to be an apparent, but not real, major exception.

His critical analysis of the cases in African Political Systems indicates that there is a general pattern of a positive relationship between state formation and high population density. In most of the cases, however, there is no cause-effect relationship between the two variables. The relationship seems more complex, and it involves commercial communication, political and economic organization, and population density in a threeway nexus of complex but reciprocal interactions.

The author's contribution to the understanding of traditional African political systems lies in his reconsideration of the Ibo traditional political system. To say this is not to give him undue primacy; nor should it be construed as a denial of appropriate honor to Professor Dike. Stevenson's uniqueness is in his articulation of the case. He spells out Fried's criteria for statehood and applies the criteria to the Ibo case. In his opinion, the Aro satisfied Fried's primary and secondary functions. He concludes:

In terms of Fried's criteria, then, the Aro organization would seem to constitute a state. The major distinction between the Aro and a state like Dahomey would seem to be in the Aro concentration on crucial nerve centers, trade routes, and markets rather than on a circumscribed and bounded region as such pp. 210-11.

Perhaps not every reader will grant the status of statehood to Aro, but it will be difficult to dispute that a process of state formation was well underway in Iboland. Personally, I do sympathize with the author's position; it is not gratuitous to regard the Aro as a state. One important point must not go unnoticed; states need not come only in one structural form. Indigenous African states are no exception. While we must accept the Sudanic states with their "conventional, centralized, monarchical model" as a type most common to indigenous African states, we must also be cognizant of the probablity of other structural models. Pobert Stevenson seems to argue that the Aro represents a model, different from the classic structural model.

In balance, I feel that the author has achieved his stated objective and he has done so painstakingly. He has drawn upon almost all available resources relevant to his subject (Evans-Pritchard's Essays in Social Anthropology is conspicuously absent from Stevenson's bibliography) and articulated his argument rather meticulously, perhaps, sometimes, too meticulously. This is not a book for a casual reader. A serious student of African history, politics, political anthropology, anthropology, and even geography will find it rewarding. It is a happy example of the fruitfulness of the inter-disciplinary approach.

However, there were times when I wondered if Stevenson had not been too harsh on the authors of African Political Systems. After all, Evans-Pritchard in the 1950's was among the first to admonish his colleagues to shift away from the static and synchronic analysis and move towards the diachronic study of societies. In fact, he specifically wanted them to consider the histories of the societies they study. I find this passage from his Essays in Social Anthropology most redeeming.

But with the bath water of presumptive history, the functionalists have also thrown out the baby of valid history. They say . . . that even when the history of a society is recorded it is irrelevant to a functional study of it. I find this point of view unacceptable. The claim that one can understand the functioning of institution, at a certain point of time without knowing how they have come to be what they are, or what they were later to become, as well as a person who, in addition to having studied their constitution at that point of time, has also studied their past and future is to me an absurdity. Moreover, so it seems to me, neglect of the history of institution prevents the functionalist anthropologist not only from studying diachronic problems but also from testing the very functional constructions to which he attaches most importance, for it is precisely history which provides him with an experimental situation p. 21.

Perhaps the fact that the book was originally written as a dissertation may be partly responsible for the unusually sharp tone of the author. Incidentally, it may also explain the somewhat dry style. Of course, this may also be the case of the subject matter dictating the style of its writer.—VICTOR A. OLORUNSOLA, Iowa State University.

Friends Not Masters: A Political Autobiography. By Mohammad Ayub Khan. (New York: Oxford University Press, 1967. Pp. 275. \$7.50.)

Pakistan's Development: Social Goals and Private Incentives. By Gustav F. Papanek. (Cambridge, Harvard University Press, 1967. Pp. 354, \$8.95.)

These two books complement each other in an admirable fashion. Friends Not Masters may be described as the memoirs of a man in power who has tried to justify his seizure of political power in terms of the political stability and national unity that his country gained following his intervention. But he has not told us anything about how Pakistan achieved phenomenal economic progress under his regime. It is to the credit of Dr. Papanek that he has described in such a lucid and graphic manner the story of Pakistan's impressive economic development.

There are two dominant themes in President Ayub's political autobiography—political stability and foreign policy. The theme of political stability is familiar in the sense that Pakistan had to be saved from incessant squabbles among politicians and regional strife by the intervention of General Ayub and the imposition of martial law. President Ayub has defended the new political system con-

sisting of a dominant President, a docile legislature, and a controlled electroate that he has ushered in under the Constitution of 1962. In his defense, he can point out that the former political process under the parliamentary system, given the existing social structure and regional cleavages of the country, could not and did not generate encugh political power in the executive for purposes of maintaining national unity and promoting economic growth. Therefore, under the new system the primary need is to mobilize and consolidate considerable political power in the hands of the executive. But the crucial question from the point of view of long-term political stability is has the President been successful in using this power for creating national and regional consensus and in mobilizing adequate economic resources for purposes of economic growth? The President has been successful in the latter objective and not in the former. In spite of economic growth and the ostensible political support that he has gathered through the system of Basic Democracies, the President has bitterly recorded: "On a number of occasions I have been accused, abused, and vilified, subjected to all kinds of rumours and slanders, all thoroughly unjustified and untrue, by some of the biggest blackguards in the country. and I have swallowed it." The President is justified in complaining about the acerbity in the attacks of the opposition. However, the failure of the regime in the art of skillful manipulation and minimization of its coercive machinery and above all the sense of political alienation that exists in East Pakistan and some of the urban areas of West Pakistan are factors which cannot be brushed aside as inconsequential.

It is in articulating the emerging trends of the foreign policy of his country that President Avub displays a level of skill and sophistication which has seldom been equalled by an Asian statesman. He explains why and how Pakistan had to give a new orientation to its foreign policy after the American decision to give military aid to India when that country was faced with Chinese incursicn in 1962. He conceives of Pakistan's relations with each of the big powers, the U.S., the U.S.R. and China, in terms of bilateral equations and how each such equation would be determined by the limits of tolerance of third parties. In other words, Pakistan would align itself with a power like the United States or China, but the extent of cordiality and the support that Pakistan would give to the major objectives of each of these powers would have to be so skillfully manipulated that each power would give maximum assistance to Pakistan. Ayub by no means is the first or the original expositor of such a policy. However, President Ayub can claim credit for the new course that has been charted for Pakistan's foreign policy

and for the sense of pragmatism and shrewd assessment of the geopolitical interests of the big powers on which this foreign policy rests.

Papanek's book not only provides a fascinating account of Pakistan's economic development, but also the role played by the main actors, namely, the administrators and the businessmen, in this drama of development. Dr. Papanek describes in an illuminating manner how Pakistan, having inherited the authoritarian traditions of the British bureaucratic system and a hard core of competent administrators, first decided in favor of direct controls and how these controls on the whole turned out to be deterrent rather than stimulating for economic growth. Direct controls resulted in incorrect decisions, delays, excessive stocks, errors in the direction of investment, and in composition of imports.

The United States when faced with the problem of acute depression adopted certain economic measures under the New Deal legislation which, drawing on the ideas and policy proposals of Keynesian economics, avoided the alternative approach of drastic direct administrative controls of a totalitarian variety. Papanek's book suggests that a developing country like Pakistan, faced with the problem of scarce resources and mounting population, can also adopt indirect controls exercised through the price mechanism and fiscal measures and progressively dismantle a number of direct controls. What is more, he has tried to demonstrate that Pakistan by embarking on a policy of indirect controls in 1959 and at the same time discarding a number of direct administrative controls has been able to forge ahead economically in an impressive manner. Dr. Papanek, while recommending a system of indirect controls, does not suggest that Pakistan should adopt a pure type of capitalist or free enterprise system. He assigns a prominent place to government intervention and innovative economic policies. The system that he advocates is one where the machinery of government will be used to harness self-interest of the individual and particularly the entrepreneur to social goals. However, it may be added that Pakistan's rapid economic growth since 1959 cannot be attributed only to the dismantling of several direct controls because the latter action was facilitated largely by the generous grants of economic aid that Pakistan received from the United States during the early 1960's.—KHALID B. SAYEED, Queen's University, Canada.

The Administration of the White Australia Policy.
By A. C. Palfreeman. (Melbourne: Melbourne University Press, 1967. Pp. 184.)

From the establishment of the Commonwealth of Australia in 1901 until 1958, and in effect until 1966, it was the policy of all Australian govern-

ments to prevent the entry of non-whites as permanent residents, subject only to specified exceptions on family and business grounds. This was the White Australia policy, probably the most widely-known product of the Australian polity. Though it had economic as well as racialist origins and justifications, the policy and its title were all too clearly the product of a time when racial pride was both blatant and narrow. 'We are more British than the people of Great Britain,' said Prime Minister W. M. Hughes in 1919, adding gnomicly, 'and we are held firmly to the great principle of the White Australia because we know what we know.' The last twenty years have seen the abandonment by all parties of the belief that Australia should remain overwhelmingly British in ethnic origin, and there can be no doubt that that change is real and permanent. The last ten years have also seen some modification of the policy of excluding non-white immigrants on principle, but no-one, not even the men who drafted the changes, can know whether they are sheer window-dressing or the beginning of a process which will produce if not a multi-racial society then at least a significant proportion of Asian-Australians.

Mr. Palfreeman's book thus comes at a convenient time, though it is plain that the policy changes of 1966 were highly inconvenient for him and necessitated some insertions and revisions. The content of his quite short book is very much what its title declares. The larger and better part of it is a study of the principal administrative rules and their application from 1901 to 1966, together with a necessary summary of the statutes which gave them validity. The book does not pretend to be a history of the policy in any other sense than this, still less to be a critique or an apology, though elements of all these things are to be found in it.

Though great issues were involved in the policy of exclusion, as we need no reminding now, the administration of the laws by which it was expressed inevitably was a matter of day-to-day decisions which in themselves were usually trivial and often had an element of burlesque. In 1901. Australia had a Chinese population of about 30,000, and the subsequent history of non-white immigration was predominantly concerned with enabling Chinese-Australian restauranteurs, market gardeners and other small business men to bring into the country a sufficient number of assistants to maintain their distinctively Chinese businesses in the manner to which they and their customers were accustomed. The result, as Mr. Palfreeman's account shows, was a rich growth of bureaucratic distinctions and a jargon in which to implement them. The most memorable example of the latter is 'Liberal Attitude Status,' meaning not, of course, the status of people who held a lib-

eral attitude but that bundle of rights possessed by a favoured group of non-white immigrants towards whom the Department of Immigration, in its own opinion, adopted a liberal attitude. Mr. Palfreeman himself sometimes falls victim to the stylistic contagion of his materials, referring in one place to 'the traditional policy of optimum exclusion of non-Europeans,' but on the whole he gives a lucid and illuminating account of how a series of little consistencies and little anomalies become a formidable, if distinctly creaking, body of rules. No one need puzzle further over such problems as how large a Chinese restaurant had to be before the Department of Immigration would agree to the admission of three cooks from China to work in it. The answer to this question, and to dozens of others of the same order, are carefully set out in this book. Mr. Palfreeman acknowledges the assistance of the Department in his research, and it is certainly not his purpose to condemn its officers, past or present. Nor does it appear from his account that they should be condemned. Nevertheless, when viewed from the present time, the record has an air of shabby complexity and misplaced ingenuity, while sometimes, especially those past instances which involved the deportation of the non-white husbands and wives of Australians. it has a more painful and shameful quality. Sometimes Mr. Palfreeman permits himself a subdued irony. For example:

Clearly, the administration of the White Australia policy by this time had become quite elaborate and sophisticated, and no doubt was founded upon carefully considered, albeit obscure, *desiderata* about who should enter for temporary residence.

The broader aspects of the policy and its critics, which do not really come within the scope of the title, are handled summarily and even uncertainly. Mr. Palfreeman summarizes the possibily portentous statement of the Minister for Immigration in February 1966, which opened the way to some non-white immigration, and quotes it in full in an appendix. One can sympathize with his uncertainty as to what this change really portends, but he also appears to take both sides of the argument to which it gives rise. He refers in one place to 'the existing policy of exclusion,' appearing to discount the significance of the change altogether, but in another place says that the administration of the policy as it now exists 'could well be the deciding factor in finally sealing the coffin of the White Australia policy,' implying that the policy is already dead or at least moribund. Political attitudes to White Australia, and particularly the abandonment of at least the phrase itself by nearly all the political parties, are handled too briefly and in some respects misleadingly. But Mr. Palfreeman has very helpfully illuminated what was previously the most obscure aspect of the very debatable subject of non-white immigration to Australia, and that is a considerable task and a considerable service.—D. W. RAWSON, Australian National University, Canberra.

Thailand: The War That Is, The War That Will Be. By Louis E. Lomax. (New York: Random House, 1967. Pp. 175, \$4.95.)

Louis E. Lomax is a man with a deep, admirable, and completely understandable emotional involvement in the quest for social justice in the United States. His previous three books have all dealt with various aspects of this problem, and his new book on Thailand is closely related to this theme despite its subject matter and, perhaps, despite the intent of its author. There is little in Thailand for the area specialist or for layman inquisitive about the area. In fact, this volume abounds in overstatements, understatements, and misstatements about Thailand, and the uninformed reader should be warned of this in advance. Yet this is not a book without its rewards. Before turning to these, however, let me briefly describe the plot.

Louis Lomax had proceeded as far as Cambodia enroute to Hanoi when his invitation was unexpectedly rescinded. Rather than waste his trip he diverted himself to Thailand, and for this detour he reports that he will always remain grateful to Ho Chi Minh because "Thailand . . . is where the action is (p. x)." In Thailand Lomax interviewed numerous officials (including a lengthy session with the powerful American Ambassador, who did not emerge as one of the author's favorite personalities), intellectuals, peasants, surrendered guerrillas, and practicing communists in serene Bangkok and in the troubled Northeastern and Southern provinces. His thesis (so far as one can say that this book has a thesis) is that an undeclared and unacknowledged war is in progress in Thailand, that in this stage it is strikingly similar to the beginnings of the Vietnamese conflict, and that once the United States has lost in Vietnam it will shift its full-scale operations to Thailand. Thus, Lomax is reporting "the war that is" and prophesying "the war that will be." It is a thesis that is intended to needle both Thais and Americans, and, indeed, reactions on both sides indicate that Lomex has been very successful in this.

The really interesting aspects of this book stem from neither the author's reportage nor his prophesies. The book is far more fascinating for the insights it provides into the dilemmas facing many perceptive, inquiring, and responsible American critics of a liberal bent. Lomax is innately anticommunist enough that he is frightened by the thought of a communist regime in power in Thailand, but he is constantly troubled by the unarticulated suspicion that of all the persons he inter-

viewed only two groups—the Peace Corps and the communists—seemed seriously concerned about the physical and psychic well being of the Thai masses. And, despite his conditioned reflex against communism, Louis Lomax is equally and more consciously concerned about the exploitation of the underprivileged by the establishment, whether he finds it among Negro sharecroppers in Mississippi or among the Phu-Thai of Northeast Thailand. Moreover, while Lomax apparently looks forward with some misgivings to the day when the liberals shall have become the isolationists and the conservatives the "globalists," he nevertheless seems to presume that there is little the United States can or should do in Thailand. He seems to be trying to tell us that the fatal flaw in this tragedy is that in the end the tyranny of the establishment will bring about the destruction of the system. And Thailand is not alone in being victimized by an establishment. In answer to his implied question, "what can change American military policy toward Thailand?," Lomax replies:

if the Congress and the people rise as one and cry "Halt!" to the military-industrial complex, those men of war Dwight Eisenhower so passionately warned us against, then American men will no longer die in the wrong place, for the wrong reasons, and at the wrong time (p. 161).

Louis Lomax is caught up in a whole series of contemporary American dilemmas, and his book on Thailand's internal problems is more illuminating for its obiter dicta on America than for its major theme.—ROBERT O. TILMAN, Yale University.

INTERNATIONAL POLITICS, LAW, AND ORGANIZATION

Arms Control and the Atlantic Alliance: Europe Faces Coming Policy Decisions. By Karl W. Deutsch. (New York: John Wiley & Sons, 1967. Pp. 167. \$5.95.)

As a factual report on the attitudes of French and West German elites toward arms control and related areas in 1964, this study is excellent. My criticism of it stems not from its methods of data collection or what it reports at a descriptive level but from (1) its almost complete failure to give any theoretical interpretation to its content, (2-the form in which this content is communicated, and (3) the validity of some inferences made from the data.

The study involved interviews with 147 elite respondents in France, and 163 in West Germany, from several different occupational categories.¹ France and West Germany were singled out for detailed study because of the decisive influence their leaders certainly will have on the success or failure of arms control and disarmament, and political integration, in Western Europe. In fact, at the end of the study Deutsch proposes to institutionalize the pre-eminent position of these two major continental powers in a Four-Power NATO Executive Committee that would also include Britain and the United States, with each country sharing more or less equally in the direction and control of the future Atlantic Alliance.

¹ Methodological details of the sampling and interviewing are given in the companion volume to the book under review, Karl W. Deutsch, Lewis J. Edinger, Roy C. Macridis, and Richard L. Merritt, France, Germany and the Western Alliance: A Study of Elite Attitudes on European Integration and World Politics (New York: Charles Scribner's Sons 1967).

For such a short book, it provides some pretty ponderous reading. The book's appendices, giving a large summary table, the interview schedule, and a statistical breakdown of the responses to most of the questions in the schedule, comprise 60 of the book's 147 pages. When the tables in the main body of the book are added to the appendices, only about half the book is left over to text.

The bulk of this "text" is a summary of the statistics given in the tables and appendices. (As if the statements in the text are not to be believed or really must be checked, many are cross-referenced to the questions and response breakdowns in the appendices.) In page after page chock full of figures, Deutsch presents the survey results on the general attitudes of the French and West German elites toward aims control and disarmament and their specific attitudes toward each other, other countries, European integration, NATO, German reunification, the French force de frappe, and the MLF (multilateral nuclear force) proposal. He finds widespread support from both the French and German elites for disarmament and arms control on a worldwide scale, though the two elites differ to some extent on such questions as the desirability of MLF and an independent nuclear force.

The topics explored are clearly important, and the responses of each elite by age, occupation, etc. are revealing in the sense of not always being "obvious." Deutsch argues that this kind of quantitative research can yield information about changes in political conditions before they are manifest even to astute observers, citing a correspondent's report of strong French support for President de Gaulle's attack on NATO over a year after the quantitative data were in.

Yet even after the condensation of "several thousand pages of typescript, tables, and computer printout" (p. ix), the study more resembles a code and data book than an interpretative analysis. There is little doubt about Deutsch's ability to digest prodigious amounts of data. When presented serially and in such overwhelming detail, however, the task of culling the most important findings from even these predigested data, and grasping their broader significance, becomes a task of heroic proportions. The quantitative responses to question after question leave one with a sense of bewilderment and finally loss in trying to relate back the figures to those given in the previous paragraphs and the preceding chapters.

This is not a criticism that the details shouldn't be filled in but rather that they should be developed within a theoretical framework that makes them interpretable at a higher level of analysis. Because no model of the process of attitude and opinion formation is offered—or even a set of hypotheses that relate responses in different substantive areas to the processes of consensus formation or political integration—the question of how things got the way they are and what their cumulative impact is tend to go unanswered.

This failure to anchor the study theoretically by making the assumptions of the analysis explicit and tracing out their logical implications has repercussions on the validity of some inferences drawn from the data. In one of the few statistical tests reported—that age accounts for less than 10 percent of the variance observed (p. 68)—the inference drawn that present attitudes are likely to persist for some time is simply not a logical consequence in the absence of a model that relates cross-sectional variance explained to longitudinal fluctuations. The conclusion that "the development of . . . a French-German consensus is likely to require far more than ten years, even under favorable conditions" (p. 15) is another unsupported inference from the data; to make such a projection (why not five or twenty years?), what is needed is not only the "broadly based evidence" that Deutsch calls for but a specification of the empirical indicators used to define operationally "consensus" and an analysis of their differential rates of change over time. Finally, the conclusion that the French Fifth Republic is not "a surface phenomenon that will vanish after President de Gaulle" (p. 73) may or may not turn out to be true; the important point is, however, that this inference presupposes a theoretical perspective which is not made explicit: that the influence of the intellectuals and nonbusiness interest groups, who were least willing to give the Republic after de Gaulle a long lease on life, will not turn out to be significant.

Deutsch is at his best when he steps back somewhat from his data and speculates on the future of the Atlantic Alliance. His plea for a loosened alliance unbridled by United States assertions of hegemony does seem to touch the contours of favorable elite opinion. It is unfortunate that these recommendations spring more from an attempt to surface "trends" in the data than from a theory which Deutsch might have given us and used his data to test (as he has superbly done in earlier studies).—Steven J. Brams, Syracuse University.

Propaganda and World Public Order: The Legal Regulation of the Ideological Instrument of Coercion. By B. S. Murry. (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1968. Pp. 310. \$10.00.)

The encomia with which this book comes readily equipped and packaged are enough to propagandize a timid reviewer before he gets a chance to object. On the front jacket flap Professor Richard Falk says the book is "undoubtedly the most profound and comprehensive study of this important subject yet available," while the back flap echoes in the words of Professor J. B. Whitton that "the present work is superior to anything I have read on the subject." In a glowing foreword Professor Lasswell declares "it is as sure as any prognosis can be that his work will be accepted as the landmark treatise on an elusive topic."

I found it instead an elusive treatise on a landmark topic. Some day, perhaps, a great book might be written on the legal and political questions involved in attempting to regulate the use of propaganda-what Professor Murty calls (throughout the book and rather ponderously) the "ideological instrument of coercion." Even as purely normative political theory, the question of whether, and if so what types of, propaganda should be regulated offers fascinating potential. Although Professor Murty does not shrink from offering prescriptions, his book suffers not only from a basic lack of psychological realism but also from a lack of concrete examples of propaganda that he would allow or disallow in his repeated goal of securing "minimum" world public order.

In the first place, what is propaganda? Professor Murty talks extensively about it in 294 tightly printed pages, but for a central organizing concept the best he can offer is that it is an "ideological instrument of coercion," while the latter term is defined—straight out of the Encyclopedia Britannicz—as "moral or physical compulsion by which a person is forced to do or to refrain from doing some act apart from his own voluntary action." Leaving out physical compulsion as irrelevant, this leaves us with moral compulsion. That, says Professor Murty, occurs when a person is "subjected

to a high degree of constraint in the choice of alternatives in shaping his conduct." How many alternatives? A "few," says Professor Murty, and those are "attended with expectations of high cost and low gains." (p. 28).

But in what sense are alternatives restricted by propaganda? Are they physically removed? Morally deflected? Are we talking about a recipient of propaganda whose visual horizons become clouded as a result of the insistent message, who sees fewer alternatives than are really there? The housewife who homes in on a particular brand of soup without "seeing" all the others on the supermarket shelves? Or has someone, working with the propagandist, actually removed all the other brands?

And how about conflicting messages? Professor Murty has a large blind spot for the informative effects of conflicting propaganda. Busy with the task of trying to regulate one stream of propaganda, his schemata would probably become too complex if he had to acknowledge that a second stream could neutralize the first. (It's hard for anyone looking at "law" with the evident awe that Professor Murty evinces to say that two wrongs can make a right.)

Clearly a basic problem with the book is lack of specificity—despite the numerous sources and even examples that are cited. Just what image or concept bothers the author? I got the impression that cases such as the Japanese warmongering machine that was in full force in the 1930's is something that the author would like, somehow, to suppress under international law. But there is no detailed study—as might, for example, be undertaken by factor analysis-of the relation between internal propaganda and external aggressive behavior, or even more important, of whether one may infer a causal relationship between propaganda and aggressiveness. Propaganda might be a result rather than a cause, and as such could be useful in alerting other nations to the propagandizing state's intentions.

The author alludes in passing to several studies of the content analysis of propaganda, as he also alludes to gestalt psychology and "Pavlov's conditioning theory" (no mention of Skinner). Content analysis, of course, is not directly relevant to the author's purpose, which is to indicate how propaganda can and should be legally regulated. But an awareness of the numerous levels of commitment, motivation, and cognitive dissonance that research in content analysis demonstrates would have served the author well in his attempt to lay down rules for legal regulation. Rather than simply stating that many of the questions are matters of degree, he would have seen that the question is whether any lines can be drawn at all. If Japanese propaganda brought on the second world war, should the United States immediately silence the John Birch society? From an international law standpoint, how can the other nations force the United States to silence the Birchites? Would such an attempt to force a country to take steps against the freedom of speech of its own citizens itself lead to world war three? Or is propaganda bad only if its emanates (is controlled by?) official sources? What should we have done with Hitler, who constantly preached peace? The author has considerable trouble with the results of the Nuremberg trials which did not hold as criminal any propaganda per se. He writes that if Goebbels had been one of the defendants he would not have been acquitted, but the evidence he cites from the trials indicates that a Goebbels conviction would have been based on participation in a conspiracy to initiate a war of aggression and not on his radio broadcasts. Although the author does a commendable job of summarizing the history of propaganda as a concept of international law, his analysis progressively falters as matters are brought up to date.

Professor Murty's heavy reliance throughout on organizing categories derived from the writings of Professor Lasswell gives the book a sense of organization that is not really there. Some chapter headings, for instance, are: "clarification of policy," "audience," "objectives," "situation and capability," "strategies," "outcome," "decision process." These umbrella words overlap all over the place, with the result that matters brought up in "objectives" are repeated in a later chapter called "outcome" and again in the chapter called "decision process." We read the chapter on "audience" only to find that audience has little if anything to do with the analysis. Chapter headings become titles of index-card boxes in which the cards are reshuffled indiscriminately. This is not to blame Professor Lasswell, whose brilliance and acuity if anything transcended his cumbersome terminology in his pioneering works on propaganda and related subjects. Rather, it seems to be a by-product of the main stream of behavioralism these days, which finds in outlying tributaries jargon-infested studies which to the nondiscerning reader cast disrepute on the main stream itself. Professor Murty simply made use of the wrong types of methodology.—Anthony A. D'AMATO, Northwestern University.

The Common Aid Effort. By MILTON J. ESMAN AND DANIEL S. CHEEVER. (Columbus: Ohio State University Press, 1967. Pp. 421. \$7.50.)

This book addresses itself to the manner in which Western industrialized countries can more rapidly reduce the well-being gap between themselves and the poverty-ridden nations of the Third World. The authors' main hypothesis is that the North-South "confrontation between the rich and

the poor is likely to be the most important and enduring problem in international affairs." (p. ix) Contending that cooperation among the donor nations can significantly increase the effectiveness of help given to the poorer countries, this study centers on the Development Assistance Committee (DAC) of the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD). The member nations of the OECD include the fourteen members of NATO, the three European neutral states of Austria, Sweden and Switzerland, and Spain and Japan. The United States, France, Great Britain and Western Germany have played the leading role in the evolution of DAC, DAC assists "the donors by enabling them to perceive their national interests in terms of larger objectives and wider perspectives than would be the case if there were no common aid forum." (p. 6).

The first chapter in The Common Aid Effort reviews the evolution of aid from UNRRA to the Marshall Plan in the aftermath of the Second World War, and in the context of the Cold War which followed. During the fifties, many newly independent, impoverished nations became recipients of foreign aid. Despite this assistance the average per capita income in the developed countries is more than seven-times that of the backward nations, or, to put it differently, "30.2 percent of the world's population receives 75.5 percent of its goods and services." (p. 21) Since the Soviet Union and Communist China have also entered the arena of developmental competition, the income gap between industrialized countries, whether they be market or centrally planned economies, and the poorer nations continues to widen. Almost all of the developing countries' economic performance falls short of their aspirations, "thus increasing their frustrations and the probability of violence." (p. 23) During the period 1954-63, OECD member countries contributed over eight-times the amount of aid furnished by the communist countries. The communist aid program, however, helped to stimulate the OECD countries to begin to think about a common aid effort. The Western industrialized nations have moved in that direction despite the uncertainty that "economic aid will promote democratic societies, economic stability, international cooperation, or improved commercial relations." (p. 25)

The authors frequently refer to the concept of foreign aid strategy and seem to believe that DAC could provide the forum for such a strategy. Strategy implies the selection of a common goal, the choosing of intermediate-phased objectives, and allocation of adequate resources with which to achieve them. Chapter 4, "The Development Assistance Committee," negates the possibility of a foreign aid strategy being developed within that mechanism. "The DAC was conceived and remains

essentially as a framework or a forum for governmental representatives to discuss, rationalize, and, where possible, cooperate, coordinate, and harmonize national aid policies and operations." (p. 144) In fact, "there is little public evidence that development policies are considered in the DAC in terms of a coordinated free world political strategy." (p. 145)

The various member nations of DAC regard the value of their membership in this committee from differing perspectives. Some members of the U. S. Congress believe that DAC can be used to induce its members "to accept a larger and more equitable proportion of the common aid and defense burden, of which they believe the United States is now shouldering too large a share." (p. 182) Yet the American contribution to foreign aid has been dropping so rapidly that we may no longer have the leverage to induce contributions from other countries. In 1951, foreign aid appropriations represented 2.2 percent of the U. S. national GNP, whereas in 1967 it represented 2.9 percent of a GNP that was well over twice as large.

France, which frequently sees advantage in acting individually, values information gained from the exchange of ideas within the DAC working parties. West Germany, anxious to achieve acceptability in world affairs, values participation in a common aid effort which also helps to promote export opportunities. "The United Kingdom has become increasingly convinced of the DAC's utility." Informed Britishers believe "the common strategy and even coordinated action may be required...." (p. 185)

In the concluding chapter, the authors reassert that "one of the major international tensions for the next half-century at least will be the confrontation between the rich nations and the poor." (p. 323) A different point of view was presented by George W. Ball in an article entitled, "3½ Super Powers," which appeared in LIFE Magazine on Merch 29, 1968. Ball urged that the creation of a stable and prosperous Europe should be our highest policy goal. This reviewer agrees with Ball that "at least for the next several decades, the discontent of poorer nations does not threaten world destruction."

Esman and Cheever contend to the contrary—that the North-South problem "cannot be ignored because modern technology has created a web of interdependencies that interlinks the fates of all nations. Neither distances nor traditional systems of control nor overwhelming military power can shield the industrialized nation from events that take place in the emerging countries." (p. 324-325) The developing countries' tactic of pressuring the incustrialized nations to help them is abetted by the "growing current opinion in most of the industrialized countries that favor foreign aid for a

combination of humanitarian, commerical, and political reasons." (p. 325) This statement is too optimistic. The United States has stressed the Alliance for Progress as the key to development in Latin America. Yet, during the last year, there has been a decline in living standards as the population explosion in Latin America far outpaces advances in industrial and agricultural productivity.

U. S. leadership and greater commitment to foreign aid is absolutely essential for more effective development in the Third World. "Since leadership belongs to the United States, the slackening of American performance will result at best in stabilization and at worst in a reduction in the European efforts." (p. 359-360) The retrenchment program initiated by Trudeau in Canada, the inward turning of most European countries, and the dissenchantment which many Americans hold toward their country's involvement in world problems, make it unlikely that the pressing needs of the developing countries will be satisfied.

The authors of this book have made an objective and low-key appraisal of one of the most important problems facing mankind. If the aid which is desirable, or even necessary, will not be given, one can only hope that George Ball's assessment of the poorer nations proves to be correct: "They can create local situations of instability and they can appeal to the conscience or cupidity of the industrialized nations, but they do not, given reasonable prudence on our part, have the capacity to precipitate major world conflict." (LIFE Magazine, March 29, 1968, p. 83.)—WILLIAM R. KINT-NER, University of Pennsylvania.

Defense of the Realm: British Strategy in the Nuclear Epoch. By R. N. ROSECRANCE. (New York: Columbia University Press, 1968. Pp. 308. \$7.50.)

This book presents a careful analysis of the evolution of British military strategy from 1946 to 1966 with particular emphasis on the formative years from the end of World War II to the Suez disaster. The story of British defense policies is told largely in chronological historical narrative. American strategy is a constant reference point. The author takes particular care to demonstrate that far from being a mirror image on a smaller -scale, or worse still an impotent dependency of the United States, Great Britain initially showed greater vision and realism and experienced unrivaled successes in strategy and diplomacy. Rose--crance believes that British postwar influence reached its "zenith" in 1954-55: "All of her military adventures, with the possible exception of the retention of the Suez base, were successful. The atomic bomb had been developed independently; the hydrogen bomb was well on the way. . . . In Europe and overseas, Britain maximized her influence" (pp. 192-3). And then came Suez and the awful revelation of weakness, incapacity and dependence upon the United States.

Indeed, how the mighty had fallen! If, before Suez "British courses in world affairs were often not much less ambitious than those of the United States" (p. 216), after that debacle "Britain could no longer be regarded as a major world power; she could scarcely be viewed as a major regional power" (p. 233). Rosecrance briefly and skillfully traverses the period since Suez, ending his narrative with a series of recommendations designed to enhance British power in the future. Summarized, these are: reduce British overseas commitments to the bone; turn vigorously to Europe; join the Common Market: establish special ties with Germany; and—the most interesting and provocative suggestion-arrange, with American concurrence, a British nuclear "trusteeship" that would make it possible for the British to commit an Americanassisted nuclear deterrent for Europe in the form of British Polaris submarines (modified for Poseidon missiles), a deterrent system in which the Europeans alone would participate (details of the scheme are found on pp. 278 ff.). In short, Britain's future lies with Europe and strategic initiatives on her part can make her an influential partner.

There is much to commend the reader to this work. It is strong on analysis of British nuclear strategy. Of special interest is Rosecrance's detailed account of a key "global strategy paper of 1952," which is alleged to have been of lasting influence on British, American and NATO strategies. The author pays particular attention to the linkage between British and American strategy, evaluating the interrelationship from one period to the next. It provides under one cover a comprehensive analysis of America's most important postwar ally.

Rosecrance argues persuasively, if not uniquely, that Britain skillfully enhanced her power by operating as broker between Europe and the United States while at the same time building her own nuclear forces and sustaining numerous far-flung commitments in the Middle East and Asia. It was by any account a remarkable achievement, even if in subsequent years things have not turned out so well on any of these accounts.

On the other hand, the book is marred by a tendency toward hyperbole and anglophilia. The author exaggerates the heights and depths of British power, perhaps for dramatic effect, as he also overstates British influence upon American strategy. In particular, he seizes upon the global strategy paper of 1952, proclaiming its historic significance and pervasive influence, but then admits that Churchill rejected its implications (p. 176) and, indeed in the end, that "the global strategy paper

was not really carried out" (pp. 178-9). No doubt the paper was very important in terms of doctrine even if not carried into operational policy, but in this matter, as in too many others, the author simply overstates his case. Likewise Rosecrance claims that NATO "was virtually" Ernest Bevin's "personal creation" (p. 259); that in Korea and Indo-China "it was British influence which prevented a redirection of American energies toward the Far East and maintained NATO resolve" (p. 233). According to Rosecrance, the British first enunciated a strategy of nuclear deterrence, were first to recognize the deficiencies in the Lisbon agreements, were first to build a nuclear force without a putative foe in mind, and unlike the Americans, succumbed neither to the excesses of massive retaliation nor to over-reliance upon conventional forces.

These are all matters of slight exaggeration and/or disputable propositions. They are more in the nature of annoyances, however, than they are serious factual or analytical defects. Most of them appear to arise out of an implicit admiration for the plucky British, an admiration which this reviewer shares. But the constant comparison, often invidious, with American policies has hardly ever really got any point to it. Thus, we are treated at the very outset to the following statement: "Britain has certainly made her mistakes in her postwar military policy, but they do not, on balance, seem greater than those made by the United States" (p. vii). Perhaps Rosecrance is urging us to give the British more credit than we do. There is no other apparent motive.

I do not mean to suggest that Rosecrance applied only praise to the British. He is not only incisive in his analysis of British policies in general, but he lays bare their major deficiencies over time. And whether or not it is germane to argue that the British developed a nuclear strategy "first." he clearly sees its defects, especially when the British after Suez refuse to face up to the deficiencies revealed by and caused by that event. I have yet to see a more lucid account of the factors contributing to British influence prior to the Suez crisis nor a more accurate assessment of the reasons why subsequently Great Britain, in spite of its position as third most powerful nuclear nation, has experienced a waning influence in Europe and in Washington.

For those who have read Rosecrance's other major book, Action and Reaction in World Politics: International Systems in Perspective (Boston: Little, Brown, 1963), I owe at least this passing comment: Defense of the Realm bears virtually no relationship to the theoretical framework and general conclusions of the earlier work. Indeed, where in 1963 Rosecrance concluded that internal (domestic) factors were the most impor-

tent variables contributing to foreign policy behavior, in the book under review one has the impression that British strategy evolved in response to external pressures (the international system). But then, Rosecrance did not apply that framework to this analysis.—David W. Tarr, University of Wisconsin.

Nuclear Weapons Safety and the Common Defense. By Joel Larus. (Columbus: Ohio State University Press, 1967. Pp. 171. \$6.50.)

Thirteen days before this book was published, Fresident Johnson invited additional outside inspection of U. S. nuclear facilities, thus restressing the relativity of hitherto secret information when world goals are at stake. Thirty-eight days after publication, a SAC B-52 carrying four hydrogen bombs crashed in North Star Bay near Thule. Almost immediately, former Defense Secretary Robert McNamara ordered SAC B-52 alert training flights disarmed of their nuclear weapons. Rarely do events so aptly frame a book.

The growth in both numbers and kinds of nuclear weapons implies the possibility of nuclear accidents-particularly, unintended nuclear detonation and contamination. The chances of accidents some time, somewhere may be 1 in a million, 1 in 100, or as the author accepts Sydney Hook's laconic estimate, just high or low. Purely and simply, Professor Larus argues that civilization has a common interest in sharing information about nuclear weapons safety. "Pure and simple" doesn't cescribe the job he took on, however, Separating the single interest objective of nuclear weapons safety from all other questions of nuclear weapons management takes a lawyer's rhetoric and a political scientist's diorism. Fortunately the author is both lawyer and skilled political scientist, Nuclear Weapons Safety and the Common Defense makes its case eminently readably, conservatively, and remarkably freely of the polemics and tortuous calculations of owning nuclear weapons.

Professor Larus finds two main kinds of radioactivity accidents, along with the conventional two reasons why they happen—human and mechanical. One kind of accident is an "unauthorized, unintentional, or inadvertent" nuclear explosion. The second kind, of somewhat higher probability, is a nuclear mishap, e.g., a weapon rupture that contaminates the environment with fissionable radioactive material without setting off the fissionable material. He weaves a briefing on administrative, economic, and technical nuclear weapons management and safeguards into the fabric of his case-without sacrificing scholarship or punch.

The worst kind of accident has not happened at this writing, but nuclear weapons accidents arehardly unique. The United States admits a dozen so-called "Broken Arrow" incidents since Hiroshima. Professor Larus, working entirely from unclassified data, searches out hard indications of at least another nine. Thus the average is about one U. S. accident a year since World War II. How many more there have been, no one knows. Possessors have been even less willing to talk about arms safety than about arms proliferation.

For many persons, and not just lay observers, the most dangerous consequence of nuclear weapons accidents is nuclear war. And so it doubtless is. But there is an important difference between "most dangerous" and "most likely." Herman Kahn and others concluded that the world was most accident prone during the late 1950s and into the 1960s, i.e., there existed the least manageable combination of political trust and mechanical controls on nuclear weapons. Since then, the superpowers have devoted time, money and experience to reduce to a "very slim possibility" the chances that a "faulty communications signal, a mentally deranged airman, or any other unfortunate mishap could trigger a Russo-American nuclear exchange." But as one likelihood subsided, others arose: the threat that France, China, and would-be possessors have not spent and will not allocate the money and know-how to play it safe with multikiloton weapons. One might add that tactical subkiloton weapons, by whomever possessed, are equally risky though the author barely mentions battlefield nuclear devices.

A fourth of the book deals with nuclear weapons proliferation—the "spreading fires of Prometheus." The length of this section leaves some question as to whether a much more concise statement about arms spread would not better have supported his critical variable of multiple possessors in calculating accident probabilities. It is not that Professor Larus' discussion is not consistent with most published research and thinking in nuclear arms proliferation, i.e., that arms spread is a matter of politics, not cosmic pathology, and can be studied even as other political behavior is studied. It is consistent, and precisely because it is, this part of the book seems to undermine the author's main point that nuclear weapons safety is a separable area for negotiation and that nuclear weapons safety "involves all states without exception."

Not all states, however, would be directly involved in Professor Larus' proposal for internationalizing nuclear weapons safeguards. His program rests on an assumption that all nations must take part in talks about safeguards relevant to their respective levels of nuclear military capability—an assumption that the anti-proliferation pact talks didn't validate. He offers three procedural rules for international safety talks, all three of which have been observed in the past, though infrequently all on the same topic at the same time:

talks would progress from least sensitive to most sensitive information; participant states would have to qualify by demonstrating nuclear military capability relevant to safety information being exchanged; and all resulting information would be shared. His four-stage exchange of information begins with relatively inocuous discussion, politically, about safe storage and basic weapons transport. It progresses finally to mobile, solid fuel dilivery systems. Thoughtful prescriptions and their details should not be summarized, as is done here. But Professor Larus' program itself resembles an unclassified summary of a classified technical-diplomatic agenda that one devcutly hopes someone is working on. Considering that the plan comes from the editor of From Collective Security to Preventive Diplomacy, one concludes that Professor Larus deliberately sketched the program broad brush in the knowledge that is more important now to recognize the problem than detail its resolution. National decisions to opt for nuclear weapons safety must, at some point, pass political tests.

Nuclear Weapons Safety and the Common Defense is not only a book about a fresh, hard, real problem of science and politics. It is at once a model of unclassified digging into an area shrouded by classification, and a pedagogically valuable example of excruciating discrimination, by and large, between more political and less political functions of international intercourse.—
Timothy Alden Williams, Kansas State University.

The Insecurity of Nations: International Relations in the Twentieth Century. By Charles Yost. (New York: Frederick A. Praeger for the Council on Foreign Relations, 1968. Pp. 276. \$6.50.)

This book is of interest both to the general public and to specialists, but for different reasons, The theme of interest to the concerned public is that contemporary views of national security are outmoded; the present quest for security can produce only insecurity. If chaos caused by new weapons is to be prevented, a new international system based on nations that are not nations in the old sense of the term must be constituted. Certainly this message, coming as it does, from a distinguished American diplomat, is important. However, for the specialist, neither the analysis of international politics nor the prescription for the future is as interesting as the insight the book provides into the author himself. As a reflection of the assumptions and perceptions of one important member of the diplomatic establishment, and as a record of his views of American policy, it is a fascinating and sometimes frightening volume.

Throughout the book the perceptions and misperceptions, the preconceptions and indoctrination of leaders is stressed. The opening chapters, al-

though cursory and conventional in their survey of twentieth century international history and the forces alleged to underlie our present insecure condition, lay bare the author's assumptions and preconceptions. From these chapters it is apparent that the author is the apotheosis of the humane, liberal, cultivated gentleman whose values and views are challenged by contemporary events. Modern developments, whether scientific, technological or cultural, seem to have been mainly disastrous. The net effect of the twentieth century has been to undermine the old faiths. Science has given a "secular option between heaven and hell" but has disavowed the responsibility for choice; intellectuals have recorded the confusion of mind and soul but have not offered any constructive alternatives: the technological means for solving major problems of production exist, yet the potential is unrealized. Moreover, these advances have created far greater public problems: complex bureaucracies limit flexibility and make problem solving difficult; new developments in weaponry constantly escalate the arms race and inhibit control. All of these developments are disturbing, but for Ambassador Yost they have shattered an orderly world that once existed, the world congruent with the values and goals acquired in another era.

After setting out the underlying causes of international insecurity, the author proceeds to examine the major East-West confrontations in the post-war period. It is frightening to find that in nearly every major confrontation or policy choice, the conflict with the USSR over Japan at the end of the war, the problem of nuclear controls, the assessment of Communist China, the German problem, the posting of the Seventh Fleet to the Formosa Straits, as well as in Laos and Vietnam, the policy chosen was based on misread intentions, faulty intelligence, misplaced confidence and above all, on a failure to take the long view of "what the total society needs." Reality was misread because perceptions and judgments were based on irrelevant past experiences. Further, modernity in the form of research institutes, bureaucracies, and the pressures of an uninformed public, also contributed to failure. Added to these factors was the frantic pace of modern life itself which inhibited diplomatic reflection.

In the third section of the book entitled "Reflections and Conclusions," Ambassador Yost suggests an alternative to anarchy. This section while expressing hope, is hardly optimistic. The alternatives posed require an extraordinary vision and great good will on the part of individual leaders. Essentially he argues that "realpolitik" is now utopian and thus formerly utopian solutions are now realistic. The quest for security by individual nations through the arms race has failed; now a new interpretation of national security and inter-

est based not in terms of glory and prestige but in terms of the welfare needs of the individual is necessary. The United Nations, and its peace keeping arm especially, must be strengthened. Once again the notion of national interest is elusive. A national interest conceived in terms of individual welfare need not be as uniform as he implies; furthermore, individual needs may well be fulfilled by policies of prestige and glory. Ultimately, the solution, if there is one, is to be found in the pressures of an "enlightened public opinion." Unfortunately, if information is already too abundant, and mistaken pre-conceptions as well as mis-perceptions rife among leaders, it is difficult to see how pressures from a public only incidentally concerned could be of assistance. Beyond this, the fundamental problem, the fact that we have not "learned to adapt our inherited emotional drives to the new environment" does not seem to be solved. Perhaps this volume can serve to enlighten public opinion. Most certainly the foreign policy making process it describes does not inspire confidence even though the goals of Ambassador Yost himself are commendable.—Keith R. Legg, University of Florida.

Elite Images and Foreign Policy Outcomes: A Study of Norway. By Philip M. Burgess. (Columbus: The Ohio State University Press, 1967. Pp. 179. \$6.25.)

On the eve of the invasion by Nazi Germany in April, 1940, Norwegian leaders assumed that geographical isolation, non-involvement in the issues that divided the major powers, and a strong "peace tradition" would permit their country to remain neutral in World War II, as it had done during World War I. The decision of the Norwegian government, almost exactly nine years later, to become a charter member of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization was based on a diametrically opposed set of premises about the nature of and conditions for national security. The linkage between the "strategic images," as revealed by elite pronouncement (the independent variable), and Norwegian foreign policy outcomes (the dependent variable) is the subject of this interesting book. Less attention is devoted to the antecedents of elite images although, as in the case of Glenn Paige's recent The Korean Decision, Burgess' study reveals the importance of the analogieswhether valid or not-which decision-makers find in history.

The first chapter, a brief but exhaustively documented survey of Norwegian foreign policy prior to World War II, emphasizes the elements of Norway's historical experience out of which a strategic image supporting neutralist policies developed. Chapter II examines the effects of the Nazi invasion on the thinking of the government in

exile in London. To Foreign Minister Halvdan Koht, the military catastrophe of 1940 could be explained by German malice rather than by any basic flaw in the pre-war strategic image. Opposing this view was that of Trygve Lie, who succeeded Koht as Foreign Minister in 1941. The policy outcome of Lie's image was an alliance with Great Britain, the first such military agreement in Norway's history.

The third chapter examines Norway's policy in the immediate post-war period. Historical experience had "proved" to Lie and his successor Halvard Lange, that neutrality was bankrupt, that Norway's geographical position was strategic rather than peripheral in great power rivalries, and that, rather than seeking to isolate themselves from great power conflicts, small nations such as Norway could best serve their security needs by working to make the United Nations an effective "bridge" between the United States and the Soviet Union. Not until 1948 did Norwegian leaders perceive that international tensions had undermined the ability of the United Nations to carry out its security-related functions. The fourth chapter examines how this strategic image initially led to exploration of two policy choices—membership in a Scandinavian bloc attached to the West or direct membership in the Western alliance—and ultimately to the decision to join NATO. This is the most interesting part of Burgess' analysis, in part because he compares the strategic images held by Norwegian, Danish and Swedish leaders to demonstrate convincingly that incompatible images prevented the formation of a Scandinavian alliance.

Among the conclusions presented in the fifth and final chapter, two stand out. First, Burgess concludes that elite images have considerable explanatory power for negative explanation (which policy alternatives were not adopted), as well as for predicting the course of action ultimately selected: "(I)mages and outcomes corresponded very closely, and potential mediating factors were not sufficiently powerful to alter the outcome. Examining only elite images would have left unexplained certain of the tactical domestic and diplomatic maneuvers that were reviewed above, but the final outcome, given the alternatives, was predictable from the images structure itself" (page 160). Second, the finding in other studies that an individual's images are highly resistant to change is supported; thus, modification of authoritative images is most likely to result from change of decision-makers, as in the case of Koht's replacement by Lie.

Among the merits claimed for the concept "strategic image," beyond its apparent ability to explain some important aspects of foreign policy, is its suitability for comparative analysis. This is a valid and important point. In a field that is

scarcely overburdened with truly comparative studies, such concepts should be exploited to the fullest extent possible. But those who are induced to replicate this study will find that the absence of an operational definition of "strategic image" makes it difficult to do so. These images appear to include such cognitive components as structure of the international system, nature and source of threat to national security, and the like, as well as an affective or valuational dimension. But nowhere are the rules for coding foreign policy statements made explicit. A more precise distinction between elements of the concept might also stimulate inquiry into some interesting questions of a comparative nature. Which aspects of the strategic image are most important for explaining policy outcomes? Under what circumstances? For what types of nations? In short, Burgess' study suggests that "strategic image" is a concept with considerable potential, but until it is made operational its utility for the comparative or cumulative study of foreign policy will fall short of its promise.—OLE R. Holsti, University of British Columbia.

Cyprus: Conflict and Conciliation, 1954-1958. By STEPHEN G. XYDIS. (Columbus: The Ohio State University Press, 1967. Pp. 704. \$15.00.)

This volume, essentially a study of diplomatic effort exerted through the United Nations (the United Nations General Assembly and the Assembly's Political Committee), traces the discussion and action in connection with the Greek Government's five recourses to the world body concerning Cyprus over the period indicated in the title. The author devotes special attention to the positions taken by Greece, Turkey, the United Kingdom and the United States, respectively, but without limiting his account to these states. American readers will find references at various places to the position or views of the United States chief of mission to Greece (as at pp. 83, 137-140, 184, 247, 249); these, as the author explains in his preface (p. xi), are based upon Greek diplomatic sources rather than American archival records.

Particularly instructive are the author's analyses of the views expressed and the positions taken by the representatives of particular members of the United Nations in the long-drawn-out effort looking to the disposition of the Cyprus problem. The very nature of the problem was a subject of some disagreement. As the author suggests (p. 4), the dispute was an "imperfect" one, protagonists and antagonists being allies. The moves concerning Cyprus are described (at p. 23) as "symptoms of irrational behavior in international conflict." While Greece's spokesmen sought self-determination for the island (which their opponents in argument sought to identify with enosis), Turkey's representatives advocated partition for the Cyp-

riots (p. 108), or an Anglo-Turkish-Greek condominium (p. 176). In the course of the discussions there was reference to the Cyprus problem as one which was not a "straight-forward colonial problem" (p. 294) and a spokesman for Greece observed that Greece was separated from a friendly and allied country (the United Kingdom) only by the Cyprus question (p. 321). Self determination, a British spokesman observed at one point in the discussions, had to be applied in a manner suitable to each particular case, and it meant self determination for all—a description which a Greek spokesman challenged (p. 422).

Viewed from the standpoint of an international system of law and organization, the developments with respect to the ease of Cyprus before the United Nations bodies elicited observations to the effect that there was need for a sense of international responsibility in order for a state to play the role of a member of an international society (p. 552). There was further reference to a "primitive society" which, like the United Nations, has neither courts nor police, and which is "primarily a collection of third parties" (p. 557).

At various places in the volume the author has drawn attention to matters of interest to students of international law. One of these was a suggestion (reported to have been made by an American Secretary of Embassy) to the effect that Cyprus might become a mandate or trusteeship (p. 141). There was reference to "domestic" jurisdiction questions (as at pp. 194, 209, 221, 303), to possible recourse to the European Commission on Human Rights (pp. 194-195, 239-240) and to the Cyprus question from the point of view of NATO and the "cohesion of the West" (p. 259). One speaker pointed out (p. 313) that Cyprus was not an "ethnic personality." There is indication at various places of positions which Commonwealth states took in the voting on issues presented (as at p. 493).

The limitations of a brief review preclude more than an illustrative mention of the processes which were involved in the Cyprus case before the United Nations in the selected period. The subsequent developments pertaining to Cyprus underline (1) the seriousness of the continuing problem, and (2) the difficulty of arriving at a solution which would be consistent with principles of the United Nations Charter and with the responsibility of the major states to cooperate in seeking a solution. That the coming of independence to Cyprus has not solved the problem is underlined by the continued United Nations force (UNFIYP) on the island. The basis for an understanding of the still-existing problem of Cyprus is enriched by the detailed account and analysis which Professor Xydis has provided.—ROBERT R. WILSON, Duke University.

U. S. Policy and the Security of Asia. By Fred Greene. (New York: McGraw-Hill Book Company, 1968. Pp. 429. \$9.95.)

This eighth volume in the Council on Foreign Relations' series on the United States and China in World Affairs concentrates on American security interests and commitments in Asia. The approach is as confusing and as contradictory as the subject itself. Although he is obviously well aware of the broader setting in which security questions must be considered, especially in Asia, the author seldom gives more than passing lip-service to the larger aspects of security problems. Doubtless it is true that "security questions deserve close study in their own right," but it does not follow that they can properly be considered apart from other issues and considerations. Thus this study gives an unbalanced picture of the existing situation in Asia and of the prospects for effective American involvement in Asian defense.

So many of the studies sponsored by the Council on Foreign Relations, perhaps because of the limits imposed upon them, lack depth and focus, and this one is an extreme example of the defects of such an approach. Professor Greene is a competent and well-informed student of Asian affairs. It is a pity that he forced his study so rigidly into the Council's mold.

The author argues that Communist China's growing nuclear capability enhances the Communist threat in Asia. Although this means, in his view, that "grim confrontations among nuclear states are in the offing" in Asia, he believes that the United States must commit itself to the containment of Chinese power, and that to do this its "vital interest" and "long-range goal" are "the creation of a balance of power" in Asia (note the word "creation"). Presumably this is to be achieved by reshaping its alliance policies and its alliance system ("the United States must broaden, rather than narrow, existing alliances"), and by "extensive American participation in Asian security affairs" and "an ever-deepening involvement in Asia."

Much of the book is a realistic analysis of the existing situation and future prospects in Asia, which provides ample proof of the difficulties, indeed probably of the impossibility, of implementing the proposed balance-of-power, containment, alliance, and involvement policies. The real difficulty lies not in the author's understanding of the situation in Asia but in his compulsive tendency to offer prescriptions which seem to have little chance of implementation, and which indeed seem likely to defeat the stated objectives if they could be implemented.

A concern for the Asian balance of power is logical enough, although it has an old-fashioned ring. A recommendation for reshaping and strengthening the American alliance system in Asia seems rather unrealistic in the light of the many evidences that the period of the maximum effectiveness of such a system has passed and that, with a few exceptions, there is little support for it among Asian nations today. The call for "an ever-deepening American involvement in Asia," presumably still referring to military involvement, seems to fly in the face of recent experience, and of the wishes of most of America's Asian allies—although it is clear, as the author states, that the leaders of some Asian states are more fearful of an American withdrawal than of increasing American involvement in Asian affairs.

A more balanced view was recently expressed by Congressman Clement J. Zablocki, Chairman of the Subcommittee on Asian and Pacific Affairs of the House Committee on Foreign Affairs, in commenting on the views expressed by witnesses during hearings on U.S. policy in Asia and the Pacific: "Witnesses . . . saw the future U. S. role in Asia and the Pacific as being somewhat less visible than today, but no less important. American power. wealth, and influence would be devoted with maximum flexibility to fostering Asian regionalism, promoting Asian economic progress and assisting Asians' ability to resist certain types of threats to their region's peace and stability. Among those threats would be attempts at nuclear blackmail by the Communist Chinese."

In spite of his desire for a tough line on China and for a neutralization of Chinese nuclear power, Professor Greene wants the United States to avoid "a frozen security posture" and to display "both firmness and a willingness to negotiate." In Vietnam he believes that "the iron test . . . is to demonstrate American determination to block Communist expansion-even in the face of a severe setback." He argues that "As a prerequisite for an Asian nation to decide not to produce nuclear weapons, the United States will have to extend broad, credible, and permanent security guarantees. . . . America's moral obligation in this regard will rise in proportion to its efforts to dissuade these states from producing their own weapons." Realizing that credible and effective American guarantees, especially in the Indian subcontinent, are probably out of the question, he considers other alternatives: "joint nuclear forces of some sort," a "collective-defense arrangement" between Japan and India, "some type of nuclear alliance" with the United States, a joint Soviet-American guarantee, separate but parallel U. S.-Soviet assurances, and a British guarantee, which, incredibly, he regards as "the most realistic and attractive of the 'outside guarantee' approaches."

Professor Greene touches upon a multitude of subjects. His coverage of the security picture in Asia, and of America's security interests, and commitments, is comprehensive, if rather confused, and his recommendations have the virtues of boldness, even though their impracticality is often demonstrated in the author's own words. His analysis, in short, is much sounder that his conclusions and recommendations.—Norman D. Palmes, *University of Pennsylvania*.

The Art of Diplomacy. By THOMAS A. BAILEY.
(New York: Appleton-Century-Crofts, 1968. Pp. 303. \$2.50.)

The preface of this book portends a sense of humor. In it, Professor Bailey states: "I have set forth 267 basic guidelines or maxims" on the art of diplomacy. My first reaction was one of delight. An instructor would have no difficulty in making up exam questions for ten years without repeating himself.

Taken separately, these guidelines or maxims seem routine. The following is a fair sampling: "Study your opponent's strengths and weaknesses"; "tactfulness is the essence of diplomacy"; "flexibility facilitates policy"; "criticism at home weakens policy abroad"; "foreign friendship cannot be bought"; "miscalculation is often the mother of war"; and finally, "armament and disarmament both entail risks." Historical illustrations are provided for each. Taken as a whole they are like quick silver do's and don't's. Should one "keep the diplomatic initiative" always, sometimes, or never? Is it true that "unhappy allies are potential enemies"—and how can we make them happy or should we?

On behalf of Professor Bailey, it must be said that his book is kind of ingerious. It is not easy to ferret out 267 guidelines or maxims, and there may be some point to it. We are not ordinarily aware of all the things that diplomats and decision-makers could do or should think of, and after all 267 is more manageable than say 503.

Does all this mean that we should not be writing policy-oriented books, that The Prince should no longer be assigned reading, that Harold Nicolson's importance has diminished with the decline in boudoir diplomacy, that the Foreign Affairs Quarterly should turn itself into another Journal of Conflict Resolution? I think not. There is still opportunity to whisper in the King's ear, to persuade the powerful, and to bend theory into resipes for action that the harried decision-maker will listen to and use. But, the way to do it is through specific policy proposals about concrete situations.

The difficulty with what we might call Professor Bailey's preceptual approach is that there are contrary precepts for every occasion. Much of Mr. Bailey's advice can provoke the opposite kind of guidance, viz. whereas "the Secretary [of State] should rise above politics," there are times when

he would be better advised to immerse himself in their cover. And, it should be added, that when precepts do not admit of their converse, they are simply amusing, viz., "send envoys who are persona grata."

Professor Bailey wants his book to be read by the President, "denizens of Foggy Bottom," and other relevants, and this is a legitimate and important goal for scholars. The goal can best be sought in two ways-by ideas and augmentation and by careful diplomatic history. Scholars have been in the forefront of these suggesting that the USG has not recognized the extent to which Western Europe is now stronger and more desirous of making its own decisions, that power relations in the current international context do not amount to very much, that there is such a thing as "overkill." that the conflict in South Vietnam would involve great cost without a clear or pleasing solution, that our policy priorities were not clear,—and the list is large and impressive. All of these ideas and arguments have found listeners in high places, have given greater depth, subtlety, and incisiveness to the internal governmental debates. The garbage and paper responsibilities of these in government is so great that perspective and freshness are bound to be somewhat lacking. Yet, there are always enough people who count who want ideas to make for an eager audience.

Careful diplomatic history is also relevant and helpful. Despite all the shibboleths about historical analogies, argument by such analogy is commonplace and irreplaceable in discussions of strategy and high policy. By so contrasting and comparing one gets a sense of where things are and what things mean. Of course, this can be a dangerous game, and that is why such histories must be careful to draw attention to their singularity. Moreover, when well done, these historical studies provide insight into ingeniousness and ingenuousness—the former always in need and the latter ever present. One of the big problems of policymaking is simply being able to think of all the alternatives that are both distinct and doable. The familiar policy triangle of one ridiculous extreme, the other ridiculous extreme, and the "middle way" is really not exhaustive, but who is ingenious enough to think of the other choices.

Stressing ideas and history means not trying to be too relevant to actual policy-making. The closer most scholars push toward a time, a place, an act of decision, the more off-base they are likely to be. Invariably, issues arise in the bureaucracy in a special, hard-to-divine way. An agency Policy Planning Staff, Office of the Secretary of Dejense.

Enemies in Politics. By DAVID J. FINLAY, OLE R. HOLSTI, AND RICHARD R. FAGAN. (Chicago: Rand McNally and Co., 1967. Pp. 257. \$7.50.)

The notion of focussing attention on the idea of the enemy in politics is intriguing. Here is a fundamental concept involved to a greater or lesser degree in the functioning of virtually every political system extant. Anyone who could make some novel and valid general statements about the relationship between different kinds of political systems and the conceptions of the enemy they employ would be making a very important contribution to the discipline of political science.

The authors of *Enemies in Politics*, to their credit, raise and begin to explore some of the questions which might lead to such general statements. But they do not take us far along the way to formulating and testing the sort of hypotheses we would be interested in.

The book consists mainly of three separate studies begun independently by each of the co-authers. Holsti offers a content analysis of John Foster Dulles' public pronouncements about Soviet Russia. He finds, not surprisingly, that Dulles viewed the Soviet-American conflict as one rooted in ideological and moral differences rather than merely in clashing national interests. Throughout his six years as Secretary of State, he described the Soviet Union and its leaders as materialistic, despotic, aggressive and atheistic, his emphasis on Communist moral shortcomings increasing toward the end of his term in office. He consistently referred to Soviet policy as hostile to the United States, and even when he perceived particular Soviet actions as less hostile, he attributed these not to any change in motives or in the nature of the Communist system, but to Communist weakness and the firmness of American policies. "The obvious conclusion," Holsti notes, "one with which Dulles fully agreed, is that increasing the pressure on one's opponents will make them even less aggressive. Quite apart from the actual issues involved in a conflict, to the extent that both parties adopt this theory of the other's behavior, there is little prospect for its peaceful resolution"

Finlay reviews the evolution of the idea of the enemy in pre- and post-independence Ghana. Under Kwame Nkrumah's direction, the threat posed by the forces of colonialism, and later neo-colonialism, served as an all purpose rallying point.

mah, suspension of elections, and comprehensive party control of the schools and mass media. The rationale by which these developments were justified involved identifying internal enemies with their external counterparts. Since Nkrumah and his ruling Convention People's Party were Ghana's only effective leaders in the struggle against neo-colonialism, those who opposed them were clearly serving the neo-colonialist enemy.

A similar conceptual fusion of internal and external enemies. Fagan finds, has been a key element in the official ideology of Fidel Castro's "mobilization regime" in Cuba. A content analysis of editorials appearing in the daily newspaper ElMundo during 1961 and 1962 reveals that more than 60% dealt with national or international issues, or infused domestic issues with important international overtones. The most frequent themes of these editorials were criticism and defiance of the United States and its allies and praise for the Soviet Union and the Cuban revolution. By transmitting these themes energetically to the masses through the media, the armed forces, mass organizations, schools and the Cuban Communist Party, the new regime has helped to legitimize its programs, spur the masses to action, and provide new (Communist) models for the Cuban nation and people to emulate.

In a short concluding chapter attempting to summarize the significance of these three "case studies," the authors state the limitations of their own book very precisely:

The cases, organized around a common theme but differing markedly in research style, system level and subject matter, do not provide the sort of data base from which one feels comfortable in launching inductive generalizations not already launched from other platforms. Even less do we feel moved to treat the studies as rigorous tests of the theoretical ideas set forth in Chapter I. There is much in the studies which supports and confirms the generalizations of the first chapter, but the former were not originally designed to test the latter, and they cannot honestly be made to do so post facto (p. 232).

Given these limitations, the authors content themselves with identifying some questions which warrant further investigation: to what extent is the choice of enemies determined by individual leaders as opposed to the historical and cultural milieu in which they operate? Under what conditions do national political elites come to organize political life around the fusion of internal and external enemies cited earlier? What kinds of conceptions of enemies are functional, and what kinds of dysfunctional, to various political systems?

These are fascinating and important political questions, and we can only join the authors of *Enemies in Politics* in hoping that their preliminary explorations will stimulate some more systematically designed investigation of the nature and

functions of political enmity in the near future.— Sheldon Appleton, The Charter College of Oakland University.

The Road to Jerusalem. By WALTER LAQUEUR. (New York; Macmillan, 1968, Pp. 368, \$6.95.)

Given the background of Arab-Israeli strife and the drama of the Six Day War, the 1967 crisis is a legitimate subject for instant history, but given the wealth of passions, it is also full of pitfalls. Two books to take seriously are Theodore Draper's Israel and World Politics and the volume here under review. The two bear much comparison, for they go over almost identical ground, share many conclusions, and hold a common pro-Israeli sympathy. Both have done plenty of homework. Laqueur, however, is the victim of his own polemical style. He is eminently readable: he is more clever. erudite, and entertaining than Draper: but his ironies and innuendoes becloud his analysis. His half-hearted acknowledgments of Arab views and interests, hastily rebutted in the same breath, are of little help; his Israelis are real men, his Arabs are newspaper stereotypes, and this gives his book a bit of the flavor of a "Jewish Western." Draper emerges as more lucid and instructive, and, at heart, more serious.

These overtones aside, Laqueur presents a detailed, well-documented account of the road to the 1967 war, plus some interesting interpretations of national policies, particularly those of the Soviet Union and of Israel. He supplies a motive for the Soviets to have deliberately misled the Syrians and Egyptians into believing that large Israeli forces were poised for an attack on Syria in mid-May: to wit, that the Syrian regime was in danger of collapse, that the Soviets were incapable of bolstering it on their own, and that therefore they created a war scare in order to draw Egypt in on Syria's side and bring Nasser's prestige, adroitness, and steadying influence to bear on the madmen in Damascus. The thesis is interesting, though not fully spelled out: why should the Soviets, as Laqueur suggests, have seen this game as free of risks, and why should Nasser have fallen into it so readily? On the other hand, Laqueur shows some ground for doubt that the alleged Israeli buildup was really what moved Nasser, in which case his initial motives, and those of the Soviets, are all the more mysterious. Did Nasser aim only at a limited diplomatic success—the removal of UNEF -and a boost to his sinking prestige, and only later decide to close the Straits of Tiran in a rash moment? Did he want war-"a return to 1948"-or only "a return to 1956"? No one, of course, can give us a definitive answer; perhaps, as Draper puts it, Nasser's problem was that he himself did not know. But Laqueur does not grasp

this question clearly, for at some points he gives us one answer, and elsewhere the other. Furthermore, he passes over evidence (cited in detail by Draper) that the Soviets were alarmed to see Nasser close the Straits, and seems surprisingly ready to assume that their policy stemmed from confidence in Egypt's ablity to fight.

On the Israeli side, Laqueur goes into much absorbing detail about Cabinet deliberations, the insistence of the generals that Israel must attack with the least possible delay, and the effects of Abba Eban's efforts to enlist Western diplomatic support. The primary concern, he insists, became Egypt's military buildup in Sinai rather than the closing of the Straits; Israel's very existence was at stake. Meanwhile, Eban's lack of success reinforced the urge for unilateral action. It emerges clearly that the generals were determined on a pre-emptive attack, and the only question was how soon. Yet we also learn that the generals in Tel Aviv-like those in the Pentagon-were certain of an Israeli victory, that they they did not expect an Egyptian attack, and that many soldiers were granted leave as late as June 3. A more sustained analysis of this anomaly, in place of extended accounts of Jewish mothers sending fruitcakes to the front, etc., would be helpful.

The most glaring analytical gap concerns American policy, of which we get only a casual assertion that the Israelis appealed for help in Washington in vain, plus the implication that the June 5 attack had tacit advance approval—points that are clearly contradicted by Draper, who establishes that United States initiatives had by no means played themselves out.

Laqueur's narrative ends on June 5, followed only by a puzzlingly lengthy analysis of world public and official opinion on the crisis. It is curious that he chooses to call his book The Road to Jerusalem, for this title can only refer to Israel's subsequent conquest and annexation of the Arab city, an action that had nothing to do with the stated reasons why Israel went to war in the first place. It does, inadvertently, remind us that the significance of the 1967 war lies not only in the narrow-minded opportunism with which the Arabs arranged for their own defeat, but also that with which the Israelis celebrated their victory.—MALCOLM H. KERR, University of California, Los Angeles.

The Politics of the Common Market. By W. Harr-Ley Clark. (Englewood Cliffs: Prentice-Hall, Inc., 1967. Pp. 180. \$4.95.)

However muddy the waters of European integration may appear, the institutions of the European Communities have continued to develop, and the political patterns surrounding them have grown in complexity. A number of books and arti-

cles are available to provide a background for observing this shifting pattern. To take a few examples, Leon Lindberg's excellent study, The Political Dynamics of European Economic Integration, published in 1963, is still highly relevant and has been made more valuable by Lindberg's more recent articles; and the articles in the April-July 1967 number of Government and Opposition highlight various aspects of politics and decision making in the Communities.

In addition to works such as these, books of a more basic nature have appeared. These are largely directed toward courses on international relations and European government and are designed to provide a brief descriptive introduction to the structure and politics of the Communities. Although varying greatly in quality, the books in this category face similar problems. Their brevity works against a nuanced and detailed exposition, and they run the risk that certain specific information will be rapidly outdated.

It is in this context that Professor Clark's book is to be considered. Writing before the Treaty fusing the executives of the three Communities was ratified, he attempts to introduce not only the formal structure of the European Economic Community, but the relationships between its component elements as they have developed. He presents a chapter on each of the components—the Council, the Commission, the Commission's growing administration, the European Parliament and the Court of Justice. These are complemented by chapters on interest groups and public opinion in the Communities, on relationships between the E.E.C. and other states and on implications for world and European politics. Within the limitations which he has set for himself, Professor Clark has provided a useful introduction; many of the criticisms one could make would be directed more toward the limitations than what was done within

Yet there are criticisms to be made. Many statements in the book are too strong or potentially misleading, even when accompanied by qualifications. One is struck by such assertions as, "The Council has done more to unify Europe than any other institution in the history of the Continent." In other places Professor Clark presents good material in such manner as to lessen its effect. The discussion of public opinion provides one example: although it contains valuable information, it could easily confuse students. And in concluding that E.E.C. economic regulations may have broad effects on attitude, Professor Clark makes a meaningful point; but the conclusion is scarcely strengthened by the statement, "Women's fashions and the format of women's magazines is already 'unified' for instance, as is the European taste in toys." There are also statements of questionable relevance to the current situation. For example, in view of the fact that the Parliament has never exercised its power to remove the Commission, and is unlikely to do so in the near future, Professor Clark is not directing students toward central political problems when he says, "There is a crying need for at least some provision for the dissolution of Parliament by the Commission if the removal power is used too often."

More seriously, discussions of certain points are less complete than they need be, even in a brief book. Disproportionate attention is given relatively unimportant subjects to the detriment of more important matters. By drastically reducing such sections as the four page discussion of the location of a permanent European capital, the author could give more attention to other problems. The book would benefit from a clearer picture of the actual politics of the Communities. One possibility would be a more extensive discussion of the Commission's power base. In this the various references to the 1965-66 crisis could be drawn together to illustrate better the interactions between the Commission and the member states. (And with regard to the crisis one might question Professor Clark's tendency to minimize its effects.) One could make a similar request for more focus in discussions of all the Community components and better integration of the parts.

In conclusion, The Politics of the Common Market does not say anything particularly new about the European Communities and does not provide as much information as it could and should. However it is a useful introduction and is better than other attempts of its kind. It serves to illustrate the need for more and better classroom materials dealing with the substance of politics in the European Communities.—Robert L. Peterson, The University of Iowa.

Economic Development and American Foreign Policy, 1943-62. By David A. Baldwin. (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1966. Pp. 291. \$7.95.)

Atlantic Economic Co-operation. The Case of the O.E.C.D. By HENRY G. AUBREY. (New York: Frederick A. Praeger, 1967. Pp. 214. \$6.00.)

These two books in a very real sense complement each other. Professor Baldwin has examined from an historical and analytical framework the shift in American official attitudes about foreign aid, while Professor Aubrey has explored in depth the structure and function of the OECD. In the former, Baldwin reveals the extent of the confusion that exists in the discussions of development aid by pointing to the varied uses of the term "soft loan," which can cover financial transactions as varied as those permitting repayment over "a long period" of time but in dollars, to repayment

in local currency, including the borrowing nation's, over a shorter period of time. To classify this type of transaction he notes that among business men such loans are generally thought of as "bad," a rather interesting commentary considering that many government officials who are instrumental in shaping and administering the programs involved hold a contrary view.

After this brief introductory chapter the author traces the elements of continuity and change in American aid policy. From the outset, and one might argue to this moment, the view has been widely held in the United States that there is a direct causal relationship between the existence of poverty and the appeal of communism, the existence of mass social and economic distress and danger to the peace. This assumption, plus the shift in Soviet policy from opposition to support of foreign aid, has made it possible for the nation to veer from its traditional view that the flow of trade and finance is almost exclusively a private sector matter to one in which the Government takes a much more active role. This is not to say that during the period under study, 1943-1962, the Government became the major agency for foreign development, for Baldwin reveals that although the amount of public funds varied, the guiding principles were keep the amount small (relative to private expenditure abroad), maintain American controls over its use, and shape the aid policy in such a way as to minimize competition with private investors (p. 22).

Other shifts in policy also occurred. For example, despite the opposition to scft loans, Congress eventually adopted a soft loan scheme with enthusiasm, the reason being that by 1953 the storage of agricultural commodities under the subsidy program had reached excessively costly proportions. The scheme aided in the disposal of much of the wheat, and since it was sold for local currency it did not create a repayment problem. Eventually, under President Kennedy, the Government adopted a policy in support of long term low interest loans.

Despite these changes the author points out that U. S. economic development policy remained essentially conservative throughout, and this affected its role in the multilateral banking and trade agencies of which it became a member. Thus institutions like the IBRD are very much influenced by American economic philosophy, which is the result of the Bank's voting system and the predominant positions Americans hold in the upper echelons of these organizations. This at least partially explains the accusation that the World Bank and the IFC have, broadly speaking, a conservative social philosophy. Both take into consideration the political and social conditions in the country requesting a loan rather than decide

solely on the basis of the merits of the project for which help is sought. Although this may appear to be a normal precaution for any banking institution (contrary to Baldwin's assertions), it would appear that the judgement rendered is strongly influenced by American values regarding these conditions. Furthermore, according to the author, several of those who received important appointments in the Bank had earlier opposed its creation and policies (p. 57).

Because he was interested primarily in revealing the political dimensions of U.S. involvement in multilateral aid programs, he did not provide any description of what these various development agencies are expected to accomplish nor how they function. Baldwin reveals the nature of U.S. influence, that Congress is even more conservative in its thinking than the Administration, and the general sympathy for this position by organizations such as the IBRD. But there is much repetition here arising from the way in which the book is structured. One wonders if a revision of the study to explore certain important questions might not have improved the work. For example, how does U. S. economic philosophy compare with that of other major capitalist states who hold positions of importance in these agencies. Difficult though it might be to get detailed information, it would be of great importance to know what projects have not been acceptable to the Bank, and what national development strategies have had to be employed to make proposals acceptable. Likewise it would be useful to know what differences, if any, are reflected in the views of the banking institutions and industrial firms in the U.S. regarding development policy. One might also ask whether clear-cut differences in party or sectional views exist re development strategy in the Congress. Any additional knowledge along these lines might have been of greater benefit to the reader than the many pages of disagreement with other authors who discussed foreign aid.

But for those interested in increasing their understanding of the many phases of foreign aid legislation and the assumptions which may underlie the positions taken, the Baldwin book will prove quite useful.

The Aubrey study is a more narrowly focused one concerned with the operations and structure of the Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development, the working philosophy behind it—in particular the American influence—and the author's views regarding changes which would help to make it more effective. For example, he points to the need to improve its performance by stressing specific kinds of linkages—supply and demand, production and trade, etc. (pp. 128-9), and the need to generate new ideas in the economic policy committee (pp. 149-50). But perhaps even more than urging reforms, the author seems to consider

it his mission to explain and seek support for the Organization. That Professor Aubrey sees it as providing great benefit is quite clear. This does not, however, prevent him from recognizing some of its weaknesses and the validity of some of the criticism that has been levelled against it by the lesser developed countries. As a successor to the OEEC it has been concerned primarily with questions of increasing production, with financial stability, with freeing trade, and with other matters pertaining to manpower needs and production. Only after these problems were addressed were the OEEC and the OECD interested in aiding underdeveloped countries. Even the goal of liberalizing the terms of trade does not necessarily work to the advantage of the primary producing countries. As the author points out, there were even splits between the members of OECD, the "seven" wanting an inter-governmental approach to planming and trade, the "six" wanting a gradual movement toward supranationality, at least in economic affairs. The U.S., Aubrey finds, seemed to be in a contradictory position, approving both the views of the "six" and also supporting GATT which stood for ending discrimination in trade.

In this book, as in Baldwin's, evidence is cited of the conservative position the U. S. has taken, particularly in matters of trade liberalization and soft loans—i.e., of the long term, low interest type. The author defines U. S. policy as restrictive and cautious (p. 59), and its desire to establish a closer relationship between the NATO and the OECD has diminished its standing with the non-NATO members. He makes it quite obvious that in his opinion the U. S. sees trade in large measure as a political weapon. In that respect it is in the same camp as the Soviet Union.

Nor, for that matter, has the OECD done much to help the developing states in re their three major problems,—lagging demand for raw materials, instability of their prices in world markets, and inadequate access of their industrial products in the markets of the economically advanced countries. (Even the GATT has not been of major benefit to them because of its general trade objectives.)

There is little doubt that Aubrey sees the benefits of OECD in terms of its ability to educate governments and publics of the need for change in economic policies. In turn, "ability" is translated by the author as "objective." Because he finds that OECD was not established as a supra-national body, he does not urge efforts to re-direct its policy. This may be considered realism, but as so many have noted, in the area of civil liberties such a position tends to accept and extend the influence of the supporters of the status quo. Certainly it does little to build up strong pressure for the very changes which the author himself notes are necessary to face some of the major problems

in international economic relations today.—Maurice Waters, University of the West Indies.

Australia Faces Southeast Asia: The Emergence of a Foreign Policy. By Amry and Mary Belle Vandenbosch. (Lexington: University of Kentucky Press, 1967. Pp. 175. \$5.75.)

Australia Faces Southeast Asia is the collaborative effort of a man and wife team, the senior author being a recognized authority on Southeast Asia. The book is designed as a general review of the postwar setting in which Australia has lived, made appraisals, and devised and conducted her external affairs. It is a book which illustrates the dilemmas faced by a Western "middle power" which has attempted to adapt to and coexist with its volatile Asian environment, while seeking adequate security arrangements. Consistent with Professor Vandenbosch's established interest in the area, considerable attention is devoted to illustrating the governing themes of the book by drawing on the Dutch New Guinea and Malaysian "confrontation" disputes.

The survey character and easy, uncluttered style of the book recommend it to the general reader. It is not, however, a book which says anything particularly new, or says it very differently, or with greater subtlety of argument, than do existing works. Furthermore, it contains a disappointing number of shortcomings which materially detract its scholarly appeal.

First, Australia Faces Southeast Asia has some exceptionally curious emphases. For instances, in discussing Labor's foreign policy in the 1940's, the authors expend considerable detail on the wartime ANZAC Pact with New Zealand and the Manus Island dispute with America. The criticism here is that such Labor foreign policy directions as the search for a regional security alliance, and accommodation to a non-European Commonwealth, are hardly mentioned at all—even though they are fundamental subjects and which carried far beyond Labor's removal from office in 1949.

Collaterally, a number of themes which are discussed at length have some of their obvious dimensions omitted. Menzies' Malayan troop commitment announcement in 1955, although characterized as "a very important document of Australian foreign and defense policy," is not connected to America's reluctance to countenance a standing force for the recently evolved SEATO. Commitments under ANZUS are broached, but the construction of the United States naval signal station in Western Australia is in no way related to the Austral-American alliance, toward which it was decidedly designed to contribute.

The book also contains some unfortunate oversimplifications or misconstructions. The authors argue that the Government's near-defeat in the 1961 elections reflected strong public antagonism toward Indonesia's apparent ability to get away with provocative behavior over Dutch New Guinea. In fact, while the public was hostile to Indonesia's behavior, the 1961 election was decided almost entirely on economic and other domestic issues. Foreign policy, as survey research data demonstrate, played almost no part in determining electoral behavior. The authors allude to the size of Australia's "overseas" civil aid contributions. In fact, the scope of such contributions becomes much less impressive when qualified to mean that "overseas" includes aid to Australian Papua and New Guinea. The authors cite a quantum jump in Australian defense spending from \$282 million to \$1.1 billion. In fact, they confuse dollars and pounds and fail to identify the increase as being spread over a period of years.

The Vandenbosches also have some difficulties with basic facts. They identify Evatt and Calwell as Labor Leader and Deputy Leader, respectively, in a debate staged early in 1950-although these titles were not achieved until more than a year later. They say that an embassy was installed in Taipei in 1956—although the decision to do so was not taken until 1966, after a change of leadership from Menzies to Holt. They cite Churchill's remark that, under Labor in World War Two, "conscription even for home defence was banned," with the clear implication that this was the position throughout the duration of the war. In truth, Labor inherited conscription for domestic service from the preceding Government, and proceeded to legislate conscription for limited overseas duty.

Other, miscellaneous caveats could also be entered. For instance, some introductory comments on domestic politics and foreign policy are not pursued throughout the balance of the book. Remarks by individual Opposition members are often made to appear as if they represented Labor Party policy, which was not necessarily so. Newspaper editorial opinions are often made to appear as if they represented public opinion, which again was not necessarily so.

In the large, then, while Australia Faces Southeast Asia has its value, its drawbacks at least outweigh its merits. Perhaps a more sensitive research effort would have helped. A number of important sources, including nearly all Australian periodical literature and survey data, are neglected. When sources are cited, they are not always the most representative. Much of the discussion of Labor's wartime policy, for instance, draws upon Churchill's history of the Second World War. Churchill was not the most reliable observer of Australian conditions, and it is a pity that pertinent Australian sources are here, as elsewhere, mysteriously absent.—Henry S. Albinski, The Pennsylvania State University.

ANNOUNCEMENTS

The sixty-fifth Annual Meeting of the Association will be held September 2-6, 1969, at the Commodore Hotel, New York City.

The Executive Committee of the American Political Science Association has decided that, beginning with the 1968 meetings, the minutes of meetings of the Council and of the annual and special meetings of the Association's membership will be reported in P.S. rather than, as heretofore, in the Review.

ARTICLES ACCEPTED FOR FUTURE PUBLICATION*

March, 1969

- Joel D. Aberbach, University of Michigan, "Alienation and Political Behavior"
- David W. Adamany, Wesleyan University, "The Party Variable in Judges' Voting: Conceptual Notes and a Case Study"
- Stephen J. Cimbala, University of Wisconsin, "Foreign Policy as an Issue Area: An Exploratory Analysis"
- Thomas R. Dye, Florida State University, "Income Inequality and American State Politics"
- Arthur S. Goldberg, University of Rochester, "Social Determinism and Rationality as Bases of Party Identification"
- Dean Jaros and Gene L. Mason, University of Kentucky, "Party Choice and Support for Demagogues"
- Arthur L. Kalleberg, University of Minnesota, "Concept Formation in Normative and Empirical Studies"
- Lawrence B. Mohr, University of Michigan, "Determinants of Innovation in Organizations"
- Douglas W. Rae, Yale University, "Decision-Rules and Individual Values in Collective Choice"
- R. J. Rummel, University of Hawaii, "Indicators of Cross-National and International Patterns"
- Peter G. Snow, University of Iowa, "The Class Basis of Argentine Political Parties"
- Raymond E. Wolfinger, Stanford University, and Fred I. Greenstein, Wesleyan University, "Comparing Political Regions: The Case of California"

June, 1969

- F. M. Barnard, University of Saskatchewan, "Culture and Political Development: Herder's Insights"
- Richard W. Boyd, Indiana University, "Presidential Elections: An Explanation of Voting Defection"
- John F. Manley, University of Wisconsin, "Wilbur D. Mills: A Study in Congressional Influence"
- Norman H. Nie, University of Chicago, Bingham G. Powell, University of California, Berkeley, and C. Kenneth Prewitt,

- University of Chicago, "Social Structure and Political Participation: Developmental Relationships, I"
- Richard G. Niemi, University of Rochester, "Majority Decision-making with Imperfect Agreement on Norms"
- James H. Oliver, University of Maryland, "Citizen Demands and the Soviet Political System"
- Kenneth Prewitt, University of Chicago, and Heinz Eulau, Stanford University, "Political Matrix and Political Representation: Prolegomenon to a New Departure from an Old Problem"
- Howard Rosenthal, Carnegie-Mellon University, "The Electoral Politics of Gaullists in the Fourth Republic: Ideology or Constituency Interest?"
- Bruce M. Russett, Yale University, "Who Pays for Defense?"
- Giovanni Sartori, University of Florence, "Politics, Ideology, and Belief Systems"
- Robert A. Schoenberger, University of Michigan, "Campaign Strategy and Party Loyalty: The Electoral Relevance of Candidate Decision-making in the 1964 Congressional Elections"
- Henri Theil, University of Chicago, "The Desired Political Entropy"

September, 1969

- Graham T. Allison, Harvard University, "Conceptual Models and the Cuban Missile Crisis"
- Charles F. Cnudde and Donald J. McCrone, University of Wisconsin, "Party Competition and Welfare Policies in the American States"
- Richard M. Merelman, University of California, Los Angeles, "The Development of Political Ideology: A Framework for the Analysis of Political Socialization"
- Ira Sharkansky, University of Wisconsin, and Richard I. Hofferbert, Cornell University, "Dimensions of State Politics, Economics, and Public Policy"
- * Production exigencies may occasionally necessitate publication of articles in issues other than those given in this listing.

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INDEX TO V	OLUME LXII
1878: Disraeli, Gladstone and Revolution: The Passing of the Second Reform Bill. Maurice Cowling. Noted by James B. Christoph	Betancourt. Hacia America Latina Demo- cratica e Integrada
Lawyers and the Courts: A Sociological Study of the English Legal System, 1750- 1965. Noted by Theodore L. Becker 297	Representatives, 1836-1860. Noted by James J. Best
Abernethy, David B. Note on Okei Arikpo, The Development of Modern Nigeria 998	Levy, Origins of the Fifth Amendment 1334 Alford, Robert R. and Eugene C. Lee.
A Body-Incorporate: City-County Separa- tion in Virginia. Chester W. Bain. Noted	Voting Turnout in American Cities 796 Alford, Robert R. and Harry M. Scoble.
by Wendell Bedichek	Sources of Local Political Involvement 1192 Ali, Chaudhri Muhammad. The Emergence
ment. John Locke. Noted by Fred H. Willhoite	of Pakistan. Noted by Ralph Braibanti. 649 Alisky, Marvin. Note on Paul L. Doughty,
Abshire, David M. Note on Joseph L. Morrison, W. J. Cash: Southern Prophet:	Huaylas: An Andean District in Search of Progress
A Biography and Reader	Allen, William Sheridan. The Nazi Seizure of Power: The Experience of a Single
by Gilbert R. Winham	German Town, 1930-1935. Noted by G. Bingham Powell, Jr
King of Hawaii. Noted by Robert Horwitz	The American Chief Executive: The Presidency and the Governorship. Joseph E.
The Administration of the White Australia Policy. A. C. Palfreeman. Noted by D. W. Rawson	Kallenbach. Noted by Leslie Lipson 626 The American Far Right: A Case Study of Billy James Hargis and Christian Crusade.
The Admirals' Hobby. Vincent Davis. Noted by J. C. Ries	John H. Redekop. Noted by Robert A. Schoenberger 982
Adrian, Charles R. and Charles Press. Decision Costs in Coalition Formation 556	American Federalism in Perspective. Aaron Wildavsky, ed. Noted by Roscoe C.
Africa: The Politics of Unity. Immanuel Wallerstein. Noted by Victor T. Le Vine 1354	Martin
Agency Requests, Gubernatorial Support and Budget Success in State Legislatures. Ira	ism and Realism. Donald Brandon. Noted by John T. Holden 683
Sharkansky	AMERICAN GOVERNMENT: COMMUNITY POLITICS On the Neo-Elitist Critique of Community
Mikhail Bor. Noted by George R. Feiwel 1010 Ake, Claude. A Theory of Political Integration. Noted by Henry Teune 978	Power. Richard M. Merelman 451 Policy Maps of City Councils and Policy Outcomes: A Developmental Analysis.
Alba, Victor. Nationalists Without Nations: The Oligarchy Versus the People in Latin	Heinz Eulau and Robert Eyestone 124 Sources of Local Political Involvement.
America. Noted by Peter Ranis 1383 Alberoni, Francesco, Vittorio Capecchi,	Robert R. Alford and Harry M. Scoble 1192 AMERICAN GOVERNMENT: CONGRESS
Agopik Manoukian, Franca Olivetti and Antonio Tosi. L'Attivista di Partito.	The House and the Federal Role: A Computer Simulation of Roll-Call Voting.
Noted by Robert D. Putnam	Michael J. Shapiro 494 The Institutionalization of the U. S. House
Imperial Germany, 1888–1918. Lamar Cecil. Noted by Edward L. Pinney 270 Albinski, Henry S. Note on Amry and	of Representatives. Nelson W. Polsby 144 A Measure of the Population Quality of
Mary Belle Vandenbosch, Australia Faces Southeast Asia; The Emergence of a	Legislative Apportionment. Henry F. Kaiser
Foreign Policy	the House of Representatives. Charles O. Jones

Organization Theory and the Explanation of Important Characteristics of Congress. Lewis A. Froman, Jr	matic Recognition. Peter G. Filene. Noted by William B. Ballis	301
AMERICAN GOVERNMENT: ELECTIONS AND VOTING BEHAVIOR	Blau and Otis Dudley Duncan. Reviewed by M. Kent Jennings	596
The Repeal of Fair Housing in California: An Analysis of Referendum Voting. Raymond E. Wolfinger and Fred I. Greenstein	America's Political Dilemma: From Limited to Unlimited Democracy. Gottfried Dietze. Noted by Peter Bachrach	1310
R. Alford and Eugene C. Lee	Change in Continental Europe in the Nineteenth Century. Noted by Charles Lewis Taylor	1360
A Comparative Analysis of State and Federal Judicial Behavior: The Reapportionment Cases. Edward N. Beiser	Nineteenth Century. Noted by Charles Lewis Taylor	1360
AMERICAN GOVERNMENT: POLITICAL PARTIES	Noted by Kenneth S. Sherrill	1342
Motivation, Incentive Systems, and the Political Party Organization. M. Margaret Conway and Frank B. Feigert 1159 AMERICAN GOVERNMENT: POLITICAL SOCIALIZA-	Appleton, Sheldon. Note on David J. Finlay, Ole R. Holsti, and Richard R. Fagan. Enemies in Politics	1402
ITION Image of a President: Some Insights into the Political Views of School Children. Roberta S. Sigel	Europe Faces Coming Policy Decisions. Karl W. Deutsch. Noted by Steven J. Brams	1391
The Malevolent Leader: Political Socializa- tion in an American Sub-culture. Dean Jaros, Herbert Hirsch and Frederic J.	Three Essays on Ideology and Develop- ment. Noted by Irving Louis Horowitz The Art of Conjecture. Bertrand de Jouvenal.	1321
Fleron, Jr	Reviewed by James A. Robinson The Art of Diplomacy. Thomas A. Bailey.	236
Civics Curriculum in the United States. Kenneth P. Langton and M. Kent Jen-	Noted by Leslie H. Gelb	,
nings	Simpson. Noted by L. L. Wade And Promises to Keep: The Southern Conference for Human Welfare, 1933-1948. Thomas A. Krueger. Noted by Emory	
AMERICAN GOVERNMENT: STATE POLITICS Agency Requests, Gubernatorial Support and Budget Success in State Legislatures. Ira	F. Via	269
Sharkansky	Issues of Political Development. Reviewed by Arpad von Lazar	24 3
mental Expenditures. Allan G. Pulsipher and James L. Weatherby, Jr	English Politics and Economics During the Crimean War. Noted by Charles Mark	668
form, and the Judicial Process. Wilfred E. Rumble, Jr. Noted by Michael A. Weinstein	Anderson, Thornton. Russian Political Thought: An Introduction. Noted by R. V. Daniels.	612
The American Party Systems. William Nisbet Chambers and Walter Dean Burnham, eds. Reviewed by A. E. Kier Nash 1275	Andrain, Charles F. Note on Herbert J. Spiro, ed., Patterns of African Development	284
Americans and the Soviet Experiment, 1917– 1933: American Attitudes Toward Russia from the February Revolution Until Diplo-	Andrews, William G. Note on Alfred Grosser, French Foreign Policy Under de Gaulle	1018

Annuaire Suisse de Science Politique— Schweizerisches Jahrbuch für Politische Wissenschaft. Noted by William R.		Australia Faces Southeast Asia: The Emer- gence of a Foreign Policy. Amry and Mary Belle Vandenbosch. Noted by Henry S.	
Keech	666	Albinski	
cisims of his review of Bernard J. Frieden,		Thought of Karl Marx. Noted by David	
"Metropolitan America: Challenge to		M. Ricei	1309
Federalism."	1272		
Anton, Thomas J. Note on Bernard J.		Bachrach, Peter and Morton S. Baratz.	
Frieden, Metropolitan America: Challenge		Communication on Richard M. Merel-	
to Federalism	623	man's "On the Neo-Elitist Critique of	
Antonio Gramsci and the Origins of Italian		Community Power."	1268
Communism. John M. Cammett. Noted		Bachrach, Peter. Note on Gottfried Dietze,	
by Sidney G. Tarrow	253	America's Political Dilemma: From Lim-	
Arikpo, Okei. The Development of Modern		ited to Unlimited Democracy	1310
Nigeria. Noted by David B. Abernethy	998	Bachrach, Peter. Note on William E. Con-	
Arms Control Arrangements for the Far		nolly, Political Science and Ideology	599
East. Noted by Dale Pontius	687	Back to Back: The Duel between FDR and	
Arms Control for the Late Sixties. James E.		the Supreme Court. Leonard Baker, Noted	
Dougherty and J. F. Lehman, Jr., eds.		by C. Herman Pritchett	631
Noted by William P. Gerberding	678	Bailey, Thomas A. The Art of Diplomacy.	
Asamoah, Obed Y. The Legal Significance		Noted by Leslie H. Gelb	1401
of the Declarations of the General Assembly		Bain, Chester W. A Body Incorporate: City-	
of the United Nations. Noted by A. R.		County Separation in Virginia. Noted by	
Headley	693	Wendell Bedichek	640
Ashcraft, Richard. Locke's State of Nature:		Bain, Joe S., Richard E. Caves and Julius	
Historical Fact or Moral Fiction?	898	Margolis. Northern California's Water	
Ashford, Douglas E. Morocco-Tunisia:		Industry. Noted by Ashley L. Schiff	634
Politics and Planning. Reviewed by		Baker, Leonard. Back to Back: The Duel	
George Lenczowski	587	between FDR and the Supreme Court.	
Ashford, Douglas E. National Development		Noted by C. Herman Pritchett	631
and Local Reform: Political Participation		Balassa, Bela. Trade Liberalization Among	
in Morocco, Tunisia and Pakistan. Re-		Industrial Countries: Objectives and Alter-	
viewed by George Lenczowski	587	natives. Noted by David S. Ball	692
Ashford, Douglas E. Perspectives of a Moroc-		Baldwin, David A. Economic Development	
can Nationalist. Reviewed by George		and American Foreign Policy 1943-1962.	
Lenczowski	587	Noted by Maurice Waters	1405
Asian Drama: An Inquiry into the Poverty		Baldwin, George B. Planning and Develop-	
of Nations. Gunnar Myrdal. Reviewed by		ment in Iran. Noted by Marvin Zonis.	645
	1278	Balinsky, Alexander, Abram Bergson, John	
Aspaturian, Vernon V. The Soviet Union in		N. Hazard and Peter Wiles. Planning	
the World Communist System. Noted by	000	and the Market in the U.S.S.R.: the 1960's.	
Nish Jamgotch, Jr.	690	Noted by Arthur W. Wright	655
Atlantic Economic Co-operation. The Case		Ball, David S. Note on Bela Balassa, Trade	
of the O.E.C.D. Henry C. Aubrey. Noted	1405	Liberalization Among Industrial Coun-	600
by Maurice Waters	1400	tries: Objectives and Alternatives	692
The Atlantic Idea and its European Rivals.		Ballis, William B. Note on Peter G. Filene.	
Harold Van B. Cleveland. Reviewed by Stuart A. Scheingold	1206	Americans and the Soviet Experiment, 1917–1933: American Attitudes Toward	
Aubrey, Henry C. Atlantic Economic Co-		Russia From the February Revolution	
operation. The Case of the O.E.C.D. Noted	•	Until Diplomatic Recognition	301
by Maurice Waters	1405	Bankwitz, Philip C. F. Maxime Weygand	901
Auerbach, Jerold S. Labor and Liberty: The	1100	and Civil-Military Relations in Modern	
LaFollette Committee and the New Deal.		France. Noted by John N. Colas	1004
Noted by Douglas Camp Chaffey	989	Baratz, Morton S. and Peter Bachrach.	1001
Aus Nächster Nähe: Lebenserinnerugen.		Communication on Richard M. Merel-	
Vol. I. 1884-1927. Mit der Kraft des		man's "On the Neo-Elitist Critique of	
Geistes. Vol. II. 1927-1967. Arnold		Community Power."	1268
	1204	Rephar Reniemin P. Note on George A	

Codding, Jr., Governing the Commune of Veyrier: Politics in Swiss Local Govern-		Separation in Virginia Behind the Shield: The Police in Urban	640
ment	1374	Society. Arthur Niederhoffer. Noted by Neal Milner	625
on Science and Government	985	The Reapportionment Cases Bell, Wendell, ed. The Democratic Revolution in West Indies. Noted by Morton	788
Barnes, Samuel H. Note on Umberto Melotti, Cultura e partecipazione sociale nella citta in transformazione	273	Kroll. Benes, Vaclav, Andrew Gyorgy and George Stambuk. Eastern European Government	1368
Barnes, Samuel H. Party Democracy: Politics in an Italian Socialist Federation.	210	and Politics. Noted by Carl Beck Benes, Vaclav L. Note on Joseph Roths-	289
Noted by Timothy M. Hennessey Barnett, A. Doak. Cadres, Bureaucracy, and Political Power in Communist China.	1351	child, Pilsudski's Coup d'Etat Benjamin, Roger W. and John H. Kautsky. Communism and Economic Development	1370 110
Reviewed by Bruce D. Larkin Barnett, A. Doak. China After Mao. Re-	963	Benjamin, Roger W. Review of A. Doak Barnett, China After Mao	588
viewed by Roger W. Benjamin Barry, Donald D. Note on Isaac Deutscher, The Unfinished Revolution: Russia 1917-	588	Benjamin, Roger W. Review of Francois Geoffrey-Dechaume, China Looks at the World	588
1966	662	Benjamin, Roger W. Review of Hans Granqvist, The Red Guard Benjamin, Roger W. Review of Merle	588
Beyle	269	Goldman, Literary Dissent in Communist China	588
Peking, Hanoi	686	the Danish Resistance Movement, 1940- 1945: A Study of the Wartime Broadcasts of the BBC Danish Service. Noted by	
States and Asia	685	Harold Graves	298
ed., Scandinavian Political Studies Baylis, Thomas A. Note on Lewis J.	237	mercier-Quelquejay. Islam in the Soviet Union. Noted by Robert A. Rupen	1002
Edinger, ed., Political Leadership in Industrialized Societies: Studies in Comparative Analysis	644	Bergson, Abram, John N. Hazard, Peter Wiles and Alexander Balinsky. Planning and the Market in the U.S.S.R.: the	
Beals, Alan R. and Bernard J. Siegel. Divisiveness and Social Conflict. Noted		1960's. Noted by Arthur W. Wright Berlin: The Wall is Not Forever. Eleanor	655
by Roger D. Masters	618	Lansing Dulles. Noted by William E. Wright Bernd, Joseph L., ed. Mathematical Appli-	295
Court. Noted by Bradley C. Canon Beaney, William M. Note on Paul A. Freund. On Law and Justice	$\frac{265}{1335}$	cations in Political Science, II. Noted by Alden E. Lind	615
Beaufre, André. NATO and Europe. Reviewed by Stuart A. Scheingold	1296	cations in Political Science, III. Reviewed by Herbert F. Weisberg	1294
Beck, Carl. Note on Kurt London, ed., Eastern Europe in Transition Beck, Carl. Note on Vaclav Benes, Andrew	289	Berzins, Alfred. The Two Faces of Co- Existence. Noted by W. W. Kulski Best, James J. Note on Thomas B. Alex-	312
Gyorgy and George Stambuk, Eastern European Government and Politics Becker, Theodore L. Note on Brian Abel-	289	ander. Sectional Stress and Party Strength: A Study of Roll-Call Voting Patterns in	
Smith and Robert Stevens, Lawyers and the Courts: A Sociological Study of the		the U. S. House of Representatives, 1836–1860 Betancourt, Romulo. Hacia America Latina	633
English Legal System, 1750-1965 Bedichek, Wendell. Note on Chester W. Bain A Rody Incorporate: City-County	297	Democratica e Integrada. Noted by Robert J. Alexander	685

Noted by Marian D. Irish	684	Pakistan	649
Cess	269	Outlooks	980
Beyond Ideology: The Revival of Political		Brakeman, Louis F. Note on Stephen D.	
Theory. Dante Germino. Reviewed by		Kertesz, The Quest for Peace Through	
Harry Girvetz	958	Diplomacy	679
Beyond Vietnam: The United States and		Brams, Steven J. Measuring the Concentra-	
Asia. Edwin O. Reischauer. Noted by		tion of Power in Political Systems	461
George G. Bauroth	685	Brams, Steven J. Note on Karl W. Deutsch,	
Bidault, Georges. Resistance: The Political		Arms Control and the Atlantic Alliance:	
Autobiography of Georges Bidault. Noted	****	Europe Faces Coming Policy Decisions	1391
by Michael R. Gordon	1003	Brandon, Donald. American Foreign Policy	
Bienen, Henry. Tanzania: Party Transformation and Economic Development.		Beyond Utopianism and Realism. Noted by John T. Holden	200
Noted by Paul Saenz	653	Brass, Paul R. Coalition Politics in North	683
Biographical Dictionary of Republican	000	India	1174
China. Vol. I. Howard L. Boorman, ed.		Brass, Paul R. Note on Michael Brecher,	1112
Book note	298	Nehru's Mantle: The Politics of Succession	
Blake, Robert. Disraeli. Noted by Lewis		in India	293
J. Edinger	1380	Braunthal, Gerard. Note on Goetz Briefs,	
Blau, Peter and Otis Dudley Duncan. The		ed., Laissez-faire-Pluralismus: Demokratie	
American Occupational Structure. Re-		und Wirtschaft des gegenwärtigen Zeital-	
viewed by M. Kent Jennings	596	ters	1009
Bliss, Howard. Note on Robert Lemaignen,		Braunthal, Gerard. The Federation of	
L'Europe au berceau: souvenirs d'un		German Industry in Politics. Noted by	001
technocrate	304	George K. Romoser	664
Bloomfield, Lincoln P. Review of Alf Ross, The United Nations: Peace and Progress	roe	Brayman, Harold. Corporate Management in a World of Politics: The Public, and	
Bloomfield, Lincoln P. Review of David W.	586	Governmental Problems of Business. Noted	
Wainhouse and Associates. International		by Oliver Garceau	625
Peace Observation: A History and Forecast	586	Brczilian Planning: Development Politics	020
Blue, Richard N. Note on Edgar A. and	•••	and Administration. Robert T. Dal-	
Kathryn R. Schuler, Public Opinion and		and. Reviewed by John T. Dorsey,	
Constitution Making in Pakistan	647	Jr	245
Bolingbroke and His Circle: the Politics of		The Brazilian Revolution of 1930 and the	
Nostalgia in the Age of Walpole. Isaac		Aftermath. Jordan M. Young. Noted by	
Kramnick. Noted by James V. Elliott	1312	Robert T. Daland	282
Bombwall, K. R. The Foundations of Indian	4000	Breakthrough in Burma: Memoirs of a Revo-	
Federalism. Noted by Baljit Singh	1008	lution, 1939-1946. Ba Maw. Noted by	1000
Boorman, Howard L., ed. Biographical		Fred R. von der Mehden Brecher, Michael. Nehru's Mantle: The	1363
Dictionary of Republican China, Vol. I. Book note	298	Politics of Succession in India. Noted by	
Bor, Mikhail. Aims and Methods of Soviet	200	Paul R. Brass	293
Planning. Noted by George R. Feiwel	1010	Brecht, Arnold. Aus Nächster Nähe: Leben-	200
Boston University Papers on Africa, Transi-		serinnerugen. Vol. I. 1884-1927. Mit der	
tion in African Politics. Jeffrey Butler and		Kraft des Geistes. Vol. II. 1927-1969.	
A. A. Castagno, eds. Noted by Fred G.		Noted by Gordon A. Craig	1304
Burke and John R. Nellis	283	Briefs, Goetz, ed. Laissez-faire-Pluralismus:	
Bowman, Lewis. Note on Andrew Buni,		Demokratie und Wirtschaft des gegen-	
The Negro in Virginia Politics, 1902-	400	wärtigen Zeitalters. Noted by Gerard	***
1965	638	Braunthal	1009
Bowman, Lewis. Note on Jack D. Fleer, North Carolina Politics: An Introduction	1347	British Broadcasting and the Danish Re- sistance Movement, 1940-1945: A Study	
Boynton, George R. Note on William C.	4041	of the Wartime Broadcasts of the BBC	
Mitchell, Sociological Analysis and Poli-		Danish Service. Jeremy Bennett. Noted	
tics: The Theories of Talcott Parsons	250	by Harold Graves	298
Braibanti, Ralph. Note on Chaudhri		The British General Election of 1966. D. E.	
Muhammad Ali, The Emergence of		Butler and Anthony King. Noted by	

Bernard Hennessy	296	by Bernard Hennessy	296
The Sea in Modern Strategy	1019	Boston University Papers on Africa, Transition in African Politics. Noted by Fred G. Burke and John R. Nellis	
State Court Policy Impact and Functions in a Local Political System	983	Butterfield, Herbert and Wight, Martin, eds. Diplomatic Investigations: Essays in the Theory of International Politics.	
The Communist States and the West. Noted by Jonathan Harris	311	Noted by Don C. Piper Butwell, Richard and Amry Vandenbosch.	679
Brown, Bernard E. Note on James M. Clark. Teachers and Politics in France: A Pressure Group Study of the Federation		The Changing Face of Southeast Asia. Noted by Frank C. Darling	313
de l'Education Nationale	275	Cadres, Bureaucracy, and Political Power in Communist China. A. Doak Barnett.	
behari Majumdar, History of Indian Social and Political Ideas—From Ram-		Reviewed by Bruce D. Larkin	963
mohun to Dayananda	611	Bureaucracy. Noted by Henry J. Steck Cammett, John M. Antonio Gramsci and the Origins of Italian Communism. Noted	1000
Communications. Noted by Ellen B. Pirro	607	by Sidney G. Tarrow	253
Buni, Andrew. The Negro in Virginia Politics, 1902-1965. Noted by Lewis	•	Metropolitan America: Fiscal Patterns and Governmental Systems. Noted by	
BowmanBunzel, John H. Anti-Politics in America:	638	Robert L. Lineberry	621
Reflections on the Anti-Political Temper and its Distortions of the Democratic		Planning Reforms in the Soviet Union, 1962–1966	656
Process. Noted by Kenneth S. Sherrill. Burgess, Philip M. Elite Images and Foreign	1342	Canada and "Imperial Defense" I. A Study of the Origins of the British Common-	
Policy Outcomes: A Study of Norway. Noted by Ole R. Holsti	1398	wealth's Defense Organization, 1867-1919. Richard A. Preston. Noted by Hiram M.	900
Burke, Fred G. and John R. Nellis. Note on Jeffrey Butler and A. A. Castagno,		Stout	306
eds., Boston University Papers on Africa, Transition in African Politics Burks, Ardoth W. Note on Allen B. Color	283	Gideon Rosenbluth. Reviewed by Gilbert R. Winham	965
Burks, Ardath W. Note on Allan B. Cole, George O. Totten, and Cecil H. Uyehara, Socialist Parties in Postwar Japan	277	Noted by Peter Regenstreif	1369
Burks, Ardath W. Note on George Oakley Totten, III, The Social Democratic Move-		1963: The Problems of a Middle Power in Alliance. Jon B. McLin. Reviewed by	
ment in Prewar Japan Burma from Kingdom to Republic: A His-	277	Gilbert R. Winham	965
torical and Political Analysis. Frank N. Trager. Noted by Fred R. vonder Mehden	1363	the 25th Parliament. Allan Kornberg. Noted by Dean L. Yarwood Canon, Bradley C. Note on Max Freedman,	997
Burma through Alien Eyes. Helen G. Trager.	1363	William M. Beaney and Eugene Rostow, Perspectives on the Court	265
Burner, David. The Politics of Provincial- ism: The Democratic Party in Transition,		Cantril, Hadley and Lloyd A. Free. The Political Beliefs of Americans: A Study of	
1918-1932. Noted by Jay S. Goodman Burnham, Walter Dean and William Nisbet Chambers, eds. The American Party	987	Public Opinion. Noted by Aage Clausen Capecchi, Vittorio, Francesco Alberoni, Agopik Manoukian, Franca Olivetti, and	1345
Systems. Reviewed by A. E. Keir Nash Burns, E. Bradford. ed. Perspectives of Brazilian History. Noted by Jordan M.	1275	Antonio Tosi. L'Attivista di Partito.	1352
Young	281	The "Intensity" Problem and Democratic	r.
Butler, D. E. and Anthony King. The British General Election of 1966. Noted		Theory	. 5

The Democratic Experiment: American Political Theory	1316	Cha-les Evans Hughes: Politics and Reform in New York, 1905-1910. Robert F.	,
Carey, George W. Note on Neal Riemer, The Revival of Democratic Theory	1316	Wesser. Noted by Frederick H. Schaps- meier	630
Carmen, Ira H. Movies, Censorship and the		Charlot, Jean. L'Union pour la Nouvelle	
Law. Noted by Robert S. Gerstein Caroe, Olaf. Soviet Empire: The Turks of Central Asia and Stalinism. Noted by	266	République: Etude du pouvoir au sein d'un parti politique. Noted by John E. Schwarz Chapsal, Jacques. La Vie Politique en	294
Richard F. Rosser	661	France Depuis 1940. Noted by James M. Clark	294
Centre. Noted by Stephen F. Cohen	659	Cheever, Daniel S. and Milton J. Esman.	
The Case of the Trotskyite-Zinovievite Ter-		The Common Aid Effort. Noted by	
rorist Centre. Noted by Stephen F. Cohen	659	William B. Kintner	1393
Casstevens, Thomas W. A Theorem about Voting	205	Chen, Lung-Chu and Harold Lasswell. Formosa, China, and the United Nations	
Castagno, A. A. and Jeffrey Butler, eds.	200	—Formosa in the World Community.	
Boston University Papers on Africa,		Noted by Douglas Mendel, Jr	673
Transition in African Politics. Noted by		China After Mao. A. Doak Barnett. Re-	010
Fred G. Burke and John R. Nellis	283	viewed by Roger W. Benjamin	588
Catholic Action in Italy: The Sociology		China Looks at the World. François Geof-	
of a Sponsored Organization. Gianfranco		frey-Dechaume. Reviewed by Roger	
Poggi. Noted by Joseph Lopreato	255	W. Benjamin	588
A Causal Model of Civil Strife: A Com-		Christoph, James B. Note on F. B. Smith,	
parative Analysis Using New Indices.		The Making of the Second Reform Bill	1378
Ted Gurr	1104	Christoph, James B. Note on Maurice	
Caves, Richard E., Joe S. Bain and Julius		Cowling, 1878: Disraeli, Gladstone and	
Margolis. Northern California's Water		Revolution: The Passing of the Second Re-	
Industry. Noted by Ashley L. Schiff	634	form Bill	1378
Cecil, Lamar. Albert Ballin: Business and		Cities in a Race With Time: Progress and	
Politics in Imperial Germany, 1888-	070	Foverty in America's Renewing Cities.	
1918. Noted by Edward L. Pinney Censorship of the Movies: The Social and	270	Jeanne R. Lowe. Noted by Vincent L.	619
Political Control of a Mass Medium.		Marando	019
Richard S. Randall. Noted by Robert J.		La Vie Politique en France Depuis 1940	294
Steamer	1332	Clark, James M. Teachers and Politics in	201
Chaffey, Douglas Camp. Note on Jerold S.	200	France: A Pressure Group Study of the	
Auerbach, Labor and Liberty: The La-		Fédération de l'Education Nationale.	
Follette Committee and the New Deal	989	Noted by Bernard E. Brown	275
Chambers, William Nisbet and Walter		Clark, W. Hartley. The Politics of the Com-	
Dean Burnham, eds. The American		mon Market. Noted by Robert L.	
Party Systems. Reviewed by A. E. Keir		Feterson	677
Nash	1275	Claude, Richard. Note on Samuel Krislov,	
Chambers, William Nisbet. Note on		The Negro in Federal Employment	637
Richard P. McCormick, The Second		Claus Spreckles: The Sugar King of Hawaii.	1044
American Party System: Party Formation	1990	Jacob Adler. Noted by Robert Norwitz.	1340
in the Jacksonian Era	1990	Clausen, Aage. Note on Lloyd A. Free and Hadley Cantril, The Political Beliefs of	
Dollars, Dependents and Dogma: Over-		Americans: A Study of Public Opinion.	1345
seas Chinese Remittances to Communist		Clem, Alan L. Prairie State Politics: Popular	10.10
China	1371	Democracy in South Dakota. Noted by	
The Changing Face of Southeast Asia. Amry		John H. Fenton	1333
Vandenbosch and Richard Butwell.		Cleveland, Harold Van B. The Atlantic Idea	
Noted by Frank C. Darling	313	and its European Rivals. Reviewed by	
Chapman, John W. and J. Roland Pennock.		Stuart A. Scheingold	1296
Nomos X: Representation. Reviewed by		Cnudde, Charles F. and Donald J. Mc-	
James A. Steintrager	1289	Crone. Communication on Forbes and	
Charisma and Factionalism in the Nazi		Tufte, "A Note of Caution in Causal	
Party. Joseph Nyomarkay. Reviewed by	200	Modelling"	1269
H. P. Secher	590	Cnudde, Charles F. Note on Richard Rose,	

Influencing Voters: A Study of Campaign Rationality	1365	"The Politics of the European States" Communication by Kramer, Gerald H. on	1271
Coalition Politics in North India. Paul R.		Thomas Casstevens' "A Theorem About	0 = =
Brass	1174	Voting"	955
Commune of Veyrier: Politics in Swiss Local Government. Noted by Benjamin R. Barber	1374	"myth" that communist governments have never been voted into power in a free election	1272
Cohen, Stephen F. Note on The Case of the Anti-Soviet Trotskyite Centre	659	Communication by Lineberry, Robert L. and Edmund P. Fowler on Wolfinger and	
Cohen, Stephen F. Note on The Case of the		Field, "Political Ethos and the Structure	000
Trotskyite-Zinovievite Terrorist Centre Colas, John N. Note on Philip C. F. Bank- witz, Maxime Weygand and Civil-Military	659	of City Government"	230
Relations in Modern France	1004	the State Functions as a Religion, What Are We to Do Then to Save Our Souls?"	577
H. Uyehara. Socialist Parties in Postwar Japan. Noted by Ardath W. Burks	. 277	Communication by Merelman, Richard M. on criticisms of his article "On the Neo-	
Collier, Simon. Ideas and Politics of Chilean Independence 1808-1833. Noted by Rob- ert H. Dix	1372	Elitist Critique of Community Power Communication by Modelski, George and Jean-Luc Vellut on Russett, et al.,	1269
Colombia: The Political Dimensions of	~ ~ .~	"National Political Units in the Twen-	050
Change. Robert H. Dix. Noted by Kenneth F. Johnson	996	tieth Century: A Standardized List" Communication by Neubauer, Deane E. on	952
The Common Aid Effort. Milton J. Esman and Daniel S. Cheever. Noted by William R. Kintner	1393	criticisms of his article "Some Conditions of Democracy"	581
The Commonwealth Bureaucracy. Gerald E. Caiden. Noted by Henry J. Steck		and Hamblin, "Socio-economic Variables and Voting for the Radical Left: Chile,	
Communication by Anton, Thomas J. on criticisms of his review of Bernard J.	1000	1952"	578
Frieden's "Metropolitan America: Challenge to Federalism"	1272	David Singer and Melvin Small, on criticisms of their article "National	
Communication by Bachrach, Peter and		Political Units in the Twentieth Century:	0.55
Morton S. Baratz on Richard M. Merelman's "On the Neo-Elitist Critique of Community Power"	1268	A Standardized List"	955
Communication by Cnudde, Charles F. and	1200	Politics: The Global System"	1268
Donald J. McCrone on Forbes and Tufte, "A Note of Caution in Causal Modelling"	1269	Communication by Verba, Sidney on Louis Lipsitz' "If, As Verba Says, the State	
Communication by Cutright, Phillips on Deane E. Neubauer's "Some Conditions	×#0	Functions as a Religion, What Are We to Do Then to Save Our Souls?"	576
of Democracy"	578	Communication by Wolfinger, Raymond E. and John Osgood Field on criticisms of their article "Political Ethos and the	
article "A Note of Caution in Causal Modelling"	1270	Structure of City Government"	227
Communication by Frieden, Bernard J. on Thomas J. Anton's review of his book	-	Roger W. Benjamin and John H. Kautsky	110
"Metropolitan America: Challenge to Federalism"	1271	The Communist Movement in Iran. Sepehr Zabih. Noted by Marvin Zonis	645
Communication by Friedman, Edward on the December 1967 issue of the REVIEW	231	The Communist States and the West. Adam Bromke and Philip E. Uren, eds. Noted	
Communication by Haas, Michael on Rus-	LUI	by Jonathan Harris	311
set et al., "National Political Units in the Twentieth Century: A Standardized	050	A Comparative Analysis of State and Federal Judicial Behavior: The Reappor-	700
List"	952	tionment Cases. Edward N. Beiser COMPARATIVE GOVERNMENT	788
Robert A. Rupen's review of his book		Coalition Politics in North India. Paul R.	

Brass	1174	T. Patterson. Reviewed by David R.	
Communism and Economic Development.		Mayhew	
Roger W. Benjamin and John H.		Congressional Ethics: The Conflict of Interest	
Kautsky	110	Issue. Robert S. Getz. Noted by Irwin	
Comparing Communist Nations: Prospects		N. Gertzog	990
for an Empirical Approach. Paul Shoup	185	Congressional Insurgents and the Party	
Factions and Coalitions in One-Party Japan:		System, 1909-1916. James Holt. Noted	
An Interpretation Based on the Theory of		by Delmer Dunn	988
Games. Michael Leiserson	770	The Congressional Process: Strategies, Rules	
Group Influence and the Policy Process in	***	and Procedures. Lewis A. Froman, Jr.	
the Soviet Union. Joel J. Schwartz and		Noted by Eugene Eidenberg	263
William R. Keech	840	Connolly, William E. Political Science and	200
Majority vs. Opposition in the French	010	Ideology. Noted by Peter Bachrach	599
National Assembly, 1956-1965: A Gutt-		Conservatism, Personality and Political Ex-	000
man Scale Analysis. David M. Wood	88	tramism. Robert A. Schoenberger	868
Measuring Social and Political Require-	00	Contemporary Radical Ideologies: Total-	
	•	itarian Thought in the Twentieth Century.	
ments for System Stability in Latin Amer-			
ica. Ernest A. Duff and John F. Mc-	1105	A. James Gregor. Noted by James H.	1907
Camant	1125	Meisel	1307
Political Development and Socioeconomic		Content Analysis of Communications. Rich-	
Development: The Case of Latin America.	000	ard W. Budd, Robert K. Thorp and	
Martin C. Needler	889	Lewis Donohew. Noted by Ellen B.	0.05
The Recruitment of Candidates for the Can-		Pirro	607
adian House of Commons. Allan Kornberg		Contracting for Atoms. Harold Orlans.	
and Hal H. Winsborough	1242	Noted by Don E. Kash	981
The Soviet Central Committee: An Elite		Conway, M. Margaret and Frank B.	
Analysis. Michael P. Gehlen and Michael		Feigert. Motivation, Incentive Systems,	
McBride	1232	and the Political Party Organization	1159
Soviet Elections as a Measure of Dissent: The		Cooper, Joseph. Note on Jackson Turner	
Missing One Percent. Jerome M. Gillison	814	Main, The Upper House in Revolutionary	
Soviet Elite Participatory Attitudes in the		America, 1763–1788	1331
Post-Stalin Period. Milton Lodge	827	Corbett, Edward M. Quebec Confronts	
The Structure of Political Conflict in the		Canada. Noted by Maurice Pinard	1367
New States of Tropical Africa. Aristide		Corporate Management in a world of Politics:	
R. Zolberg	70	The Public, Political and Governmental	
Comparative Political Development: The		Problems of Business. Harold Brayman.	
Precedent of the West. G. Lowell Field.		Noted by Oliver Garceau	625
Noted by Warren L. Mason	280	Correspondance d'Alexis de Tocqueville et de	
Comparing Communist Nations: Prospects		Gustave de Beaumont. Texte Établi,	
for an Empirical Approach. Paul Shoup	185	Annoté et Préfacé par André Jardin.	
Competitive Interference and Twentieth Cen-		Reviewed by Melvin Richter	234
tury Diplomacy. Richard W. Cottam.		Cottam, Richard W. Competitive Inter-	
Noted by Andrew Scott	304	ference and Twentieth Century Diplomacy.	
The Concept of Ideology and Other Essays.		Noted by Andrew Scott	304
George Lichtheim. Noted by George		Couloumbis, Theodore A. Greek Political	
Kateb	600	Reaction to American and NATO In-	
The Conflicted Relationship: The West and		fluences. Noted by Stephen G. Xydis	302
the Transformation of Asia, Africa, and		Cowling, Maurice. 1878: Disraeli, Gladstone	
Latin America. Theodore Geiger. Re-		and Revolution: The Passing of the Second	
viewed by H. Bradford Westerfield	242	Reform Bill. Noted by James B. Chris-	
Congress and the Citizen-Soldier. William F.		toph	1378
Levantrosser. Noted by Lewis A. Fro-		Cox, Archibald. The Warren Court: Con-	
man, Jr	263	stitutional Decision as an Instrument of	
Congress and the Constitution: A Study of		Reform. Noted by J. Woodford Howard,	
Responsibility. Donald G. Morgan. Noted		J=	1329
by Dale Vinyard	986	Cox, Arthur M. Prospects for Peacekeeping.	
Congressional Conservatism and the New		Reviewed by Lawrence S. Kaplan	961
Deal: The Growth of the Conservative		Cox, James L. Note on Harold Kaplan,	
Condition in Congress 1088-1080 Temps		I'rham Political Systems: A Functional	

Analysis of Metro Toronto	643	mans. Noted by Elke Frank Davidson, Roger H. Note on Charles O. Jones, Every Second Year: Congressional	
Vol. I. 1884-1927. Mit der Kraft des Geistes. Vol. II. 1927-1967		Behavior and the Two-Year Term Davies, A. F. Private Politics: A Study of Five Political Outlooks. Noted by Karl	980
Perspectives. John Plank, ed. Reviewed by Richard R. Fagen		Braithwaite	980
Noted by Samuel H. Barnes Cutright, Phillips. Communication on	273	W. Rae	261
Deane E. Neubauer's "Some Conditions of Democracy"	578	Noted by J. C. Ries	1344
1958. Stephen C. Xydis. Noted by Robert R. Wilson	1399	Aid Davison, W. Phillips. International Political	680
Czempiel, Ernst-Otto. Das amerikanische Sicherheitssystem 1945–1949—Studie zur Aussenpolitik der bürgerlichen Gesell-		Communication. Reviewed by Karl W. Deutsch Deane, Herbert A. The Political and Social	969
schaft. Noted by John H. Herz	300	Ideas of St. Augustine. Noted by David G. Smith	979
Culture	878	taire en Belgique: Mecanismes D'Acces et Images. Noted by Jeffrey L. Obler	274
Daland, Robert T. Brazilian Planning: Development Politics and Administration.		Decision Costs in Coalition Formation. Charles R. Adrian and Charles Press	556
Reviewed by John T. Dorsey, Jr Daland, Robert T. Note on Jordan M. Young, The Brazilian Revolution of 1930 and the Aftermath	245	Defense of the Realm: British Strategy in the Nuclear Epoch. R. N. Rosecrance. Noted by David W. Tarr	1395
Dallin, Alexander and Thomas B. Larson, eds. Soviet Politics Since Khrushchev. Noted by William Parente	1385	Vatikiotis, Politics and the Military in Jordan: A Study of the Arab Legion 1921–1957	1375
D'Amato, Anthony A. Note on B. S. Murty, Propaganda and World Public Order: The Legal Regulation of the Instrument		Democracy's Dilemma: The Totalitarian Party in a Free Society. Benjamin E. Lippincott. Noted by Kurt P. Tauber.	
of Coercion	1392	The Democratic Experiment: American Political Theory. Vol. I. Neal Riemer. Noted by George W. Carey	
tion Danilevsky: A Russian Totalitarian Philos-	612	The Democratic Republicans of New York: The Origins, 1763-1797. Alfred F. Young.	1010
opher. Robert E. MacMaster, Note by Rolf H. W. Theen	256	Reviewed by Manning J. Dauer The Democratic Revolution in West Indies.	594
Darling, Frank C. Note on Amry Vanden- bosch and Richard Butwell, The Changing Face of Southeast Asia	313	Wendell Bell, ed. Noted by Morton Kroll	1368
Das amerikanische Sicherheitssystem 1945– 1949—Studie zur Aussenpolitik der bür- gerlichen Gesellschaft. Ernst-Otto Czem-	.*	1952-1962: Changes in the Old Alliance. Jay S. Goodman. Noted by Vernon M. Goetcheus	984
piel. Noted by John H. Herz Dauer, Manning J. Review of Alfred F. Young. The Democratic Republicans of	300	Dennis, Jack. Note on Harmon Zeigler, The Political Life of American Teachers. Dennis, Jack. Note on Harmon Zeigler,	1339
New York: The Origins, 1763-1797 Dauer, Manning J. Review of Carl F. Prince, New Jersey's Jeffersonian Republicans: The Genesis of an Early Party	594	The Political World of the High School Teacher	1339
Machine	595	1945-1953d'Entrèves, Alexander Passerin. The Notion	688

of the State: An Introduction to Political	. •	Urban Politics: State Court Policy Impact	
Theory. Noted by Maynard Smith	1319	and Functions in a Local Political System.	
Deutsch, Karl W. Arms Control and the		Noted by Irvin H. Bromall	983
Atlantic Alliance: Europe Faces Coming		Dollars, Dependents and Dogma: Overseas	
Policy Decisions. Noted by Steven J.		Chinese Remittances to Communist China.	
Brams	1391	Chun-hsi Wu. Noted by Yi-chun Chang	1371
Deutsch, Karl W., Lewis J. Edinger, Roy		Dorrestic Sources of Foreign Policy. James	
C. Macridis and Richard L. Merritt.		N. Rosenau. Noted by Paul Y. Ham-	
France, Germany and the Western Alliance;		mond	299
A Study of Elite Attitudes on European		Donald, Aida DiPace. Note on Theodore	
Integration and World Politics. Reviewed		Sorenson, Kennedy	260
by Donald D. Searing	240	Donohew, Lewis, Richard W. Budd and	
Deutsch, Karl W. Review of W. Phillips		Robert K. Thorp. Content Analysis of	
Davison, International Political Com-		Communications. Noted by Ellen B.	
muncation	969	Pirro	607
Deutscher, Isaac. The Unfinished Revolu-		Donovan, John C. The Politics of Poverty.	
tion: Russia 1917-1967. Noted by Donald		Noted by John H. Strange	636
D. Barry	662	Dorpalen, Andreas. Note on Ferdinand A.	
Deutschlands Araberpolitik im zweiten Welt-		Hermens and Theodor Schieder, Staat,	
krieg. Heinz Tillman. Noted by Gerhard		Wirtschaft und Politik in der Weimarer	
von Glahn	305	Republik, Festschrift für Heinrich Brüning	665
Deutschlands Beziehungen zu Frankreich,		Dorsett, Lyle W. The Pendergast Machines.	
Grossbritannien, Belgien sowie deutsche		Noted by Douglas Fox	1337
Entwaffung Reparationen, Völkerbund und		Dorsey, John T., Jr. Review of Robert T.	
internationale Abrüstung, Dezember 1925		Daland. Brazilian Planning: Develop-	
bis Juli 1926, Akten zur deutschen aus-		ment Politics and Administration	245
wartigen Politik, 1918-1945. Vol. I. Hans		Dougherty, James E. and J. F. Lehman,	
Rothfels et al., eds. Noted by Stanley		Jr., eds. Arms Control for the Late Sixties.	
Suval	675	Noted by William P. Gerberding	678
The Development of Modern Nigeria. Okei		Doughty, Paul L. Huaylas: An Andean	
Arikpo. Noted by David B. Abernethy	998	District in Search of Progress. Noted by	
The Development of Political Attitudes in		Marvin Alisky	1379
Children. Robert D. Hess and Judith V.		Draper, Theodore. Abuse of Power. Noted	
Torney. Noted by Lester W. Milbrath	1348	by Gilbert R. Winham	686
Dexter, Anthony Lewis. Note on Daniel		Droz, Jacques. Le Socialisme Democratique,	
Katz and Robert L. Kahn, The Social		1864-1960. Noted by William Ebenstein	257
Psychology of Organizations	1306	Druks, Herbert. Harry S. Truman and the	
Dexter, Byron. The Years of Opportunity:		Russians, 1945-1953. Noted by Lee	
The League of Nations, 1920–1926. Noted		Denson	688
by Whitney T. Perkins	1014	Duff, Ernest and John F. McCamant.	
Dietze, Gottfried. America's Political Di-		Measuring Social and Political Require-	
lemma: From Limited to Unlimited	1910	ments for System Stability in Latin	1105
Democracy. Noted by Peter Bachrach	1310	America	1125
Diplomatic Investigations: Essays in the Theory of International Politics. Herbert	,	Dulles, Eleanor Lansing. Berlin: The Wall	
		Is Not Forever. Noted by William E.	905
Butterfield and Martin Wight, eds. Noted	679	Wright Dumhoff, G. William. Who Rules America?	295
by Don C. Piper	013	Noted by Andrew Hacker	1901
J. Edinger	1380	Duncan, Otis Dudley and Peter Blau. The	1301
Divisiveness and Social Conflict. Alan R.	1000		
Beals and Bernard J. Siegel. Noted by	•	American Occupational Structure. Reviewed by M. Kent Jennings	596
Roger D. Masters	618	Dunn, Delmer. Note on James Holt, Con-	000
Dix, Robert H. Colombia: The Political	010	gressional Insurgents and the Party Sys-	
Dimensions of Change. Noted by Kenneth		tem, 1909–1916	988
F. Johnson	996	Dunner, Joseph. Note on Bernard K.	000
Dix, Robert H. Note on Simon Collier,		Johnpoll, The Politics of Futility: The	
Ideas and Politics of Chilean Independence		General Jewish Workers Bund of Poland,	
1808–1833		1917–1943	667
Dolhegre Kenneth M. Trial Courts in		The Dunamic of Mexican Nationalism	501

Frederick C. Turner. Noted by Robert		The Elite in the Welfare State. Piet Thoenes,	
E. Scott	1386	ed. Noted by Dwaine Marvick	603
The Dynamics of Compliance: Supreme		Elliott, James V. Note on Isaac Kramnick,	
Court Decision-Making from a New		Bolingbroke and His Circle: The Politics	
Perspective. Richard M. Johnson. Re-		of Nostalgia	1312
viewed by Sheldon Goldman	1285°	Ellul, Jacques. The Technological Society.	
		Noted by William R. Nelson	603
Earl, Donald. The Moral and Political		The Emergence of Pakistan. Chaudhri	
Tradition of Rome. Noted by Deane E.		Muhammad Ali. Noted by Ralph Brai-	
Neubauer	609	banti	649
Earl Warren: A Political Biography. Leo		The Emergent American Society. Lloyd	
Katcher. Noted by Clifford M. Lytle	631	Warner et al. Noted by Andrew Hacker	1301
Eastern Europe in Transition. Kurt London,		Enemies in Politics. David J. Finley, Ole	
ed. Noted by Carl Beck	289	R. Holsti and Richard R. Fagan. Noted	
Eastern European Government and Politics.		by Sheldon Appleton	1402
Vaclar Benes, Andrew Gyorgy and		Engelman, F. C. and M. A. Schwartz.	
George Stambuk. Noted by Carl Beck	289	Political Parties and the Canadian Social	
Ebenstein, William. Note on Jacques		Structure. Noted by Bernard K. John-	
Droz. Le Socialisme Democratique, 1864-		poll	278
1960	257	Epstein, Fritz T. Note on Gabor Erdelyi,	
Economic Development and American For-		prep. German Periodical Publications	660
eign Policy, 1943-1962. David A. Bald-		Epstein, Fritz, T. Note on Karol Maichel,	
win. Noted by Maurice Waters	1405	Soviet and Russian Newspapers at the	
Economic Evaluation of Urban Renewal:		Hoover Institution	660
Conceptual Foundation of Benefit-Cost		Epstein, Klaus. The Genesis of German	
Analysis. Jerome Rothenberg. Noted by		Conservatism. Noted by John Rodman	1007
David J. Olson	993	Erdelyi, Gabor, prep. German Periodical	
Economic Policies Toward Less Developed		Publications. Noted by Fritz T. Epstein	660
Countries. Harry G. Johnson. Noted by		Erdman, Howard L. The Swatantra Party	
George M. Platt	682	and Indian Conservatism. Reviewed by	
Edinger, Lewis J., ed. Political Leadership		Susanne Hoeber Rudolph	1293
in Industrialized Societies: Studies in		Esman, Milton J. and Daniel S. Cheever.	
Comparative Analysis. Noted by Thomas		The Common Aid Effort. Noted by Wil-	
A. Baylis	644	liam R. Kintner	1393
Edinger, Lewis J. Note on Robert Blake,		An Essay on Marxian Economics. Joan	
Disraeli	1380	Robinson. Noted by George R. Feiwel	1010
Edinger, Lewis J., Roy C. Macridis,		Eulau, Heinz and Robert Eyestone. Policy	
Richard L. Merritt and Karl W. Deutsch.		Maps of City Councils and Policy Out-	
France, Germany and the Western Alli-		comes: A Developmental Analysis	124
ance; A Study of Elite Attitudes on Euro-		The Eurocrats. Altiero Spinelli. Reviewed	
pean Integration and World Politics. Re-		by Ronald Inglehart	593
viewed by Donald D. Searing	240	The European Common Market and the	
Eidenberg, Eugene. Note on Lewis A.		World. Werner Feld. Noted by Vernon	
Froman, Jr. The Congressional Process:		C. Warren, Jr	1020
Strategies, Rules and Procedures	263	Every Second Year: Congressional Behavior	
Eidenberg, Eugene. Note on Randall B.		and the Two-Year Term. Charles O.	
Ripley, Party Leaders in the House of		Jones. Noted by Roger H. Davidson	980
Representatives	1325	Eyestone, Robert and Heinz Eulau. Policy	
Eisenberg, Ralph. Note on Malcolm E.		Maps of City Councils and Policy Out-	
Jewell, Legislative Representative in the	•	comes: A Developmental Analysis	124
Contemporary South	1341		
Eisenstein, Louis and Elliot Rosenberg. A		Factions and Coalitions in a One-Party	
Stripe of Tammany's Tiger. Noted by		Japan: An Interpretation Based on the	
Theodore J. Lowi	642	Theory of Games. Michael Leiserson	770
Electronic Journalism. William A. Wood.		Fagen, Richard R., David J. Finlay, and	
Noted by David L. Paletz	639	Ole R. Holsti. Enemies in Politics. Noted	
Elite Images and Foreign Policy Outcomes:		by Sheldon Appleton	1402
A Study of Norway. Philip M. Burgess.		Fagen, Richard R. Politics and Communica-	
Noted by Ole P. Heleti	1308	tion Noted by Ellan B. Pirra	607

Fagen, Richard R. Review of John Plank,		eds. Race and the News Media. Noted by	
ed., Cuba and the United States: Long-		David L. Paletz	639
Range Perspectives		Fitzgibbon, Russell H. Note on Edward	
Fagen, Richard R. Review of Maurice		J. Williams, Latin American Christian	
Zeitlin, Revolutionary Politics and the		Democratic Parties	279
Cuban Working Class		Fleer, Jack D. North Carolina Politics: An	
Fagin, Henry and Leo F. Schnore. Urban		Introduction. Noted by Lewis Bowman	
Research and Policy Planning. Noted by		Fleron, Frederic J., Jr., Dean Jaros and	
Frank Smallwood	620	Herbert Hirsch. The Malevolent Leader:	
Fainsod, Merle. Some Reflections on Soviet-	020	Political Socialization in an American	
American Relations	1093	Sub-culture	564
The Fall of Sukarno. Tarzie Vittachi. Noted	1000	Fogelman, Edwin. Note on Fred M.	00.
by William Liddle	670	Frohock, The Nature of Political Inquiry	973
	010	Food and Fiber in the Nation's Politics.	914
Federation in East Africa: Opportunities			
and Problems. Colin Leys and Peter		Charles M. Hardin. Noted by H. George	00
Robson, eds. Noted by Victor T. Le	107/	Frederickson	994
Vine	1354	Forbes, Hugh and Edward R. Tufte. Com-	
The Federation of German Industry in		munication on criticisms of their article	
Politics. Gerard Braunthal. Noted by		"A Note of Caution in Causal Modelling"	1270
George K. Romoser	664	Forbes, Hugh Donald and Edward R.	
Feigert, Frank B. and M. Margaret Con-		Tufte. A Note of Caution in Causal	
way. Motivation, Incentive Systems, and		Modelling	1258
the Political Party Organization	1159	Force, Order and Justice. Robert E. Osgood	
Feit, Edward. Note on William A. Hance,		and Robert W. Tucker. Noted by Philip	
ed., Southern Africa and the United States	1366	Green	1012
Feiwel, George R. Note on Joan Robinson,		The Foreign Aid Programs of the Soviet Bloc	
An Essay on Marxian Economics	1010	and Communist China: An Analysis.	
Feiwel, George R. Note on Mikhail Bor,		Kurt Muller. Noted by Marshall I.	
Aims and Methods of Soviet Planning	1010	Goldman	1021
Feld, Werner. The European Common		Formosa, China, and the United Nations-	
Market and the World. Noted by Vernon		Formosa in the World Community. Lung-	
C. Warren, Jr	1020	Chu Chen and Harold Lasswell. Noted	
Fenton, John H. Note on Alan L. Clem,		by Douglas Mendel, Jr	673
Prairie State Politics: Popular Democracy		The Foundations of Indian Federalism. K. R.	
in South Dakota	1333	Bombwall. Noted by Baljit Singh	1008
Ferguson, Yale H. Note on Jerome Slater,		Fowler, Edmund P. and Robert L. Line-	
The OAS and United States Foreign		berry. Communication on Wolfinger and	
Policy	308	Field, "Political Ethos and the Structure	
Field, G. Lowell. Comparative Political		of City Government"	230
Development: The Precedent of the West.		Fox. Annette Baker and William T. R.	
Noted by Warren L. Mason	280	Fox. NATO and the Range of American	
Field, John Osgood and Raymond E.		Choice. Reviewed by Stuart A. Scheingold	1296
Wolfinger. Communication on criticisms of	\	Fox. Douglas. Note on Lyle W. Dorsett,	
their article "Political Ethos and the		The Pendergast Machine	1337
Structure of City Government"	227	Fox, William T. R. and Annette Baker	
Filene, Peter G. Americans and the Soviet		Fox. NATO and the Range of American	
Experiment, 1917-1933: American At-		Choice. Reviewed by Stuart A. Schein-	
titudes Toward Russia From the February		gold	1296
Revolution Until Diplomatic Recognition.		France, Germany, and the Western Alliance:	
Noted by William B. Ballis	301	A Study of Elite Attitudes on European	
Finer, S. E. Pareto and Pluto-Democracy:	001	Integration and World Politics. Karl W.	
The Retreat to Galapagos	440	Deutsch, Lewis Edinger, Roy C. Mac-	
Finlay, David J., Ole R. Holsti and Richard	110	ridis and Richard L. Merritt. Reviewed	
R. Fagan. Enemies in Politics. Noted by		by Donald D. Searing	240
Sheldon Appleton	1402		₽ ±0
Fischer, Georges et al. Régime Interne et	¥ 202	Fank, Elke. Note on Eugene Davidson, The Trial of the Germans	1019
Politique Extérieure Dans les Pays d'Asie.		Frederickson, H. George. Note on Charles	1013
Noted by Robert O. Tilman	1364	M. Hardin, Food and Fiber in the Nation's	
	1004		004
Fisher, Paul L. and Ralph L. Lowenstein,		Politics	994

Free, Lloyd A. and Hadley Cantril. The Political Beliefs of Americans: A Study of Public Opinion. Noted by Aage		System. Andrew M. Scott. Noted by Frederic Wurzburg	1016
Clausen		Alliance: Its Status and Prospects. Reviewed by Frederick H. Hartmann	
Court. Noted by Bradley C. Canon French Foreign Policy Under de Gaulle, Alfred Grosser. Noted by William G.	265	Galtung, Johan. Theory and Methods of Social Research. Noted by Fred M. Frohock	617
Andrews		Galant, Henry C. Note on Philip M. Williams, The French Parliament: Politics in the Fifth Republic	1361
Henry C. Galant	1361 1314	Garceau, Oliver. Note on Harold Brayman. Corporate Management in a World of Politics: The Public, Political and Govern-	
Freund, Paul A. On Law and Justice. Noted by William M. Beaney		mental Problems of Business The Garden and the Wilderness: Religion and	625
Fried, Robert C. Review of Seymour Martin Lipset and Stein Rokkan, eds. Party Systems and Voter Alignments: Cross- National Perspectives	960	Government in American Constitutional History. Mark DeWolfe Howe. Reviewed by Thomas S. Schrock	597
Frieden, Bernard J. Communication on Thomas J. Anton's review of his book	300	The Soviet Central Committee: An Elite Analysis	1232
"Metropolitan America: Challenge to Federalism"	1271	Geiger, Theodore. The Conflicted Relation- ship: The West and the Transformation of Asia, Africa and Latin America. Re-	
Challenge to Federalism. Noted by Thomas J. Anton	623	viewed by H. Bradford Westerfield Gelb, Leslie H. Note on Thomas A. Bailey. The Art of Diplomacy	242 1401
Hitler and the United States, 1939-1941. Reviewed by H. P. Secher	590	The Genesis of German Conservatism. Klaus Epstein. Noted by John Rodman	
Friedman, Edward. Communication on the December, 1967 issue of the Review Friedrich, Carl J. Some Thoughts on the	231	Geoffrey-Dechaume, François. China Looks at the World. Reviewed by Roger W. Benjamin	588
Relation of Political Theory to Anthropology	536	Gerbroding, William P. Note on James E. Dougherty and J. F. Lehman, Jr., eds.,	
Friends Not Masters: A Political Auto- biography. Mohammad Ayub Khan. Noted by Khalid B. Sayeed	1388	Arms Control for the Late Sixties The German Army and the Nazi Party, 1933-39. Robert O'Neill. Reviewed by	678
Frohock, Fred M. Note on Johan Galtung. Theory and Methods of Social Research	617	H. P. Secher	590
Frohock, Fred M. The Nature of Political Inquiry. Noted by Edwin Fogelman Froman, Lewis A., Jr. Note on William F.	973	Erdelyi, prep. Noted by Fritz T. Epstein Germany and the Atlantic Alliance: The	660
Levantrosser, Congress and the Citizen-Soldier	263	Integration of Strategy and Politics, James L. Richardson. Noted by Charles B. Robson	676
Froman, Lewis A., Jr. Organization Theory and the Explanation of Important Characteristics of Congress	518	Germino, Dante. Beyond Ideology: The Revival of Political Theory. Reviewed by Harry Girvetz	958
Froman, Lewis A., Jr. The Congressional Process: Strategies, Rules and Procedures.		Gerstein, Robert S. Noted on Ira H. Carmen. Movies, Censorship and the Law	266
Noted by Eugene Eidenberg The Function of "China" in Marx, Lenin, and Mao. Donald M. Lowe. Noted by	263	Gerteiny, Alfred G. Mauritania. Noted by Bruce B. Mason	1381
Mostafa Rejai	1310	Congressional Ethics: The Conflict of Interest Issue	990
Administration. Paul Y. Hammond The Functioning of the International Political	57	Conflict of Interest Issue. Noted by Irwin N. Gertzog	990

Gil, Frederico G. Note on John Bartlow Martin. Overtaken by Events: The Domin- ican Crisis from the Fall of Trujillo to the	,	in Swiss Local Government. George A. Codding, Jr. Noted by Benjamin R. Barber	
Civil War	310	Granqvist, Hans. The Red Guard. Reviewed by Roger W. Benjamin	588
Measure of Dissent: The Missing One Percent	814	Grant, Bruce. Indonesia. Noted by William R. Liddle	
Gillin, Donald G. Note on John E. Rue,		Graves, Harold. Note on Jeremy Bennett,	670
Mao Tse-tung in Opposition 1927–1935 Gillin, Donald G. Warlord: Yen Hsi-shan	669	Eritish Broadcasting and the Danish Resistance Movement, 1940-1945: A Study	
in Shansi Province, 1911–1949. Noted by by Chi Hsi-sheng	292	of the Wartime Broadcasts of the BBC Danish Service	298
Ginsburgs, George. Note on George G. S. Murphy, Soviet Mongolia. A Study of the		Gresk Political Reaction to American and NATO Influences. Theodore A. Cou-	
Oldest Political SatelliteGirvetz, Harry. Review of Dante Germino,	. 291	loumbis. Noted by Stephen G. Xydis Green, Philip. Note on Robert E. Osgood	302
Beyond Ideology: The Revival of Political Theory	958	and Robert W. Tucker, Force, Order and Justice	1012
Glock, Charles Y., ed. Survey Research in the Social Sciences. Noted by Betty H. Zisk	251	Greene, Fred. U. S. Policy and the Security of Asia. Noted by Normal D. Palmer	1400
Goerner, E. A. Peter and Caesar: The	201	Greenstein, Fred I. and Raymond E.	1400
Catholic Church and Political Authority. Noted by Glenn Tinder	610	Wolfinger. The Repeal of Fair Housing in California: An Analysis of Referendum	
Goetcheus, Vernon M. Note on Jay S. Goodman. The Democrats and Labor in		Voting Gregor, A. James. Contemporary Radical	7 53
Rhode Island, 1952–1962: Changes in the Old Alliance	984	Ideologies: Totalitarian Thought in the Twentieth Century. Noted by James H.	
Goldman, Marshall I. Note on Kurt Muller, The Foreign Aid Programs of the Soviet		Meisel	1307
Bloc and Communist China: An Analysis	1021	Uses of Functional Analysis	425
Goldman, Marshall I. Soviet Foreign Aid. Noted by Leon M. Herman	689	Grosser, Alfred. French Foreign Policy Under de Gaulle. Noted by William G.	
Goldman, Merle. Literary Dissent in Com- munist China. Reviewed by Roger W.		Andrews	1018
BenjaminGoldman, Sheldon. Review of Richard M.	588	dal, Asian Drama: An Inquiry into the Poverty of Nations	1278
Johnson, The Dynamics of Compliance:		Group Influence and the Policy Process in	12.0
Supreme Court Decision-Making from a New Perspective	1285	the Soviet Union. Joel J. Schwartz and William R. Keech	840
Goldman, Sheldon. Review of William K. Muir, Jr., Prayer in the Public Schools:		Gugin, David. Note on Ralph Horwitz, The Political Economy of South Africa	652
Law and Attitude Change	1285	Gunnell, John G. Political Philosophy and Time. Noted by George Kateb	1303
The Politics of Provincialism: The Demo-	0.97	Gurr, Ted. A Causal Model of Civil Strife:	1000
cratic Party in Transition, 1918-1932 Goodman, Jay S. The Democrats and Labor	987	A Comparative Analysis Using New Indices	1104
in Rhode Island, 1952-1962: Changes in the Old Alliance. Noted by Vernon M.		Guyot, James F. Note on William R. Roff, The Origins of Malay Nationalism	648
Gordon, Michael R. Note on Georges	984	Gyorgy, Andrew, George Stambuk and Vaclav Benes. Eastern European Govern-	
Bidault. Resistance: The Political Auto- biography of Georges Bidault	1003	ment and Politics. Noted by Carl Beck	289
Gosnell, Harold F. Note on J. R. Pole, Political Representation in England and		Haas, Michael. Communication on Russett et al., "National Political Units in the	
the Origins of the American Republic Gottlieb, Gidon. The Logic of Choice: An	608	Twentieth Century: A Standardized List"	952
Investigation of Rule and Rationality. Noted by Stuart S. Nagel	**	Havia America Latina Democratica e Inte-	
Governing the Commune of Veyrier: Politics	1000	grada. Romulo Betancourt. Noted by Robert J. Alexander	685

		•	
Hacker, Andrew. Note on Arnold M. Rose, The Power Structure: Political Process in	1901	Marxism: A Re-Examination	974
	1301	Barnes, Party Democracy: Politics in an Italian Socialist Federation	1351
Hacker, Andrew. Noted on Lloyd Warner et al., The Emergent American Society	1301	and Anthony King, The British General Election of 1966	296
Hammond, Paul Y. A Functional Analysis of Defense Department Decision-Making in the McNamara Administration	57	Hennessy, Mary L. and Kenneth O. Warner. Public Management at the Bar- gaining Table. Noted by Donald P. Spren-	
Hammond, Paul Y. Note on James N. Rosenau, Domestic Sources of Foreign	0.	gel	992
Policy	299	Goldman, Soviet Foreign Aid	689
Hance, William A., ed. Southern Africa and the United States. Noted by Edward Feit	1366	Hermens, Ferdinand A. and Theodor Schieder, eds., Staat, Wirtschaft und	:
Hardgrave, Robert L., Jr. Review of Lloyd		Politik in der Weimarer Republik, Fest-	
I. Rudolph and Susanne H. Rudolph,		schrift für Heinrich Brüning. Noted by	
The Modernity of Tradition: Political	1280	Andreas Dorpalen	665
Development in India Hardin, Charles M. Food and Fiber in the	1200	Herz, John H. Note on Ernst-Otto Czem- piel; Das amerikanische Sicherheitssystem	
Nation's Politics. Noted by H. George		1945–1949—Studie zur Aussenpolitik der	
Frederickson	994	bürgerlichen Gesellschaft	300
Harris, Jonathan. Note on Adam Bromke		Hess, Robert D. and Judith V. Torney.	
and Philip E. Uren, eds., The Communist		The Development of Political Attitudes in	
States and the West	.311	\ Children. Noted by Lester W. Milbrath	1348
Harris, Jonathan. Note on Rodger Swear-	•	Hindus, Maurice. The Kremlin's Human	-
ingen, ed., Soviet and Chinese Communist		Dilemma: Russia After Half a Century of	
Power in the World Today	311	Revolution. Noted by Peter Juviler	286
Harris, Joseph P. Note on Marie Seton,	651	Hirsch, Herbert, Frederic J. Fleron, Jr.	
Panditji: A Portrait of Jawaharlal Nehru Harry S. Truman and the Russians 1945-	651	and Dean Jaros. The Malevolent Leader: Political Socialization in an American	
1953. Herbert Druks. Noted by Lee		Sub-culture	564
Denson	688	History of Indian Social and Political Ideas	
Hartmann, Frederick H. Review of Charles		-From Rammohun to Dayananda. Bi-	•
O. Lerche, Last Chance in Europe: Bases		manbehari Majumdar. Noted by D.	
for a New American Policy	239	MacKenzie Brown	611
Hartmann, Frederick H. Review of Edgar		Hohenberg, John. Between Two Worlds.	601
S. Furniss, Jr., ed., The Western Alliance: Its Status and Prospects	239	Noted by Marian D. Irish	684
Hawkins, Carroll. Note on Charles Wagley.	209	American Foreign Policy Beyond Utopian-	
The Latin American Tradition	1377	ism and Realism	683
Hayek, Friederich A. Studies in Philosophy,	,	Holsti, Ole R., David J. Finlay and Richard	
Politics and Economics. Reviewed by		R. Fagan. Enemies in Politics. Noted by	
William C. Mitchell	968	Sheldon Appleton	1402
Hayward, Fred M. Note on Robert W. July,		Holsti, Ole R. Note on Philip M. Burgess,	
The Origins of Modern African Thought:		Elite Images and Foreign Policy Out-	1000
Its Development in West Africa During	1919	comes: A Study of Norway	1398
the Nineteenth and Twentieth Centuries Hazard, John N., Peter Wiles, Alexander	1919	Hollander, Paul. Note on Alex Simirenko, ed., Soviet Sociology: Historical Antece-	
Balinsky and Abram Bergson. Planning		dents and Current Appraisals	252
and the Market in the U.S.S.R.: the		Holmes, Jack E. Politics in New Mexico.	202
1960's. Noted by Arthur W. Wright	655	Noted by Roy D. Morey	641
Headley, A. R. Note on Obed Y. Asamoah,		Holt, James. Congressional Insurgents and	
The Legal Significance of the Declarations		the Party System, 1909-1916. Noted by	
of the General Assembly of the United		Delmer Dunn	988
Nations	.693	Holt, Robert T. and John E. Turner. The	
Heller, Walter W. New Dimensions of Political Flances C.		Political Basis of Economic Development:	
ical Economy. Reviewed by Harvey C. Mansfield	248	An Exploration in Comparative Political	583
Hendel, Samuel. Note on Irving M. Zeitlin,	410	Analysis. Reviewed by Gerald A. Weiner Hoogerwerf, Andries. Note on Arend	900

Lijphart, The Politics of Accommodation:		for an Effective Congress. Harry M. Scoble.	
Pluralism and Democracy in the Nether-		Noted by John H. Kessel	1326
lands	1349	"If, As Lipsitz Thinks, Political Science	
Horowitz, Gad. Canadian Labor in Politics.		Is To Save Our Souls, God Help Us!"	
Noted by Peter Regenstreif	1369	Communication by Sidney Verba	576
Horowitz, Irving Louis. Note on Raymond		If, As Verba Says, the State Functions as a	
Aron, The Industrial Society: Three Es-		Religion, What Are We To Do Then To	
says on Ideology and Development 1	1321	Save Our Souls? Lewis Lipsitz	527
Horwitz, Ralph. The Political Economy of		The Illusion of Permanence: British Im-	
South Africa. Noted by David Gugin	652	perialism in India. Francis G. Hutchins.	
Horwitz, Robert. Note on Jacob Adler,		Noted by Jorgen Rasmussen	307
Claus Spreckles: The Sugar King of		Image of a President: Some Insights into the	
Hawaii 1	1346	Political Views of School Children.	
Houn, Franklin W. A Short History of		Roberta S. Sigel	216
Chinese Communism. Noted by Dennis		Imperial America: The International Politics	
M. Ray 1	1362	of Primacy. George Liska. Noted by	
The House and the Federal Role: A Computer		Clifton E. Wilson	681
Simulation of Roll-Call Voting. Michael		Imperial Japan's Higher Civil Service	
J. Shapiro	494	Examinations. Robert M. Spaulding, Jr.	
Hovet, Thomas, Jr. Note on David Mit-		Reviewed by Edwin O. Reischauer	966
rany, A Working Peace System	303	Indonesia. Bruce Grant. Noted by William	
Howard, J. Woodford, Jr. Note on Archi-		R. Liddle	670
bald Cox, The Warren Court: Constitu-		The Industrial Society: Three Essays on	
tional Decision as an Instrument of		Ideology and Development. Raymond	
•	1329	Aron. Noted by Irving Louis Horowitz.	1321
Howard, J. Woodford, Jr. On the Fluidity		Influencing Voters: A Study of Campaign	
of Judicial Choice	43	Rationality. Richard Rose. Noted by	
Howe, Mark DeWolfe. The Garden and the			1365
Wilderness: Religion and Government in		Inglehart, Ronald. Review of Altiero	
American Constitutional History. Re-		Spinelli, The Eurocrats	593
	597	The Insecurity of Nations: International	
Hsi-sheng, Chi. Note on Donald G. Gillin,		Relations in the Twentieth Century.	
Warlord: Yen Hsi-shan in Shansi Prov-		•	1397
	292	The Institutionalization of the U.S. House	
Huaylas: An Andean District in Search of		of Representatives. Nelson W. Polsby	144
Progress. Paul L. Doughty. Noted by	. 0 = 0	The "Intensity" Problem and Democratic	
	1379	Theory. Willmoore Kendall and George	_
Hughes, Colin A. and John S. Western. The		W. Carey	5
Prime Minister's Policy Speech: A Case		The Intermediaries: Third Parties in Inter-	
Study in Televised Politics. Noted by	000	national Crises. Oran R. Young. Noted	1010
<u>.</u>	999	by David W. Wainhouse	1018
Hulicka, Irene M. and Karel Hulicka.		International Peace Observation: A History	
Soviet Institutions, The Individual and Society. Noted by Ellen Mickiewicz	650	and Forecast. David W. Wainhouse, and Associates. Reviewed by Lincoln P.	
Hulicka, Karel and Irene M. Hulicka.	658	Bloomfield	586
Soviet Institutions, The Individual and		International Political Communication. W.	900
	658	Phillips Davison. Reviewed by Karl W.	
Hutchins, Francis G. The Illusion of Per-	000	Deutsch	969
manence: British Imperialism in India.		International Regions and the International	505
	307	System: A Study in Political Ecology.	
Hyneman, Charles S. Popular Government	001	Bruce M. Russett. Reviewed by Michael	
in America: Foundations and Principles.		K. O'Leary	970
Reviewed by Neal Riemer	284	International Relations	0.0
		National Attributes as Predictors of Dele-	
Ideas and Politics of Chilean Independence		gate Attitudes at the United Nations. Jack	
1808-1833. Simon Collier. Noted by		E. Vincent	916
Robert H. Dix	372	Some Reflections on Soviet-American Rela-	
Ideology and Electoral Action: A Compara-		tions. Merle Fainsod	1093
tive Case Study of the National Committee		Interstate Compacts in the Political Process	

Weldon V. Barton. Noted by Thad L. Beyle	269	and Otis Dudley Duncan, The American Occupational Structure	596
Economic and Social Revolution. Richard H. Sanger. Noted by Paul F. Power	1023	tive in the Contemporary South. Noted by Ralph Eisenberg	1341
The Invention of the American Political Parties. Roy F. Nichols. Noted by James S. Young	268	Johnpoll, Bernard K. Note on F. C. Engel- mann and M. A. Schwartz, Political Parties and the Canadian Social Structure	278
Ionescu, Ghita. Communication on Robert A. Rupen's review of his book "The		Johnpoll, Bernard K. The Politics of Futility. The General Jewish Workers	210
Politics of the European States'' Ionescu, Ghita. The Politics of the European Communist States. Noted by Robert A.	1271	Bund of Poland, 1917-1943. Noted by Joseph Dunner	667
Rupen	663	and John Nottingham, The Myth of Mau Mau: Nationalism in Kenya	285
Between Two Worlds	684	Johnson, Harry G. Economic Policies Toward Less Developed Countries. Noted by George M. Platt	682
quejay. Noted by Robert A. Rupen The Islamic Law of Nations. Shaybani	1002	Johnson, Kenneth F. Note on Robert H. Dix, Colombia: The Political Dimensions	000
Siyar. Noted by Moshe Perlmann Islamic Reform: The Political and Legal Theories of Muhammad Abduh and Rashid	671	of Change	996
Rida. Malcolm H. Kerb. Reviewed by Fauzi M. Najjar	972	from a New Perspective. Reviewed by Sheldon Goldman	1285
Israel on the Road to Sinai, 1949-1956. Ernest Stock. Noted by George Kirk	691	Johnston, J. Paul. Note on Donald Atwell Zoll, The Twentieth Century Mind	259
Issues of Political Development. Charles W. Anderson, Fred R. von der Mehden, and Crawford Young, eds. Reviewed by		Jones, Charles O. Every Second Year: Con- gressional Behavior and the Two-Year Term. Noted by Roger H. Davidson	980
Arpad von Lazar	243	Jones, Charles O. The Minority Party and Policy-Making in the House of Repre-	404
Jackson, Carlton. Presidential Vetoes: 1792- 1945. Noted by Robert J. Kulishek	628	Jouvenal, Bertrand de. The Art of Con-	481
Jamgotch, Nish, Jr. Note on Vernon V. Aspaturian, The Soviet Union in the World Communist System	690	jecture. Reviewed by James A. Robinson Juggernaut: The Russian Forces, 1918- 1966. Malcolm Mackintosh. Noted by	236
The Japanese Communist Movement, 1920-1966. Robert A. Scalapino. Reviewed by		Roman Kolkowicz	658
Solomon B. Levine The Japanese Imperial Institution in the Tokugawa Period. Herschel Webb. Noted	1300	African Thought: Its Development in West Africa During the Nineteenth and Twentieth Centuries. Noted by Fred M.	
by Akira Kubata	1358	HaywardJung, Hwa Yol. Note on Alfred Schutz,	13 13
facé par). Correspondance d'Alexis de Tocqueville et de Gustave de Beaumont.		The Phenomenology of the Social World Justice in Communist China. Shao-Chuan	614
Reviewed by Melvin Richter Jaros, Dean, Herbert Hirsch and Frederic J. Fleron, Jr. The Malevolent Leader:	234	Leng. Noted by Chan Lien Juviler, Peter H. and Henry W. Morton, eds. Soviet Policy-Making: Studies of	1382
Political Socialization in an American Sub-culture	564	Communism in Transition. Noted by Carl A. Linden	288
Jennings, M. Kent, and Kenneth P. Lang- ton. Political Socialization and the High School Civics Curriculum in the United		Juviler, Peter. Note on Maurice Hindus, The Kremlin's Human Dilemma: Russia After Half a Century of Revolution	286
States. Jennings, M. Kent and Richard G. Niemi. The Transmission of Political Values from	852	Kahn, Robert L. and Daniel Katz. The Social Psychology of Organizations.	
Parent to Child	169	Noted by Anthony Lewis Dexter Kaiser, Henry F. A Measure of the Popula-	1306

tion Quality of Legislative Apportionment Kallenbach, Joseph E. The American Chief Executive: The Presidency and the Gover-	208	Ideology and Electoral Action: A Comparative Case Study of the National Committee for an Effective Congress	1326
norship. Noted by Leslie Lipson (Kaplan, Harold. Urban Political Systems: A Functional Analysis of Metro Toronto.	626	Kessel, John H. Note on Leroy N. Riesel- bach, The Roots of Isolationism: Congres- sional Voting and Presidential Leader-	
Noted by James L. Cox	643	ship in Foreign Policy	632
Kaplan, Lawrence S. Review of Arthur M. Cox, Prospects for Peacekeeping	961	Khan, Mohammad Ayub. Friends Not Masters: A Political Autobigoraphy.	
Kaplan, Lawrence S. Review of Jeremy J.	<i>J</i> 01	Noted by Khalid B. Sayeed	1388
Stone, Strategic Persuasion: Arms Limita-		King, Anthony and D. E. Butler. The	
tions through Dialogue	961	British General Eelection of 1966. Noted	296
Miller, World Order and Local Disorder:		by Bernard Hennessy	290
The United Nations and Internal Con-		Century. John Leddy Phelan. Noted by	
▼	961	Robert G. Wesson	1006
Kaplan, Morton A. Note on Herbert J. Spiro, World Politics: The Global System	694	Kintner, William R. Note on Milton J. Esman and Daniel S. Cheever, The Com-	
Kash, Don E. Note on Harold Orlans, Con-	094	mon Aid Effort	1393
	981	Kirk, George. Note on Manfred W. Wen-	
Kassof, Allen, ed. Prospects for Soviet		ner, Modern Yemen, 1918-1966	647
•	.385	Kirk, George. Note on Ernest Stock, Israel	601
Katcher, Leo. Earl Warren: A Political Biography. Noted by Clifford M. Lytle	631	on the Road to Sinai, 1949-1956 Kleusner, Samuel Z., ed. The Study of Total	691
Kateb, George. Note on George Lichtheim,	001	Eocieties. Noted by C. P. Wolf	601
The Concept of Ideology and Other		Kneese, Allen V. and Stephen C. Smith,	
	600	eds. Water Research. Noted by Ashley L.	004
Kateb, George. Note on John G. Gunnell, Political Philosophy and Time	1303	Schiff	634
Katz, Daniel and Robert L. Kahn, The	.000	and Government. Sanford A. Lakoff, ed.	
Social Psychology of Organizations. Noted		Noted by Bernard Barber	985
· · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · ·	1306	Kolmehl, Kenneth. Note on Lee Metcalf	
Kautsky, John H. and Roger W. Benjamin. Communism and Economic Development.	110	and Vic Reinemer, Overcharge	264
Keech, William R. and Joel J. Schwartz.	110	Kogan, Norman. Review of Sidney G. Tarrow, Peasant Communism in Southern	
Group Influence and the Policy Process		Italy	1282
	840	Kolkowicz, Roman. Note on Malcolm	
Keech, William R. Note on Annuaire		Mackintosh, Juggernaut: The Russian	a z o
Suisse de Science Politique—Schweizer- isches Jahrbuch für Politische Wissen-		Forces, 1918-1966	658
schaft	666	The Recruitment of Candidates for the	
Kendall, Willmoore and George W. Carey.		Canadian House of Commons	1242
The "Intensity" Problem and Democratic	E	Kornberg, Allan. Canadian Legislative Be-	
Theory Kennedy. Theodore C. Sorenson. Noted by	5	havior: A Study of the 25th Parliament. Noted by Dean L. Yarwood	997
Aida DiPace Donald	260	Kort, Fred. A Nonlinear Model for the	
Kerb, Malcolm. Islamic Reform: The Po-		£nalysis of Judicial Decisions	546
litical and Legal Theories of Muhammad		Kramer, Gerald H. Communication on	
Abduh and Rashid Rida. Reviewed by Fauzi M. Najjar	972	Thomas Casstevens' "A Theorem About Voting"	955
Kercz, Jerzy F., ed. Soviet and East		Kramnick, Isaac. Bolingbroke and His	
European Agriculture. Noted by Roy D.		Circle: The Politics of Nostalgia. Noted	
Laird	290	by James V. Elliott	1312
Kerr, Malcolm H. Note on Walter Laqueur, The Road to Jerusalem	1403	The Kremlin's Human Dilemma: Russia After Half a Century of Revolution.	
Kertesz, Stephen D. The Quest for Peace		Maurice Hindus. Noted by Peter Juviler	286
Through Diplomacy. Noted by Louis		Krislov, Samuel. The Negro in Federal Em-	_
F. Brakeman	679	ployment. Noted by Richard Claude	637
Kessel, John H. Note on Harry M. Scoble.		Kroll, Morton, Note on Wendell Bell, ed.,	

The Southern Conference for Human Welfare. Noted by Emory F. Via	279
The Japanese Imperial Institution in the Tokugawa Period	239 373 279 377 352
Kulski, W. W. Note on Alfred Berzins, The Two Faces of Co-Existence	373 279 377 352 619
tical Institutions. Jacques Lambert. Noted by Arthur P. Whitaker	279 377 352 619
sell H. Fitzgibbon	377 352 619
mittee and the New Deal. Jerold S. Auerbach. Noted by Douglas Camp Chaffey. 989 La Fonction Parlementaire en Belgique: Mecanismes D'Acces et Images. Frederic Debuyst. Noted by Jeffrey L. Obler	352 619
La Fonction Parlementaire en Belgique: Mecanismes D'Acces et Images. Frederic Debuyst. Noted by Jeffrey L. Obler	619
Laird, Roy D. Note on Jerzy F. Kercz, ed., Soviet and East European Agriculture 290 Laissez-faire-Pluralismus: Demokratie und Wirtschaft des gegenwärtigen Zeitalters. Goetz Briefs, ed. Noted by Gerard Braunthal	619
Laissez-faire-Pluralismus: Demokratie und Wirtschaft des gegenwärtigen Zeitalters. Goetz Briefs, ed. Noted by Gerard Braunthal	
Lakoff, Sanford A., ed. Knowledge and Power: Essays on Science and Government. Noted by Bernard Barber	294
Lambert, Jacques. Latin America: Social Structures and Political Institutions. Noted by Arthur P. Whitaker	
Lang, Gladys Engel and Kurt. Politics and Voting Turnout in American Cities	297
Television, Noted by Bradbury Seasholes 1327 Lefever, Ernest W. Uncertain Mandate.	7 96
	287
Langton, Kenneth P. and M. Kent Jennings. Political Socialization and the High School Civics Curriculum in the United the General Assembly of the United Nations. Obed Y. Asamoah. Noted by A. R. Headley	693
States	
Thompson, Organizations in Action 246 lations in the Twentieth Century 13 La Porte, Todd. Review of Victor H. Vroom, ed., Methods of Organizational porary South. Malcolm E. Jewell. Noted	397
	341
Noted by Malcolm H. Kerr	678
nett, Cadres, Bureaucracy, and Political Power in Communist China	58 4
Soviet Politics Since Krushchev. Noted by William Parente	J.J.E
Larus, Joel. Nucleur Weapons Safety and the Common Defense. Noted by Timothy Based on the Theory of Games	770
Alden Williams	211

Howard Bliss	304	Social Democracy in Germany, 1878-1890.	
Lemercier-Quelquejay, Chantal and Alex-		Noted by Edward L. Pinney	270
andre Bennigsen. Islam in the Soviet		Lien, Chan. Note on Shao-chuan Leng,	
Union. Noted by Robert A. Rupen	1002	Justice in Communist China	1382
Lenczowski, George. Review of Douglas		Lijphart, Arend. The Politics of Accom-	
E. Ashford, Morocco-Tunisia: Politics and		modation: Pluralism and Democracy in	
Planning	587	the Netherlands. Noted by Andries	
Lenczowski, George. Review of Douglas E.		Hoogerwerf	1349
Ashford, National Development and Local		Lijphart, Arend. The Trauma of Decolon-	
Reform: Political Participation in Moroc-		ization: The Dutch and West New Guinea.	
co, Tunisia and Pakistan	587	Noted by James C. Scott	314
Lenczowski, George. Review of Douglas E.		Lind, Alden E. Note on Joseph L. Bernd,	
Ashford, Perspectives of a Moroccan		ed., Mathematical Applications in Polit-	
Nationalist	587	ical Science, II	615
Leng, Shao-chuan. Justice in Communist		Linden, Carl A. Note on Henry W. Morton	
China. Noted by Chan Lien	1382	and Peter H. Juviler, eds., Soviet Policy-	
Lenin: The Man, The Theorist, The Leader:		Making: Studies of Communism in Tran-	
A Reappraisal. Leonard Schapiro and		eilion	288
Peter Reddaway, eds. Noted by Alfred		Lindsay, David. Communication on the	
G. Meyer	1001	"myth" that communist governments	
Lerche, Charles O. Last Chance in Europe:		have never been voted into power in a	
Bases for a New American Policy. Re-		free election	1272
viewed by Frederick H. Hartmann	239	Lineberry, Robert L. and Edmund P.	
Le Socialisme Democratique, 1864-1960.		Fowler. Communication on Wolfinger	
Jacques Droz. Noted by William Eben-		and Field, "Political Ethos and the Struc-	
stein	257	ture of City Government"	230
L'Europe au berceau: souvenirs d'un tech-		Lineberry, Robert L. Note on Alan K.	
nocrate. Robert Lemaignen. Noted by		Campbell and Seymour Sacks, Metro-	
Howard Bliss	304	politan America: Fiscal Patterns and	
Levantrosser, William F. Congress and the		Governmental Systems	621
Citizen-Soldier. Noted by Lewis A. Fro-		Lippincott, Benjamin E. Democracy's	
man, Jr	263	Dilemma: The Totalitarian Party in a Free	
Le Vine, Victor T. Note on Colin Leys and		Society. Noted by Kurt P. Tauber	1315
Peter Robson, eds., Federation in East		Lipset, Seymour Martin and Stein Rokkan,	
Africa: Opportunities and Problems	1354	eds. Party Systems and Voter Alignments:	
Le Vine, Victor T. Note on Immanuel		Cross-National Perspectives. Reviewed by	
Wallerstein, Africa: The Politics of Unity	1354	Robert C. Fried	960
Levine, Solomon B. Review of Robert A.		Lipsitz, Lewis. Communication on criticisms	
Scalapino, The Japanese Communist		of his article "If, As Verba Says, the	
Movement, 1920-1966	1300	State Functions as a Religion, What Are	
Levy, Leonard W. Origins of the Fifth		We to Do Then to Save Our Souls?"	577
Amendment. Noted by Dean Alfange, Jr.	1334	Lipsitz, Lewis. If as Verba Says, the State	
Lewis, Paul H. The Politics of Exile: Para-		Functions as a Religion, What Are We to	
guay's Febrerista Party. Noted by Ronald		Do Then to Save Our Souls?	527
H. McDonald	1356	Lipsky, Michael. Protest as a Political	
Leys, Colin and Peter Robson, eds. Federa-		Resource	1144
tion in East Africa: Opportunities and		Lipson, Leslie. Note on Joseph E. Kallen-	
Problems. Noted by Victor T. Le Vine	1354	bach, The American Chief Executive:	
A Liberal State At War: English Politics		The Presidency and the Governorship	626
and Economics During the Crimean War.		Liska, George. Imperial America: The	
Olive Anderson. Noted by Charles Mark	668	International Politics of Primacy. Noted	
Lichtheim, George. The Concept of Ideology		by Clifton E. Wilson	681
and Other Essays. Noted by George		Li Ta-chao and the Origins of Chinese	
Kateb	600	Marxism. Maurice Meisner. Noted by	
Liddle, William. Note on Tarzie Vittachi,		Mostafa Rejai	1310
The Fall of Sukarno	670	Literary Dissent in Communist China.	
Liddle, William R. Note on Bruce Grant,		Merle Goldman. Reviewed by Roger W.	
Indonesia	670	Benjamin	588
Lidtle Vernon I. The Outlaned Party		Looks John Tong Tracts on Congrument	

Philip Abrams, ed. Noted by Fred H. Willhoite	614	Madron, Thomas Wm. Note on W. J. M. Mackenzie, Politics and Social Science	075
Locke's State of Nature: Historical Fact or Moral Fiction? Richard Ashcraft	898	Magid, Alvin. Note on Wolfgang R. Stol- per, Planning Without Facls: Lessons in	975
Lodge, Milton. Soviet Elite Participatory	090	Resource Allocation from Nigeria's De-	
Attitudes in the Post-Stalin Period	827	velopment	654
Loewenberg, Gerhard. Note on William		Maichel, Karol, comp. Soviet and Russian	
Safran, Veto-Group Politics: The Case of		Newspapers at the Hoover Institution: A	
Health-Insurance Reform in West Ger-	1055	Catalog. Noted by Fritz T. Epstein	660
many	1357	Main, Jackson Turner. The Upper House in	
Concepts of Rule and Rationality. Gidon		Revolutionary America, 1765-1788. Noted by Joseph Cooper	
Gottlieb. Noted by Stuart S. Nagel	1308	Majority vs. Opposition in the French Na-	1001
Loman, Louis E. Thailand: The War That		tional Assembly, 1956-1965: A Guttman	
Is, The War That Will Be. Noted by		Scale Analysis. David M. Wood	88
Robert O. Tilman	1390	Majumdar, Bimanbehari. History of Indian	
London, Kurt, ed. Eastern Europe in	000	Social and Political Ideas—From Ram-	
Transition. Noted by Carl Beck	289	mohun to Dayananda. Noted by D.	611
Lopreato, Joseph. Note on Gianfranco Poggi, Catholic Action in Italy: The		MacKenzie Brown The Making of the Second Reform Bill. F. B.	611
Sociology of a Sponsored Organization	255	Smith. Noted by James B. Christoph	1378
Loveday, P. and A. W. Martin. Parliament	-00	Malapportionment, Party Competition, and	20.0
Factions and Parties: The First 30 Years		the Functional Distribution of Govern-	
of Responsible Government in New South		mental Expenditures. Allan G. Pulsipher	
Wales, 1856-1889. Noted by John Orbell	1000	and James L. Weatherby, Jr	1207
Lowe, Donald M. The Function of "China"		The Malevolent Leader: Political Socializa-	
in Marx, Lenin and Mao. Noted by	1910	tion in an American Sub-culture. Dean	
Mostafa Rejai	1310	Jaros, Herbert Hirsch, and Frederic J. Fleron, Jr	564
Time: Progress and Poverty in America's		Manoukian, Agopik, Francesco Alberoni,	501
Renewing Cities. Noted by Vincent L.		Vittorio Capecchi, Franca Olivetti, and	
Marando	619	Antonio Tosi. L'Attivista di Partito.	
Lowenstein, Ralph L. and Paul L. Fisher.		Noted by Robert D. Putnam	1352
eds. Race and the News Media. Noted by		Mansfield, Harvey C. Review of Walter	
David L. Paletz	639	W. Heller, New Dimensions of Political	040
Lowi, Theodore J. Note on Louis Eisen- stein and Elliot Rosenberg, A Stripe of		Economy	248
Tammany's Tiger	642	John E. Rue. Noted by Donald G.	
L'Union pour la Nouvelle République:	012	Gillin	669
Etude du pouvoir au sein d'un parti poli-		Marando, Vincent L. Note on Derek Senior,	
tique. Jean Charlot. Noted by John E.		ed., The Regional City: An Anglo-Amer-	
Schwarz	294	ican Discussion of Metropolitan Planning	619
Lytle, Clifford M. Note on Leo Katcher,		Marando, Vincent. Note on Edward O.	
Earl Warren: A Political Biography	631	Laumann, Prestige and Association in an	
Mackenzie, W. J. M. Politics and Social		Urban Community: An Analysis of an Urban Stratification System	619
Science. Noted by Thomas Wm. Madron	975	Marando, Vincent L. Note on Jeanne R.	010
Mackintosh, Malcolm. Juggernaut: The		Lowe, Cities in a Race With Time: Prog-	
Russian Forces, 1918-1966. Noted by		ress and Poverty in America's Renewing	
Roman Kolkowicz	658 [′]	Cities	619
MacMaster, Robert E. Danilevsky, A		Margolis, Julius, Richard E. Caves and	•
Russian Totalitarian Philosopher. Noted	oge	Joe S. Bain. Northern California's Water	ġ94
by Rolf H. W. Theen	256	Industry. Noted by Ashley L. Schiff Mark, Charles. Note on Olive Anderson,	634
J. Edinger and Richard L. Merritt.		A Liberal State at War: English Politics	
France, Germany, and the Western Al-		and Economics During the Crimean War	668
liance; A Study of Elite Attitudes on		Martin, A. W. and P. Loveday. Parliament	
European Integration and World Politics.		Factions and Parties: The First 30 Years	
Reviewed by Donald D. Searing	240	of Responsible Government in New South	

Wales, 1856-1889. Noted by John Orbell Martin, John Bartlow. Overtaken by Events:	1000	ica	1125
The Dominican Crisis from the Fall of Trujillo to the Civil War. Noted by Fre-		ican Party System: Party Formation in the Jacksonian Era. Noted by William Nisbet	•
derico G. Gil	310	Chambers	1330
Martin, L. W. The Sea in Modern Strategy.	010	McCrone, Donald and Charles F. Cnudde.	1000
Noted by Bernard Brodie	1019	Communication on Forbes and Tufte, "A	-
Martin, Roscoe C. Note on Aaron Wil-	1010	Note of Caution in Causal Modelling"	1260
davsky, ed., American Federalism in		McDonald, Ronald H. Note on Paul H.	1200
Perspective	624	Lewis, The Politics of Exile: Paraguay's	
Marvick, Dwaine. Note on Piet Thoenes,	024		1956
The state of the s	600	Februsia Party	1356
ed., The Elite in the Welfare State	603	McLin, Jon B. Canada's Changing Defense	
Marx in the Mid-Twentieth Century: A		Folicy, 1957-1963: The Problems of a	
Yugoslav Philosopher Reconsiders Karl		Middle Power In Alliance. Reviewed by	005
Marx's Writings. Gajo Petrovic. Noted		Gilbert R. Winham	965
by Edward D. Wilde	613	McShea, Robert J. The Political Philosophy	1000
Marxism: A Re-Examination. Irving M.	0 101	of Spinoza. Noted by Stanley Rosen	1323
Zeitlin. Noted by Samuel Hendel	974	A Measure of the Population Quality of	
Mason, Bruce B. Note on Alfred G. Ger-		Legislative Apportionments. Henry F.	
teiny, Mauritania	1381	Kaiser	208
Mason, Warren L. Note on G. Lowell		Measuring the Concentration of Power in	
Field, Comparative Political Development:		Political Systems. Steven J. Brams	461
The Precedent of the West	280	Measuring Social and Political Requirements	
Masters, Roger D. Note on Alan R. Beals		for System Stability in Latin America.	
and Bernard J. Siegel, Divisiveness and		Ernest A. Duff and John F. McCamant.	1125
Social Conflict	618	Meehan, Eugene J. Note on Oran R. Young,	
Mathematical Applications in Political		Systems of Political Science	1322
Science, II. Bernd, Joseph L., ed. Noted		Meisel, James H. Note on A. James Gregor,	
by Alden E. Lind	615	Contemporary Radical Ideologies: Totali-	
Mathematical Applications in Political		tarian Thought in the Twentieth Century	1307
Science, III. Joseph L. Bernd, ed. Re-		Meisner, Maurice. Li Ta-chao and the	
viewed by Herbert F. Weisberg	1294	Origins of Chinese Marxism. Noted by	
Mauritania. Alfred G. Gerteiny. Noted by		Mostafa Rejai	1310
Bruce B. Mason	1381	Merelman, Richard M. Communication on	
Maw, Ba. Breakthrough in Burma: Memoirs		criticisms of his article "On the Neo-	
of a Revolution, 1939-1946. Noted by		Elitist Critique of Community Power"	1269
Fred R. von der Mehden	1363	Methodology	
Maxime Weygand and Civil-Military Re-		$M \epsilon a suring$ the Concentration of Power in	
lations in Modern France. Philip C. F.		Political Systems, Steven J. Brams	461
Bankwitz. Noted by John N. Colas	1004	National Political Units in the Twentieth	
Meyer, Arno J. Politics and Diplomacy of		Century: A Standardized List. Bruce M.	
Peacemaking: Containment and Counter-		Russett, J. David Singer and Melvin	
revolution at Versailles, 1918-1919. Noted		Small	932
by Whitney T. Perkins	1014	A Nonlinear Model for the Analysis of	
Mayhew, David R. Review of James T.		Judicial Decisions. Fred Kort	546
Patterson. Congressional Conservatism and		A Note of Caution in Causal Modelling.	
and the New Deal: The Growth of the		Hugh Donald Forbes and Edward R.	
Conservative Coalition in Congress, 1933-		Tufte	1258
1939	1298	Political Science and the Uses of Functional	
Mazrui, Ali A. Towards a Pax Africana: A		Analysis. A. James Gregor	425
Study of Ideology and Ambition. Noted		Probabilism and the Number of Units	
by Herbert J. Spiro	258	Affected Measuring Influence Concentra-	
McBride, Michael and Michael P. Gehlen.		ion. Bruce M. Russett	476
The Soviet Central Committee: An Elite		A Salience Dimension of Politics for the	
Analysis	1232	Study of Political Culture. Moshe M.	
McCamant, John F. and Ernest A. Duff.		Ozudnowski	878
Measuring Social and Political Require-		A Theorem about Voting. Thomas W.	
ments for System Stability in Latin Amer-		Casstevens	205

Milbrath, Lester W. Note on Robert D.		Nayar. Noted by Theodore P. Wright,	650
Hess and Judith V. Torney, The Develop- ment of Political Attitudes in Children	1348	Jr	000
Melotti, Umberto. Cultura e partecipazione		A. Hayek, Studies in Philosophy, Politics	060
sociale nella citta in transformazione. Noted by Samuel H. Barnes	273	and Economics	968
Mendel, Douglas, Jr. Note on Lung-Chu	213	and Politics: The Theories of Talcott	-
Chen, and Harold Lasswell, Formosa,		Parsons. Noted by George R. Boynton	250
China and the United Nations—Formosa		Mitrany, David. A Working Peace System.	
in the World Community	673	Noted by Thomas Hovet, Jr	303
Meranto, Philip. The Politics of Federal Aid		Modelski, George and Jean-Luc Vellut.	
to Education in 1965: A Study in Political		Communication on Russett et al, "Na-	
Innovation. Noted by Lawrence K.		tional Political Units in the Twentieth	
Pettit	635	Century: A Standardized List"	952
Merelman, Richard M. On the Neo-Elitist		Modern Yemen, 1918-1966. Manfred W.	
Critique of Community Power	451	Wenner. Noted by George Kirk	647
Merritt, Richard L., Karl W. Deutsch,		The Modernity of Tradition: Political	
Lewis J. Edinger, and Roy C. Macridis.		Development in India. Lloyd I. Rudolph	
France, Germany, and the Western Al-		and Susanne H. Rudolph. Reviewed by	1000
liance; A Study of Elite Attitudes on		Robert L. Hardgrave, Jr	1280
European Integration and World Politics. Reviewed by Donald D. Searing	940	The Moral and Political Tradition of Rome. Donald Earl. Noted by Deane E. Neu-	
Metcalf, Lee and Vic Reinemer. Over-	240	bauer	609
charge. Noted by Kenneth Kofmehl	264	Morey, Roy D. Note on Jack E. Holmes,	000
Methods of Organizational Research. Victor	201	Politics in New Mexico	641
H. Vroom, ed. Reviewed by Todd La		Morgan, Donald G. Congress and the Consti-	•
Porte	246	tution: A Study of Responsibility. Noted	
Metropolitan America: Challenge to Federal-		by Dale Vinyard	986
ism. Bernard J. Frieden. Noted by		Morocco-Tunisia: Politics and Planning.	
Thomas J. Anton	623	Douglas E. Ashford. Reviewed by George	
Metropolitan America: Fiscal Patterns and		Lenczowski	587
Governmental Systems. Alan K. Campbell		Morrison, Joseph L. W. J. Cash: Southern	
and Seymour Sacks. Noted by Robert L.		Prophet: A Biography and Reader. Noted	
Lineberry	621	by David M. Abshire	991
Meyer, Alfred G. Note on Leonard Schapiro		Morton, Henry W. and Peter H. Juviler,	
and Peter Reddaway, eds., Lenin: The		eds. Soviet Policy-Making: Studies of	
Man, The Theorist, The Leader: A Reap-	1001	Communism in Transition. Noted by Carl	000
praisal	1001	A. Linden	288
Mickiewicz, Ellen. Note on Karel Hulicka, and Irene M. Hulicka, Soviet Institutions,		Motivation, Incentive Systems, and the Political Party Organization. M. Margaret	
The Individual and Society	658	Conway and Frank B. Feigert	1159
Mickiewicz, Ellen Propper. Soviet Political	000	Movies, Censorship and the Law. Ira H.	
Schools: The Communist Party Adult		Carmen. Noted by Robert S. Gerstein.	266
Instruction System. Noted by Joel J.		Muir, William K. Jr. Prayer in the Public	
Schwartz	276	Schools: Law and Attitude Change. Re-	
Miller, J. D. B. The Politics of the Third		viewed by Sheldon Goldman	1285
World. Noted by Jack C. Planodile	1017	Muller, Kurt. The Foreign Aid Programs of	
Miller, Linda B. World Order and Local		the Soviet Bloc and Communist China:	
Disorder: The United Nations and Internal		An Analysis. Noted by Marshall I. Gold-	1001
Conflicts. Reviewed by Lawrence S.	001		1021
Kaplan	961	Murphy, George G. S. Soviet Mongolia. A	
Milner, Neal. Note on Arthur Niederhoffer, Behind the Shield: The Police in Urban		Study of the Oldest Political Satellite. Noted by George Ginsburgs	291
Society	625	Murty, B. S. Propaganda and World Public	LOL
The Minority Party and Policy-Making in	020	Order: The Legal Regulation of the Ideo-	
the House of Representatives. Charles O.		logical Instrument of Coercion. Noted by	
Jones	481	Anthony A. D'amato	1392
Minority Politics in the Punjab. Baldev Raj		Myrdal, Gunnar. Asian Drama: An Inquiry	

into the Poverty of Nations. Reviewed by		in India. Michael Brecher. Noted by	
Jean Grossholtz	1278	Paul R. Brass	293
The Myth of Mau Mau: Nationalism in	•	Nellis, John R. and Fred G. Burke. Note on	
Kenya. Carl H. Rosberg, Jr. and John		Jeffrey Butler and A. A. Castagno, eds.,	,
Nottingham. Noted by David H. Johns.	285	Boston University Papers on Africa,	
		Transition in African Politics	283
Nagel, Stuart S. Note on Gidon Nottlieb,		Nelson, William R. Note on Jacques Ellul,	
The Logic of Choice: An Investigation of		The Technological Society	603
the Concepts of Rule and Rationality		Neubauer, Deane E. Communication on	
Najjar, Fauzi M. Review of Malcolm Kerb,		criticisms of his article "Some Conditions	701
Islamic Reform: The Political and Legal		of Democracy"	581
Theories of Muhammad Abduh and Rashid Rida	972	Neubauer, Deane E. Note on Donald Earl, The Moral and Political Tradition of	
Nash, A. E. Keir. Review of William Nisbet	514	Rome	609
Chambers and Walter Dean Burnham,		New Dimensions of Political Economy.	003
The American Party Systems		Walter W. Heller. Reviewed by Harvey	
National Attributes as Predictors of Delegate	12.0	C. Mansfield	248
Attitudes at the United Nations. Jack E.		New Jersey's Jeffersonian Republicans:	
Vincent	.916	The Genesis of an Early Party Machine.	٠
National Development and Local Reform:		Carl F. Prince. Reviewed by Manning J.	
Political Participation in Morocco,		Dauer	595
Tunisia and Pakistan. Douglas E. Ash-		Newman, Dale A. Note on James L. Price,	
ford. Reviewed by George Lenczowski	587	Organizational Effectiveness: An Inventory	
National Political Units in the Twentieth	•	of Propositions	1320
Century: A Standardized List. Bruce M.		Nichols, Roy F. The Invention of the Ameri-	
Russett, J. David Singer and Melvin		can Political Parties. Noted by James S.	
Small	932	Young	268
"National Political Units in the Twentieth		Niederhoffer, Arthur. Behind the Shield:	
Century: A Standardized List," Russett		The Police in Urban Society. Noted by	
et al. Communication by George Modelski	0.50	Neal Milner	625
and Jean-Luc Vellut	952	Niemi, Richard G. and M. Kent Jennings.	
"National Political Units in the Twentieth		The Transmission of Political Values from	100
Century: A Standardized List," Russett		Parent to Child I Baland Ban	169
et al. Communication by Michael Haas Nationalists Without Nations: The Oligarchy	952	Nomos X: Representation. J. Roland Pennock and John W. Chapman, eds. Re-	
Versus the People in Latin America.		viewed by James A. Steintrager	1289
Victor Alba. Noted by Peter Ranis	1383	A Nonlinear Model for the Analysis of	1200
NATO and Europe. André Beaufre. Re-	1000	Judicial Decisions. Fred Kort	546
viewed by Stuart A. Scheingold	1296	North Carolina Politics: An Introduction.	- ·
NATO and the Range of American Choice.		Jack D. Fleer. Noted by Lewis Bowman	1347
William T. R. Fox and Annette Baker		Northern California's Water Industry. Joe	
Fox. Reviewed by Stuart A. Scheingold.	1296	S. Bain, Richard E. Caves and Julius	
The Nature of Political Inquiry. Fred M.		Margolis. Noted by Ashley L. Schiff	634
Frohock. Noted by Edwin Fogelman	973	A Note on Censorship. Gordon Tullock	1265
Nayar, Baldev Raj. Minority Politics in the		A Note of Caution in Causal Modelling.	
Punjab. Noted by Theodore P. Wright,		Hugh Donald Forbes and Edward R.	
Jr	650	Tufte	1258
The Nazi Seizure of Power: The Experience		The Notion of the State: An Introduction	
of a Single German Town 1930-1935.		to Political Theory. Alexander Passerin	1910
William Sheridan Allen. Noted by G.	079	d'Entrèves. Noted by Maynard Smith	1919
Bingham Powell, Jr	272	Nottingham, John and Carl H. Rosberg, Jr. The Myth of Mau Mau: Nationalism	
and Socioeconomic Development: The Case		in Kenya. Noted by David H. Johns.	. 285
of Latin America	889	Nuclear Weapons Safety and the Common	. 200
The Negro in Federal Employment. Samuel	-50	Defense. Joel Larus. Noted by Timothy	
Krislov. Noted by Richard Claude	637	Alden Williams	1396
The Negro in Virginia Politics, 1902-1965.		Nyomarkay, Joseph. Charisma and Fac-	
Andrew Buni. Noted by Lewis Bowman.	638	tionalism in the Nazi Party. Reviewed by	
Mohan's Mantle, The Delition of Sugaragion		H P Sacher	500

		,	
The OAS and United States Foreign Policy. Jerome Slater. Noted by Yale H. Fer-			1012
guson	308	The Outlawed Party: Social Democracy in Germany, 1878–1890. Vernon L. Lidtke. Noted by Edward L. Pinney	270
Mecanismes D'Access et Images O'Leary, Michael K. Review of Bruce M.	274	Overcharge. Lee Metcalf and Vic Reinemer. Noted by Kenneth Kofmehl	264
Russett, International Regions and the International System: A Study in Political Ecology	970	Overtaken by Events: The Dominican Crisis from the Fall of Trujillo to the Civil War. John Bartlow Martin. Noted by Fred-	
O'Leary, Michael Kent. The Politics of American Foreign Aid. Noted by Vincent	310	erico G. Gil	310
Davis	680	Pakistan's Development: Social Goals and Private Incentives. Gustav F. Papanek. Noted by Khalid B. Sayeed	1388
Antonio Tosi. L'Attivista di Partito. Noted by Robert D. Putnam	1352	Paletz, David L. Note on Paul L. Fisher and Ralph L. Lowenstein, Race and the	
Olorunsola, Victor A. Note on Robert F. Stevenson, Population and Political Systems in Tropical Africa	1386	News Media Paletz, David L. Note on William A. Wood, Electronic Journalism	639 639
Olson, David J. Note on Jerome Rothenberg, Economic Evaluation of Urban Re-	1000	Palfreeman, A. C. The Administration of the White Australia Policy. Noted by D.	000
newal: Conceptual Foundation of Benefit- Cost Analysis	993	W. Rawson	
On the Fluidity of Judicial Choice. J. Woodford Howard, Jr.	43	U. S. Policy and the Security of Asia Panditji: A Portrait of Jawaharlal Nehru.	
On Law and Justice. Paul A. Freund. Noted by William N. Beaney	1335	Marie Seton. Noted by Joseph P. Harris Papanek, Gustav F. Pakistan's Develop- ment: Social Goals and Private Incentives.	651
Power. Richard M. Merelman O'Neill, Robert. The German Army and the	451	Noted by Khalid B. Sayeed	1388
Nazi Party, 1933-39. Reviewed by H. P. Secher.	590	lin and Thomas B. Larson, eds., Soviet Politics Since Khrushchev	1385
Orbell, John. Note on P. Loveday and A. W. Martin, Parliament Factions and Parties: The First 30 Years of Responsible	÷	Parente, William. Note on Allen Kassof, ed., Prospects for Soviet Society Pareto and Pluto-Democracy: The Retreat	1385
Government in New South Wales, 1856–1889	1000	to Galapagos. S. E. Finer Parliament Factions and Parties: The First	440
Ordeshook, Peter C. and William H. Riker. A Theory of the Calculus of Voting	25	30 Years of Responsible Government in New South Wales, 1856–1889. P. Loveday	
Organizational Effectiveness: An Inventory of Propositions. James L. Price. Noted by Dale A. Newman	1320	and A. W. Martin. Noted by John Orbell Parsons, Malcolm B. Note on Richard Polenberg, Reorganizing Roosevelt's Gov-	1000
Organization Theory and the Explanation of Important Characteristics of Congress.		ernment: The Controversy Over Executive Reorganization 1936–1939	627
Lewis A. Froman, Jr	$\frac{518}{246}$	Party Building in a New Nation: The Indian National Congress. Myron Weiner. Re-	501
son. Reviewed by Todd La Porte The Origins of Malay Nationalism. William R. Roff. Noted by James F. Guyot	648	viewed by Avery Leiserson Party Democracy: Politics in an Italian Socialist Federation. Samuel H. Barnes.	584
The Origins of Modern African Thought: Its Development in West Africa During the	_ 300	Noted by Timothy M. Hennessey Party Leaders in the House of Representatives.	1351
Nineteenth and Twentieth Centuries. Robert W. July. Noted by Fred M. Hayward	1313	Randall B. Ripley. Noted by Eugene Eidenberg	1325
Origins of the Fifth Amendment. Leonard W. Levy. Noted by Dean Alfange, Jr Orlans, Harold. Contracting for Atoms.		Party Systems and Voter Alignments: Cross- National Perspectives. Seymour Martin Lipset and Stein Rokkan, eds. Reviewed	
Noted by Don E. Kash	981	by Robert C. Fried Patterns of African Development. Spiro,	960

Herbert J., ed. Noted by Charles F.	20.4	• •	1367
Andrain	284	Pincus, John. Trade, Aid and Development. Reviewed by H. Bradford Westerfield	242
servatism and the New Deal: The Growth		Pinney, Edward L. Note on Vernon L.	
of the Consevative Coalition in Congress,		Lidtke., The Outlawed Party: Social	
1933-1939. Reviewed by David R. May-		Democracy in Germany, 1878-1890	270
_	1298	Pirer, Don C. Note on Herbert Butterfield	
Peaceful Coexistence: International Law in	1400	and Martin Wight, eds., Diplomatic In-	
the Building of Communism. Bernard A.		vestigations: Essays in the Theory of	
Ramundo. Noted by W. W. Kulski	312	International Politics	679
Peasant Communism in Southern Italy.	0	Pirro, Ellen B. Note on Richard R. Fagen,	0,0
Sidney G. Tarrow. Reviewed by Norman		Politics and Communication	607
	1282	Pirro, Ellen B. Note on Richard W. Budd,	
The Pendergast Machine. Lyle W. Dorsett.	1202	Robert K. Thorp, and Lewis Donohew,	
Noted by Douglas Fox	1337	Content Analysis of Communications	607
Pennock, J. Roland and John W. Chapman,	1001	Plank, John, ed. Cuba and the United States:	001
eds. Nomos X: Representation. Reviewed		Long-Range Perspectives. Reviewed by	
by James A. Steintrager	1280	Richard R. Fagen	1291
Perkins, Whitney T. Note on Arno J.	1200	Planning and Development in Iran. George	1201
Mayer, Politics and Diplomacy of Peace-		B. Baldwin. Noted by Marvin Zonis	645
making; Containment and Counterrevolu-		Planning and the Market in the U.S.S.R.:	010
tion of Versailles, 1918–1919	1014	the 1960's. Alexander Balinsky, Abram	
Perkins, Whitney T. Note on Byron Dexter,	1014	Bergson, John N. Hazard, and Peter	
The Years of Opportunity: The League		Wiles. Noted by Arthur W. Wright	655
of Nations, 1920–1926	1014	Planning Reforms in the Soviet Union, 1962-	000
Perlmann, Moshe. Note on Shaybani, Siyar.	1014	1966. Eugene Zaleski. Noted by Robert	
The Islamic Law of Nations	671	Campbell	656
Perspectives of a Moroccan Nationalist.	017	Planning Without Facts: Lessons in Resource	000
Douglas E. Ashford. Reviewed by George		Allocation from Nigeria's Development.	
Lenczowski	587	Wolfgang F. Stolper. Noted by Alvin	
Perspectives of Brazilian History. E. Brad-	301	Magid	654
ford Burns, ed. Noted by Jordan M.		Plano, Jack C. Note on J. D. B. Miller, The	001
Young	281	Politics of the Third World	1017
Perspectives on the Court. Max Freedman,	201	Platt, George M. Note on Harry G. John-	1011
William M. Beaney and Eugene V.		son, Economic Policies Toward Less	
Rostow. Noted by Bradley C. Canon	265	Developed Countries	682
Pesonen, Pertti, ed. Scandinavian Political	200	Poggi, Gianfranco. Catholic Action in Italy:	002
Studies. Reviewed by Christian Bay	237	The Sociology of a Sponsored Organization.	
Peter and Caesar: The Catholic Church and	201	Noted by Joseph Lopreato	255
Political Authority. E. A. Goerner. Noted		Pole, J. R. Political Representation in	200
by Glean Tinder	610	England and the Origins of the American	
Peterson, Robert L. Note on W. Hartley,	010	Republic. Noted by Harold F. Gosnell	608
Clark, The Politics of the Common Market	677	Polenberg, Richard. Reorganizing Roose-	000
Petrovic, Gajo. Marx in the Mid-Twentieth	•••	velt's Government: The Controversy Over	
Century: A Yugoslav Philosopher Recon-		Executive Reorganization 1936-1939.	
siders Karl Marx's Writings. Noted by		Noted by Malcolm B. Parsons	627
Edward D. Wilde	613	Policy Maps of City Councils and Policy	
Pettit, Lawrence K. Note on Philip Mer-		Outcomes: A Developmental Analysis.	
anto, The Politics of Federal Aid to		Heinz Eulau and Robert Eyestone	124
Education in 1965: A Study in Political		The Political Basis of Economic Develop-	-
Innovation	635	ment: An Exploration In Comparative	
Phelan, John Leddy. The Kingdom of Quito		Political Analysis. Robert T. Holt and	
in the Seventeenth Century. Noted by		John E. Turner. Reviewed by Gerald A.	
Robert G. Wesson	1006	Weiner	583
The Phenomenology of the Social World.		The Political Beliefs of Americans. A Study	
Alfred Schutz. Noted by Hwa Yol Jung.	614	of Public Opinion. Lloyd A. Free and	
Pilsudski's Coup d'Etat. Joseph Rothschild.		Hadley Cantril. Noted by Aage Clausen	1345
Noted by Vaclav L. Benes	1370	The Political Consequences of Electoral Laws.	
Pinerd Maurice Note on Edward M Cor-		Donales W. Rea. Noted by John Sprague	606

The Political Creature. Peter Zollinger.	Theory. Willmoore Kendall and George	
Noted by Sidney Waldman 1318 Political Development and Socioeconomic	W. Carey	
Development: The Case of Latin America.	Moral Fiction? Richard Asheraft 898	
Martin C. Needler 889	A Note on Censorship. Gordon Tullock 1265	
The Political Economy of South Africa.	Pareto and Pluto-Democracy: The Retreat	
Ralph Horwitz. Noted by David Gugin 652	to Galapagos. S. E. Finer	
Political Institutions and Social Change in Continental Europe in the Nineteenth	Protest as a Political Resource. Michael Lipsky	
Century. Eugene N. Anderson and Paul-	Some Thoughts on the Relation of Political	
ine R. Anderson. Noted by Charles Lewis	Theory to Anthropology. Carl J. Friedrich 536	
Taylor	A Theory of the Calculus of Voting. William	
Political Leadership in Industrialized Soci-	H. Riker and Peter C. Ordeshook 25	
eties: Studies in Comparative Analysis.	Political Theory and the Rights of Man. D.	
Lewis J. Edinger, ed. Noted by Thomas	Raphael, ed. Noted by John Rawls 977	
A. Baylis	The Political World of the High School Teacher. Harmon Zeigler. Noted by Jack	
Harmon Zeigler. Noted by Jack Dennis 1339	Dennis	
Political Participation in Communist China.	Politics and Communication. Richard R.	
James R. Townsend. Noted by John E.	Fagen. Noted by Ellen B. Pirro 607	
Rue 995	Politics and Diplomacy of Peacemaking:	
Political Parties and the Canadian Social	Containment at Counterrevolution at Ver-	
Structure. F. C. Engelmann and M. A.	sailles, 1918-1919. Arno J. Mayer. Noted	
Schwartz. Noted by Bernard K. John-	by Whitney T. Perkins 1014	
poll	Politics and Social Science. W. J. M. Mac- kenzie. Noted by Thomas Wm. Madron 975	
Gunnell. Noted by George Kateb 1303	Politics and Television. Kurt and Gladys	
The Political Philosophy of Spinoza. Robert	Engel Lang. Noted by Bradbury Sea-	
J. McShea. Noted by Stanley Rosen 1323	sholes	
Political Protest in the Congo. Herbert Weiss.	Politics and the Military in Jordan: A Study	
Reviewed by Crawford Young 1287	of the Arab Legion 1921-1957. P. J. Vati-	
Political Representation in England and the	kiotis. Noted by Richard H. Dekmejian 1375	
Origins of the American Republic, J. R.	Politics in Brazil, 1930-1964. Thomas E.	
Pole. Noted by Harold F. Gosnell 608	Skidmore, Noted by Jordan M. Young. 281	
Political Science and Ideotory. William E. Connolly. Noted by Peter Bachrach 599	Politics in New Mexico. Jack E. Holmes. Noted by Roy D. Morey	
The Political and Social Ideas of St. Augus-	The Politics of Accommodation: Pluralism	
tine. Herbert A. Deane. Noted by David	and Democracy in the Netherlands. Arend	
G. Smith	Lijphart. Noted by Andries Hoogerwerf 1349	
Political Science and the Uses of Functional	The Politics of American Foreign Aid.	
Analysis. A. James Gregor 425	Michael Kent O'Leary. Noted by Vincent	
Political Socialization and the High School	Davis	
Civics Curriculum in the United States.	The Politics of the Common Market. W. Hart-	
Kenneth P. Langton and M. Kent Jennings	ley Clark. Noted by Robert L. Peterson. 677	
Political Television. Bernard Rubin. Noted	The Politics of Conformity in Latin America. Claudio Veliz, ed. Noted by Kenneth N.	
by Bradbury Seasholes	Walker	
Political Theory	The Politics of Exile: Paraguay's Febrerista	
A Causal Model of Civil Strife: A Com-	Party. Paul H. Lewis. Noted by Ronald	
parative Analysis Using New Indices.	H. McDonald	
Ted Gurr	The Politics of Federal Aid to Education in	
Conservatism, Personality and Political Ex-	1965: A Study in Political Innovation.	
tremism. Robert A. Schoenberger 868	Philip Meranto. Noted by Lawrence K.	
Decision Costs in Coalition Formation. Charles R. Adrian and Charles Press 556	Pettit	
If, as Verba Says, the State Functions as a	Legislative Interaction. Peter A. Toma.	
Religion, What Are We to Do Then to	Noted by John M. Richardson, Jr 1340	
Save Our Souls? Lewis Lipsitz 527	The Politics of Futility: The General Jewish	
The "Intensity" Problem and Democratic	Workers Bund of Poland, 1917-1943.	

Bernard K. Johnpoll. Noted by Joseph Dunner.	667	Price, James L. Organizational Effective- ness: An Inventory of Propositions.	1000
The Politics of Poverty. John C. Donovan. Noted by John H. Strange The Politics of Provincialism: The Demo-	636	Noted by Dale A. Newman	1320
cratic Party in Transition, 1918-1932. David Burner. Noted by Jay S. Goodman	987	Hughes and John S. Western. Noted by Kenneth H. Thompson	999
The Politics of the European Communism States. Ghita Ionescu. Noted by Robert A. Rupen	663	Prince, Carl F. New Jersey's Jeffersonian Republicans: The Genesis of an Early Party Machine. Reviewed by Manning J.	
The Politics of the Third World. J. D. B.		Dauer	595
Miller. Noted by Jack C. Plano Polsby, Nelson W. The Institutionaliza-	1017	Pritchett, C. Herman. Note on Leonard Baker, Back to Back: The Duel between	
tion of the U.S. House of Representatives. Pontius, Dale. Note on Arms Control	144	FDR and the Supreme Court Private Politics: A Study of Five Political	631
Arrangements for the Far East Popular Government in America: Founda-	687	Outlooks. A. F. Davies. Noted by Karl Braithwaite	980
tions and Principles. Charles S. Hyneman. Reviewed by Neal Riemer	1984	Probabilism and the Number of Units Affected: Measuring Influence Concentra-	
Population and Political Systems in Tropical	1201	tion. Bruce M. Russett	4 76
Africa. Robert F. Stevenson. Noted by Victor A. Olorunsola	1386	Propaganda and World Public Order: The Legal Regulation of the Ideological Instru-	
Powell, G. Bingham, Jr. Note on William Sheridan Allen, The Nazi Seizure of		ment of Coercion. B. S. Murty. Noted by Anthony A. D'amato	1392
Power: The Experience of a Single German Town. 1930-1935	272	Prospects for Peacekeeping. Arthur M. Cox. Eeviewed by Lawrence S. Kaplan	961
Powell, Sandra. Communication on "Socio-	212	Prespects for Soviet Society. Allen Kassof,	
economic Variables and Voting for the Radical Left: Chile, 1952."	578	ed. Noted by William Parente Protest as a Political Resource. Michael	1385
Power, Paul F. Note on Richard H. Sanger, Insurgent Era: New Patterns of Political		Lipsky Psychiatry and Public Affairs. Reports and	1144
Economic and Social Revolution The Power Structure: Political Process in	1023	Symposia of the Group for the Advance-	
American Society. Arnold M. Rose.		ment of Psychiatry. Reviewed by Harold D. Lasswell	249
Noted by Andrew Hacker	1301	Public Management at the Bargaining Table. Kenneth O. Warner and Mary L. Hen-	
in South Dakota. Alan L. Clem. Noted by John H. Fenton	1333	nessy. Noted by Donald P. Sprengel Public Opinion and Constitution Making in	992
Prayer in the Public Schools: Law and		Pakistan, 1958-1962. Edgar A. and	
Attitude Change. William K. Muir, Jr. Reviewed by Sheldon Goldman	1285	Kathryn R. Schuler. Noted by Richard N. Blue	647
Prelude to Downfall: Hitler and the United States, 1939-1941. Saul Friedlander.		Pulsipher, Allan G. and James L. Weather- by, Jr. Malapportionment, Party Competi-	
Reviewed by H. P. Secher	590	ion, and the Functional Distribution of Governmental Expenditures	
Wann. Noted by Peter Woll		Putnam, Robert D. Note on Francesco	
Presidential Vetoes: 1792-1945. Carlton Jackson. Noted by Robert J. Kulisheck.	628	Alberoni, Vittorio Capecchi, Agopik Manoukian, Franca Olivetti, and Antonio	
Press, Charles and Charles R. Adrian. Decision Costs in Coalition Formation	556	Tosi, L'Attivista di Partito	1352
Prestige and Association in an Urban Com-		Quebec Confronts Canada. Edward M. Cor-	
munity: An Analysis of an Urban Strati- fication System. Edward O. Laumann.		bett. Noted by Maurice Pinard The Quest for a United Germany. Ferenc A.	
Noted by Vincent L. Marando Preston, Richard A. Canada and "Imperial	619	Váli. Noted by James H. Wolfe The Quest for Peace Through Diplomacy.	674
Defense": A Study of the Origins of the British Commonwealth's Defense Organi-		Stephen D. Kertesz. Noted by Louis F. Brakeman	679
zation, 1867-1919. Noted by Hiram M.		Page and the Manne Madia Poul I Fisher	

170 1 2 T Y		a a b u	00=
and Ralph L. Lowenstein, eds. Noted by	200	George G. Bauroth	685
David L. Paletz	639	Reischauer, Edwin O. Review of Robert M.	
Rackow, Felix. Note on John W. Spanier, The Truman-MacArthur Controversy and		Spaulding, Jr., Imperial Japan's Higher Civil Service Examinations	966
the Korean Ear	629	Rejai, Mostafa. Note on Donald M. Lowe,	900
Rae, Douglas W. Note on James D. Davis,	020	The Function of "China" in Marx, Lenin,	
Springboard to the White House: Presi-		and Mao	1310
dential Primaries: How They Are Fought		Rejai, Mostafa. Note on Maurice Meisner,	
and Won	261	Li Tachao and the Origins of Chinese	
Rae, Douglas W. The Political Consequences		Marxism	1310
of Electoral Laws. Noted by John Sprague	606	Reorganizing Roosevelt's Government: The	
Ramundo, Bernard A. Peaceful Coexistence:		Controversy Over Executive Reorganization	
International Law in the Building of Com-		1936-1939. Richard Polenberg. Noted by	
munism. Noted by W. W. Kulski	312	Malcolm B. Parsons	627
Randall, Richard S. Censorship of the		The Repeal of Fair Housing in California:	
Movies: The Social and Political Control		An Analysis of Referendum Voting. Ray-	
of a Mass Medium. Noted by Robert J.		mond E. Wolfinger and Fred I. Green-	m = 0
	1332	stein	753
Ranis, Peter. Note on Victor Alba, Nation-		Resistance: The Political Autobiography of	
alists Without Nations: The Oligarchy	1909	Georges Bidault. Georges Bidault. Noted	1009
Versus the People in Latin America Raphael, D., ed. Political Theory and the	1383	by Michael R. Gordon	1000
Rights of Man. Noted by John Rawls	977	Riemer. Noted by George W. Carey	1316
Rasmussen, Jorgen. Note on Francis G.	J.,	The Revolutionary Personality: Lenin,	1010
Hutchins, The Illusion of Permanence:		Trotsky, Gandhi. Victor E. Wolfenstein.	
British Imperialism in India	307	Noted by Arnold A. Rogow	604
Rawls, John. Note on D. Raphael, ed.,		Revolutionary Politics and the Cuban Work-	
Political Theory and The Rights of Man	977	ing Class. Maurice Zeitlin. Reviewed by	
Rawson, D. W. Note on A. C. Palfreeman.		m	1291
The Administration of the White Australia		Ricci, David M. Note on Shlomo, Avineri,	
Policy	1389	The Social and Political Thought of Karl	
Ray, Dennis M. Note on Franklin W.			1309
Houn, A Short History of Chinese Com-		Richardson, James L. Germany and the	
munism	1362	Atlantic Alliance: The Integration of	
The Recruitment of Candidates for the Can-		Strategy and Politics. Noted by Charles	070
adian House of Commons. Allan Kornberg	1040	B. Robson	676
and Hal H. Winsborough	1242	Richardson, John M., Jr. Note on Peter A. Toma, The Politics of Food for Peace:	
by Roger W. Benjamin	588	Executive-Legislative Interaction	1340
Reddaway, Peter and Leonard Schapiro, eds.,	1,00	Richter, Melvin. Review of Correspondance	1010
Lenin: The Man, The Theorist, The		d'Alexis de Tocqueville et de Gustave de	
Leader: A Reappraisal. Noted by Alfred		Beaumont. Texte Établi, Annoté et	
G. Meyer	1001	Préfacé Par André Jardin	234
Redekop, John H. The American Far Right:		Riemer, Neal. The Democratic Experiment:	
A Case Study of Billy James Hargis and		American Political Theory. Vol. I. Noted	
Christian Crusade. Noted by Robert A.			1316
Schoenberger	982	Riemer, Neal. Review of Charles S. Hyne-	
Regenstreif, Peter. Note on Gad Horowitz,		man, Popular Government in America:	1004
	1369		1284
Régime Interne et Politique Extérieure Dans		Riemer, Neal. The Revival of Democratic	1916
les Pays d'Asie. Georges Fischer et al. Noted by Robert O. Tilman	1364	Theory. Noted by George W. Carey Ries, J. C. Note on Vincent Davis, The	1910
The Regional City: An Anglo-American Dis-	TOOT		1344
cussion of Metropolitan Planning. Derek		Rieselbach, Leroy N. The Roots of Isolation-	1011
Senior, ed. Noted by Vincent L. Marando	619	ism: Congressional Voting and Presiden-	
Reinemer, Vic and Lee Metcalf. Overcharge.		tial Leadership in Foreign Policy. Noted	
Noted by Kenneth Kofmehl	264	by John H. Kessel	632
Reischauer, Edwin O. Beyond Vietnam:		Riker, William H. and Peter C. Ordeshook.	
The United States and Asia. Noted by		A Theory of the Calculus of Voting	25

Ripley, Randall B. Party Leaders in the	Rosenthal, Albert H. The Social Programs	
House of Representatives. Noted by	of Sweden, A Search for Security in a Free	
Eugene Eidenberg	25 Society. Noted by Arne J. Stokke	1005
The Road to Jerusalem. Walter Laqueur.	Ross, Alf. The United Nations: Peace and	
Noted by Malcolm H. Kerr 14		
Roazen, Paul. Freud: Political and Social	field	586
Thought. Noted by William Leiss 13	,	
Robinson, James A. Review of Bertrand	Soviet Empire: The Turks of Central Asia	
	36 and Stalinism	661
Robinson, Joan. An Essay on Marxian	Rostow, Eugene V., Max Freedman and	
Economics. Noted by George R. Feiwel. 10		
Robson, Charles B. Note on James L.	Court. Noted by Bradley C. Canon	265
Richardson, Germany and the Atlantic	Rothenberg, Jerome. Economic Evaluation	
Alliance: The Integration of Strategy	of Urban Renewal: Conceptual Founda-	
	76 tion of Benefit-Cost Analysis. Noted by	
Robson, Peter and Colin Leys, eds. Feder-	David J. Olson	993
ation in East Africa: Opportunities and	Rothfels, Hans et al., eds. Deutschlands	
Problems. Noted by Victor T. Le Vine. 13.		
Rodman, John. Note on Klaus Epstein,	nien, Belgien sowie deutsche Entwaffung	
The Genesis of German Conservatism 100	• •	
Roff, William R. The Origins of Malay	tionale Abrüstung, Dezember 1925 bis Juli	
Nationalism. Noted by James F. Guyot 6	,	
Rogow, Arnold A. Note on E. Victor	Politik, 1918–1945. Vol. I. Noted by	
Wolfenstein, The Revolutionary Person-	Stanley Suval	675
, ,,	04 Rothschild, Joseph. Pilsudski's Coup d'Etat.	
Rokkan, Stein and Seymour Martin Lipset,		1370
eds. Party Systems and Voter Alignments:	Rubin, Bernard. Political Television. Noted	
Cross-National Perspectives. Reviewed by		1327
	Rudolph, Lloyd I. and Susanne H. Rudolph.	
Romoser, George K. Note on Gerard Braun-	The Modernity of Tradition: Political	
thal, The Federation of German Industry	Development in India. Reviewed by	1000
_	T 1	1280
The Roots of Isolationism: Congressional	Rudolph, Susanne H. and Lloyd I. Rudolph.	
Voting and Presidential Leadership in Foreign Policy. Leroy N. Rieselbach.	The Modernity of Tradition: Political Development in India. Reviewed by	
		280
Rosberg, Carl H., Jr. and John Notting-	Rudolph, Susanne Hoeber. Review of	400
ham. The Myth of Mau Mau: National-	Howard L. Erdman, The Swatantra	•
ism in Kenya. Noted by David H. Johns 28		503
Rose, Arnold M. The Power Structure:	Rue, John E. Mao Tse-tung in Opposition	.200
Political Process in American Society.		669
Noted by Andrew Hacker 130		000
Rose, Richard. Influencing Voters: A Study	Political Participation in Communist	
of Campaign Rationality. Noted by	·	995
Charles F. Cnudde	85 Rumble, Wilfred E., Jr. American Legal	•
Rosecrance, R. N. Defense of the Realm:	Realism: Skepticism, Reform, and the	
British Strategy in the Nuclear Epoch.	Judicial Process. Noted by Michael A.	
Noted by David W. Tarr 139		.336
Rosen, Stanley. Note on Robert J. McShea,	Rupen, Robert A. Note on Alexandre	
The Political Philosophy of Spinoza 132		
Rosenau, James N. Domestic Sources of		.002
Foreign Policy. Noted by Paul Y. Ham-	Rupen, Robert A. Note on Ghita Ionescu,	
mond	9 The Politics of the European Communist	
Rosenberg, Elliot and Louis Eisenstein.		663
A Stripe of Tammany's Tiger. Noted by	Russett, Bruce M. International Regions	
Theodore J. Lowi		
Rosenbluth, Gideon. The Canadian Econ-	Political Ecology. Reviewed by Michael	
omy and Disarmament. Reviewed by	•	970
Gilbert R. Winham 96	5 Russett, Bruce, M., J. David Singer and	

Melvin Small. Communication on criticisms of their article "National Political Units in the Twentieth Century: A Standardized List."	955	NATO and the Range of American Choice Schieder, Theodor and Ferdinand A. Hermens. Staat. Wirtschaft und Politik in der Weimarer Republik, Festschrift für	1296
Russett, Bruce M., J. David Singer and Melvin Small. National Political Units in the Twentieth Century: A Standardized		Heinrich Brüning. Noted by Andreas Dorpalen	665
List	932	and Stephen C. Smith, eds. Water Research	634
fluence Concentration The Russian Empire 1800-1917. Hugh Seton-Watson. Reviewed by Frederick	476	Richard E. Caves, and Julius Margolis, Northern California's Water Industry Schnore, Leo F. and Henry Fagin. Urban	6 34
C. Barghoorn	1276	Research and Policy Planning. Noted by Frank Smallwood	620
Daniels	612	Personality and Political Extremism Schoenberger, Robert A. Note on John H.	868
Sacks, Seymour and Alan K. Campbell. Metropolitan America: Fiscal Patterns and Governmental Systems. Noted by		Redekop, The American Far Right: A Case Study of Billy James Hargis and Christian Crusade	982
Robert L. Lineberry Saenz, Paul. Note on Henry Bienen, Tan-	621	Schrock, Thomas S. Review of Mark De- Wolfe Howe. The Garden and the Wilder-	002
zania: Party Transformation and Eco- nomic Development	653	ness: Religion and Government in American Constitutional History	597
Case of Health-Insurance Reform in West Germany. Noted by Gerhard Loewenberg	1357	Opinion and Constitution Making in Pakistan. Noted by Richard N. Blue	647
A Salience Dimension of Politics for the Study of Political Culture. Moshe M. Czudnowski	878	Schuler, Kathryn R. and Edgar A. Public Opinion and Constitution Making in Pakistan. Noted by Richard N. Blue	647
Sanger, Richard H. Insurgent Era: New Patterns of Political, Economic and Social	010	Schutz, Alfred. The Phenomenology of the Social World. Noted by Hwa Yol Jung	614
Revolution. Noted by Paul F. Power Sayeed, Khalid B. Note on Gustav F. Papanek, Pakistan's Development: Social	1023	Schwartz, Joel J. and William R. Keech. Group Influence and the Policy Process in the Soviet Union	840
Goals and Private Incentives	1388	Schwartz, Joel J. Note on Ellen Propper Mickiewicz, Soviet Political Schools: The	0.40
Ayub Khan, Friends Not Masters: A Political Autobiography Scalapino, Robert A. The Japanese Com-	1388	Communist Party Adult Instruction System	276
munist Movement, 1920-1966. Reviewed by Solomon B. Levine	1300	Political Parties and the Canadian Social Structure. Noted by Bernard K. Johnpoll	278
Scandinavian Political Studies. Pertti Pesonen, ed. Reviewed by Christian Bay Schapiro, Leonard and Peter Reddaway,	237	Schwarz, John E. Note on Jean Charlot, L'Union pour la Nouvelle République: Etude du pouvoir au sein d'un parii	
eds. Lenin: The Man, The Theorist, The Leader: A Reappraisal. Noted by Alfred	1001	politique Scoble, Harry M. and Robert R. Alford.	294
G. Meyer. Schapsmeier, Frederick H. Note on Robert F. Wesser, Charles Evans Hughes: Politics	1001	Scoble, Harry M. Ideology and Electoral Action: A Comparative Case Study of the	1192
and Reform in New York, 1905-1910 Scheingold, Stuart A. Review of André Beaufre, NATO and Europe		National Committee for an Effective Congress. Noted by John H. Kessel Scott, Andrew. Note on Richard W. Cottam,	1326
Scheingold, Stuart A. Review of Harold Van B. Cleveland, The Atlantic Idea and		Competitive Interference and Twentieth Century Diplomacy	304
its European Rivals	1296	Scott, Andrew M. The Functioning of the International Political System. Noted by Frederic Wurzburg	1016

Scott, James C. Note on Arend Lijphart,		of the Democratic Process	1342
The Trauma of Decolonization: The Dutch		A Short History of Chinese Communism.	
and West New Guinea	314	Franklin W. Houn. Noted by Dennis M.	
Scott, Robert E. Note on Frederick C.		Ray	1362
Turner, The Dynamic of Mexican Na-		Shoup, Paul. Comparing . Communist	
tionalism	1386	Nations: Prospects for an Empirical	
The Sea in Modern Strategy. L. W. Martin.		Approach	185
Noted by Bernard Brodie	1019	Siegel, Bernard J. and Alan R. Beals.	
Searing, Donald D., Review of Karl W.		Livisiveness and Social Conflict. Noted	
Deutsch, Lewis J. Edinger, Roy C.		by Roger D. Masters	618
Macridis and Richard L. Merritt, France,		Sigel, Roberta S. Image of a President:	0.10
Germany and the Western Alliance; A		Some Insights into the Political Views of	
Study of Elite Attitudes on European		School Children	216
Integration and World Politics	240	Simirenko, Alex, ed. Soviet Sociology: His-	210
Seasholes, Bradbury. Note on Bernard.		torical Antecedents and Current Ap-	
Rubin, Political Television		p-aisals. Noted by Paul Hollander	0.50
Seasholes, Bradbury. Note on Kurt and	1021	Simpson, Smith. Anatomy of the State De-	252
			0.45
Gladys Engel Lang, Politics and Televi-	1907	partment. Noted by L. L. Wade	267
sion	1021	Singer, J. David, Bruce M. Russett and	
Secher, H. P. Review of Joseph Nyomarkay,		Melvin Small. Communication on criti-	
Charisma and Factionalism in the Nazi	700	cisms of their article "National Political	
Party	590	Units in the Twentieth Century: A	
Secher, H. P. Review of Robert O'Neill, The		Standardized List"	955
German Army and the Nazi Party, 1933-	***	Singer, J. David, Bruce M. Russett and	
39	590	Melvin Small. National Political Units in	
Secher, H. P. Review of Saul Friedlander,		the Twentieth Century: A Standardized	
Prelude to Downfall: Hitler and the		List	932
United States, 1939-1941	590	Singh, Baljit. Note on K. R. Bombwall,	
The Second American Party System: Party		The Foundations of Indian Federalism	1008
Formation in the Jacksonian Era. Richard		Siyer, Shaybani. The Islamic Law of Na-	
P. McCormick. Noted by William Nisbet		tions. Noted by Moshe Perlmann	671
	1330	Skidmore, Thomas E. Politics in Brazil,	
Sectional Stress and Party Strength: A		1930-1964. Noted by Jordan M. Young	281
Study of Roll-Call Voting Patterns in the		Slater, Jerome. The OAS and United States	
U.S. House of Representatives, 1836-1860.		Foreign Policy. Noted by Yale H. Fer-	
Thomas B. Alexander. Noted by James J.		guson	308
Best	633	Small, Melvin, Bruce M. Russett and J.	
Senior, Derek, ed. The Regional City: An		David Singer. Communication on criti-	
Anglo-American Discussion of Metro-		cisms of their article "National Political	
politan Planning. Noted by Vincent L.		Units in the Twentieth Century: A	
Marando	619	Standardized List"	955
Seton, Marie. Panditji: A Portrait of		Small, Melvin, Bruce M. Russett and J.	
Jawaharlal Nehru. Noted by Joseph P.		David Singer. National Political Units in	
Harris	651	the Twentieth Century: A Standardized	
Seton-Watson, Hugh. The Russian Empire		List	932
1801-1917. Reviewed by Frederick C.		Smallwood, Frank. Note on Leo F. Schnore	
Barghoorn	1276	and Henry Fagin, Urban Research and	
Shapiro, Michael J. The House and the		Policy Planning	620
Federal Role: A Computer Simulation		Smith, David G. Note on Herbert A.	
of Roll-Call Voting	494	Deane, The Political and Social Ideas of	
Sharkansky, Ira. Agency Requests, Guber-		Si. Augustine	979
natorial Support and Budget Success in		Smith, F. B. The Making of the Second Re-	
	1220	form Bill. Noted by James B. Christoph	1378
Sherrard, Thomas D., ed. Social Welfare		Smith, Maynard. Note on Alexander Pas-	
and Urban Problems. Noted by York		serin d'Entrèves, The Notion of the State:	
	1348	An Introduction to Political Theory	1319
Sherrill, Kenneth S. Note on John H.		Smith, Stephen C. and Allen V. Kneese,	
Bunzel, Anti-Politics in America: the		eds. Water Research. Noted by Ashley L.	
Anti-Political Temper and its Distortions		Schiff	634

.

The Social and Political Thought of Karl Marx. Shlomo Avineri. Noted by David M. Ricci	1309	munism in Transition. Peter H. Juviler and Henry W. Morton, eds. Noted by Carl A. Linden	288
The Social Democratic Movement in Prewar Japan. Totten, George Oakley, III. Noted by Ardath W. Burks	277	Soviet Political Schools: The Communist Party Adult Instruction System. Ellen Propper Mickiewicz. Noted by Joel J.	
The Social Programs of Sweden, A Search for Security in a Free Society. Albert H. Rosenthal. Noted by Arne J. Stokke	1005	Schwartz Soviet Politics Since Krushchev. Alexander Dallin and Thomas B. Larson, eds. Noted	276
The Social Psychology of Organizations. Daniel Katz and Robert L. Kahn. Noted		by William Parente	1385
by Lewis Anthony Dexter		Current Appraisals. Alex Simirenko, ed. Noted by Paul Hollander The Soviet Union in the World Communist	252
Socialist Parties in Postwar Japan. Allan B. Cole, George O. Totten and Cecil H.		System. Vernon V. Aspaturian. Noted by Nish Jamgotch, Jr	690
Uyehara. Noted by Ardath W. Burks Sociological Analysis and Politics: The Theories of Talcott Parsons. William C.	277	Spanier, John W. The Truman-MacArthur Controversy and the Korean war. Noted by Felix Rackow	629
Mitchell. Noted by George R. Boynton Some Reflections on Soviet-American Re-	250	Spaulding, Robert M. Jr. Imperial Japan's Higher Civil Service Examinations.	nec
lations. Merle Fainsod	1093 536	Reviewed by Edwin O. Reischauer Spinelli, Altiero. The Eurocrats. Reviewed by Ronald Inglehart	966 593
Sorenson, Theodore C. Kennedy. Noted by Aida DiPace Donald	260	Spiro, Herbert J. Communication on Kap- lan's review of his book "World Politics:	1960
ert Alford and Harry M. Scoble Southern Africa and the United States. Wil-	1192	The Global System"	1268
liam A. Hance, ed. Noted by Edward Feit	1366	Andrain	284
World Today. Rodger Swearingen, ed. Noted by Jonathan Harris	311	Ideology and Ambition	258
The Soviet Central Committee: An Elite Analysis. Michael P. Gehlen and Michael McBride	1232	System. Noted by Morton A. Kaplan Sprague, John. Note on Douglas W. Rae. The Political Consequences of Electoral	694
Soviet and East European Agriculture. Jerzy F. Karcz, ed. Noted by Roy D. Laird	290	Laws	606
Soviet Elections as a Measure of Dissent: The Missing One Percent. Jerome M. Gilison Soviet Elite Participatory Attitudes in the	814	Warner and Mary L. Hennessy, Public Management at the Bargaining Table Springboard to the White House: Presidential	992
Post-Stakin Period. Milton Lodge Soviet and Russian Newspapers at the Hoover Institution: A Catalog. Karol Maichel, comp. Noted by Fritz T. Ep-	827	Primaries: How They are Fought And Won. James D. Davis. Noted by Douglas W. Rae	. 26 1
Soviet Empire: The Turks of Central Asia and Stalinism. Olaf Caroe. Noted by	660	marer Republik, Festschrift für Heinrich Brüning. Ferdinand A. Hermens, and Theodor Schieder, eds. Noted by Andreas	
Richard F. Rosser	661 689	Dorpalen	665
Soviet Institutions, The Individual and Society. Karel Hulicka and Irene M. Hulicka. Noted by Ellen Michiewicz	658	ernment and Politics. Noted by Carl Beck Steamer, Robert J. Note on Richard S. Randall, Censorship of the Movies: The	289
Soviet Mongolia. A Study of the Oldest Political Satellite. George G. S. Murphy.		Social and Political Control of a Mass Medium	1332
Noted by George Ginsburgs Soviet Policy-Making: Studies of Com-	291	Steck, Henry J. Note on Gerald E. Caiden, The Commonwealth Bureaucracy	1000

Steintrager, James A. Review of J. Roland Pennock and John W. Chapman, eds.,	1000	Systems of Political Science. Oran R. Young. Noted by Eugene J. Meehan	1322
Nomos X: Representation	1289	m : D : M :	
Stevens, Robert and Brian Abel-Smith.		Tanzania: Party Transformation and Econom-	
Lawyers and the Courts: A Sociological		ic Development. Henry Bienen. Noted	050
Study of the English Legal System, 1750-	007	by Paul Saenz	653
1965. Noted by Theodore L. Becker	297	Tarr, David W. Note on R. N. Rosecrance,	
Stevenson, Robert F. Population and Polit-		Defense of the Realm: British Strategy in	1005
ical Systems in Tropical Africa. Noted	1000	the Nuclear Epoch	1395
by Victor A. Olorunsola	1386	Tarrow, Sidney G. Note on John M. Cam-	
Stock, Ernest. Israel on the Road to Sinai.	001	mett, Antonio Gramsci and the Origins	050
1949–1956. Noted by George Kirk	691	of Italian Communism	253
Stokke, Arne J. Note on Albert H. Rosen-		Tarrow, Sidney G. Peasant Communism in	
thal, The Social Programs of Sweden, A	400*	Southern Italy. Reviewed by Norman	* 0.00
Search for Security in a Free Society	1005	Kogan	1282
Stolper, Wolfgang R. Planning Without		Tauber, Kurt P. Note on Benjamin E.	
Facts: Lessons in Resource Allocation from		Lippincott, Democracy's Dilemma: The	
Nigeria's Development. Noted by Alvin		Totalitarian Party in a Free Society	1315
Magid	654	Taylor, Charles Lewis. Note on Eugene N.	
Stone, Jeremy J. Strategic Persuasion: Arms		Anderson and Pauline R. Anderson,	
Limitations through Dialogue. Reviewed		Political Institutions and Social Change in	
by Lawrence S. Kaplan	961	Continental Europe in the Nineteenth	
Stout, Hiram M. Note on Richard A.		Century	1360
Preston, Canada and "Imperial Defense":		Teachers and Politics in France: A Pressure	
A Study of the Origins of the British Com-		Group Study of the Federation de l'Edu-	
monwealth's Defense Organization, 1867-		cation Nationale. James M. Clark. Noted	~==
1919	306	by Bernard E. Brown	275
Strange, John H. Note on John C. Donovan,		The Technological Society. Jacques Ellul.	
The Politics of Poverty	636	Noted by William R. Nelson	603
Strategic Persuasion: Arms Limitations		Teune, Henry. Note on Claude Ake, A	٥=٥
through Dialogue. Jeremy J. Stone. Re-		Theory of Political Integration	978
viewed by Lawrence S. Kaplan	961	Thailand: The War That Is, The War That	
A Stripe of Tammany's Tiger. Louis		Will Be. Louis E. Loman. Noted by	1000
Eisenstein and Elliot Rosenberg. Noted	0.10	Robert O. Tilman	1390
by Theodore J. Lowi	642	Theen, Rolf H. W. Note on Robert E.	
The Structure of Political Conflict in the		MacMaster, Danilevsky, A Russian	050
New States of Tropical Africa. Aristide R.	=0	Totalitarian Philosopher	256
Zolberg	7 0	A Theorem About Voting. Thomas W.	
Studies in Philosophy, Politics and Econom-		Casstevens	205
ics. Friedrich A. Hayek. Reviewed by	000	A Theory of the Calculus of Voting. William	~=
William C. Mitchell	968	H. Riker and Peter C. Ordeshook	25
The Study of Total Societies. Samuel Z.	001	A Theory of Political Integration. Claude	070
Klausner., ed. Noted by C. P. Wolf	601	Ake. Noted by Henry Teune	978
Survey Research in the Social Sciences.		Thoenes, Piet, ed. The Elite in the Welfare	000
Charles Y. Glock, ed. Noted by Betty H.	071	State. Noted by Dwaine Marvick	1003
Zisk	251	Theory and Methods of Social Research.	
Suval, Stanley. Note on Hans Rothfels,		Johan Galtung. Noted by Fred M. Fro-	017
Deutschlands Beziehungen zu Frankreich,		hock	617
Grossbritannien, Belgien sowie deutsche		Thompson, James D. Organizations in	040
Entwaffung Reparationen, Völkerbund und		Action. Reviewed by Todd La Porte	246
internationale Abrüstung, Dezember 1925		Thompson, Kenneth H. Note on Colin A.	
bis Juli 1926 Akten zur deutschen auswarti-	675	Hughes and John Western, The Prime	
gen Politik, 1918–1945. Vol. I	675	Minister's Policy Speech: A Case Study	000
The Swatantra Party and Indian Conserva-		in Televised Politics	999
tism. Howard L. Erdman. Reviewed by Susanne Hoeber Rudolph	1909	Thorp, Robert K., Lewis Donohew and	
Swearingen, Rodger, ed. Soviet and Chinese	1293	Richard W. Budd. Content Analysis of	
Communist Power in the World Today.		Communications. Noted by Ellen B.	607
Noted by Jonathan Harris	311	Pirro Tillmann, Heinz. Deutschlands Araber-	007
ATOVOR DE VOIRGIAM MALES	O X T	AMERICAN, ANDREAS AFORDORES AFORDER	

politik im zweiten Weltkrieg. Noted by		by Felix Rackow	629
Gerhard von Glahn	305	Tucker, Robert W. and Robert E. Osgood.	•
Tilman, Robert O. Note on Georges Fischer,		Force, Order and Justice. Noted by Philip	
et al., Régime Interne et Politique Ex-		Green	1012
térieure Dans les Pays d'Asie	1364	Tufte, Edward R. and Hugh Donald	
Tilman, Robert O. Note on Louis E. Loman,		Forbes. A Note of Caution in Causal	
Thailand: The War That Is, The War		Modelling	1258
That Will Be		Tufte, Edward R. and Hugh Forbes. Com-	
Tinder, Glenn. Note on E. A. Goerner,	•	munication on criticisms of their article	
Peter and Caesar: The Catholic Church and		"A Note of Caution in Causal Modelling"	
Political Authority	610	Tullock, Gordon. A Note on Censorship	1265
Toma, Peter A. The Politics of Food for		Turner, Frederick C. The Dynamic of	
Peace: Executive-Legislative Interaction.	4040	Mexican Nationalism. Noted by Robert	4000
Noted by John M. Richardson, Jr	1340	E. Scott.	1386
Torney, Judith V. and Robert D. Hess.		Turner, John E. and Robert T. Holt. The	
The Development of Political Attitudes in	1010	Political Basis of Economic Development:	
Children. Noted by Lester W. Milbrath	1348	An Exploration in Comparative Political	F00
Tosi, Antonio, Francesco Alberoni, Vittorio		Analysis. Reviewed by Gerald A. Weiner	583
Capecchi, Agopik Manoukian, Franca		The Twentieth Century Mind. Donald At-	~~~
Olivetti. L'Attivista di Partito. Noted by	1050	well Zoll. Noted by J. Paul Johnston	259
Robert D. Putnam	1352	The Two Faces of Co-Existence. Alfred	010
Totten, George O., Cecil H. Uyehara and		Berzins. Noted by W. W. Kulski	312
Allan B. Cole. Socialist Parties in Post-	077	Two Tracts on Government. John Locke.	
war Japan. Noted by Ardath W. Burks	277	Philip Abrams, ed. Noted by Fred H.	014
Totten, George Oakley, III. The Social		Willhoite	614
Democratic Movement in Prewar Japan.	077	Theoretain Mandata Emport W. Lofover	
Noted by Ardath W. Burks	277	Uncertain Mandate, Ernest W. Lefever.	1997
Towards a Pax Africana: A Study of Ide- ology and Ambition. Ali A. Mazrui. Noted		Reviewed by Crawford Young	. 1401
by Herbert J. Spiro	258	The Unfinished Revolution: Russia 1917-1967. Isaac Deutscher. Noted by Donald	
Townsend, James R. Political Participation	400		662
in Communist China. Noted by John E.		D. Barry The United Nations: Peace and Progress.	004
Rue	995	Alf Ross. Reviewed by Lincoln Bloom-	
Trade, Aid and Development: The Rich and	330	field	586
Poor Nations. John Pincus. Reviewed by		United States Policy and the Third World:	000
H. Bradford Westerfield	242	Problems and Analysis. Charles Wolf.	
Trade Liberalization Among Industrial		Reviewed by Arpad von Lazar	243
Countries: Objectives and Alternatives.		The Upper House in Revolutionary America,	~10
Bela Balassa. Noted by David S. Ball	692	1763-1788. Jackson Turner Main. Noted	
Trager, Frank N. Burma from Kingdom to	00-		1331
Republic: A Historical and Political		Urban Political Systems: A Functional	2002
Analysis. Noted by Fred R. von der		Analysis of Metro Toronto. Harold Kap-	
Mehden	1363	lan. Noted by James L. Cox	643
Trager, Helen G. Burma Through Alien		Urban Research and Policy Planning. Leo	
Eyes. Noted by Fred R. von der Mehden	1363	F. Schnore and Henry Fagin. Noted by	
The Transmission of Political Values from		Frank Smallwood	620
Parent to Child. M. Kent Jennings and		Uren, Philip E., and Adam Bromke, eds.	
Richard G. Niemi	169	The Communist States and the West. Noted	
The Trauma of Decolonization: The Dutch		by Jonathan Harris	311
and West New Guinea. Arend Lijphart.		U.S. Policy and the Security of Asia. Fred	
Noted by James C. Scott	314	Greene. Noted by Norman D. Palmer	1400
Trial Courts in Urban Politics: State Court		Uyehara, Cecil H., Allan B. Cole and	
Policy Impact and Functions in a Local		George O. Totten. Socialist Parties in	
Political System. Kenneth M. Dolbeare.		Postwar Japan. Noted by Ardath W.	
Noted by Irvin H. Bromall	983	Burks	277
The Trial of the Germans. Eugene Davidson.			
Noted by Elke Frank	1013	Vali, Ferenc A. The Quest for a United	
The Truman-MacArthur Controversy and		Germany. Noted by James H. Wolfe	674
the Korean War. John W. Spanier. Noted		Vandenbosch, Amry and Mary Belle.	

Australia Faces Southeast Asia: The		Development	243
Emergence of a Foreign Policy. Noted by		von Lazar, Arpad. Review of Charles Wolf,	
	1407	United States Policy and the Third World:	
Vandenbosch, Amry and Richard Butwell.		Problems and Analysis	243
The Changing Face of Southeast Asia.		Voting Turnout in American Cities. Robert	
Noted by Frank C. Darling	313	R. Alford and Eugene C. Lee	796
Vandenbosch, Mary Belle and Amry.		Vroom, Victor H., ed. Methods of Organiza-	
Australia Faces Southeast Asia: The		tional Research. Reviewed by Todd La	
Emergence of a Foreign Policy. Noted by		Porte	246
Henry S. Albinski	1407		
Vatikiotis, P. J. Politics and the Military in		Wade, L. L. Note on Smith Simpson,	
Jordan: A Study of the Arab Legion 1921-		Anatomy of the State Department	267
1957. Noted by Richard H. Dekmejian.	1375	Wagley, Charles. The Latin American Tradi-	
Veliz, Claudio, ed. The Politics of Confor-		ticn. Noted by Carroll Hawkins	1377
mity in Latin America. Noted by Kenneth		Wainhouse, David W. and Associates.	
N. Walker	1011	International Peace Observation: A His-	
Vellut, Jean-Luc and George Modelski.		tory and Forecast. Reviewed by Lincoln P.	
Communication on Russett, et al., "Na-		Bloomfield	586
tional Political Units in the Twentieth		Wainhouse, David W. Note on Oran R.	
Century: A Standardized List"	952	Young, The Intermediaries: Third Parties	
Verba, Sidney. Communication. "If, As		in International Crises	1018
Lipsitz Thinks, Political Science Is To		Waldman, Sidney. Note on Peter Zollinger,	1020
Save Our Souls, God Help Us!"	576	The Political Creature	1318
Veto-Group Politics: The Case of Health-	0.0	Walker, Kenneth N. Note on Claudio Veliz,	
Insurance Reform in West Germany. Wil-		The Politics of Conformity in Latin Amer-	
liam Safran. Noted by Gerhard Loewen-		ica	1011
berg	1357	Wallerstein, Immanuel. Africa: The Poli-	1011
Via, Emory F. Note on Thomas A. Krueger,	1001	tics of Unity. Noted by Victor T. Le Vine	1254
And Promises to Keep: The Southern		Wann, A. J. The President as Chief Admin-	1001
Conference for Human Welfare	260	istrator. Noted by Peter Woll	1220
	269		1990
Vietnam Triangle: Moscow, Peking, Hanoi.		Warlord: Yen Hsi-shan in Shansi Province,	
Donald S. Zagoria. Noted by George G.	200	1911-1949. Donald G. Gillin. Noted by	900
Bauroth	686	Chi Hsi-sheng	292
Vincent, Jack E. National Attributes as		Warner, Kenneth O. and Mary L. Hen-	
Predictors of Delegate Attitudes at the		nessy. Public Management at the Bargain-	000
United Nations	916	ing Table. Noted by Donald P. Sprengel	992
Vinyard, Dale. Note on Donald G. Morgan,		Wainer, Lloyd, et al. The Emergent American	1001
Congress and the Constitution: A Study		Society. Noted by Andrew Hacker	1301
of Responsibility	986	The Warren Court: Constitutional Decision	
Vittachi, Tarzie. The Fall of Sukarno. Noted		as an Instrument of Reform. Archibald	
by William Liddle	670	Cox. Noted by J. Woodford Howard, Jr.	1329
von der Mehden, Fred R., Crawford Young		Warren, Vernon C., Jr. Note on Werner	
and Charles W. Anderson, eds. Issues of		Feld, The European Common Market and	
Political Development. Reviewed by Arpad		the World	1020
von Lazar	243	Water Research. Allen V. Kneese and	
von der Mehden, Fred R. Note on Ba Maw,		Stephen C. Smith, eds. Noted by Ashley	
Breakthrough in Burma: Memoirs of a		L. Schiff	634
Revolution, 1939-1946	1363	Waters, Maurice. Note on David A. Bald-	
von der Mehden, Fred R. Note on Frank		win, Economic Development and American	
N. Trager, Burma from Kingdom to Re-		Foreign Policy 1943-62	1405
public: A Historical and Political Analysis	1363	Waters, Maurice. Note on Henry C. Aub-	
von der Mehden, Fred R. Note on Helen		rey. Atlantic Economic Co-operation. The	
G. Trager, Burma Through Alien Eyes	1363	Case of the O.E.C.D	1405
von Glahn, Gerhard. Note on Heinz Till-		Weatherby, James L., Jr. and Allan G.	
mann, Deutschlands Araberpolitik im	• †	Pulsipher. Malapportionment, Party Com-	
Zweiten Weltkrieg	305	pstition, and the Functional Distribution	
von Lazar, Arpad. Review of Charles W.		of Governmental Expenditures	1207
Anderson, Fred R. von der Mehden, and		Webb, Herschel. The Japanese Imperial	
Crawford Young, eds., Issues of Political		Institution in the Tokugawa Period.	

Noted by Akira Kubata		1960's. Noted by Arthur W. Wright Willbern, York. Note on Thomas D. Sher- rard, ed., Social Welfare and Urban	
Basis of Economic Development: An Exploration in Comparative Political Analysis	583	Problems	1348
Weiner, Myron. Party Building in a New Nation: The Indian National Congress.		ed	614
Reviewed by Avery Leiserson	584	Christian Democratic Parties. Noted by Russell H. Fitzgibbon	279
Skepticism, Reform, and the Judicial Process	1336	Politics in the Fifth Republic. Noted by Henry C. Galant	
Bernd, ed., Mathematical Applications in Political Science, III	1294	Larus, Nuclear Weapons Safety and the Common Defense	
Weiss, Herbert. Political Protest in the Congo. Reviewed by Crawford Young Wenner, Manfred W. Modern Yemen, 1918-	1287	Wilson, Clifton E. Note on George Liska, Imperial America: The International Politics of Primacy	681
1966. Noted by George Kirk	647	Wilson, Robert R. Note on Stephen G. Xydis, Cyprus: Conflict and Resolution, 1954-1958	1399
1910. Noted by Frederick H. Schaps- meier	630	Winham, Gilbert R. Note on Theodore Draper, Abuse of Power	686
Wesson, Robert G. Note on John Leddy Phelan, The Kingdom of Quito in the Seventeenth Century	1006	Winham, Gilbert R. Review of Gideon Rosenbluth, The Canadian Economy and Disarmament	965
Westerfield, H. Bradford. Review of John Pincus, Trade, Aid and Development	242	Winham, Gilbert R. Review of John B. McLin, Canada's Changing Defense	000
Westerfield, H. Bradford. Review of Theodore Geiger, The Conflicted Relationship: The West and the Transformation of Asia,	040	Policy, 1957-1963: The Problems of a Middle Power in Alliance	965
Africa and Latin America	242	The Recruitment of Candidates for the Canadian House of Commons	1242
by Frederick H. Hartmann	239	and Reader. Joseph L. Morrison. Noted by David M. Abshire	991
Case Study in Televised Politics. Noted by Kenneth H. Thompson Whitaker, Arthur P. Note on Jacques Lam-	999	Third World: Problems and Analysis. Reviewed by Arpad von Lazar	243
bert, Latin America: Social Structures and Political Institutions	1373	ed., The Study of Total Societies	601
Who Rules America? B. William Dumhoff. Noted by Andrew Hacker Wight, Martin and Herbert Butterfield,	1301	The Quest for a United Germany Wolfenstein, E. Victor. The Revolutionary Personality: Lenin, Trotsky, Gandhi.	674
eds. Diplomatic Investigations: Essays in the Theory of International Politics. Noted	670	Noted by Arnold A. Rogow Wolfinger, Raymond E. and Fred I. Green-	604
by Don C. Piper	679	stein. The Repeal of Fair Housing in California: An Analysis of Referendum Voting	753
Martin	624	Wolfinger, Raymond E. and John Osgood Field. Communication on criticisms of their article "Political Ethos and the	,
A Yugoslav Philosopher Reconsiders Karl Marx's Writings	613	Structure of City Government"	227
Wiles, Peter, Alexander Balinsky, Abram Bergson and John N. Hazard. Planning and the Market. in the U.S.S.R.: the		President as Chief Administrator Wood, David M. Majority vs. Opposition in the French National Assembly, 1956—	1338

1965: A Guttman Scale Analysis Wood, William A. Electronic Journalism.	88	Young, James S. Note on Roy F. Nichols, The Invention of the American Political	
Noted by David L. Paletz	639	Parties	268
Noted by Thomas Hovet, Jr World Order and Local Disorder: The United	303	Burns, ed., Perspectives of Brazilian History	287
Nations and Internal Conflicts. Linda B. Miller. Reviewed by Lawrence S. Kaplan	961	Young, Jordan M. Note on Thomas E. Skidmore, <i>Politics in Brazil</i> , 1930-1964	281
World Politics: The Global System. Herbert	901	Young, Jordan M. The Brazilian Revolution	201
J. Spiro. Noted by Morton A. Kaplan	694	of 1930 and the Aftermath. Noted by Robert T. Daland	000
Wright, Arthur W. Note on Alexander Balinsky, Abram Bergson, John N.		Young, Oran R. The Intermediaries: Third	282
Hazard, and Peter Wiles, Planning and		Parties in International Crises. Noted by	
the Market in the U.S.S.R.: the 1960's Wright, Theodore P., Jr. Note on Baldev	655	David W. Wainhouse Young, Oran R. Systems of Political Science.	1018
Raj Nayar, Minority Politics in the		Noted by Eugene J. Meehan	1322
Punjab	650	Yarwood, Dean L. Note on Allan Korn-	-
Wright, William E. Note on Eleanor Lan- sing Dulles, Berlin: The Wall is Not For-	•	berg, Canadian Legislative Behavior: A Sindy of the 25th Parliament	997
ever	295	• •	
Wu, Chun-hsi. Dollars, Dependents and Dogma: Overseas Chinese Remittances		Zabih, Sepehr. The Communist Movement in Iran. Noted by Marvin Zonis	645
to Communist China. Noted by Yi-chun		Zaleski, Eugene. Planning Reforms in the	0.20
Chang	1371	Soviet Union, 1962-1966. Noted by	050
Wurzburg, Frederic. Note on Andrew M. Scott, The Functioning of the International		Robert Campbell	656
Political System	1016	Moscow, Peking, Hanoi. Noted by George	ese
Xydis, Stephen G. Cyprus: Conflict and		G. Bauroth	686
Resolution, 1954-1958. Noted by Robert		American Teachers. Noted by Jack Den-	
R. WilsonXydis, Stephen G. Note on Theodore A.	1399	nis	1339
Couloumbis, Greek Political Reaction to		High School Teacher. Noted by Jack	
American and NATO Influences	302	Dennis	1339
The Years of Opportunity: The League of		Zeitlin, Irving M. Marxism: A Re-Examina- tion. Noted by Samuel Hendel	974
Nations, 1920-1926. Byron Dexter. Noted		Zeitlin, Maurice. Revolutionary Politics and	0.7
by Whitney T. Perkins	1014	the Cuban Working Class. Reviewed by	1001
Yost, Charles. The Insecurity of Nations: International Relations in the Twentieth		Richard R. Fagen	1291
Century. Noted by Keith R. Legg	1397	ed., Survey Research in the Social Sciences	251
Young, Alfred F. The Democratic Republi- cans of New York: The Origins, 1763—		Zolberg, Aristide R. The Structure of Poli- tical Conflict in the New States of Tropical	
1797. Reviewed by Manning J. Dauer	594	Africa	70
Young, Crawford, Charles W. Anderson,		Zoll, Donald Atwell. The Twentieth Century	250
and Fred R. von der Mehden, eds. Issues of Political Development. Reviewed by		<i>Mind.</i> Noted by J. Paul Johnston Zollinger, Peter. <i>The Political Creature</i> .	259
Arpad von Lazar	243	Noted by Sidney Waldman	1318
Young, Crawford. Review of Ernest W.	100	Zonis, Marvin. Note on George B. Baldwin,	645
Lefever, Uncertain Mandate Young, Crawford. Review of Herbert Weiss,	1287	Planning and Development in Iran Zonis, Marvin. Note on Sepehr Zabih, The	645
Political Protest in the Congo	1287	Communist Movement in Iran	645

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CONTENTS

Number 1-March, 1968

The "Intensity" Problem and Democratic Theory. Willmoore Kendall and George W. Carey A Theory of the Calculus of Voting. William H. Riker and Peter C. Ordeshook	5 25
On the Fluidity of Judicial Choice. J. Woodford Howard, Jr	43 57
The Structure of Political Conflict in the New States of Tropical Africa. Aristide R. Zolberg Majority vs. Opposition in the French National Assembly, 1956–1965: A Guttman Scale Analysis. David M. Wood	70 88
Communism and Economic Development. Roger W. Berjamin and John H. Kautsky Policy Maps of City Councils and Policy Outcomes: A Developmental Analysis. Heinz Eulau	110
and Robert Eyestone. The Institutionalization of the U.S. House of Representatives. Nelson W. Polsby The Transmission of Political Values from Parent to Child. M. Kent Jennings and Richard G. Niemi.	124 144 169
BIBLIOGRAPHICAL ESSAY Comparing Communist Nations: Prospects for an Empirical Approach. Paul Shoup	185
RESEARCH NOTES A Theorem about Voting. Thomas W. Casstevens.	205
A Measure of the Population Quality of Legislative Apportionment. <i>Henry F. Kaiser</i> . Image of a President: Some Insights into the Political Views of School Children. <i>Roberta S.</i>	208
Sigel	$\frac{216}{227}$
Book Reviews and Notes. James W. Prothro (ed.).	233
Announcements	316
Number 2—June, 1968	
Political Science and the Uses of Functional Analysis. A. James Gregor.	425
Pareto and Pluto-Democracy: The Retreat to Galapagos. S. E. Finer	$\frac{440}{451}$
Measuring the Concentration of Power in Political Systems. Steven J. Brams	461
Russett	476 481
Shapiro	494
Froman, Jr	518
Souls? Lewis Lipsitz	527
Some Thoughts on the Relation of Political Theory to Anthropology. Carl J. Friedrich	536 546 556
Hirsch, and Frederic J. Fleron, Jr	564 576
Book Reviews and Notes. James W. Protho (ed.)	582
Announcements	695
Number 3—September, 1968	
The Repeal of Fair Housing in California: An Analysis of Referendum Voting. Raymond E. Wolfinger and Fred I. Greenstein.	753
Factions and Coalitions in One-Party Japan: An Interpretation Based on the Theory of Games. Michael Leiserson.	770
A Comparative Analysis of State and Federal Judicial B∋havior: The Reapportionment Cases. Edward N. Beiser	788
Voting Turnout in American Cities. Robert R. Alford and Eugene C. Lee	796

Soviet Elections as a Measure of Dissent: The Missing One Percent. Jerome M. Gilison	814
Soviet Elite Participatory Attitudes in the Post-Stalin Period. Milton Lodge	827
Group Influence and the Policy Process in the Soviet Union. Joel J. Schwartz and William R. Keech	840
Political Socialization and the High School Civics Curriculum in the United States. Kenneth P. Langton and M. Kent Jennings	852
Conservatism, Personality and Political Extremism. Robert A. Schoenberger	868
A Salience Dimension of Politics for the Study of Political Culture. Moshe M. Czudnowski Political Development and Socioeconomic Development: The Case of Latin America. Martin C.	878
Needlet	889
Locke's State of Nature: Historical Fact or Moral Fiction? Richard Ashcraft	898
National Attributes as Predictors of Delegate Attitudes at the United Nations. Jack E. Vincent.	916
National Political Units in the Twentieth Century: A Standardized List. Bruce M. Russett, J.	
David Singer, and Melvin Small	932
Communications to the Editor	952
Book Reviews and Notes. Richard F. Fenno (ed.)	957
Announcements	1024
Number 4—December, 1968	
Some Reflections on Soviet-American Relations. Merle Fainsod	1093
A Causal Model of Civil Strife: A Comparative Analysis Using New Indices. Ted Gurr	1104
Duff and John F. McCamant	1125
Protest as a Political Resource. Michael Lipsky	1144
Motivation, Incentive Systems, and the Political Party Organization. M. Margaret Conway and	
Frank B. Feigert	1159
Coalition Politics in North India. Paul R. Brass	1174
Sources of Local Political Involvement. Robert R. Alford and Harry M. Scoble	1192
penditures. Allan G. Pulsipher and James L. Weatherby, Jr	1207
Agency Requests, Gubernatorial Support and Budget Success in State Legislatures. Ira	
Sharkansky.	1220
The Soviet Central Committee: An Elite Analysis. Michael P. Gehlen and Michael McBride	1232
The Recruitment of Candidates for the Canadian House of Commons. Allan Kornberg and Hal H. Winsborough	1242
A Note of Caution in Causal Modelling. Hugh Donald Forbes and Edward R. Tufte	1258
A Note on Censorship. Gordon Tullock	1265
Communications to the Editor.	1268
Book Reviews and Notes. Richard F. Fenno (ed.).	1274
Announcements	1408
Index to Volume LXII. Nancy B. Edgerton and Mary H. Grossman	1410

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
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
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
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
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
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
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
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
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
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